

LONDON AND NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY.

Ministry of Transport,

7, Whitehall Gardens,

London, S.W. 1.

25th January, 1927.

SIR,

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Minister of Transport, in accordance with the Order of the 13th December, 1926, the result of my Inquiry into the circumstances of two collisions which occurred at about 5.34 a.m. on that date at Orgreaves, on the Great Central Section, Southern Area of the London and North Eastern Railway.

While the 2.50 a.m. up goods train Mexboro' to Woodford was standing on the up loop line at Orgreaves home signal it was run into in rear by the following 1.15 a.m. goods train, Dewsnap to Nottingham. This collision resulted in a number of wagons of the latter train becoming derailed, damaged, and thrown foul of the adjoining up main line, the wreckage being almost immediately run into by the 5.20 a.m. miners' train, Sheffield to Orgreaves, which was travelling on that line.

There were 594 workmen in the last-named train; and 24 of them, the driver and fireman, received minor injuries or shock. The driver and guard of the Nottingham train, and the guard of the Woodford train also suffered slight injuries and shock as the result of the first collision.

The compositions of the two goods trains were as follows:—

Woodford.—Engine No. 6358, six-wheeled tender, type 2—8—0, weighing 120½ tons in working order; hauling 48 loaded with 3 empty wagons, and a four-wheeled 10-ton brake van in rear.

Nottingham.—Engine No. 5053, six-wheeled tender, type 4—6—0, weighing 121 tons, and drawing in the following order:—

- 1 wagon goods loaded,
- 2 wagons minerals loaded,
- 30 „ coal empties,
- 16 „ goods loaded,
- 2 „ minerals loaded,
- 1 brake van, six-wheeled, 15-tons.

The length of each train was roughly 1,100 feet. Both engines were fitted with the steam brake operating blocks on the coupled and tender wheels, and with the hand brake working the same blocks on the latter. Neither engine was damaged.

In regard to the Woodford train buffer gear and headstocks were damaged of seven wagons and the brake van, and some six other wagons had slight defects as the result of the first collision. The front portion of this train was chiefly affected; for instance, the first three wagons were buffer-locked, the second being badly damaged.

In regard to the Nottingham train, the first fifteen wagons were not affected. Thereafter nine of the above-mentioned empties were derailed, piled in a mass and very badly damaged, three being completely demolished, the wreckage as mentioned fouling the up line.

The miners' train was drawn by six-wheeled tender engine No. 3280, type 4—4—2, weighing 112 tons 14 cwts. in working order; and comprised 14 four and six-wheeled coaches weighing with the passengers some 190 tons. The engine was fitted with the automatic vacuum brake, operating blocks on all wheels of the train except those of the engine bogie and the central axles of the six-wheeled vehicles.

The length of the train was roughly 500 feet, and it was lighted throughout by gas. When it collided with the wreckage the engine bogie and driving wheels were derailed, the train travelling without other derailment for 624 feet. The left-hand top foot-board of all the coaches was ripped off and most of the axle boxes on this side were broken. Some portion of the mass of wrecked wagons also hit all the vehicles half-way up the side, breaking most of the windows and the majority of the commode and door handles. The panelling on this side also sustained considerable damage throughout the train, but fortunately it was not penetrated as happened at

Rawmarsh. Only one window on the right-hand side of the train was broken and the foot-boards grazed on the third, fourth, and fifth coaches. The engine appears to have cut a path through one wagon, carrying a portion forward with it and throwing the remainder foul of the down main line.

In regard to the permanent way, 150 chairs, 50 sleepers, 4 fish-plates and 2 fish-bolts were broken, 120 sleepers being also damaged.

A patchy but dense drifting fog prevailed at the time.

Description.

The Company's main line runs in an easterly direction from Sheffield to Orgreaves Colliery Junction, a distance of a little more than $3\frac{3}{4}$ miles. There are four running lines named from the north side of the railway in the following order:—up loop, up main, down main and down loop, spaces of 6 feet and 10 feet 6 inches intervening respectively between the up roads and between the up and down mains at the site of the accident.

Darnall West signal box, which controls the junction with the Mexboro' branch, is located on the West side of Darnall Station, some $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles from Sheffield. Thence the up lines rise at gradients of 1 in 1,329 for 463 yards, and 1 in 155 for 1,026 yards past Darnall East box to the summit. Thence they fall at gradients of 1 in 157 for 594 yards, and 1 in 200 for 1,559 yards to Orgreaves Colliery box. The intervening posts, Darnall East and High Hazel, were switched out at the time.

The approximate distances from Orgreaves box to relevant signals and other points relating to this case are as follows:—

Up loop and main home signals on bracket post, at which the Woodford train was standing	...	226 yards west
Foot overbridge		600 " "
Rear of Woodford train and point of first collision on up loop line		625 " "
Point of collision with wreckage on up main	...	750 " "
Orgreaves up main distant signal carried under High Hazel up starter, and approximate position of rear of Nottingham train when it came to a stand on up loop		942 " "
Fogman's hut		954 " "
Darnall West box	 2 miles	122 " "

The boxes concerned are equipped with Tyler's Permissive three-wire three-position block instruments relating to the loop lines, the receiving instruments having a mechanical tell-tale indicator on the commutator for recording, up to six, the number of trains in the section.

The Regulations for working goods lines where the absolute block telegraph system is not in operation are contained in the Superintendent's (Southern Area) circular No. R.R.6 dated February, 1926, extracts of which applicable to this case are as follows:—

8. (a) When a train is brought to a stand at a Home signal or behind a preceding train the Guard must immediately go back at least a quarter of a mile and place a detonator upon the line for the protection of the train, afterwards returning to his van.

(b) During fog or falling snow, when a train is unable to proceed at a greater speed than four miles an hour, the guard must alight from his van, place a detonator upon the rail, and afterwards rejoin his van.

Evidence.

The evidence is contradictory, but the following account of the circumstances leading up to each collision and the weather conditions which prevailed at the time is compiled from what appear to be the more reliable statements on each particular point.

1. Fogmen had been out all night, underman Keaton at the up main distant signal and underman Brown at the up home signals for Orgreaves. They were being

supervised generally by ganger Hill, who was acting as fog assistant in a cabin near Orgreaves signal box, his length extending for some three-quarters of a mile on either side of the box. At the time of the accident the fog was drifting down the line from east to west, with varying density, though previously it had evidently remained dense. At Orgreaves it had lifted at about 4.50 a.m. to such an extent that the atmosphere was clear and, at any rate according to Brown, a reliable witness, he could see at least as far as the signal box from his post, viz., for about 250 yards. This condition continued at Orgreaves until 5.15 a.m., or perhaps as late as 5.20 a.m., when the fog came up again rapidly and probably thicker than ever, range of vision then being no farther than 20 yards, underman Brown estimating it at 10 yards.

Similar conditions prevailed at Keaton's post and at Darnall West, but correspondingly later. Keaton said the clear interval, when visibility was such that he could see Brown's fire, distant 700 yards, lasted from about 5 a.m. to 5.20 a.m., range of view after that not exceeding 10 or 12 yards. Signaller Hallam estimated that at 5 a.m. at Darnall West visibility had increased to 100 yards and was improving at 5.26 a.m. when the miners' train passed. But by 5.40 a.m. it had again become reduced to only a few yards.

2. There is no doubt that both the Nottingham goods and the miners' trains passed Darnall West and approached Orgreaves in comparatively dense fog; but having regard to its drifting nature important features of the case are the conditions in this respect under which the Woodford train arrived at Orgreaves home signal, and the time of its arrival.

Underman Brown was being visited by ganger Hill in clear weather at 5.0 a.m., the latter leaving this post at about 5.10 a.m. and reaching Orgreaves box at about 5.15 a.m., still in clear weather. Brown judged that the Woodford train arrived and drew up to within 10 yards of the home signal at perhaps a little before 5.15 a.m., and that for two or three minutes afterwards, say at least until 5.17 a.m., the atmosphere in the locality remained clear.

Signaller Brown, of Orgreaves, confirmed that the fog lifted as described and did not come up again until "between 5.15 and 5.20 a.m." He left the box at 5.12 a.m. and went down on to the line to the cabin with the object of telling ganger Hill to withdraw the fogmen, but he did not meet Hill, who was evidently then walking towards the box. However, Brown said that by observation from the line at this time he noted that the train had not arrived. Hill came to the box soon after (between 5.12 and 5.15 a.m.) when discussion took place as to the necessity for retaining the fogmen's services any longer, Brown also asking Hill whether he had noticed the arrival of the train and receiving a negative reply. After three or four minutes in the box Hill left it and returned across the line, apparently in clear weather, to his cabin, where he remained for 15 minutes, Brown not having asked him to ascertain whether the train had arrived. On leaving his cabin again, Hill found the fog was denser than ever, and, according to his statement, he thereupon returned to the box, reaching it three or four minutes before fireman Brown of the Woodford train, who had come to report the first collision. Signaller Brown, however, said that Hill and fireman Brown arrived in the box together at 5.36 a.m., at which time the "obstruction danger" signal was sent to Darnall West.

The train register entries of signalmen Brown and Hallam agree with generally only a minute's difference. Brown accepted the Woodford train at 4.57 a.m. and said he was expecting its arrival at his home signal at 5.12 a.m. after the usual running time interval of 15 minutes. At this time, as mentioned, he left his box and observed the train had not arrived. According to Hallam the train moved slowly past Darnall West, without having been stopped, at 5 a.m. Goods guard W. Maw, on the other hand, said that it had been brought to a stand at this box for some five minutes; he had booked departure at 4.55 a.m. and arrival at Orgreaves home signal at 5.5 a.m. These timings were according to his watch which, not having been checked over the week-end, might have been two or three minutes slow.

Maw stated that though the weather had previously been foggy between Mexborough and Darnall it was clear while the train was proceeding between Darnall and Orgreaves, so much so that on arrival at Orgreaves home signals he could see them through the brake van windows, visibility according to him therefore being some 400 yards. He added that the train had been standing at Orgreaves for ten to fifteen minutes before the fog came on again, or, at any rate, before it reached his van, his

estimate in this respect being based on the passage of the Sheffield to Nottingham passenger train, which preceded the miners' train on the up main and passed Maw at about 5.18½ a.m. according to the Orgreaves train register.

In contradiction again of the foregoing accounts driver Shepherd and fireman Brown of the Woodford train said that after leaving Darnall West visibility gradually decreased, and by the time the foot-bridge was reached it was no more than 15 yards, this condition remaining while the train was standing at the home signals. Shepherd estimated that he had taken 20 minutes to traverse the two miles from Darnall West but he had not looked at his watch. This corresponds to an average speed of only 6 miles an hour, whereas Maw, who said he was a fairly good judge, estimated that 10 to 15 miles an hour was attained at a maximum, though up the gradient and passing High Hazel it was not more than 4 to 5 miles an hour, thus representing running time of perhaps 17 minutes.

There is no disinterested witness on the above-mentioned points but the weight of evidence certainly favours the opinion that the atmosphere was comparatively clear at the time of the arrival of the train at Orgreaves, and I am inclined to accept underman Brown's account as his evidence is also confirmed by that of guard Maw. It may be assumed therefore that the train drew up at the home signals in weather sufficiently clear at any rate to have enabled signalman Brown, had he been on the look-out, to observe the engine headlight. There was as a matter of fact only one headlight (chimney) burning, that on the buffer beam having previously gone out. I also think that having regard to the normal running time of 15 minutes for traversing this section of the road, guard Maw's booking of 10 minutes, Shepherd's estimate of 20 minutes, it would be fair to assume that the train took about 17 minutes, and that it arrived at perhaps 5.14 a.m., after ganger Hill had left underman Brown and after signalman Brown had tried to observe the train from the track.

3. Signalman Brown said that he had not forgotten this train, and on his return to the box he was depending upon hearing it explode a detonator to announce its arrival at the home signals; and, further, that if he had heard this detonator he would have let the train proceed. Underman Brown, however, did not lay a detonator for the reason that having regard to the view then obtainable he did not think it necessary. There is contradiction as to the precise position in which the train came to a stand in relation to the home signal post, but in view of this admission on the part of underman Brown the point is not material.

Driver Shepherd stated (confirmed by his fireman, Brown) that on coming to a stand he operated the engine whistle for a "short pop" to indicate the arrival of the train. This whistle, however, was not heard even by underman Brown who was standing near by, nor by ganger Hill, nor by signalman Brown. The last named, having failed to hear the detonator, said he looked from the cabin at 5.15 a.m. in clear weather and he certainly thought the train had not arrived then. When ganger Hill left the box about this time Brown did not think it necessary to send him to ascertain if the train had arrived, Hill as a matter of fact being employed merely for the supervision of his fogmen. After this the fog came on again, signalman Brown still apparently waiting to hear the detonator explode. He was dealing at the time with the Sheffield to Nottingham passenger train, which preceded the miners' train on the up main and passed the box at 5.19 a.m., also with a goods train on the down loop which he accepted at 5.17 a.m. and which passed the scene as the collision occurred.

4. Driver Shepherd, having whistled once, took no further steps to acquaint signalman Brown of the arrival of the train. He stated that "on seeing the home signal off for the colliers' train (as a matter of fact it referred to the preceding Nottingham passenger train) I did not think it was necessary for me to send my fireman to the signal box to carry out Rule 55." What he apparently did was to get down to attend to a sander which he said was not operating properly, and fireman Brown mounted the tender to get coal. They estimated that the train had been stationary for ten minutes when they felt the shock of the first collision, the engine being forced forward for one and a half lengths. The train in fact must have been standing there for double this time, fireman Brown not reaching the box to report the collision until 5.36 a.m.

Guard Maw's actions and excuses were equally unsatisfactory. As, according to him, the weather was clear, he did not lay a detonator either during the journey up the bank to Darnall East and past High Hazel when speed was low, or during the ten minutes after the train came to a stand at Orgreaves. He stated, however, that when the fog came on he left his van and placed a detonator on the line 35 to 40 yards in rear. He was afraid to go farther away for fear of being left behind, as he anticipated that the train would follow the Nottingham passenger train which passed him at 5.18½. He returned to his van to eat food and after an estimated further wait of fifteen minutes he heard a whistle popping, the detonator explode, and he saw the engine head-lights of the Nottingham goods train. He did not even have time to leave the van. He estimated that his train had been stationary for as long as 26 minutes.

Maw stated that in conversation subsequently driver Pennington of the Nottingham goods train acknowledged exploding the detonator, and this was confirmed by fireman Brown, who said he overheard the conversation. However, driver Pennington emphatically denied this and could not remember the conversation. Moreover no one else (11 witnesses in all, including fireman Brown and 3 of the men on the down goods train mentioned above, which was passing at the time on the down loop) heard this detonator explode, and Maw did not look for and therefore could not produce it afterwards.

5. The first collision took place apparently at about 5.34 a.m. The Nottingham goods train was accepted by signalman Brown at 5.20 a.m. under the warning arrangement applicable to permissive working. The train had been standing at Darnall West for some ten minutes before Hallam offered it forward, and, upon acceptance, it was drawn up to the box, Hallam displaying a caution lamp signal and verbally advising driver Pennington that there was a train ahead of him, Pennington acknowledging the warning. The brake van passed the box at 5.22 a.m. and the evidence of Pennington, his fireman, Grimshaw, and guard Wylde was generally to the effect that visibility got worse as Orgreaves was approached, and that when the collision occurred range of view from the engine did not amount to more than eight wagon lengths. Speed during the journey was said to have been certainly no more than five or six miles an hour, and, when the collision took place, three or four. Having regard, however, to the time, 5.36 a.m., at which the "obstruction danger" signal was transmitted and allowing two minutes for fireman Brown's journey to the box at Orgreaves, it will be noted that the train must have traversed the distance of a mile and three-quarters in fourteen minutes, viz., at an average speed of at least seven miles an hour. Taking into account, therefore, the slipping which Pennington experienced up the bank to Darnall East, where speed was evidently very low, it is not unlikely that ten miles an hour was attained between High Hazel and the standing train. In view also of the weights of the two trains, and the damage done, it is apparent that at the time of the collision the train must have been travelling faster than Pennington thought. He observed the tail light at a range of about eight wagon lengths but his brake application had the effect of skidding the wheels, though sand was applied. He evidently took such action as he could to avoid the collision, popping his whistle at the same time, and fireman Grimshaw stated that the second collision occurred before he had time even to get down from the engine.

The miners' train left Sheffield two minutes late, passed Darnall West at 5.26 a.m., and came to a stand at Darnall Station where 356 miners got in. It left there, presumably, shortly after 5.28 a.m. Driver Bagley described the fog then as dense, visibility being 20 yards, and he approached the up main distant signal for Orgreaves in the warning position at 10 to 15 miles an hour, having just previously closed his regulator. He exploded a detonator at this signal, and observed fogman Keaton's red lamp. He had of course no warning of the obstruction, which his engine struck, before he saw it, at an estimated speed of 10 miles an hour. Keaton on the other hand said the train passed his post 200 yards in rear of the obstruction, at 30 miles an hour, its usual speed. This is evidently an exaggeration, but having regard to the timings, start and stop, and in view of the weight of the train and the distance traversed subsequent to derailment, it would appear that the collision took place at a speed of not less than 15 miles an hour. When the train passed Keaton, perhaps 25 seconds previously, he had just heard the sound of the first collision and even had he realised what had resulted he would not apparently have had time to place another detonator on the line to warn driver Bagley.

Conclusion.

6. The foregoing evidence of the men who were more closely concerned in this case—with perhaps one or two exceptions—was unsatisfactory. Much of it was not straightforward, and there is contradiction not only in details but on material points, as the result of endeavours to make excuses, honest and otherwise.

Briefly, I conclude that the Woodford train may have arrived at the home signals at Orgreaves at least by 5.14 a.m. in weather clear enough at any rate to have enabled signalman Brown to have observed the one engine head-light and to have allowed the train to proceed on its journey. He was not in fact troubling to do more than depend upon hearing the explosion of a detonator to announce the arrival of the train, which detonator was not laid by fogman Brown for the reason that the atmosphere was then clear and he did not therefore think action in this respect was necessary. To make matters worse, Rule 55 was not carried out by fireman Brown, even under the dense fog conditions which prevailed during most of the twenty minutes which transpired before the first collision occurred. In the meantime, guard Maw, even according to his own account, had also failed to take requisite action to safeguard the train. The severity of the resulting collision, at about 5.34 a.m., can be more or less gauged by its effect throughout, and particularly at the leading end of, the Woodford train. There is, moreover, no evidence to suggest that any of the rolling stock of the Nottingham train was inherently defective, and having regard to the marshalling of the loaded vehicles in rear of this train it is evident that the derailment and telescoping of the nine empty wagons near the middle were purely the result of contact at somewhat higher speed than was admitted in evidence. The collision between the miners' train and the wreckage appears to have followed in about half a minute and was unpreventable.

Owing to late running both goods trains had been diverted on to the up loop to enable the Nottingham and miners' passenger trains to proceed on the up main. Neither collision would have happened had signalman Brown kept the first goods train on the move. In effect he pleaded that having failed to hear the detonator he was holding up the Woodford train to give preference to the shunt of the miners' train across its path. The latter was not due for 18 minutes, 5.32 a.m., and the excuse can hardly be upheld. In all the circumstances I consider that he regrettably failed to display the judgment, initiative, or interest which are to be reasonably expected of a man of his experience and knowledge of the traffic. He anticipated that the Woodford train would arrive at 5.12 a.m., the weather then being clear, but having failed to see it, or to hear its whistle or the detonator, he made no use of ganger Hill for ascertaining the position. In fact, according to his own admission, he took no action of any kind in respect of this train (after 5.15 a.m.) until fireman Brown reported at the box at 5.36 a.m. He then omitted to send the "obstruction danger" signal to Woodhouse. He has 24 years' service and has been a signalman for 10 years, during the last three of which he has worked at Orgreaves. The accidents occurred during the last half hour of his tour of twelve hours' duty which commenced at 6 p.m. on Sunday evening.

Driver Shepherd's failure is in the same category. Having been stopped here on previous occasions and having invariably seen that Rule 55 was obeyed, it is the more surprising that he omitted to do so on this occasion in view of his evidence, which, however, I have disregarded, that dense fog prevailed when he arrived. His excuses are also not acceptable and I doubt their genuineness. For a man of his experience—26 years' service, 19 as a driver—to say that he did not give the whistle more than a "short pop" on arrival, or repeat it because "it was too hot to hold," is merely trifling and appears to indicate, like other features of the case, a lack of alertness or of desire to co-operate in the expeditious and efficient movement of traffic. Fireman Brown must also of course accept his, though the minor share, of responsibility for failing to obey the rule, which he also admitted having carried out here previously.

In regard to ganger Hill—a man of 27 years' service, for the last 21 years in his present capacity—I must say that he does not appear to have been particularly helpful to signalman Brown, though it is true that he was not asked—as apparently it was no part of his duty—to go and ascertain whether the Woodford train had arrived. Instead, he left the box at about 5.15 a.m. and returned to his cabin where he remained for at least 15 minutes, merely "to have a drink and clean my lamp" while the fog came on thicker than ever. He was not surprised that fogman

Brown removed his detonators when the weather cleared and before he advised him of his release from duty. In fact he said he expected him to do so, though he had given no instruction to this effect. The thoroughness therefore of his supervision, his primary duty, appears to be open to some criticism.

Fogman Brown also has long experience of this duty and 31 years' service, but in explaining his failure to retain a detonator on the line he impressed me as being straightforward, and in saying moreover that had it been there the train drew up near enough to the signal to have exploded it, he admitted that he was disobeying regulations. In acknowledging also that he had never been instructed to act in this manner, he accepted such responsibility as might attach to him. However, it may, I think, be fairly assumed that he anticipated (when Hill left him to go to the box) that Hill's intention then was to release him from duty, though signalman Brown at the moment did not concur. The subsequent rapid envelopment of the area in fog at about 5.20 a.m. evidently took the three men by surprise.

7. Notwithstanding the various contributory failures of the above-mentioned men, it would hardly be fair to attach immediate responsibility to any of them for the consequences. It is clear that signalman Brown was entitled not only to leave the Woodford train where it was, but to accept the following train on the up loop. Indeed, in other circumstances, it may have been necessary for him to do this. Similarly, even had driver Shepherd and fireman Brown complied with Rule 55, or had fogman Brown laid his detonator, the delay in which the Woodford train became involved may conceivably have remained unaltered.

In my opinion, therefore, there is nothing to relieve guard W. Maw of the immediate and primary responsibility for the first collision. In view of the weight of evidence, I regret that I am unable to accept his statement that he laid a detonator, and I do not believe that he was doing anything else than sitting in his van during the long wait at Orgreaves. Even if he did, as he alleged, utilise a detonator, its distance from the rear of his train was quite inadequate to provide sufficient warning to driver Pennington, having regard to the prevailing weather conditions. Maw was, in fact, so little on the alert that he had no time to leave the van before the collision took place. He has 26 years' service, having been a goods guard for the last 20 years.

In regard to driver Pennington, there is no doubt that he had been properly advised at Darnall West of the occupation of the section ahead. He is a man of 42 years' service with 30 years' driving experience, and went so far as to say that under similar circumstances he would not expect to explode a detonator more than 50 to 60 yards in rear of the train ahead. According to him, visibility on this occasion was apparently about this distance, and, in view of the weight of his train and the state also of the rail, such conditions would necessitate very slow speed and the exercise of the utmost caution in the handling of his train. Having regard to the timings, it is very doubtful whether speed on this occasion was correspondingly restricted; but in view of my conclusion that a detonator was not laid, I do not think that Pennington's responsibility for the resulting collision is so serious as it would otherwise have been.

Remarks.

8. The only remarks I have to make relate to the protection of trains on goods lines by detonator under the permissive system of working.

Regulation 8 (a) requires the guard, when a train is stationary and regardless of the weather, to place a detonator at least a quarter of a mile in rear and return to his van; but 8 (b), applicable only in fog or falling snow, requires him to alight, place the detonator, and return to his van while and provided that, the train is travelling at 4 miles an hour or under.

According to guards Maw and Wylde, both men of 20 years' experience, 8 (a) is generally disregarded in fine weather, and neither could remember having had to carry it out in fog. It is significant that Maw failed on this occasion, and that driver Pennington's long experience only led him to expect this warning at the inadequate distance of 50 to 60 yards in rear of a train. In regard to 8 (b), Maw can be excused as his train passed through the section when visibility was comparatively clear; but Wylde appears to have failed to comply, if his statement in respect of the speed of the Nottingham goods train is reliable.

There is, therefore, evidence of considerable laxity in regard to compliance with these Regulations, and the Company's officers informed me that the matter would receive attention. At the same time, consideration of the advisability of making some alteration in procedure with regard to Regulation 8 (a), appears to be desirable. If drivers are adequately cautioned of the state of occupation of the section ahead, and unless view is exceptionally bad and maximum speed permitted to be high, it seems unnecessary for safety and only makes for delay, if guards as a general rule, are obliged to take precisely the same action in clear weather as should essentially be taken in fog. Moreover, if the practice generally prevails of disregarding the obligation in the former eventuality, it is not improbable that uncertainty and inadequate fulfilment may occur in the latter.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A. H. L. MOUNT,

Lt.-Colonel.

The Secretary,

Ministry of Transport.
