Note: The following is a translation of “Patriarch Gregorios II. von Cypern über das Filioque” by Bernhard Schultze, S.J., published in Orientalia Christiana Periodica (OCP) 51 (1985), pp. 163-187. Pages of the original article are indicated between forward slashes (/*/); references to Aristides Papadakis’s Crisis in Byzantium are to the first edition (New York: Fordham University Press, 1983), not to the second edition published in 1997 by St. Vladimir’s Press. The original edition can be read online at archive.org.

Patriarch Gregory II of Cyprus on the Filioque

Georgos, a native of Cyprus (1241–1290), took the name Gregorios II upon becoming Patriarch of Constantinople. At the time of the Union of Lyons (1274), he was the opponent of John XI Bekkos, whom he succeeded on the patriarchal throne. Under Emperor Michael Palaiologos (1259–1260; 1261–1282), he favored union with the Latins and was a collaborator of John Bekkos. Under Emperor Michael’s successor, Andronikos II (1282–1328), however, he defected to the opponents of the Union and, before being proclaimed the successor to the deposed Bekkos, wrote a treatise against Bekkos in 1283 concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit¹. Bekkos, for his part, was initially opposed to the Latin doctrine of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son, but after thorough patristic studies, he resolutely defended it until his death, enduring many vicissitudes: imprisonment, deposition, and exile².

Gregorios (we’ll just call him Gregory) attempted to offer a mediating, orthodox interpretation of the formula regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit “through the Son” or “from the Father and the Son.” His view is presented—and one might even say hyped—by today’s Orthodox theologians with ever-greater emphasis as both faithful to tradition and creative.

In an interdenominational anthology on the theology of the Holy Spirit³, the Greek Orthodox theologian Markos A. Orphanos bases Orthodox doctrine on the Holy Spirit on four pillars: Photius (9th century), Gregory of Cyprus (13th century), Gregorios Palamas (14th century), and Mark of Ephesus (15th century, during the Council of Ferrara-Florence)⁴. In the same anthology, the Romanian theologian Dumitru Staniloae refers specifically to Palamas and, prior to him, to Gregory of Cyprus⁵. At the international theological congress on pneumatology in Rome in 1982, Staniloae himself reported in detail on the pneumatology of Gregory of Cyprus⁶. The Greek Orthodox Bishop G. Khodr mentions Gregory of Cyprus only in passing and refers to him as a saint⁷.

Under the title, “Crisis in Byzantium: The Filioque Controversy in the Patriarchate of Gregory II of Cyprus (1283–1289)”⁸, the Greek Orthodox historian and theologian Aristeides PAPADAKIS has subsequently presented the first comprehensive study of Gregory in English⁹. For him, too, the main pillars of Orthodox Trinitarian doctrine are Photius, Gregory of Cyprus, and Gregory Palamas¹⁰. Papadakis places Gregory’s life and work within the contemporary political and theological context and discusses the tensions between the Old and the New Rome at the time of the Council of Lyons, as well as the tensions between the emperor and the patriarch in Byzantium and within Greek Orthodoxy at that time. In his study, he focuses on the dogmatic question, convinced that the controversy between East and West is, at its core, fundamentally a matter of faith¹¹. Thus, the account of the events surrounding the Council of Blachernae (1285) is given greater prominence, and the Tomos of this synod—a work by Gregory—is included in an appendix (in English translation)¹².

Among the Catholic theologians who have studied Gregory, two in particular deserve mention: Fr. Martin Jugie, A.A., and Fr. Manuel Candal, S.J. Jugie discusses Gregory in the first and second volumes of his standard work, Theologia Dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium ab Ecclesia catholica dissidentium¹³, and in the study De processione Spiritus Sancti ex fontibus Revelationis et secundum Orientales dissidentes¹⁴; Candal, among other works, in two studies: “Progresso dogmatico nelle definizioni trinitarie del Concilio II di Lione e del Fiorentino”¹⁵ and “¿Nueva interpretación del ‘per Filium’ de los Padres Griegos?”¹⁶. Yves M.-J. Congar, O.P., mentions Gregory of Cyprus only very briefly in his three-volume work Je crois en l’Esprit Saint¹⁷. /165/

Several reasons led Gregory to propose a new solution to the Filioque question. During the theological discussions between East and West and the resulting more in-depth study of the Church Fathers, it had become apparent that Patriarch Photius’s thesis regarding the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father alone was too rigid and did not fully correspond to the teaching of the Fathers, according to which a relationship between the Son and the Spirit must be assumed not only on the economic level of the Spirit’s sending by the Father and the Son, but also on the intratrinitarian level—that is, the Spirit’s existence through the Son.

In his dissertation, Papadakis attempts to prove three basic theses: (1) The Union of Lyons is a false compromise, merely an external juxtaposition of two formulas, the “Filioque” and the “per Filium.” (2) Patriarch Gregory found the true synthesis. (3) The difference between Eastern and Western Trinitarian doctrine reveals a profound divergence in the way the problem of God is viewed and addressed. Let us now examine these three points.

(1) According to Papadakis, Bekkos took a misguided approach toward union¹⁸. What Bekkos attempted was not a resolution of the problem of the two different approaches to the question of God in the East and West, but rather an accommodation between the two¹⁹. For him, the phrase “through the Son” was merely the Greek patristic systematization of the Latin Filioque. Bekkos overvalued this formula and took it literally. Papadakis then sees the same shortcoming in the Union negotiations at Florence: the two formulations were simply adapted to one another and declared not to be contradictory. Therefore, the “capitulation theology of unionism”²⁰ was wrong, and, like the Union of Lyons, “the Florentine Compromise” also failed to provide a theological solution. People were unable to understand the true meaning of “through the Son” in Byzantine thought. In the union councils, attention was paid to what was peripheral, while what was central was ignored²¹.

It is striking that here, objective evidence is supplemented with terms such as “misleading,” “conformity,” “systematization,” “capitulation theology,” and “compromise” in order to show that the Catholic solution remains merely superficial, while there is no attempt whatsoever to acknowledge the opposing view as an internal synthesis. Thus, as far as this first point is concerned, Papadakis limits himself to mere assertions.

(2) Before we can judge the value of Gregory’s synthesis, we should first let him speak for himself, and then let Papadakis have his say.

1) Gregory set forth his Trinitarian thesis on several occasions. His style is convoluted and, in places, difficult to understand. Furthermore, a Latin translation is missing from Migne, Volume 142. A critical edition has /166/ yet to be published. We will examine three of his writings in chronological order: 1. On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, written in 1283 against Bekkos, before Gregory succeeded Bekkos as patriarch²². 2. Expositio Tomi Fidei contra Beccum²³, which is the Tomos of the Council of Blachernae from the year 1285²⁴. 3. The Homologia, the confession of faith in which he defends himself against the accusations of the monk Mark before his opponents prior to his abdication in 1289²⁵.

1. Gregory writes: “Believe that the natural principle (ἀρχὴ φυσική) of the Son and the Spirit (is) from the Father, to be poured out (προχεῖσθαι) and bestowed (χορηγεῖσθαι) and to exist (ὑπάρχειν) as from such a cause, but that the one who proceeds from the Father is from the Son as of the same essence (ὁμοουσίου) and the same nature (ὁμοφυοῦς), as being from that One with whom He is united in terms of being of the same essence, in whom He rests and is founded (ἵδρυται) and takes His dwelling without going forth (ἀνεκφοίτητον τὴν μονὴν ποιεῖται). The Spirit exists from the Son (ὑπάρχει ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ), as Cyril has said, but not because of his being-made-essence (οὐσίωσιν), for this is from the Father alone, but because of the reflection (ἀπόλαμψιν) and the manifestation (φανέφωσιν) of the Spirit, who is united with the Son from the Father and abides in him. For He appears (ἐκφαίνεται) through the Son and shines forth (ἐκλάμπɛι) proceeding from the Father. He exists from the Son (ὑπάρχει ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ), but does so when we conceive of him as the One who has appeared (φανερούμενον), as the One who is given, sent, and breathed in (ἐμφυσώμενον), as coming to renew creation—in this way, as given, he has the Son as his Giver, and, as the One who is poured out, he has the Son as the Pourer, and, as the One who is sent, he has the Son as the Sender; these are things that are always associated with the Holy Spirit”²⁶. Gregory then speaks of all the gifts of the Spirit, of everything the Holy Spirit shares with the Father and the Son, except for being the Father and being the Son. He then continues: “But do not say that, because he—as is said—exists from the Son (ὑπάρχει ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ), therefore also he derives his existence from the Son (τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἔχει): for the words do not always carry the same meaning (δύναμιν)”²⁷. Gregory then refers to a general remark by Maximus the Confessor²⁸.

2. In the Tomos of the Council of Blachernae against Bekkos from the year 1285, Gregory cites, under No. 3, a text by St. John of Damascus that is fundamental to his hypothesis. This likely refers to the sentence from De Fide Orthodoxa 12b: “that the Father, through the Son, is the source of the revealing Spirit /167/ (ὅτι προβολεύς ἐστιν τοῦ ἐκφαντορικοῦ πνεύματος ὁ Πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ)”²⁹. According to Gregory, this refers to the revelation (φανέρωσις) of the Spirit through the Son—(the Spirit) who derives his existence (τὴν ὕπαρξιν) from the Father. Indeed, the Damascene states in the same chapter that the Father alone is the cause (μόνον αἴτιος)³⁰ within the Trinity. Opponents, however, claim that the Holy Spirit derives His existence from the Father through the Son and from the Son, whereas for John of Damascus it is merely a shining forth (ἔκλαμψις) and a revelation (φανέρωσις) (of the Spirit through the Son)³¹. Gregory continues: “For through the Son—and this is undisputed—the Paraclete shines forth eternally, just as light shines from the sun through its rays. But it (the Damascene’s statement) also signifies the bestowal, the gift, and the sending to us. But it does not also mean that He (the Spirit) exists (ὑφίσταται) through the Son and from the Son, and that He receives His being (εἶναι) through Him and from Him; otherwise he would indeed also have the Son as his cause and principle (αἴτιον καὶ ἀρχήν), just as he has the Father—not to say, the Son more than the Father. For it is said that “that from which every thing derives its existence is, to boot (πλουταῖν), also regarded as the principle (ἀρχή) and cause (αἴτιον) of being”³². Like the other sections of the Tomos, No. 4 also concludes with the words: “Whoever asserts such a thing, we separate from the orthodox community”³³. In this section, Gregory cites the Damascene in support of his theory; in the passage cited, the Damascene explicitly discusses “through the Son”³⁴. The same work by the Damascene also contains the comparison with the sun, the ray, and the light³⁵.

From No. 9 of the same volume: The opponents claim that, just as in creation the Father is indeed the first cause (προκαταρκτικὴ αἰτία), but the Son must not be separated from him in this regard—one must not deprive him of his status as Creator and Cause—so too in theology (meaning the doctrine of the Trinity): “Even if it is said that the Father is the first cause (ἀρχικὸν αἴτιον) of the Son and the Spirit, /168/ and that He is the cause of the Spirit through the Son, the Son would not be separated from the Father at the outpouring (προόδῳ) of the Spirit”³⁶. “But they say this and absurdly link the Son to the Spirit’s being the cause. For even if the Son is the creator of the things that have come into being through him, just as the Father is, he is not thereby also the cause of the Spirit, because the Father is the producer (προβολεύς) of the Spirit through him; nor, conversely, is the Father now also the cause (αἴτιος) of the Spirit through the Son, simply because the Father is the bringer forth (προβολεύς) of the Spirit through the very same Son. For the expression ‘through the Son’ here denotes the process of coming into being (πρόοδον εἰς ἔκφανσιν) [probably: coming into manifestation] and of shining forth (ἔκλαμψιν), not that of existence.”³⁷ According to Gregory, the Father alone and of himself is the cause of the Spirit, not through the Son³⁸.

3. In the creed of 1289, Gregory reaffirms his view: The question is whether the phrase “through the Son” (ἡ διὰ Υἱοῦ λέξις) signifies the procession (πρόοδον) of the Spirit—who has his existence from the Father—toward eternal radiance (εἰς ἀΐδιον ἔκλαμψιν), but not simply the procession toward being (τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι καθαρῶς)³⁹. In response to Bekkos, who argues that “δι’ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα” means the same as “ὕπαρξιν δι’ Υἱοῦ,” Gregory writes: “But we do not think this way at all; rather, we know that it sometimes refers to His eternal manifestation (ἔκφανσιν) and radiance (ἔκλαμψιν) and His revelation (φανέρωσιν) before⁴⁰ the saints (παρὰ τοῖς ἁγίοις), but at other times it signifies the bestowal, the sending, and the gift for us”⁴¹. “What does the Tomos say? Regarding the expression (ῥήσει) that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, the phrase “through the Son” here does not, as Bekkos says, signify the existence (ὕπαρξιν) of the All-Holy Spirit—since it does not signify this elsewhere either— for the Holy Spirit’s existence does not come from any other source than the Father, from whom He also proceeds, nor does it denote the bestowal, sending, and gift—even if it means this elsewhere—but rather His eternal manifestation through the Son (τὴν διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ αΐδιον ἔκφανσιν), which coincides and is conceived together (συντρέχουσαν καὶ συνεπινοούμενον) with his proceeding (προόδῳ) from the Father into being (εἰς τὸ εἶναι)”⁴².

Gregory then emphasizes the difference between his ideas and those of Mark⁴³. /169/ Mark had, in fact, interjected: Either the phrase “through the Son” means that the Spirit does not proceed directly from the Father, or one must add further explanations (παραγράφεσθαι) to clarify this expression of the Father⁴⁴.

What follows⁴⁵ is translated verbatim into Latin by Jugie⁴⁶. Gregory replies: “We say that the Spirit exists immediately from the Father and through the Son (Ἡμεῖς φαμεν καὶ ἀμέσως ὑπάρχειν τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Πατρòς καi διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ). We do not, as our opponents claim, nullify the ‘through the Son’ when we say ‘immediately,’ nor do we deny the ‘immediately’ when we confess the ‘through the Son’—for we affirm (δογματίζομεν) because the Spirit derives His existence according to the hypostasis (τὴν καθ ̓ ὑπόστασιν ὕπαρξιν)—and indeed, His very being—from the Father, and not from the Son, nor through the Son. For otherwise the Son would indisputably be the cause (ἂν αἴτιος ὑπῆρχεν) of the Spirit, which is neither pious nor has any of the saints ever said this or written it. But when we say ‘through the Son,’ we mean that the Spirit (is), and that (thereby) our confession of ‘immediately’ is not violated, since He, proceeding (ἐκπορευὀμενον) and separating (ἀφιστάμενον) from the Father—from whom the Son is also begotten—passes (προέρχεται) and shines forth (ἐκλάμπει) through the Son, while, incidentally, deriving His perfect being from the Father alone”⁴⁷.

As in what was said above⁴⁸, the explanation here is also illustrated by the example of the sun, a ray, and light: “In this way, as is said, light comes from the sun through the ray; while the sun, as its source (πηγή) and cause (αἰτία) of being, serves as its natural principle (ἀρχὴν φυσικήν), the light nonetheless passes through (διϊόν), emerges (προϊόν), and shines forth (ἐκλάμπον) through the ray, from which the light derives neither its existence (ὕπαρξις) nor its ‘becoming a being’ (οὐσίωσις). But it comes from it⁴⁹, as has been said; yet it by no means has it as the principle (ἀρχήν) of being through it or from it, but (comes) purely (καθαρῶς) and directly from the sun, from which the ray itself also originates, through which the light appears as it emerges (τὸ φῶς φαίνεται προϊόν)”⁵⁰.

2) Papadakis on Gregory’s Attempt at a Solution.

Although the formula that the Holy Spirit proceeds “through the Son” is rarely found among some of the Fathers—indeed, Papadakis claims, citing Meyendorff, that Gregory of Nazianzus does not mention it even once⁵¹—it is particularly emphasized /170/ by St. John of Damascus and must not be disregarded. Like Photius, Gregory also sees in the Father the sole cause (αἰτία), the sole principle of the person and existence of the Holy Spirit. And yet he admits that not all of the Fathers’ expressions can be reduced to Photius’s exclusive schema. Gregory seeks a middle ground between the eternal proceeding of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone and the temporal sending of the Spirit by the Father and the Son. In his view, between the eternal intra-Trinitarian level and the temporal economic level lies the intra-Trinitarian level of an eternal manifestation or illumination of the Holy Spirit through the Son⁵².

According to Papadakis, Gregory’s strength did not lie in refuting Bekkos or in supporting Unionism, but rather in the fact that he found the true solution to the problem in the writings of the Fathers⁵³. Papadakis seeks to show that Gregory’s attempt at a solution is consistent with the teaching of the Cappadocian Fathers and, more broadly, with the Orthodox Byzantine tradition. He sees one of the most fruitful and creative aspects of Gregory’s teaching in the insight that the formula “through the Son” expresses the eternal manifestation or illumination of the Holy Spirit through the Son. The significance of this explanation lies in its openness to the Filioque, insofar as this appears in the Roman formula “ab utroque”⁵⁴.

Papadakis writes: “The timeless manifestation of the Spirit was, like the Filioque, an eternal action and included the participation of the Son. In fact, one could say that the Holy Spirit proceeds ex Patre Filioque as illumination or energy. It is true that the Son and the Spirit have a single relationship to the Father, insofar as one is begotten and the other is projected. Likewise, they also have a relationship of reciprocity between themselves”⁵⁵.

He adds: “In terms of causality, we are dealing with the forward movement of the Spirit—from the Father—toward existence; in terms of the intratrinitarian relationship between the Spirit and the Son, we are dealing with the forward progress of the Spirit—from the Son—toward manifestation. Manifestation, however, is not an expression of consubstantiality—of essential identity—between the Son and the Spirit. For it would then be possible to have a manifestation of the Spirit from the Father, of the Son from the Spirit and the Father, and of the Father from the Spirit and the Son. On /171/ the contrary, it is an expression of a personal relationship, an indissoluble bond between the Son and the Spirit, whereby the Spirit returns to the Father through the Son as soon as he has been revealed through him. This manifestation cannot be denied. To do so would deny the Spirit a personal and, in fact, eternal relationship”⁵⁶.

Papadakis then attempts to explain the merits of the solution proposed by Gregory. He argues that Gregory complemented Photius’s doctrine of “a Patre solo” by acknowledging not only an economic but also an intratrinitarian dimension of the Filioque. He speaks of the remarkable balance in Gregory’s formula, noting that Gregory provided an Orthodox interpretation of the Roman formulation. Gregory should no longer be viewed merely in the shadow of Bekkos⁵⁷.

Papadakis emphasizes that Gregory’s teaching on the Filioque received conciliar approval, not only at the Council of Blachernae but also in the following century through the Palamite councils. He sees the Palamite synthesis as having been prepared⁵⁸ by Gregory: “The fundamental point of this idea—the distinction between essence and energy—is nothing other than the ‘working principle’ of Palamas’s own theology.” The formal ratification of this theological antinomy as a dogma of the Byzantine Church by the Palamite councils of 1341, 1347, and 1351 was, so to speak, foreshadowed by the confirmation of the Tomos at the Council of 1285”⁵⁹.

Papadakis notes that all Orthodox authors who have written about Palamas—he mentions Lossky, Krivosheine, Papamichael, Meyendorff, Christou—agree that Gregory gave legitimate expression to the Orthodox tradition⁶⁰, whereas, on the other hand, the Western authors who studied Gregory and Palamas—Jugie, Cayré, Grumel, Laurent, Candal—regarded both as revolutionary innovators⁶¹. There is “one and the same tradition… at various points among the Orthodox, from St. Photius to Gregory of Cyprus and St. Gregory Palamas”⁶². Papadakis believes that Orthodox scholarship can present reasons to show that Gregory had, in a prescient manner, refuted Palamas’s opponents in the person of Bekkos. He therefore /172/ repeatedly emphasizes that both Gregory’s and Palamas’s ideas were endorsed by council decrees⁶³.

Our Assessment of Gregory’s Attempt at a Trinitarian Solution.

Gregory’s theory can be summarized in the following assertions: 1. that the Holy Spirit does indeed exist (ὑπάρχει) from the Son, but does not derive His existence (τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχει) from the Son; 2. that the Holy Spirit derives His existence from the Father alone, but exists as revealed by the Father through the Son or as appearing from the Son; 3. that the Spirit exists directly from the Father and at the same time appears indirectly through the Son.

Numerous objections can be raised regarding both Papadakis’s and Gregory’s portrayals.

For Papadakis, Gregory’s patriarchate is comparable in importance to the patriarchates of Photius and Cerularius. He calls it a milestone in late Byzantine theology⁶⁴. In his view, Catholic authors exaggerate the significance of Patriarch Bekkos, his tolerance, theological competence, exceptional personality, and martyrdom⁶⁵. His image, he argues, needs to be redefined⁶⁶. In Papadakis’s view, however, the scales tip against Bekkos and tilt considerably in favor of Patriarch Gregory. Papadakis praises Gregory for his conceptual clarity, which was lacking in the past⁶⁷. This judgment sounds paradoxical. For, on the one hand, the very basic idea of a convergence of an eternal proceeding of the Spirit, according to existence, from the Father alone with his eternal proceeding, according to revelation, through the Son is logically, but above all metaphysically, unclear and contradictory. Papadakis speaks euphemistically here of a “theological antinomy”⁶⁸. On the other hand, we acknowledge that Gregory’s distinction between the eternal intra-Trinitarian level of the Holy Spirit’s proceeding, the eternal intra-Trinitarian level of a revelation of the Holy Spirit, and the temporal, economic level of the mission is, from a purely systematic perspective, a proposal to clarify the issue—although the question of the theological and metaphysical feasibility of these distinctions remains open.

The author is aware that he is often unable to offer definitive conclusions⁶⁹. Like the majority of Orthodox Christians, he believes that the addition of the Filioque to the Creed is not only unlawful but also theologically /173/ unacceptable. He considers it the cause of the schism between East and West⁷⁰.

The author’s assessment of the significance of the phrase “through the Son” in Greek patristic and Byzantine thought would need to be revised in several respects. In fact, it occurs quite rarely among some of the Church Fathers, such as Epiphanius; indeed, as Papadakis himself asserts, citing Meyendorff, it does not appear even once in the works of Gregory the Theologian—which, however, is incorrect⁷¹. Among other Fathers, especially John of Damascus, it appears frequently and is emphasized. Note that Theodoret rejects both “from the Son” and “through the Son”⁷², whereas “through the Son” is found at the Second Council of Nicaea (787)⁷³. It is telling that, in Byzantium in 1285, agreement could not be reached on the “διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ” based on the teaching of John of Damascus, just as it could not be reached during the union negotiations between the Orthodox, Old Catholics, and Anglicans in Bonn after the Catholic Church had proclaimed the infallibility of the pope in matters of faith. The deeper reason lies in the fact that, for John of Damascus—even though he denies “from the Son”—the phrase “through the Son” for him not only lies on the eternal intratrinitarian level but also, within that level, implies a causal relationship of origin between the Son and the Spirit, thus effectively leading back to the Filioque.

When Papadakis speaks of the “radical immediacy of the hypostatic attributes or characteristics of the Trinity” and credits Gregory with praising this insistence⁷⁴, he tacitly assumes that, according to Greek patristics, the active proceeding of the Spirit is a hypostatic attribute—a claim that cannot be proven. With regard to the Holy Spirit, only the “spiratio passiva”—as the Latins would later say—and not the “spiratio activa” is a personal characteristic.

/174/ Papadakis sees in Gregory an openness toward the Filioque, as expressed in the Roman formula “ab utroque,” because, like the Filioque, the “timeless manifestation” of the Spirit is also an eternal action. Indeed, one could say of the Holy Spirit as illumination or energy that it proceeds “ex Patre Filioque”⁷⁵. From this perspective, the Son and the Spirit each have a single relationship to the Father and, moreover, a relationship to one another. Indeed, Gregory does show a willingness to accommodate Roman doctrine, but only in a very imperfect and inadequate way. Gregory rightly concludes that the Son and the Spirit must also have a direct intratrinitarian relationship with one another. Yet this still denies that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son in terms of being and essence. And it follows from Gregory’s theory that, within the immanent Trinity, while the Father has a relationship to the Son and to the Spirit that is causal in terms of being and essence, the relationship from the Son to the Spirit or from the Spirit to the Son is not causal in terms of being. Added to this is the surprising thesis that, unlike in God’s relationship to creatures, what is conceived as divine energy common to all three Persons—namely, illumination—is postulated here as a divine energy that proceeds only from two divine Persons. Papadakis writes: “Indeed, the Holy Spirit as illumination, or energy, could be said to proceed ex Patre Filioque”⁷⁶. Can such a thesis be proven from tradition and Scripture? And is the hypothesis of a divine energy that is said to proceed only from two divine Persons compatible with the theses of Palamism, which emerged in the following century? Papadakis and contemporary followers of Gregory—as well as Jugie⁷⁷, for that matter—assume that Gregory somehow anticipated Palamism.

Regarding this hypothesis of a divine energy said to emanate from only two persons, it could be said that the Holy Spirit could be included as a third person, insofar as he himself emanates (medially) in illumination. We have found a similar theory in Maksim Grek, who conceives of the communication of the Holy Spirit as an autonomous, self-determined coming or descent of the Spirit with the consent or approval of the Father and the Son⁷⁸.

When Papadakis speaks of a movement of the Holy Spirit—a twofold progression of the Holy Spirit, from the Father to existence and from the Son to manifestation—and then of a return of the Spirit to the Father through the Son, it remains questionable whether he can draw upon Scripture and the tradition of the Church Fathers to support this view.

In his Third Theological Oration (Oration 29.2–3), Gregory of Nazianzus speaks of a movement within the Trinity, though in a quite different sense. He seeks to explain the divine monarchy, but by this he does not mean the monarchy of the /175/ Father, but rather that of all three Persons, who share the same nature, are of one mind in their decision and in the identity of their movement—in the power, efficacy, or activity common to all three Persons—and in their consent to the One (the Father) on the part of those who are from him⁷⁹. Gregory then continues: “Therefore, the unity (μονάς) moves originally (ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς) toward duality (εἰς δυάδα) and comes to rest at the Trinity (μέχρι Τριάδος ἔστη). And for us, this is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: on the one hand, the Begetter (γεννήτωρ) and the Bringer Forth (προβολεύς)—though I understand this to be intact, timeless, and incorporeal—while of the other two, one is the Begotten (γέννημα) and the other the Brought Forth (πρόβλημα); or I do not know how one might call this, if one were to disregard visible things entirely”⁸⁰.

Gregor’s attempt at a solution still faces fundamental difficulties: 1. the distinction between the expressions “to have existence” and “to exist”; 2. the convergence and integration of two eternal orders, causality and revelation; 3. the assertion that the Spirit exists directly from the Father and is simultaneously manifested through the Son; 4. the hypothesis of non-holistic, accidental relationships within the immanent Trinity; 5. the question of the “who” of the postulated intra-divine revelation; 6. in addition, Papadakis posits a circular movement within the immanent Trinity.

Our assessment in more detail:

If one is not content with mere words, one cannot see what the difference is supposed to be between expressions such as “to have existence” and “to exist” of the Spirit from the Son or through the Son. Even on the postulated intratrinitarian level of illumination or revelation, the words “from” or “through”—implying a source or a causal relationship—are used, even if a specific verb is omitted or merely implied. In the eternal, purely spiritual God, this cannot signify anything spatial or temporal. The example of the sun, the ray, and the light cited by Gregory is only helpful at first glance. For, first, an example borrowed from the material world is highly questionable when applied to the super-spiritual mystery of the Trinity⁸¹, and second, the very explanation given by Gregory—that the ray does not cause the light—can be disputed. One must surely say—according to both ancient and modern physics—that the sun and the ray together produce the light, /176/ that they are the cause of the light, just as the Father and the Son are the cause of the Spirit.

In fact, Catholic theologians such as Jugie and Candal see a fundamental contradiction in Gregory’s conception⁸². On the one hand, Gregory views the Father’s relationship to the Son and to the Spirit on the intratrinitarian level as holistic: the Father communicates his entire subsistence/substance and existence to the Son and the Spirit. This communication is causal. The Father is the cause of the divine Person of both the Son and the Holy Spirit. On the other hand, Gregory sees within the intratrinitarian level a relationship of dependence that is neither existential nor causal and is not holistic; it is limited to a shining forth, a manifestation, to the exclusion of any transfer of existence or being from the Father through the Son or from the Son. From this perspective, the Holy Spirit does not depend on the Father and the Son in his existence, but only in his appearance, his radiance, or his manifestation. To put it another way: In the eternal intratrinitarian level of revelation postulated by Gregory, not the entire substance—or not the entire substance together with the divine radiance—is communicated from the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit, but only the divine radiance, appearance, or revelation. While, according to the Catholic view, there is a holistic, existential causal relationship between the Father and the Son, the Father and the Spirit, and the Son and the Spirit, according to Gregory such a relationship is lacking only between the Son and the Spirit. And this relationship—viewed from a Trinitarian perspective—between the Father and the Son on the one hand and the Spirit on the other is, as mentioned, not, according to Gregory, substantial, existential, or holistic, but limited to a radiance, to a reflection; it appears to be an accidental, limited aspect. But is such a distinction possible in the absolutely simple God? Is this not a transposition from the material world into that of the pure Spirit?

Meyendorff seeks to explain the difference between “ὕπαρξιν ἔχειν” and “ὑπάρχειν” by drawing on the approximate distinction between the ideas of “cause” and “raison d’être” in French, but he does not specify which of the two corresponds to which Greek term⁸³. Incidentally, such a distinction between “cause” and “raison d’être” is of little help, since in intra-Trinitarian relationships of interdependence, cause and raison d’être coincide; this is because intra-Trinitarian relationships, due to God’s absolute simplicity and fullness, always encompass the entirety of God’s reality.

/177/ What is particularly troubling, then, is that Gregory posits relationships within the Trinity that are not holistic—that do not encompass the persons’ entire existence. Curiously, such a conception stands in contrast to a consideration by St. Basil, which he advanced against Eunomius. He writes: “But suppose”—in the context, he affirms that we (naturally) cannot know the nature or essence of God—“ “that, because the divine nature is simple and not composite, the essence goes hand in hand with the power (σύνδρομον τίθεται), and that, because of the goodness inherent in God, it is said that the Father’s entire power is moved to beget the Son, and in turn the entire (power) of the Only-Begotten is directed toward the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, so that from that of the Spirit one sees the power of the Only-Begotten, but at the same time also the essence, and in turn from that of the Only-Begotten one sees the power and the essence of the Father—then see what follows from this! The proofs with which he sought to demonstrate the dissimilarity (τὸ ἀνόμοιον) of essence actually showed that he was establishing their similarity (τὴν ὁμοιότητα). For if power has nothing in common with essence, how was he (man) then led to comprehend the creatures, which are precisely the effects of power? But if essence and power are one and the same, then what characterizes power will certainly also be a characteristic of essence. Thus, as you (Eunomius) say, creatures do not lead to the dissimilarity of essence, but precisely to its similarity”⁸⁴.

That Gregory’s distinction involves a transfer from one order—the economic—to another—the intratrinitarian—is confirmed when we seek to answer the question posed emphatically by Candal, following Meyendorff: “To whom is this manifestation or revelation made in eternity, before the creation of the world?”⁸⁵. Who can receive this manifestation? Meyendorff answers: “Neither the ancient Greek Fathers nor Gregory of Cyprus provide an answer to this question. One must seek it in another Byzantine theologian, who is none other than the Archbishop of Thessaloniki, St. Gregory Palamas”⁸⁶. Meyendorff then cites a text by Gregory Palamas that, while speaking of love and joy in the intra-Trinitarian life, does not explicitly mention manifestation or illumination⁸⁷. This text states that the Spirit is the love of the Father for the Son and of the Son for the Father, “but insofar as they proceed together from the Father and insofar as this love rests consubstantially upon Him… Thus, the Spirit is the eternal joy of the Father and the Son, in which they find pleasure in one another. This /178/ joy is sent by both to those who are worthy of it…, but proceeds from the Father alone into existence”⁸⁸.

However, it is not true—as Meyendorff and Candal claim—that Gregory offers no answer to the question of “who.” In his creed, when explaining “through the Son,” he distinguishes precisely between two levels: first, an eternal appearance, illumination, or eternal manifestation/revelation; second, an economical bestowal, sending, or gift; and he adds to the former: “(revelation) before the saints”⁸⁹. Palamas, too, in the text just cited—which Candal quotes at greater length—explicitly speaks only of a revelation to those who are worthy, that is, to human beings. Thus, the eternal intratrinitarian level of manifestation is, after all, also economic; and the distinction between the two levels—which is characteristic of Gregory—is blurred by Gregory himself in the passage cited, as well as by Meyendorff in his interpretation of a text by Palamas that he considers prophetic.

It seems to me that the reason for such a regression from the eternal intratrinitarian level to the economic level lies in the fact that there is no third level between the eternal intratrinitarian level of causal origins and the economic level of mission into time, and that this third level remains incomprehensible to theological thought.

From a Catholic perspective, Gregory’s attempt appears to be merely another effort to make concessions based largely on the data from Scripture and tradition—except, crucially, on the essential points regarding the Holy Spirit’s existential-causal dependence on the Son, which is at the heart of the Filioque doctrine. Before Gregory presented his original hypothesis, he had made various other futile attempts to circumvent the actual Filioque. There were several such attempts at that time⁹⁰.

(3) Profound Differences Between East and West?

Is there a profound difference between East and West in how they view the problem of God and the Trinity? First, let us hear from Papadakis; then we will respond to his arguments.

1) Papadakis emphatically attributes the difference between East and West in the doctrine of the Filioque to a profound difference in the way theology is practiced. Writing about the different approaches to God in Augustine and the Greek Fathers, he states: “The focus of the Council of 1285 was exclusively Trinitarian and dealt with two main approaches to the Trinity—the Augustinian and the Cappadocian—which had developed in the East and West over the course of the Middle Ages. It suffices to point out that the Byzantines were obliged to defend their own biblical and Cappadocian approach to the Trinity, having been challenged in the wake of the Council of Lyon by the doctrine of the eternal personal proceeding of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son /179/ as from a single principle”⁹¹. Papadakis then quotes Meyendorff: “The East refused to identify God’s being with the concept of a ‘simple essence,’ while the West allowed this identification on the basis of Greek philosophical presuppositions”⁹². Papadakis concurs with J. Pelikan: “Certainly, the two approaches involved not only what might be called ‘theological method,’ but also fundamental differences in the doctrine of God Himself”⁹³.

According to Eastern tradition, God’s personal revelation in Scripture is the starting point for all Trinitarian theology, including both the Cappadocian and the Byzantine traditions. “God can be reduced neither to unity nor to the single, shared essence of philosophical speculation”⁹⁴.

“In contrast, a very different line of development can be observed in the West”⁹⁵: “Instead of beginning with the three hypostases—the personal distinction within God—and then moving on to the consideration of the one essence, the West first considers the one essence and then arrives at the three hypostases. Latin theology is thus inclined to consider nature first and then move on to the agent. While the Cappadocians experienced God as three Persons before encountering Him as the one God, the Latins experienced Him as one God before encountering Him as three Persons. This is, in fact, the approach of Augustine, whose De Trinitate, written in 414, was subsequently widely adopted by nearly every Latin writer in the West”⁹⁶. This was the case with the Carolingian theologians and later with Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas. Augustine’s terminology likely underlies the definition of the Council of Lyons⁹⁷.

Significantly, Papadakis continues: “Certainly, both approaches were legitimate insofar as neither attributed any priority—whether to the one Being or to the three Persons”⁹⁸. To do either would be to deny the Trinitarian personalistic experience as the ultimate revelation of the nature of God⁹⁹.

Papadakis seeks to ground his theory of the radical contrast between Eastern and Western Trinitarian doctrine in the teachings of the Cappadocians. A key element of this is their theory of the relationships among the three Persons and the principle of causality that this entails. “This is the key to understanding why /180/ Byzantine theology subsequently rejected the Filioque clause”¹⁰⁰. “The teaching of the Cappadocians maintains that the origin of the Persons in the Godhead is not the common essence, but the hypostasis of the Father, the sole cause and (the sole) principle of the unity of both the Son and the Spirit”¹⁰¹. Here Papadakis mentions a famous text by Gregory of Nyssa (Ad Ablabium), which was also the subject of debate at Blachernae. Papadakis sees in it a veiled form of dangerous subordinatianism, because Gregory of Nyssa says that in God, of those (the Son and the Spirit) who are of one cause, one proceeds immediately from the First, and the other through that which proceeds immediately from the First¹⁰².

“In contrast (to this), the West acknowledges the causal dependence of the Son and the Spirit on the Father within the one shared essence. The focus is no longer on the hypostasis of the Father, as ἄναρχος ἀρχή, (as) the origin of the Persons in the Trinity, but on the shared essence; the result is that the Persons within this one essence are defined in terms of their mutual relationships. Thus, when we speak of God, we do so in reference to His essence, but when we speak of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (whether in the act of begetting or of sending), we speak ‘relatively’ of His relationships. In particular, there is a shift in emphasis (for which Augustine is responsible) toward a philosophically conceived unity and essence of God, whereby the three Persons have lost their distinctiveness by being transformed into mere relationships. From this perspective, not only has the essence taken on a logical priority over the person of the Father, but the Trinitarian concept of God (in which the Father—in accordance with his hypostasis—is the principle of unity and the sole cause of the Son and the Spirit) becomes “meaningless and incomprehensible”¹⁰³. “The personal God of revelation has become a philosophically impersonal being”¹⁰⁴.

Papadakis continues and reiterates what he has said: “It is, of course, not difficult to see how this emphasis leads directly to the Filioque. For the creative role within the Godhead is necessarily attributed to the one essence shared by the Father and the Son, but not to the hypostasis of the Father. As such, it is said that the Holy Spirit is proceeded from by both the Father and the Son. The Byzantine Church’s firm opposition to this doctrine /181/ is entirely understandable. For either one is forced to destroy unity by recognizing two principles of the Godhead, or one must ground unity primarily in the common nature, which thus overshadows the Persons and transforms them into relationships within the unity of the essence”¹⁰⁵. The difference between this essentialist perspective, on the one hand, and the personalist orientation, on the other, is evident. It suffices to point out that this formed the starting point of the debate of 1285”¹⁰⁶.

2) It cannot be denied that there are significant differences in theology between the East and the West. (One need only consider the work of G. PODSKALSKY, Theology and Philosophy in Byzantium¹⁰⁷, which Papadakis does not cite.) Nor do we deny that there are differences between the Cappadocians and Augustine in the way they approach the problem of God. The question is simply what these differences consist of, whether they are substantial, and whether Papadakis has stated them accurately. Citing Meyendorff¹⁰⁸, Papadakis defines the difference by noting that, in contrast to the West, the East did not identify God’s being with the concept of a “simple being.” Two things are unclear here: What is meant by identifying God’s being (ontological order) with a concept (logical order)? And why does Papadakis, following Meyendorff, place “simple being” in quotation marks? In reality, the Christian West does not at all identify God’s being with an abstract concept, that of a simple being. However, the West does emphasize that God is simple, absolutely simple; and in this regard, the West is in complete agreement with the East. For Palamas, too, God is simple, the Simplest, indeed “simplicity”¹⁰⁹. The only question is whether—apart from the relations of Father, Son, and Spirit known from revelation—real distinctions in the sense of the Palamite energies or Gregory’s manifestation are compatible with this absolute simplicity of God. However, there is also some truth in the assertion by both authors that the West permitted such an identification based on Greek philosophical presuppositions. One such Greek philosophical premise is, among others, that the Law of Non-Contradiction /182/ is considered to be grounded in God as eternal truth, and that—if I do not wish to contradict myself—I cannot, on the one hand, assert that God is absolutely simple, while, on the other hand, positing real distinctions. Therefore, if God—in accordance with revelation—is absolutely simple in His essence or essentially, and threefold in His persons, the differences between the persons cannot be absolute, but only relative. Another example is the one mentioned above: If God is the absolutely perfect substance, the absolutely perfect simple being, then it is difficult—or even impossible—to understand a real distinction between substantial subsistence and an accidental manifestation or appearance. Such a manifestation or self-revelation is, in fact, conceived by Gregory as a distinct, limited aspect of the absolute fullness of divine being.

We agree with Papadakis when he¹¹⁰ speaks of two paths of theological method and objective theological doctrine. However, we strongly dispute the claim that one path is Eastern and the other Western. It can be shown that the approach characterized by Papadakis as “Western” has also been and continues to be followed by representatives of the East; that, beginning with Greek patristics and continuing through the centuries to the present day, there is a line of convergence toward the supposedly “Western” Catholic view, but alongside this there is also a line of convergence toward the Palamite conception, as we have shown elsewhere¹¹¹.

Papadakis then attempts to shed even more light on the differences—whether perceived or real—that exist between East and West.

When he notes that, according to Eastern tradition, God’s personal revelation in Scripture¹¹² is the starting point for all Eastern Trinitarian theology—both Cappadocian and Byzantine—he fails, however, to add that this also applies to all of Western Catholic theology. Yet he paints a caricature of the latter when, in a pointed remark against it, he observes that God can never be reduced to unity nor to the single, shared essence of philosophical speculation. Papadakis then goes on to paraphrase de Régnon’s schema—which lacks sufficient historical nuance in terms of the history of theology—according to which the East proceeds from the personal diversity within God, while the West proceeds from the unity of essence. In the Old Testament, theology could not proceed from the Trinity, which had not yet been clearly revealed. The Son of God, who became man, first presupposed Jewish monotheism in his preaching and proceeded from it before revealing the mystery of the Trinity. A Christian theology that seeks to lead unbelievers to faith in God will first seek to demonstrate (I do not say “mathematically prove”) that God exists as one, before speaking of the Trinity and proceeding from it (cf. Rom. 1; Acts 17:22ff.).

/183/ While it is true that in the West theological exposition generally and predominantly begins with the unity of God’s essence, it must not be forgotten that God’s unity and Trinity are based on revealed truth, and that no Catholic theologian arrives at the three hypostases through a contemplation of the one essence in the sense of deriving the three Persons from that one essence. Papadakis suggests such an interpretation of the method of Catholic theologians. Is it true, then, that Latin theology tends first to consider in God the nature—which Papadakis regards as impersonal—and then to move on to the acting entities, that is, to the Persons? Distinguishing between nature or essence and the Persons, however, is not the same as separating nature from the Persons in God. All truly Catholic Trinitarian theologians always consider nature or essence in God together with the Persons.

Papadakis extends his discussion of the difference between Eastern and Western theology to include the experience of God. But is theology the same thing as the experience of God, as some theologians in both the East and the West claim today—for example, the highly influential V. Lossky¹¹³? The author’s assertion that in the East one first experiences and encounters the Triune God, whereas in the West one first experiences the one God, is a regrettable generalization and exaggeration that disregards the great diversity within the Catholic Church in the practice of theology and in approaching God through theology, asceticism, and mysticism. Conversely, one might ask whether the Trinitarian encounter with God truly always comes first in the East. Does the Eastern monk or Christian, who repeatedly recites the Jesus Prayer, experience God as the Triune God?

With regard to St. Augustine, whom Papadakis blames for the fact that, as a result, God has been viewed and experienced in the West over the centuries primarily as the One and not as the Triune, a question now arises that must be answered: Why did Augustine not title his magnum opus “De Deo Uno,” but rather “De Deo Trino”? Doesn’t this single fact alone show that, for Augustine the theologian, the Trinity was at the beginning, at the center, and at the end?

Papadakis himself has realized that he was going too far, and now emphasizes that both approaches—the one based on the Trinity and the one based on the single Being—are legitimate, provided that neither is given priority. Here we are in complete agreement with Papadakis: in Christian theology, one can and may follow one approach or the other—or, better yet, both approaches, which then converge. His additional remark, however, strikes me as questionable: that the Trinitarian personalist experience is the ultimate revelation of the nature of God. I must and can accept the revelation of the Trinity in dark faith even without experiential knowledge or mystical experience.

Equally one-sided is the contrast—traced back to V. Lossky—/184/ between the Eastern personalist orientation and the Western essentialist perspective. What is needed is a synthesis of the two.

The author’s claim that there is a radical difference in the assessment of causality within the Trinity between the Cappadocians and Western theologians—and that this supposed difference made the acceptance of the Filioque impossible—is, therefore, completely unsubstantiated. I have shown elsewhere¹¹⁴ that the Cappadocians are open to the Filioque, even though they do not teach it in those exact words. To prove his thesis of a radical difference, Papadakis accuses Catholic theologians—in contrast to the Orthodox—of holding the doctrine that the origin of the Persons within the Godhead is the common essence (the common essence)¹¹⁵: “The doctrine in question insists that the origin of the Persons within the Godhead is not the common essence, but the hypostasis of the Father”¹¹⁶. Papadakis overlooks the fact that Catholic theology, too, recognizes the axiom: “Actiones sunt suppositorum” (“Actions belong to the agents”). In other words, as applied to the Filioque, the following holds true: the cause of the Holy Spirit is the Persons of the Father and the Son, but not insofar as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one—not a single Person.

It is telling that Papadakis criticizes a text by Gregory of Nyssa here because he sees in it a veiled form of dangerous Subordinationism. After all, Gregory says that in God, of those (the Son and the Spirit) who have a common origin, one proceeds immediately from the First¹¹⁷. This text is one of those that make it clear that the Cappadocians do not deny the Filioque at all, but rather maintain an open attitude toward it¹¹⁸.

The following remarks by Papadakis serve to obscure the fact that in Western Catholic doctrine on the Trinity, just as in Eastern doctrine, the Father as a Person is and remains the very first and common cause of the other two Persons—μόνος αἴτιος, the sole uncaused cause (ἄναρχος ἀρχή), the First Cause par excellence.

In a chain of reasoning that is logically inconsistent, Papadakis seeks to justify his rejection of the Filioque. Step by step, he compiles his judgments on Catholic doctrine to arrive at his damning negative conclusion: “The personal God of revelation has become a philosophically impersonal being”¹¹⁹. And how does he prove this? Through the half-true assertion that the West attributes the causal dependence of the Son and the Spirit on the Father to a single shared essence; that as a result, /185/ the focal point (of Trinitarian reflection) no longer lies in the person of the Father but in the common essence; that speaking of God refers to the essence, whereas speaking of the three persons—as Papadakis intends to say—turns them into abstract relations, reducing them to impersonal relationships. In particular, Augustine is said to be responsible for shifting the emphasis toward a philosophically conceived unity and for the loss of a clear distinction between the divine Persons, whereby the essence assumes logical priority over the Person of the Father, and the Trinitarian concept of God becomes meaningless and incomprehensible. And this emphasis is said to have then led to the Filioque. It is difficult to follow Papadakis’s logical leaps. Papadakis presents as Western doctrine what is not Catholic doctrine at all. An emphasis becomes an overemphasis and then a reversal of the true Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

Papadakis has several noteworthy predecessors who are moving in the same direction. Among them is Richard HAUGH, who published the book Photius and the Carolingians: The Trinitarian Controversy about a decade ago¹²⁰. Haugh argues that the emphasis on “tamquam ab uno principio” during the first dogmatization of the Filioque at the Second Council of Lyons (1274) altered the nature of the problem to such an extent that the “que” (“and”) in the Filioque no longer has any real meaning. This development, he argues, confirms one of Patriarch Photius’s main accusations against the Latin West, namely, viewing the procession of the Holy Spirit in a depersonalized manner, which is ultimately rooted in the fact that one regards God in his “nature” and in his “essence” and then conceives of the Spirit as proceeding from the united substance of the Father and the Son, as is done in the Pseudo-Athanasian writings to which the Carolingians refer¹²¹.

Like Papadakis recently, Haugh contrasts two triadological models from the outset: an Eastern one, which he views positively, and a Western one, which he holds responsible for a misguided development. In the East, he argues, the Trinity is viewed primarily from the perspective of the Person of the Father, whereas in the West, it is viewed from the perspective of the unity of the divine essence. In contrast to Haugh, we have emphasized that he exaggerates the contrasts; that the Western Augustine derives the mystery of the three Persons from a nature of positive revelation, and that the Eastern John of Damascus begins his major theological work, De fide orthodoxa, with a consideration of the one divine nature, only then proceeding to speak of the Persons¹²². Gregory of Cyprus is not mentioned by Haugh in his study. However, we have pointed out that Haugh is correct in noting some gaps in Photius’s argumentation, namely that Photius fails to pay attention to the patristic expression “through the Son”¹²³.

/186/ For this reason, Haugh has attempted to briefly demonstrate—as is the concern of Gregory of Cyprus—that, contrary to Photius, the words “through the Son” can have not only an economic meaning but also an intratrinitarian one; however, Haugh, too, excludes—a priori—any existential or causal relationship between the Son and the Spirit¹²⁴.

Among the Orthodox authors who today hold St. Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity responsible for erroneous developments is Archpriest John ROMANIDES. He has summarized his ideas particularly in his study, “The Filioque”¹²⁵. Romanides accuses the Latins in particular of turning the divine energies—as defined by Gregory Palamas—into creatures and, following Augustine, equating in God what He has with what He is¹²⁶.

Conclusion.

There is no denying that Papadakis has offered a well-rounded, comprehensive presentation of the work of Patriarch Gregory of Cyprus, drawing on extensive source material, and that it is stimulating in every respect. But now to the three points that Papadakis sought to prove:

(1) Papadakis cannot prove—especially for this reason—that the Union of Lyons (and that of Florence) is a theologically false union consisting merely of an external compilation of formulas, because he makes no effort whatsoever to trace the path that Catholic theology took toward the Filioque, beginning with Sacred Scripture—and here especially the Farewell Discourse (including John 15:26 together with John 16: 13–15), through the convergence toward the Filioque among the Cappadocians and the explicit Filioque in Epiphanius, Didymus, and Cyril of Alexandria. Whatever does not support his argument in the writings of the Church Fathers, he either reinterprets or simply omits.

(2) In his synthesis, Gregory, like Papadakis, shows that Patriarch Photius’s thesis regarding the Holy Spirit’s proceeding from the Father alone—and his denial of intratrinitarian, non-economic relations between the Son and the Spirit—does not do justice to patristic tradition, particularly that of the Damascene. But in his effort to eliminate the causal, existential relationship between the Son and the Spirit (in the sense of the Filioque), Papadakis, like Gregory, arrives at antinomies—not to say contradictions—and at constructions of two intratrinitarian levels that are difficult or even impossible to reconcile with the absolute simplicity, wholeness, and fullness of every Trinitarian relationship¹²⁷.

/187/ (3) The radical difference between East and West in theology and in the experience of God, as claimed by Papadakis, does not hold up in light of the diverse historical facts. For one thing, the contrasts in theology and in the experience of God are not nearly as radical; rather, they are mostly minor differences in emphasis that, for the most part, coincide. Furthermore, in the East there are not only points of convergence with Palamite theology—or that of Gregory of Cyprus—but there have also been, throughout the centuries, points of convergence with the Catholic position, beginning with the Greek Fathers and continuing through Bekkos and his like-minded colleagues, and extending all the way to the Council of Florence.

Here, a brief concluding remark on Epiphanius should be added: His Filioque formula regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit consistently reads: “proceeding from the Father and receiving from the Son: from the Father and the Son”¹²⁸. A question naturally arises: Will today’s Orthodox Palamite theologians interpret Epiphanius’s formula in the sense of Gregory of Cyprus? So far, I have not encountered such an interpretation. In any such attempt, one would have to rule out from the outset any existential-causal meaning of the Filioque in Epiphanius, which, however, is not possible without distorting Epiphanius’s texts.

Pontificio Istituto Orientale Piazza S. Maria Maggiore 7, 00185 Roma

Bernhard Schultze S.J.

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1. On this, see M. Jugie, A.A., Theologia Dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium ab Ecclesia catholica dissidentium, tom. I, Paris 1926, pp. 429-431; tom. II, Paris 1933, pp. 358-366; De processione Spiritus Sancti ex fontibus revelationis et secundum Orientales dissidentes, Rome 1936, p. 322. ↩︎
2. Jugie, II, pp. 345-346 with note. ↩︎
3. Le théologie du Saint Esprit dans le dialogue oecuménique (sous la direction de Lukas Vischer) = Conseil Oecuménique des Églises, Document Foi et Constitution, nº 103, Taizé 1981. ↩︎
4. Ibid., pp. 29-53. ↩︎
5. Pp. 198 ff. ↩︎
6. Credo in Spiritum Sanctum, Atti del Congresso Teologico di Pneumatologia, I-II, Libraria Editrice Vaticana 1983; I, pp. 661 ff.; 666 ff. ↩︎
7. Op. cit., I, p. 379. ↩︎
8. Crisis in Byzantium: The “Filioque” Controversy in the Patriarchate of Gregory II of Cyprus (1283-1289). ↩︎
9. Fordham University Press, New York, 1983. ↩︎
10. Ibid., p. 150. ↩︎
11. Ibid., p. 147. ↩︎
12. Pp. 153-167; 155-165. ↩︎
13. See note 1. ↩︎
14. Ibid. ↩︎
15. Divinitas 2 (1961), pp. 324-344. ↩︎
16. OCP 31 (1965), pp. 5-20. ↩︎
17. Je crois en l’Esprit Saint, III, Paris 1980, pp. 98-99, notes 7-9. ↩︎
18. Papadakis (see note 8), pp. 147-148 (= pp. 201-202 of 1997 ed.). ↩︎
19. Ibid., p. 148 (= p. 202 of 1997 ed.). ↩︎
20. P. 149 (1997 ed., p. 204). ↩︎
21. P. 148 (1997 ed., p. 202?). ↩︎
22. Περὶ τῆς ἐκπορεύσεως τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος, PG 142, 269B-300B; 275C-276A. Cf. Orphanos (see notes 3-4), pp. 35-36. ↩︎
23. Ἔκθεσις τοῦ τόμου τῆς πίστεως κατὰ τοῦ Βέκκου, PG 142, 233A-246B. ↩︎
24. In English translation at Papadakis, pp. 155-165 (1997 ed., pp. 212-226). ↩︎
25. (We’ll skip the long, cumbersome Greek title.) PG 142, 247A-252C; cf. Candal (see note 16), p. 11. ↩︎
26. PG 142, 275C-D. ↩︎
27. Loc. cit., 275D; 275D-276A. ↩︎
28. 276A. Papadakis, pp. 90 ff. (1997 ed., pp. 123 ff.). ↩︎
29. PG 142, 240A. — Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, II, Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως, Expositio Fidei, Besorgt von P. Bonifatius Kotter O.S.B., Berlin/New York 1973, 12b, 43-44; p. 36. ↩︎
30. PG 142, 240A. ↩︎
31. Ibid., Nr. 4, PG 132, 240B. ↩︎
32. Ibid., 240B-C. Cf. Papadakis, p. 160. ↩︎
33. 240C. ↩︎
34. John of Damascus, Expositio Fidei (cf. note 29), 12b, 43-44; p. 36 (not verbatim, but according to its sense); 12b, 46; 51-52; 55-57 (from the Father…, Spirit of the Son, not as being from him, but as proceeding through him from the Father; for the Father alone is cause); cf. also 7,20-21; pp. 16-17 (the Holy Spirit is essential power, proceeding from the Father, abiding in the Word and manifesting him: ἐκφαντικήν). ↩︎
35. Expositio Fidei, 8, 288-297; 293-295; pp. 30-31. ↩︎
36. PG 142, 242A-B. Cf. Papadakis, pp. 161-162. ↩︎
37. G 142, 242B. ↩︎
38. Ibid. Gregory then turns against those who claim that, just as the Virgin and Mother of God is called the “Source of Life,” so too is the Son the “Source of Life.” He replies that Mary’s role is that of the Incarnation, not the Son’s participation in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit: PG 142, 242C-D. ↩︎
39. PG 142, 250A. ↩︎
40. 250B-C: “before:” The term “πασά” erroneously found in the Greek we read as “παρά”. ↩︎
41. 250B-C. ↩︎
42. 250C. ↩︎
43. 250C-D. ↩︎
44. 250D. ↩︎
45. 250D-251B. ↩︎
46. Jugie (cf. note 1), II, p. 364. ↩︎
47. PG 142, 250D-251A. ↩︎
48. Ibid. ↩︎
49. 251A-B. ↩︎
50. Ibid. ↩︎
51. Papadakis, p. 148. J. Meyendorff, “La procession du Saint-Esprit chez les Pères orientaux,” Russie et Chrétienté, 3-4 (1950), p. 170. And yet “through the Son” is found in Nazianzen, Carminum Liber I, Theologica: PG 37, 632A. On this, see our study: “Die Pneumatologie des Symbols von Konstantinopel als abschließende Formulierung der griechischen Theologie (381-1981),” OCP 47 (1981), 5-54, esp. pp. 43-44. ↩︎
52. Papadakis, pp. 148 ff. ↩︎
53. P. 148. ↩︎
54. Ibid. ↩︎
55. P. 148. ↩︎
56. P. 149. ↩︎
57. Ibid., p. 149. ↩︎
58. Also Jugie opines: “tanquam doctrinae palamiticae praenuntius jure habendus est”: Theologia Dogmatica, I (cf. note 1), p. 430. ↩︎
59. Papadakis, p. 149. ↩︎
60. Pp. 149-150. ↩︎
61. P. 150. ↩︎
62. Ibid. Papadakis refers to V. Lossky, “The Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Triadology,” The Eastern Churches Quarterly, Supplementary issue, 7 (1948), p. 51. ↩︎
63. E.g., Papadakis, pp. 149, 150. One must ask, however, to what extent these decisions have been—or are still—recognized as binding for Orthodoxy as a whole. ↩︎
64. Papadakis, pp. 2, 3-4. ↩︎
65. Pp. 5-6. ↩︎
66. Pp. 6-7. ↩︎
67. P. 7. ↩︎
68. P. 149. ↩︎
69. P. 147. ↩︎
70. See our study on the cause of the schism: “Das Weltbild des Patriarchen Photios nach seinen Homilien”, Kairos, 15 (1973), 101-115; esp. pp 109-113. Also: “Das Konzil unter Photios vom Jahre 879-880,” in our dissertation: Maksim Grek als Theologe (= OCA 167), Rome 1963, pp. 69-89. Furthermore, our review of John Meijer C.S.R., A Successful Council of Union, A Theological Analysis of the Photian Synod of 879-880 (= Analecta Vlatadon 23), Thessaloniki 1975, in OCP, 43 (1977), pp. 225-229. Fantinus Vallaresso, Latin Archbishop of Crete at the time of the Council of Florence, believed that the cause of the schism between East and West was neither the Filioque nor its addition to the Creed, but rather opposition to the primacy of Rome. Read more about this in our edition of: Libellus De ordine Generalium Conciliorum et Unione Florentina, in Concilium Florentinum, Documenta et Scriptores, Series B, Volumen II — Fasciculus II (Rome 1944), pp. 17, 3-12; 25, 8ff.; 603ff. ↩︎
71. See above, note 51. ↩︎
72. Against Cyril of Alexandria’s 9th Anathematism: PG 76, 432. ↩︎
73. Mansi 13, 552B. Cf. Mansi 12, 1121-1122D. ↩︎
74. Papadakis, p. 148. ↩︎
75. Ibid. ↩︎
76. P. 148. ↩︎
77. Cf. above, note 58. ↩︎
78. Maksim Grek als Theologe (see note 70), pp. 30-33. ↩︎
79. PG 36, 73-104; 76B. On this, cf. our study: “S. Bulgakovs ‘Utěšitel’’ und Gregor der Theologe über den Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes,” OCP 39 (1973), 162-190; esp. pp. 174-175. ↩︎
80. PG 36, 76B. ↩︎
81. Gregory of Nazianzus, in his Oration 31 (Theological Oration 5, §§31-33) (PG 36, 169A-172B), introduces the comparison of the Trinity with sun, ray, and light (PG 36, 169B-C), but he immediately raises his own reservations, much as he had done in the same oration where, to illustrate the unity of the essence and the Trinity of the Persons in God, he had spoken of three suns (PG 36, 149A). In our article on Bulgakov’s trinitarian theology (see note 79), pp. 169-174. ↩︎
82. Jugie writes: “Haec subtilis distinctio inter existentiam habere et existere est prorsus inintelligibilis”: Jugie I (see note 1), p. 429; and Jugie II (see note 1), pp.364-365. Candal speaks of “una vera logomachia, inintelligibile giuoco di sole parole”: Divinitas (see note 15), pp. 338-339; OCP, 31 (1965) (see note 16), pp. 10-13. ↩︎
83. J. Meyendorff, “La procession du Saint Esprit chez les Pères Orientaux,” Russie et Chrétienté 3-4 (1949-1950), 158-179, esp. pp. 177-178. ↩︎
84. Basil, Adv. Eunomium II, 32: PG 29, 648B; Contre Eunome II (SC 305), Paris 1983, pp. 134-135. ↩︎
85. Candal, OCP (cf. note 82), p. 17. ↩︎
86. Meyendorff, Russie et Chrétienté (cf. note 83), pp. 177-178. ↩︎
87. Meyendorff refers to Palamas, Capita Physica, 37: PG 150, 1144-1145. ↩︎
88. Meyendorff, loc. cit., p. 178. ↩︎
89. See above, note 40. ↩︎
90. Jugie, II, pp. 353ff. ↩︎
91. Papadakis, p. 63. ↩︎
92. Ibid. J. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology (New York 1979), p. 188. ↩︎
93. Papadakis, p. 63. J. Pelikan, The Spirit of Eastern Christendom, Chicago 1971-1974, p. 193. ↩︎
94. Papadakis, p. 64. ↩︎
95. Ibid. ↩︎
96. P. 64. ↩︎
97. Ibid. ↩︎
98. P. 64. ↩︎
99. Ibid. ↩︎
100. P. 64. ↩︎
101. P. 64. ↩︎
102. Pp. 64-65. This has to do with the text: Quod non sunt tres dii, Ad Ablabium: PG 45, 133. On this, cf. our study: “Die Pneumatologie des Symbols von Konstantinopel,” OCP 47 (1981) (see note 51), pp. 50-51. ↩︎
103. An allusion to T. R. Martland, “A Study of Cappadocian and Augustinian Trinitarian Methodology,” Anglican Theological Review 47 (1965), 252-263; p. 257. ↩︎
104. Papadakis, p. 65. ↩︎
105. A citation from V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, London 1947, p. 58. ↩︎
106. Papadakis, p. 65. ↩︎
107. With the subtitle: Der Streit um die theologische Methodik in der spätbyzantinischen Geistesgeschichte (14./15.Jh), seine systematischen Grundlagen und seine historische Entwicklung (The Controversy over Theological Methodology in Late Byzantine Intellectual History (14th–15th Centuries): Its Systematic Foundations and Historical Development), München 1977. Reviewed by us in OCP 44 (1978), pp. 197–203. ↩︎
108. See above, note 92. Papadakis, p. 63. ↩︎
109. Gregory Palamas, Collected works (in Greek): Syngrammata, vol. II, Thessaloniki 1966, pp. 215,10-11; 216,6-10, 27-29ff. On this, cf. our study, “Grundfragen des theologischen Palamismus,” Ostkirchliche Studien, 24 (1975), 105-135, pp. 113-114. ↩︎
110. Papadakis, pp. 63-64. ↩︎
111. “Zur Gotteserkenntnis in der griechischen Patristik,” Gregorianum, 63 (1982), pp. 525-558; “Grundfragen des theologischen Palamismus” (see note 109), pp. 130-131. ↩︎
112. Papadakis, p. 64. ↩︎
113. Especially in his Mystical Theology. See note 105. ↩︎
114. E.g., in the studies mentioned above in notes 79 and 102. ↩︎
115. Papadakis, p. 64. ↩︎
116. P. 64. ↩︎
117. Papadakis, pp. 64-65. See above, note 102. ↩︎
118. See above notes 79 and 102. ↩︎
119. Papadakis, p. 65. ↩︎
120. Photius and the Carolingians, The Trinitarian Controversy (Massachusetts 1975). See our review in OCP, 43 (1977), pp. 221-225. ↩︎
121. Haugh, p. 70 (PL 105, 244). ↩︎
122. Haugh, pp. 16-19. In our review (see note 120), pp. 222f. ↩︎
123. Ibid., p. 223. ↩︎
124. Haugh, pp. 175-176. ↩︎
125. Κληρονομία, 7 (1975), pp. 285-312. Previously in Russian: Messager de l’Exarchat du Patriarche Russe en Europe Occidentale / Vestnik, 23 (1975), pp. 89-115. ↩︎
126. In the English text: pp. 310-312; 296-297. ↩︎
127. Papadakis has briefly summarized what he calls “theological antinomy as a dogma of the Byzantine Church” (see notes 59 and 68) in the following way: “In trinitarian theology… two distinct realities are involved. If one level of reality denotes the internal life and nature of the Trinity itself — its self-existence — the other denotes the external life or self-revelation of God himself, as it reveals perpetually the glory and ‘splendor’ that is common to the trinity of persons in the Godhead… God, in short, exists not only in His essence but outside His essence. But, since this antinomy is, in truth, a distinction within God’s very being (both the manifestation and the timeless procession are eternal), the divine manifestation or life, as such, is neither alien nor ‘without’ God” (Papadakis, p. 91). ↩︎
128. “Ἐκ Πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ λαμβάνον…, ἐκ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ.” E.g., Panarion, Haeresis 62: PG 41, 1053D. ↩︎