

Behavioral Mechanism Design as a Benchmark for Experimental Studies

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Abstract

I study the behavioral mechanism design problem in which, in addition to the usual selfish players, there are noisy players who play randomly and ethical players who actively seek to maximize social welfare and are committed, up to a point, to “do their bit” to achieve that goal. I calibrate this model using data on lottery choice and on giving in dictator games. I then use it to study seventeen different (out of sample) experiments including stag hunt games, ultimatum bargaining games, public goods games with and without punishment, and gift exchange games. I show that this simple calibrated model makes sharp predictions and does a good job both qualitatively and quantitatively in explaining the data from those experiments. The theory also identifies quantitative anomalies in the data pointing the way to future improvements. I conclude that this simple calibrated model might be a good benchmark for other experiments.

1. Introduction

This is a paper about social preferences in the experimental laboratory. In their monumental review of experimental evidence on social preferences Fehr and Charness

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(2024) report that two robust facts stand out: that participants have both a desire for efficiency and a desire for fairness. Here I suggest that the desire for fairness may be induced by the combination of the desire for efficiency and risk aversion. I examine this in a simple stylized model with three types of players. In addition to the usual selfish players there are noisy players who play randomly and ethical players who actively seek to maximize social welfare and are committed, up to a point, to “do their bit” to achieve that goal. I calibrate this model using data on risk aversion and giving in dictator games. I then use it to study seventeen different (out of sample) experiments including stag hunt games, ultimatum bargaining games, and public goods games with and without punishment. I show that this simple calibrated model makes sharp predictions and does a good job both qualitatively and quantitatively in explaining the data from those experiments. The theory also identifies quantitative anomalies in the data pointing the way to future improvements. I conclude that this simple calibrated model might be a good benchmark for other experiments.

Before getting to the details, as this is an issue in honor of Gary Charness, I want briefly mention that I sought good individual level experimental data on a wide variety of games that are used to study social preferences. I particularly wanted to include a gift exchange game, and was very pleased to find a very clean treatment that was one of Gary’s first experiments, Charness (1998). This experiment reflects Gary’s brilliance as an experimental economist. Everything about the experiment, from the design to the implementation, is meticulous. So I am grateful to Gary not only for many years of friendship and many discussions of our mutual interest in social preferences, and for his broad research program, but I am grateful to him, as well, for the excellent experimental data that forms part of the analysis in this paper.

To put the theory described here in context, suppose that you and three friends are on your way to the experimental laboratory to meet eight other students to be randomly matched to play an ultimatum bargaining game for ten dollars. You and your friends are public spirited in the sense you would like to maximize the *ex ante* expected utility of the participants - provided it is not too costly for yourselves. You and your friends also know that while the other students are, like you, risk averse, unlike you they are not so public spirited. About half are selfish and will try to get what they can for themselves; the other half will have other agendas, such as worrying about what they will do over the weekend, or trolling the experimenter. Knowing that you will get to play a number of times what should you and your friends agree

to do? This is a prototypical example of a behavioral mechanism design problem: behavioral because in addition to selfish types there are two behavioral types: ethical players like the friends in the example, and noise players with other agendas.²

In this paper I analyze the behavioral mechanism design problem with selfish noisy and ethical types and provide solutions for a number of games that have been played in real laboratories. In the example, you and your friends should offer an even split as first mover, should accept offers of four dollars or more, and for each dollar less increase the rejection rate by about 30%. The striking fact is that in this and the other games I study the observed play in the laboratory resembles the idealized solution of the behavioral mechanism design problem both qualitatively and quantitatively. To be clear: it is unlikely that if there are ethical players in these experiments they are able to collude or that they know in advance what game they will play. Nevertheless play by experienced participants in the laboratory experiments I study may reasonably be described “as if” it is the solution to a behavioral mechanism design problem.

The setting for the formal model is a finite normal or extensive form game. In that game players are drawn from a population with three types. Selfish types are “standard” players who care only about their own utility. Noisy types are like behavioral or commitment types in the reputation literature or noise traders in the finance literature and play according to a fixed exogenous strategy. Ethical types are like ethical or group rule-utilitarian voters. On the one hand they are willing (to an extent) to sacrifice their individual utility for the common good. On the other hand they act as mechanism designers, committed to picking an equilibrium that maximizes social welfare and optimally deploying their largesse. Below in the literature review I indicate that none of these types are new, and that they are adopted from the existing literature.

The main application of the model is to calibrate it and propose it as a benchmark for analyzing experimental data for standard stakes experiments involving experienced college student participants. A benchmark model in my view is a model that is not estimated from data, but converts experimental instructions into quantitative predictions about play. The point of a benchmark model is to detect anomalies: if

²Kucuksenel (2012) introduces the idea of behavioral mechanism design as mechanism design with other-regarding behavioral types.

the experiment is what is predicted by the benchmark then there is little reason to search for new theories or modify old ones. The standard Nash (or subgame perfect) model with selfish risk neutral agents is an example of a benchmark model, and is widely used as such. It is a low bar because vast numbers of anomalies are known and it is easy to find new ones. The Levine (1986) calibrated model of signaling spite and altruism is a benchmark model albeit it has not proved a very useful one. The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) calibrated model is also a benchmark model and has proven more useful.

To use a behavioral mechanism design model as a benchmark model it must be calibrated. In the calibrated version of the model I make the uniformity assumption that all types are equally likely, the social welfare function puts equal weight on all types, and the noise players maximize a measure of entropy at each information set. In addition all players have the same risk averse utility function for money income. This and the largesse of the ethical types are calibrated to data on individual decisions for games that are non-strategic in the sense that strategies are ordered by strict dominance. I particularly want to emphasize the role of risk aversion because efficiency creates a demand for insurance and this in turn means that “fair” allocations are preferred to “unfair” ones.

Having provided a calibrated model I use it to benchmark seventeen different experimental treatments. All are classical experiments that have been replicated many times. The specific experiments are drawn from those that have proven important for the study of social preferences. The details about how the experiments were selected can be found in Appendix 3. The first application is to stag hunt. Behavioral mechanism design rules out coordination failure. Stag hunt seems an obvious counter-example. I show it is not. I examine four treatments. Social preference in the form of largesse plays no role, but noise players play a crucial role. Indeed: while behavioral mechanism design does well, theories lacking noise players do poorly and despite the fact they do not make precise predictions are wrong in the few predictions that they do make.

The second application is to ultimatum bargaining for which there are two treatments. These experiments highlight the role of risk aversion in generating a demand for fairness. They also provide evidence that players are not merely reacting to unfair or unkind behavior by their opponents but are acting as mechanism designers and actively seek to achieve social goals. The third primary application is to public goods

games with and without punishments of varying costs. This application demonstrates how the constraint on largesse interacts with the possibility of punishment to generate “the law of demand.” The ultimatum and public goods contribution games are chosen not only to illustrate specific points about the theory but because they have been widely used to assess models of social preferences. The final primary application is to a gift exchange game, another game widely used to assess models of social preferences. Gift exchange, however, is unlike ultimatum and public good games with punishment, in the sense that incentives are provided by on the path rewards rather than off the path punishments. Can one theory account for the provision of both types of incentives? In each case the behavioral mechanism design benchmark is qualitatively and quantitatively on the mark, albeit with some quantitative anomalies that I explore.

What, then, is the marginal contribution of this paper to the existing literature? First, with respect to theory, this paper advances a different point of view than most existing models. With rare exceptions, behavioral models take account of psychological factors such as desire for fairness, reciprocity and altruism and build theories of what should be considered kindness and fairness. This includes earlier work on behavioral mechanism design. The theory here approaches these issues from a different angle. As an example, take the willingness to punish those who fail to contribute to the common good. Standard behavioral theories build this into preferences as a kind of desire for revenge against those who fail to do their fair share, who are unkind, or in order to improve equity. In the mechanism design model here punishment is a means to an end - ethical players are committed to punish others to provide them with incentives to contribute to the common good. Fairness is not in conflict with efficiency, but in the presence of risk aversion fairness is demanded by efficiency. As I indicate below in the literature review this is not a new idea, but the model here through its simplicity and starkness provides the basis for a benchmark calibration which earlier models do not.

The second contribution of the paper is to the experimental literature. It provides a simple qualitative and quantitative (and new) explanation of a wide variety of experimental results and can be used as benchmark for detecting anomalies. It enables us to ask and answer questions such as: is risk aversion sufficient to explain the demand for fairness or is there trade-off between efficiency and fairness?

The model has two ingredients: noise players and the idea that punishments are

issued in order to provide incentives. I provide evidence for both of these ideas. In the stag hunt game models that lack noise players predict only that all players should choose the same action. In fact after nine periods of play more than 27% fail to play the modal action. In ultimatum bargaining models of fairness predict that the frequency with which an offer should be rejected should not depend upon how frequently that offer is made, while models of kindness and reciprocity predict that more frequent bad offers should be rejected more often. In fact, in the same population, when the frequency of \$3.00 offers increases from 3% to 31% the frequency of rejections drops from 85% to 14%. Mechanism design, by contrast, says that punishments should not be issued if they do not accomplish the purpose of discouraging ungenerous offers.

Let me comment on the stark assumptions of the model. All players are assumed to have a common degree of risk aversion, that they agree on an egalitarian social welfare function, and that there are three equally likely types, with the ethical types having a common level of largess. There is little chance that any of these things are true and no doubt a more complicated model would do greater justice to the data. However, the goal here is to ask to what extent a simple model can serve as a useful benchmark for assessing experimental play. Bear in mind that the standard model is even more stark: it assumes no risk aversion and a single type.

Finally, let me comment on the issue of robustness. I do not view this as an issue of whether variations on the model would lead to a slightly better or worse fit. Rather the issue of robustness should be measured by how well the model does across a wide range of experiments and treatments. Never-the-less in Section 10 I show that the model is indeed quite robust to variations.

2. Literature Review

As I indicated, the viewpoint of this paper has precedent and I would be remiss not to acknowledge the extent to which it builds on my earlier work with Rohan and Salvatore in Dutta, Levine and Modica (2021). That paper had ethical players (there called acolytes) and selfish players, but no noise players. Instead it had a noisy signaling technology that (as acknowledged in the paper) makes sense outside the laboratory but not inside the laboratory. Although we did try to calibrate that model, the calibration was clumsy due to the mismatch between the model and the laboratory and there was very little out of sample testing of the calibration. Here I have dropped the signaling technology as it is not relevant to the laboratory and

replaced it with noise players who are. This leads to a cleaner model and one that can be calibrated using only data from non-strategic settings and used as a benchmark (out of sample) in strategic settings.

The work here is also in the spirit of recent work, for example Fudenberg and Karreskog Reh binder (2024), exploring how experimental data can be explained by models that are both simple and sensible. The idea of using a numerical target (here welfare) to measure consistency of the theory with data is reminiscent of the idea of measuring losses in Fudenberg and Levine (1997). Finally, the model is similar to that used by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) who fit a model with altruistic, selfish and noise players to data on the centipede game.

Behavioral Mechanism Design

There is a small but growing theoretical literature on mechanism design with behavioral types that have social preferences. Examples include Kozlovskaya and Nicolo (2019) who study reciprocity and Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) who consider intentions. The theory here builds on those earlier theories, but differs from them through the element of commitment on the part of the ethical players. That is, ethical players are not only altruistic, but can be endogenously “assigned” to socially useful tasks such as creating incentives through punishment. By contrast reciprocal agents or agents concerned about intentions are exogenously hard-wired to behave a certain way. As I will indicate data from ultimatum bargaining strongly favors the “endogenous” hypothesis.

Ingredients of the Model: Ethical Players

As I indicated, the features of the model are not new and the types of players have ample precedent in the literature. In the empirical literature Coase (1960), Ostrom (1990), Townsend (1994) and Levine, Mattozzi and Modica (2022) argue that groups are good at self-organizing to find solutions to mechanism design problems. The formal model of an ethical player is taken directly from Harsanyi (1982) who refers to such players as rule-utilitarian. More recently the idea of ethical players has become important in the study of voting, including the theoretical model of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) and the voting study of Coate and Conlin (2004). Other theoretical and applied uses of these models can be found in Herrera, Morelli and Nunnari (2016) and Levine and Mattozzi (2020) among others. The players in Roemer (2010) have

a similar flavor although they are dedicated to a less traditional Kantian notion of justice rather than the more standard notion of efficiency.

The idea implicit in the ethical players is that they choose the best equilibrium. This idea is scarcely new to the experimental literature, and efficiency considerations have frequently been used to select among equilibria, for example, in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Since that does not predict well in settings such as the stag-hunt games refinements such as risk dominance have been used, for example, in Battalio, Samuelson and Van Huyck (2001). Risk dominance uses hypothetical noise players: the introduction of actual noise players here eliminates the need for hypothetical ones and so behavioral mechanism design here does not use them.

A key element of ethical players is that they are not only willing to “do their bit” but they are committed to doing it. In a sense they solve the Stackelberg problem and are committed to play the Stackelberg action - they play like the Stackelberg types in the reputational theory of Fudenberg and Levine (1989).

The idea that ethical players are willing to “do their bit” but only up to a limit is much the same as the idea of “revoking costs” used in the bargaining literature such as Dutta (2012). It is closely related to the experimental literature on “warm glow” giving. Examples are Andreoni (1990) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997). In Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) as well as Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996) giving in public goods contribution games is accounted for using a model of mixed types similar to that used here.

Ingredients of the Model: Noise Players

As indicated, noise players are not new either. They have been extensively used in the reputational literature, including but not limited to, Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and Levine (1989), and Mailath and Samuelson (2001). Noise traders are widely used in the finance literature: a quick overview can be found in the Palgrave article by Down and Gorton (2008).

As shown in Appendix 2 noise players in this setting are equivalent to players who tremble. Trembles have been widely used in the experimental literature. McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) use trembles to explain play in their centipede experiment. The quantal response players of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) exhibit trembling, and these quantal response models have been extensively used to analyze experimental data. The extensive form quantal response in McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) generates play

similar to that of the noise players here.

Finally, as mentioned, the role of noise players has parallel in the notion of risk dominant equilibrium, especially in the evolutionary literature: see for example Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Young (1993), and more recently Peski (2010) among many others. Although the time frame for evolution and mutations is quite different than considered here, the role of noise is the same.

Psychological Models

As I have indicated the main alternative to the theory here are the many psychological theories of fairness and or reciprocity. In general these are qualitative analyses of experimental data and are not suitable as benchmark models. To mention a few of the more popular theories: Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) develop models of fairness with which they do qualitative analyses for a variety of experiments, and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) do quantitative analyses as well. Charness and Rabin (2002) introduce a psychological theory of fairness with many factors and do a set of experiments determine which are the most important. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) use higher order beliefs to model intentions and reciprocity. This is primarily a qualitative analysis. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) similarly model intentions, kindness and reciprocity. Along somewhat different lines Levine (1986) models intentions that are inferred from type signaling and uses it to analyze several experiments quantitatively.

A good overview of the theoretical and experimental literature in this area can be found in Fehr and Charness (2024). One of their main findings is that players value both fairness and efficiency. Benchmark behavioral mechanism design creates a demand for both by assuming risk aversion and maximizing *ex ante* welfare.

Risk Dominance and Potential Maximization

The mechanism design model, as well as having ethical players who design incentives for selfish players, is also an equilibrium selection model. An important experimental setting for the study of equilibrium selection models are coordination games. Many of these are public goods games in which only the minimum effort matters. I use data from Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) to examine whether the noise players in the calibrated mechanism design model correctly selects the correct equilibrium in these coordination games.

There are two other theories that predict which equilibrium should be seen in coordination games: these are risk dominance theory and potential theory. Both involve noise. In risk dominance theory the noise is hypothetical, while in potential theory it is shown in Goeree and Holt (2005) to lead to a unique quantal response equilibrium in which players tremble.

Risk dominance is studied in the laboratory by Battalio, Samuelson and Van Huyck (2001), who also study quantal response equilibrium. The pure risk dominance theory predicts that either the best or the worst equilibrium will be observed and that is not always the case in experimental coordination games.

Quantal response (or potential maximization, which is the same thing) leads to intermediate level equilibria with the level of contributions to the public good decreasing in number of players and cost of effort, and increasing in the marginal benefit of the minimum effort. The mechanism design model makes the same qualitative predictions, and these qualitative predictions are verified in work by Goeree and Holt (2005) and Chen and Chen (2011). I have not examined the quantitative implications of the calibrated mechanism design model for these three experiments, while the quantal response models used by the authors of these studies estimate the noise parameter from the experimental data.

Quantitative Calibration: Benchmark Models

As indicated, in addition to the selfish risk-neutral Nash model, there are two models that are potential benchmark models.

Levine (1986) calibrates a type signaling model on ultimatum and a public goods contribution game. There are two parameters describing the three types: altruistic, spiteful, and selfish (constituting 52% of the population). There are two out of sample analyses, that of the centipede game and that of a market game. Both are relatively successful.

Fehr and Schmidt (1999) calibrate a preference for fairness from ultimatum game data. There are two parameters one of which can take on four values and one three. The calibration is not complete as they do not specify the correlation between the two parameters. They conduct three out of sample analyses, that of a market game and that of a public good contribution games with and without punishment. All three are relatively successful. They also give a qualitative analysis of the trust game.

Fehr and Schmidt (1999) also examine dictator, which fails. Levine (1986) did not discuss dictator, but it is easy to apply the model and it fails even worse than Fehr and Schmidt (1999). By contrast, the benchmark behavioral mechanism design does fine, although this is not an out of sample test as the largesse of ethical players is calibrated from dictator data.

In both the Levine (1986) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) models there can be multiple equilibria so that the predictions of those theories are not sharp. I want to emphasize that in contrast to these other models - including selfish risk neutral Nash - the theory here makes sharp predictions. There is a single number - the optimal social welfare - that is spit out by the model from experimental instructions and can easily be compared to the empirical data. The play leading to that optimum need not be unique but often is, including in settings where the other models make few useful predictions.

Finally, let me indicate that while the quantal response model has proven extremely useful in analyzing experimental data it is not a benchmark model. First, it requires a parameter, the intensity of preference for optimal behavior, to be estimated from the data *ex post*. Unfortunately at the current time nobody has developed a systematic theory of how that parameter depends upon the experimental setting or instructions - hence the theory does not make *ex ante* predictions. Second, many of the experiments here, notably ultimatum bargaining and public goods contribution games with punishment, cannot be explained without some sort of social preferences - indeed this is why models of social preferences were developed. It is possible to combine quantal response with social preferences - see, for example, Levine and Zheng (2015) - but so far nobody has proposed a systematic way of doing this.

Strategic Reasoning

I would be remiss not to mention a related, but in many ways, orthogonal enterprise, that of creating a benchmark model of strategic reasoning. This literature, surveyed in Crawford, Costa-Gomes and Iriberry (2013) focuses on play in the first period so that learning can be excluded. It is in a sense opposite this paper, which focuses on equilibrium play that is the consequence of learning. The strategic reasoning literature has had some success with the Stahl and Wilson (1995) hierarchical level- k reasoning model. Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) develop a benchmark model of a Poisson distribution over types with a single parameter for which the value 1.5

they argue provides a reasonable description of first period play across a range of experiments.

I should indicate that this literature focuses on coordination games in which social preferences should not matter. This is in order to isolate strategic reasoning. By contrast the focus in this paper is on games in which social preferences do matter, although the stag-hunt game provides an overlap.

3. The Model

The setting is that of a game. Although this may be an extensive form game to limit notation I formally describe only the normal form. There are n player roles and each player role has a finite strategy space $s^i \in S^i$ with payoffs $u^i(s^i, s^{-i})$. Mixed strategies are denoted by σ^i and $u^i(\sigma)$ is the expected utility. Each player role is drawn privately from a single population in which there are three types: (S)elfish, (N)oise and (E)thical, where $\tau \in \{S, N, E\}$ denotes the type and $\phi_\tau > 0$ is the fraction of the population that is type τ with the obvious property that $\phi_S + \phi_N + \phi_E = 1$. Player roles are partitioned into classes of roles that are indistinguishable and mixed strategies for a type are feasible if and only if they are symmetric within each class. For example, in a fourteen player public goods contribution game with identical players there are 14 player roles, but players cannot distinguish what their “player number” is.

As expected the selfish types are standard players who try to maximize their utility $u^i(s^i, s^{-i})$ for the player role i they are assigned. The noise type plays according to a fixed probability distribution σ_N with $\sigma_N^i(s^i) > 0$. The ethical players are public spirited and committed to act as mechanism designers, choosing incentive compatible strategies for themselves and the selfish types to maximize a social welfare function as I now explain.

To be specific, for given mixed strategies for each type σ_τ denote the mixture by $\sigma = \sum_\tau \phi_\tau \sigma_\tau$. The mechanism design problem can be stated as a choice of σ_S, σ_E to maximize the expected per capita social welfare function

$$E \sum_\tau w_\tau \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n u^i(\sigma_\tau, \sigma^{-i})}{n}$$

where the welfare weights $w_\tau \geq 0$ and $\sum_\tau w_\tau = 1$. For selfish types there are incentive

constraints for $i = 1, \dots, n$ and $s^i \in S^i$

$$u^i(\sigma_S^i, \sigma^{-i}) \geq u^i(s^i, \sigma^{-i}).$$

In addition the willingness of the ethical players to contribute to the public cause is not unlimited and the ethical players are characterized by a utility limit γ , the *largesse*, on how much they are willing to sacrifice. This gives additional incentive constraints

$$u^i(\sigma_E^i, \sigma^{-i}) + \gamma \geq u^i(\sigma_S^i, \sigma^{-i}).$$

Discussion of the Model

Two aspects of the model deserve mention. First, I have not assumed that the welfare weights are all positive. It might be, for example, that the ethical players do not care about the noise players, viewing them as being deviant. Or they might care only about the welfare of the ethical types.

Second: the behavior of the ethical types (and possibly of the selfish types as well) is not individualistic. Coate and Conlin (2004) follow Harsanyi (1982) in calling ethical voters as “group rule-utilitarian” and this is accurate. That is, ethical players ask: what would we like to happen (given the incentive constraints) and how can we do our share to make it happen? In particular: even if $\gamma = 0$, or, as is the case in stag-hunt if γ is irrelevant, if there are multiple equilibria the ethical players get to select the most favorable equilibrium. It is for this reason that one of my applications is to the stag hunt game. Ordinarily this is viewed as a failure of the hypothesis that most favorable equilibria are selected. As I will show this is not the case for the calibrated behavioral mechanism design model: the presence of the noise players changes the calculus of both equilibrium and welfare and is consistent with what is seen in stag hunt experiments. I emphasize in addition that ethical types are not merely willing “to do their bit” but are committed to doing so.

Incentive Constraints

The incentive constraints are applied after player roles have been assigned and types determined, but, if the game is sequential, before moves take place. Hence the equilibrium concept is Nash rather than subgame perfect. In this setting with noise players who play everything with positive probability this distinction is meaning-

less: every information set feasible given a player's strategy is reached with positive probability, Bayes law always applies, and every Nash equilibrium is sequential.

The *ex ante* nature of the incentive constraints does have implications for the behavior of the ethical players. For example, an ethical player who is moving second in a game may respond to an unlikely move of the first player by taking a greater loss than γ . This is because they are committed to do “whatever it takes” when the time comes, provided the *ex ante* expected loss from doing so is not too great. I should note that in experimental treatments where one round is chosen at random to be paid the commitment is automatic: at the time the decision is made the action chosen is purely hypothetical and will involve an actual loss only with some probability - after the fact it is impossible to renege.

Existence of a Solution

The one relevant, although unsurprising, theoretical fact is that the behavioral mechanism design problem here has a solution. For completeness I give a proof.

Theorem 3.1. *The problem of maximizing social welfare subject to the incentive constraints has a solution.*

Proof. This follows if the expected utility functions are continuous in the strategies and the constraint set is closed and non-empty. Continuity of expected utility in strategies follows from the fact that the game is finite so they are multi-linear. The constraint set is closed because the utility functions are continuous and the constraints are defined by weak inequalities. The only substantive issue is whether the constraint set is non-empty. Since the noise players act as “nature” there is a Nash equilibrium for the selfish and ethical players in which the ethical players act selfishly: this satisfies all the constraints. \square

4. Overview

Before analyzing the experiments in detail I first give an overview of the calibrated model and results. The utility function $u(m)$ for monetary payoffs and γ are calibrated to data. This is done below, but I want to indicate that this calibration is for standard stakes with students as participants: those are the applications I am going to consider. I suspect that for other stakes and with other populations this calibration would not “work.” In addition the theory is an equilibrium theory and we only observe something

resembling equilibrium in the laboratory when participants have an adequate chance to play and learn. Consequently, in the applications I will only look at data from late periods of play. Exactly what this means is described below. As indicated all treatments are classical experiments that have been replicated many times. Further details about the selection of experiments and treatments can be found in Appendix 3.

The Calibrated Model

Besides the monetary payoff function, which is given by the experimental instructions, the mechanism design problem depends upon the utility $u(m)$ for monetary payoffs m , the largesse γ of ethical players, the weights w_τ in the social welfare function, the fractions of types ϕ_τ , and the strategy of the noise types σ_N .

Here is the calibrated model. Utility is given by the “short-run” function from Fudenberg and Levine (2011) that they show to be consistent with risk aversion outside the laboratory. It is

$$u(m) = 1 - (1 + m/C)^{1-\rho}$$

where $C = \$40.00$ is an estimate of daily “pocket cash” and ρ is a coefficient of relative risk aversion determined from laboratory choices over gambles as $\rho = 9.0$.

If there are T paid rounds then largesse in each round is $u^{-1}(\gamma) = \$1.00/T$. For the utility weights and fractions the simplest assumption and the one I will adopt is the *uniformity hypothesis*: this is $w_\tau = \phi_\tau = 1/3$.

For the behavior of the noise players σ_N I adopt the *maximum entropy hypothesis*. I first partition and order the actions at each information set by weak dominance. Within each weak dominance class actions are chosen with equal probability; and each weak dominance class has the same probability as the combination of all lower weak dominance classes. For example, the probability that some weakly undominated strategy is chosen is equal to the probability that some weakly dominated strategy is chosen.

Details and discussion of this calibration are below in section 5.

Results

The strong prediction made by solving the mechanism design problem concerns welfare. This is reported below in Table 4.1 for the six experiments and seventeen

treatments analyzed in this paper. Details about how these experiments were chosen can be found in Appendix 3.³

		period(s)	theory	data	actual err	SGP err	FS err
stag	$n = 2p$	7	\$1.18	\$1.18	\$0.00	\$0.22*	
	$n = 2s$	5	\$1.18	\$0.91	\$0.27	\$0.39*	
	$n = 14$	10	\$0.64	\$0.60	\$0.04	\$0.70*	
	$n = 15$	10	\$0.60	\$0.66	-\$0.06	\$0.64*	
	$n = 16$	10	\$0.60	\$0.61	-\$0.01	\$0.69*	
ult	no obs	10 – 40	\$3.45	\$3.44	\$0.01	\$0.08	\$1.38
	obs	10 – 40	\$3.45	\$3.43	\$0.02	\$0.10	\$1.40
pub	no pun	10	\$1.51	\$1.51	\$0.00	-\$0.01	
	pun 1	10	\$1.80	\$1.64	\$0.16	-\$0.14	
	pun 2	10	\$1.88	\$1.78	\$0.10	-\$0.28	\$0.63*
	pun 3	10	\$1.91	\$1.99	-\$0.08	-\$0.49	\$0.42*
	pun 4	10	\$1.92	\$1.91	\$0.01	-\$0.41	\$0.50*
gift	human	10	\$1.03	\$0.86	\$0.17	-\$0.69	\$0.46
	robot	10	\$1.05	\$1.15	-\$0.10	-\$0.35	-\$0.04
PD	PD1	9	\$0.22	\$0.19	\$0.03	-\$0.02	
	PD2	9 – 10	\$0.25	\$0.23	\$0.02	-\$0.01	
mar		10	\$0.35	\$0.44	-\$0.09	\$0.00	

Table 4.1: Welfare

*equilibrium selected as most efficient

n in stag hunt is number of players, for $n = 2$ the s denotes strangers and p partners in ultimatum bargaining no obs is the standard treatment and obs is the treatment where the play of another player is observed in the public goods game pun represents the punishment factor (or no punishment)

The experiments are stag (hunt), ult(imatum bargaining), pub(lic good contributions), gift (exchange), one shot P(risoner’s) D(ilemma), and the mar(ket auction). Welfare is reported in certainty equivalent units by applying u^{-1} to the expected utility of a player in the game generated by the theory. I then computed the actual utility from the data in the same units and the difference between the theory and the data (actual err). This in itself proves little: it is possible to develop theories that generate predictions that do not depend upon the data at all: for example, the

³Appendix 11 reports on results for the two one-shot PD treatments and Appendix 12 the market auction game (mkt). The remaining games are discussed in the text. To avoid informational overload I do not report standard errors here. They are discussed in the context of specific experiments in the text and in Appendix 13. They add little to the information presented in the table.

maximum possible payoff in the game. It is important to know that there is a wide range of possible predictions for welfare, that is, that the theory can be wrong. To this end, as I explain in Appendix 4, I computed welfare for two other benchmark theories, selfish risk neutral subgame perfect equilibrium (subgame perfection or SGP) and the calibrated Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (FS) model. In the final two columns I then computed the error for each of these other theories. In cases where there were multiple equilibria (marked with a *) I followed Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and picked the most efficient one.

For one game, the public good game with no punishment, all the theories agree that there will be very little contribution. In thirteen of the other sixteen treatments the actual error for benchmark behavioral mechanism design is no more than \$0.10 in absolute terms. By contrast, the other theories come within \$0.10 of empirical welfare in only five of the fourteen treatments and often have much higher errors. Overall, I take this to mean that benchmark behavioral mechanism design does fairly well in predicting welfare.

In the table I have highlighted the three anomalies identified by the calibrated model. These are the stag hunt game with strangers (players are randomly matched each period), the punishment factor one public goods game, and the human gift exchange game. These I will examine below, but for the moment note that the first and worst anomaly, the stag hunt anomaly, occurs with relatively inexperienced players who got to play only five periods. For the punishment factor one public goods game both subgame perfection and Fehr-Schmidt do better than mechanism design under predicting welfare by \$0.14 rather than over predicting it by \$0.16, but none of the theories do terribly well. For the human gift exchange game, both subgame perfection and the Fehr-Schmidt theory do substantially worse than mechanism design.

There are two cases in which subgame perfect equilibrium does well and has long been known to do so: in the one-shot PD and the market auction game. In the former case benchmark behavioral mechanism design does not do much worse. In the market auction game benchmark behavioral mechanism design does less well, but as I indicate in Appendix 12 the sole reason for this is that the theory makes the unreasonable assumption that noise players are willing to throw away roughly \$10.00 for no reason 50% of the time.

The other case in which an alternative theory does well - subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining - is, unfortunately, a case of the broken clock being right twice

a day: subgame perfection makes two offsetting errors. On the one hand it under predicts the generosity of offers, predicting \$1.00 offers as against at least \$3.63 in the data. This lowers welfare. On the other hand it also under predicts rejections, predicting that no offers will be rejected, while the actual rejection rate in the data is about 20%. This raises welfare and the two errors more or less cancel out. In contrast the Fehr-Schmidt model does poorly with ultimatum welfare, over predicting by more than \$1.37. Unlike subgame perfection Fehr-Schmidt gets the distribution of offers fairly accurate for one of the two ultimatum games, but over predicts welfare because it gets the rejection rate too low. This shows that the details are important. Using standard measures of behavior such as the distribution of contributions to public goods or offers in bargaining and, where relevant, measures of second mover behaviors such as conditional punishments and rejection rates, I will go through the details of the benchmark mechanism design model shortly.

The Key Ingredients

The key ingredients of the model are the ethical players with their largesse, the noise players, and risk aversion. The role of these three ingredients depends on the class of game studied. Here there are three classes of games: I have followed the earlier literature that do studies across different classes of games in selecting these. The details can be found in Appendix 3. Let me briefly indicate what goes wrong for each type of game if one of these ingredients is omitted.

The PD and market auction are games where standard SGP is known to perform well and are usually included in studies of this type as a sanity check to make sure that existing good results are not “unexplained.” Because these games are not central to the paper the detailed analysis is in the appendices. For these games adding largesse, noise players, and risk aversion is clearly not needed - the goal is to check that they do not “unexplain” what is already explained. They do not, albeit with some caveats as discussed in Appendices 10 and 11.

I included stag hunt because behavioral mechanism design is an equilibrium selection theory and I wanted to check that in a setting where social preferences (largesse) does not matter that the theory yields the correct equilibrium selection. Here largesse and risk aversion do not matter, including them or excluding them makes no difference. However, the noise players are crucial and deliver the correct equilibrium selection.

The ultimatum, public goods games with punishment, and gift exchange games are standard and well established examples of how standard SGP fails badly. In ultimatum standard SGP predicts everything demanded and nothing rejected while in actuality many offers are rejected and offers are closer to a 50-50 split. In public goods games with punishment the prediction is there will be little contribution to the public good because nobody is willing to punish. In actuality punishment is widely used and provides incentives resulting in large and in some cases nearly first best contributions to the public good. In gift exchange, games standard SGP predicts no gifts will be exchanged while in the laboratory the gifts that are exchanged are substantial.

Ultimatum bargaining requires all three elements of the theory. Without largesse, in ultimatum bargaining, nobody is willing to provide incentives for good offers by rejecting bad ones (noise players reject all equally). Hence the equilibrium collapses to the usual “ask for everything and get it” (plus with noise players some not very interesting noise). This is never observed in any ultimatum experiment. Risk aversion creates a demand for fairness: without it the ethical players could implement the first best by rejecting no offers with all selfish and ethical players demanding and getting nine dollars (except from the noise players). This is strongly counter-factual. The point here is to establish that the level of risk aversion from individual lottery choice data is consistent with the demand for fairness observed in ultimatum bargaining hence provides a unified theory.

Noise players also play a crucial role in ultimatum bargaining. Because there are noise players, punishments must be issued on the equilibrium path and this is socially costly. Hence the ethical players must trade off an increased cost of punishment against an improved outcome. Without the noise players the ethical players would simply implement the first best at no actual cost of punishment and equilibrium would collapse to the first best with all offers being an equal split and no offers rejected. In fact splits of 60-40 are far more common and many offers are rejected.

In the public goods contribution games studied here the stakes are too low for risk aversion to play a role and fairness is not at issue. However, largesse and noise players play the same crucial role that they do in ultimatum bargaining. Largesse is needed so that the ethical players are willing to provide incentives by punishing non-contributors and noise players make these punishments socially costly so that the ethical players cannot simply implement the first best at no cost.

The gift exchange game is like public goods with punishment in that largesse is crucial in allowing the receiver to reciprocate the sender's gift, and so create incentives for sending it. In contrast to the other games, noise is not so crucial, as no gifts need be provided to noise players.

The sensitivity of the model to the parameters is examined quantitatively and in greater detail in Section 10 below. Before that I explain how the calibration was done, then go through the details of the theory and data.

5. Benchmark Calibration for Long-Term Play

The utility $u(m)$ for monetary payoffs m , the largesse γ of ethical players, the welfare weights w_τ , the fractions of types ϕ_τ and the strategy of the noise types σ_N all must be calibrated. As indicated for the utility weights and fractions are not calibrated to data, rather I adopt the uniformity hypothesis: this is $w_\tau = \phi_\tau = 1/3$. Similarly as I describe below the strategy of the noise players is derived from the maximum entropy hypothesis. Then I calibrate σ_N and $u(m)$, as these are needed for calibrating γ , and conclude by calibrating γ .

For the weights and the play of the noise players, uniformity is relatively standard. For the types, it is the only data free assumption, and therefore seems a natural starting point. Indeed, a uniform distribution over types is typically used in theoretical studies, beginning with Akerlof (1978). As I shall show in section 10 the predictions of the model are relatively robust to the exact distribution over types.

I should add: the fraction of noise players is large relative to those used in level- k analysis (see Crawford, Costa-Gomes and Iriberri (2013)) but I will present evidence that it fits the experimental data rather well. Probably a slightly lower fraction would work a bit better, but this is at odds with the goal of producing a simple benchmark model. There is also reason to believe that, for short term play, there are likely to be a higher fraction of noise players than in the calibration used here to study long term play. Estimates from the quantal response model indicate that the amount of noise falls over time. This is one of the main findings of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), and has been supported in many subsequent studies. Indeed, in the two player strangers treatment stag hunt game, studied in section 6, the number of dissidents, a measure of how many noise players there are, falls substantially over the course of play.

I want to emphasize that in the calibration of risk aversion and largesse I have taken data from standard experiments using best practices that have been replicated

many times. In addition, I use only data from non-strategic settings. By this I mean games where strategies are ordered by strict dominance with respect to monetary payoffs: single player decision problems, dictator games, and lotteries.

There is also an issue of type persistence. The bottom line is that in partners treatments I assume that types are randomly redrawn after each game: the issue is discussed further in Appendix 9.

Entropy Maximization in the Agent Normal Form

Strictly speaking I do not calibrate σ_N at all, rather I assume that it is noisy in the sense of maximizing a measure of entropy. As it is the behavior of noise players that matters, it makes sense to talk of behavior strategies and the most straightforward assumption is that the noise players randomize uniformly over actions at each information set. This leads to absurd play in some settings, so I instead adopt the maximum entropy hypothesis which I now describe.

To motivate the maximum entropy hypothesis, consider the public goods game with punishment studied by Fehr and Gächter (2000). Here in the second stage of a game a player must decide how to allocate 20 “punishment points” among three opponents. These are costly both to the punisher and the punished.

What does this structure mean in terms of the information set where punishment is allocated? There is one action in which no punishment points are allocated. There are three actions in which one punishment point is allocated among the three opponents, and in general there are $(k+1)(k+2)/2$ actions which allocate k punishment points among three opponents. The point is that a uniform distribution over actions at this information set implies that large numbers of punishment points are far more likely than small numbers because there are many more ways to allocate them. In particular the probability that six or fewer punishment points are assigned is less than 5% while the probability that 16 or more punishment points are assigned is more than 50%. This is not reasonable and is grossly inconsistent with the play of laboratory participants.

To provide a more “reasonable” description of the play of noise players, I instead categorize actions and assume that entropy is first maximized between categories, then within categories. Specifically, working in the agent normal form so as to deal with behavior strategies and actions at information sets, for each information set I at which player i is playing, strategies can be divided into those that are weakly

dominated $W^0(I)$ and those that are not $N^0(I)$. By *zero order reasonableness* I mean that it should not be more likely to play a weakly dominated strategy than a weakly undominated strategy:

$$\Pr(N^0(I)) \geq \Pr(W^0(I)).$$

This criterion should be applied recursively: we can define $W^1(I)$ as the subset of $W^0(I)$ that are weakly dominated by a strategy in $W^0(I)$ and $N^1(I)$ as those which are not, and continuing in this way define $W^k(I), N^i(I)$ until we run out of strategies. The *reasonableness constraints* are

$$\Pr(N^k(I)) \geq \Pr(W^k(I)).$$

The maximum entropy hypothesis then asserts that entropy should be maximized among categories subject to the reasonableness constraints: in particular actions within each category are chosen with equal probability.

In the example the constraints bind so the maximum entropy hypothesis gives rise to the punishment strategy for the noise players: the probability of issuing k punishment points is $(1/2)^{k+1}$ for $k \leq 19$ and $(1/2)^{20}$ for $k = 20$. For each level of punishment k there are 3^k ways of allocating those punishments among three opponents, and each of these has equal probability.

Risk Aversion

It has long been observed that players are risk averse over the small stakes in laboratory experiments. Risk aversion plays a key role in the theory both because there are risks and because it induces a demand for fairness. That is, if agents are risk averse, maximizing *ex ante* expected utility of a player means that an equal split provides both players with insurance. The social optimality of the equal split plays a key role in the analysis of ultimatum bargaining and in gift exchange.

As indicated, the utility function is taken from Fudenberg and Levine (2011) as $u(m) = 1 - (1 + m/C)^{1-\rho}$ where $C = \$40.00$ is an estimate of daily “pocket cash.” This was estimated by Fudenberg and Levine (2011) using aggregate US data on consumption and savings. The coefficient of relative risk aversion $\rho = 9$ is estimated below. I should indicate that over the relevant range it makes little difference what utility function is fit to the data. In Appendix 1, I have plotted, along with the calibrated utility function, a CARA utility function fit to the Gneezy and Potters

(1997) data: it looks the same over the relevant range of zero to ten dollars, and my results would not be substantively different if that function was used instead. I also show in section 10 that my results are robust to substantial changes in the coefficient of relative risk aversion.

To calibrate ρ I used data from the risky investment data of Gneezy and Potters (1997). For robustness I checked this result against the multiple price list approach popularized by Holt and Laury (2002). These methods are discussed in the review paper Charness, Gneezy and Imas (2013) and are the two methods used as objective measures of risk aversion in the large scale standardized survey of Snowberg and Yariv (2021). In both cases I used data from the original papers.

Gneezy and Potters (1997) give 84 participants an endowment of \$1.20 and ask them to decide how much to invest in a risk project that pays nothing with probability $2/3$ and pays 3.5 times the investment with probability $1/3$. They played nine times: the average investment was $x = \$0.30$ and did not vary much from round to round. Differentiating the objective function

$$(2/3)u(1.20 - x) + (1/3)u(1.20 - x + (3.5)x)$$

with respect to x , equating to zero, substituting $x = \$0.30$, and solving for ρ yields the estimate $\rho = 8.7$. In keeping with the policy of rounding off to avoid spurious precision, I used $\rho = 9$ for the calibration.

Second, following Fudenberg and Levine (2011), I use data from Holt and Laury (2002)'s normal stakes experiments to derive an lower and upper bound on the median value of ρ . They provide 187 participants with a menu of paired lottery choices where the first is a lottery between \$2.00 and \$1.60 the second between \$3.85 and \$0.10. The menu gives different probabilities between the first and second prize. They find when the odds are 50 – 50 that 70% of participants take the safe choice, while when the odds are 60 – 40 only 45% of participants take the safe choice. For the first lottery indifference requires $\rho = 4.2$ and for the latter $\rho = 12.5$. These two values give a range of possible values for the median, and the calibrated value of $\rho = 9$ lies comfortably within that range.

Those familiar with the literature on risk aversion in the laboratory may be puzzled by the fact that these values of ρ are much higher than appear in other studies. This is because I have assumed a “wealth” of $C = \$40.00$ while other studies assume much

smaller “wealth.” With larger wealth risk aversion must be larger to fit the data.

One additional remark is important for interpreting the numerical values of welfare and utility: they are reported in certainty equivalent units, that is, by applying u^{-1} .

Largesse

How much are ethical players willing to sacrifice for the common good, or to say the same thing, what is γ ? To answer this question I use data only from non-strategic settings where actions are completely ordered by strict dominance with respect to monetary payoffs: these are the dictator game, the one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and public goods contribution games without punishment. The bottom line is that if there are T paid rounds then I take $u^{-1}(\gamma) = \$1.00/T$.

I am interested in games where experienced players have played many times. A robust finding from many studies is that willingness to give declines substantially over time. Figure 5.1 below plots contributions over time from Fehr and Gächter (2000)’s repeated public goods contribution game with about 66 strangers, and another with about 44 partners. In the final period the two are quite similar and the average of the two $\mu = 0.268$ I take to be the long-term ratio. For comparative purposes I also show the fraction of the population cooperating in Dal Bo (2005)’s one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game with 390 strangers. This is quantitatively quite similar to the Fehr and Gächter (2000) stranger treatment and stabilizes in about the 7th round with the average over the last four rounds equal to 0.242.




Figure 5.1: Willingness to Give Declines with Experience

I view the long-term ratio μ as discount factor that multiplies giving in a first time game to determine giving for a pool of experienced players. To determine first time giving I use data from the dictator game.

In the dictator game one player allocates a fixed amount between themselves and one other player. The basic source of information about dictator is the Engel (2011) meta-study based on 83 papers with a total of 20,813 observations. The key relevant finding is that with student participants the donation rate is about 25%. The most common dictator game in the laboratory is for \$10 stakes where giving is in whole dollars.

In the standard \$10 dictator game with students in the laboratory Engel (2011)'s data indicates we can expect an average contribution of \$2.50. Discounting this by $\mu = 0.268$ and taking account of the fact that the experienced noise players each contribute on average \$1.00 yields the formula for the willingness of the ethical players to contribute

$$u^{-1}(\gamma) = 3(2.50)\mu - 1 = 1.00. \quad (5.1)$$

The given value of γ makes sense when one round is chosen randomly to be paid. When all rounds are paid it makes sense that the given value of γ applies to the entire game. That is, if the game is played ten times it makes no sense that each time it is played the ethical players are willing to sacrifice \$1.00, but rather that they are willing to sacrifice that much over the entire course of play, that is, \$0.10 for each round. More generally, if there are T paid rounds I take $u^{-1}(\gamma) = \$1.00/T$.

I note that there is an issue with the γ constraint failing to bind which would invalidate these computations - in Appendix 5 I show that the calculations here are robust to this concern.

Long Term Play

As indicated the theory is an equilibrium theory and we only observe something resembling equilibrium in the laboratory when participants have an adequate chance to play and learn. Consequently, in the applications I will only look at data from late periods of play. What exactly does this mean?

The usual practice for experiments that provide “adequate time to learn” as practiced in the literature is “ten periods or more” although experiments that are explicitly designed to study learning dynamics sometimes use more periods. I would summarize many decades of experience by saying that there is a consensus that ten periods is usually enough. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 4.1 most of the experiments here gave participants ten periods of play.

To provide a bit more context, I gathered data from an unrelated experiments by

Dal Bo and Frechette (2011). In these experiments participants played an indefinite ending repeated prisoner’s dilemma supergame many times against different opponents. These are strategically complex games so learning over the course of play is an important issue. Table 5.1 below provides information about cooperation rates based on how many supergames have been played. The results are pooled across three different payoff matrices for each of the different discount factors (continuation probabilities) of $1/2$ and $3/4$ in the study. As can be seen the tenth match is substantially different from the average of the first nine matches, but quite similar to the subsequent matches.

discount factor	match			number of matches
	1 – 9	10	11+	
$1/2$	0.26	0.20	0.21	59 – 77
$3/4$	0.37	0.56	0.57	23 – 47

Table 5.1: Cooperation Rates in Repeated Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Figure 5.1 based on public goods contribution games similarly shows substantial convergence by period 10.

Many of the experiments here are partner treatments in which the same players play with each other in every period. To avoid repeated game effects this means that only the final period should be used. As this is ordinarily the tenth period, for consistency, in strangers treatments, I take data beginning with the tenth period until the final period.⁴ This is a rule-based approach for which the periods of data used is determined from the experimental instructions without looking at the data, so is suitable for a benchmark theory.⁵

Finally I should note that the results here are robust in the sense that, for example, using the final two periods of play in the partners treatment makes little difference.

6. Stag Hunt

The first experiments I analyze are the stag hunt games of Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) designed to illustrate how coordination on efficient equilibria can

⁴When possible I also check that using only late periods does not matter.

⁵As can be seen in Table 4.1 there is one exception which is PD2. In PD1 participants never got to play ten times and it seemed wrong for comparative purposes to compare the ninth match in PD1 with the tenth match in PD2 so I took the cutoff for “enough times” to be nine rather than ten.

fail. This class of games is interesting because the standard benchmark theories Fehr-Schmidt and subgame perfection have little to say about these games, and what little they do say is wrong.

The games studied in Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990) are simultaneous move n player games in which each player chooses effort in dollars $q^i = \{0.10, 0.20, \dots, 0.70\}$. The monetary payoff of i is given by

$$m^i(q^i, q^{-i}) = .60 + 2.0 \min\{q^j\} - q^i.$$

Players are paid for every period. There are two treatments: one with a large fixed population that plays for ten periods with $n \in \{14, 15, 16\}$. Three sessions were conducted with $n = 16$ and two each with $n = 14, 15$. The other treatment is for a small population with $n = 2$: this is done both with a fixed population (partners) and randomly matched players (strangers).

Qualitative Analysis. In the stag hunt game no individual player, nor even a third of them, have a substantial chance of raising the minimum, so social preferences including largesse play no role. Rather it is the play of the noise players together with equilibrium selection that is crucial. With a large population (14 or more players) the chances one player messes it up for everyone by choosing a low effort is high and it is impossible to sustain high levels of effort. With a small population the chance of the one other player messing it up is not so great and high effort levels are sustainable. Hence the theory predicts low effort levels in the large population and high effort levels in the small population. This is characteristic of stag hunt experiments. As discussed in the literature review, risk dominance and potential maximization make similar predictions to the mechanism design model. Characteristic of noise players is that, unlike in other theories, there should be dissidents who fail to play the modal action, and indeed that nearly a third of the population should be dissidents. This is, in fact, true. Note that this analysis provides a strong rationale for explicitly including noise players in substantial numbers: if noise players and equilibrium selection were added to existing models such as Nash equilibrium or models of social preferences the results would be identical to those found here.

Description of the Solution. In all cases the mechanism design problem has a unique solution. All the selfish and ethical players choose the same target level of effort.

When $n = 2$ noise players are rare and every target effort level is an equilibrium. Welfare is increasing in the target and so the optimum is maximal effort \$0.70. When $n = 14, 15, 16$ the chances of at least one noise player are high and there are only equilibria with low effort levels. Specifically, when $n = 14$ the effort levels \$0.10, \$0.20 are equilibria and the optimum is \$0.20. When $n = 15, 16$ the only equilibrium is \$0.10 so this is the optimum.

Below in Table 6.1 I summarize the theoretical solution and the data from the final period of play. Note that the maximum attainable joint money payoff is \$1.30 per player.

n	strangers	welfare		mean effort		period	participants
		theory	data	theory	data		
2	no	1.18	1.18	0.60	0.64	7	28
2	yes	1.18	0.91	0.60	0.53	5	16
14	no	0.64	0.60	0.27	0.19	10	28
15	no	0.60	0.66	0.20	0.14	10	30
16	no	0.60	0.61	0.20	0.18	10	48

Table 6.1: Summary of Stag Hunt

Qualitatively the theory does extremely well capturing the fact that welfare and effort are higher with fewer players. Quantitatively the theory does reasonably well: however when $n = 2$ with strangers the theoretical welfare is substantially greater than welfare in the data.

I turn now to a more detailed analysis of the mechanism design problem in these stag hunt games.

The Large Population Game

I should start by noting that the large population games are played with a fixed set of players: a partners rather than strangers treatment. However, as indicated, data is from the final period so that there are no repeated game effects.

To solve the mechanism design problem observe that there are no weakly dominated strategies, so that the noise players randomize uniformly over contributions. Using this, I compute the utility of a selfish player for a particular contribution under the assumption that no selfish or ethical player is choosing a smaller contribution: I refer to this as the *popular minimum*, as it is the minimum for 2/3rds of the population, although it need not be the minimum at all when noise players are accounted

for. As the combinatorics of the noise players is complicated, I computed utility by matching players in a Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000,000 draws. The results are below in Table 6.2 for the case $n = 16$.

popular minimum	$n = 16$	welfare
0.70	0.27	0.36
0.60	0.37	0.43
0.50	0.46	0.50
0.40	0.56	0.55
0.30	0.64	0.60
0.20	0.695	0.63
0.10	0.700	0.60

Table 6.2: Large Population Game: Selfish Payoff

It follows from these utilities that for selfish players each wants to reduce the popular minimum: the only equilibrium behavior is for all to contribute the minimum \$0.10. In Appendix 6 I show that this is also the optimum for the ethical players.

From Table 6.2 it should be clear that the equilibrium at \$0.10 rather than at \$0.20 is delicate: this is why I used the full risk averse utility function even though risk aversion is minor over these stakes. With $n = 14$ there is an equilibrium at \$0.20 as well as \$0.10 and this would be chosen by the ethical players.

Also from Table 6.2 observe that the gain in social welfare of moving from \$0.10 to \$0.20 is small: it is about \$0.03. This highlights a limitation of the mechanism design: while the prediction of welfare is strong, even if equilibrium is unique it may be delicate in the sense that a small perturbation of the parameters may cause it to jump. Moreover, it seems unrealistic that an equilibrium could jump with respect to such a tiny change: in the $n = 14$ game the loss to a selfish player to erroneously choosing effort \$0.10 rather than \$0.20 is less than half a cent, and if even a modest fraction of them wrongly decide \$0.10 is best they all want to switch. This is known problem with mechanism design: it allows the designer to choose equilibria that are not terribly robust.

Dissidents

Consider the Fehr-Schmidt and subgame perfection theories. For these minimum games fairness is not at issue and a player with social preferences behaves no differently than a selfish player: there is no benefit from increasing effort above the minimum

or decreasing effort below the minimum. In other words, in the usual way with coordination games, every common effort level is an equilibrium. The only prediction made by these theories is that there should be no dissidents in the sense that every player should play the modal effort level. In Table 6.3 below I provide information about the modal effort levels for the $n = 15, 16$ games and the fraction of dissidents. As can be seen the prediction of no dissidents fails badly as more than a quarter of the population are dissidents. By contrast the behavioral mechanism design benchmark makes precise and correct predictions about the modal effort levels and matches the number of dissidents in the large population games quite well.

n	modal effort		dissidents	
	theory	data	theory	data
15, 16	0.10	0.10	29%	27%

Table 6.3: Dissidents are those not choosing the modal effort

It is interesting also to take a look at what the dissidents do. Below in Figure 6.1 I plot the theoretical ($n = 15$ or $n = 16$) and empirical distribution (all large population sessions pooled) of contributions conditional on contributing more than \$0.10. As is assumed, the theory is flat. What is interesting is the data: there is a slight bias towards lower contributions and against intermediate contributions. What is striking though is the high fraction who are contributing the maximum: \$0.70. This is especially the case since in no round of any session was the minimum ever close to \$0.70. Perhaps these noise players are making a statement?

I should indicate that the data here is weak. There are 106 observations and 7 of them have effort \$0.70. In the theory each player has a $1/3$ chance of being a noise player, and a noise player has a $1/7$ chance of providing effort \$0.70. The binomial probability of getting 7 or more such draws in 106 trials is fairly large by the standards of statistical significance: 13.3%.




Figure 6.1: Dissidents

Small Population Game

To compute the unique equilibrium in the small population game, the popular minimum payoff from Table 6.2 is recomputed for $n = 2$ in Table 6.4 below using 10,000 Monte Carlo draws. There is a Nash equilibrium at \$0.70 and as it maximizes welfare it is chosen by the ethical players giving the unique solution reported below in Table 6.4.

popular minimum	$n = 2$	welfare
0.70	1.09	1.18
0.60	1.05	1.11
0.50	1.00	1.03
0.40	0.94	0.94
0.30	0.87	0.84
0.20	0.79	0.72
0.10	0.70	0.60

Table 6.4: Small Population

In the small population game and the partners treatment the theory does well. I will therefore focus on the strangers treatment in which players play against randomly matched opponents. This is the worst anomaly in Table 4.1. Since the individual matches were not reported I used a Monte Carlo to randomly match the players 10,000 times in order to compute welfare from the data.

As observed above when $n = 2$ in the strangers treatment the theory predicts too high a level of welfare and too low a rate of dissidence. However, in addition to relatively little data (16 observations) the game was played only 5 times so the participants cannot be considered experienced. It is important then to ask: how has

the game progressed over time? Did they start by trying to cooperate at $s^i = 0.70$ and then this gradually unraveled? Or has cooperation increased over time so that as experience is gained play more closely resembles the prediction of the theory. Below in Table 6.5 I report the distribution of play between the first and fifth round: by every measure play is moving towards that predicted by the theory as player become increasingly successful at coordinating on \$0.70.

	1st round	5th round	theory
minimum = 0.70	10%	25%	51%
minimum \geq 0.40	39%	66%	73%
minimum = 0.10	44%	12%	6.5%
dissidents	69%	50%	29%

Table 6.5: Evolution of Play Over Time

Overview

The most important anomalies are

- In the $n = 14$ game the equilibrium has mode 0.20 rather than 0.10 as in the data.
- With $n = 2$ in the strangers treatment the theory indicates far more coordination than in the data.
- The distribution of the dissidents is different in the data than in the theory.

None of these anomalies are terribly important.

In addition there is an important message for experimental studies: before concluding that there is coordination failure please check that it is not due to noise players as it is in stag hunt. This is especially important in studies that are oriented towards mechanism design.

7. Ultimatum Bargaining

Many ultimatum bargaining experiments have been conducted with similar results. In ultimatum bargaining game the first mover proposes the division of a fixed amount of money, usually \$10.00, and the second mover either accepts and both are paid as agreed, or rejects and both get nothing. Here I analyze data from Duffy and Feltovich

(1999) for the important reason that players got to play 40 times rather than the usual 10. This is important because play after round 10 is different than earlier, but remains largely constant during the final 30 periods indicating that this is “the long-run” with experienced players. The experimental design is also a clean one with the standard \$10 stakes, offers in whole dollars, no zero offer, and one randomly chosen round paid. The whole dollars greatly eases the analysis of the data: when offers are in \$.05 increments we see things like a single offer of \$4.60 rejected and one of \$4.55 accepted. In other words, to make sense of it the data has to be aggregated into cells and this is always fraught.

Another useful feature of Duffy and Feltovich (1999) is that there are two treatments: one the standard treatment (nobs, 32 participants), and a second in which players get to observe the results of one other match each period (obs, 40 participants) - a treatment that they and I expect to enhance learning. For consistency I take an experienced player to be one who has played in nine or more matches, so I use data from the final 31 rounds.

Qualitative Analysis. Ultimatum bargaining highlights the importance of risk aversion in generating a demand for fairness. Without noise players the ethical players would simply insist on the efficient outcome which is an equal split and back this up by rejecting less generous offers. Without noise players this punishment is entirely hypothetical and has no cost. With noise players enforcing more generous offers increases the number of offers that must be rejected, so imposes a social cost offsetting the gain in fairness. Hence the theory predicts that offers should be generous but many should fall short of an equal split. This is characteristic of ultimatum game experiments. The theory also predicts a substantial rejection rate, also characteristic of ultimatum experiments.

Description of the Solution. The benchmark behavioral mechanism design problem has a unique solution for this game. There is a target for the selfish first mover. This is supported by the ethical players rejecting offers less generous than the selfish target at an increasing rate. The rejection rate should be as small as possible subject to incentive compatibility. These facts are proven in Appendix 7. I then compute that the welfare maximizing target is \$4.00 for the selfish players while the ethical players themselves offer \$5.00.

I report the key statistics of the solution below and contrast it with the data for

both the obs and nobis treatments. For the rejection rate I also reported for the obs treatment the final 10 periods only. This is to verify that the noise as measured by rejected offers is not declining over time.

mean offer			rejection rate				welfare		
theory	obs	nobs	theory	obs	nobs	obs 10	theory	obs	nobs
4.83	4.45	3.63	0.18	0.20	0.19	0.18	3.45	3.43	3.44

Table 7.1: Ultimatum Bargaining

For welfare and the rejection rate the theory and data match well. The mean offers for the obs treatment is reasonably close to the theory but the mean offer for the nobis treatment is anomalous.

Offer Distribution

Figure 7.1 below provides detail with the theoretical and empirical offer densities.




Figure 7.1: Observed Offers (left), Unobserved Offers (right); dots are data, lines theory

The empirical distribution for the obs case looks similar to the theory. The nobis case looks much like the obs case but with offers shifted a dollar to the left except for a modest number that remain at \$5.00. In other words, the nobis case looks as if the target for the selfish players is 3 rather than 4 and that the majority of the ethical players are offering \$4.00 rather than \$5.00.

Play in the nobis case looks quite different than the theory. I want to emphasize, however, that there is very little welfare loss in doing this: the welfare difference is less than a penny. To understand this better I compute in Table 7.2 below the welfare

corresponding to each target offer for the selfish type. This was needed in any case to find the optimum. Note that the constraint only binds on the ethical players when target is \$1.00 in which case they must offer \$4.00 rather than \$5.00 as they do for the other targets. As can be seen setting a target of \$3.00 rather than \$4.00 results in similarly small drop in welfare as in the obs treatment. The same cannot be said for other targets: as the target is lowered below \$3.00 welfare drops off fairly rapidly.

target	5	4	3	2	1
welfare	3.41	3.44	3.42	3.33	3.17

Table 7.2: Welfare

The \$3.00 target mechanism also does not match the obs data since all the ethical players are offering \$5.00. Again, however, the welfare consequences of the ethical players switching to \$4.00 is quite small: I computed this and it lowers welfare from \$3.42 to \$3.40.

I note that Duffy and Feltovich (1999) argue that the difference between the two treatments is because the learning process is changed by the additional information about other player's play. That makes sense the context of mechanism design as well: I do not imagine that the players make some sort of exact calculation of the solution to the mechanism design problem in their heads, although I imagine they have some general ideas, such as "we must reject bad offers so as to encourage good ones." In particular ethical players may be unsure what "their bit" is supposed to be: some may think \$5.00 while others think \$4.00 would be enough. Observing the offers of others might well convince those making \$4.00 offers that they are not doing their bit, and so switch to \$5.00 offers.

Good Offers

There is an anomaly in the offer distribution that is hard to see in the figures. That is that there are far too many good offers. The theory predicts 16.7% of all offers with be for \$6.00 or more. In the data this is true for only 20 out of 1080. Moreover, the same as has been found in hundreds of ultimatum experiments: the only apparent exception is the experiment conducted with the whale hunting Lamalera reported in Henrich et al (2004). In that case, however, the noise player was the experimenter - the "low offers plotted for the Lamalera were sham offers created by the investigator."

A good robustness check is to ask what happens if *ad hoc* and by fiat I were to assume that players cannot make offers better than \$5.00. This raises the cost to the ethical players of providing incentives to the selfish players because the noise players now make more bad offers. It changes the optimal mechanism: the target for the selfish players drops from \$4.00 to \$3.00 and, accounting for the poorer offers by the noise players, reduces the mean offer from \$4.83 to \$3.67. This mechanism now mirrors the data for the noobs case where the mean offer is \$3.63. The reduction in welfare due to increased rejection of bad offers is offset by the fact that uniform offers between \$1.00 and \$5.00 are more efficient than between \$6.00 and \$10.00 and both welfare and the rejection rate are unchanged. Overall, the theory with this ad hoc modification does about as well as the original.

Associated with the anomaly in the good offers is an associated anomaly with the rejection rates. By pooling all the good offers out of 20 only 1 is rejected, a rejection rate of 5%. According to the theory the rejection rate should be 17% - much higher.

Rejection Rates

I turn finally to the theoretical and empirical rejection rates. At the aggregate level the theory matches the data quite well. Below I report the conditional rejection rates. Qualitatively the theory matches the noobs data well: declining until the target of \$4.00 is reached, then flat. Not unexpectedly for the noobs case the decline ends when the target of \$3.00 is reached. I will focus on the noobs case.




Figure 7.2: Observed Offers (left), Unobserved Offers (right); dots are data, lines theory

Quantitatively the theory does poorly. Good offers are rejected far too often and

bad offers not often enough. The low theoretical rate of rejection of bad offers is not in itself surprising. The theoretical rates make the selfish players exactly indifferent. This is a general problem in mechanism design theory. In practice with heterogeneity and noise to get selfish players to behave themselves it is wise to give them stronger incentives than exact indifference.

Assuming the ethical players reject more frequently than the theory says is inadequate to explain the data, however. In the data we may call an offer bad if it is less than \$4.00 in the obs treatment and less than \$3.00 in the nobis treatment. In the data there are 84 bad offers and 64, that is 76% of them, are rejected. By contrast the theory says that the maximum possible rejection rate when ethical players reject, selfish players accept, and noise players reject half the time is only 50%. Even if all the noise players and ethical players rejected the offers the probability of seeing so many rejections 64 is less than 4%. This suggests that the selfish players might be ethical players albeit with a much smaller but still positive value of γ , so willing to punish unlikely bad offers.

Fairness, Kindness and Reciprocity

Models of fairness such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), predict that an offer should be equally likely to be rejected regardless of how often it is made. Whether an offer is fair does not depend upon how likely it is to be made. The left shift of equilibrium going from the obs to the nobis case provides a test of this hypothesis: in fact when the frequency of \$3.00 offers jumps up from 4% to 30% the rejection rate plunges from 87% to 14%. Note that the latter number is close to the 17% rejection rate implied by only noise players rejecting offers. Models of kindness and reciprocity such as Levine (1986), Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) fare even worse. They predict that as the frequency of bad offers increases this should be taken as a sign of unkindness in the population and this should be reciprocated with a higher rejection rate, the opposite of what is seen in the data.

As indicated above, while mechanism design prediction is consistent with the obs data it is not with the nobis data. From a broader perspective however, what we see in the nobis data is an incentive compatible mechanism that is not the best, but very close: welfare of \$3.40 against \$3.44. On the other hand emotional players who rejected offers of \$3.00 at the rate seen in the obs case would do terribly against

first movers who acted like those in the nobs case: welfare would plunge to \$1.78. Mechanism designers by contrast are pragmatic: even dropping incentives entirely and allowing the selfish types to offer one would result in much higher welfare of \$3.16.

Overview

The most important anomalies are

- In the no-observation case the offers distribution is shifted about \$1.00 to the left from the theory.
- The data has too few good offers and too low a rejection rate for them.
- The data rejects bad offers far too much.

I argued that the no-observation shift is not terribly important. That the theory produces too many good offers and rejects them too frequently is entirely due to the behavior of the noise players so can be isolated. The rejection of bad offers, however, implies that even selfish players must sometimes reject bad offers.

8. Public Goods with Punishment

Public goods experiments with punishment have been much studied and replicated since Fehr and Gächter (2000) and an overview can be found in Chaudhuri (2011) or Drouvelis (2021). These studies show that without punishment little contribution occurs, but with punishment contribution levels are quite high. I used data from Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) who vary the cost of punishment and use a relatively easy to analyze linear cost structure.

Four partners play ten times but are randomly relabeled each period. The game has two stages. In the first stage money payoffs are given by

$$m^i(1) = 1.50 - q^i + 0.4 \sum_{j=1}^n q^j$$

where $q^i \in \{0, 0.075, 0.150, \dots, 1.50\}$ and $n = 4$. There is a punishment factor $\lambda \in \{0, 1, \dots, 4\}$ and if $\lambda > 0$ there is a second stage

$$m^i(2) = m^i(1) - \sum_{j \neq i} p^{ij} - \lambda \sum_{j \neq i} p^{ji}$$

where $p^{ij} \in \{0, 0.075, 0.150, \dots\}$ is a punishment assigned by player i to player j . There is also a constraint on individual punishment $\sum_{j \neq i} p^{ij} \leq m^i(1)$. As indicated the punishments have a common cost to the sender but differ in how costly they are for the recipient. Besides the ability to do comparative statics over λ this experiment also has a linear cost structure making it easier to analyze than some earlier experiments.

How to Spend It. Insight into the solution can be gained by considering the problem for an ethical player of optimally deploying their largesse for the lowest punishment factor $\lambda = 1$. For a private cost of 0.6 an ethical player can increase their own contribution by 1. Suppose instead that the ethical player increases punishment for anyone who chooses the current and lower levels of contributions by 0.6. There are three opponents: roughly, another ethical player, a selfish player, and a noise player. The noise player will contribute the current level or less at some of the time, so the expected cost of the increased punishment is something less than 0.6. On the other hand, both the other players will be induced to increase their output by 1 resulting in a total output increase of 2. In other words, for somewhat lower expenditure of largesse, the ethical player can achieve a greater increase in contribution using it for punishment rather than for their own contribution. Higher punishment factors make largesse even more attractive. Hence punishment is always the right way to expend largesse.

Qualitative Analysis. The importance of these type of experiments is that they show how contributions jump up when punishment is an option. The analysis of the optimal use of largesse provides one explanation. Without punishment there is not enough largesse to lead to substantial contributions. With punishment using largesse for punishment, as shown above, is an effective way to generate high contribution rates. Moreover, unlike in the other experiments, here the largesse constraint binds in an important way. Higher levels of contribution require more punishment and while the gain in contribution outweighs the loss of punishment socially it does not do so individually. The amount of punishment sent by the ethical players does not depend on the contribution rate, rather it is determined by the largesse constraint. With lower punishment factors the punishment received is smaller so less high contribution rates can be sustained: this is the “law of demand” identified by Nikiforakis and Normann (2008).

Description of the Solution. As the stakes are not great, for simplicity of analysis I abstract here from risk aversion (see Appendix 1 for discussion). With this simplification it is easy to compute the solution to the mechanism design problem for each set of parameters. There is a single target for the selfish players. The ethical players provide incentives by punishing contributions below target. This punishment should be as small as possible subject to incentive compatibility. These facts are proven in Appendix 8. Computationally I find that welfare is increasing in the target while the cost of punishment also increases, so the target should be chosen as high as possible subject to the γ constraint for the ethical players. Because of the integer constraint of the selfish players this may not exhaust the largesse off the ethical players: any additional largesse is spent with a probability of the next higher contribution level. The equilibrium described in terms of expected punishment is unique but there may be several mixtures over punishment levels by the ethical players that give the same expected punishment and any of these is an equilibrium. Using these facts I computed the welfare optimal target for each punishment factor.

punishment factor	contribution		punishment		welfare		participants
	theory	data	theory	data	theory	data	
4	1.16	1.24	0.06	0.07	1.92	1.91	24
3	1.05	1.16	0.06	0.05	1.91	1.99	24
2	0.90	0.68	0.06	0.04	1.88	1.78	24
1	0.66	0.24	0.05	0.01	1.80	1.64	24
none	0.07	0.03	0.00	0.00	1.51	1.51	24

Table 8.1: Public Goods Contribution with Punishment

Above in Table 8.1 I report the optimum and compare it to the data the final (tenth) period. Note that “punishment” is the punishment sent by the punisher not the punishment received by the punished. For comparative purposes, note also that the maximum possible welfare is all contributing the maximum \$1.50 and there is no punishment: it is \$2.40.

Before comparing the theory to the data I want to comment on the big picture. An important reason public goods with costly punishment has been frequently studied is because of the stark contrast between the no punishment and punishment case. This can be seen in the data, where contributions jump from practically none with no punishment to 83% of the maximum with punishment factor four. The discussion of how to spend it above provides an explanation. Without punishment the ethical

players have no choice but to spend their largesse on increased contributions, but as their largesse is limited this has little impact. Punishment, by contrast, is far more cost effective: the same largesse that has little impact on voluntary contributions has a big impact when used to provide incentives in the form of costly punishments.

Turning back to the comparison between the theory and the data, as expected from Table 4.1 the theory and data match quite well for the higher punishment factors (3, 4) and when there is no punishment. It does, however, under predict contributions by about \$0.10. Qualitatively the model gets right the declining contributions as the punishment factor declines. However, the theory does poorly from a quantitative point of view for lower punishment factors (1, 2). In both cases actual contributions are substantially lower than predicted by the theory with correspondingly lower welfare. Note that the apparent collapse of the mechanism for low punishment factors is consistent with the idea in Dutta, Levine and Modica (2022) that there might be a fixed cost of operating a non-trivial mechanism: it may be that the ethical players simply give up and act selfishly when the gains from the optimal mechanism is less than a fixed cost.

The contribution schedule in the theory is flatter than in the data. This is partly due to the fact that in all treatments the noise players each make an expected contribution of \$0.75 regardless of the punishment factors. Below in Table 8.2 are the per capita contributions of the ethical and selfish players

punishment		4	3	2	1
contribution	ethical+selfish	1.36	1.20	0.98	0.62
	data	1.24	1.16	0.68	0.24

Table 8.2: If noise players do not contribute

When the punishment factor is 1 the empirical punishment is also much lower than the theory says is needed to sustain high contributions.

Distribution of Contributions

Below in Table 8.3 I provide greater detail for the punishment factor three and four cases. To provide some smoothing with 24 observations spread over so many categories I aggregated the 21 contribution levels into 7 by grouping them in blocks of 3 contribution levels.

effort	frequency		punishment		effort	frequency		punishment	
	theory	data	theory	data		theory	data	theory	data
1.50	0.71	0.71	0.03	0.00	1.50	0.05	0.46	0.03	0.00
1.13	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.00	1.13	0.71	0.21	0.03	0.05
1.03	0.05	0.13	0.09	0.00	1.00	0.05	0.13	0.08	0.08
0.67	0.05	0.00	0.13	?	0.78	0.05	0.13	0.12	0.00
0.53	0.05	0.00	0.16	?	0.53	0.05	0.00	0.16	?
0.30	0.05	0.00	0.19	?	0.38	0.05	0.04	0.21	0.00
0	0.05	0.13	0.23	0.55	0	0.05	0.04	0.26	0.83

Table 8.3: Left: Punishment Factor 4 - Right: Punishment Factor 3

The distribution of effort between the theory and data is reasonably good. The data on punishment is quite noisy since there are only 24 observations so less than 3 individuals in all but the top cell. Never-the-less the broad picture fits the theory: there is increased punishment for contributing less than the target, and probably that increases as distance to the target grows.

Low Punishment Factors

I would like to draw attention instead to what happens with punishment factors two and one. These are reported in Table 8.4 below.

effort	frequency		punishment		effort	frequency		punishment	
	theory	data	theory	data		theory	data	theory	data
1.50	0.05	0.33	0.03	0.00	1.50	0.05	0.08	0.03	0.00
1.28	0.05	0.00	0.03	?	1.28	0.05	0.00	0.03	?
1.02	0.71	0.08	0.03	0.00	1.05	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.00
0.75	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.75	0.71	0.05	0.04	0.11
0.52	0.05	0.00	0.09	?	0.52	0.05	0.00	0.07	?
0.30	0.05	0.08	0.12	0.00	0.26	0.05	0.08	0.11	0.00
0.02	0.05	0.42	0.15	0.09	0.03	0.05	0.75	0.16	0.06

Table 8.4: Left: Punishment Factor 2 - Right: Punishment Factor 1

The theory says ethical and selfish types all share the same target and that 71% of the population should be contributing that target. In the theory column I have highlighted the modal contribution levels implied by the theory: \$0.98 for punishment factor two and \$0.68 for punishment factor one. For punishment factor one the equilibrium seems to have collapsed to a mode of zero rather than \$0.68.

The data for punishment factor two has two peaks at the highest and lowest contribution levels. I have highlighted these as well in Table 8.4. This led me to wonder if there was not a mechanism with two peaks, but there is not: if the ethical players can be induced to contribute at the highest level then the selfish players will contribute not much less. Moreover, the punishment levels in the data are not nearly incentive compatible - the punishment for contributing at the lowest levels - also highlighted - is far too low to make it unprofitable for any type to deviate from the highest to lowest level. As I explain in Appendix 9 this anomaly may be due to pooling across sessions.

Robustness

As the public goods games with punishment are the only games in which γ plays a role in determining the solution of the mechanism design problem I want to examine robustness with respect to the calibrated value of γ . Specifically, as observed above, the discount ratio μ for first period largesse is $\mu = 0.242$ in the final periods of the Dal Bo (2005) data. From equation 5.1 this corresponds to a value of $u^{-1}(\gamma) = 0.082$ substantially less than the calibrated 0.10. Below the welfare results are reported both for the calibrated $u^{-1}(\gamma) = 0.10$ and for the alternative $u^{-1}(\gamma) = 0.08$. As expected tightening the constraint reduces welfare - but very little. It results in a slightly worse fit for the high punishment factors and a slightly better fit for the low punishment factors.

welfare/punishment factor	4	3	2	1	none
$u^{-1}(\gamma) = 0.10$	1.92	1.91	1.88	1.81	1.51
$u^{-1}(\gamma) = 0.08$	1.89	1.88	1.84	1.80	1.51
data	1.91	1.99	1.78	1.64	1.51

Table 8.5: Effect of $\mu = 0.242$

Overview

There is one important anomaly: for low punishment factors players are far less successful at achieving high contribution levels than indicated by the theory. This might be explained by learning in the partners treatment.

q^w	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.0
$c(q^w)$	0.00	0.04	0.08	0.16	0.24	0.32	0.40	0.48	0.60	0.72

Table 9.1: Cost of Gift Effort

9. Gift Exchange

Gift exchange experiments with punishment have been much studied and replicated and an overview can be found in Fehr and Charness (2024). These studies show that socially beneficial gifts given by a first-mover are sometimes reciprocated. I used data from Charness (1998) who uses a relatively easy to two partner structure..

Two strangers play ten times using round-robin matching. The game is sequential. In the first period the sender sets a wage $w^e \in \{0.80, 0.84, \dots, 4.80\}$. After observing the wage the receiver determines a level of effort $q^e \in \{0.1, 0.2, \dots, 1.0\}$. Money payoffs for the sender are

$$m^e = (4.80 - w^e)q^w$$

and for the receiver

$$m^w = w^e - c(q^w) - 0.80$$

where the cost of effort is shown in Table 9.1 below.

As described this is the *human* treatment. There is also a *robot* treatment in which the wage is not set by the sender, but either by a computer or by the experimenter. As behavior in the latter cases was similar I pooled the data from the two of them.

Description of the Solution. In this set up there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which wages and effort are at a minimum. There is also a unique solution to the problem of maximizing monetary payoffs, also with the minimum wage, but with effort at a maximum. The takeaway here is, with less than full effort, increasing wages helps the receiver more than the sender, so in the optimal mechanism, wages will be higher than the minimum.

To create incentives for more the efficient higher wages, the ethical receivers must use up their largesse to reward senders by providing effort. The best mechanism is to set two wage targets, one for selfish senders of 2.52 and a slightly higher one for ethical senders of 2.56, and reward these wages by providing the highest effort consistent with available largesse: this is 0.39. For lower and higher wages no largesse should be wasted on noise players by providing any extra effort.

treatment	wage		effort		welfare		participants
	theory	data	theory	data	theory	data	
human	2.64	2.10	0.20	0.29	1.03	0.86	44
robot	2.57		0.23	0.37	1.05	1.15	78

Table 9.2: Gift Exchange Game

In the robot game, there is no reason to provide incentives to the sender, but there is a second reason to provide effort: higher effort increases the money income of the receiver by more than the loss to the sender. Solving the welfare maximization problem, effort should be chosen so that the marginal increase in welfare relative to the marginal increase in largesse cost is constant. This implies that the optimum for the ethical player is, for wages less than or equal to 3.2, to provide a constant effort level of 0.4, and to provide a minimal effort of 0.1 for higher wages. The optimal mean wage, effort, and welfare are reported in Table 9.2 below.

For both treatments the participants provide more effort than predicted by the theory. For the human treatment incentive can be used to force a higher mean wage than is observed in the data. There are two effects at work. Higher effort raises welfare, which is why empirical welfare is higher than the theoretical welfare in the robot treatment. However, lower wages reduce welfare, offsetting the empirical gain from higher effort in the human treatment. This wage effect is more important than the effort effect, resulting in substantially lower welfare in the human treatment data than in the theory.

Wage Distribution

The reason for the lower wage in the human data than in the theory can be clearly seen in Figure 9.1 below, with empirical and theoretical histogram of wage offers.



Figure 9.1: Offer Histogram; dots data, line theory

As can be seen this are relatively similar, except that in the data there is a large mass of players who offer only the minimum wage.

This theoretical anomaly has a learning theoretic explanation. Ethical players are assumed to work out what is the optimal mechanism, or at least a reasonable approximation that they can experiment with. No such assumption is made about selfish players - in the early rounds, before equilibrium is reached, they must be taught what the social norms are by the ethical players. In some settings learning is harder than other, so that learning theory potentially is complementary to mechanism design theory.

From a learning theoretic perspective, there is an important difference between games with rewards, where the reward occurs on the equilibrium path, and games with punishments where the punishment occurs off the equilibrium path. A first mover who chooses wrongly in a punishment game will be punished and observe this fact. A first mover who chooses wrongly in a reward game will not observe how they would have been rewarded for another choice. Roughly speaking, if bad behavior is rewarded, there is little reason to try out good behavior. By contrast bad behavior is punished, there is every reason to try and see if good behavior leads to a better result. In Appendix 10 I give a simple example to show how this works.

In the gift exchange data, there is evidence that setting the minimum wage is, indeed, self-confirming in the sense of Fudenberg and Levine (1993). Fudenberg and Levine (1997) show that in experimental data, lack of information about off-path play is an important reason players leave money on the table. That is also the case here:

based on the empirical effort levels, the 25% of senders who set the minimum wage earn only \$0.40. If they offered, say, \$2.40 they would earn in expected value more than double this amount. If they offered \$2.50 they would earn nearly four times this amount.

Effort Response

How does actual effort provision compare with the theory? As indicated, on average participants provide more effort than predicted by the theory. Figure 9.2 below shows the details.




Figure 9.2: Effort vs. Wage; left panel human, right panel robot; dots data, solid line theory; dashed line Fehr-Schmidt

As the theory suggests, effort for the human treatments has a strong peak in the middle. By contrast, and also as the theory suggests, in the robotic case, effort is much flatter as a function of the wage.

The strong peak in the middle has been noted before in the context of gift exchange, and has been somewhat puzzling for psychological theories. This is illustrated by the dashed line showing the effort levels implied by the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) calibration. Note that for fairness theory the human versus robot treatment should not matter for effort, so fairness theory does not capture the comparative statics. Fairness leads effort to increase, with one small blip until the wage reaches \$3.60. At this point it falls off, due to the limited effect of effort when wages are very high. However, such high wages do not occur in the robot data, and rarely in the human data. Overall, fairness theory does relatively well for wages up to about \$2.40, and quite poorly for higher wages.

10. Sensitivity Analysis

The calibration determined the level of risk aversion, the fraction of each type of player, the largesse, and the distribution of trembles by the noise players. Here I examine how sensitive the results are to those parameters. Table 10.1 below summarizes in which classes of games the different parameters have more than a minor effect. Below I discuss case by case those that are sensitive.

game	parameter				
	risk ρ	ethical ϕ_E/ϕ_S	largesse γ	noisy ϕ_S	trembles
stag	no	no	no	yes	no
ult	yes	yes	no	yes	yes
no pun	no	no	no	no	no
pun	no	no	yes	yes	no
gift	no	no	yes	yes	yes
PD/mar	no	no	no	yes	yes

Table 10.1: Sensitivity to Calibration

risk = risk aversion; ethical = ratio of ethical to selfish; noisy = fraction of noisy; trembles = distribution of noisy actions

Risk Aversion. Risk aversion has little impact on the incentive constraints - this is not a new finding. It is, however, qualitatively important as it determines the demand for fairness. In games such as dictator and ultimatum, and also in games such as the trust game, this is important. In the games studied here, fairness matters only in ultimatum. It is worth emphasizing how the analysis of public goods games with punishment here differs from that in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) punishments are issued because players dislike free-riders as being unfair. In behavioral mechanism design punishment is to provide incentives not to free ride, regardless of fairness.

Risk aversion matters quantitatively for ultimatum - higher risk aversion means greater inefficiency from unfair offers and makes the ethical players more willing to press the selfish players to make better offers. It also lowers welfare because the unfair offers by noisy players are less efficient.

To see the effect in ultimatum, if risk aversion is halved to $\rho = 4.5$, then the target “acceptable” offer for selfish players drops from \$4 to \$3. Empirical welfare increases to \$3.72 and theoretical welfare to \$3.77. If risk aversion is doubled to $\rho = 18$ the target offer remains at \$4 while both empirical and theoretical welfare fall to \$2.80.

Ratio of Ethical to Selfish Players. The calibration of largesse depends on the ratio of ethical to selfish players. The conceptual experiment here is to vary the ratio while adjusting largesse accordingly. This means that the ratio does not have much impact on welfare.

The ethical/selfish ratio does allow heterogeneous behavior between the two types. This is primarily relevant in ultimatum. Here it is predicted that the ethical players make more generous offers than the selfish players. In the data the ratio between the predicted offers of the two types is roughly fifty-fifty. Adjusting the ratio in either direction will accordingly fit the data less well.

It is important to note: while increasing the ratio of ethical to selfish players makes little difference except in ultimatum, decreasing the ratio is inconsistent with calibrating play to dictator giving - fewer ethical players makes it impossible to match the observed giving rates in dictator.

Largesse. Largesse matters in principle in ultimatum, but the constraint does not bind, so varying it will not have any impact on the analysis. By contrast the constraint does bind in the public goods games with punishment: the level of contribution that can be supported is limited by the willingness of the ethical players to suffer losses punishing the noisy players.

To see how this matters, I doubled largess from \$1.00 to \$2.00. This is most important when the punishment factor is one and contributions are low, and should enable the ethical players to increase contributions. It does, but not by all that much: the theoretical average contributions increase from \$0.66 to \$0.72. I then halved the largess from \$1.00 to \$0.50. This is most important when the punishment factor is four and contributions are high, and should force the ethical players to allow lower contributions. This has a more substantial impact: theoretical average contributions decrease from \$1.16 to \$0.90.

Largesse is also important in gift exchange. Increasing largesse result in higher wages in the human treatment and higher efficiency in both treatments, fitting the human treatment less well and the robot treatment better. Lowering largesse has the opposite effect.

Fraction of Noisy Players. The fraction of noisy players is crucial in Stag Hunt since higher fractions of noise players make it more difficult to achieve the “good equilibrium” of high contributions. To see the quantitative effect I halved the fraction of

noise players from $1/3$ to $1/6$. As expected, in the two player case this has no effect - they still achieve the highest level of contribution \$0.70. However, it does increase the modal level of contribution in the large population games: in the 14 player case it increases from \$0.20 to \$0.30.

Next I increased the fraction of noise players to $1/2$. This has no effect on modal contribution. When it is further increased to $2/3$ in the two player case the modal contribution drops substantially from \$0.70 to \$0.40.

In ultimatum and public goods with punishment decreasing the fraction of noise players is akin to increasing largesse: it means it is less costly for the ethical players to provide incentives through punishment. In ultimatum there are two other effects.

First, the fraction of noise players determines the rejection rates for “acceptable” offers. In the nobs case this is either \$5.00 or \$4.00. As the theoretical rejection fraction of 16% matches the theory, reducing the fraction of noise players will result in too few rejections of “acceptable” offers.

Second, in ultimatum because the largesse constraint does not bind, welfare is sensitive to fraction of noisy players - they create losses by making unfair offers and rejecting them as well as rejecting “acceptable” offers. Quantitatively a 10% increase or decrease in the fraction of noise players ($\pm 3.3\%$) results in about a 3.6% decrease or increase in welfare.

In the human gift exchange game noise has the opposite effect than ultimatum or public goods with punishment. Here decreasing the fraction of noise players makes it more costly for ethical players to create incentives using effort. However, this effect is relatively modest.

In the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Market Auction games reducing the fraction of noise players fits the data better, however a drastic reduction is needed to match the data.

Trembles. By trembles I mean the distribution of the noisy players actions. This is important in analyzing the data only when there is a binary choice: accept/reject the offer in ultimatum, cooperate/defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, and accept/reject the bid in the Market Auction. In ultimatum reducing the probability of the weakly dominated action of rejection results in too few rejections of “acceptable” offers. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Market Auction reducing trembling onto the weakly dominated action is the same as reducing the fraction of noise players and fits the data better. Again: a drastic reduction is needed to match the data.

11. Conclusion

I have presented a simple and stark calibrated benchmark model and documented its successes and failures across a range of different experiments. What do the anomalies tell us about how the model can be improved?

With respect to the selfish and ethical players their sharp optimization could be softened in several ways. The quantal response model of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) rather than exact best response would eliminate the “good” equilibrium in the large population stag hunt game, for example. However, quantal response models are difficult to use for benchmarking purposes as they require an intensity parameter that is hard to predict without looking at the data. Another softening would be to introduce a trade-off for the ethical players between social welfare and own utility rather than a sharp limit. As a practical matter it seems unlikely that ethical players are willing to sacrifice as much for a small gain in social welfare as for a large gain. This could help in the public goods experiments with low punishment factors: ethical players might be less willing to forgo selfish behavior when the welfare losses are modest.

I think that softening the play of the selfish and ethical players while improving fit with the data would not make a good benchmark model: the additional parameters and complexity would not make sense when the model is doing reasonably well with these players already. Where the action is, I would say, is with the noise players.

Modeling the Noise Players

The noise players play a key role in the theory. They serve to keep the ethical players “honest” by forcing them to bear real costs of providing incentives through punishment. They also introduce an element of risk dominance that is important in equilibrium selection. Moreover the number of dissenters in the stag hunt and public goods contribution games are consistent with the calibration and show that indeed, a substantial fraction of the population are in some sense “noise” players.

In many respects the noise players are what differentiates this theory from others. If we just had ethical and selfish types with risk aversion the model would not be so different from using the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model and choosing the best equilibrium as they suggest. In a similar vein if we introduced noise players into the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) it would likely fix the equilibrium selection problem in the

large population stag hunt game and increase the rejections for ultimatum bargaining bringing the model into closer alignment with the data.

Simple entropy maximization delivers the basics at an aggregate level and so is useful as a benchmark. It does less well with the details. In large population stag hunt the dissidents appear to be split between those “making a statement” by providing the highest level of effort and those providing slightly more effort than the minimum. In ultimatum the most important anomaly is caused by the noise players making far too many good offers. They also reject far too many good offers and not nearly enough bad ones. In the public goods contribution games the noise players flatten the contribution schedule below that observed in the data.

Let me highlight some of the theoretical issues with the model of noise players. In the public goods games there is an abrupt change in the behavior of the noise players depending on whether or not there is punishment. Without punishment higher contributions are dominated by lower ones, so the probability of contributions falls off exponentially, and expected contributions by the noise players is quite small. By contrast with punishment no contribution level is weakly dominated so the probability of contributions is uniform and expected contributions jump up from near zero to \$0.75. This fits well with the no punishment case and the high punishment factor case, but fares poorly with low punishment factors.

There is also a denomination issue. If there are two actions, one that earns zero and one that loses a dollar both are equally likely. If we add an intermediate denomination so that there is an action that loses fifty cents, then the probability of choosing zero remains at a half, but the probability of losing one falls to a quarter. As we add more intermediate denominations the expected loss falls. This might be true to an extent - but surely not when denominations become hard to distinguish.

In a related vein, when there are just two actions ordered by dominance both have equal probability. As I indicated this is already problematic in ultimatum as it leads to rejections rates too high for good offers and too low for bad offers. It is problematic for other games with two actions, for example, the one shot prisoner dilemma game. In that game suppose that the γ constraint binds on the ethical players so that they cheat. However, the noise player will cooperate half the time leading to a 17% cooperation rate. In fact (see, for example, Dal Bo (2005)) the cooperation rate with experienced players is more like 6%. I should note, however, that from a welfare point of view the discrepancy is not so great: a full analysis can

be found in Appendix 11. In a similar vein in the market auction game studied by Roth et al (1991) the ubiquitous \$9.95 and \$10.00 top bids should be rejected about 17% of the time: in fact they are never are. Additional discussion of this can be found in Appendix 12. *Ex post* rationalization suggests that some anomalies would be reduced or eliminated by placing a limit on the willingness of noise players to take “obvious” losses.

To “work” the noise players need to be impulsive and willing to do things “just for the heck of it.” This should be clear from the roughly 30% of dissenters in stag hunt and in the public goods contribution games with punishment (see Table 8.3). But the data suggests that noise players are not, as the theory assumes, completely oblivious to what other players are doing. As I have indicated in the literature review, psychological models have become popular: surely an important role for these models is to better understand the behavior of noise players - to model their emotion and impulsivity?

Last Words

In considering the role of psychology I want to indicate that if I were designing a functional and effective human being I would design a person who was emotional and sometimes would be angry. The point is that emotions serve as a commitment device: because we are angry we carry out punishments that *ex post* are not in our interest. But we can control our anger, tailoring it to circumstances: an ethical player would use anger as an ends to a mean, carrying out the commitment to punish, but determining the level of punishment to provide efficient incentives. Perhaps the difference between ethical players and noise players is that the former have greater control over their emotions?

I want to emphasize that the model is calibrated to western college students playing for standard stakes in the laboratory. We know from the work of Snowberg and Yariv (2021) and others that the general population is both more risk averse and more generous than college students. We also know from cross-cultural studies such as Henrich et al (2004) that behavior in experiments differs between cultures. However, I have no reason to think that the fraction of ethical players is invariant to culture, and indeed in Dutta, Levine and Modica (2021) we developed a model of how the fraction of ethical players might vary depending on the nature of public goods problems faced by different cultures. One of the advantages of a benchmark

model is that by identifying anomalies it provides hints as to what might be different between different populations, stakes, or cultures.

Finally, what, if anything, can we conclude about behavior beyond the laboratory? Altruism, whether in the form of ethical players, or otherwise, as documented in Fehr and Charness (2024), is accepted as playing an important role in the laboratory. I do not believe, nor do I think many economists believe, that people are altruistic enough to provide the level of public goods needed to sustain a modern society. Here, I want to draw attention to the public goods experiments with punishment. Largesse in those experiments is not great, about \$0.10 per game, and, without punishment, contribution to the public good is virtually nil. Largesse works well when it works as a complement to more ordinary incentives - in this case punishment. Because ethical players are willing to accept the small cost of punishing free-riders, they are able to create strong incentives to contribute to the public good, and, as a result, contributions are quite large.

What I call largesse and ethical play inside the laboratory, corresponds to what is called civic duty outside the laboratory. Consider, outside the laboratory, the criminal justice system. The penalties for crimes are stiff, but to convict a criminal requires witnesses to incur the cost of reporting crimes, of answering questions of the police, and of testifying in court. Without some largesse on the part of these ordinary citizens, it is hard to see how the criminal justice system could function. This use of largesse to leverage more ordinary incentives, outside the laboratory as well as inside, is studied in greater detail in the predecessor of this paper, Dutta, Levine and Modica (2021).

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Appendix 1: Risk Aversion for Low Stakes

Figure 11.1 below plots the CES utility function with $\rho = 9$ (the dots) and a CARA utility function fit to the Gneezy and Potters (1997) data (solid line) along with a risk neutral utility function normalized to match utility at \$3.31.




Figure 11.1: CES and CARA Utility

The linear utility function is a good approximation in the public games experiments, including stag hunt, because participants were paid for every period so the stakes were quite low. In Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) the greatest possible monetary payoff in a single period is \$3.31 marked with a vertical line.⁶ As can be seen while the utility function has substantial curvature over the entire range, it is minimal over $[0.00, 3.31]$ where a straight line is an accurate approximation.

As it enormously simplifies computations I treated the players in the Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) experiments as risk neutral. I did not do so in stag hunt although it also makes very little difference: however in stag hunt as indicated above the benefit of deviating is so small in the large population games that I wanted to be sure that the calculations were valid when risk aversion was accounted for.

Appendix 2: Repeated Games, Type Persistence, and Trembles

The model presumes that types are chosen once at the beginning of play and do not change over time. In all applications players play a number of times. An experienced player is defined as one who has played at least nine times, or if the

⁶Negative monetary payoffs are possible but this never occurred in practice.

game is repeated less than ten times, who is playing for the final time. In a strangers treatment, as in ultimatum, after each game players are rematched so, in effect, types are drawn again and the game played is a one-shot game. In some cases, for lack of data, partners treatments with a fixed horizon are analyzed. In these cases only data from the final period is used so that ordinary repeated game effects do not matter. However: in principle players can learn something about their opponent's types from play in the earlier games.

The first issue is: what difference does learning opponent's types make? The key point is that it can change a player's incentive constraints. Knowing that one is facing a noise player, for example, means that a player knows that their own actions will not be punished or rewarded. To avoid this issue I assume that in each game players independently redraw their types, that is, that types are not persistent between games. Although this works relatively well in describing play, as I indicate in the discussion of public goods with punishment factor two, there is some evidence against it.

A related issue has to do with the interpretation of noise players. If at the beginning of the game there are two equally likely types, ethical and selfish, and each has a one third chance of trembling, does this make a difference? If we follow McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) in saying that when a player trembles they play randomly according to the distribution followed by noise types and if no player plays more than once then the model of noise players and trembles are identical.

If a player plays more than once then the model of noise players implies type persistence while the model of agent normal form trembles implies type imperistence. Again, type persistence may matter if it changes incentive constraints. This would certainly be true in a genuinely repeated game, for example, an indefinite horizon prisoner's dilemma game. However, the only game studied here in which a player moves twice is a game in which the second stage is a pure decision problem of how many punishment points to allocate to opponents. The incentive constraints for this problem do not depend on first stage play, so here as well noise players and trembles are the same.

By contrast with noise players, persistence of ethical types is important in the public goods game with punishment in the sense that a player who is ethical in the first contribution stage should remain ethical in the second punishment stage. This is needed to force the player to trade off largesse between the two stages.

Appendix 3: Selection of Treatments

In this Appendix I discuss the choice of experiments and treatments used in the paper: it is of course possible to study many many experiments and report results only for those in which the theory “works.” As I have found anomalies that is perhaps some evidence I did not do that, but the only real “proof” is for someone else to study other experiments.

Let me say first that I elected to study a few experiments in detail rather than doing a meta-study of many experiments. While I hope that I or someone else might do a meta-study one day it does not seem a good starting place for evaluating a new theory: the details matter.

That said, let me indicate the criteria that I used in selecting studies. I should indicate that having chosen a paper and experiment I report *all* treatments in that paper on that experiment.

- I looked for studies with robust results - this to me means classical experiments that have been replicated many times.
- For a specific study I looked for papers by researchers with a strong track-record.
- I wanted play to be repeated enough times for learning to take place. This is not a theory of “one-off” play.
- I looked for comparable studies: “standard” college students in laboratory for “normal” stakes. I do not propose as a first pass to try to explain differences in populations and the impact of stakes.
- I looked for studies in which there were several treatments. This makes it possible to see how the theory does on comparative statics.
- I focused on games the same as or similar to those analyzed by previous social preference studies. These are games in which social preferences are known to lead to striking deviations from subgame perfect Nash equilibrium so there is something to “explain.”
- Data summarized in published work is rarely suitable for analyzing new theories: I used studies for which individual level data is available.

Past Studies

Table 11.1 summarizes the classes of games that have been studied using the behavioral theories discussed in the main text along with the first reference I can find to an experimental study of games in that class.

ult	ultimatum bargaining	Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982)
dict	dictator	Forsythe et al (1994)
PD	one shot prisoner's dilemma	?
pub	public good contribution	Bohm (1972)
pun	public good contribution with punishment	Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992)
gift	gift exchange/trust	Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)
		Blount (1995)
cent	centipede	McKelvey and Palfrey (1992)
imp	impunity	Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998)
stag	stag hunt	Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990)
mkt	market auction	Roth et al (1991)
best	best shot	Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989)

Table 11.1: Games from Past Studies

Table 11.2 indicates which studies analyze which games from the list.

	ult	dict	PD	pub	pun	gift	cent	imp	stag	mkt	best
L	X			X			X			X	
FS	X	X		X	X	X		X		X	
BO	X	X	X	X		X				X	
FF	X	X	X	X		X				X	X
DK	X		X	X							
This	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	

Table 11.2: Social Preference Model Case Studies

L=Levine (1986)

FS=Fehr and Schmidt (1999)

BO=Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)

FF=Falk and Fischbacher (2006)

DK=Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)

Below I explain why the gift exchange, centipede, impunity, and best shot were excluded from this study as well as comments about those classes of games that were included

Ultimatum Bargaining

Ultimatum bargaining has been extensively studied. I chose the Duffy and Feltovich (1999) experiment because the original data is available and the experimental design is well suited for testing a theory of “long-run” behavior. There were many (40) repetitions and payment was for a randomly chosen round eliminating issues of intertemporal preferences or income effects. Bids were restricted to even dollars making the data easier to analyze. In addition there were two informational treatments providing a stronger test of the theory.

Dictator

While dictator had been extensively studied it was used in the calibration procedure so cannot be used to “test” the benchmark behavioral mechanism design model. In addition I have been unable to locate any data on repeated dictator games.

One Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma

The one shot prisoner’s dilemma game has been extensively studied. I excluded it from the main text due to space considerations and because the calibration partly used data from repeated stranger one shot prisoner’s dilemma games. For the interested reader I did analyze the data from Dal Bo (2005) in Appendix 9: it does not present significant anomalies.

Public Goods Contribution

Public goods games have been extensively studied. I chose the Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) study because it was part of the public goods contribution with punishment experiment described next.

Public Goods Contribution with Punishment

There are two classes of games that give players a clear chance to provide incentives for others so are a natural testing ground for benchmark behavioral mechanism design. In public goods games with punishment after contributions are observed players have the chance to impose costly (to the sender and receiver) punishments based on contributions. Gift exchange and trust games are the opposite: players move sequentially with the first mover having the option of making a welfare improving contribution to the second mover, and the second mover having the option of providing a costly reward to the second mover. While both classes of games have been

extensively studied space considerations preclude studying both and I followed the lead of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) who studied public goods games with punishment quantitatively.

I chose the particular study by Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) based on the survey article of Chaudhuri (2011). Earlier work assume non-linear cost of punishment presenting complications for an analysis. More recent work such as Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) focused on linear cost. While I would have preferred a strangers treatment to the partners treatment used by Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) and more repetitions than ten such studies are not available, so I compromised, selecting Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) because the careful design of cost variation provides a good comparative static for quantitative analysis.

Gift Exchange/Trust

In the gift exchange or trust game a first mover makes a gift to the second mover that has greater value to the receiver to the sender (so is efficient to send) and the second mover has the option of returning the gift. Selfish subgame perfect equilibrium says that no gift should be given or returned, but of course gifts are given and returned. Behavioral analyses of these games have been qualitative rather than quantitative and behavior mechanism design does fine in this regard. Ethical players will make and return gifts, and moreover understand that gifts are efficient and incentive need to be given to encourage selfish players to make gifts.

The main difference between the trust and gift exchange games appears to be the fact that gift exchange usually involves an element of competition: there may be several senders or receivers. For example, in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) there are many receivers who may accept or reject the proposed gift with on who accepts chosen at random to receive the gift and possibly return some of it. The trust game is cleaner: one sender and one receiver, but while these games have been extensively studied for possibly historical reasons they appear generally to be done one off and not repeated with either strangers or partners.

As indicated analysis of these games has been qualitative. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) discuss data from Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) but analyze it as a trust game, that is, they ignore the competitive aspect. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) discuss qualitatively both a bilateral “investment” (trust) game as well as the competitive gift exchange.

I chose the study of Charness (1998) (also reported in Charness and Haruvy (2002)). This is easier to analyze than most gift exchange games because, like the trust game, there is only a single sender and receiver. In addition the experiment is ten periods with strangers. It also has the interesting feature in that there is a robot treatment in which the sender gift is set exogenously.

Centipede

The centipede game of McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) has not been extensively studied and there are issues even in repeated play about whether sufficient learning takes place or whether players make “mistakes” due to self-confirming considerations: see Fudenberg and Levine (1997). Hence I excluded it from this study.

Impunity

The impunity game of Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998) is a variation on ultimatum bargaining that has not widely studied. Hence I excluded it from this study.

Stag Hunt

As indicated, behavioral mechanism design rules out coordination failure. Stag hunt, where players coordinate on a bad equilibrium, seems an obvious counterexample. It is not: I included it to make this point.

Market Auction and Best Shot

In the market auction of Roth et al (1991) and best-shot game of Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) subgame perfection makes strong predictions that accurately describes behavior in the laboratory. Perhaps as a result, neither has been extensively studied. Certainly neither game has much scope for social preferences and their inclusion in theoretical work is likely a sanity check that these new theories do not “un-explain” existing knowledge. I have not included best shot in this study as it has not been so heavily studied as the other games. I discuss the classical market auction game of Roth et al (1991) in Appendix 12. It features repeated play with a “near” strangers treatment and a single paid round randomly chosen.

Appendix 4: Welfare Comparison

The Fehr-Schmidt calculations are based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999).

For ultimatum I computed rejection rates, then optimal offers for each type. This led to 70% offering 5 and having it accepted and the remainder offering 4 and having it accepted 90% of the time.

For public goods contributions games I used their Proposition 5. It requires $\beta = 0.6$ for the non-selfish type. The correlation between α and β for their calibrated model is not specified, but even assuming independence there are at least 12% of the population with $\alpha \geq 1$ and $\beta = 0.6$ and this guarantees that the condition in Proposition 5 is satisfied for all the relevant punishment factors.

There is also a constraint that links the best possible equilibrium to the greatest possible punishment. Let Q be the best possible equilibrium, ψ the fraction of types with $\beta = 0.6$ and $\alpha \geq 1$, and punishment factor λ . Recall that the greatest possible punishment if everyone chooses Q in the first state is $1.6Q$. From Fehr and Schmidt (1999) Proposition 5 the constraint is

$$\frac{Q}{4\psi - 1/\lambda} \leq 1.6Q.$$

The fraction of types with $\beta = 0.6$ and $\alpha \geq 1$ could be anywhere from 0.12 to 0.40. At $\lambda = 1$ the necessary ψ is greater than 0.40 so the constraint fails. I took the fraction ψ to be greater than 0.28 as the constraints for $\lambda > 1$ are satisfied and this best fits the data.

Appendix 5: Willingness to Sacrifice

For the calibration of γ in the text to be valid the γ constraint should bind both for the dominant strategy experiments in which willingness to give is measured over time and for the one-off dictator game in which base willingness to give is measured.

Take first the public goods experiments in Fehr and Gächter (2000). From the information given concerning overall earnings, we find in dollars

$$m^i = 1 - (0.6)s^i + (0.4) \sum_{j=1}^n s^j.$$

where $s^i \in \{0, .05, 0.10, \dots, 1.00\}$ and $n = 4$. The derivative of social welfare with

respect to s^i is given as

$$\frac{dS}{ds^i} = (1/n) \sum_{j=1}^n u'(m^j) ((0.40) - \mathbf{1}(i = j)(0.6))$$

where

$$u'(m) = -(1/C)(1 - \rho)(1 + m/C)^{-\rho}.$$

Observe that if an ethical player contributes the maximum of \$1.00 and nobody else contributes they get \$0.80 and everyone else gets \$1.40. Marginal utility for the former is $u'(0.8) = 0.0206$ and the latter $u'(1.4) = 0.0183$. Hence

$$\frac{dS}{ds^i} \geq (0.0183)(0.40) - (0.0206)(0.25)(0.6) = .010 > 0,$$

that is, the fact that a one dollar increased contribution results in a six dollar increase in welfare dominates the (modest) unfairness of ethical players contributing more than others, so an ethical player should contribute the most they can: that is, the constraint should bind.

In the dictator experiments, by contrast, fairness dictates that an ethical player contribute no more than half the maximum, and this constraint might bind. However, in \$10.00 dictator experiments with \$1.00 increments average contributions are \$2.50 while in \$5.00 dictator experiments with \$0.50 increments such as List (2007) they fall to about half that, to \$1.33 in List (2007) (24 participants). If the γ constraint was strictly binding that should not happen as the selfish types continue to contribute zero, the noise types halve their contribution, and the ethical types reduce their contribution by less than a half.

However, List (2007) provides us with extra information: he considers allowing a “take” option of taking up to \$5.00 (48 participants). If the constraint is not binding when the take option is available then contributions by the ethical type should remain fixed at \$2.50, while the contributions of the selfish player should fall by \$5.00 and that of the noise players by approximately that amount. That is, contributions should fall by \$3.33. However, they fall by \$3.82 which indicates that the constraint does bind in the take treatment. The actual contribution in this treatment is $-\$2.48$, or \$2.52 above the floor. Conveniently this is about the same as the approximately \$2.50

contribution in the standard \$10.00 treatments, so we conclude that \$2.50 is a good estimate of contributions when the constraint does bind.

Appendix 6: Ethical Players in Stag Hunt

Given that selfish players are contributing \$0.10 should ethical players they raise their contribution to a greater amount, for example \$0.20 instead of \$0.10? This results in a sure loss to themselves (33% of population) of \$0.10. However, if there are no selfish players and all the noise players contribute \$0.20 or more, it does raise the income of all players by \$0.10.

The implication is that if and only if there is a greater than 1/3 chance both that there are no selfish players and that all the noise players contribute \$0.20 or more then it is welfare improving for the ethical players to increase their contribution. However, the chance of this happening is much less than 1/3: the chance that there are no selfish players by itself is less than 0.3%.

The same analysis applies to contributions greater than \$0.20, and indeed above \$0.30 welfare would be reduced even if the selfish players were also willing to contribute that amount. Hence the unique equilibrium as reported above and to contributions above \$0.20 when that is the equilibrium.

Appendix 7: Optimal Mechanism for Ultimatum

Proposition. *Selfish first movers use a pure strategy and no selfish or ethical players offers more than \$5.00. The rejection rates are as small as possible subject to incentive compatibility.*

Proof. SELFISH PLAYERS NEVER REJECT OFFERS. This is obvious.

THERE IS AN OPTIMAL MECHANISM IN WHICH NO SELFISH OR ETHICAL PLAYER MAKES A GOOD OFFER GREATER THAN \$5.00 WITH POSITIVE PROBABILITY. Suppose not. Set all rejection rates by ethical players for good offers and \$5.00 to zero.

If there is a selfish player making a good offer move all ethical and selfish players to \$5.00. This is the first best so certainly weakly welfare improving and is incentive compatible since the selfish player making the good offer is at least as willing to offer \$5.00 without punishment than a better offer.

If the only good offers are by ethical players, move all ethical players to \$5.00. This is certainly weakly welfare improving. It is incentive compatible for first movers.

The utility of selfish first movers does not change. Since originally all ethical players had the same utility and the ethical player making the greater offer has at least as much utility after the move their utility weakly increases, so is incentive compatible. It is incentive compatible for second movers. For offers at or above \$5.00 the utility of selfish second movers does not change and the utility of ethical second movers weakly increases. For offers below \$5.00 the utility of ethical second movers decreases less than that of selfish first movers since the move is to a weakly lower rejection rate for the ethical second movers.

THERE IS AN OPTIMAL MECHANISM WITH MINIMUM INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE REJECTION RATES. Fix the first mover strategies. Lowering rejection rates subject to those strategies remaining incentive compatible improves welfare and improves second mover incentive compatibility for ethical players.

THERE IS AN OPTIMAL MECHANISM IN WHICH SELFISH FIRST MOVERS USE A PURE STRATEGY. If they are indifferent moving them to a higher offer does not change their utility, but increases the utility of the second mover who gets a better offer with lower probability of rejection. \square

Appendix 8: Optimal Mechanism for Public Goods with Punishment

Proposition. *There is a single target for the selfish players. The ethical players provide incentives by punishing contributions below target. This punishment should be as small as possible subject to incentive compatibility.*

Proof. THERE IS AN OPTIMAL MECHANISM IN WHICH p^{ji} DEPENDS ONLY ON q^i . Take an optimal mechanism \hat{q}, \hat{p} and define $p^{ji}(q^i) = E[\hat{p}^{ji}|q^i]$. Then \hat{q}, p is also incentive compatible and yields the same welfare.

Define \hat{q} to be the maximum in the support of selfish player contributions. THERE IS AN OPTIMAL MECHANISM IN WHICH THERE IS NO PUNISHMENT FOR $q^i > \hat{q}$. This is welfare improving and incentive compatible for selfish types. Because I showed in the text that largesse is best spend on providing incentives it is also incentive compatible for the ethical types.

THERE IS AN OPTIMAL MECHANISM WITH MINIMUM INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PUNISHMENTS. Fix the first period strategies. Lowering punishment rates subject for those strategies remaining incentive compatible improves welfare.

THERE IS AN OPTIMAL MECHANISM IN WHICH SELFISH FIRST MOVERS USE A PURE STRATEGY. If they are indifferent moving them to a higher contribution level does not change their utility, but increases the utility of everyone else. \square

Appendix 9: Partners in Public Goods with Punishment

As indicated Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) experiments were conducted using a partners treatment in which the same four players remained together for the entire ten periods. As indicated above, there is no issue with repeated game effects as data is only used from the final period. However, as discussed, there is another element of the partners treatment: the possibility of learning about the types of opponents. The issue has been avoided by the assumption that in each game types are redrawn. Is this accurate?

Type persistence and learning about types provides a possible resolution to the anomaly found in the distribution of contributions for punishment factor two. Note that while the model provides a precise way of analyzing the learning it would not make sense to apply it to this data. While the players may be experienced with the one shot game after nine rounds, they are not experienced in learning about their opponents. To apply Bayesian updating about types I would want data with repeated repeated play as in Dal Bo (2005).

Specifically, with low punishment factors, the optimal mechanism is sensitive to how many ethical and noise players there are. In the extreme, if there are no ethical players, then the modal play is the least contribution while if there are no noise players the modal play is the greatest contribution. Each of these has a 20% chance. More generally with learning and low punishment factors, there will be some groups in which most players make the least contribution and others in which they make greatest contribution but there should rarely be groups in which many players do both. Never-the-less when the sessions are averaged it will give the anomalous pattern seen in Table 8.4 for punishment factor two.

To determine the frequency of anomalous groups in which many players simultaneously make both the lowest and highest contribution, I disaggregated the data for the punishment factor two treatments by group. For each group I calculated the minimum frequency of the highest and lowest contribution cells (\$1.50 and \$0.05 in Table 8.4). If groups tend to cluster at the top or the bottom but not both then these minima should be small. Below in Table 11.3 I report the fraction of punishment

factor two groups that correspond to the different minima. There are 4 observations per group in the final period and 20 over the last five periods. For example, if the minimum frequency is 0.05 in the table for the last five periods one of two things is true: only one time out of 20 was the minimum contribution made or only one time out of 20 was the maximum contribution made. In other words the anomaly in Table 8.4 is not present in that session.

minimum frequency	final period	last five periods
0 – 5%	67%	67%
20 – 25%	33%	33%

Table 11.3: Top and Bottom Effort Levels: Punishment Factor Two

As can be seen, most groups do not simultaneously have high fractions of both the highest and lowest effort, so clustering and aggregation are largely responsible for the anomaly reported in Table 8.4 for punishment factor two. This clustering may be due learning in the partners treatment.

Appendix 10: Learning with Rewards and Punishments

Here I consider two simplified sender/receiver games, one with rewards, and one with punishments, and no risk aversion, to illustrate the self-confirming aspect of bad behavior with rewards. For simplicity I consider only selfish and ethical types, with the actual population equally split between the two. The sender can send wages $w^e \in \{1, 2\}$ and earns a base utility of 0.80 for sending $w^e = 1$ and 0.40 for sending $w^e = 2$. This is adjusted according to the reward or punishment of 1.00. Ethical receivers are assumed to punish a low wage of $w^e = 1$, and reward a high wage of $w^e = 2$, depending on the game. Selfish receivers always send a low wage, and ethical senders always send a high wage, but this does not matter to the analysis, which focuses on optimal learning by the selfish sender. A key feature of these parameters is that if a selfish sender knows the true model they will always send the high wage - the loss from a higher wage is 0.40 but the reward or punishment has an expected value of 0.50.

The sender plays twice against randomly chosen types and initially believes that there is a probability R_1 of the true distribution of types and that there is a probability of $1 - R_1$ that all opponents are selfish. The bottom line is this: in the punishment

game there is at least a 50% chance the selfish player will send the high wage in the second period, regardless of R_1 . On the other hand, in the reward game, if $R_1 < 0.72$ then the selfish player will never send the high wage in the second period. That is, in the reward game, the selfish sender can get stuck sending a low wage when the optimum is to send a high wage, but this does not happen in the punishment game.

First, the punishment game. Suppose that it is optimal to send the low wage. If punishment is received, then it is known for sure that $R_2 = 1$, so in the second period it is optimal to send the high wage. If it is optimal to send the high wage, then the result is uninformative, so it is again optimal to send the high wage. Hence, there is at least a 50% chance of the high wage in the second period, regardless of R_1 .

In the reward game, if it is optimal to send the low wage, the result is uninformative and it will be optimal to send it again. The low wage results in a total utility of 1.60. Observe that it is myopically optimal to send the low wage when $0.80 \geq 0.90R_1 + 0.40(1 - R_1)$, or $R_1 \leq 4/5$. Suppose, in fact, that $R_1 < 0.72 < 4/5$ and that it is optimal to send the high wage. If a reward is received then $R_2 = 1$ so it is optimal to again set the high wage in the next period, resulting in an initial utility of 1.40 and a second period expected utility of 0.90, or total utility of 2.30. If a reward is not received, then $R_2 < R_1 < 4/5$, so it is optimal to send the low wage in the second period. Hence, total utility is 1.20. If, in fact, expected utility from the high wage is greater than from the low wage then

$$2.30(R_1/2) + 1.20(1 - R_1/2) \geq 1.60$$

or, $R_1 \geq 0.72$. In other words, for $R_1 \leq 0.72$ it is not optimal to send a high wage in the first period, and as a result the high wage will never be seen in the second period. Appendix 11: One Shot PD

Many repeated strangers one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiments have been conducted with similar results. Here I analyze results from Dal Bo (2005). There were two treatments with payoffs in dollars as indicated below in Table 11.4.

	C	D	C	D
C	0.325, 0.325	0.050, 0.500	0.375, 0.375	0.050, 0.500
D	0.500, 0.050	0.175, 0.175	0.500, 0.050	0.225, 0.225

Table 11.4: Dal Bo Games: PD1 left, PD2 right

game	observations	periods	cooperation			welfare		
			theory	nash	data	theory	nash	data
PD1	54	9	25.0%	0.0%	7.4%	0.221	0.175	0.190
PD2	294	9 – 10	23.3%	0.0%	5.4%	0.251	0.225	0.231

Table 11.5: Dal Bo Results

From a theoretical point of view there is cooperation by noise players: they cooperate half the time. In addition, ethical players cooperate a fraction of the time due to their largesse. As participants were paid for roughly 30 rounds during the experiment largesse is not large: \$1.00/30. To find the exact contribution rate of the ethical players requires an equilibrium calculation since the cost of cooperating depends on how frequently the other player is cooperating. This done, benchmark behavioral mechanism design predicts in addition to the 16.67% cooperation from noise players and 3 – 7% cooperation from ethical players depending on the treatment. The details are in Table 11.5 below.

Unfortunately not all participants got to play ten times, and in PD1 no participant played more than nine times. For this reason I give results for period 9 for PD1 and averaged over periods 9 and 10 for PD2.⁷ The theoretical and empirical results are below in Table 11.5.

The bottom line is that Nash (and Fehr-Schmidt which here is the same as Nash) do better quantitatively than benchmark behavioral mechanism design both in terms of description of play and welfare. However, benchmark behavioral mechanism design does not do particularly poorly with welfare with an error of 2 – 3 cents depending on the treatment as against 1 – 2 cents for Nash.

Benchmark behavioral mechanism design does better than Nash from a qualitative point of view: it correctly predicts that there should be less cooperation in PD2 than in PD1 while Nash asserts the two should be the same.

Sequential Move PD

The papers that study the PD, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), focus primarily on the sequential PD, although Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) also examine the simultaneous move PD.

⁷Cooperation rates for PD2 were 5.2% in period 9 and 5.8% in period 10. Fewer participants played ten rounds than nine so the average over the two periods is weighted in favor of period 9.

I have not attempted to analyze the sequential PD due to lack of space and data. However, from a qualitative point of view, behavioral mechanism design with selfish, noisy and ethical types makes the same predictions as the psychological models - that there will be reciprocity in the sequential PD with cooperation rewarded with a greater chance of cooperation. The reason for this is straightforward: the ethical players will find it desirable to provide incentives for efficient cooperation by cooperating with those who cooperate.

Appendix 12: Market Auction

The game studied in Roth et al (1991) is a market auction in which 9 players simultaneously submit bids between \$0.00 and \$10.00 (in increments of \$0.05) and a tenth player the auctioneer may accept or reject the highest bid. If the bid is rejected everyone gets zero; if the bid is accepted the winner is chosen randomly among those submitting the high bid, and the winner gets \$10.00 minus the bid and the auctioneer gets the bid.

Participants are divided into two markets each with one anonymous auctioneer and nine bidders. They play ten times with the auctioneer being fixed and the bidders randomly remixed between the two markets each period. One period is randomly chosen to be paid. A total of 14 markets were studied in four countries and in two US markets the monetary payoffs were tripled. No high bid was ever rejected. In the tenth round the winning bid was \$10.00 in 9 of the markets and \$9.95 in the remainder.

The main result about bidding does not depend on behavioral mechanism design theory but holds generally when there are selfish players. It shows that if there is at least a 25% chance of a player being selfish this is enough to assure that with very high probability the highest bid is \$9.95. This is the sense in which the market auction game is a low lying fruit.

Theorem 11.1. *Suppose that the acceptance rate is weakly increasing in the highest bid, that there is a positive probability of a player who bids less than \$10.00 and that at least 25% of the players are selfish and that selfish players use a common pure strategy. Then every selfish player bids \$9.95 and there is at least a $1 - (3/4)^9 = 92.5\%$ chance that the highest bid is this high.*

Proof. I can ignore risk aversion as I will show breaking a tie with a higher bid increases expected money income so for a risk aversion payer must increase expected utility. I will show inductively that all selfish players bid 9.95.

First, since there is a positive probability that the highest bid is less than 10.00 no selfish player bids 10.00 as this would result in a utility of 0 while bidding 9.95 results in a strictly positive utility. Second, no selfish player bids 0.00 as this is a winning bid only if all other eight bidders bid 0.00 resulting in an expected money payoff of 10/9 as against bidding 0.05 and getting 9.95 for sure.

Suppose that the selfish players bid $x < 9.95$. I will complete the induction by showing that this implies a bid by a selfish player of $x + 0.05$ is better.

There is a probability ϕ_S that a player is selfish. All of these players by inductive hypothesis bid x . Let π be the probability of a non-selfish player bidding less than x . The probability that there are no other selfish players and they all bid less than x is $(1 - \phi_S)^8 \pi^8$. In this case bidding $x + 0.05$ results in a loss of no more than 0.05. The probability that there is one other selfish player and all the non-selfish player bid less than or equal to x is at least $8\phi_S(1 - \phi_S)\pi^7$. Recall that $x \leq 9.90$. Hence in this case bidding $x + 0.05$ results in a gain of at least

$$(10 - x) - 0.05 - (10 - x)/2 = (1/2)(10 - x) - 0.05 \geq 0.$$

With the remaining probability bidding $x + 0.05$ results in a gain of at least

$$(10 - x) - 0.05 - (10 - x)/3 = (2/3)(10 - x) - 0.05 \geq 0.016.$$

It follows that bidding $x+0.05$ is profitable provided $(0.016)(1 - 8\phi_S(1 - \phi_S)^6\pi^7 - (1 - \phi_S)^8\pi^8) > (0.05)(1 - \phi_S)^8\pi^8$ or

$$0.016 > 0.066(1 - \phi_S)^8\pi^8 + 0.128\phi_S(1 - \phi_S)^7\pi^7.$$

As the right hand side is increasing in π the inequality holds if it holds for $\pi = 1$, and it does for $\phi_S \geq 0.25$. □

Corollary 11.2. *In the calibrated model the probability of a \$10.00 high bid is $1 - (5/6)^9 = 80.6\%$ and if selfish players are constrained to play a pure strategy the probability of a \$9.95 or higher bid is $1 - (1/2)^9 = 99.8\%$.*

Notice that in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium there is no equilibrium in which

there is a positive probability that the high bid is both \$9.95 and \$10.00 as is the case in the data. Nor do behavioral theories of fairness or equity explain why the weakly dominated strategy of bidding \$10.00 is employed. Benchmark behavioral mechanism design does better, predicting that 80% of the time there will be a bid of \$10.00 due to the presence of noise players. This is reasonably close to the 64% observed in the data.

By contrast, on the auctioneer side benchmark behavioral mechanism design does poorly. The lack of bid rejection by the auctioneer poses a problem for the noise players: supposedly half of the noise players should reject the winning bid, resulting in a 17% rejection rate, and achieving a welfare of \$0.36 as against the actual welfare of \$0.44. However, it is neither credible nor reasonable that noise players would simply throw away \$9.95 (with an impact of less than five cents on the other players) nor is there evidence from any other experiment that they do so.

Note that the issue here is not that it is difficult to impose a limit on the losses of the noise players, nor yet to do so in a way compatible with the other experiments. Rather the issue is that there are many ways of doing this and very little data with which to judge which is the “right” way. For example: we could say that no player conditional on an information set takes a certain loss of more than \$9.50. Or we could compute the expected loss at that information set conditional on the equilibrium strategies - which while it might make more sense would complicate the model by endogenizing the play of the noise players. Regardless, there is no doubt about the need for an improvement in modeling the noise players willingness to suffer large losses.

Finally, the unwillingness of the noise players to take losses here is similar to that in the one-shot PD, but a simple limit of the type described is too large to explain the one-shot PD where the losses suffered by cooperating are much less than rejecting a favorable bid in the market auction. However: in the one-shot PD not only is there a loss, but the result is manifestly unfair to the noise player. It is possible to speculate that endowing the noise players with fairness preferences of the type described by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) together with a utility bound on acceptable losses might provide a better benchmark. Given limited data and limited space I have not pursued this idea here.

Remark:. The second part of Corollary 11.1 presumes that the ethical players are limited to choosing a pure strategy for the selfish players. To do otherwise would be complicated. However, by bidding low the ethical players can create an equilibrium in which the selfish players mix.

To understand the situation, condition on their being no noise players bidding \$10.00 so that there are $2/5$ ethical, $2/5$ selfish and $1/5$ noise players playing uniformly on $0, \dots, 9.95$. If the ethical players all bid zero a selfish player who deviates from \$9.95 to \$7.50 increases expected utility by about $3/10$ of a cent so the ethical players can break the pure strategy equilibrium if they choose. The best mixed equilibrium will have the ethical players bidding just below the support of the selfish players to give them the maximum incentive to bid low.

Finding the best (or any) mixed equilibrium is difficult, but the bottom of the support of a mixed equilibrium must satisfy the property that it cannot be profitable either to deviate by bidding an extra \$0.05 or by bidding \$9.95. If the probability of bidding the bottom is large then it is profitable to bid the extra \$0.05 to break a tie. If the probability of bidding the bottom is small the best chance of winning is for all the other bidders to be ethical. The probability, however, that all eight other players are ethical is quite small: $(2/5)^8 = 0.0007$. From these facts computations show that bottom must be at least at least \$7.45, and that utility at the bottom is quite close to utility at the pure equilibrium. As the bottom must earn the equilibrium utility these conditions also imply that welfare at a mixed equilibrium exceeds that of the pure equilibrium by at most $3/100$ of a cent.

Appendix 13: Sampling Error

Hypothesis testing is fraught and standard errors are often subject to misinterpretation. The gap between theory and practice is large, and I refer the interested reader to the relevant literature and in particular Leamer (1983) and Imbens (2021).

Before explaining how standard errors they should be interpreted in this setting, let me first describe how to compute them. Standard errors are computed with respect to a model: in this case the “hypothesis” is a point hypothesis - the calibrated model with given and known coefficients that are not estimated and certainly not from the data being analyzed. From the theoretical model samples are drawn in exactly the same way as in the data and this gives the entire distribution of sampling error including the standard error. A convenient way to do this is via Monte Carlo.

There are two possible results of finding confidence intervals based on the standard errors. First, the confidence intervals may be small and the data may lie outside the confidence intervals. Since the theory is certainly wrong and is expected to be wrong with enough data this will always be the case, and so it is meaningless. In smaller samples the confidence intervals might be large relative to the distance from the theory to the data. When the theory is closer to the data than the standard errors suggest the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn is that I manipulated either the theory or the data: for example, I cherry-picked the experiments to fit the theory, or I chose the calibration after looking at the data. For this reason there is some importance in reporting the standard errors.

In the stag hunt games I analyzed sampling error in the context of dissidents where it was relevant. I have not computed standard errors in the ultimatum games because the sample is large and there is an issue of whether there is serial correlation over the thirty periods of data used. Below in Table 11.6, in the public goods games with punishment, I add to Table 4.1 the standard errors (se) computed using a Monte Carlo with 1,000 draws.

	theory	data	se	actual err	SGP err	FS err
pun 1	1.80	1.64	0.07	0.16	-0.14	
pun 2	1.88	1.78	0.10	0.10	-0.28	0.63
pun 3	1.91	1.99	0.13	-0.08	-0.49	0.42
pun 4	1.92	1.91	0.15	0.01	-0.41	0.50

Table 11.6: Welfare and Standard Errors for Public Goods with Punishment

Specifically the procedure is this. For each treatment each Monte Carlo iteration draws six matches. In each match four players are randomly drawn from the player types and the noise players randomly draw contributions and punishments. The punishments of the noise players by the ethical players is then computed, and welfare for the match is determined and averaged over the six matches. This is done 1,000 times to find the distribution of the draws.

The standard errors are large enough that except in the case of punishment factor one the data is within two standard deviations of the theory. Except in the case of punishment factor four the data is not exceptionally close to the theory compared to the standard error. In addition the standard errors are small enough that with the exception of punishment factor one they exclude SGP and FS which lie consid-

erably more than two standard deviations from the data. This argues that if we were to engage in hypothesis testing the test would have some power. We may also wish to conclude that the anomalous data point - the increase in welfare going from punishment four to three - might be due to sampling error.

Overall the standard errors, while computable, add only modestly to our understanding of the theory and the data.