By Sam Huntington
I’ll begin with a highlight of Mr. Madison’s War. As I previously wrote, the war stemmed from poor leadership among America’s senior officials. One could argue that our country’s early decline began with Thomas Jefferson, an ideologue who, while serving as George Washington’s Secretary of State, covertly conspired with others to destroy the president’s reputation and administration. In modern parlance — a backstabber. Jefferson’s presidency, like his life, was “out there.”
The War of 1812 was poorly advised, easily avoidable, and badly fought, and it caused sustained misery throughout the land. Its negative effects lasted for many years, but it also had positive consequences.
Highlights
- Early naval victories included the USS Constitution’s single-ship duels against the Royal Navy.
- Failed invasions of Canada that resulted in the unnecessary loss of men and equipment, the surrender of Fort Detroit, and the demonstration that American militia lacked a warrior ethos.
- Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry secured a vital American naval victory on Lake Erie in 1813.
- In 1814, after British infantry defeated American forces defending Washington at Bladensburg, Maryland, the city of Washington was burned to the ground — save one structure in its entirety: the U.S. Marine Barracks at 8th and I Streets, near the Navy Yard. At Bladensburg, when the entire American militia retreated from the British line, only one American unit remained at its post and fired its artillery until it ran out of ammunition: the U.S. Marines. Amazingly, President James Madison joined these Marines in battle, carrying shot and powder to the Marine gun placements until the Marine commander signaled that the fight was over. It was this performance that saved the Marine Barracks — as a sign of the British Army’s respect for the fighting spirit of the Marines.
- The defense of Baltimore at Fort McHenry — for which Francis Scott Key penned the words to the poem entitled “ The Star-Spangled Banner.
- The Battle of New Orleans (1815) — an overwhelming American victory that took place 30 days after the British and Americans signed the Treaty of Ghent to end the war.
When Mr. Madison asked Congress for a Declaration of War against Great Britain, the British Army and Navy were heavily engaged in the Napoleonic Wars. It was a desperate struggle to stop Napoleon Bonaparte, the self-styled French emperor. It was a costly war. The British could not afford, either financially or in men and equipment, to fight a two-front conflict. British war planners wisely decided to “bide their time” and address the American problem once the Napoleonic Wars had been resolved. In London, news of the declaration appeared on the back pages of the London Gazette.
Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Inglis Cochrane (GCB) (1758 – 1832) was a veteran of the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1812. In 1814, he assumed command of the Royal Navy’s Red Squadron on the North American Station (including naval bases in Jamaica and Bermuda).
As Great Britain’s senior naval officer, Cochrane commanded the forces that fought at Bladensburg, destroyed Washington City, and bombarded Fort McHenry. During that bombardment, Francis Scott Key was a prisoner aboard Cochrane’s ship — from which he wrote the Star-Spangled Banner.
Admiral Cochrane also commanded the British forces at the Battle of New Orleans. He planned to attack the City of New Orleans, believing it would force the Americans to lose interest in Canada.
After arriving at the mouth of the Mississippi River, south of New Orleans, Cochrane ordered his soldiers and Marines to build a road toward the city. The road no longer exists, but it was built through Chalmette. He also sent a flotilla into Lake Pontchartrain to draw out any defending Americans, whom he quickly defeated.
The commander of British land forces was Major General Edward Pakenham. Pakenham began his military career at 16; his father purchased a lieutenancy for him in the 92nd Regiment. He later served as an officer in the dragoons (mounted riflemen). He served as a combat officer in Ireland, Nova Scotia, Barbados, Saint Croix, Saint Lucia, Copenhagen, and Martinique. During his career, he was wounded twice. He was a brother-in-law of the Duke of Wellington.
Pakenham served as adjutant-general under the Duke of Wellington during the Peninsular War. He commanded a regiment at the Battle of Bussaco in 1810 and, in 1811, led troops at the Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro in defense of Almeida, helping secure a British victory. In 1812, Pakenham was praised for his performance at Salamanca, where he commanded the Third Division and struck the flank of the extended French line.
In August 1814, Vice Admiral Cochrane convinced the British Admiralty that his plan to assault New Orleans would weaken American resolve to resist Canada and hasten the war’s end. The Royal Navy therefore began operational planning to capture New Orleans.
Pakenham, who had recently been promoted to major general, was sent to North America to replace Major General Robert Ross — the officer who destroyed Washington — after Ross was killed outside Baltimore.
In the winter of 1814, the British sought to control the entrance to the Mississippi River and to challenge the legality of the Louisiana Purchase. To this end, an expeditionary force of about 8,000 troops under Pakenham arrived on the Gulf Coast to seize the city and port of New Orleans.
While Cochrane and Pakenham marshaled their forces for combat, unknown to either officer, British and American diplomats had already agreed to a general ceasefire and signed the Treaty of Ghent (24 December 1814). However, the U.S. Senate had yet to ratify the treaty, so technically, the two countries remained at war. Andrew Jackson, commanding the American defensive forces, also did not learn of the treaty until after the battle.
On Christmas Day (1814), Major General Pakenham went ashore and assumed command of the battle area. His first order was to conduct a reconnaissance in force (RIF) against Major General Jackson’s earthworks. The RIF was tasked with testing the defensive line and assessing the strength of Jackson’s forces. If the RIF found a weak point in the line, Pakenham would direct a full assault against it.
The RIF found more than a weak point in the defensive line; they found a highly aggressive force of American riflemen who were not intimidated by the sudden appearance of redcoats en masse. When Pakenham witnessed his RIF collapse and retreat in panic, he inexplicably ordered a general withdrawal of his remaining line. In the firefight, Pakenham’s deputy, Major General Samuel Gibbs, was killed.
That night, Pakenham met with his subordinate commanders and staff, along with Admiral Cochrane and his staff — who were displeased with Pakenham’s performance in the field. Cochrane was also displeased with Pakenham’s plan for future operations. Pakenham wanted to send a brigade through the Chef Menteur Pass as his primary approach to the American defenses. Cochrane overruled him. The Chef Menteur Pass is a narrow tidal waterway connecting Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne.
Admiral Cochrane likely focused on enemy troop numbers or estimates rather than closely examining the commander—Andrew Jackson. Some have argued that no one in North America hated the British more than Andrew Jackson.
Cochrane commanded 8,000 British infantry and perhaps as many as 3,000 British sailors. Jackson had about 4,500 men. Cochrane may not have understood why Pakenham was maneuvering rather than attacking Jackson to end it. Cochrane allegedly admonished Pakenham, saying that if he couldn’t defeat the Americans, he would send in his sailors to accomplish the task.
On New Year’s Day (1815), British artillery opened fire on the American line. The Americans recovered quickly and returned fire, shell for shell. The exchange continued for three hours. After another failed attempt to breach Jackson’s line, Pakenham decided to wait for reinforcements.
In the enemy camp, the Americans had constructed three lines of defense. The forward line was positioned four miles south of the city. It was strongly entrenched along the Rodriguez Canal, which ran from an eastern swamp to the Mississippi River. The trench was reinforced with felled timber, loop-holed breastworks, and artillery earthworks. Major General Jackson had mustered just under 4,700 men on the left bank (east side of the Mississippi River) and 546 men on the right bank (west side of the Mississippi River).
On January 5, 1815, British Major General John Lambert and two infantry battalions (totaling 1,700 men) disembarked to reinforce Pakenham. Once ashore, Pakenham’s force totaled nearly 8,000 men. Pakenham planned an attack on the 20-gun right (west) bank American artillery battery. Once captured, he would turn the American artillery on their left (east) bank defensive line during Pakenham’s general assault. He assigned this mission to Colonel William Thornton.
On the right (east) bank, Major General Samuel Gibbs would command the Second Brigade in an assault against Jackson’s left center. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rennie, commanding light infantry companies from the 4th and 21st Regiments, would march in column along the riverbank as a feint. Historians regard this move as part of Major General Keane’s 1st Brigade. Keane’s men would move either to exploit Rennie’s successes or Gibbs’s efforts in the center. Pakenham’s 3rd Brigade, under Major General John Lambert, was held in reserve.
The advance of Keane and Gibbs from their disembarkation point was about 650 yards to the American line. Because these formations would be in sight and within range of the American artillery, it was vital to execute the plan so the troops would reach the ditch at first light. The signal for the start of battle was the launch of a signal rocket at 06:20. Soon after, British artillery would focus on Jackson’s headquarters at the McCarty House.
Note: Of the total number of Americans serving under Andrew Jackson, one-fourth (2,256 men) were mustered from the State of Kentucky. To these must be added the officers and men of the U.S. Seventh Regiment of Infantry, also recruited from Kentucky. Lieutenant Colonels Gabriel Slaughter, Presley Gray, and William Mitchusson organized and commanded the three Kentucky militia regiments. Gray, having resigned, was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel John Davis. Mitchusson, having resigned, was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Parker. Major General John Thomas and Brigadier General John Adair commanded the forces.
Pakenham’s preparations for battle had not escaped the Americans’ notice. Anticipating the inevitable assault, Jackson unobtrusively reinforced the Louisiana militia with two hundred Kentucky riflemen under Lieutenant Colonel John Davis. They filtered into the line around 04:00 after a five-mile quick march through mud and ice-cold swamp water. Exhausted, they had not eaten since noon the previous day. Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, commanding the Louisiana and Kentucky militia, deployed the Kentucky riflemen at two locations roughly a mile apart.
Meanwhile, British engineers dug a canal to allow Thornton’s men to board 42 small boats and transport them to the American position on the left bank. The effort faltered early on 8 January when the canal banks collapsed and a dam failed. This left British seamen dragging loaded boats through mud alongside Thornton’s assault force. Overall, canal problems set the entire operation back by eight to twelve hours and reduced Thornton’s force by a third, to 560 men.
Under Thornton, Captain Roland Money of the Royal Navy commanded the naval detachment, and Brevet Major Thomas Adair commanded the Royal Marine detachment. Thornton, deciding he did not need to consult a naval officer, failed to account for the Mississippi River’s current, which carried him and his force 1,000 yards below his intended landing site.
Despite this critical delay, Pakenham foolishly ordered the assault to proceed at daybreak. In fairness, however, in 1815, the only way for a field commander to communicate with forward unit commanders was by courier. Pakenham had no way to reach Thornton, whose assault force operated on the opposite side of the Mississippi River (nearly 900 yards wide at Chalmette). Notwithstanding his difficulties, Colonel Thornton’s element was the only British success at the Battle of New Orleans. His force attacked and overwhelmed the American line, routing 700 militia.
At around 10:00, General Lambert was informed that Thornton had taken the right bank. However, Thornton was badly wounded and delegated command to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Gubbins. Additional casualties included two dead, one missing, and 41 wounded. Among the naval detachment, two were dead and 18 were wounded, including Captain Money. Royal Marine casualties were two dead, three officers, one sergeant, and 12 other ranks wounded.
After the successful British assault, led by Colonel William Thornton, on the American-held battery on the west side of the river, Colonel Alexander Dickson, Major General Lambert’s Chief of Artillery, was sent forward to assess whether the captured position could be held. Dickson estimated that at least 2,000 troops would be required to hold it. Because the main British army had just suffered a catastrophic defeat on the eastern bank, Lambert deemed the requirement too steep and ordered a complete withdrawal. When Gubbins withdrew, he took a few American prisoners and serviceable cannon with him.
The Americans were so dismayed by the loss of their west bank position, from which the artillery could have inflicted heavy damage on their lines if the British attack were renewed, that they prepared to withdraw. Nevertheless, as brilliant the move was to seize American artillery on the left bank, it had no effect on the outcome of the main battle — as we will now observe.
On January 8, 1815, General Pakenham assigned the advance guard position for the first-column attack to the 44th Regiment of Foot. These troops would carry the fascines and ladders that would enable the British to cross the ditch and scale the American defenses. The officer commanding the 44th Regiment was Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Mullins. He had been commended twice during the Chesapeake Campaign and had been recently promoted.
Still, Mullins was arrogant, careless in his attention to detail, and contemptuous of his superior officers. One of Pakenham’s last directives to Mullins was to determine the locations of the fascines and ladders on the evening of 7 January — to avoid delays in retrieving them the following morning. Later that day, General Gibbs also instructed Mullins to confirm the locations of those much-needed fascines and ladders.
Mullins delegated this task to a subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Johnston. Johnston promptly went to the headquarters section as instructed. While there, General Gibbs observed him and asked what he was doing. In response to the general’s question, Gibbs issued a formal order to Mullins stating that Mullins, as the Officer Commanding the 44th Regiment, would ascertain the location of the fascines and ladders — and do so “this evening.”
A map of the stored equipment was provided to Johnston, who delivered it to Mullins, who casually tucked it into his waistcoat.
At 17:00 on 7 January, Mullins summoned his officers for a meeting to discuss the attack. One of his officers asked about the ladders’ location and received a caustic rebuke. At about 20:00, Mullins was diplomatically reminded that it was time to prepare for the next day — and that he was to follow General Gibbs’ directive. Mullins dismissively replied that there would be time the next morning.
Pakenham sent a written order to the engineer, directing Mullins to the location of the fascines and ladders (in the redoubt). Coincidentally, Mullins arrived in the presence of the engineer officer (and the artillery officer). After the order was read, he was asked if he had any questions. Mullins replied that the order was clear.
That night, an advance battery was set up forward of the advance redoubt, about 880 yards away, and 800 yards south of Line Jackson. Mullins, thinking this was the location of the materiel, passed the advance redoubt and halted the regiment at the battery. Upon discovering his mistake, he sent two-thirds of his 427 men back to the redoubt at the double-quick to pick up the fascines and ladders. But it was too late. Because the other regiments were already advancing behind the 44th, Mullins’s working party lost formation as they struggled to reach the redoubt. As day dawned, the attack commenced before the much-needed materials could be brought forward.
The attack took place under the worst possible conditions. It began in darkness and heavy fog, which lifted just as the British approached the American line — exposing them to withering artillery fire. The attack formation had already been disordered by the passage of Mullins’ working party, and, being mightily confused by the “fog of war,” they marched into a firestorm of American fire.
Without fascines and ladders, the assault force could not scale and storm the American position. The British forces fell into confusion, thrown into disorder by the advance guard’s retreat to the rear. Most of the senior officers were killed or wounded, including Major General Samuel Gibbs, who was killed leading the main attack column on the right, and Colonel Rennie, who led a detachment on the left by the river. Mullins’s incompetence had compromised the British plan of attack. Mullins was later court-martialed, convicted, and dismissed from the British Army.
Pakenham ordered General Keane to move his 93rd Regiment in a right oblique — concerned that they would be caught in Thornton’s redirected artillery fire. While moving across the field, Keane was wounded. Colonel Rennie attacked and overran an American advance redoubt by the river, but he could neither hold the position nor storm the main line of resistance without reinforcements. Within a few minutes, the 7th US Infantry arrived, advanced, and fired on the British in the captured redoubt. Within thirty minutes, Rennie and nearly all of his men were dead.
In the main attack on the right, British infantrymen either threw themselves to the ground, huddled in the canal, or were mowed down by a combination of American musket fire and grapeshot. A handful reached the top of the right parapet, but they were killed or captured. The riflemen of the 95th Regiment of Foot had advanced in open skirmish order ahead of the main assault force and were concealed in the ditch below the parapet, unable to advance further without additional support.
Although the two main assaults were repulsed and Pakenham and Gibbs were mortally wounded, Major Wilkinson of the 21st Regiment reformed his lines and launched a third assault. The 21st reached the entrenchments and attempted to scale them. Wilkinson made it to the top before being shot. Impressed by his courage, the Americans carried him to safety behind the rampart; he survived the Battle. His soldiers, having no orders to advance or retreat, stood in the open and were shot to pieces by American artillery.
The light infantry companies under Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Jones attacked the right flank but were repulsed by Coffee’s troops. After the attack failed, British troops withdrew to take cover in the woods. Colonel Jones was mortally wounded.
General Lambert, serving in reserve, assumed command of Pakenham’s army. He ordered his force to advance, directed the withdrawal of the remnants of his army, and covered the retreat of the remaining men. Although the attack lasted two hours, the main assault lasted only thirty minutes.