

The *Salisbury Review*

A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE OF CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT



The Third Marquess of Salisbury, 1830–1903

Geoffrey Partington

Antony Flew

George Martelli

Andrew Thomas

Roy Kerridge

John R. Greenaway

David Regan

Nigel Ashford

Graham Dawson

John Marks

David Sexton

Sally Shreir

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There is a serious price to pay for the decline of the educated Left – namely the rise of the half-educated Left, which no longer feels itself to be surveyed and controlled from a height of superior understanding. The unhindered intrusion of this brisk, philistine force into British politics has undeniably changed the climate of opinion, and lowered the standard of debate. Ways of thinking that, in previous decades, would have been discountenanced by the Labour Party as bigoted or totalitarian, are now openly propagated. Fanatical graduates in Community Studies, World Studies, Peace Studies, and Women's Studies are able to see, in the closed minds of Arthur Scargill and Ken Livingstone, the true tendency of their own researches, and the justification of an unthinkingness which their academic pursuits have done nothing to remove.

One form of this unthinkingness is discussed by Geoffrey Partington, who lays bare the extraordinary mental contortions of the radical feminist, in her benighted attempt to understand the aims of education. An outlook founded upon the uncompromising rejection of the truth – in this case, the truth that men and women are intellectually, emotionally, morally and physically different – may yet survive every refutation, provided only that it is able to destroy the influence of learning. 'Educational reforms' currently proposed by the left in Britain (the dissemination of Peace Studies in schools, the downgrading of examinations, the pressure towards an ever more 'relevant' curriculum) can be seen as flowing from the natural instinct of the closed mind to beg questions in its favour, and to stop up the channels of dissent.

The habit of question-begging has its sophisticated variant, as our thinker of the Left, Immanuel Wallerstein, displays. In the hands of a clever academic, diseducation can seem like its opposite, and bigotry may mask itself as intellectual flair. The 'third worldism' of Wallerstein has also proved immensely useful in nurturing the sentiments of guilt upon which radical movements are founded. It diverts the radical mind from that about which it should feel guilty (the real situation of people in the 'socialist world', the world which left-wing thinking created) towards that about which it should not, and concerning which guilt is a sentimental luxury.

It is one of the virtues of American conservatism – in particular of the conservatism of Russell Kirk discussed here by Nigel Ashford – that it has perceived left-wing

movements not as contributions to the process of constitutional change, but as pathological forms of religious emotion. If the Labour Movement has been so successfully accommodated by British politics, this is in part because of a Labour Party which has put procedure before sentiment, and regarded the feelings of its more bigoted followers with a measure of educated contempt. That Labour Party has now been destroyed, and it is clear that Conservatives can no longer rely on the strategies of a Salisbury or a Baldwin (here analysed by John Greenaway) to construct from the raw material of disaffection, an opposition party obedient to the forms of British Government.

Religious pathology has its amusing side, as Roy Kerridge displays. His account of an English Sufi community contrasts vividly with George Martelli's lament for the vanished order of Christendom. For Martelli, sentimental Sufism is but one stage further along the road which all European religion has begun to travel – the road of rebellion against apostolic authority. This rebellion defines the spiritual condition of modern man, for whom that alone is authoritative, which bears the imprint of the Self. The major task of conservatism in our time is to neutralize this pursuit of 'authenticity', and to reconcile the individual to his social and political circumstances. An important hint as to what this might involve is contained in Andrew Thomson's critical discussion of another kind of authenticity – the barren hermeticism of the 'authentic musical performance'.

A tradition of musical performance is one example of what Hayek has called 'spontaneous order' – and one in which authority, freedom and culture are harmoniously conjoined. Another example, John Marks argues, is provided by the growth of scientific knowledge. Yet another, according to Hayek himself, is the price mechanism of a market economy, a mechanism whose virtues, Graham Dawson points out, are still undervalued by conservatives. As our Eastern European correspondent argues, there are circumstances in which the fight against communism requires the affirmation of the market economy as a moral ideal. In these circumstances, one might question the wise generality of Russell Kirk, that 'not many conservatives would be happy to enlist under the banner of one abstraction, Capitalism, against another abstraction, Communism . . . or to die, absurdly, for a "higher standard of living"'. For some standards of living are really standards of dying.

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Conservative Journals: NIEPODLEGŁOŚĆ

The official political journals of Eastern Europe are devoted to hysterical propaganda, with the occasional analysis of this or that item of 'socialist progress', 'capitalist crisis', or 'imperialist crime'. Nicely printed, handsomely bound, they lie in unsold piles on the counters of every newsagent and bookseller. The samizdat journals, produced at great cost of human labour, pass rapidly from hand to hand, disseminating the ideas which the official press castigates as 'bourgeois' and 'counter-revolutionary'.

Until recently few *samizdat* journals in Poland have deserved those flattering labels. Most were content to offer another, and 'milder', form of socialism, an alternative intellectual plan for the 'just society' of the future. In the wake of 'Solidarity', however, genuine and militant conservatives have emerged, willing (in Patočka's words) 'to confess to history', and recognising that 'social justice' is a political delusion, and an active enemy of the truth. Principal among the new conservative journals is the monthly *Niepodległość* ('Independence'), founded in 1982, edited anonymously in Warsaw, and printed by stencil on

rough industrial paper which tortures the capitalist hand.

Niepodległość carries on its cover the old Polish Eagle, surmounted by a crown, and devotes its pages not only to social and economic criticisms of the communist order, but also to invocations of Polish legitimacy, and to anti-socialist analysis of conditions in the West. The January issue argues that the invasion of Grenada by the United States – unlike the occupation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union – was in accordance with the legal and political norms of European government. Another article provides an appreciative analysis of Thatcherite privatisation, while a third, on the 'unloved America', gives an acute description of institutionalised disaffection within democratic societies. The journal articulately distances itself from all forms of humanist cant; in our Central Europe column we give an example of its uncompromising response to the vacillations of Lech Walesa.

Niepodległość is obtainable with difficulty in Warsaw, and costs 60 złotych.

Radical Feminism and The Curriculum

Geoffrey Partington

Educational radicals have in the past been far from united in favour of any form of common or compulsory curriculum at all. To be sure, educational radicals have typically rejected with indignation curricular differentiation based on claims that the genetic distribution of intelligence precludes access to high culture or to liberal education by the mass of people, claims such as that of F. R. Leavis¹ that 'it is impossible to question the clear fact; only a small minority is capable of advanced intellectual culture'.

On the other hand many radicals have rejected forms of common curriculum on other grounds. Naturally enough some radicals have rejected particular forms of common curriculum because their content was dictated by the wrong people, but such radicals, as the experience of the French, Soviet, Cuban and other revolutions shows, are often willing enough to compose a common curriculum when its prescription is in their own hands. Other radicals, however, such as A. S. Neill, have been strongly individualistic and have opposed in principle any curricular prescriptions. Illich opposed a common curriculum because he denied that schooling could conceivably enlarge worthwhile forms of shared culture or that it could ever reduce cultural disparities. Postman, although now a neo-conservative, objected² in his radical period even to making reading a part of a common curriculum on the grounds that the hidden purpose behind teaching reading was 'to make students accessible to political and historical myth' propagated by the ruling classes.

One important radical group, radical feminists, had apparently been entirely united until very recently indeed against at least one form of curricular differentiation: that based on gender. Radical feminists did not consider that a common culture was actually being widely shared between men and women in society, but they seemed to hold as central articles of faith that cultural differences based on gender should be utterly eliminated and that the schools were an important agency in the achievement of this goal. Sometimes, it is true, there was some slip-and-slide among feminists between description and prescription, between 'is' and 'ought': when an aspect of social reality favoured by feminists seemed to be inadequately reflected in the schools their call was then for the curriculum to reflect social reality, but in regard to aspects of social reality disliked by feminists their demand was that existing 'sexist stereotypes' should be transformed by the schools. Sarah Delamont tried³ to contrast, for example, the real world in which she believes that 'girls are taken to cricket matches and given toy trains if they ask for them, while the boys are allowed to knit, play with

doll's houses and cry', with oppressive schools in which 'institutional pressures, teachers and peers enforced stereotyped sex roles, and are intolerant of idiosyncracies', yet Delamont knows in her heart that, alas, even without schools there would be few boys found weeping over their dolls and few girls who long to crash Garner and Holding through the covers. This common enough inconsistency admitted however, there appeared to be no doubt that curricular identity represented to radical feminists the only basis for educational justice for girls.

The strongest example of unfair curricular disadvantage in the eyes of radical feminists appeared to be the single-sex school. Madeleine Arnot writes⁴ very typically that 'the dominant form of reproduction of bourgeois gender relations (until recently when it has been modified) has been that of single-sex schools', and again that 'the use of single-sex schooling had been the major form of reproduction of gender relations - relations that constituted the bourgeois ideal of the family form of male hierarchy and female dependency and subordination'. It is always axiomatic of course among radical feminists that such bourgeois gender relations are utterly wicked and that one of the first objects of social policy should be their destruction.

Single-sex schools were not alone, however, in the eyes of radical feminists in their tendency to reproduce the infamous gender relations of bourgeois society. In schools which were nominally co-educational there were also curricular differences based on gender which were intended to and served to reproduce these gender relations. In Britain in 1975 the Department of Education Science, despite its function as part of the Ideological State Apparatus and as an agency of male hegemony, issued a survey on *Curricular Differences for Boys and Girls* which, in Arnot's words,⁵ 'revealed the extent of gender differentiation practiced in schools'. Any such differentiation was then held by radical feminists to be *prima facie* evidence of unfair discrimination against girls.

In Britain in 1975 the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) was established with a seek-and-destroy mission to extirpate every remnant of gender differentiation in curriculum. Eileen Byrne, an early luminary of the EOC and presently Professor of Education in the University of Queensland, campaigned with great energy for curricular identity between boys and girls. In a typical attack she wrote,⁶

The technical craft subjects

... unquestionably have a major educative value in their own right. Regardless of whether boys later became welders or craftsmen, woodwork, metal-

work and technical drawing have several foundation and transfer values not characteristic of domestic economy. They reinforce spatial development and numerical concepts, involving mensuration and spatial relationships from the outset—the very areas in which girls are alleged to be innately weaker than boys and in which girls therefore need early reinforcement, not further deprivation There is a clear casual relationship between girls' *exclusion* from the technical crafts and their most total under-recruitment in the training and employment fields of construction, metal trades, electrical engineering, maintenance engineering.

In Australia too the elimination of curriculum differences related to gender seemed to be a fundamental tenet of radical feminism. Typical enough were the submissions made in 1980 to the Gilding Committee into Teacher Education in South Australia. Denise Bradley, then Women's Adviser to the Ministry of Education in South Australia, denounced⁷ all gender-based types of curriculum differentiation. She castigated schools in which more boys than girls participated in boys' traditional crafts and *vice-versa*, and criticized shorthand and typing courses and commercial courses in general on the grounds that their higher enrolment of girls than boys demonstrated their restricted and sexist nature.

Physical education was another area in which radical feminists then appeared to demand full co-education. The Women's Electoral Lobby (WEL) of South Australia claimed⁸ that especially in primary schools it is important for teachers to develop a wide repertoire of activities in which both sexes have an equal chance of success', urging that activities which appealed particularly to one sex rather than the other should be rejected as sexist.

The curricular area in which unfair discrimination against girls was most bitterly alleged by radical feminists was, of course, mathematics and physical sciences. Despite nominal adherence to the slogan that 'bilingual is beautiful', few radical feminists ever betrayed any anxiety that boys might be 'under-represented' in advanced language courses, but the 'under-representation' of girls in advanced maths and science courses had been the occasion of so much feminist rhetoric that it deserves our particular attention.

We might note first, however, that whenever a clear difference arises in patterns of choice or of achievement between girls or boys radical feminists always assume that the male distribution is the better one and the differences constitute *prima facie* evidence of discrimination against females. For example, in Australia until the mid 1970s the retention rate in full-time schooling of boys was higher than that of girls, but more recently proportionally more girls have stayed on at school. In each case radical feminists have used the datum as evidence of unfair discrimination: in the first case because girls were 'under-represented' in schools; in the

second case because girls are 'under-represented' in the workforce. The radical feminist Judith Oakeley wrote,⁹ 'boys' and girls' educations are not symmetrical but they are *ideologically interdependent*; that considered female is partly defined by its opposite: that which is considered to be male. The characteristics of one institution are strengthened by their absence in the other. Qualities primarily reserved for one gender will have a different meaning in the institution of the opposite gender'. If we put this recondite saying into the active voice one can indeed agree that radical feminists themselves redefine as useless almost anything which most girls or women actually do. As Midge Decter once put it rather crudely,¹⁰ radical feminists operate a 'shit-work' thesis: if women do it, it is shit-work or its equivalent, or as Marx (Groucho, not Karl) once said, 'if it's a club that will have me as a member, it's a club that isn't worth joining'. This is one of the self-destructive elements built into radical feminism, and seems to be related to a belief in an omniscient, although entirely evil, patriarchal social power, which will only permit those changes to succeed which are bound to prove ineffective.

To return to mathematics, the main concern expressed by radical feminists is that too few girls continue with their studies for a sufficient period or to a sufficient level. The 'under-representation' of girls is not taken as a rather unremarkable example of the propensity of different groups to exercise choice in different ways. Nor is it taken as arguably defensible that a girl might prefer Jane Austen to Venn Diagrams or the French Revolution to Pie Charts. No, the 'under-representation' is, as the Women's Electoral Lobby in South Australia put¹¹ it very typically, the result of 'early direction of female pupils away from competence and interest in mathematics and science subjects': it is evidence of male influence exercised cunningly enough through the predominantly female teachers in the Junior Primary and Primary Schools.

If the problem were, of course, simply or mainly one of making a mistaken choice of subject the solution would be simple. We should remove the choice of discontinuing maths or any other subject deemed essential on stated grounds to the learner or to society. If mathematical achievement up to a given level is really a pre-requisite for full rationality or for equal employment opportunities we must make its continued pursuit compulsory until the level is achieved or the child leaves school. This nettle, however, was one which feminists were not prepared to grasp, partly, perhaps, because many suffered themselves from maths-phobia and hesitate to inflict anguish on fellow-sufferers, and partly because such compulsion would impose more resented coercion on girls than on boys. What seemed unambiguous, however, in the main line radical feminism represented by Eileen Byrne's 1979 book and Denise Bradley's 1980 submission was that provision of identical conditions of learning in mathematics and sciences and in all other subjects for both girls and boys was a non-negotiable demand.

We wrote earlier that radical feminists had 'apparently been entirely united until very recently indeed' against any forms of gender differentiation in curriculum. Appearances are often deceptive of course and one of the deeper sentiments held by many feminists was a conviction that the real interests of women lay not in identity with men, but in polar contrast. Marilyn French's comparison in *The Women's Room* of 'all men' with 'Nazis', Susan Brownmiller's thesis¹² that all men were engaged in a conspiracy to subdue all women by the implied threat of rape, Shulamith Firestone's *Dialectic of Sex*, with its concept¹³ of 'sex itself as the class struggle', and Jill Johnston's *Lesbian Nation*, with its view¹⁴ that 'man has become (if he was not always) the natural enemy of women (so that) it follows that the continued collusion of any woman with any man is an event that retards the progress of woman's supremacy', are representative of a strong undercurrent in the Women's Movement'.

There had for that matter been an active minority of radical feminists earlier in the century who had campaigned openly against co-education and the mainline feminist programme. In England for instance the National Union of Women Teachers declared¹⁵ in 1933 that 'separate department for girls, boys and infants are, under present conditions, better than amalgamated departments. A mixed department is not that ideal thing—a co-educational school. A co-educational school would require two things; full equality between the girl and boy pupil and; full right of consideration for the headship by both men and women. These provisions were probably only tactical and there is no reason to believe that the leadership of the NUWT would have welcomed co-education if and when full equality in terms of their own definitions had been achieved.

The NUWT in England was very much a minority however, and the decisive majority of women teachers were in the National Union of Teachers which strongly favoured co-education; moreover in England, and for that matter in Australia, the Labour Party was committed to co-education largely through the influence of its women teacher members. A significant challenge to co-education and to common learning conditions for boys and girls only emerged in radical feminism in Britain over the last five years, under the leadership of Dale Spender, an Australian who teaches at London University's Institute of Education.

Spender and her group drew particular attention to the hard fact that not only was the sort of 'sexist stereotyping' in subject choice attacked by Byrne and by Bradley not significantly reduced in co-educational comprehensive high schools, but that it was even more marked, when allowance had been made for all external factors, in the co-educational than in the single sex schools. In other words all other things being equal even more girls chose arts and less chose maths and science in a mixed than in a girls' school. This was no new discovery and had been made widely known by R. R. Dale,¹⁶ although, despite his findings, he had

favoured co-education on social rather than on academic grounds. In any case Dale was not even a woman, let alone a radical feminist, and his work had been cited by feminists, on those few occasions when they had been compelled to refer to it only to impugn it.

The evidence on which Spender based her denunciation of the mixed school is in fact very little different from that which had led earlier radical feminists to denounce the single-sex school. In each case the educational outcomes are different for girls as a whole than for boys, and in each case the differences are alleged to 'reproduce the patriarchal relations of domination'. For Spender, however, it is the presence of boys and of men which creates low self-perception in many girls, whereas for her predecessors it was segregation from them which was mainly to blame. For King the root of unfair discrimination against girls lies¹⁷ in schools in which in every classroom boys hung their coats separately from the girls. They were lined up in separate rows at the doors. They were divided for activities; for Spender even such proximity to boys entails female subordination and oppression.

Spender did bring a new perspective to bear on the problem, however, in that she had conducted research which she claimed had established that in mixed groups the males always talk the females down and demean them. It was this unalterable fact, unalterable by anything short of total social revolution, which led Spender to exclude males from women's studies course whenever their numbers made it likely that they would dominate discussion, and thus undermine rather than raise the consciousness and the will to power of the females. Finally, she began to favour separate schools.

Spender's solution is not very different perhaps from that which the NUWT leaders would have advanced in the inter war years had they been bolder. She calls¹⁸ for all-female teaching staff, and for headmistresses who are committed to the cultivation of 'sisterhood', and who will enable girls to find their self-confidence and to learn how to challenge patriarchal relations. A slight difficulty is presented by the shortage of women teachers with ideological convictions that are both correct in themselves and impervious to seductive heresies. However, there were few ideologically-advanced class-conscious workers in the USSR in the 1920s and yet that did not prevent the consolidation of the Soviet system. Arnot, who seem to have Menshevik or Bukharinite-Rightist tendencies, fears¹⁹ that Spender's schemes 'do not have a clear strategy as to how to overcome *male prejudicial attitudes* to women'. Will we ever have enough committed feminists to take over the teaching of the boys as well as the girls? Where indeed can we find a final solution for these prejudiced males?

The Women's Movement as a whole might have been less influenced by Spender's demands for new and extreme forms of curricular differentiation had it not been that much of the detailed research on gender differences in achievement in mathematics and the physical sciences (two areas of particular interest to feminists) had not produced some findings which ought

to disturb them. R. Wood, D. A. Jones, J. Cable and others examined in some detail in the 1970s the areas within mathematical thinking in which sex differentiation is significant. Wood analysed²⁰ sex differences in mathematical attainment in the 1973 and 1974 General Certificate of Education Ordinary Level examinations set by the University of London; later he studied the 1975 results. He found that, in all three years, girls achieved at least parity with boys on multiple choice questions concerning modern maths topics such as Venn Diagrams, matrix multiplication and vectors. At the same time, they performed relatively badly on pie chart, probability, scale and orders of magnitude, and locus items. Interestingly, too, the girls fell below parity in open-ended questions on the very modern maths topics on which they gained at least parity on the multiple questions. Wood claimed²¹ that 'girls are most vulnerable on two classes of problems, those involving what Cable calls *quantification* and those involving spatial visualization'. Spatial visualization has often been treated as to some extent separate and distinct from other mathematical thinking; the research of Coltheart *et al.*²² and of Bock²³ shows that is in problems requiring spatial visualization and field articulation that girls perform relatively worst. Wood claimed²⁴ confirmation in Shadbolt's finding, that in matched groups of 13½–14 year olds the boys showed considerable superiority in fractions, percentages, proportion, probability and pie charts, but that the girls were superior in matrix operations and set theory.

'Quantification' raises wider questions than spatial visualization. John Cable argued²⁵ that 'comparison factors are the basis of all that might be called quantification, certainly for continuous quantities'. Girls seemed weaker in such comparison factors, i.e. numbers used to state how one quantity compares with another of the same kind, as well as on solid geometry and other areas in which spatial visualization is very important. Could these differences between the areas of mathematical reasoning in which girls as a whole achieved at least parity and those in which they were out-performed by boys be entirely of cultural origin? Perhaps problems of scale, latitude and bearings are to some extent linked to male-oriented activities and farther removed from the experience of girls, but the other differences are less amenable to this line of argument.

A more promising approach seemed to lie in examining contrasting learning strategies between the two sexes and particularly the significant sex differentiations evidenced in convergence/divergence scales. Wood suggested that girls are more likely to keep to methods they have been taught, to show caution and to avoid risks which may lead to error; and that the areas in which girls achieve parity or above 'are just the kind of operations which are most susceptible to drilling; or, equally, characteristic of convergence'. Jones found²⁶ that 11 year old girls were much more likely than boys to try to break problems down into separate stages, while the boys more often attempted

holistic approaches, which, according to Jones, is more likely to avoid nonsense answers or huge errors in magnitude.

Pedagogy was perhaps significant here as well as learning styles. Dale found in Britain that maths teachers were disliked more than any other groups of teachers by their former pupils. Dale suggested that²⁷ the precise nature of the subject matter, with the oral work which is involved, either causes the teachers to be more impatient with pupils' incorrect answers, or causes pupils to react more strongly when they have made mistakes. Answers are usually unequivocally right or wrong, sometimes blatantly wrong, – and to be publicly shamed in front of one's classmates is something which many pupils feel deeply'.

In Australia mathematical achievement is prized above other intellectual attainments even more than in Britain, but in both countries girls experience far more anxiety than boys. Emotional tension seem to suffuse maths lessons more than others and to affect girls particularly adversely. Dale and Griffith²⁸ found that dislike of maths among girls was mirrored by dislike of French (or Latin) in boys, and that in the early years of selective secondary education in the case of both sexes this dislike was associated with general deterioration in school performance. The effect on the girls was more severe, however, partly perhaps because of steeper anxiety levels and partly because maths has an even higher prestige than has a second language.

Generalised consciousness-raising for girls did not seem to Wood or to Dale to be likely to improve their mathematical achievement, nor did they make a case for separate mathematical pedagogies for boys and girls, partly because, in maths the differences within the sexes are much greater than those between them. It seemed doubtful too, to non-feminists, that changing external features of a maths problem, so as to use the feminine instead of the masculine pronoun, would have more than a marginal effect. After all the majority of historians and historical personages or literary authors and their characters are male, but girls are not put off the study of history and literature simply by this.

Radical feminists, however, have been unsympathetic to the line of argument in the last few paragraphs, since it does not accord with their doctrines of male hegemony and their conspiracy theories. Radical feminists instead argued that the elimination of masculine pronouns from maths textbooks and the provision of wide publicity for the achievements of female mathematicians would be helpful steps in reducing gender differences in mathematical achievement. Such steps are unlikely to have much effect, except on textbook writers, and publishers, but are compatible with full co-education. The second demand of radical feminists was that more female role models should be available in maths and science teaching, since girls find it hard to identify with male teachers and are thus convinced that the pursuits themselves are outside their range of possibilities. The advice is of limited value, since it implies that we should solve the problem

of the small number of women mathematicians and scientists before we start to tackle it. It would hardly help the female image if women teachers were appointed who were less competent than the available men. Furthermore this approach weakens co-education, which is based in part on the claims that gender is irrelevant to the suitability of the individual teacher and that men and women are in principle inter-changeable in the classroom. The third feminist reaction, even less compatible with co-education, has been to call for separate consciousness-raising classes for girls and for extra practice in primary schools for girls in activities such as throwing and jumping that are traditionally pursued more by boys than by girls, but which are thought to have an influence on the growth of spatial skills.

In 1981 the mathematics teachers of Stamford High School in Tameside in the North of England reported that they had been placing their girls in separate maths classes for three years. The report claimed that the girls made on average better progress in the segregated than in the mixed classes. No analysis was given of ways in which boys were affected. In 1983 the Inner London Education Authority, the most powerful British bastion of educational radicalism in general and of radical feminism in particular, recommended²⁹ its teachers to follow the Stamford High example and to experiment with separate classes for boys and girls in maths and science.

There thus seems to be every reason to believe that radical feminism, which until so recently appeared to be firmly identified with movements towards a common curriculum, will now exert pressure towards greater curricular differentiation. Mainline radical feminism was itself divided between the two modes of common curriculum noted earlier: those concerned to expand the number of highly achieving girls favoured the first

mode, while those concerned more with equality of outcomes the second, but common curriculum in some form or another certainly seemed to be a logical corollary of radical feminism. In the later 1980s we ought rather to anticipate feminist calls for increasing curricular differentiation. Many versions of her story are readily available to replace patriarchally perverted history and Germaine Greer, if not by then excommunicated, can be used as a resource³⁰ to provide courses in art and in literature, based on those many creative women previously excluded from the syllabus by male prejudice.

For a movement based on total or near total ideology, such a change, from empassioned advocacy to envenomed denunciation, is less hard to make than outsiders might believe. Staunch Marxist-Leninist found it easy to move from implacable hostility to Hitler to fawning flattery and then back again; the radical feminists perhaps will be no less flexible. Sympathy should be extended, however, to those fellow travellers who have responded so well to the call to extirpate all sex differentiation in education, and who, immediately after the accomplishment of this great enterprise, are now faced with the task of re-building more strongly than before the structures just destroyed. In Britain the Labour Party is in many areas (such as Bradford, where Moslem support for single sex schools, has intensified radical determination to end them) abolishing its very last single-sex schools, just as the bugle call is heard that the campaign is to be reversed. Perhaps the conspiracy theory is correct? Perhaps the ruling classes do have their agents everywhere, even concealed among the radical feminists. If only we knew whether it is mixed schools or the single sex schools which are the chosen instruments through which the ruling class is seeking to exert its hegemony most fully, then we should know how to deal with it.

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Purity or Tradition? The Case of Early Music

Andrew Thomson

At certain crucial points in the history of civilisation there arises a need to throw off the accumulation of the immediate past and return to basic sources. We find Protestant nations in the 16th century fostering the study of Greek in order that the New Testament might be read in its original form, free of the encumbrances of Roman Catholic scholasticism and commentaries. In England, Henry VIII encouraged Roman Civil lawyers into his service to facilitate his programme of radical legislation by cutting through the thick and entangled undergrowth of the medieval Common Law. Even today, new forms of worship in the Church of England are inspired (so it is claimed) by a vision of the primitive Early Church.

The musical culture of the 20th century displays in its general reaction to 19th century Romanticism, a similar phenomenon in the complementary forms of the 'New Music' and the 'Early Music Revival'. This article is concerned with the latter. It must be stated from the outset that much excellent work has been done by the Early Music Revival which has enhanced our musical life. Works from the Medieval and Renaissance periods have been revived after centuries of neglect; Baroque music has been 'restored' to its pristine condition from the original manuscripts; 'obsolete' instruments (harp-sichord, recorder, viol, crumhorn etc) have been copied, and old treatises on musical performance and practice consulted. However, there are limits to the usefulness of this movement and some attempt should be made to define them: the movement itself could benefit from criticism, for it shows signs of becoming self-defeating and even destructive of that which it most cares for.

The concept of authenticity, or stylistic purity is a modern one: previous centuries did not apply it to their dealings with their own past. Hence we find classical

pediments attached to Gothic churches, as at old St Pauls, and St Eustache, Paris. Mozart apparently felt no qualms in adding accompaniments of rococo sweetness to Handel's Messiah. In our fashionable revulsion against such eclecticism, we may be in danger of overreacting, by projecting onto the past particularly modern notions of austerity. In the case of music, this may lead to a denial of the expression of feeling as a mere Romantic egocentricity. To the latter-day followers of William Morris, authenticity involves a rejection of 'capitalist' individualism, and an emphasis on the composer as a virtually anonymous craftsman, a servant of the courts or of the church. This attitude to musical history inevitably diminishes the stature of such composers as J. S. Bach and gives disproportionate attention to minor figures.

Absolute authenticity, even were it attainable, would not in fact be acceptable. It has never been seriously suggested that the standard practice of the 17th and 18th centuries of keeping singers and players in time by banging a stick on the floor (the odious Lulli died after striking his toe) or a rolled up parchment (as described in Rousseau's Confessions) be revived. Today, we rely on the players' own autonomous rhythmic sense – a modern attribute – even when performing old music. In reality, the search is really not so much for a literal recreation of the past, but for a musical ideal: in Levi-Straussian terms, 'a theoretical model outside time and space'. In other words, a mixture of early and modern practices, but belonging to no particular time.

Problematic issues arise in cases where – as with 18th century composers – there is performing continuity through the 19th century to the present day. As a result of this continuity, Romantic performing practices – involving more developed instruments and the habit of

personal expression—become incorporated into the tradition of performance. The question arises: should these new traditions be respected, either in Darwinian terms as an evolutionary development, or by analogy with Common Law, as a long accumulation of performing experience? Or should later accretions be ruthlessly expunged, in order to lay bare the original conception in all its purity? A parallel is often made with the stripping-off of Victorian varnish from Renaissance paintings, so as to reveal the bright original colours.

The issue becomes deeply philosophical and highly speculative when we consider composers of such universal stature and appeal as J. S. Bach, Handel and Mozart. It is arguable that the works of these composers demand modern forces and techniques if their expressive power is to be fully realised. Modern man—as Nietzsche pointed out—has become accustomed to very intense levels of musical sensation. To him, Wagnerian harmony and orchestration—not to mention Schoenbergian dissonance—is the norm. No amount of historical empathy or imagination will enable him to hear and be affected by earlier musical languages and instruments in the same way as his forebears. It follows from this argument that authentic treatment effectively imprisons the spirit of Bach in the conditions of his own times, and prevents the modern listener from experiencing his full range and power of expression. For musicians of the pioneering generation of Albert Schweitzer, the communication of the experience of the life of God into human life involved an element of artistic compromise. In his words: ‘the older music will remain strange as long as it is not rendered for us in a way that resembles a bit of our modern music.’

It is undeniable that much interest has been aroused in authentic performance. Frequently however, this interest is a form of antiquarianism, perhaps centring on the intrinsic appeal of early instruments. The fashionable professional chamber-type performances of the Messiah do indeed provide new and fascinating perspectives, with their dancing rhythms, light open textures, clarity of articulation, ornamentation of melodies and the like. But what has happened to the spiritual dimension, to the grandeur and *gravitas*, to the evangelistic qualities which the large-scale Victorian

performances elicited in this music? We should respect the altitude which Schweitzer showed to Bach, when he maintained that ‘what is needed to make Bach known and loved is . . . the unheralded devotion of thousands of ordinary folk who should find food for their souls in his work . . .’

The example is, I believe, interesting for anyone who would understand the meaning of conservatism. I submit that a mere return to, or revival of certain selected areas of the past is not the sign of a conservative philosophy. Indeed, the desire to uncover foundations may well have a radical or even a revolutionary motivation. In contrast, a conservative approach endeavours to preserve the continuity of musical traditions, enshrined in such institutions as the English Choral Societies. At the same time traditions and institutions must be renewed: Burke wrote: ‘a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation’. Vaughan Williams, in his celebrated and idiosyncratic performances of the St Matthew Passion, was concerned above all to integrate Bach into the English Choral tradition, as Handel had been integrated in the 19th century. ‘Surely this work should be produced in such a way as to give modern hearers the same emotional and spiritual effect which Bach produced on his contemporaries’.

With both Schweitzer and Vaughan Williams, the emphasis is placed on communal participation in musical performance, and a shared artistic and religious experience. The tragedy of the Early Music movement is precisely what is most modern about it; the tendency towards excessive specialisation and professionalism, and the tendency to make the past into an object of study, rather than a part of life. The result is that much of the musical repertoire has been removed from its natural domain—for example, the church—to the concert hall and the recording studio. The ultimate stage in this process of alienation is exemplified by a recent performance in London of a Bach cantata in which the chorus parts—in accordance with an elaborate musicological theory—were taken by solo voices! Clarity of counterpoint cannot compensate for the rootlessness of such a conception. Our nation’s musical health still lies with the Choral Societies. May they not lose confidence in their task.

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Two Kinds of Order

John Marks

‘An age of superstitions is a time when people imagine they know more than they do’
(Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, Vol. III, p. 176)

I wish to draw attention to some ideas of Friedrich von Hayek concerning phenomena which are ‘the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design’ (Adam Ferguson *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, London, 1767, p. 187; quoted in *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, (hereafter *LLL*) Vol. I, p. 20 and note 19, p. 150). Hayek distinguishes three sources of human values – those ‘which are genetically determined and therefore innate’; those which are ‘products of rational thought’; and those which are the result of cultural evolution. He emphasises the importance of the third of these – cultural evolution – and he considers that many people either ignore or underrate its significance. (*LLL*, III, p. 153). I believe that these ideas of Hayek’s can help us to understand the market, science, and language; they also cast light on the structures of both liberal and socialist societies.

Hayek distinguishes two kinds of rationalism: what he has called *constructive rationalism* and *evolutionary rationalism*. And he associates these with two kinds of order: *designed or made orders* and *spontaneous orders*. Constructive rationalism derives from Descartes with his twin emphases on logical or mathematical deduction from explicit premises, and on machines as appropriate models for explaining natural phenomena, however complex. According to constructive rationalism, rational actions are those which are determined entirely by known and demonstrable truths, and rational social institutions are those which are deliberately designed to achieve specific, defined purposes.

Constructive rationalism gives rise to designed or made orders, like cars, or silicon chips, buildings or factories, armies or planned economies. All of these have been designed for one or several definite purposes. It is the very success of constructive rationalism in some of these examples – particularly in the less complex situations – that leads to the assumption that all social institutions and all other human productions are, and ought to be, the product of deliberate design.

But such design is neither actual nor feasible. It is not possible for any individual or small group to know all the relevant facts needed to design complex social institutions. To think that this is possible is to suffer from what Hayek calls the *synoptic delusion*. And many of the social institutions which are indispensable in a

modern industrial society have not been consciously designed.

Hence we need to recognise the importance of evolutionary rationalism and of self-generating or spontaneous orders to which the ideas of purpose and design do not apply. Organisms, languages, market economies, societies are orders which were not designed: they evolved. Evolutionary rationalists insist on the distinction between designed and spontaneous orders, especially in understanding man and society.

Man is seen as a rule-following animal as well as a purposive one, and human culture as partly an order of rules which we inherit, and only partly as an order of rules which have been either designed or fully explicated. Many rules and institutions have evolved, and have been strengthened and refined by selection. Man has often been successful because he observed rules, not because he understood why he did so. It is not in any way irrational to follow rules we do not clearly understand. For example, even today we have only a small understanding of the structure of language – yet without language virtually nothing of our culture would exist. So evolutionary rationalists argue that the evolution of social rules and institutions is as important for understanding man and society as is biological evolution for understanding man as a species.

But to recognise this is not to deny the importance of constructive rationalism in limited areas. In almost all real situations, *both* kinds of rationalism are involved. If we recognise this, we can appreciate more accurately the potential benefits and limitations of conscious design. We shall also, be able, I hope, to distinguish situations where the constructive rationalist model will be most fruitful. A complex self-generating order of individuals, institutions and organisations, which is a modern society, makes continual use of constructive rationalism in limited areas, but in its totality such a society bears little resemblance to a machine. However, if we adopt a constructive rationalist approach and attempt to plan the whole of our society – just as if it were a machine – then we will be moving in a totalitarian direction.

The examples I wish to discuss – the market, science, language, and the structures of liberal societies – all show common features.

1. They all make use of constructive rationalism in limited areas. It is very difficult to think of pure-bred examples of *either* kind of rationalism.
2. The systems involved are so complex that it is inconceivable that any individual could know all the facts which are relevant to their functioning.
3. Consequently these spontaneous orders have evolved decentralised mechanisms for transmitting information which overcome the limitations of individual knowledge. The development of such mechanisms is a *necessary* condition for the formation of complex spontaneous orders.
4. A *framework of rules* is required if the information transmission mechanism of a spontaneous order is to function and the order to survive. These rules are partly explicit and partly tacit, and may in some cases be reinforced by a commonly accepted system of values.
5. By their very nature, spontaneous orders evolve diverse mechanisms for correcting errors or imperfections. These self-correcting mechanisms, which in some ways resemble 'negative feedback loops' in mechanical or electrical systems or homeostatic mechanisms in biological systems, operate at many levels in a spontaneous order, in ways which are scarcely possible in a made order.

The classic example of an evolved or spontaneous order is a market economy. As Hayek puts it: 'We have never designed our economic system. We were not intelligent enough for that'. (*LLL*, III, p. 164). A market economy is one in which many individuals or organisations may plan their detailed activities by using a constructive rationalistic approach, but which in its totality forms a complex order whose details are not known to anybody. This complex order functions effectively because of one singular fact: the market prices obtaining under competition transmit information throughout the whole system. It is this information, transmitted through prices, which enables each part of the system to respond to the rest and to plan its own detailed activities.

If such an economy is to function effectively, central government must maintain the conditions required for the decentralised transmission of information. Governments must maintain order both internally and externally, and create a legal framework—including laws of property, contract and tort—which allows the market order to function. But the attempt to do more than that may endanger the price mechanism and its crucial role of transmitting information. How much more is permissible on the part of government has therefore been a matter for argument ever since the time of Adam Smith. Questions like, 'Which social services are public goods that cannot be provided by the market?' and, 'How large can the public sector be?' are not easy to answer. What we can say is that governments must answer them in ways which do not threaten the market order on which the overall prosperity of the economy depends. In particular, governments must not succumb to the synoptic delusion by adopting detailed economic planning, or by

administering prices. For they can neither possess the knowledge required to do this, nor explicitly understand the detailed mechanisms which enable modern complex economies to function. Thus, '... if anything is certain it is that no person who was not already familiar with the market could have designed the economic order which is capable of maintaining the present numbers of mankind'. (*LLL*, III, p. 164).

So far, what I have been saying is neither especially new nor controversial. But I suspect that my next example of evolutionary rationalism—modern science—may be much more contentious. For it is a widely accepted image that modern science is a particularly successful example of constructive rationalism. This image, which dates from the mechanical philosophy of the 17th century and from the writings of Descartes in particular, is influential, superficially plausible, but wrong. More than that; I believe it to be almost the opposite of the truth.

The image has gained its hold for two reasons. First, constructive rationalism has been very successfully applied in science *in limited areas*; this is especially true of the mathematical sciences. Secondly, scientific papers are written, for very good reasons, in ways which overemphasise the constructive rationalist aspect of scientific work (*cf.* Sir Peter Medawar's well-known essay—'Is the Scientific Paper a Fraud?').

But when we consider the whole body of scientific knowledge, and the complex mode of operation of the international scientific community, we see that the constructive rationalist model is inadequate. The body of scientific knowledge is made up of a vast network of theories, experiments and observations, recorded in multifarious papers, monographs and textbooks. It is so vast and complex that nobody can be aware of more than a fraction of it. At the same time, it is not just a random assortment of separate and disconnected items of knowledge. The parts are interrelated in many complex ways, and the whole has a structure and coherence of its own. But it is not a structure which has been designed or made or planned. The whole body of knowledge has *evolved* in many diverse, unplanned and unpredictable ways, and it has many of the characteristics of a spontaneous order.

These characteristics are even more apparent when we consider the structure, not of scientific knowledge, but of the scientific community and the way it operates. The scientific community is made up of individuals, scientific societies, learned journals and institutions of higher education and research, all of which are in continual interaction. The structure is now very complex: for example, there are estimated to be around 30,000 scientific journals currently being published. This structure has also grown and evolved in a spontaneous way from its rudimentary origins in the 17th century, in parallel with the growth in the body of scientific knowledge over the same period.

Its primary purpose is the *transmission of reliable information* throughout the whole complex system. It achieves this by using two main criteria; first, logical

coherence, and the use of all available relevant evidence in judging claims to knowledge; and secondly, the practice of exposing such claims to open, public criticism.

The second main function of the scientific community is to maintain the conditions which enable this decentralised process of information transmission to operate. It does this by institutionalising the criteria of logic and evidence, and by fostering the values of openness, criticism, pluralism, individual academic freedom and tentativeness. In this way, the whole scientific community can generate and use a vastly greater stock of collectively validated knowledge than any individual or centralised group. At the same time, the system of continual public criticism and evaluation has the great advantage of enabling faulty work to be eliminated.

It is clear that any attempt to plan or direct the course of future scientific development is likely to fail – not only because future discoveries, by their very nature, cannot be predicted, but also because individuals or small groups cannot possess all the details even of our present knowledge; nor can they explicitly understand and control the detailed mechanisms by which scientific knowledge is acquired.

Thus scientific knowledge and the scientific community together form a complex spontaneous order which has many similar features to a market economy. It has evolved rather than been designed, it operates through a decentralised system of information transmission whose maintenance is the prime function of its governing body, and it contains many self-correcting mechanisms which enable errors or mistakes to be eliminated. Moreover, as with the market, it is conceivable that anyone could have designed the scientific order which over the last three centuries has created the most significant and universal body of interlocking theoretical and empirical human knowledge yet achieved.

At first sight it may seem surprising that two such different areas of human activity as a market economy and modern science should show so many common features. But I believe that this is no accident. I also believe that there are other suggestive parallels and analogies which are worth exploring – analogies between science and language, and between evolutionary and constructive rationalism and the structures and values of liberal and socialist societies respectively. I realise that these are deep waters and therefore I put forward my ideas tentatively in what I hope is the true Popperian spirit of conjecture and refutation. In other words, I offer my conjectures, and invite my readers to refute them.

Human languages are spontaneous orders which have many important similarities with science – particularly if we accept the view of science as a redescription of the world. Natural languages are not designed; they are the products mainly of evolutionary rather than constructive rationalism. The artificial languages for which this is not true – mathematical and computer languages –

are special cases, which lack many of the essential characteristics of natural languages.

Languages deal with and describe the natural world, a world which is so complex that any individual attempt to describe it, and make sense of it, can only capture part of it. In order to survive, each individual must make some sense of his environment, most fundamentally by acquiring a language. But the language of each individual (his *idiolect*) only functions effectively if it forms part of a wider structure such as the language of a group, a region or a nation. So our languages are complex decentralised mechanisms for transmitting information. And we use them confidently without much explicit understanding of their structure or of how they develop. A framework of rules governs the forms which natural languages take. But these rules are concerned with the structure rather than the content of what we say. This is true both for the socially transmitted grammatical rules which are specific to each language, and for the deep structures or *linguistic universals* which Chomsky claims are common to all human languages (*cf.* Geoffrey Sampson *Liberty and Language*, Oxford, 1979). Hence languages exhibit the same common features as the other spontaneous orders I have mentioned. Nor is the analogy destroyed by the fact that in this case part of the governing framework of rules – Chomsky's deep structure – appears to be innate rather than man-made.

There is a further respect in which languages resemble markets and science. Like these last two institutions, they incorporate self-correcting or error-eliminating mechanisms. Linguistic forms which do not lead to effective communication tend not to persist; more successful forms persist, and gradually evolve into more permanent features of the language. Natural languages have the interesting property that partially incoherent or ungrammatical statements can transmit some information, although they may also lead to misunderstandings. This is *not* a property of such products of constructive rationalism as computer languages, where one error is often enough to destroy completely the meaning of a statement. Again, unlike computer languages, the very complexity of natural languages may lead to differences in interpretation and a lack of communication – as when two people use the same word in different ways.

Yet another similarity exists between language and other institutions of spontaneous order. This is the essentially personal character of language: the fact that much of our linguistic experience and knowledge is personal, tacit and never fully conveyed to anyone else. Similarly, much of scientific knowledge and experience has a strong personal element of this kind (a point particularly emphasised by Michael Polanyi in his books *The Tacit Dimension* and *Personal Knowledge*).

I have already stressed the importance of evolutionary rationalism in understanding modern complex societies. I indicated that such societies, while they may use constructive rationalism in limited areas, in their totality have evolved rather than been designed.

Moreover, they are so complex that they need to develop and maintain decentralised mechanisms for information transmission; and these mechanisms provide such societies with adaptive or self-correcting properties.

I want now to try to illustrate these points by contrasting two very different kinds of society—liberal (capitalist) societies and socialist (Marxist) societies. I suggest that the fundamental differences between liberal and socialist societies arise because liberal societies depend primarily on evolutionary rationalism and spontaneous order, whereas the structures of socialist societies take constructive rationalism and designed order as their model.

Ideally, liberal societies are fundamentally decentralised. All the main spheres of human life—economic, political, educational, cultural, religious—are partially separated. And within each sphere, pluralism is, to some extent, both encouraged and realised—diverse centres of economic power, many political parties, diversity of provision in education and other cultural spheres, many coexisting religions. The resulting complex order is underpinned by the values of tolerance, pluralism and individual freedom, and, in particular, by freedom of expression, communication and access to information. It is clearly impossible to plan the *overall* development of such a society even if short-term developments in some areas can be planned.

By contrast, Marxist societies are centralised and monolithic. Their governments attempt to control all aspects of life. They have centrally planned economies and only one political party possesses any substantial reality. This party controls all educational and cultural activities. Freedom of expression and of access to information are expressly prevented, and the values which are encouraged are those of collective commitment to the centralised rule of the party. Anything which the party does is to be approved and anything which threatens its central role is condemned and suppressed. Marxist societies have clearly tried to organise themselves according to the principles of constructive rationalism. But, as I have argued, such principles are antithetical to the effective functioning of many essential institutions of modern complex societies. So there develops a great gulf between promise and performance in Marxist states. And this gulf persists because of the lack of self-correcting mechanisms in a system based on constructive rationalism.

This analysis may help to explain why the Gulag Archipelago has lasted so long and cost so many millions of lives, why the charlatan Lysenko ruled Soviet biology for more than forty years, and why the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia still does not list five of the eight men who have been premiers of the USSR since the revolution.

All the examples of spontaneous orders have one major common characteristic—they are all concerned with how we gradually learn about our environment and how we adapt to it. Successful learning and adaptation are facilitated if the environment is relatively

stable. So this partly explains why the kind of knowledge we have been able to acquire about the relatively stable natural world—via language and science—is of a more durable and cumulative kind than that which we have acquired about the more plastic social and political worlds. And the knowledge or information transmitted by the market is the most transient of all, reflecting as it does the current economic situation. But this does not mean that all economic knowledge is transient any more than the transient nature of the spoken word implies that we can learn nothing enduring about language. If my analysis is valid, it should be just as possible to build up a cumulative body of knowledge in economics as it is in linguistics.

Therefore I would contend that we can aspire to appreciate how the market and other complex spontaneous orders function. The work of Hayek has made it possible for us to generalise some of the insights of Adam Smith, in ways which it may be vital for us to understand if our society is to survive. It has also displayed the dangers involved in trying to organise societies according to the constructive rationalist model, as socialists advocate and practise. I shall conclude with some of Hayek's own words:

If our civilization survives, which it will do only if it renounces those errors, I believe men will look back on our age as an age of superstition chiefly connected with the names of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud. I believe people will discover that the most widely held ideas which dominated the twentieth century, those of a planned economy with a just distribution, a freeing ourselves from repressions and conventional morals, or permissive education as a way to freedom, and the replacement of the market by a rational arrangement of a body with coercive powers, were all based on superstitions in the strict sense of the word. An age of superstitions is a time when people imagine that they know more than they do. In this sense the twentieth century was certainly an outstanding age of superstition, and the cause of this is an overestimation of what science has achieved—not in the field of the comparatively simple phenomena, where it has of course been extraordinarily successful, but in the field of complex phenomena, where the application of the techniques which proved so helpful with essentially simple phenomena has proved to be very misleading.

Ironically, these superstitions are largely an effect of our inheritance from the Age of Reason, that great enemy of all that it regarded as superstitions. If the Enlightenment has discovered that the role assigned to human reason in intelligent construction had been too small in the past, we are discovering that the task which our age is assigning to the rational construction of new institutions is far too big. What the age of rationalism—and modern positivism—has taught us to regard as senseless and meaningless formations due to acci-

dent or human caprice, turn out in many instances to be the foundations on which our capacity for rational thought rests. *Man is not and never will be the master of his fate: his very reason always progresses by leading him into the unknown and unforeseen where he learns new things.*

To which it is fitting to add the words of Isaac Newton – the man whose scientific work inspired many of the men of the Enlightenment but who was a lifelong

opponent of that prime advocate of constructive rationalism, Descartes:

I do not know what I may appear to the world; but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, while the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.

Thinkers of the Left: Immanuel Wallerstein

Roger Scruton

One of the most important problems facing the New Left during the sixties and seventies was that of recreating the international dimension of its movement. Lenin had been in no doubt that the proletariat existed as an 'international class'. Moreover, he had come across the work of J. A. Hobson who, in 1902, presented his popular analysis of imperialism as a search for captive markets. This gave the clue for what has been perhaps the most influential and persistent false theory in the history of the modern world: the theory of 'imperialism as the highest state of capitalism' (to quote the title of the volume published by Lenin in 1917). According to Lenin, the bourgeoisie is as much an international class as the proletariat, and capitalism as much an international force as the socialism which had emerged in opposition to it. Imperialism, he argued, is an economic necessity for the capitalist economy, through which it tries to overcome the otherwise inevitable 'falling rate of profit' that spells its doom. Imperialism, however, leads to international competition for markets and resources, and hence to 'imperialist war', and, through that war, to the final collapse of capitalism.

The theory is orthodoxy in the communist world. It has been especially redesigned for the African market, in the slogan 'neo-colonialism as the last stage of imperialism' (to borrow the title of another influential book (1965) by Kwame Nkrumah). However it is so clear that the colonies provided no real market for European goods that few socialists in the West would accept the theory as originally formulated. It has been necessary to find an amended form that will do the same moral work as Lenin's – representing capitalism as an ever-expanding, ever-oppressive international force – without being quite so evidently contrary to the experience of those designed to consume it.

The problem took on a new urgency in the seventies, as there emerged into political consciousness a generation that had not known the reality of world war, and which consequently had not closed its mind to the truth about the Soviet Union. It no longer seemed

possible to inspire the allegiance of the young by awakening their sympathies towards that beleaguered 'revolution in one country' which had in fact already, and notoriously, carried its indigenous habits of bloodshed into nineteen others. On the whole, it was expedient to direct attention away from the realities of Soviet communism, towards those other places where revolution had yet to occur: in particular towards the 'third world'. Not only did this have the beneficial consequence of concealing the nature of Soviet totalitarianism; it also cast the Soviet Union in a favourable light, as the natural friend of 'liberation movements' everywhere, and as the only force able to begin the process whereby the terrible injustices of colonialism could be remedied.

Theoretically this shift was enormous – too enormous to be readily comprehended within available Marxian categories. The Left acquired a wholly new and wholly unforeseen constituency: the toiling proletariat of the European city, gave way to the lazy, sun-drenched tribesman of the African bush, as the preferred recipient of left-wing condescension. Although the theoretical shift was enormous, however, the emotional shift was comparatively slight. The 'third world' peasant fitted the dramatic role of social victim as well as, perhaps even better than, the industrial proletarian. In particular, his style of life, his mental condition, and his geographical circumstances together made him unknowable. He therefore presented no obstacle to the sympathising imagination. Like the proletarian of the Soviet poster, he conforms in every particular to the sentimental emotion of his champion. He has the supreme political virtue of being hidden: he is the *deus absconditus* of the new political liturgy. Moreover, he lends himself to the growing passion for ecology: he consumes only what he produces, and produces only what he needs. Unlike the European proletarian, he is not an ecological disaster. His unknowableness therefore combines with rumours of his non-toxic quality, to refurbish the myth of the Noble Savage, and to release the torrent of Rousseauist sentiment which

ruined Europe in the eighteenth century, and threatens to ruin it again.

We should not be surprised, therefore, to find that Christian priests, who in the last century travelled to impart to this creature the good news of his salvation, now make the same journey not as missionaries but as pilgrims, to worship what they had previously tried to convert. The third world peasant has become the Christ-like bearer of our sins, the pure and suffering victim who can redeem us, so long as we confess to our most grievous fault. He has gone from pastoral lamb to scapegoat, with no intervening period as a complacent sheep. The redemptive task of socialism is to remake the world in his image, and also in his favour.

'Third worldism' has therefore helped to fill the gap created by the disappearance of the industrial proletariat. It has produced a victim with which the middle-class radical can identify, and a cause for which he can fight. Yet more important, however, since it touches on the deepest radical motive, this cause has the power to embarrass our rulers. It suggests policies harmful to the interests of the 'capitalist' world, and favourable to the 'wars of liberation' which preface the transition of nations from independence to irreversible membership of the communist block. In other words, third worldism endows the naughty gestures of the radical with the dignity of a moral purpose.

The effect of third worldism, in providing an international socialist cause, has been enormous. It has found personal embodiment in Willy Brandt, the president of the Socialist International, who, as West German Chancellor, did more than any other postwar politician to weaken the strategic position of Western Europe. The *Brandt Report* is perhaps the most turgid and ill-considered document ever to have achieved the status of a radical manifesto. Nevertheless, its authority is now unquestioned in radical circles and—interestingly enough—it has become one of the few items of required reading for the new-style politicized academic courses ('Peace studies' at the University of Bradford, for example, and now—believe it or not—'World Studies' at the World Studies Teacher Training Centre in the University of York). The Brandt report presents the important facts upon which 'third worldism' is founded, and, however feeble the theory which these facts are used to sustain, there is no doubt about the political exhortation which we are to read in them.

What, however, of the theory? In discussing Gramsci, I pointed to the enormous importance in radical politics of the idea of 'theoretical correctness', and even if the theory in question is—like that of Althusser—tautologous and theological, it must nevertheless exist, if the radical is to identify in his sentiments the true occasion for political action. Without theory, the intellectual's sole title to government collapses. Whenever a radical cause is found, therefore, the theory must be provided, which converts burning sentiment into justified 'praxis'.

I shall discuss the theory offered by Immanuel

Wallerstein, a New York radical professor who, after active participation in the sixty-eight frolics at Columbia, moved first to McGill University in Montreal, and then to the State University of New York at Binghamton, where he holds a variety of distinguished posts. His *Modern Systems Theory* (vol. 1, 1974), and *Historical Capitalism* (1983), contain the most extended modern attempt to give an analysis of the 'system' of international capitalism, upon which to ground a radical third-world politics.

'Systems theory' is by no means a left-wing monopoly. Nor is its use as an anti-capitalist instrument in any way new. Eastern Europeans still groan at the mention of the 'convergence theory' proposed by Gordon Skilling (an expert on Czechoslovakia, whose experience has yet to make an impression on his mind). According to this theory, the 'system' of world capitalism, and the 'system' of world socialism, are, under the pressure of mutual interaction, gradually converging; the differences between American democracy and Soviet totalitarianism are increasingly 'superficial', disguising a deep and sinister similarity. The theory shows the use to which 'systems' thinking can be put. Criticism of the socialist states is turned at once into criticism of the Western democracies. That which is truly terrible in the first (totalitarian control), or truly admirable in the second (systematic representation), become alike 'superficial' characteristics, irrelevant to the underlying moral reality. As so often in the intellectual devices congenial to the Left, a *deep* reality is found, as the true bearer of moral attributes, to be contrasted with the superficial appearance, in which the liberal or conservative places his deluded trust. The correct response, of course, is to reverse the argument: that which is illusory is the appearance of depth, and that which bears the moral attributes of a body politic is precisely the 'superficial' realm, in which people live and respond as social animals.

In order to understand Wallerstein's approach, however, we should return to the paradigm of 'deep' analysis: the theory of 'class struggle' as developed by Marx. The perennial appeal of Marx's theory—and the reason why it has survived so many refutations—lies in its ability to capture a fundamental socialist sentiment. It shows how to re-describe social inequality as a form of 'oppression'. It turns inequality into injustice, and so justifies that 'violence for equality' which stirs the sympathies of the heroic middle class.

In its bare essentials, the Marxian theory is as follows: by virtue of my position in the 'relations of production', I belong to a certain class. The two primary classes under 'capitalism'—those of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—are formed respectively from those who control the means of production, and those who control only their labour power, and who therefore must contract with the former if they are to produce anything. The proletariat is rewarded with the 'exchange value' of his labour power—which is the value sufficient to reproduce it. The surplus of his product is appropriated by the bourgeois. Thus one

party accumulates the surplus, while the other merely survives. The proletariat undergoes 'immiseration', while the bourgeoisie enjoys unhindered the fruits of its 'control of the means of production'. The 'production relations' which unite the two classes are therefore inherently 'antagonistic': whatever is in the interest of one party, is against the interest of the other. The 'class struggle' consists in the emergence at the political level of the antagonism embedded within the relations of production. The proletariat then tries to wrest control of the means of production, so as to regain control of the product of its labour.

The interesting feature of the analysis is its description of the parties to the 'struggle': these are not individuals but classes. The individual bourgeois does not do to the individual proletarian what the bourgeoisie as a class does to the proletariat as a class. The distinction is morally crucial. For there need be no injustice in the dealings between the individuals, however disparate the rewards of the respective classes. In favourable circumstances, the labourer is in a position freely to strike a bargain and withdraw upon any breach of its terms. The circumstances in question are indeed complex, involving unionisation, legislation governing the hours of work, and welfare provisions which ensure that the proletarian may survive without working. Nevertheless, in the right circumstances, there may exist, between the parties to the wage contract, just as much freedom and justice as ever exists between separate individuals, with separate interests, who contract for their mutual advantage.

It is only when we transfer our attention from the relations between individuals to the relations between classes, that the 'oppression' becomes apparent. For the bourgeoisie *as a class* is solely empowered to dictate, to the proletariat *as a class*, the terms upon which the latter may live, work, and find its satisfactions. Or at least, so it seems.

It is at this point, however, that socialist and non-socialist perceptions diverge. For the socialist, the bourgeoisie acts *as a class*, to secure that permanent balance in its own favour, of which the proletariat (as a class, and also individually) is the unjust victim. The bourgeoisie is supposed to be a kind of moral agent, which does things and suffers things collectively, and which might be praised or blamed. Without that supposition it becomes incoherent, either to accuse the bourgeoisie of injustice, or to resent its dominion. It also becomes incoherent – and indeed immoral – to resent, punish, or (for example) expropriate someone *as a member of the bourgeoisie*. In other words, without the supposition of the bourgeoisie as a corporate agent, the flood of radical emotion is impeded. The free flow of radical resentment requires that the bourgeoisie be personified.

To do him credit, Marx regarded his theory as destroying the possibility of all such personifications. 'Class', he argued, is no more than the theoretical description of a material structure. At the same time, his own language – and in particular the inflammatory

language of *The Communist Manifesto* – betrays him. And, it is this inflammatory language that has entered the left-wing conscience. It creates the image of the proletarian as the victim of injustice, and of the bourgeois as the insolent oppressor of the labourer upon whom he feeds. Moreover, your being a proletarian or a bourgeois becomes a moral attribute, part of your character: you are rendered virtuous or vicious by your membership of your social class. (In order to arrive at this emotional conclusion, the socialist conscience must avoid a host of uncomfortable facts: for example, the facts that one and the same person may be both employer and employee; that a person may be employed today, and an employer tomorrow; that the mature 'bourgeois' order throws all property into a flux of changing ownership, and sets a premium on the development of every skill. To appreciate such facts, however, is to see through the myth of the 'class struggle'.)

In order to personify the bourgeoisie it is necessary to associate it with a corporate person. Two such corporate persons suggest themselves: the state, and the firm. It is a received principle of law that both of these may have legal personality, legal liability, legal rights and legal duties. And what is possible in law, is possible also in morality.

The master-stroke of classical Marxism is to identify a class with the state, and so to find, in the genuinely adjudicable actions of the body politic, the moral reality of the 'ruling class'. By this move, the 'ruling class' becomes the *perpetrator* of 'social injustice', while the lower class, which supposedly occupies no position in the state apparatus, is the perpetrator of nothing – for it has no personality. (Indeed, paradoxically, when it seizes power, it is in order to abolish power, and so to abolish the collective liability of which it might otherwise stand accused.) Here then is the crucial emotional transformation, which decks out the neutral 'production relations' with the moral attributes of injustice and oppression.

The theory is philosophically extremely dubious, and supposes just the kind of 'class agency' which Marxian economics repudiates. It is also, I believe, morally pernicious. For it invites us to blame what cannot be blamed, and to avenge imaginary wrongs against those innocent of their perpetration. It is the inspiration of those 'classist' feelings which led to the 'liquidation of the kulaks', to the 'cultural revolution', and to Pol Pot's 'purification' of the social order in Cambodia. Despite this, the charm of the theory remains absolute and overwhelming. And it is by extending it into the realm of international politics that thinkers like Wallerstein endow third worldism with the necessary foundation of moral outrage.

The new internationalist theory requires only three stages of argument:

1. We must identify, in the international situation, a collective underdog, and a collective overdog.
2. We must find a 'material' link between the

prosperity of the one and the 'immiseration' of the other.

3. We must show that the overdog *acts* so as to sustain that link, and we must endow its action with the character of corporate liability.

The first move is obvious and easy. The second involves some variant of the theory of 'capitalist imperialism'; the third involves the crucial rhetorical trick: that of identifying a class (and it must, of course, be the very same 'ruling class' against which the radical conducts his own private struggle) with appropriate corporate persons. These persons are monotonously identified as the Western 'capitalist' states, and the 'multi-national' companies.

The thrust of Wallerstein's argument is entirely concentrated on this third move. For he clearly sees that, without it, the other two moves can have no emotional force, and the accusation of injustice will not stick. He begins, therefore, from the most extraordinary description of what he calls 'historical capitalism':

What distinguishes (this) historical system... is that... capital came to be used (invested) in a very special way. It came to be used with the primary objective or intent of self-expansion... (Hence) '...over time, it was the accumulation of capital that regularly took priority over alternative objectives' (*Historical Capitalism*, London 1983, pp. 13-4).

Such 'observations' are the greatest economic nonsense. An accumulation is capital only to the extent that it represents, for the accumulator, a potential object of exchange. Accumulation can never become the *primary* objective of economic activity, without the effective disappearance of capital. Nevertheless, Wallerstein is not sufficiently interested in economic analysis to be disturbed by that objection. The important feature of his description of capitalism is that it contains, in ready-moralized form, a reference to an inner purpose (the 'relentless and curiously self-regarding goal of the holder of capital, the accumulation of still more capital' - p. 14): a purpose familiar to moralists through the ages as the motive of human greed. Hence we are led naturally to the view that 'in the course of seeking to accumulate more and more capital, capitalists have sought to commodify more and more of (the) social processes (involved) in all spheres of social life' (p. 15). That process demarcates the basic rules of capitalist production, and, in the course of time, 'the enforcers of those rules (have grown) ever more intransigent' (p. 18).

Of course, the rules are absurd:

One accumulates capital in order to accumulate more capital. Capitalists are like white mice on a treadmill running ever faster in order to run still faster (p. 40).

Why 'white', one wonders? But not for long. For while

'in the process, no doubt, some people live well'... 'others live miserably' (p. 40), and those others are, increasingly, the oppressed peoples of the third world. These oppressed peoples are the victims, not only of the capitalist expansion that has caused their 'immiseration', but also of the 'racism' which provides its ideological screen, and which ascribes the misery of the black peoples of the world to their inherent moral degradation. 'Racism', Wallerstein insists, has nothing to do with xenophobia:

Quite the contrary. Racism was the mode by which various segments of the work force within the same economic structure were constrained to relate to each other. Racism... served to keep low-ranking groups in line, and utilize the middle-ranking groups as the unpaid soldiers of the world police system. (p. 79)

The quotations give some impression of the prevailing tone of Wallerstein's work: angry, impetuous, hungry for punishment of an 'oppressor' whose nature is, in truth, so sketchily described, as to present no resistance to his accusations. (For who is this remorseless 'accumulator' of capital, in the last analysis? You? Me? Mrs Thatcher?). The language sets the tone for the theory whereby the first and second moves of the socialist vision are accomplished. For it is now open to Wallerstein to find, in the 'poverty gap' between rich and poor nations, the major instance of systematic oppression in the modern world. It is oppression, precisely because it is the result of capitalism's inner 'purpose'. Accumulation requires, not markets, but cheap labour. And it is in search of cheap labour that capitalism has roamed the world, enticing the innocent from their pastoral habits of production. It is this which has brought about the 'proletarianization' of the third world, and the ruin of its people. In comparison with the resulting gap between North and South, and the moral outrage to which it testifies, the minor difference between Soviet totalitarianism (which is just a special form of 'state capitalism') and American democracy (which is capitalism in its vilest and most unbridled form) fades into insignificance.

In order to swallow all that, the reader has to pass very rapidly over stage 2 of the argument: the assertion that the gap between rich and poor is the result of a single process, which causes both the poverty of the poor and the wealth of the rich, so that the good fortune of the one is purchased *at the price of* the misery of the other. Wallerstein is here so selective in his evidence as to carry conviction only for those who are already persuaded. He is unwilling to attend, either to the real economic improvement of many third world countries as a result of colonial administration, or to the subsequent collapse of some of them, at the point where they ceased to provide the 'cheap labour' upon which they had thrived. He neglects to mention that the prosperity of Europe preceded the colonisation of Africa, or that the 'immiseration' of countries like

Czechoslovakia and Poland was precipitated by their forcible incorporation into the communist bloc. He does not attend to the similar immiseration that has been brought about by communism in the third world – in Aden and Ethiopia, for example, in Cuba and Mozambique. He pays no attention to the most telling contrast of all: that between Taiwan and mainland China (which declared itself a ‘third world’ country in 1955, an observation which, unique among the official descriptions of the Chinese People’s Republic, has proved to be true). All those facts, which clearly require far more subtle analysis than the essentially rhetorical theory of ‘historical capitalism’ can accord to them, are passed over, as indeed they are passed over by the *Brandt Report*, and by almost all the internationalist theory that has fed upon its findings.

Nor is this really surprising. For in truth, the second move in the internationalist argument is no more important for the moral foundation of third worldism than was the equivalent move for the traditional Marxist revolutionary. For the socialist mentality, it suffices to identify privilege and disadvantage, and then to provide the description of the privileged class as corporate agent, active in the pursuit of its own advantage. The ‘immiseration’ of the victim then has the appearance of an obvious corollary. If the theory has yet to be found, which shows exactly how the wealth of the *Überhund* results from the poverty of the underdog, that is no more than a detail. Why wait for theory, in order to feel, on the victim’s behalf, the burning resentment which is, in any case, his only asset?

Like many of the theorists of class hatred, Wallerstein finds it necessary to ‘unmask’ the human face of capitalism. He argues that welfare provisions, factory legislation, even the representation of the working class and universal suffrage, are no more than subtle additions to the ‘state machinery’ whereby the workforce is controlled. To the innocent eye, it may seem that the ‘bourgeois’ state has often used its powers of taxation for the benefit of the weak and the disadvantaged. Do not be deceived, Wallerstein tells us: ‘the power to tax was one of the most immediate ways in which the state directly assisted the process of the accumulation of capital in favour of some groups rather than others’ (p. 53) – a mere tautology, of course, given Wallerstein’s understanding of ‘accumulation’, but one which, under the influence of his rhetoric, at once becomes the foundation for yet another attack on the ways and means of that vicious international person, the capitalist class.

The paranoia implicit in Wallerstein’s analysis is, I believe, a defensive reaction to a fundamental socialist contradiction. It is essential that the object of radical hatred be primarily identified, not as a state, but as a class. A state can indeed be hated. For it is a corporate person, which makes decisions of its own. But that which makes decisions may also be influenced and deterred by argument. (The state which *permits* no argument – the totalitarian state – is insane in *just the*

way that an individual who permits no argument is insane). It is a mark of the ‘capitalist’ states that they are, on the whole, constitutionally governed: opposition is permitted, and dissent expressible. Such states may be persuaded, by political pressure and rational argument, to forswear their unjust actions and to set themselves upon more righteous paths. They may stand corrected, as our own state stood corrected by Shaftesbury, Manners, Disraeli and the Chartists in the matter of Factory Legislation. The state reveals its corporate identity, and corporate liability, precisely in this disposition to change direction. Hence, to the extent that it merits blame, it may also avoid blame. And to the extent that it is constitutional – open to political persuasion – the perception of error will lead to the initiation of change.

It is precisely such a vision of the political process that the radical wishes to avoid. Because nothing short of revolution (the murder of the state) will satisfy him, all constitutional change must be ruled out *ab initio*. And it must be made clear from the start that no change within the repertoire of the bourgeois state can possibly satisfy his grievance. Hence the radical directs his resentment not to a state, but to a class which is supposedly represented by it, and sees all major battles as occurring between classes. (This is the true reason for his description of the Western states as ‘capitalist’. No matter that they have, like France or Spain, socialist governments; all such facts are too superficial for the radical eye – which sees only the depths that are hidden from those who are deluded – to perceive them.) By this means, in effect, the radical is able to avoid entering into relation with his opponent, and is able to reject every change or compromise that is offered to him. Thus, when the institutions of ‘bourgeois’ learning produced their enlightened, ‘universalist’ visions of man, and opposed them to the ‘racism’ of which bourgeois society has so often been accused, the radical anti-racist cannot perceive this as a virtue. For it displays a change of heart in that which he must believe to be heartless. Hence:

Universalism was offered to the world as a gift of the powerful to the weak. *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes!* (sic). The gift itself harboured racism, for it gave the recipient two choices: accept the gift, thereby acknowledging that one was low on the hierarchy of achieved wisdom; refuse the gift, thereby denying oneself weapons that could reverse the unequal real power situation. (p. 85)

In other words, whatever the changes in the state, the class intent remains unaltered. But the correct conclusion to draw from that is precisely the conclusion that the radical cannot draw. The correct conclusion is that the ruling class is not, after all, identical with the state: it is distinct from the one corporate person to which blame and resentment in these circumstances can reasonably attach. The ruling class is revealed, by the implacability of the radical’s hatred, for what it is: a

material force which it makes no sense either to condemn or to praise, a fact of economics to be assessed not for what it does (for it *does* nothing) but merely for what it causes to happen. Hence the radical, despite his need to personify class, is also forced to preserve at the heart of his thinking, the image of class as something essentially impersonal, essentially outside the sphere of moral judgement. This contradiction (which exists in precisely analogous form in 'racist' thinking) can be avoided only by recognizing the all-important distinction between class and state. But to recognize that distinction, and to attribute to it the moral significance that it demands, is to abolish the foundations of third worldism. Even if we continue to blame the Western states – by whatever casuistry – for the impoverishment of the noble savage, we cannot blame them on account of their 'capitalism', on account of that which belongs, not to the 'superficial' realm of political decision-making, but merely to the 'deep' structure which lies

beyond praise and blame.

We may deplore the intellectual confusion evinced by this contradiction. Far more serious, however, is its moral effect. For it encourages the radical to direct his hatred to that which has neither will nor reason. It causes him to engage, not with the real world of political negotiation and compromise, but with the 'deep' and illusory world of uncompromising forces, in which light and dark struggle for a metaphysical ascendancy that can be achieved by no merely human will. This Manichean sentiment destroys in the radical both the spirit of compromise itself, and the ability to perceive compromise as a political value. It prepares him to accept as his preferred form of politics – and one only 'superficially' different from the politics against which he rages – the procedures of totalitarian government, from which compromise, adjustment, criticism and reform have been finally eliminated, by an 'irreversible' change.

The Way of a Sufi, English Style

Roy Kerridge

Sufism in Turkey and the Moslem countries may be reduced to a cult today, but its history and traditions are by no means ignoble. Whirling Dervishes, wandering philosophers, the comic stories about the Mullah Nasrudin and even the verses of Omar Khayyam, all form part of the colourful tapestry of Sufism. From what little I have read of Sufism in translation, I gather that it is an intellectual variant of Mohammedism that shows some similarities to Christianity, but without the emphasis on Free Will and the power of Satan. Orthodox Moslems look askance at Sufis, and in Turkey, the stronghold of Sufism, the religion is actually banned! Turkey is officially a secular state, and has become, in practice, a combination of non-established Mohammedism and an official Cult of Atatürk-ism. Huge posters of the late political leader are everywhere – he's the man who did Turkey the dubious honour of outlawing the fez, curly-toed slipper and sash around the waist. Whirling Dervishes, who still wear beautiful clothes when whirling, are allowed to perform at their Festival once a year, supposedly as a tourist attraction. However, most of the tourists are Sufis on pilgrimage, who come from all over the world. I confess that I see little sense in spinning round and round as a method of worship, but Sufis in England who have made the pilgrimage all agree that it is a wonderful sight. The rootless English version of Sufism, all young people and communes, would probably

greatly surprise the Incomparable Mullah Nasrudin and his faithful donkey, inspiring a witticism from the one and a hearty bray from the other.

Preston Street, in Brighton, used to have a funny little Oriental gift shop in a curious white building with pavilion-like windows. The bald, bearded proprietor could have been an artist, male witch, Buddhist, spiritualist or any other typical Brighton character, and was in fact a Sufi. Meetings were held above his shop, where you could look out on Preston Street and the Scientologists and *their* shop on the other side of the road. Both premises are now closed, but before this happened, I paid one visit to a Sufi meeting. I found a crowded flat, decorated in beautiful Islamic style, full of excited young Sussex University students. I got the impression that they had discovered Islam for the first time, and were revelling in a new mental climate, with the bearded man as a benevolent host. Young girls in flowing patterned dresses pored over books of Moslem architecture, without thinking of their own place as Moslems in that architecture, which they would then only be able to admire from the inside. A pink cheeked fringe-bearded young man enthused to me about hashish smoking as an aid to meditation, but I don't know if he had ever done it himself.

Nothing much happened that evening, but I learned of another flourishing branch of Sufism, the Beshara Sufis, who were rivals of the first lot, although I could

not make out the difference. I stayed for a cup of tea, and noticed that apart from the bearded man, the only other older person there was a tough, blowsy sardonic looking woman, of a type seldom associated with any Christian church. Nevertheless, unrepentant Magdalenes seem to be a feature of English-Eastern amateur religions.

Next summer, that of '74, I found myself enjoying tea and vegetarian pie in the pleasant communal flat of some Beshara Sufis in Oxford, just off the Woodstock Road. This is an idyllic tree-lined area of large family houses, almost mansions, which were built for the first generation of married dons in Victorian days, when the old monkish university rules were done away with.

These Sufis, as befitted their surroundings, were gently spoken, but bright eyed with a rather touching enthusiasm. None were drugged, boys and girls were equally represented, and most were recent converts. No older people were there (except me). I never met any Turks or non-westerners at all during my time with the Sufis.

One young man in Oxford, tall, dark and desperately earnest, had left the university with a degree, and then stayed in the town as a Sufi, working in a car factory. He told me that his fellow-workers, with whom he was ill at ease, regarded the Gown element in Oxford with a mixture of great respect, suspicion and fear. His sister, a neat young girl who had just started at the University, was there too, although she was not a Sufi. Another non-Sufi was a shy undergraduate who hoped to go into the Church. Boyish, decent and middle class, he seemed a happy survival from the E. Nesbit days of large walled gardens and family walks in the country.

Masterminding the meeting was a passionately forceful Jewish girl, who had changed her name from Rachel to Fatima. All dedicated Beshara Sufis changed their names into Eastern ones. Another girl, Elizabeth, had changed her name to Aziza. Another Sunday Schoolish type, she gravely told me that her name was also one of the many names of God, and signified the most wonderful and beloved one.

'God is perfectly Aziz', she said, and announced a prayer.

Tea being over, we squatted on the floor for the evening study of Sufi thought. One of the great pleasures of new religions for the young is the ritual of sitting on the floor cross-legged.

Fatima explained to me that everyone had to hum 'Mmm' 33 times before the meeting could begin. She led the humming, and we all went 'Mmm' together.

She kept count, and at the 32nd hum she announced, 'Last time! Mmm!'

Then we studied a typed out translation of Sufi thought, with much pondering. I found that the Oxford Sufis had fallen into the habit of thinking plain thoughts tortuously, and of using 14 long words painfully when three short ones would have expressed the meaning more clearly. Perhaps this is the effect of reading bad translations, or perhaps the Sufi philosophers they studied made mountains out of molehills, and arrived at

simple Sunday School truths by terribly complicated routes. I do not think Fatima would have been a Sufi if she could have had an intelligent introduction to Christianity. But these days intelligent Christians are rare, and the faith which founded Oxford has become associated with simple mindedness.

Before leaving Oxford, I bought a small bottle of wine for the Sufis, and conversation sparked.

A year later I returned, and found the Sufis dispersed and in dingier surroundings. Twelve months of Eastern philosophy had taken its toll of them, and they seemed more wan, spotty, ill tempered and stupid than before. Fatima was happy, however, as she and her postgraduate husband were the proud parents of a baby girl with an impossibly Eastern name.

Later, in a commune flat, I met two less agreeable Beshara Sufis, Ted and Ali. Ali was a fat-faced young waiter, who had probably been to grammar school in the days when his name was Alan. He took his Sufism very pompously, and yet during the meetings, when all the 'Mmms' were done, he struck me as radiating not spirituality but a suppressed bawdiness. Someone ought to write a thesis on 'Religion as an Aid to Meeting Girls'.

Ted was a thin, shabby young man, with a long nose and small mean eyes. A large bush of hair grew out of the end of his nose, which surprised me. Why didn't he shave his nose?

Thirty five miles away, in some wild hills, there was a farm where the Beshara Sufis ran a highly organised commune and meeting place, with religious services and guest weekends. One of the members was a highly successful pop singer, a graduate of London University, who was famous for running around on stage with his head on fire. This was done by means of a petrol soaked headdress. I hoped that Ted and Ali would drive me down to this farm so I could see all the wonders for myself.

'We usually go on Sundays, but we're not going today', said Ali. 'Are you hoping to join the commune?'

'Oh no, I only want to have a look. I'm Church of England myself, actually'.

'Church of England! They're a lot of sheep—quite mindless'.

This was a backhanded compliment to say the least, but my impression was that he was saying it automatically, and meant no harm at all.

Bidding Ted and Ali farewell, I set out to hitch hike to the farm. After many adventures and setbacks, during which I met many interesting people and saw some wonderful scenery, I found myself climbing a steep hill as night was falling. It was a spring evening, and the beauty of the rolling landscape, with woods here and there, was marred for me by the feeling of desolation I get in uninhabited places at night. Was I on the right path? Would one of the shrieking owls swoop at me and frighten me into a fit? Country paths have a habit of disappearing among nettles or bracken or fallen trees.

Near the crest of the hill, beneath some elms, a young

fox trotted across my way and disappeared into the hedge. Then I was looking down on a farm – but was it the right one?

A girl stood near the farmyard gate, and to my great relief I saw that she looked strained and emaciated, her hair hung loose and she wore a long faded dress. In short, someone who had been to university, and an obvious Beshara Sufi! And so it proved.

The girl was friendly and asked me in, and in the last gleams of light I met her friend, a dark haired vivacious young lady who studied at Bristol Tech., a long way away. Sufis came to the farm from all the big cities of England, I learned, to spend paying weekends. There were several fields but no animals, a big farm house expensively modernised by the Sufis themselves, a few staff cottages and a barn converted into a temple, all on the slope of the hillside.

I was escorted into a large room made out of one whole side of the farmhouse, and there I met the company, seated round a long table. There were very many of them, more girls than boys and all very well dressed and professional looking. No older people as usual, and the leader seemed to be a fiery eyed young man with blonde hair and sunken cheeks. He was very tall, and kept order with an air of ferocity.

I sat down, and who did I see but Ted and Ali! They looked at me disgustedly.

'I thought you said you weren't coming!' I exclaimed.

'Yes, we said we were coming, but later on', Ali lied. 'We've been here for ages – where were you?'

Calling us to order, the blonde young man made some announcements, and then a bell rang and everyone filed out. There I found a cheerful girl pulling a rope which jangled an enormous ship's bell mounted on a post.

Another young lady told me that I was welcome to attend the service at the temple, but that she advised me not to join in the dancing straight away.

In the barn doorway, everyone took off their shoes, picked up a blanket and mounted some steps up to a big dance floor. Silent, walking in single file and cloaked in blankets like priestesses, their heads held high, the Beshara Sufis made an impressive and eerie sight. I never took a blanket, imagining it to be part of the ritual. Soon I bitterly regretted this, as the hall was icy cold and the blankets were worn from motives of sheer common sense. Nobody had their head on fire, or I might have warmed myself. Even without any heating, someone had clearly spent a fortune on the barn, which had a polished wooden floor and a curious white domed ceiling, shaped like a giant curve of jagged crystal. Where the great barn door had been was a glass window with a large screen in front of it. On this screen was an obscure smudgy pattern like a big eye.

I say in one of the few chairs at the edge of the floor, and shivered. Everyone else joined hands in a circle and squatted on little wooden supports. Some of the girls left the ring and took seats without embarrassment, on orders from the blonde young man, as it was their 'bad time'.

To a word of command from the young man, the Sufis laid aside their blankets, rose to their feet and began to dance. They did not whirl individually like dervishes, but remained hand in hand, like a grown-up and very serious game of 'Ring-a-ring-a-roses'. Faster and faster they went, now standing, now sinking low, but never ceasing to move. With blazing eyes, like a mad Puritan, the blonde young man acted as a bizarre square dance caller. No one knew any fancy steps, but prompted by the young man, they all chanted wildly and humourlessly.

'HOO Allah Jamal Kish! HOO Allah Jamal Kish!' the chant sounded, again and again. Except for the loud breathy cry of 'HOO' at the beginning of the line, these words aren't quite right, but only as I remember them. There were other words I can't recall – all names of God, apparently.

'HOO' means 'The Essence', I was told later, and has to be emphasised. Personally, if I was God and anyone addressed me like that, I would do dreadful things to him. Fortunately He is All Merciful, and the chanting continued.

Time went by and still they danced and chanted, oblivious to the cold. Now their heads were lolling about madly, their eyes closed, all bobbing up and down, round and round. Even the girls in chairs around the room, sensibly wrapped in blankets, chanted and rocked themselves in ecstasy. There was Ali, silly fool, play-acting the mystic, his eyes shut, his head wobbling and a fatuous smile on his face. The others were quite sincere, and the young man, eyes glaring, directed them into leaping or crouching positions.

'HOO Allah Jamal Kish! HOO Allah Jamal Kish!'

Suddenly I became aware of the fix I was in. Now it was pitch dark outside, and there I was, in a mysterious barn, on top of a hill in a wild country in the middle of nowhere, on a freezing night. My companions, madmen. How I longed for my tiny hotel room in the far off city! There it was, waiting for me, with its electric fire and crisply turned down sheets, and would I see it again, that night or any other?

Supposing the young man, as the dance reached its climax, suddenly stood up and announced, 'The sacrifice will now begin'?

Or supposing he called for silence and exclaimed, 'There is an *unbeliever* in our midst,' and *all eyes* turned upon me?

Instead of which, after an hour of dancing, everyone stopped, put on their shoes and walked back to the farmhouse perfectly normally. I followed them, and was given tea and bread and jam. One young lady, a social worker from Camden Town, London, became so friendly that Ted and Ali withdrew to a corner, muttering jealously. Most of the company were students, teachers or social workers, I found.

After tea, a cheerful clean-cut young man drove me down to a motor road by some back-track. Before we said goodbye, I asked my deliverer what name I should take, were I ever to become a Beshara Sufi. 'You don't choose your name – they are chosen for you', he replied.

The Diary of Lord John Manners

We conclude our series of extracts from the diary of Lord John Manners with an account of his reception of his first Cabinet post, in 1851, as Minister for Woods and Forests in Lord Derby's government, and with a description of the personal tragedy which robbed Manners of the spirit necessary for the pursuit of the highest office.

London October 10th 1852—Continued Malvern 1853. We returned from our trip in November last year with Louisa very delicate—having been in considerable danger. Spent our Christmas at Belvoir, where she slowly picked up a little strength to meet her approaching confinement: during that time I was engaged in an attempt to keep Disraeli and Granby together: the former having evidently made up his mind to abandon all duties, and Granby resolute for adhering to them. The former at last seemed to despair of the party's future and the correspondence ended on my part with the sanguine prophecy that before long I should see him leading the House of Commons. Then came Palmerstone's dismissal, the opening of Parliament with an unusually large and eager meeting at Lord Derby's speedily followed by the destruction of the Government, which in some sense was fortuitous—the whip had been sent out on our side; nor was it understood by our Party that Palmerston's amendment would be proposed until after the House met, when through the agency of Dunn, Palmerston's resolve of vengeance became known to our leaders, who then strained every nerve to keep our troops on the field. Several days of excitement followed. One evening I received a short note from Beresford directing me to be at Lord Derby's in St James' Square the next day at 12 o'clock.

I went, was shown into a room in which were Sugden, Pakington and some others of my future colleagues, all looking nervous and miserable—in a few minutes I was summoned into Lord D's library; he said, 'you are aware that Granby announced to me in the course of the winter his determination not to take office in the event of my forming a minority—I regretted that determination; but it now enables me to have the pleasure of offering you the Woods and Forests with a seat in the Cabinet. It is a place that brings you a good deal into contact with the Queen and the Prince, and I have no doubt the choice I have made will be agreeable to them'. I had formed no idea as to the place I was likely to be offered, and had but little idea of being at once turned from a plain MP into a Cabinet Minister—I therefore was taken by surprise, and stammered out a few words expressive of my fear that I should disappoint him and render no effective service: 'oh', said he, 'you'll do well enough, I am confident': both words and manner were cordial and encouraging, and I returned to the other room with mixed feelings. Each future minister had a similar separate colloquy

with him, and then we were all ushered in to form our first Cabinet: he then thanked us all for standing by him; said with the single exception of Palmerston he had not applied for aid to any out of his party: and that after their rejection of his overtures last year if the Peelites hereafter wished to join him, it must be one by one as vacancies happened to occur. He then rapidly sketched the outline of the temporary policy he proposed to adopt, and said he should in less than an hour submit the list of our names to the Queen, by whom he did not doubt it would be graciously received.

Then came the memorable Privy Council, at which 18 new Privy Counsellors were made, the re-elections & we were in office. I soon received a summons to attend Prince Albert: he received me alone, motioned me to sit down, looked very nervous and awkward himself and began to give me his views on all the subjects connected with my Department: it was impossible not to be struck by the largeness of many of his views, and the clearness of his expression of them: but it was evident that the bent of his mind was set against the impediments which the House of Commons raises to great schemes of that class. Being unversed in business, entirely ignorant of the very first principles of Art, and knowing nothing of the subjects on which he was discoursing I maintained a discrete and respectful silence, endeavouring to recollect as well as I could the purport of his remarks. Nor did I feel much more comfortable in my office to which Lord Seymour introduced me. Sewers, Intramural Interments, Building Acts, Board of Health, Water Supply, Closing of Exhibition, besides the routine business of the Department all pressing for immediate settlement. By degrees however light broke upon the chaos, and from the first I had the comfortable assurance that I could thoroughly depend upon the fidelity, practical information and zeal of the permanent Secretary, Philipps: but his cooperation did not extend beyond the routine of the Office of Works. In all the perplexing questions connected with the Board of Health I had to rely on... my judgement. Walpole, nearly overwhelmed at the Home Office with the Militia to arrange, threw all but the general supervision of them on my shoulders: fortunately a confidential paper left by Sir C. Wood in the Exchequer upon the Interment question drawn up by W. Macaulay, one of the Secretaries of the Board of Health, was handed over to me by Disraeli—this afforded me a clue to unravel some at least of the mysteries. But I found it impossible

to act with the Board, and after many anxious consultations with Macaulay settled the Metropolitan Extramural Interment Bill, and carried it triumphantly into a Law. The Clergy, whom I did not consult, and for which omission the Bishop of London at the head of a Deputation reprehended me, behaved nobly, and the Metropolitan Radical members were civil and gave their assistance, though the Dissenters fought one point rather venomously, the right of Burial in consecrated ground. Not long before the second Reading, Sir J. Graham made an elaborate attack upon the quantity of bills the various Departments of Government had in hand; and as my office was a subordinate one, and my bills consequently postponed to the others, it was very late in the Session before I could press them: under these circumstances it required some assurance to answer the question Lord Derby put to me at one of the Cabinet meetings, – ‘have you any chance of carrying your bills?’ – in the affirmative. But I carried all save one, a Metropolitan Buildings Bill, which I never intended to persevere with.

Both the Queen and Prince Albert were civil and kind. She danced with me at one of the State Balls, talked a good deal, and we were asked to Windsor for two of the Ascot Days. Louisa unluckily was not sufficiently recovered from her confinement to go, and I went alone. The dinner in St George’s Hall one of the finest convivial sights in the world, but the noise made by the band in their strange dresses barbaric. Our Cabinets were naturally frequent, but remarkably harmonious. Until after the Elections general policy was not much discussed at them. Then, as in settling the Queen’s Speech and deciding on the Budget, Hardwicke, Walpole and myself leant most strongly towards an agricultural policy: and it was to meet by vehement instances that Lord Derby proposed to insert the paragraph in the speech, which was laid hold of by the Opposition as an excuse for Villiers’ resolution. But had Disraeli done what was agreed upon, given notice of a distinct and early day for the Budget, that excuse would not have availed them: he was prevented from doing so by Lord Derby; why, I forget. Herries, whose counsels had been wise up to this time, apparently threw up all responsibility in despair, and absented himself from one of the important councils.

Disraeli’s original proposal included the repeal of the Advertisement Duty, and it was not until after Parliament met that the Duke of Northumberland gave in such enlarged estimates for the naval defences as compelled the omission of that popular measure. This was a severe blow to Disraeli; and greatly weakened his scheme of finance. Perhaps the fate of the parliamentary campaign might have been altered had he been able to offer that sop to Manchester. But it was his conviction that our defeat had been arranged by the leaders of the Coalition on the Canada Clergy Reserves question, which Molesworth was to have brought in. When Villiers gave notice of his resolution it was agreed by the Cabinet that we should propose our amendment, and until the Division came on we had no other meeting

after Palmerston gave notice of his. Disraeli’s acceptance of it was consequently unauthorised, and was, in my opinion, a serious error. So strongly did I feel the disgrace we incurred in supporting it that I all but voted with Granby, and when, the next morning, we all went down to Windsor and my colleagues were in high spirits at the majority, I was quite disheartened and prepared for the worst: ‘you may easily alienate your friends, you cannot conciliate your enemies’ was a phrase constantly in my mouth. Of the intrigues that brought about our actual defeat I say little. The Irish Brigade were cajoled by Hayter into the belief that the next Government would not extend the Income Tax to Ireland, and though our friends rallied round us to a man, the proposal to extend and double the House Tax was (as Hardwicke prophesied when it was first mentioned in the Cabinet) ‘so d . . . d just’ as to secure our fall. The decision we came to unanimously – to resign – somewhat comforted me for our past errors. It is worthy of remark that the only member of the Cabinet who was willing to brave the storm and fight it out was Lord Lonsdale, to whom office is less than nothing; and that Walpole, to whom it was everything and who had sacrificed all to it, was vehement in combating against the idea of clinging to it. Lord Derby thanked us all for our services and cooperation and we parted with extreme good humour and mutual kindness. I will say a few words on what struck me in some of my colleagues’ characters.

Lord Derby showed more forbearance and toleration of his colleagues’ ignorance and official blunders than I had expected from his hastiness, love of fun, and the frightful amount of work he had to do. The number of letters that had to be written with his own hand alone must have been a man’s work: and yet upon whatever subject I had to write to him, a most careful, full and beautifully written answer always came. He showed great tact and delicacy in retrieving Walpole’s false step when, in conducting the Militia bill through the Commons, he proposed the Military franchise on the recommendation of the Speaker. A Cabinet was called the next day and Lord Derby had to dispose of the blunder without hurting Walpole’s feelings: this he did by thanking him for the zeal and efficiency he had displayed, and reminding him of Mr Fox’s saying that he would not give sixpence for a man who never blundered.

Brighton December 9th 1853. I sate this morning a quarter of an hour with Samuel Rogers: he is 93 years of age: his voice was low, and his body feeble: but neither his mind, nor his memory betrayed any signs of failing powers. He told two stories of Empress Catherine (a propos to the Russo-Turkish quarrel, the now ordinary topic of conversation) which he heard from Lord St Helens, then our Ambassador at St Petersburg, without hesitation or the least forgetfulness. One was to the effect that, never playing cards herself, – they were yet permitted in the Palace: one evening she sent for one of her Ministers; he did not come: impatient, she walked into the room in which she found him playing,

loath to leave his game: all thought his ruin accomplished; she sent him on the errand for which he was wanted, and played his cards for him during his absence. The old man seemed pleased to be visited: he gave Mrs Marlay a copy of the new edition of his poems with a little inscription on the title page in his own handwriting, very clear.

London April 11th 1854. Shut up this book: my sky is darkened; the sun is taken from my heaven; all is gloom and hopeless sorrow so far as this earth is concerned; and how am *I* to hope for happiness in another?

Our married life was growing month after month happier and sweeter; we had learnt much more of our mutual tempers and minds, and could make much more allowance for our occasional diversities of thought. Everyday I saw more to admire and love in her, and more reason to repose confidence in her right judgement and good sense: she was forming excellent plans for little Henry's education, and approving herself in every particular a true, loyal, loving, faithful and discrete wife. We had spent a happy honeymoon summer at Malvern, an equally happy autumn at Brighton, and went to Belvoir before Xmas; the Scarlet Fever was then at Bottesford, Adelija and her family had fled from it to the Castle, and my darling had more than once expressed her fear lest she might catch it; time however went on, Parliament met at the end of January; we returned, as I thought, in safety to London: her health was fairly good; we walked together every day and early on Sunday morning March 12th, she was easily delivered of a little girl; all seemed prosperous; on Monday the little thing was given her to suckle, and I pray that I may never forget that beautiful and holy sight; those sweet loving eyes bent down upon the diminutive face with love unutterable beaming from them. On Tuesday sore throat came on, and Stone became alarmed; on Wednesday morning he knelt down at my bedside and told me Scarlet Fever had appeared—I felt he rung her death knell; but what could be done was done. Chilver was called in, Henry sent to the Hotel in the Square, a nurse brought in for the infant, and on the following Monday Chilver announced to us that the eruptive stage of the malady was safely passed. For three days we indulged in hopes; but on Thursday it was evident from their manner that the Doctors were alarmed, on Saturday Stone took his leave saying his part of the treatment was over, and on that night Chilver called in Ferguson. This was a night of anguish. She had suffered acute pain, had been distressed by injections, tormented by fever, and was quite unprepared to see another doctor; the nurse in vain attempted to reconcile her to it. It became my duty. She cried; told me she would never love me again, and although she consented to see him made me feel that I had added fresh bitterness to her sufferings; when they left her Ferguson told us she was in all but a hopeless state: and her poor mother and I sat up till past five in the morning listening, for every sound from the sick chambers. That was the 25th. The night before

the poor little infant died, filled with dreadful poison. We did not tell her of the death, but she divined it, and as on the following Monday I was sitting by her asked me quite calmly when and where the burial was to be—I told her the time and place; she expressed her acquiescence and only added 'I hope they will be quiet about it, and then I will endeavour to dismiss it from my thoughts, least it should prevent my recovery'. From that moment so long as her intellect remained unclouded she never spoke of the child again. God only knows, but I partly guess how precious to her soul that little creature was: but her self-control and resignation were remarkable through all that frightful illness; when the baby had been removed upstairs, and Henry out of the House, she at once guessed the nature of her illness, and asked me if it was not so. Alarmed at the possible consequences of telling her the truth I endeavoured to dissemble, and then her frank truthful nature broke and said 'you are deceiving me, John, I will never love you again' (those words pierced my heart, and I must always grieve that I attempted to conceal the truth from her, for the attempt prevented her making any preparation for death; may God forgive me, and accept her sweet soul!) Almost immediately afterwards Chilver came; he found it useless to attempt further concealment, and broke the awful fact tenderly and wisely to her; it was night; she saw me again, shed very few tears, kissed me and from that moment never bewailed her fate, nor desponded, nor complained; but did all she was told to, took all medicine and food she was ordered to take; and set an example of fortitude, good sense and resignation which I cannot hope to follow. Then came days and nights of agonizing hope and fear; sometimes they gave us faint hopes, at others symptoms which in our ignorance we had thought favourable they pronounced to be the reverse. And then her clear intellect began to give way, her thoughts to ramble, and her consciousness at times to fail; but still she knew her Mother, and Lucy, and me, and on the 20th, on Wednesday evening, she called me to her, and in a clear collected voice said 'John kiss me; you know what I mean; oh, how I loved you, John'; and again the next day Thursday at noon she said 'My darling, give me one kiss—I am happy now'.

It seemed to me that she thus took leave of me, and forgave me all I had done wrong, even my concealment of the truth from her. Ah—what words can tell how I feel in transcribing those sweet words of her. After that all was dark; the stomach began to swell, poisoned phlegm to accumulate, and annoy her; fits of stupor, which we sometimes fancied were refreshing slumbers, followed by nights of raving, but still her constitution held out, and to the last she took nourishment. As the distention of stomach increased so did the pain and annoyance; her thin transparent fingers were constantly twitching at the clothes, and she was constantly praying the nurse to take it away (thinking that she was about to be confined). About three days before she died the poison struck her eyes and destroyed them; but she did not seem to be aware of this; and yet inspite of all these

accumulated miseries she would rouse herself to thank Chilver for his attendance, and the nurse for the things she gave her. I heard her almost with her dying breath say 'thank you' for some drink. At last after several days of hovering between the two worlds, at half past three on Friday morning, April 7th, the nurse came into my room, and said that she was worse. I got up, threw on some clothes, and went into that room—never again seen by me without a heart-pang. The change was evident, and before I had been long by her side she gave some cries of pain: oh, great Heaven—how they tortured me; and then her sweet voice lost its power, and though she spoke frequently, and, as I thought, with an anxious wish to be audible and to be answered, we could not gather what she said; her beloved left hand, becoming colder and colder every hour lay in my right, and thus after 12 hours misery and, I fear, agony, she died; all her little wishes unknown; no opportunity given for formally resigning her soul to God; perhaps even unconscious that her Mother and her Husband, who loved her so in life were with her in death. But I thought I once heard her say in answer to our sobbed prayers 'Christ have mercy', and two days before Mr Murray had read the Church's last prayer over her. Thus miserably in pain, darkness and confusion died my Angel-Wife. If I ever forget her sweet, pure, dutiful and joyous Life, or her sad and terrible death, I am neither worthy to have enjoyed those short three years of marvellous Happiness with her here below, nor to join her in Glory hereafter. Long, my life, my love, my Angel be present in some mysterious way with me to my life's end! Amen—good Lord—Amen.

Bournemouth July 3rd 1854. So far as I can see through the thick and dreary haze of past sin and present sorrow, life, if prolonged to me, seems to hold out three chief objects to comfort and assist my son, and my mother-in-law; to watch over and educate as best I may my little boy; and to do as much good to others as I can.

As to the second of these objects: it is clear that the loss of such a mother is the greatest drawback from the moral and religious welfare of my dear boy that could occur: and although I have heard him once (the other day when his Grandfather was here and talked of going away) say Mammum, it is impossible to hope that he can recollect her sweet presence, example, or precepts: but it may be that when he grows older he may wish to know something of that beautiful vision dimly haunting his earliest fancy, and may in moments of temptation derive good from the feeblest reflection of those excellencies and charms which it now costs his miserable father so many bitter tears to think of, and endeavour to chronicle. Moreover, should his life be spared, and should some great sorrow overtake him, it may encourage him to know that others have had sorrows equally great to bear, and that his own father, whom he may regard as a prosperous man, has drunk to its very dregs, the cup of human sorrow. With this object I transcribe a letter of Dr Johnson abounding in manly counsels, and recommending the course I am

now pursuing. Should I die before Henry is old enough to understand the meaning of these few pages I wish them to be carefully reserved for his reading, together with the two packets of letters written during his sweetest mother's fatal illness, and after her death, at the proper time.

Dr Johnson to Mr James Elphinston. September 25th 1750.

Dear Sir,

You have as I find by every kind of evidence, lost an excellent mother; and I hope you will not think me incapable of partaking of your grief. I have a mother, now 82 years of age, whom therefore, I must soon lose, unless it please God that she should rather mourn for me. I read the letters in which you relate your Mother's death to Mr Strahan, and think I do myself honor, when I tell you that I read them with tears: but tears are neither to you, nor to me of any further use, when once the tribute of nature has been paid. The business of life summons us away from useless grief, and calls us to exercise of those virtues of which we are lamenting our deprivation. The greatest benefit that one friend can confer on another is to guard, and excite, and elevate his virtues. This your mother will still perform, if you diligently preserve the memory of her life, and of her death: a life, so far as I can learn useful, wise, and innocent: and a death resigned, peaceful, and holy. I cannot forbear to mention, that neither reason, nor revelation denies you to hope, that you may increase her happiness by obeying her precepts; and that she may, in her present state, look with pleasure upon every act of virtue to which her instructions or example have contributed. Whether this be no more than a pleasing dream, or a just opinion of separate spirits, is, indeed, of no great importance to us when we consider ourselves as acting under the eye of God: yet surely there is something pleasing in the belief, that our separation from those we love is merely corporeal; and it may be a great incitement to virtuous friendship, if it can be made probable, that the union that has received divine approbation shall continue to eternity.

There is one expedient by which you may, in some degree, continue her presence if you write down minutely what you remember of her from your earliest years, you will read it with great pleasure and receive from it many hints of soothing recollection, when time shall remove her yet farther from you, and your grief shall mature to veneration. To this, however painful for the present, I cannot but advise you as to a source of comfort and satisfaction in the time to come; for all comfort, and all satisfaction is sincerely wished you by, dear Sir.

Your most obliged, most obedient,
And most humble servant,
Samuel Johnson

With this preface let me, my dearest son, attempt to bring before you some few of the many sweet and

endearing characteristics and qualities of your angelic mother.

Of her personal charms I need say little; for great and nearly unrivalled as they were, they were not the cause of my devoted love, my now almost frantic sorrow; not would their portraiture, could I succeed in drawing it, encourage you to do your duty in life, nor assist you to resist its temptations. But you will not err if you picture to yourself the virtues and mental charms I am going to specify embodied in one of the most graceful and beautiful forms that ever mortality put on.

She was but twenty years, and a few months when she gave me her hand, and her love: and although I was twelve years older, and had acquired a disrelish—at which you will not wonder if you read the records of your Father's folly in this journal—for those gay and bright scenes which she so adored and enjoyed in the innocent gaiety of her young heart, yet she never would allow me to say I was a day too old for her, nor did she ever show herself so happy as when we were living in perfect retirement alone. So thoroughly unworldly and pure was her enjoyment of this retired life that she would in sport call each such season spent at the Woodhouse, Scarborough, Brighton, Tonbridge Wells or Malvern our third, or fourth Honeymoon, and sorrow over its break-up as though the happiness of life consisted in it. After your birth, indeed, those retirements had an increased charm for her, for it was then undistracted by the recuperations and fatigue of London or Belvoir, that she would hang over your little crib, and point out to me the sweetness of the smile on your sleeping face, or your attitude of artless grace. So impressed was she with the desire to fulfill all her duties as a mother, that when owing to fatigue, or to the languor incident to her condition previous to her fatal confinement, she could not go up to the nursery in the evening, she would reproach herself for that so-called neglect, and account it an omission of duty. No detail of Love, or Duty to you, to her Mother, her brother, or me was too minute, or too trivial for her to perform. In Brussels I remember her hunting—as I thought with unnecessary exactness—through a jewellers store, in order to find a small cross of some particular fashion for her brother; and on the least article of your little dress she would bestow as much pains and thought as on the train in which she was to appear before the Queen. So in many a small matter affecting a friend, a relative, a dependent, or a servant, she would evince as great an interest, and take as much trouble as she would for an object immediately concerning herself. With so much to tempt her out of the way of humility she retained an eye, an ear, and a hand always open to the sorrows of the poor and humble, and often shamed me by the frank kindness with which she addressed those who applied to her: but though thus remarkably abounding in charity and humility, her innate good sense and quick perception restrained her from foolish generosity, and indiscriminate alms giving. Reason and feeling went hand in hand, and guided all her actions. She had no liking for expenditure on herself, and was learning to

keep accounts regularly, with a view to diminish her personal expenses. Her frank kindness of heart and humility showed themselves in her deportment towards her inferiors: she was as gracious to, and as grateful for a little service rendered by some casual visitor or humble friend, as to lords and ladies of the highest degree. Merit in any rank she highly esteemed; and for the lack of it not the highest distractions, or most brilliant talents, could atone in her estimation: for this reason she disliked and mistrusted politics and politicians, believing that expediency and not principle too generally guided them: and, great as was her love for me, she never concealed her disapprobation of some of my political connections. But I think part of that dislike was owing to that very love, which grudged every hour of the time—with a too prophetic jealousy—taken from our intercourse.

In the same way her tenderness of heart made her dislike such sports as hunting and shooting. Her sweet temper would be more ruffled by my absence during a long day's hunting, than by almost any other course. For all the brute creation she cared; in the life and motions of every small bird, or insect she was interested; and the sight of a swallow, the note of the cuckoo, or the gambols of a squirrel have powers now to bring tears into my eyes; so associated is Nature in her least details, with the memory of that beloved angel. Round a yew tree in the poultry yard at Belvoir is a seat, put at her request, where she might sit and observe her favourites without fatigue. Cruelty, violence, wrong, of any sort, were peculiarly abhorrent to her, though her spirit was high, and her courage, so far as she ever had occasion to show it, sufficient.

I have mentioned her humility; it was real and deep-seated; she often expressed to me her wonder why I so loved her; why I liked to be so much with her; what I found in her silly ignorant self to make me give up my male friends' society; and sometimes went so far in her self-deprecation as to say that it would be happy for me if that she should die, and not continue to act as a clog upon me. When I think of this trait, I derive a melancholy pleasure from the belief that, now, seeing all the rottenness of my heart and life, she sees how utterly unfounded were those self-abasing doubts. In another beautiful and, alas, unusual way did her humility appear. While her frankness, and intolerance of wrong made her freely censure great and prosperous evil-doers, no one ever heard her detract from the charms of any young lady who might be mentioned; on the contrary, so much in the habit was she of praising, where there was the least excuse for praise, looks, manner, disposition or accomplishments, that my brother George, a severe critic, would laughingly ask her if there were any young lady she was not prepared to praise. As might be expected, this lowly estimate of herself extended beyond this world: she frequently lamented to me her sinfulness and unworthiness, her fears lest she should have exercised a prejudicial influence over my soul, and, when prevented from going to Church by sickness or weakness, she would regard

the omission as almost a sin, and endeavour, as I used to find on my return, by reading parts of the service to herself with a sermon of Manning's, to keep alive in her soul the love of God and sense of duty. On the shelf of the bookcase in my study, called the Maple room in Cavendish Square just above the sofa on which used previous to her last confinement to lie, I saw after her death just as she had left them her Bible, Prayer book, and her favourite volume of Manning's sermons. By a coincidence which in my broken state, I must regard as providential, in that volume are the three sermons on the Intermediate State which have been published in a separate shape for the comfort of mourning survivors.

Truthfulness was another of her prominent characteristics: she not only never said what she did not think, but ever spoke out what she thought. Concealment was not only foreign, but hateful to her noble nature; and upon one occasion when I, having been entrusted with a secret affecting the happiness of some dear friends under pledge of secrecy, scrupled to tell her of it, I could see that I was lessened by that reserve in her opinion; nor did she like me to abstain from giving expression to my thoughts on any subject of conversation if they were adverse to hers, or to any one else's, as I sometimes did from mistrust of my temper.

In Search of Central Europe

The following editorial, from the February issue of *Niepodległość* (see 'Conservative Journals, p. 3), expresses the response of many Poles, to President Reagan's economic sanctions against the government of their country.

Reagan's Anti-Polish Sanctions

Lech Walesa, leader of the Trade Union 'Solidarity', has recently made several public statements: a speech in Oslo on the occasion of being awarded the Nobel prize; a plea for the repeal of sanctions against Poland; and a commemoration speech under the Monument to Slain Shipward Workers. In all these speeches he called for dialogue with the communists, for a 'realistic' stance, and for an agreement with the authorities. He even formulated principles for such an agreement which would be acceptable to the Union.

We have often criticised Lech Walesa's attempts at, and his belief in, an agreement with the communists, and condemned such policies for their short-sightedness and lack of realism; we shall not therefore expand on this theme at present. Instead we should like to take a stand on Walesa's appeal to Western governments, and especially to the US administration, to repeal the economic sanctions imposed on the Polish People's Republic after the declaration of the 'state of war'. Such a stand is especially necessary, in view of the fact that Walesa's statement coincided with an hysterical communist propaganda campaign, demanding that sanctions be repealed and that imaginary losses, supposedly sustained as a consequence, be compensated.

The economic significance of the sanctions is quite simply nil. For the benefit of those who think otherwise we cite extracts from an article by the Polish journalist Stefan Bratkowski, a self-declared proponent of Walesa's policies of compromise and dialogue:

How are we to respond to questions concerning our attitude to Reagan's sanctions? First and foremost by refraining from voicing our opinions until we are sufficiently informed about the substance of the sanctions and their effect on the Polish economy and government. Taking them one by one,

let us look at what the sanctions consist in:

First, the Polish airline LOT forfeits the right to land in US airports. It must therefore land in Canada. This does involve certain losses. However, those who would avail themselves of LOT's services have always had to fly to the place from which LOT planes took off. LOT itself has sustained enormous losses, but this is the result of poor management and of the travel restrictions imposed on the Polish American community, after martial law.

Secondly, Polish fishermen forfeit the right to fish in North-American waters. However, the fish never reached the Polish market; they were sold exclusively in the West. Thus the influx of foreign currency has dropped by a few dozen million dollars. This represents the only real, concrete, calculable loss sustained.

Thirdly, the United States has stopped the sale of grain for Polish zlotys. Such sales used to be one of the ways in which the US financed the Polish economy. Complaints that someone has refused to continue financing someone else are at best laughable. Indeed, some Polish experts even dared to hope that these restrictions would cause the Polish government to put into practice the slogan of the Polish journalist farmer, Karol Wojtaszczyk: 'Why pay American farmers when you can pay Polish ones . . . and pay them less at that'. Unfortunately this did not come to pass.

Fourthly, privileged status has been revoked from Polish goods for export. But Polish exports to the US, which consist mainly of meat and vodka, have never had to avail themselves of the privileged status clause, since American duties are not in any case payable on food.

Fifthly, negotiations concerning US government guarantees on Polish national debts have been suspended. Complaints against this are also not without their comic side, as those who lose out on account of this sanction are mainly the American banks which have given loans to our authorities.

To this list can be added the American firms which have not extended their licenses to the Poles. But the firms Fiat, Grundig and Singer have been waiting for an opportunity to break off their co-operation with the Poles, being dissatisfied with it; Thompson CF has already lost on Polish orders financed by the French government, while the French government, having bailed it out with credits, is in its turn loth to throw more money in that direction. Firms like Sulzer, who are satisfied with their transactions in Poland, have not broken off co-operation.

Thus Reagan's sanctions have been and continue to be mainly of a psychological nature. To the extent that they deserve the name of sanctions at all, they have merely left the Polish government to find its own solutions. At the same time the US has signed a five-year agreement to sell grain to the USSR. But, then, it is harder to apply sanctions against the USSR; for it pays in cash.

The Polish government's economic difficulties are not the result of sanctions, but of insolvency: lack of currency and credit for imports. No-one, after all, will give new credits to a debtor who is incapable of managing his economy, and who is, moreover, unable to guarantee any improvement.

The US government, like any other, has the right to be dissatisfied with the actions of the Polish authorities and to express this dissatisfaction. What is relevant for us is the fact that we are infinitely more dissatisfied with these actions than anyone else.

From the beginning of the propaganda campaign against the US government, most Poles have known perfectly well that the food shortages and deficiencies in industry and machinery were due not to the capitalist West but to the communist system of economic management, which destroys in its wake everything that might possibly alleviate material poverty. And more Poles were well aware that Western loans and technological aid had no impact on raising the Polish standard of living. 26 billion dollars were wasted in the course of the Gierke era. Ultimately, as a result of that waste, the country's economy collapsed. The collapse was, indeed, so spectacular that Polish industry, in its present state, cannot be compared even to the industries of profoundly backward countries. Western financial aid could have a positive effect only if it were used to support economic structures with a totally different mechanism of management and methods of production. In short, a genuine improvement in the nation's well-being can come about only through re-orienting the Polish economy towards a market model, with full

autonomy and strictly defined limits of government intervention. Economic improvement means the overthrow of socialist planning.

Walesa's statement, in addition to proposing that the US give Poland further financial help, – help which would only enable the governing bureaucracy and the army to tighten their control over the people, – also has a political dimension, and it is in this political dimension that the effects of the statement are most catastrophic. By a combined stubbornness and vacillation, Walesa has inflicted enormous damage on the Polish opposition. We do not refer to those wretched sanctions – even if they were withdrawn, they would not bring about a higher standard of living on the present economic model – but to the political moment with which this appeal coincided. Price rises, announced not with a view to balancing production costs but in order to drain the market yet again, without regard to the enormities of Polish poverty; the Polish propaganda's paranoid attitude towards America; the continuation of the 'state of war'; reinforced armed riot police on the streets with specially trained police dogs – and suddenly, at the same time, appeals from the leader of 'Solidarity'!

It is not hard to find the reason. Walesa must have hoped that the communists, after such a favour, would agree to negotiate with him. The naivety with which many Western politicians approach Eastern Europe has now revealed itself through the mouth of the leader of the Polish workers. The experience of the past few years seems to have taught him little. A few hours after the delivery of the appeal, the Polish government press spokesman, Jerzy Urban, in order not to leave the shadow of a doubt as to his intentions, made known his complete lack of intention to participate in any current or future negotiations with its author. So much for the 'gains' for 'Solidarity'. Meanwhile, if the US does indeed repeal the sanctions and unfreeze the credits, the Polish regime will have scored its first authentic political victory for two years. And it will be all the more valuable for having been free of charge.

The prisons are full, the 'state of war' continues, people continue to be sacked, the nation is more and more enslaved, 'Solidarity' and its leaders are vilified in the most monstrous ways, and on top of that the West is supposed to pay for it all. Such good fortune the communists never expected.

If we are to be imprisoned and beaten with truncheons on the streets, we must know why, for whom and for what. That end must be a free independent Poland. It is meaningless to attempt to reach a compromise with the communists at a time when they feel themselves to be masters of the situation; still more meaningless to suffer for that attempt. It is too early for spectacular compromises. In order to negotiate with us, the communists must first fear us. Political ideas like calling for the withdrawal of sanctions will not frighten them; at most they will provide them with the incentive for further provocation. And as for us, if we cannot yet harm them, let us at least refrain from helping them, for then we harm only ourselves.

We carry here the text of an open letter, recently sent by Advocate Władysław Siła-Nowicki of the Polish Bar, to General Jaruzelski. We judge it to be sufficiently important, as an illustration of the general threat posed to judicial independence by communist government, to merit printing in full.

The most recent occurrences in our legal community – the arrest of advocate Maciej Bednarkiewicz, and the evidently well-prepared publicity planned from above which was given to it, as well as the reaction to this development both at home and abroad – force me to take up a position in the form of an open letter to you, General. The fact is that certain parts of the state apparatus have exceeded all bounds in illegality, in contempt for the will of society, and in disregard for moral scruples. They have placed themselves above the law, and indeed, above the government itself.

It is my duty as a citizen, I believe, to send this letter to you. I act also as the person who, together with Advocate Bednarkiewicz, was representing the plaintiff, in the tragic case of Grzegorz Przemyk. This, in my view, is the real reason why Maciej Bednarkiewicz was arrested. I have had numerous conversations with him on the subject. I am also familiar with another, particularly sensitive, case which was being handled by Advocate Bednarkiewicz. This concerned the attack on the convent of St Martin in Warsaw on 3rd May 1983, by assailants whose identity is still unknown. Moreover, several months ago, I heard from his own mouth of the provocation which has been offered him. Under these conditions, I consider it my duty as a human being and as a colleague, to present certain facts to you, General, since you are, in effect, the highest representative of the government.

There are other grounds too for my feeling that I must reveal the truth as I see it. As an advocate, I have handled many cases of a political character. From my own personal experience I know well the tortuous and often morally tragic course of our judicial system. As I have mentioned, Advocate Bednarkiewicz was acting in two particularly sensitive cases, as well as being involved in many other cases of a political character. One was the attack on the St Martin Convent on 3rd May 1983, the other was the tragic death of Grzegorz Przemyk who was beaten on the 14th May 1983, and who died on the 16th May. Both cases are highly embarrassing to the police authorities in Poland.

In the first incident, an organised group launched an attack on the convent in broad daylight. It is true that in some respects the behaviour of the assailants, who clearly had some form of military training, was moderate. No-one lost his life or suffered permanent injury; the assailants only beat those who dared to offer resistance, and caused no extensive damage to property. Nevertheless it is a highly compromising fact for the government that those responsible for the assault have gone unpunished, and that their identities have remained hidden, even though they are undoubtedly known to the authorities. This is obvious to every

thinking person; and there is no lack of thinking people in Poland.

Let us turn to the cause of Grzegorz Przemyk's tragic death. Again, the manner in which the police authorities are seeking those responsible is universally obvious. All evidence shows that Grzegorz Przemyk received fatal injuries as a result of a beating administered in the militia station situated on Jesuit Street. It is true that his assailants did not intend to kill him. Unfortunately, however, the police authorities have, over a period of months, used all the means at their disposal, 'per fas et nefas', to avoid illuminating the matter, deliberately complicating and obscuring everything so that those responsible could escape the courts.

This affair has had a great effect in the country, as shown by the large number of people who attended the funeral, which became a major demonstration. The case could therefore not be simply abandoned 'for lack of conclusive evidence'. However, regardless of this fact, there have been no charges and no court case. Instead a whole process was set in motion, starting with the prevention of access to the deceased's mother, and going on to include threats to witnesses, and attempts to intimidate, (as when 'unknown people' began to pick up the children of witnesses from school). A deliberately misleading press release was issued by the Militia Command in Warsaw, which stated that Grzegorz Przemyk had been taken directly from Castle Square to the ambulance station on Hoza Street and that he never entered the militia station on Jesuit Street. Statements were obtained from three groups of experts at the highest level. These unanimously confirmed the deposition of the eyewitness reporter who affirmed that Grzegorz Przemyk had been beaten at the militia station on Jesuit Street. Notwithstanding such evidence, further efforts were made to evade the course of justice. Accusations were made against two people at the ambulance station who took the wounded man to Hoza Street; it was widely reported in the press that action would be taken against ambulancemen accused of manhandling and beating patients. Finally, after six months of investigation, an accusation was made against two militia men and two health workers, who were said to be involved in the accidental death by administering a beating (article 158, section 3, criminal code), and also against two doctors for failing to give aid to a person whose life was in danger.

One might have expected the matter to be settled in court. In fact, subsequent developments showed that this was not to be, and have in consequence completely compromised the procurator's office. The two health workers, accused of a serious offence for which they

could be imprisoned for up to 15 years, were not charged, because this would have meant charging the militia men who were accused along with them. Instead they were arrested for another, relatively minor, offence for which they could be imprisoned for up to three years (article 158, part 1, – beating without causing physical damage). This is an example of how lenient the procurator's office can be to people of this sort. Then came the 'miracle' of the court hearing. After the arrest, one of the health workers admitted giving Grzegorz Przymyk a mortal blow. Because of this totally unexpected revelation the charge had to be re-drafted.

All this – which I have outlined in a drastically summarised form – is the result of a *dangerous anarchy* (your line) in the government. It shows how the articles of the criminal code, the guarantee of the rule of law, can be disregarded without ceremony in the face of the day to day political needs and considerations of the government. One must add that all this constitutes a very poor understanding of the actual needs of the State. In order to protect individuals who have committed crimes, the police authority runs the risk of creating hostility and even hatred in the population as a whole.

In writing this, I have no desire to ascribe guilt to anyone. This is the task of the courts. I am talking about the way in which the dignity of justice has been affronted in this particular case.

It is widely believed – by myself among others – that the arrest of Advocate Bednarkiewicz, and the wide publicity this has received, was the result of the fact that, as a man of conscience, he took up the cause of those harmed in these two cases. It is obvious that the removal from these cases of the man who was involved at the preparatory hearing, and at the examination of witnesses and experts must greatly aid whatever schemes and manipulations might be devised, in order that the guilty parties may evade the workings of justice. This is particularly so now that the other lawyer representing the mother of Grzegorz Przymyk has been removed from the case, having passed the age of retirement.

Advocate Bednarkiewicz, so far as I can remember, told me directly in August last year, that, in the previous March, an advocate in Kraków had sent to him a man who claimed to be a deserter from a ZOMO unit. This man claimed that he had deserted because of his links with the 'Solidarity' union. Advocate Bednarkiewicz told me that he was suspicious of the man, against whom, despite his desertion, no case had been brought. At the same time, Adv. Bednarkiewicz was summoned to the Ministry of the Interior, where one of the senior officials – perhaps a colonel – played him a tape consisting of a statement by the alleged ZOMO deserter. On this tape, the man claimed that, as a deserter, he had taken advantage of the July Amnesty. He further claimed that, while he was in hiding, he had gone to Adv. Bednarkiewicz, who had advised him to remain underground, and had given him 50,000 zł. to assist him. The advocate had then attempted to per-

suade him to hand over the radio apparatus used by ZOMO functionaries to communicate during action. For this radio apparatus – which was to be stolen by colleagues of the deserter, so as to provide information concerning ZOMO communications – Adv. Bednarkiewicz promised 200,000 zł. The deserter further claimed that he had tried to persuade his colleagues to obtain what Adv. Bednarkiewicz wanted, but they had refused.

After playing the tape, the official asked Adv. Bednarkiewicz what he thought of it. Adv. Bednarkiewicz smiled and asked him whether such rubbish as they had just heard was taken seriously. The official replied 'naturally not', but stated that the tape could be used by the Ministry of the Interior. This discussion took place at the time of the most intensive investigations concerning Grzegorz Przymyk's death.

The government press spokesman claims that the investigating authorities intended, in this original manner, to encourage Adv. Bednarkiewicz to take part in the Amnesty. That claim is a clumsy attempt to explain the otherwise inexplicable fact, that the investigating authorities and the Procurator failed for five months to take any action, in spite of possessing evidence which they now claim to be conclusive. The conversation with Adv. Bednarkiewicz in the Ministry of the Interior last August was not an attempt to induce him to benefit from the amnesty. It was rather an attempt to put pressure on him, to which he did not yield, faithful as he was to his oath as an advocate.

Conscious of all the consequences, and with a full sense of responsibility for all my words, I assert publicly in this open letter to you, General, as Prime Minister of the Polish People's Republic, that Advocate Bednarkiewicz is the victim of a cynical provocation. The people who have organised this provocation know well that he did not commit any of the acts with which he is charged and, being conscious of this, they act in bad faith. In giving this matter such wide publicity, they aim to intimidate that group of people whose obligation it is to fight, in a responsible but also in a courageous and morally uncompromising manner, for the maintenance of the rule of law, in the interests of the Polish State as a sovereign institution, and for the common good of all Poles.

One should also mention that, in the search of Adv. Bednarkiewicz's flat, another glaring breach of the rule of law was committed. The confidentiality of legal papers concerning political trials was violated, and material concerning the attack on St Martin's Convent and the death of Grzegorz Przymyk was illegally seized by an officer of the Min. of the Interior; this officer acted with the approval of a representative of the Warsaw Procurator's Office who was – believe it or not – also present at the search. The material was sealed up in three packets and finally removed in a larger number of packets, with different seals. This gives a strong impression of contempt for the provisions of the law by men who hold themselves above the law. When the documents were returned, it was openly

admitted that the nature of the contents were now known.

These shocking abuses in the two cases I have mentioned, and the attempt to prevent those guilty of clearly criminal acts being brought to justice, as well as the unceremonious violation of the legally guaranteed confidentiality of legal documents, – all these facts are dangerous examples of anarchy within the government. But to accuse and imprison a man on the basis of a provocation and of evidence that is clearly false, is something still worse, implying a deep moral corruption in the actions of some representatives of governmental authority. In this respect we have had tragic and especially painful experience in our execution of justice during the past decades. This should not be forgotten. I have a sense of proportion and am not pig-headed. I understand well that, fortunately, we are far from those depths to which the administration of justice sank at the beginning of the 50s. Our present situation cannot be compared with what was happening then, but it is precisely when the representatives of the state powers arouse through their actions a feeling that they may, after all, be governed by moral laws, that the consequences of their immorality become unpredictable.

We also know, from our own and foreign experience, that it is possible not only to try innocent men but also, with the aid of pliable judges, to convict and sentence them. It is enough to mention the cases of Dreyfus, Tukhachevsky, Laszlo Ragli or (in our country)

General Emil Fieldorf – the head of the section of the Home Army Command hanged as a consequence of his disgraceful conviction as a Nazi collaborator. You yourself, General, as Minister of National Defence, authorised a monument to be erected to him in the Military cemetery at Powazki in Warsaw.

Thus it would also not be difficult to obtain a verdict against Adv. Bednarkiewicz. On the contrary, it would be all the easier, because the sentence involved would be light, but this would not affect the moral character of such a verdict. I thus approach you, General, with an appeal and a fervent request to ensure that proper legal procedures are observed in all three of the cases that I have described. If this were to be done in the case of Adv. Bednarkiewicz it would undoubtedly result in his immediate release.

I regard it as my moral obligation as a citizen of the Polish State to send this letter. I wrote it in the conviction that the exercise of power inevitably makes difficult contact with the population, and that not everything that takes place in the state takes place with the knowledge of its highest rulers – by which I mean you, General, and the men closest to you.

I write finally in the consciousness that you have often spoken publicly of the absolute need to base the operation of the state apparatus on moral principles.

W. SIŁA-NOWIKI
February 1984

Neo-Reformation and Counter-Reformation in the Roman Catholic Church

George Martelli

It is not surprising that the most important event in my lifetime – more important than the two world wars, or the Russian Revolution, or the expansion of the Soviet Empire, or even the bomb – has passed almost unnoticed by the media in Britain. I refer to the break-up of the once universal Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, exercising authority over the faithful throughout the world, and its division into a number of national Catholic Churches, each going its own way and paying little more than lip service to the decrees of Mother Church, as represented by the *magisterium* and His Holiness the Pope.

Not surprising, in the first place, because religion is not news in a largely irreligious country. Secondly, because news of what has been happening to the Catholic Church – not only in Britain but all over the world – has been censored by the official Catholic Press, that is *The Tablet*, *Universe*, *Catholic Herald*, etc., and

anything which suggested that all was not well would not be printed. On the other and the *Times*, the only English newspaper to take religion seriously, traditionally anti-Catholic and hammer of 'Popery', is so biased in favour of the 'ecumenical' movement, as to be quite unreliable as a chronicler and interpreter of events affecting the Catholic Church.

The decline in authority and influence of this ancient and once all-powerful institution should nevertheless be of interest to British conservatives. The Catholic Church has always stood for order – it was St Paul who enjoined his converts to be obedient to the Roman State – and often for reaction. Itself autocratic, (or as it would say theocratic), it has always favoured authoritative government, even under Mussolini though not under Hitler. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it saw itself as the bulwark against revolution, and in the twentieth it has been the bulwark – the only

effective one – against communism. It was the Catholic parties, the Christian Democrats in France, Germany and Italy, which saved Europe from communism after the last war. Some account of the crisis which Catholicism is now going through may thus be not out of place in a conservative review.

It began, of course with Vatican II, the solemn Council of over 2000 Catholic Bishops called by Pope John XXIII in the autumn of 1963. Pope John's intention was that the Council should be pastoral not doctrinal: that is to say not to re-examine any article of faith but to consider how best to present and propagate the Church's teaching in modern conditions. He also calculated that the worldwide interest aroused by such an assembly, the first to be held for just under a century (Vatican I opened in 1869), would act as a magnet to Christians who were not Roman Catholics, and bring back into the fold the 'separated brethren', that is the Protestant Churches which had left it at the time of the Reformation. He could not have dreamed that the result would be exactly the opposite. Fortunately for the repose of his soul he did not live to see it.

His successor, Pope Paul VI, was a cleverer man but a weaker character; he had no chance against the well organised pressure group determined to drag the 'outmoded' traditional Catholic Church screaming into the twentieth century. This group of ecclesiastics and their *periti* (theological advisers) were led by the so-called 'Rhine-land Bishops' (a name which gave its title to a famous book on the Council, *The Rhine flows into the Tiber*), who came mostly from France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. It was perhaps not a co-incidence that these were all countries occupied by the Nazis during the war, which had brought Catholics and Protestants together in their resistance to the common enemy. Whatever the reason, the principal aim of the group was so to 'update' the Catholic Church, and particularly its liturgy, as to make it acceptable to Protestants, thus bringing about the Christian unity which had been destroyed by the Reformation five centuries earlier.

In achieving their object they were greatly assisted by the media, especially in Britain, which treated the Council as a sort of political party conference, with liberals or progressives opposing conservatives or traditionalists. This, of course, was nonsense, since the Christian party manifesto was dictated 2000 years ago by Jesus Christ himself as recorded in the Gospels. It therefore could not be altered, although subject to re-interpretation, or what the Anglicans like to call 'new insights'. However, it made things easier for the media, enabling them to report the proceedings of the Council as a struggle between reformers, or 'renewalists', and their opponents, in which the former were of course the 'goodies' and the latter the 'baddies'. By holding daily Press conferences, giving interviews, and leaking information, the reformers easily out-manoeuvred the traditionalists and won the propaganda battle.

In these circumstances it was to be expected that the Council would produce some startling changes. In fact

it made none at all in any essential doctrine and very few others. Those who quote Vatican II, or the 'spirit of Vatican II', as justification for aberrations from the Church's traditional teaching, have probably never read the documents containing the Council's conclusions (not surprisingly since they run to over 1000 pages of closely printed text). Most of these are concerned with re-affirming, although perhaps with some difference of emphasis, the articles of dogma the Church has always taught, or with laying down new rules on such subjects as social communications, renewal of religious life, training of priests, Catholic education, function of lay people, missionary activity, etc.

The Council, however, did decree two changes which, although they did not appear so important at the time, and were not intended to be, were to open the floodgates to reform and initiate the confusion, not to call it chaos, into which the Church was soon to plunge. One was to revise the liturgy of the Mass, and the other to permit use of the vernacular in parts of it. From these two departures from tradition all the rest followed, which has resulted in a service in a Catholic Church today being more Protestant in content and atmosphere than Catholic, in splitting both religious and lay people into opposing factions, and in driving Archbishop Lefebvre and his followers practically into a state of schism from Rome, with all that means for the Church's unity.

In its original form, as approved by the Council, permission to use the vernacular in some parts of the Mass was very restricted, and it was never intended to replace Latin as the principal language of the liturgy. But it opened the way to more radical concessions, and in the years following Vatican II these resulted, against the expressed wishes of the Holy See, in the almost complete disappearance of the Latin liturgy throughout the world, and the substitution in every country of its own language. Thus one great unifying factor, which ensured uniformity of worship throughout the world and justified the Catholic Church's claim to be a universal church recognising no frontiers, was lost. Moreover differences in language led to differences in religious practice, so that whereas formerly a Catholic traveller attending Mass on Sunday, whether in Timbuctoo or Tokyo, Birmingham or Buenos Aires, always felt perfectly at home, today he never knows what exactly he will find when he arrives at the local Catholic church.

Even more disastrous was the decision to revise the liturgy of the Mass, against which Pope John had warned almost with his last breath. Here again it was not the intention of the Council to make any fundamental change. The rite was to be revised, to quote the relevant decree, 'in such a way that the intrinsic nature and purpose of its several parts . . . may be more clearly manifested, and that devout and active participation by the faithful may be more easily achieved . . . For this purpose the rites are to be simplified, due care being taken to preserve their substance.'

Apart from laying down general principles, the Council itself did not attempt any revision of the liturgy and this was left to be carried out by a commission of experts set up after the Council had closed. Its discussions were dominated by the 'renewalists', with Archbishop Bugnini (afterwards sent in disgrace to Teheran) as the chief architect of reform and Protestant 'observers' exercising strong influence in the cause of so-called 'ecumenism'. As Michael Davies and other Catholic scholars have shown, the changes adopted followed closely those made by Cranmer in the 16th century. The main object in both cases was to transform the Eucharistic sacrament, in which the sacrifice of Christ on the cross was re-enacted by the priest and bread and wine changed miraculously into His Body and Blood, into a mere memorial service commemorating the Last Supper. Although in the new Mass the Eucharistic prayer, the central point to which everything in the old Mass led up, remained unchanged, it was only one of several permissible alternatives, and most of the prayers which emphasised its nature and prepared the faithful to accept the mystery were omitted. As further cold douches to their faith, the altar was transformed into a communion table, with the priest facing the congregation; they were encouraged, in some cases forced, to take communion standing; and were also allowed to take the consecrated Host in their hands, as though it was no more, as the reformers wished them to think, than an ordinary piece of bread. In fact there was little left of the old Mass that a Protestant could object to, and this was clearly the object of the exercise, the ultimate aim being inter-communion as the visible sign of that Christian union which the 'ecumenists' are so desperate to achieve.

It should be noted, however, that among the clergy and laity (as opposed to the bureaucrats and experts) pressure for inter-communion comes mainly from the Anglicans. No Catholic has any interest in attending an Anglican communion service, since he could not regard it as a valid substitute for the Mass which he is in duty bound to attend every Sunday. By contrast many Anglicans feel aggrieved because they are not admitted to communion in a Catholic Church, when they are so ready to admit Catholics in their's; it gives them an inferiority complex that the compliment is not returned. The trouble is that they would like to join the Catholic 'club', which in their hearts they know still has something their's lacks, without becoming members or subscribing to the rules. Inter-communion would, of course, be a tremendous filip for the Church of England, putting it at one leap on a par with Rome, a place it has coveted for the last 400 years. It would be like the lifebuoy that saves a man from drowning.

It is true that the neo-reformers have not gone as far as Cranmer, who simply removed the Blessed Sacrament from the tabernacle where the consecrated Host is kept in every Catholic Church, and declared the worship of it to be, to quote the Book of Common Prayer, a 'blasphemous fable and dangerous deceit',

subsequently to be punished by the law. His modern imitators realised that if they went this far at one go the shock to Catholics would be too great, so they set about undermining their faith gradually. New prayers were introduced, old ones dropped – especially those emphasising the sacrificial as opposed to the commemorative nature of the Mass; High Mass and Low Mass were both scrapped and replaced by something resembling the Anglican Communion Service; the Gregorian chant, which could not be sung in English, made way for hymns, many of them taken from the Anglican hymnal; and the time saved by omission of essential prayers was filled in by interminable readings from the scriptures. Simultaneously, apart from the reform of the Mass, religious practices most characteristic of Catholicism, such as the Service of Benediction at which the Blessed Sacrament is adored, the processions of Corpus Christi when it is carried aloft and displayed to the faithful, the saying of the Rosary and Veneration of Our Lady (Virgin Mary to non-Catholics), all of which were supposed to give offence to Protestants, were, if not actually forbidden, frowned on by the Catholic Hierarchy. When new churches were built no statues were allowed and the altar rails which assisted communicants to kneel when taking Communion, disappeared, kneeling presumably savouring of idolatry. Perhaps the best example of 'renewalism' is the church built by the monks of Ampleforth Abbey in the sixties, which is almost as bare of all traces of Catholicism as any Calvinist *temple*.

All this was done in the name of 'ecumenism'. But whereas the Decree on Ecumenism promulgated by Vatican II had made it clear that the only kind of Christian unity acceptable to the Catholic Church was that of the 'one and only Church which Christ bestowed on it from the beginning' under the authority of 'Peter and his successors' – in other words that unity could only come through conversion of non-Catholics – a new conception was evolved called 'convergence'. This meant that the two religions, Catholic and Protestant, instead of steaming on parallel lines which would never meet, would both alter course so as to bring them gradually nearer to each other, and in the course of time together. For this purpose the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission was set up to produce 'Agreed Statements', in other words compromise formulae, on such controversial matters as the Holy Eucharist, Anglican Orders, and Papal authority. Over the last decade or so a number of these have been published but none have been officially accepted by either side, and to non-theologians they are about as intelligible as Einstein's theories would be to a primary schoolboy. A critique of the Commission's work issued by Cardinal Reitzinger last year showed that there was little enthusiasm about it in the Vatican. A new Commission has now been appointed, but in the attempt to paper over fundamental differences of doctrine it is unlikely to have any more success than its predecessor.

Meanwhile the Protestantisation of the Catholic

Church continues on the ground level with predictable results: after all they had been seen before. When Cranmer removed God (represented by the Blessed Sacrament on the altar) from the English churches, he also drove out the English people, and in spirit they never returned. That is why the Church of England never put down grass roots, has always remained in the eyes of the public part of the political Establishment, like the Monarchy or Parliament, on which it depends for its survival, with a lay person, the reigning monarch,¹ as its head, and its religious leaders, i.e. bishops, chosen by the Prime Minister.

For the elimination from Cranmer's new prayer book of the supernatural—without which no religion worthy of the name can endure—left the faithful spiritually and emotionally starved. If they went to church it was originally because they were fined for not doing so, unless they happened to be tenants of some recusant Catholic landlord rich enough to pay the fines for them. Later the villagers would go so as not to upset the squire, while the urban middle classes attended because it was the thing to do, or to hear some fashionable preacher. But the masses remained indifferent, and it was only with the rise of Non-Conformist revivalism in the eighteenth century that chapel-going became popular. Meanwhile the Church of England, deprived of the faith which had supported it for 1000 years, continued to pose and to be treated as the official religion, presiding over the great State ceremonies, baptising, marrying, burying, but in spite of the presence in its ranks of many good clergymen, never obtaining any hold over the hearts and minds of the people. Gently satirised by Jane Austen and Trollope, savaged by Hardy, ridiculed by Peter Simple, pilloried fortnightly by *Private Eye*, today it is almost a laughing stock. Divided as ever into High, Low and Broad, interminably debating with each other in Synods, without authority or leadership and therefore incapable of issuing clear advice, let alone directions, on any subject whether of faith or morals, it has become *faute de mieux* increasingly political. But when it sought to improve its image as the 'Tory party at Prayer' by adopting a left wing attitude to the problems of the day, it only succeeded in alienating still more of its congregations. Its churches, now as empty of worshippers as, since Cranmer, they have been empty of the Divine Presence, are being sold off in hundreds.

The Catholic Church has not yet reached that point, but it is going rapidly in the same direction. The red lamp still flickers in every Catholic Church, although not always easy to find, indicating that God is there in the Blessed Sacrament. But the atmosphere of reverence, awe and mystery, which it was the purpose of the old Mass to promote, and for which the great cathedrals were built, the greatest artists employed, the most thrilling music composed by the greatest masters, has either gone or is in process of being 'phased out'. *Lex orandi, lex credendi*: as people pray, so they will believe. The *Novus Ordo* is calculated to have just this effect; to weaken faith in the mystery of the Eucharist

progressively, until it eventually dies away, or becomes so unimportant as to present no obstacle to Christian unity.

The consequences are already seen and can be measured statistically in the massive decline in church attendances, confessions, vocations and conversions. Indeed the last have practically ceased, for who would want to join a Catholic Church which every year becomes less Catholic? In the seminaries the old faith is no longer taught, or is so diluted as to be almost unrecognisable: and in Catholic schools the catechism has been replaced by a syllabus prepared by 'renewalists', in which very little doctrine is mentioned but in which much reference is made to the 'caring society' and 'pleasing Christ by helping Mummy wash up.'

Such is the new reformation by which, as Pope Paul VI realised too late, the Catholic Church is destroying itself, attacked not from outside, as in the time of Luther and Cranmer, but from within. He called it 'self-demolition', spoke of the 'fumes of Satan seeping through the Vatican', and said that the 'two enemies of the Church, Modernism and Protestantism', were at the gates. But he could not stop the rot.

And what of the counter-reformation? As everybody knows, it was started by a French prelate, Archbishop Lefèbre, soon after the close of Vatican II. Realising that the sole solid foundation of Catholic faith was the Tridentine Mass, so-called because approved by the Council of Trent (1545–1564) and universally celebrated in its original form for over 400 years, and that without its support the faith itself would collapse, he resolved to save it; and for this purpose founded a seminary at Econe in Switzerland where young men are trained as priests in the old rite. From there, after being ordained, they are sent to different countries, chiefly in Europe and America, to say the Tridentine Mass and teach traditional Catholic doctrine on both faith and morals. Lefèbre also founded the St Pius X Society (named after the Pope who suppressed modernism at the turn of the century) to organise and administer his Order. The headquarters of the Society in Britain are at Highclere near Newbury, and there are at present eight or nine priests stationed in different parts of the country serving some thirty centres where the old Mass is said, usually in a village hall or disused chapel or even a private house. People come to them from far and wide, mostly but not entirely old people, and in this way the unchanged faith is kept alive.

Lefèbre's greatest enemies are the French Bishops, whose seminaries are empty because there are no vocations, and who are jealous of the success of Econe, where there is always a long waiting list. The Archbishop was ordered by Pope Paul to cease his priestly activities and not to ordain new priests, but he took no notice, arguing that he owed no obedience to a Pontiff who had allowed the Catholic Church to fall into near heresy. Now in his eighties, he has resigned active leadership of the counter-reformation movement and recently appointed a German as his Vicar-General.

However, he still travels to encourage his flocks and will be coming to England in September to perform confirmations.

The St Pius X Society is the only one in the world which actually trains and provides priests to celebrate the Tridentine Mass and preach the traditional Catholic faith. But there are numerous other societies scattered over the globe, such as the Latin Mass Society in England and *Una Voce* on the continent, who campaign for the same objectives, keeping within the Church but seeking to persuade it to restore the pre-conciliar position, and to cease making concessions to the 'ecumenists' which they maintain have undermined Catholic faith and influence without bringing Christian unity any nearer. Even within the 'renewal' Church there are some priests, mostly the older, who struggle to save something from the ruins.

There are also innumerable 'fringe' publications existing for the same purpose, of which the most important in Britain is *Christian Order*, a monthly review edited and published by Father Paul Crane S.J. Although only sold by subscription this now has a circulation larger than that of the *Tablet*, the more or less official Catholic weekly, and is read by its addicts with the same avidity as the news letters of *Solidarity* are read by the Polish underground. One suspects that the present Pope, tied as his hands are by the inept precedents set by his predecessors, would enjoy both, and that his secret sympathies are with the counter-reformation rather than with the reformers. Indeed he has given several proofs of this; but whether he can reverse the tide which after 2000 years of internal and external strife, from which it has always in the end emerged triumphant, now threatens to engulf the Catholic Church, is extremely doubtful. As a traditionalist one can only hope and pray, and remind oneself of Christ's promise that 'the Gates of Hell shall not prevail against it'.

It was Hitler, I think, who said that the greater the lie the more likely it was to be believed; and he knew what he was talking about. There is, in fact, in human psychology, a need to believe the incredible; and the belief of Catholics in miracles, above all in the miracle of the Mass, is an example of it. Call it superstition if you like; but water it down, or explain it away, and people will lose interest, as Catholics are doing today.

Moreover a tree, as Our Lord said, is judged by its fruits; and the fruits of Catholicism are the saints, the martyrs, the theologians, the great Popes, and the painters, sculptors, architects, musicians, poets, novelists, film makers even (eg Bunuel), whose masterpieces are unimaginable without their Catholic background, so little understood in Britain since she cut herself off from this, the main stream of western culture.

Should the worst occur and the present decline of true Catholic teaching and influence throughout the world continue, the outlook for our civilisation and everything it stands for, including individual freedom, human rights and democratic government, is indeed bleak. The alternative offered by the non-Catholic Churches, as represented here by the British Council of Churches and globally by the World Council of Churches, will scarcely keep the barbarians at bay. Indeed the World Council, long since infiltrated by KGB agents disguised as dignitaries of the Orthodox Church of Russia, looks more and more like a front for atheistic communism, exploiting the grievances of the Third World and black racialism to weaken the West. This is the new religion of a sizeable proportion of the world's population and it is held by its leaders with a strength of conviction that is only equalled by that of pre-conciliar Catholics. It was their faith which kept the lamp of civilisation burning through the Dark Ages; which saved Europe from being over-run by the Moslems; and which rescued a large part of it from communism in our own time. If it is allowed to die the last defence against the West's decline and fall will be down, and this should be of some concern to British Conservatives.

The Battle of Lepanto, decisive, for the future of Europe, was not won with superior armament, but by the belief of the Christian warriors in the miraculous powers of a merciful Madonna praying for their victory from her heavenly throne. So our civilisation will not be saved by bigger and better bombs; nor by humanists, scientists, leaders of religious cults, gurus of every description, liberals, social democrats, socialists, or conservatives. If it can still be saved, it will be by the inspiration given to mankind by that figure on the cross, banished from Protestant churches but still hanging on the walls of Polish school rooms, which the communists rightly see as their Enemy No. 1. Otherwise why should they try to murder His Vicar on Earth?

Note

1. For a Roman Catholic, the height of this absurdity is that the title 'Defender of the Faith' which was conferred by the Pope of the time on King Henry VIII for his defence of the

Catholic faith against Lutherism, is still claimed by a Protestant sovereign on our coinage.

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Russell Kirk as a Conservative Thinker

Nigel Ashford

Ever since the publication of *The Conservative Mind* in 1953, a scholarly yet passionate survey of Anglo-American conservative thought, Russell Kirk has been one of the most enduring influences upon American conservatism, *The Conservative Mind* had both a great immediate impact and a strong long-term influence upon the conservative movement in America. The book was widely and usually favourably reviewed, most notably in the *New York Times* and *Time* magazine, and has been reprinted in numerous editions. Its importance is threefold. First, it gave conservatism an intellectual respectability which it previously lacked. Lionel Trilling, an influential liberal writer and literary critic, wrote in 1954 that America needed a vigorous conservatism if liberalism was not to become a sterile and self-satisfied set of ideas. In the 1950s there arose several writers, collectively known as the New Conservatives, who proudly described themselves as conservative. Of particular note are Peter Viereck's *Conservatism Visited* (1949) and Clinton Rossiter's *Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion* (1955).¹ However it was Kirk who was best received amongst conservatives and whose influence can most clearly be seen in the contemporary conservative movement. *The Conservative Mind* began the process by which conservatism became worthy of intellectual discussion, and by which it was no longer a source of shame to those intellectuals and students who felt drawn to its conclusions. As George Nash, the historian of the conservative intellectual movement, noted, 'Kirk had made it respectable again to be a man of the Right' (Nash, 1966, p. 75).²

The Conservative Mind established Edmund Burke as a major intellectual influence on American conservatism. 'This book is an analysis of thinking in the line of Burke', wrote Kirk, who was 'convinced that Burke's is the true school of conservative principle... Every conservative thinker discussed in the following chapters... felt the influence of the Great Whig'. (1953, p. 15). Kirk, argues that conscious conservatism began with Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* in 1790. In his *Reader on Conservatism* he wrote 'Almost by definition, ever since Burke published his *Reflections*, the principal conservatives in the Western world have been conscious or unconscious disciples of Burke' (Kirk, 1982, p. xiii). Kirk inspired a resurgence of interest in Burke, leading to a quarterly *Burke Newsletter*, and encouraged his friend Peter Stanlis to reinterpret Burke as 'one of the most eloquent and profound defenders of Natural Law morality and politics in Western

civilisation' (Stanlis, 1958, p. xi),³ a defender, not of the status quo of dominant interests, but of principles.

Kirk identified the American tradition as conservative. He saw the American War of Independence as a conservative rebellion, designed to protect traditional rights and liberties of Englishmen against the usurping King George III. It was a revolution not made but prevented, to quote Burke's reference to the 1688 revolution in Britain against James II. Americans are seen as being of 'a conservative caste of mind' with a high degree of stability and order, and a strong commitment to Western values enshrined in the Great Tradition of religion, law and freedom. Over half the *The Conservative Mind* was devoted to the study of American conservatives, such as Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, James Fenimore Cooper, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry Adams, George Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, and George Santayana. Kirk argued that there was a respectable American conservative tradition, rebutting the claims that the American Tradition was essentially liberal, and that therefore conservatives were alien to America (Hartz, 1954).⁴

Kirk's influence did not end with *The Conservative Mind*. He has been a leading intellectual figure in the conservative movement ever since. He has written over 23 books, including *The Roots of American Order*, *Decadence and Renewal in Higher Education* and several Gothic novels. Most recently he has edited *The Portable Conservative Reader*. He is the editor of *The University Bookman*, and founded *Modern Age*, the most serious intellectual journal of traditionalist conservatism, which continues to exist, and recently celebrated its 25th birthday.⁵ He was a regular contributor to *National Review*, especially in his column on education, 'From the Academy', and has lectured on hundreds of US campuses. He was the intellectual inspiration for many of the young conservatives in the Goldwater movement of the early 1960s. He remains one of the grand old men of American conservatism.

While informing the reader of the dangers of condensing 'profound and intricate intellectual systems to a few pretentious phrases', Kirk identifies six canons of conservative thought (Kirk, 1953, p. 17):

- (1) 'Belief that a divine intent rules society'.
- (2) 'Affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of traditional life'.
- (3) Conviction that civilised society requires orders and classes.
- (4) Persuasion that property and freedom are inseparable.

ately connected, and that economic levelling is not economic progress

(5) Belief that 'Tradition and sound prejudice provide checks upon man's anarchic impulse'.

(6) Recognition that change is not identical with reform.

While all these 'canons' may not be accepted by every conservative, broadly speaking they receive wide agreement amongst those who would describe themselves as such.

Kirk's writings are wide-ranging. However, a consistent thread of argument can be perceived in them. First, he believes, there are some truths that are applicable universally and throughout time. These truths he describes as 'the permanent things that apply to today as much as when they were first articulated'. (Kirk, 1969) This explains Kirk's interest in the historical dimension of conservatism. Values expressed in the seventeenth century can remain relevant to modern society, even while the circumstances of their application may have changed. Thus Kirk rejects the prevalent moral relativism, according to which all moral ideas are considered equally worthy of consideration. Any educated man should be able to distinguish between truth and error, right and wrong, the permanent and the ephemeral.

Secondly, Kirk argues, these 'permanent things' are expressed through values and norms—enduring standards which provide the objective measure of moral worth. These values and norms are not simply those held by the majority at any particular time; they are those upheld by tradition and custom. Burke is quoted in support of this thesis:

'The individual is foolish; the multitude, for the moment, is foolish, when they act without deliberation; but the species is wise, and, when time is given to it, as species it always acts right'. (Kirk, 1982, p. xvi)

Thus the wisdom of generations, sometimes expressed through prejudice, 'the wisdom of the unlettered', is, for Kirk, greater than the rationalism of any particular thinker.

Thirdly, Kirk believes, man is flawed, imperfect and often unable or unwilling to acknowledge the permanent truths which ought to guide him. This necessitates the existence of order. 'Before a person can live tolerably with himself or with others, he must know order... Social order is the arrangement of duties and rights in a society so that Justice and Freedom and a large measure of co-operation may be achieved'. (Kirk, 1974, pp. 171–2). The greatest danger comes from those who seek to establish utopia or the Kingdom of God on earth. No utopia can be composed of imperfect men. Order can exist to the extent to which the values and norms which arise from what is permanent in human nature, are recognised and practiced in society.

How does man come to recognise and obey the

permanent things? Kirk believes that they are transmitted in three main ways—through religion, literature and law. In his book on *The Roots of American Order*, he identifies the sources in Jerusalem for Christianity, in Athens for art and in Rome for law.

T. S. Eliot is a frequent source for Kirk's views on the importance of religion. 'It is doubtful whether civilisation can endure without religion', and 'If you will not have God you will have Hitler and Stalin' (Kirk, 1972). Christianity transmits moral values to many, often in a form that is not understood by rational outsiders. Kirk believes that America is the most Christian of nations, pointing to the high rate of church attendance, and that Christian morality provides the cement to American society. It also provides the basis for the ethical principles underlying the law.

The moral imagination, the use of literature and myths, is a major transmitter of norms. In one of his books, Kirk discusses the ability of literature to transmit norms, referring to Hawthorne's *The Blithedale Romance*, C. S. Lewis' *The Great Divorce* and Ray Bradbury's, *The Martian Chronicles* (Kirk, 1969). Much conservatism is expressed through feeling, instinct and emotion. Hence Kirk concludes *The Conservative Mind* with a section on 'The Conservative as Poet'; moreover, many of the writers he discusses are writers of fiction, and he frequently expresses himself through novels.

Law is another source of what is permanent, through natural law, through the 'government of laws and not men', and through reverence for the law. Conceived in these ways law can be seen as another expression of moral values. Since man's natural passions frequently react against the constraint of morality, it is the role of the State to restrain these passions. Against those unwilling or unable to identify and obey the norms of human conduct, the law must use force to uphold them.

The emphasis on the permanent and the objective explains Kirk's deep interest in education, and his sharp criticism of contemporary educational policies. For Kirk education should be about the teaching of the permanent things, since individual improvement comes only through the development of virtue. 'The ends of education are wisdom and virtue'. (Kirk, 1978, p. 4). Education has become subverted by other ends! for example, by the improvement of society, as in Deweyite education, by the teaching of vocational skills, or by the development of personal opinions and judgements. Kirk resigned in 1953 from the faculty of Michigan State College because of the deliberate lowering of standards to increase enrollment. University education, he believes, has become impersonal, mass and rootless, preoccupied with vocation and sociability. These are the features of the 'Behemoth University', which Kirk has frequently criticised in his columns. Small universities, the admittance of 'real students', and the revision of the curriculum towards the liberal arts, directed at developing the moral, imagination and a concern with ethical ends—these indicate the appropriate direction for higher education. The role of the teacher is to hand down these values, and not to cater

to current fashions, or to the impetuous demands of students.

Kirk is a fervent critic of the individualism of classical liberalism, which, provides an historical basis for much of the modern conservative movement. His belief that a stable society needs to promote the permanent values, and to adhere to them as 'dogmas', challenges the argument of John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty*, that any topic should be considered open to critical discussion. Kirk sees the industrial revolution as destructive of traditional communities and ways of life, creating in their stead a rootless mass. He is fearful of the association of conservatism with a purely economic mode of thinking, and rejects too close an association between conservatism and capitalism. 'Conservatism not being an ideology with pretensions to universality and infallibility, there can be no Capitalist Manifesto to set against the Communist Manifesto. For that matter, not many conservatives would be happy to enlist under the banner of one abstraction, Capitalism, against another abstraction, Communism – or to die, absurdly, for a 'higher standard of living' (Kirk, 1982, p. xxxiv).

In a sharply critical article on libertarians, Kirk asked what do conservatives and libertarians profess in common, apart from a detestation of collectivism. 'The answer to that question is simple; nothing' (Kirk, 1981, p. 345). After giving his critique of John Stuart Mill, Kirk goes on to identify six fundamental differences between the two schools of thought. First, there is the great division between those who believe in some sort of transcendent moral order and those who see life as the pursuit of individual interests. Secondly, conservatives believe that order is the first need of society, while libertarians give primacy to individual liberty. Thirdly, conservatives emphasise community over self-interest. Fourthly, conservative belief in the flawed human nature is contrary to the libertarian belief that human nature is basically good. Fifthly, for conservatives the State is ordained of God, concerned with the restraint of man's passions, while for libertarians the State is the great oppressor, and justified only if it is 'miminal', a mere means to human freedom. Finally, the conservative emphasises duty, discipline and sacrifice, while the libertarian does not, and cannot, venerate ancient beliefs and customs. Kirk concludes that 'it is of high importance, indeed, that American conservatives dissociate themselves altogether from the little sour

remnant called libertarians'.

Russell Kirk presents a conservatism based on permanent truths, which conservatives must defend against current fashions and theories, even at the cost of appearing as a reactionary minority. This approach has led to two main criticisms from within the conservative movement. It is argued, first that Kirk insufficiently identifies a specifically American form of conservatism; and secondly, that he defends ideas that have been made obsolete by modern economic and social change. These criticisms are summed up in Clinton Rossiter's comment that Kirk is 'a man born 15 years late and in the wrong country' (Rossiter, 1955, p. 222). Rossiter complains that 'He wants desperately to defend the traditions and institutions of his country, yet most of them he cherishes are gone forever. He seeks to cultivate the conservative mood of reverence and contentment, yet he sounds like a radical in his attacks on what is now, for better or worse, the American way of life' (p. 221). Another leading conservative critic, Willmoore Kendall repeatedly emphasises that American conservatism must be based on American experience, and not on Burke and the European conservative tradition. Kendall has great faith in the virtue and wisdom of the American people, and does not share Kirk's distrust of the masses (Kendall, 1971).⁵ This distrust it might be added, is more in keeping with the ideals of European aristocracy, than with the democratic spirit of America. Indeed, the libertarian view of the American Revolution, is that it destroyed forever the ideas of legitimacy which are fundamental to aristocratic government.

Russell Kirk is undoubtedly the most well known intellectual spokesman for traditional conservatism in the USA. There are, however, other traditionalists whose ideas are continuous with those of Kirk. Leo Strauss and his followers urge the relevance of the classical thinkers to modern society, and see government as legitimately concerned not so much with the satisfaction of wants as with the promotion of virtue. Eric Voegelin, warns of the dangers of 'gnosticism', the desire to create 'heaven on earth'; and Richard Weaver, presents the Old South as a model society, 'the last non-materialist civilisation in the Western world' (Strauss, 1959; Voegelin, 1968; Weaver, 1968, p. 391). Kirk, however, has had the widest influence, and remains the more vivid spokesman for traditionalism in contemporary America.

Notes

1. C. Rossiter, *Conservatism in America: the Thankless Persuasion*, (Random House, 1955).
2. G. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945*, (Basic Books, 1966).
3. P. Stanlis, *Edmund Burke and the Natural Law*, (University of Michigan Press, 1958).
4. L. Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*, (Harcourt Brace, 1955).
5. R. Kirk, *The Conservative Mind*, (Regnery/Gateway, 1953). For further reading see: *Enemies of the Permanent Things*,

- (Arlington House, 1969); *Eliot and His Age: T. S. Eliot's Moral Imagination in the Twentieth-Century*, (Random House, 1972); *The Roots of American Order*, (Open Court, 1974); *Decadence and Renewal in the Higher Learning*, (Arlington House, 1978); 'Libertarians: Chirping Sectaries', *Modern Age*, 25, no. 4, (1981); *The Portable Conservative Reader*, (Penguin, 1982).
6. W. Kendall, *Willmoore Kendall Contra Mundum*, (Arlington House, 1971).

Right Responses: Salisbury and Baldwin

John R. Greenaway

British Conservatives have always travelled without much ideological baggage. Favourite Conservative themes or dogmas such as 'the one nation', 'the organic society' or 'the middle way' turn out on examination to be largely ethereal in nature and of little interest to anyone other than party stalwarts or political philosophers. There has been nothing in British Conservative history comparable, for example, to the right wing in France where rival conservative traditions or ideas – 'Orleanism', 'Bonapartism' and the ideas of the counter-revolutionary ultras – have inspired competing right wing factions or regimes.¹ Certainly in the course of its history the British Conservative Party has championed many specific causes, such as the Union with Ireland, tariff reform, a strong navy and imperial expansion; but in the last resort these have been transient and peripheral to the major concerns of the Party. The pre-eminent concerns of Conservatives have been the preservation of the power of traditional elites, the maintenance of the major institutions of the state, the defence of national interests and the provision of a stable and secure government within the framework of a capitalist economy. One of the major difficulties which successive generations of Party leaders have faced is that, with the exception of the 'patriotic' element, these concerns have by their very nature been lacking in popular appeal. This is in contrast to those of their left-wing opponents: a contrast once likened by Sir Keith Joseph to one between 'shop-soiled reality' and 'the shining utopian ideal' of the left.² As a result Conservatives have been forced onto the defensive in a series of attempts to neutralise the challenges of their opponents.

At various times Conservative leaders have identified challenges to their own position as threats to the more general political order of the day. Between 1870 and 1900 the major threat was identified as the rise of mass democratic politics; in the inter-war period it appeared to be the assault of socialism; in the past ten years it has been interpreted as the growth of a neo-corporate state in which powerful vested interests and groups undermine both the authority and competence of elected governments. Under both Salisbury and Baldwin the Conservative Party set about neutralising the respective threats of their day. This involved an endless series of tactical manoeuvres, all the more complicated because of the fluid party political situations then prevailing; but it also entailed a broader strategy. The fundamental aim here was to defuse the electoral threat posed by left wing forces while

preserving the unity of the Conservative Party and extending its social and political core. This was to be achieved partly by political manipulation, and partly by intellectual persuasion and the use of a political rhetoric designed to counteract the appeal of their opponents.

The achievement of Salisbury and his allies in the 1880s and 1890s was to cement onto the traditional Conservative base of landowners and Anglicans, such disparate supporters as Whig grandees, City and Commercial interests, Irish Unionists, Chamberlainite social reformers, brewers and publicans, jingo imperialists and suburban Villadom. In the process two alternative strategies were discarded. The first was the preservation of the traditional Tory Party as a minority component of an ever-shifting centre-right coalition, enjoying a strictly limited share of the spoils of office. The second was the transformation of Conservatism into a demagogic or populist force led by a charismatic and crusading leader such as Lord Randolph Churchill or Joseph Chamberlain.³

Various factors ensured the success of Salisbury's strategy. One was the ineptitude of his political opponents, who allowed themselves to be torn apart on the Irish question. Linked to this was Salisbury's consummate skill in handling the complex High Politics of the period after 1883 and in ensuring that Churchill, Chamberlain, Hartington and Goschen did not unduly jeopardise the Conservative strategy.⁴ Another factor was the impact of social changes which helped to consolidate the grass roots support for the Party.⁵ But equally important was the ability of Salisbury and his associates to adopt a wide-ranging style of political discourse in which appeals to freedom, paternalism, patriotism and ethics jostled side by side. Underpinning the whole, however, was a coherent intellectual framework upon which the strategy could be grafted. Salisbury identified the chief threat to the political order as being one of 'disintegration'. His chief fear was that the radicals, by emphasising the machine politics of the caucus, would not only devalue the tone of political argument but would aggravate and exacerbate the social tensions between classes. The process of politics would become simply a struggle for power; the outcome of politics would be an auction of collectivist legislation. The House of Commons which used to act as an arbiter of politics had become subverted, being turned into 'an Assembly which is itself the very field of battle on which the contending classes fight out their feuds'. The rights of classes, the property of individuals and well-tried institutions were likely to be swept away as a result of

the colonisation of the Liberal Party by sectional and sectarian interests and groups.⁶ The ultimate result of this process, if left unchecked, was likely to be the destruction of non-democratic political institutions (including the Church), the decay of the social fabric, a weakening in Britain's international position, the territorial break-up of the United Kingdom and the abrogation of the 'laws' of political economy.

Salisbury's response to these threats was neither one of out-and-out obstruction to democratic tendencies nor an attempt to bring about fundamental reconstruction of the state. Rather the objective of Conservatives after 1880 was the emasculation of radical democracy. The radical challenge was met on its own ground in such a way as to retain and preserve as much of the existing social and political order, suitably cleansed and modernised, as possible. Thus the Conservative Party itself was reorganised and rejuvenated to meet the radical electoral threat without being transformed into popular Tory Democracy of the type advocated by Lord Randolph Churchill. It was, in contrast to the Liberal Party of the day, to be a 'top-downwards' party rather than a 'bottom upwards' party. The old elite retained critical power and influence while allowing local elites a degree of local autonomy. New commercial and industrial groups were associated with the Conservative Party without the Party becoming in any way the prisoner of such groups as far as social, economic or foreign policy was concerned. Representative local government was introduced into the counties in the accurate expectation that the traditional local elites would be able to turn the situation to their advantage, while furthering the interests of decentralisation. The interests of the Church were protected and furthered wherever possible, and constitutional innovations were avoided. A modicum of social reform measures were passed in a not altogether successful attempt to remove such issues from the sphere of party politics. By 1900, despite some limitations, the Conservative Party had succeeded in supplanting the Liberals as the natural party of government. The Conservatives enjoyed a broad-based measure of support in England and Scotland (though not Wales), and were endorsed by an impressive array of intellectuals from the universities, the legal profession and the world of higher journalism. The decade after 1900 was to show that this achievement was still somewhat precarious. The Boer War uncorked a stream of frenetic jingoism and popular Toryism that was alien to all for which Salisbury stood, and this partially encouraged attempts after his death to transform Unionism into a crusading radical force. In consequence the leadership of the Party indulged on the one hand in internecine battles and on the other in turning the struggle with their opponents into a series of dramatic and strident constitutional clashes of the kind which had been so studiously avoided in the previous 20 years. Between 1908 and 1914 their opponents on the left made Conservatives appear divisive, destructive and dangerous.

By the early 1920s the political situation had been

transformed. Not only had the pre-war structure of society been severely shaken, but the cohesion and indeed the very *raison d'être* of parties appeared to have been undermined. On the one hand the Lloyd George coalition had led to the growth of an unprecedented degree of cross-party interaction which the political prima donnas of the day were able to exploit. On the other hand, the Labour Party presented a formidable challenge as an extra-parliamentary movement ostensibly committed to both social revolution and a fundamental shift in the focus of political power. With the benefit of hindsight it is all too easy to see the confused electoral and party politics of the years 1919–1929 as an aberration from the normal two-party pattern of politics, but for contemporaries the situation appeared exceptionally uncertain and fluid. Baldwin, like Salisbury before him, followed the strategy of building up the Conservative Party as a broad coalition of anti-socialist forces able to appeal to a variety of interests and aspirations. He steered the Party away from becoming either a redoubt for old-fashioned ideas and privileged propertied groups (as was to be the fate of so many European parties of the 'classical right') or an aggressive anti-working class party dominated by the 'hard-faced men who had done well out of the War'. Wherever possible, in both his personal actions and his political moves, Baldwin sought to reconcile labour leaders and trade unionists to the political system of the day. All this involved managing the peculiarly complex and intricate High Politics of the early 1920s as well as operating in a period of extreme electoral uncertainty.⁷ No original thinker, Baldwin substituted for Salisbury's intellectual analysis a peculiar brand of rhetoric and image-building in order to underpin his strategy. The style of Toryism which he formulated was deliberately vague on the substance of economic and industrial policy, but strong on emotional appeal.

Several themes which occur throughout Baldwin's speeches are of interest in this connection. One was the need for responsibility in public life and the sense of trusteeship. Duties were as important as rights and those in authority and administration had an obligation to use their positions wisely for the good of the whole community rather than for the promotion of self-interest. Associated with this was a continual harping upon the dignity of labour and the need for partnership and peace in industry, with many allusions to the harmony between 'men and masters' which Baldwin claimed to have existed in the iron works and local industry of his youth. Another theme was the defence of the Church and of Christian values in politics, whether in personal moral life, in public affairs or in the sphere of legislation: a theme which was to serve Baldwin so well in his adroit handling of the Abdication Crisis. Another recurring theme was patriotism, not the xenophobic patriotism of imperialism but an appeal to traditional English values, rooted in English history and the English countryside, a kind of political version of 'Puck of Pook's Hill'.⁸ Just as Salisbury had attempted to challenge the appeal of late-Victorian radicalism on

its own terms, intellectual persuasion, so Baldwin attempted to meet the challenge of Labour on its ground: its ethical appeal and its critique of the injustices of capitalist society. As he himself put it, the 'sordid and miserable experience' of the war years has 'left people peculiarly open to the presentation of ideals; and it is perfectly useless, in my view, to think that you can secure the support of a majority of the nation as it exists today and in the frame of mind in which it finds itself today, unless your appeal is not only to their head but to their heart'.⁹

An essential element of Baldwin's appeal was his skilful use of myth. This can be seen at work in two areas. The first was in his frequent evocation of the Spirit of Disraeli and the cultivation of the idea of the Conservatives as the party of social reform and the 'one nation'. By the 1920s Conservatives could find in history a convenient substitute for ideology, altogether more in keeping with the British 'pragmatic' approach to politics, so that much theoretical writing on Conservatism as an intellectual force during the next 50 years was in effect little more than thinly-veiled panegyrics of the history of the Tory Party. A second myth which Baldwin assiduously cultivated was that of an idyllic rural England, pre-industrial and pre-capitalist. The following famous passage from *On England* illustrates the power and beauty of Baldwin's language:

The sounds of England, the tinkle of the hammer on the anvil in the country smithy, the corncrake on a dewy morning, the sound of the scythe against the whetstone, and the sight of a plough team coming over the brow of a hill, the sight that has been seen in England since England was a land, and may be seen in England long after the Empire has perished and every works in England has ceased to function, for centuries the one eternal sight of England. The wild anemones in the woods in April, the last load at night of hay being drawn down a lane as the twilight comes on, when you can scarcely distinguish the figures of the horses as they take it home to the farm, and above all, most subtle, most penetrating and most moving, the smell of wood smoke coming up in an autumn evening, or the smell of the scutch fires: that wood smoke that our ancestors, tens of thousands of years ago, must have caught on the air when they were coming home with the result of the day's forage, when they were still nomads, and when they were still roaming the forests and the plains of the continent of Europe. These things strike down into the very depths of our nature, and touch chords that go back to the beginning of time and the human race, but they are chords that with every year of our life sound a deeper note in our innermost being. These are the things that make England, and I grieve for it that they are not the childish inheritance of the majority of the people to-day in our country.¹⁰

The two most significant things about this passage are first the extent to which—as the author realised—the picture was at odds with the reality of 1924, and secondly the degree to which it harnessed romantic or reactionary sentiment to the cause of Conservatism. During the inter-war years it was fast becoming apparent that national self-confidence could no longer be buoyed up by reference to Britain's 'imperial destiny' or to her position as 'workshop of the world'. The result in Britain, as on the Continent, was a good deal of heart searching among intellectuals of the right, who questioned whether liberalism and the institutions of parliamentary democracy were in themselves sufficient to deal with the problems of the twentieth century. Baldwin's language and rhetoric played a part in checking any incipient tendencies towards either High Tory romanticism or European-stype Christian Democracy. For him what was important was less reactionary or anti-industrial sentiment than the harnessing of idealism to the defence of the social and political order and the broadening of Conservatism's appeal into lofty new moral areas. This made it easier for the party of 'Safety First' and of Neville Chamberlain's austere and workmanlike social policies to become one of the first of the comprehensive 'catch-all' parties of Europe.

By the 1940s it was evident that Socialism as expressed in the Labour Party no longer posed such a violent challenge to the social and political order. In many ways indeed, the Labour Party represented a more congenial opponent for the Conservative than the Liberal Party had done, in so far as it was more stable and predictable and presented less of an electoral threat to the Tory heartlands. Moreover, the Labour leaders shared with the Conservatives a desire to maintain the strength of central government, an aversion to constitutional tinkering or reform and a determination to uphold the Atlantic alliance. Once post-war Conservatives had weathered the shock of 1945 and come to terms with the post-war social settlement all was relatively plain sailing. The leadership did not now have to worry about party unity in the manner of Salisbury and Balfour, since party structure was now more ossified and the lesson had been learnt that in Britain all the electoral prizes go to the party which avoids splits. Essentially the politics of the period 1950–1975 revolved around the simple question as to which party was better at managing the mixed economy and the Welfare State. And the Conservatives threw themselves into this competition all the more eagerly since it distracted attention from the retreat from empire and the series of humiliations in international affairs which the country suffered.

By the 1970s, however, it soon became clear to all observers that the post-war consensus was no longer functioning. On the one hand a whole new range of political issues had arisen outside the scope of the politics of 'normal times', for example race and immigration, devolution and separatism, Northern Ireland and the debate over defence policies. On the other hand the chronic failure of the British economy

encouraged political thinkers and politicians alike to formulate radical economic and social strategies – on the left, in the ‘new centre’ and within the Conservative Party.¹¹ Above all politicians of all persuasions became aware that the system of government itself was no longer responsive to political control. Complaints abounded concerning the problems posed by powerful groups outside government, the difficulties of controlling the bureaucracy and of implementing policy, and the failure to co-ordinate government activities. As is well-known, the ‘Thatcherite’ diagnosis was that Britain was suffering from severe governmental overload and the remedy was to ‘roll back the frontier of the state’.

‘Lessons from history’ are notoriously friable and it may be that the problems facing Salisbury or Baldwin are not entirely analogous to those facing the Thatcher government, since Conservatives now perceive the threat facing them less in political, than in governmental or economic terms. In narrowly political terms the present administration enjoys advantages denied its predecessors of the 1880s and 1920s – a cohesive parliamentary party and electorate volatility which, although affecting all parties, has severely eroded the

electoral basis of the Labour Party. However, Mrs Thatcher’s response in terms of identifying herself with a particular political ideology and her tendency to meet the challenge in confrontational terms marks a departure from both the style and strategy of her predecessors. It is a high risk strategy all the more dangerous because of the high expectations aroused. What is striking about the present Conservative Party is the apparent failure of the Party to consider any attempt to neutralise the threat posed by the neo-corporate state on its own ground. Such a strategy might entail building up a new coalition within the pluralistic institutions of the State. It might include for example, attempts to revitalise the institutions of local democracy so that they become genuinely representative and responsible; efforts to encourage the churches to take their responsibilities seriously; measures to revitalise the educational system in the pursuit of excellence; and moves to encourage the accountability of professional bodies to the consumers of government services. If Conservatives continue to ignore these issues, it may be that the leaders of the SDP, will reap the long-term advantage from ‘Thatcherism’.

Notes

1. René Rémond, *La Droite en France*, (Aubier: Paris, 1963).
2. Sir Keith Joseph, *Stranded on the Middle Ground*, (Centre for Policy Studies, 1976), p. 33.
3. Cf. Jim Bulpitt, ‘Conservatism, Unionism and the Problem of Territorial Management’, in Peter Madgwick and Richard Rose (eds), *The Territorial Dimension in United Kingdom Politics*, (Macmillan, London 1982), pp. 139–76.
4. A. B. Cooke and John Vincent, *The Governing Passion*, (Harvester: Brighton, 1974).
5. James Cornford, ‘The Transformation of Conservatism in the late Nineteenth Century’, *Victorian Studies*, (1963), VII, pp. 35–66.
6. Ideas especially vigorously worked out in ‘Disintegration’, *Quarterly Review*, (1883), no.312. See also M. Pinto-Duschinsky, *The Political Thought of Lord Salisbury 1854–1868*, (Constable: London 1967); Paul Smith, *Lord Salisbury on Politics*, (CUP: Cambridge, 1972).
7. Maurice Cowling, *The Impact of Labour*, (CUP: Cambridge 1971).
8. For analysis of Baldwin’s thought and his appeal see John Ramsden, *The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902–1904* (Longman: London, 1978), pp. 207–15; Andrew Jones and Michael Bentley, ‘Salisbury and Baldwin’, in Maurice Cowling (ed), *Conservative Essays*. (Cassell: London, 1978).
9. Quoted Ramsden *op. cit.*, p. 209.
10. Stanley Baldwin, *On England and Other Addresses*, (Philip Allan: London, 1926), p. 7.
11. Andrew Gamble, *Britain in Decline*, (Macmillan: London, 1981).

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Nigel Ashford teaches in the Department of Politics at the University of Strathclyde.

Graham Dawson is Head of Economics at Birkenhead School.

Antony Flew is professor of Philosophy at York University, Toronto.

David Foster teaches at a Roman Catholic school, and is deputy editor of *The Keys*.

John Greenaway teaches Politics at the University of East Anglia.

Roy Kerridge is a freelance writer, and author of *Real Wicked, Guy*.

David Levy teaches sociology at Middlesex Polytechnic, and is author of *Realism*.

John Marks teaches physics at North London Polytechnic, and has just published *Science and the Making of the Modern World*.

George Martelli is an author and journalist, who has published over a dozen books, including *The Man who saved London*.

Geoffrey Partington teaches Education at the Flinders University of South Australia.

Sally Shreir is currently writing a dictionary of socialist thought.

David Sexton is a research student at Trinity College, Cambridge.

Andrew Thomson is a freelance writer and recording consultant.

Freedom, State, and Tradition

Graham Dawson

My purpose in this paper is to elucidate some of the conceptual connexions between freedom and conservatism. My method is to discuss Professor E. J. Mishan's wise and cautionary paper 'Not by Economics Alone'.¹

There seem to be four categories of views about freedom. First, libertarianism allows the greatest possible scope for free action in both the economic and the social spheres: the market economy cohabits with the permissive society. Second, and at the opposite pole, authoritarianism confines economic and social action to paths which lead to some collective goal, be it equality or national prestige. Third, and the first of two middle positions, liberalism combines economic restraint and regulation with as much freedom of social action as is compatible with equal liberty for all. Fourth, conservatism favours freedom in the economic world but custom and constraint in the social.

The years since the industrial revolution have seen liberalism supplant conservatism as the ruling principle of British public life. It is often assumed that the Victorians enjoyed less freedom than we are accustomed to today. But wrongly. True, sexual morality was restrictive; distinctions of birth and class provided material for several generations of novelists; and an eminent philosopher could ponder 'My station and its duties'. But in the economic realm the state's encroachments on individual liberty had hardly begun. Taxation was negligible by our standards. There were very few forms, licences, rules and regulations to be filled in, taken out, complied with and observed. Commerce and industry could be seen as avenues of escape from the rigid conventions of social life to the romance of risk and adventure. But the entrepreneur has gradually lost the glamour of hazard; the profit motive is now widely regarded as leading only to acts of moral turpitude. And so the state takes upon itself the task of redistributing income; public sector monopolies exploit the alienated consumer; the closed shop is recognised in law; and taxes sustain the welfare machine. Meanwhile, class barriers crumble; censorship recedes so that obscenity becomes the touchstone of seriousness in the arts; and standards of sexual conduct are relaxed. The bird of freedom has not multiplied but merely changed its habitat.

The owl of Minerva has not, however, altered its habits. Still flying at twilight, it delivers a philosophical defence of these secular changes just as they are about to be arrested. *A Theory of Justice* by John Rawls was published in 1972.² Liberals wished to justify government intervention in the economy while refusing

it the right to interfere in social matters. Hence the significance of Rawl's book:

'...the liberal...wants to say that government have no right to censor, no right to dictate private conduct; and he wants to fight off the conservative who claims that governments have no right to tax their citizenry for welfare purposes. Rawl's theory provided just what was wanted. A Theory of Justice neatly separates out a group of political and civil liberties which are all but absolutely inviolable, placing them in a different category from the rules about such things as property rights which enable economic activity to proceed'.³

The task of the conservative is to put the clock back, in this case by restoring the balance between economic and social freedom. It is not easy to remain fully aware of the overriding value of freedom in one field while recognising its limitations in another. Unfortunately, Professor Mishan's mistrust of liberty extends to the economic world. I want now to contest his claim that champions of the market economy exaggerate the importance of freedom.

The claim is that freedom can be realised only in such a narrow area of human life that it is an insignificant element of the good. Professor Mishan seeks to quell the libertarian's ardour by demonstrating the limitations of freedom of choice:

'For the fact is that virtually nobody can choose what he really wants. If I want to be as strong as Hercules, as wise as Solomon, as talented as Michelangelo, I shall want in vain'.⁴

The ordinary citizen is equally frustrated in his more routine ambitions:

'...it may be that he wants all he buys. But he certainly does not buy all he wants. He has to accept as unalterable data the physical features of the environment in which he dwells. The law permits him to go wherever he pleases provided he does not trespass on private or government-segregated property, and to buy whatever he pleases subject, however, to the constraints of his income, the time at his disposal, and the range of goods available at market prices. Again, he can choose any job he wants—provided he is qualified to hold it and provided it is offered to him'.⁵

Professor Mishan concludes that 'a person obtains what he wants—or rather what he chooses—only in a very limited sense'.⁶ This critique of freedom misunderstands the concept, overlooking the fact that there are two possible reasons for not choosing to do what one wants to do. It is not simply that one may not be free to do it: one may not be capable of doing it.

There are many things I cannot choose to do. I cannot choose to be ten feet tall or to breathe underwater. Neither can I move Mount Everest to Snowdonia National Park or make the sun revolve around the earth. The properties of my body and of the world around it severely limit what it is possible for me to do. But it is my capacity for, rather than my freedom of, action which is restricted in this way.

Freedom is a property of the will. I am free to will that Mount Everest come at once to Snowdonia, but it would be a futile exercise because mountains no more obey my will than Mohammed's. Where it makes sense to talk of freedom and unfreedom is in connexion with efforts rather than achievements. I may nor may not be free to choose to go in quest of the holy grail, but it does not make sense to say either that I am free or that I am not free to find it. For that depends on whether there is such a thing and, if so, on whether I look in the right place. To take a more mundane example, I am free to choose to try to run a three minute mile, but I am neither free nor unfree to choose to succeed in that endeavour. Success in accomplishing a task is the product of ability as well as effort and so failure does not constitute a constraint on freedom.

When my freedom of choice is obstructed, the impediment may be internal and psychological or external and political. If I wish to leave my house but am in the grip of agoraphobia, I am not free to choose to go out. If I wish to leave my house but the armed guard at the door refuses to allow me to pass, I am under house arrest and my political liberty is being infringed. Political liberty is denied only when someone is prevented from choosing to try to do something by someone else.

The facts which Professor Mishan adduces in his attempt to undermine economic freedom are undeniable. But some are not germane to the issue and the significance of others is misinterpreted.

Facts relating to the unalterability of certain aspects of human minds and bodies and the physical environment are irrelevant to the question whether economic freedom is a worthwhile goal. Professor Mishan confuses limits to capacity with constraints on freedom. That I cannot realise my ambition to be a wise as Solomon reveals my incapacity, not my unfreedom. Similarly, if I want to buy a chemical which will transmute base metals into gold, my desire will be thwarted without my freedom being denied. For such a substance is beyond the ability of scientists to produce. If, however, a selfish scientist had concocted the goal of alchemy but refused to make it commercially available, then my inability to buy it could not unreasonably be regarded as an infringement of liberty. Perhaps, though,

the scientist should be free to keep his secret. A paradigm case of constraint of free action emerges if we suppose the scientist to be willing to sell but the state allows only certain classes of citizens to buy.

The innumerable state regulations to which Professor Mishan draws attention are indeed violations of liberty. He is therefore right to point out the narrowness of the area in which the state permits its citizens freedom of choice. But to conclude that we should refrain from asking for its boundaries to be extended is either defeatist or question-begging. If what little freedom we have is valued, the moral to draw is the opposite of Professor Mishan's: we should try to discover those of the state's encroachments that are unreasonable and repulse them. If, on the other hand, freedom is thought to be worthless, then its scarcity is no cause for complaint. But that is to assume what is waiting to be shown, that freedom of choice is not worth having.

However, my analysis of freedom, although different from Professor Mishan's, supports his general argument. For his main claim was that two premises which underlie judgements of social welfare cannot be justified. The two premises are 'first, that a more equal distribution of the nation's output of economic goods constitutes an improvement in social welfare, and second, that an increase in goods per capita and the availability of new goods likewise constitute an improvement in welfare'.⁷ I shall now argue that economic freedom is itself a constituent of social welfare and that this conclusion is another reason for rejecting the premises which Professor Mishan criticises.

The well-being of members of a society is usually estimated by adding up the value of all the goods and services available to them. It follows that the only way of increasing social welfare is to supply more goods and services. But it is possible to increase social welfare by allowing people to acquire goods and services at present supplied by the state through market transactions. How we acquire goods and services, as well as how many we acquire, affects our well-being.

Consider two ways in which I might acquire a car. I might save up for it, in which case ownership will bring with it a sense of achievement, a feeling that hard work and spending opportunities foregone have been rewarded. By contrast, I might acquire the car as an unsolicited gift from a friend who is a professional car thief. My use of the vehicle will be accompanied by feelings of guilt as the beneficiary of a crime, anxiety for its rightful owner and fear of detection. Far from being enhanced by pride of ownership, my life will be clouded by the need to deceive my neighbours. How goods are acquired yields utility or disutility which must be added to or subtracted from that afforded by their consumption.

The conventional economic concept of utility, from which the notion of social welfare is derived by aggregation, fails to do justice to human nature. An individual is assumed to be indifferent to the way in which he acquires goods and services. A good is thought to yield utility simply by virtue of being a physical

object of a certain sort. But a good or service can also yield utility or disutility through being a purchase, a gift, a windfall, a reward, an honour, an award for merit, a lottery prize, a 'perk', a 'right' provided free at the point of consumption but paid for out of confiscated income, treasure trove, plunder or any one of countless other things.⁸

This analysis of freedom further undermines the two premises attacked by Professor Mishan. First, a switch from private to public provision in order to secure a more equal distribution of goods is unlikely to increase social welfare. Even if the new distribution procured a rise in social well-being, it would be offset by the loss of opportunities for exercising freedom in the acquisition of goods and services. Second, an increase in goods per capita and the availability of new goods does not necessarily improve social welfare, for the goods in question may be publicly provided 'free at the point of consumption' but at the expense of goods that might otherwise have been available for acquisition through free contracting in a market. Moreover, switching the production of a good from the public to the private sector increases social welfare. For, even if no more goods are produced, social welfare rises by virtue of the fact that the same quantity is now available for acquisition through the exercise of freedom.

Some conservatives may shrink from so unabashed an advocacy of freedom. Their anxiety may focus on excellence and equity, or, in the jargon of the economist, merit goods and externalities. I shall try to allay their fears before expressing some reservations about the scope of freedom in social affairs.

Merit goods are those that provided by the state in the belief that they are of greater benefit to individuals than they themselves will admit. Health care, education and the arts are the standard examples. No reasonable man will deny the value of these activities. But when it comes down to the goods and services actually provided, one man's merit good is another man's parasite. Subsidies to reduce the price of an alleged merit good below its free market level invariably raise doubts about its true worth. A survey of the supposed merit goods subsidised in the cause of Art might well lead the uncharitable to dismiss the merit goods argument as the last refuge of the scoundrel in search of a sinecure. Education in some amorphous sense is generally accepted to be a worthwhile pursuit, but it is far from clear that comprehensive schools and mixed ability teaching are meritorious.

It is worth considering education at greater length. The real purpose of education is to know the world and understand man's place in it. And since education in this sense does not cease on the attainment of whatever standards may be adequate from an occupational point of view, its distinguishing feature is the pursuit of excellence. Those who cleave to such an ideal are sometimes apt to assume that the market is its enemy. They see popular culture rampant and imagine all that is best in literature, learning and the arts in swift retreat. The public sector, a steady beacon above the

market's endless turmoil, beckons them to a haven beyond the tides of fashion. And so state education comes to be seen as the embodiment of the clerisy, a cultural priesthood preserving superior values to those that rule the market, keeping the nation's conscience in the conviction that commercial pressures would uplift the dross and submerge the gold.

Yet it is obvious that this is precisely what much of the state educational system is doing. Almost everywhere excellence is embattled, detachment compromised and tradition overturned. In their places relevance calls the tune: community studies drives out history and environmental science flourishes while the classics die. The pursuit of excellence has suffered under the state because it is unreasonable to coerce everyone into trying to achieve what is within the reach of only a few. Accordingly, everyone must be taught only what is easy and undemanding. To forestall the objection that it is a waste of time to set only those targets no one can miss, the trinket of relevance is displayed.

I am not suggesting that schools should never teach subjects which are relevant to everyday life. My point is rather that the pursuit of excellence and the acquisition of marketable skills will both be compromised if they are carried on together. A subject which can be studied for its own sake will be distorted if the attempt is made to 'relate' it to vocational concerns: the past is bound to be misunderstood if we study it merely for the light it may throw on the present. Equally, the acquisition of practical skills will be hampered if it is forced to follow the paths of scholarship: an aptitude for entrepreneurship can be stifled by an inability to write essays for GCE 'O' level commerce. Only if the upholder of traditional standards is free to sell them in the market-place can he be unflinching in his advocacy of their excellence. Those who fear that quality will be sacrificed for the sake of sales forget that market prices signal value. People will pay handsomely for the genuine article, one of whose hallmarks is scarcity. Dust is more easily dug than diamonds. As long as there is a demand for irrelevant excellence, its rarity will ensure its survival through high prices and low sales. And as long as there is a demand for useful mediocrity, its abundance will preserve it through low prices and high sales. A free market in education could satisfy both demands, and many others, through a variety of specialist institutions.

Externalities or 'spillovers' are costs and benefits to third parties outside the market transactions which give rise to them. Professor Mishan argued plausibly that social welfare is reduced by negative externalities, such as environmental pollution. Concern for the environment can, of course, be overdone; it would be easy to return to a countryside as 'unspoilt' as that of medieval England, as long as the majority of the population were willing to tolerate the subsistence standard of living which went with it. But there is clearly a need to balance the benefits of exploiting natural resources against the damage to the environment such exploitation involves. To what extent this can be done without

infringing economic freedom – for instance, by declaring property rights – is a question that is beyond the scope of this paper.⁹ The most that could be called for is some measure of state regulation of private economic activity.

Positive externalities raise a more serious matter of principle because they are used to justify, not merely state *regulation* of private economic activity, but the *replacement* of private by public provision. Health, education and defence are the main sources of positive externalities. If a man is cured of alcoholism, everyone benefits from his return to employment, so everyone should contribute to the cost of curing him. The benefits of a degree in computer science are felt by everyone when the graduate contributes disproportionately to economic growth, so everyone should subsidise his education. If the nuclear deterrent deters at all, it deters attacks on everyone and not only on those who favour its possession, so everyone must pay for it. Accordingly, health, education and defence must be publicly provided.

Defence is a special case which I shall comment on later. With that exception, I want now to argue that the positive externalities argument is based on unsound moral foundations. It starts from the principle that the individual should be rewarded for the unintended good consequences of his actions. But, if I murder a man during the course of an armed robbery and it transpires that he was an assassin on his way to kill a popular world leader, then I deserve to be punished for the evil I intended rather than rewarded for the good which flowed by chance from my deed. And, if I read for a degree in order to secure a well-paid job, I do not merit reward for the economic growth to which I inadvertently contribute. Employment in, say, biotechnology will be sufficient reward in itself.

The positive externalities argument can quickly be reduced to absurdity by showing what it would entail if the attempt were made to apply it consistently. For the most significant unintended beneficial consequences of economic action are those identified by Adam Smith as the 'invisible hand'. The industrial revolution was the product of 'the most childish vanity' on the part of landowners who exchanged the produce of their land for manufactured goods and the principle of 'turning a penny wherever a penny was to be got' which informed the actions of merchants and artificers. 'Neither of them had either knowledge or foresight of the great revolution which the folly of the one, and the industry of the other, was gradually bringing about'.¹⁰ In this manner buyers and sellers, each pursuing his own interest, create markets and stimulate economic growth which benefit third parties. Being consistent about positive externalities entails that we should subsidise everyone who engages in market transactions. But then there would be nobody left to tax in order to finance the subsidy.

There is one more criticism of the market made by Professor Mishan. He accuses it of consumer bias, in the sense that consumer satisfaction from new products is bought at the expense of hardship among workers laid off by employers whose products the new goods

have rendered obsolete. Moreover, we must expect that 'the unavoidable "trade-off" of consumer satisfaction for worker dissatisfaction will become less advantageous'.¹¹ However, a reason for believing this problem to be less serious than Professor Mishan suggests is implicit in another charge which he levels against the market economy. He fears that new technology will make the consumer's life too easy: 'The point of a life from which all trial and obstacle is removed, from which the material needs that generate moral obligations are extruded, ... is no longer certain'. I agree that such a removal threatens our capacity for moral judgement. But it is surely less likely to come about if increases in consumer satisfaction entail greater insecurity for producers. For, since almost everyone is both a consumer and either a worker or a worker's dependant, the removal of trials from one part of a person's life may be balanced by their proliferation in another.

My defence of economic freedom, of the market economy, could form part of a libertarian or a conservative ideology. To clarify the role of freedom in social affairs would require another paper. All I can do here is to offer some hints as to why I think it possible consistently to assign freedom a central role in economic arrangements and a peripheral one in social matters. What relevant difference is there between the economy and society? A clue is to be found in the case of defence as a positive externality. Since all citizens benefit from the defence of the realm, even those who refuse to help to defray the cost, the free rider problem rules out its private provision. Yet this purely economic consideration fails to reach the heart of the matter. For it is invidious to think of one's duty to contribute to defence costs as a mere matter of paying one's way, valuable though that principle is in its own place.

What is broached by this consideration of defence is the question of the relation between, not the individual and the state, but the individual and the nation. The state is no more than a convenient mechanism for regulating the relations between individuals in their everyday transactions. It exists to prevent one man from restraining the rightful liberty of another. And so it treats people merely as rational agents, each seeking his own material improvement and each entitled to as much freedom as is compatible with the same freedom for everyone else. Once the notion of the state is properly understood, phrases such as 'the minimal state' or 'the nightwatchman state' are seen to be pleonastic. But people are more than rational economic agents.

People are also members of a larger whole, the nation. What makes a nation the nation that it is is the congeries of customs and traditions which it has inherited. And so it is these customs and traditions that constitute at least in part its people as the people they are. It follows that a person would not be the person he is if it were not for the customs and traditions which have given him his passions and prejudices, his instincts and intuitions. Without what he owes the nation in

which he was born, an individual is a less than fully human being. Liberals and libertarians alike fail to give due weight to this consideration. In their different ways, they both aim to make the individual the be-all and end-all of society but succeed only in diminishing him.

The liberal mistakenly predicates freedom of achievements rather than efforts. He is therefore led to believe that we can be sure that everyone is free to X only if everyone actually is X-ing. And he further infers that if everyone were free they would all be X-ing. Since some people do not succeed in X-ing because they lack the ability to do so, the random distribution of natural talents comes to be seen as a barrier to freedom. Thus, Rawls advocates positive discrimination 'to even out class barriers'. Otherwise, 'distributive shares are distributed by the outcome of the natural lottery; and this is arbitrary from a moral perspective'. This view is, however, incompatible with human dignity and a full appreciation of what it is to be a person. For what constitutes personal identity, what makes a person the person he uniquely is, is precisely what he has by virtue of the 'morally arbitrary' influences of heredity and family background. If we abstract from a real human being every attitude and talent, every prejudice and skill, picked up as part of a traditional way of life, we are left with something less substantial than a ghost. This remnant may be admirably suited to the role of helpless object of social policy, but it could not possibly be a thinking and feeling, choosing and acting, subject.

Libertarians tend to regard themselves as more consistent thinkers than conservatives, because they make freedom the supreme and universal value. Thus, Tame castigates conservatives for allegedly recoiling from the unpalatable consequences of applying freedom consistently:

'Rhetorical formulas embellish the protection of vested interests and special privileges. At best the conservatives want to have their cake and eat it. They clearly don't want totalitarian statism, but they would like a little bit of liberty (for themselves and their friends) when it suits them, and a little bit of statism when that suits them too'.

And The Libertarian Alliance International includes among its principles, not only economic freedom – 'the voluntary exchange of all goods and services' – but also 'each individual's liberty to pursue his or her chosen lifestyle'.

The charge of inconsistency can quickly be dismissed. To insist upon applying principles without qualification or exception is just as likely to be the mark of immaturity or dogmatic enthusiasm as of rigorous thinking. The question whether individuals should be as free to choose their lifestyles as to exchange goods and services must therefore be examined on its merits. The libertarian principle is harmless enough if all that is meant by 'lifestyle' is the sort of thing that colour supplements exist to display; interior decorators, inspectors of restaurants and physical fitness fanatics like to pontificate about; and advertising copywriters put to practical commercial use. But it is difficult to resist the suspicion that something less innocuous is intended; that the moral is being reduced to the aesthetic; that under the cloak of that apparently innocent claim it is being implied that choosing a lifestyle is no more serious and public a matter than selecting wallpaper. The libertarian seems to be suggesting that the only possible motive for disapproving of another person's conduct or lifestyle is that it offends one's personal taste. If, for instance, someone spent all his time watching video nasties; living off a state benefit although fit for work which was available; engaged promiscuously in heterosexual and homosexual practices, sometimes with children; and habitually took heroin; then no one else would have any right to coerce him into changing his ways.

However, the nation as a whole does have such a right if such a lifestyle became so popular as to threaten its own survival as the nation that it is. For then the nation would have an interest in the allegedly private conduct of its members. It would be unreasonable to expect the government of the day, as keeper of the nation's conscience, to smile benignly and accept without a qualm that this is the lifestyle the people choose and so must be free to pursue. Libertarians are fond of saying that there can be no crime without a victim. True, but the victim need not be an individual: the past can be betrayed, a heritage can be squandered, a tradition can be allowed to die of neglect, a way of life can be lost. The nation has a legitimate interest in what its people do, even behind closed doors, for private acts can have public consequences. We cannot read off from this interest Draconian laws, for nations, traditions and customs change and not *all* change is for the worse. But neither can we rule out *a priori* and in principle legislative efforts to influence the general moral tenor of the nation.

Notes

1. E. J. Mishan, 'Not by Economics Alone', *The Salisbury Review*, no. 4. (Summer 1983).
2. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
3. Alan Ryan, 'The ideologist of American liberalism', *The Times Higher Education Supplement* (8.10.82).
4. Op. cit., note 1, p. 41.
5. *ibid.*
6. *ibid.*
7. *ibid.*, p. 38.
8. For a longer exposition of this argument and its implications, see Graham Dawson, 'Less State, More Welfare', *Economic Affairs* (January 1984).
9. See Steven N. S. Cheung, *The Myth of Social Cost* (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978).
10. Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1970), p. 515.
11. Op. cit., note 1, p. 40.

Letters

Sir: Your study of Gramsci, as a thinker of the left, omitted to mention the true source of his influence over Italians of the post-war generation. Gramsci was the first true totalitarian thinker, who justified not only the practice of 'total control', but also a constant Inquisition into the thoughts and feelings of everyone. He therefore encouraged those for whom 'ideological error' is a crime, punishable even by death. This has been, and still is, the philosophy of The Red Brigade, and of the many Italian intellectuals who have shown sympathy for terrorists in recent years.

Maria-Teresa Giuli,
Via Alberico II, 4, .
Roma.

Sir: I write in response to Roy Kerridge's article 'A Day at the White Lion Free School' (*Salisbury Review*, no. 6).

Kerridge did not tell us that 'he wrote for right-wing papers'. He told us that he was writing for *New Society* and gave us the name of the reviews editor of that journal as a referee.

Both before and after his visit Kerridge promised to show us his copy before he submitted it for publication. His failure to keep his promise is the reason why the article contains the errors listed below.

Local Conservatives never 'promised a large donation if they were returned to power'. Kerridge confuses several bits of information, including the fact that Horace Cutler gave the school a donation of £1000, in a personal capacity; and those Conservative GLC members who visited the school expressed their admiration for the work we were doing.

It's not surprising there were no children in the school at 9 o'clock. The school starts at 9.30. Playgroup children (under five) do not attend meetings and do not have lunch with the rest of the school. It's entirely untrue that 'school treats and holidays take up most of the school's money'. Taken all together, educational visits, outings, residential trips and holidays account for well under ten per cent of the school's budget.

Glad as we would have been to have a German teacher, the individual Kerridge refers to was in fact a visitor like himself and therefore hardly in a position to speak on behalf of the school.

I did not draw up any list of aims. Someone else did. Kerridge's account of the draft is a travesty. My book *Progress in Education* (Croom Helm, £2.95) does not 'praise comprehensive schools' and does not 'deny that anyone plays truant for fear of bullying'.

Presumably Kerridge is trying to establish his 'street boy' credentials by pretending he does not know that the theatre in Sloane Square is the Royal Court. Although blessed with a nice sense of humour, Kerridge seems unable to detect this quality in others. Most of his quotes, presumed serious, were probably jokes.

At the time Kerridge visited us (1980) the school was having difficulties with a group of youths who did not attend the school but came in and made life unpleasant for us all. We refused them entry and there has been no difficulty since. Kerridge misleads by implying that this was an inherent feature of the school.

Even Sir Keith Joseph now acknowledges the difficulties of inner city run-down areas. Could not your journal, which I take to be trying to maintain a high standard of debate, do better than print the ignorant sneers of a slipshod novelist at those who undertake the demanding work of educating children in such areas?

Nigel Wright
c/o White Lion Street Free School,
57 White Lion Street,
London N1

Roy Kerridge Replies

Dear Nigel Wright: Sorry if my article annoyed you, but the facts are these. I thought I was writing for *New Society* at the time, but when I gave them my piece, the rotten lot turned it down! That was four years ago, before the *Salisbury Review* had been created. When I first saw the *Salisbury Review* I said to myself, 'What a marvellous paper! I bet they take that old "White Lion Free School" article that *New Society*, in their blindness, refused'. I was right. So I called at the Free School to tell them the good news, but the place was being redecorated. A telephone number was pinned on the door, and when I rang it a girl said that Nigel Wright had left the school and that few members of the original staff remained. So I saw little point in seeking them out to show them an essay which they probably would not like anyway.

I clearly recall saying that I sometimes wrote for right-wing papers, as I remember how honest I felt at the time. As for the other points: I cannot help it if the German teacher was not supposed to be there, I never mentioned that playgroup children had lunch with anyone, and my article was based on a *day* spent at the school. It was sheer bad luck that hooligans invaded the building on the day I had been invited. I'm sure the Free Schoolers can make excellent jokes, but to my mind they are at their funniest when they are trying to be serious. The theatre I was taken to had 'Youth Activist Theatre' written over the door, and resembled a bomb shelter. Perhaps it was the back entrance to the Royal Court. I have left it too late in life to become a street boy, whatever that may be. As for the deprived inner city area of Islington, it is hard to find a house there costing less than £60,000. If Islington is deprived, so is Mayfair and so is Park Lane.

Roy Kerridge
Morecambe
Easter Saturday

EDITORIAL

On April 16th of this year, an MI5 officer was, for the first time, convicted of spying, and sentenced to 23 years imprisonment. Compared with the fate of those betrayed to the KGB—to whose numbers Michael Bettaney was attempting to add—his punishment was lenient. Bettaney, however, was far from appreciating the fact. Following his conviction, he launched an amazing bombshell on the British public. In an open letter delivered by his solicitors to the press, Bettaney rehearsed the case for the overthrow of the capitalist system, in language of such naivety as to suggest a 2.2 in sociology from the Open University, or even a first in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford. To the amazement of his readers, however, it turned out that Bettaney had obtained a respectable second in English at Oxford.

Once again the British public was shown the reality of a liberal education, which proceeds not according to laws of its own, but in obedience to the prevailing winds of emotional necessity. Whether the recipient needs to adopt his national heritage or, like Bettaney, to spit on it, a liberal education will provide him with the outlook, the procedures, and the justifying language, with which to consolidate his aim.

The *trahison des clercs* is a well worn theme of modern political rhetoric. In a world in which the right of government has been wrested from the hands of kings, education has become one of the few plausible titles to power. Those who govern, and those who betray, govern or betray with the help of, and sometimes in the name of, ideas. The danger of the arrangement is evident. For ideas exert a more powerful sway over the conscience than does wealth or status. An ideology like Marxism, whose appeal rests upon its ability to 'unmask' the claims of conscience, will persuade the intellectual to do for no reward what the ignorant person would do only for money, privilege or power.

Moreover, ideas unite those who are persuaded by them, and set them apart from those who are not. They are the natural source of cohesion, and the prelude to a collective resolve, so that men like Bettaney may earn through their intellectual attachments that sense of social membership which they could never earn through their scant personal charm. Because their treachery is motivated, not by a desire for material gain, but by a self-sacrificing loyalty to ideas, others will unite with them, inspired by the same theories, and equally convinced that their loyalties lie, not towards the actual, but towards the merely ideal.

The spread of education has ensured that the professional classes are permeated by such people, ready to identify themselves through their convictions, and to join with others who share them. This is not a conspiracy. It is rather, the natural result of education granted universally, and without regard to the social

status, moral character or emotional imperatives of those who receive it. In every profession—even the legal profession—influential positions will be occupied by those who are responsive to Bettaney's appeal 'to renew their determination and redouble their efforts in pursuit of a victory which is historically inevitable'. To take such exhortations seriously, is to begin the work of revolution.

Consider Bettaney's solicitor, Larry Grant, former Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and legal officer of the increasingly left-dominated National Council for Civil Liberties. Grant was co-author of *Civil Liberty*, *The NCCL Guide*, a book which is couched in the language of Bettaney's letter. He also wrote the NCCL's book on *Race and Immigration*, in association this time with Ian Martin, former General Secretary of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, and contributor to the Communist Party of Great Britain's pamphlet 'Black and Blue, Racism and the Police'. It is interesting to discover that Grant is a partner in the firm of Seifert and Sedley, which handles much of the legal business of Communist and far left organisations, and which contains at least two Communist Party members among its partners. Another member of this firm—Sarah Burton—accompanied Lord Gifford on his mission to Grenada on behalf of the accused Grenadan revolutionaries. She is a contributor to *Morning Star*, and a member of the Communist front organisation, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, to whose Paris meeting in 1982 she went in the company of the barrister Helena Kennedy, a member of the Communist Party who shared in the defence of Bettaney at his trial.

The existence of such links is not tantamount to conspiracy, and no doubt the events which led to Grant and Kennedy acting for Bettaney are capable of innocent construction. Nevertheless, it is worth noting an additional feature of the Bettaney case. Larry Grant, who must have been aware of the threat to National interest and to the safety of our agents, pressed for the trial to be heard publicly. When the application was refused, he tried to make the matter into a question of civil liberties and legal conscience.

Grant will no doubt have had occasion to examine the dangerous secrets which the Court sought to protect. It is in the nature of the convictions expressed by Bettaney in his letter, that the claims of conscience must, in the end, be discounted if they conflict with the revolutionary cause. There is plenty of reason to think that Bettaney's convictions are shared by his lawyer. It is surely arguable, therefore, that the 'positive vetting' of members of the security force ought to be extended also to those who have occasion to represent them in court. In the present case, dangerous information may still be in the hands of one who ought not to hold it.

BOOK REVIEWS

WAUGH REVISITED

David Sexton

Evelyn Waugh, Writer Robert Murray Davis. Pilgrim Books, 1981. £26.95

The Picturesque Prison – *Evelyn Waugh and his Writing* Jeffrey Heath. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1982. £15

The Writings of Evelyn Waugh Ian Littlewood. Basil Blackwell, 1983. £14

The Essays, Articles and Reviews of Evelyn Waugh ed. Donat Gallagher. Methuen. £20

Evelyn Waugh wrote in 1959 that he was not 'the least nervous about the much-advertised threats of the nuclear scientists... because I can see nothing objectionable in the total destruction of the earth, provided it is done, as seems most likely, inadvertently. If it is done in malice someone will have behaved culpably'. Well-phrased as this is it is not phrase-making. All of his opinions were the thought-through consequence of his faith as a Catholic, as was the ordered formality of his prose. In 'The American Epoch in the Catholic Church' ten years earlier he had given this account of his discussions with secular academics: 'Nuclear fission threatens material progress; they apprehend this and are at once in despair. What are they here for if not to participate in a benevolent scheme of evolution? It is a question which only the God-fearing can answer'.

Any worthwhile attempt to criticise Waugh's work must centrally concern itself with his faith. Criticism of such beliefs from a merely temporal point of view is misconceived, as he took care to explain. An interviewer said to him 'It is evident that you reverence the authority of established institutions – for instance the Catholic Church and the Army. . . ' and was cut off thus: 'No, certainly not. I reverence the Catholic Church because it is true, not because it is established or an institution'.

Two out of these three critics display an essential failure to observe such a distinction, whilst Robert Murray Davis is unsure what to do with it. In the manner of professional criticism primarily intent on its own competence they set about categorising Waugh's work by analogy, and therefore discuss only the attributes of his central faith and let the truth or not go by as if somehow no such claim for it were even being made. So it becomes no more than a metaphor like any other, an option amongst a range of available figures. That Waugh lived and died by his creed, believing in its truth, is an embarrassment to the literary critic, for his

discipline has no internal rationale with which to confront such an intransigence. How could it?

The critic may straightforwardly assume or boldly argue that this faith was misplaced – but which critic can mount such an argument (although William Empson has done something like that)? He may admit its claims. Or he may, with varying degrees of shiftiness, neither grant nor refute them, and avoid meeting them at all by temporising and acting as if there were only parity between Waugh's devotion to the Church, the correct use of English, and the English aristocracy, instead of an ordered sequence from one to the other.

Thus transcendental claims are reduced to counters which can be readily compared and exchanged. In this way the critic is set loose to oppose to Waugh's beliefs his own categories, against the order of the Church his own sensibility. In extreme cases the exercise of such sensitivities has been seen as itself a substitute for the religious life, with the university English school transformed into the 'creative centre for the civilised world of real human responsibility' (Leavis). T. S. Eliot foresaw something like this when he reproved I. A. Richards in 1929: 'Poetry is capable of saving us', he says; it is like saying that the wall-paper will save us when the walls have crumbled.' And literary criticism is only poetry's go-between.

Waugh did not rate criticism so highly. Indeed he saw writing creatively as itself a secondary activity. (He said a Catholic writer will tend to laziness because he knows that 'five minutes after his death it will not matter to him in the least whether his books are a success or not' – typical of Waugh that he should say that a Catholic writer will know this better than a faithless one – and he described his duties thus: 'The questions a Catholic writer shall ask himself are: First, when I write in *propria persona*, am I correct in Faith and Morals? Second, do I always do my best to produce a workmanlike product that is fair for my hire? If he can answer these questions confidently he need not bother about other criticisms, however kindly intended.')

Craftsmanship was the key to his aesthetic. Seeing D. H. Lawrence's 'miserable pictures', he says, he 'began to understand that a work of art is not a matter of thinking beautiful thoughts or experiencing tender emotions (though these are its raw materials), but of intelligence, skill, taste, proportion, knowledge, discipline and industry; especially discipline'. Shortly before his death he wrote in his diary 'when I first came to the Church I was drawn, not by splendid ceremonies but by the spectacle of the priest as craftsman. He had an important job to do which none but he was qualified for. He and his apprentices stumped up to the altar with their tools and set to work without a glance to

those behind them, still less with any intention to make a personal impression on them'.

In a small way the ordering of a sentence was the maintenance of a greater order. Modernism did not participate in this: 'Chaucer, Henry James and, very humbly, myself, are practising the same art. Miss Stein is not. She is outside the world-order in which words have a precise and ascertainable meaning and sentences a logical structure. She is aesthetically in the same position as, theologically, a mortal-sinner who has put himself outside the world-order of God's mercy' (in a letter). 'All literature implies moral standards and criticisms – the less explicit the better' – it was only with this as a premise that he can be called an aesthete. What he saw at stake was this: 'Civilisation – and by this I do not mean talking cinemas and tinned food, nor even surgery and hygienic houses, but the whole moral and artistic organisation of Europe – has not in itself the power of survival. It came into being through Christianity, and without it has no significance or power to command allegiance'. 'Converted to Rome', 1930.) Between the criticism of the man who held these beliefs and that of those writing here about him there is a curious and gloomy comparison to be made.

Evelyn Waugh, Writer, the best of the three, is a study of how Waugh set about constructing his novels, making use of the manuscripts and uncollected work gathered in the Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas. Waugh wrote to his wife Laura about the *Brideshead Revisited* page proofs 'you may, must study them to see the changes', and deliberately assembled the material so that such a book as this would one day be written; so it has warrant. Seeing how something is made brings home its structure as nothing else will do.

Revisions make a tempting study for the professional critic, because once the importance of the finished work is accepted, he can take it as his reference point for dealing with earlier states. Then by shuttling between these two reference points he is saved the inconvenience of supplying his own. Further, the moving target of the work is subjected to a form of 'controlled' testing that can never normally apply in dealing with works of art.

This does not constitute any argument for the work's value in the first place, and Davis roundly admits this: 'I have assumed that Evelyn Waugh is important enough to allow me to expect that the reader will be interested in the ways in which the novels came to be written. . .'

Discriminating between different versions when the later state is only doubtfully an improvement (as with the revisions of Wordsworth and Henry James) is a nice exercise. Waugh's revisions, however, are, until his faculties began to diminish, all improvements. Davis notes with alarm of one change in *Brideshead Revisited*, 'This revision is almost unprecedented for Waugh because it becomes less specific'.

Within these limits the book is a competent and useful study, concluding only that Waugh wanted to have his books read and understood, and that 'he

always took great trouble in these matters', not only over the style of a sentence but also over the structure of a novel as a whole. Restricting himself to such a bland theme Davis does well, with only a few lapses of sympathy into ill-judged generalisation. 'Perhaps as some have observed, he did not have a complex or subtle or even first-rate mind, but he knew a good deal about the theology of the Roman Catholic Church', he declares numbly at one point. The remark is pointless because he does not say what he himself thinks of such knowledge, always limiting himself to reporting Waugh's views without comment – talking for example of 'what he regarded as the sharp contrast between the jargon of modernist philosophy and the precision of Catholic theology'. Elsewhere he makes a wistful gesture towards the charm of psychoanalytic explanation, which he succeeds in virtuously resisting – 'Those versed in psychology might find significant Waugh's association of submersion, heat and strong emotion here. . .'

Jeffrey Heath's *The Picturesque Prison* is much more argumentative, with some interesting things to say. However its entire plot is based on 'the popular heresy that resemblance constitutes identity', which Waugh remarked in a review of Muggeridge. He was making a grammatical point, but it is an appropriate description of the way Heath treats Waugh's faith as a simply comparable fiction. 'The metaphor of life as a prison dominates Waugh's view of the world', he says, and argues that he sought a refuge in the Church, as in the nursery, as in the country, etc., but this sanctuary became in the end itself a prison. Literary critics tend to forget or discount the fact that lives unlike books are rarely dominated by figures of speech, and that, on the other hand, there are, for example, real prisons. This study is constructed around a manipulation of such figures – 'He appears to have thought that he was withdrawing only from the deceptive 'City of Man', but in fact he was backing away from everything – and soon his back was against the wall'. He writes excitedly himself, in the belief that his own metaphors capture the man, feeling no resistance. Unfortunately, when it comes to that he cannot write as well as Waugh. Compare his coarsely novelistic account of Waugh – 'The face was often pinkly irascible, sometimes fiery red, and the prominent eyes glared with disapproval above the glowing, accusing cigar', an overburdened accessory – with Waugh's own description of himself as Gilbert Pinfold – 'He offered the world a front of pomposity mitigated by indiscretion, that was as hard, bright, and antiquated as a cuirass'.

The critic keenly protects himself from commitment. Heath writes about Waugh's Church as 'an enduring institution which, in his view, enshrines continuity and right order', placing the qualification so that he endorses only its endurance. In direct breach of Waugh's warning quoted above he reports him as believing that 'personality had continuity only if its possessor affiliated himself with enduring institutions', a hapless plural. In the Preface he says 'Above all, I have

stressed Waugh's interest in religion', as if to assure us that he does recognise its importance to his author, but the terms of that recognition make it plain enough that nothing much has been seen at all.

Let me make it clear at this point that I am not, of course, suggesting that it is either necessary or sufficient for a critic writing about Waugh to be Catholic himself, although it is true that F. J. Stopp and David Lodge, who are, have written about him better than most. The fallacy of that equation was sarcastically presented by Wittgenstein when a pupil wrote to him saying that he had become a Catholic partly as a result of his influence; he replied, 'If someone tells me he has bought the outfit of a tight-rope walker I am not impressed until I see what is done with it'. Eliot meditated the difficulties of reading a writer whose beliefs we may not share at length, especially in relation to Dante. 'It is a matter of knowledge and ignorance, not of belief or scepticism', he said. 'You are not called upon to believe what Dante believed . . . but you are called upon more and more to understand it'. A critic such as Heath cannot be said to have understood what Waugh's faith was to him, nor indeed to have the tact to admit that. It may be that this is not so much a personal failing as something inherent in the institutionalisation of literary criticism as a discipline.

Heath does have a degree of real sympathy with the procedures of fiction, and makes some striking comments on the nature of Waugh's achievement. Of the difference between his diaries and his letters he says, 'Waugh wrote his diaries for himself, an audience for which he often felt an intense loathing. His letters, on the other hand, were written to people he for the most part liked'. He is alive to implication and finds evidence for moral seriousness 'everywhere felt but nowhere expressed' as early as *Decline and Fall*. But this soon turns into a reluctance to take anything as what it simply is, and he sets about decoding in a frenzy of superstition. 'Waugh repeatedly uses marine imagery to describe the fallen, self-indulgent world', he decides, and sniffs out a fishy feast – 'in *Black Mischief* a woman eats sardines from the tin . . . in the *War Trilogy* Guy Crouchback sees marine creatures when he hallucinates on his return from Crete . . . and so on. Later he descends to reproof. 'Waugh lived more fully in fiction than he did in life, and he treated experience too often as a source for future art', 'Waugh did not adequately perceive that *any* place of total concealment, secular or religious, would ultimately turn into a prison', he writes, like a headmaster's dream of the Recording Angel.

Ian Littlewood's study is less sternly admonitory, but his strictures are the more disconcerting for the placidity with which they are applied. He believes that Waugh's books are 'about ways of avoiding reality and they offer in themselves an avoidance of it'. This is surely a grave charge, but we may wonder whether 'reality' is a word ready to do quite as much of the work of making it stick as he would like. There have been disagreements about its reference, after all, among

quite intelligent people. Littlewood is not troubled by doubts, and this gives him a curiously English tone of subdued sorrow at, rather than irritation with, his author's delinquencies. So he examines 'the omissions and distortions, deflections, exaggerations and denials by which a novelist can try to cheat reality of its power to oppress him', with a chapter by chapter survey of such 'literary manoeuvres' as 'humour', 'romanticism', 'nostalgia', and so forth', with in each case an account of 'the stages by which its effectiveness declined'. This makes for rather a dull story; it is more of a Leggo set than a conceptual framework. It also puts forward an odd view of what Waugh was about in his books. The chapter entitled 'Religion', which he believes to be 'a form of special pleading which can be widely applied' says, as if it were well-known, 'Of course, the security afforded by religious detachment is sounder in theory than in practice'; it is then another failed 'manoeuvre'. 'If any of the defences had been perfect, Waugh's life would have been happier' is his verdict – so that's the great aim, to be happy. Heath tells (rather badly) this good story: 'When an eager American journalist asked Waugh to comment on Will Roger's statement that the purpose of art is not to make a man think, but to make him happy, Waugh icily inquired, "Mr Rodgers is dead, I understand?" The obliging journalist replied, "That's right, Sir, guess he passed over some years back". Said Waugh, "Then he knows better now, good morning".'

The Writings of Evelyn Waugh is so superficial it can have little to tell the least reflective of Waugh's readers. It has no pretensions to scholarship – a (complete) footnote on the first page stoutly informs that Scott-Moncrieff was 'The translator of Proust' – and quotes from only two uncollected articles. A few hours in a library would have supplied this deficiency and now even that is unnecessary. Donat Gallagher has replaced his earlier brief selection from Waugh's journalism (*A Little Order*, 1977) with a far longer (662 pages), handsomely presented volume, which covers all aspects of his career, with a bibliography of those pieces still omitted. Gallagher's introductions to the chronologically arranged sections are excellent. By paying attention to the impact of personal and public events on Waugh's opinions he gives us a sense, strangely absent from these critical studies, of taking Waugh seriously. At times this is no more than saying that Waugh was right: 'The recent "revelations" of Count Nicholas Tolstoi and Lord Bethell would have appeared to him, in their general outline, not as the unearthing of matters inherently secret, but as welcome recognition of facts that had been known at the time and studiously suppressed . . .' The publication of these essays, the *Diaries* (1978), and the *Letters* (1980), has greatly altered and enhanced Waugh's reputation by making it clear that he was more fully involved in his times than a cursory reading of his novels might suggest. Gallagher usefully includes as an 'appendix'.

The 'Conservative Manifesto' from *Robbery Under Law* (1939), an elegant abstract of his tenets, but the merit of

this collection and its arrangement is that it shows Waugh's consistent judgement reacting to a range of particular events and circumstances. His belief that 'There are still things which are worth fighting *against*' ('Tolerance', 1932) – that, 'An artist must be a reactionary. He has to stand out against the tenor of the age and not go flopping along; he must offer some little opposition', (*Paris Review* interview, 1963) – is repeatedly justified, especially with regard, for example, to the group writers of the Thirties and the events of the immediate post-war period.

'Thirties writers' are still being busily written up by interested parties as one of the few available examples in recent English literature of direct political – ie ideological – engagement. Waugh resisted this from the start, aware of what was meant by it. Of Edward Upward he writes 'His thesis, if I do not misunderstand him, is that the class struggle is the only topic worth a writer's attention; his difficulty that this means relegating to insignificance almost the whole of the world's literature'. (This is in a review of C. Day-Lewis's 1937 anthology *The Mind in Chains* – he also singles out Blunt's contribution – with its canting introduction: '*The Mind in Chains* could never have been written were it not for the widespread belief of intellectual workers that the mind really is in chains today, that these chains have been forged by a dying social system, that they can and must be broken – and in the Soviet Union have been broken. . .')

Many of these pieces were written strictly for the hire – 'Please fix up anything that will earn me anything – even cricket criticism or mothers welfare notes' he tells his agent at the start of his career – and others out of personal loyalties, but even in these weaker pieces the distinctiveness and distinction of his prose is immediately apparent, itself the first communication of his passion for clarity. Its accomplishment severely exposes the lack of such style in his own critics, and enforces recognition of the fact that, despite the advances in the professionalisation of literary criticism, a critic remains only as good as his writing. This is not a popular fact amongst professionals.

Gallagher leads his preface, perhaps unwisely, with this quotation from Waugh: 'The contemporary English literary world may be conveniently divided into: those who can write but cannot think, those who can think but cannot write, and those who can neither think nor write but employ themselves at international congresses lecturing on the predicament of the writer in modern society'. 'Modesty constrained him from adding a fourth category', adds Gallagher. This has given a handle to hostile reviewers, and they have grasped at it. C. H. Sisson has accused Waugh of 'setting one prejudice against another, not developing anything that could be called a serious line of *thought*', (and, grievously, of doing it 'for money'). John Carey has explained, 'The disadvantage of Catholicism was that it stopped him thinking. He lapsed, under its influence, into quasi-medieval stupor' – doubtless inferior to the

quasi-modern or the truly medieval – 'So argument is superseded, yielding its place, in the articles, to pugnacity and prejudice'.

'Thinking' then is no more than argument. Prejudice and belief are not part of it, and the superiority of argument over them is to be taken as unarguable. But of course this is only a prejudice. Prejudices, these reviewers suggest, can be argued away, if gone at rightly. But where would this leave us? With the solitary prejudice for argument rather than belief? or not even that? We can hardly move around day by day without certain prejudices. A prejudice is, or may become, a belief; it is not an argument, although it may be arrived at, defended, proposed or even defeated, by argument. That argument is the primary mental activity, as assumed by Carey, seems a very odd belief to me.

Since Waugh had a central and external faith he did not feel the need to argue every point, nor to consider his writing itself the source of meaning (to have thought that might have shocked him). Writing could in this sense only ever be a making anew, not a new 'thinking', for him. He was a skilled craftsman in that making, and many of these pieces are exceptionally well turned. His abuse of Spender, for example, is better written than anything Spender has ever done. The best of these essays have the lucid structure and crisp phrasing that testify to a wholly consistent set of beliefs behind them, and this applies even, or especially, when those beliefs are not argued but implied. Waugh's career as a whole, too, reveals more and more coherence and solidity as the previously unpublished or uncollected work comes out. It has the 'architecture' that he saw as defining a true writer (in a review pointing out Cyril Connolly's lack of it): 'I believe that what makes a writer, as distinct from a clever and cultured man who can write, is an added energy and breadth of vision which enables him to conceive and complete a structure'.

However Waugh finally rests his case outside his work, in the Catholic Church and the fact of his Christianity. (C. H. Sisson grants him the former but patriotically denies him the latter.) In this sense his writing (particularly of course his journalism) may be considered as an applied art. It is a description he might not have rejected, although few are content to admit themselves to be practising only that today. When every work is to carry its own meaning with it, for little enough is seen outside, craftsmanship is devalued; and, on the other hand, critics are offended by it, for they can feel that what lies beneath is removed from the scope of their competence.

The reviewers of *The Essays, Articles and Reviews of Evelyn Waugh* have preferred not to recognise that at the lowest evaluation, even without acceptance of the transcendental claims, Catholicism has been at the heart of European history and civilisation. It is not, after all, in any way a private mythology (such as that of W. B. Yeats) with arbitrary inventions of significance. They behave as if it would somehow be more estimable if it were, for it would then fall more

readily within the range of those standards, such as elegance of composition and variety of design, that they know best. Now this is surely a most eccentric prejudice.

LEGENDS OF SAMOA

Sally Shreir

Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth Derek Freeman. Harvard University Press. £11.95

Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* has, for over half a century, fuelled and favoured many a liberal assumption. It has been held to support the supremacy of cultural determinism over biological necessity, and the moral superiority of sexual permissiveness over the 'repressive' morality of Christian civilization. If the Samoans are sexually free, non-aggressive, and happy, why should Western man be otherwise? And if these facets of human behaviour are merely the product of cultural contingency, why should we believe any others to be more firmly rooted in an immutable human essence? Those who view either the findings of Professor Mead, or the claims to which they have given rise, with scepticism or downright distaste, will look forward to Derek Freeman's book as a welcome corrective.

Unfortunately, they will be disappointed. The book is polemical rather than persuasive, dismissive of Mead rather than discursive. Freeman exhibits the same tendency to cultural generalisation that he condemns in his adversary, but while she described Samoa in terms which reflected the concerns and perceptions of predominantly female informants, he conjures up a Samoa saturated with traditional male values; the product of almost exclusively male testimony. Small wonder then that they should have reached such different conclusions, although the fact that a society is portrayed differently by the genders may, in itself, be sufficient to cast doubt on the feminism which has fed off the findings of Mead. Still, did we really require Freeman to spend over two years in Samoa in order to tell us that the sexes are different?

Such sterling devotion to duty is, of course, admirable. But we might have hoped also for a little more intellectual integrity. So eager is Freeman to destroy what remains of Mead's myth, that he ignores her own admission that her early field-work was inconclusive. He ignores her evidence, her qualifications, and the fact that her idealised picture of Samoan society was openly intended as a moral to the West. But if her picture was idealised, his is almost Satanic in its obsession with every conceivable form of sexual violence, repression and punishment. To what then does Freeman attribute these starkly contrasting findings? He makes much of the claim that Mead was systematically deceived by her informants; a sure sign of sexual repression, as Freud would have been the first to

point out. Yet, I find no conclusive evidence in these pages to suggest either that the Samoans *did* lie to Mead, or that they have become less devious in the intervening period.

As has already become apparent from the publicity surrounding this book – front page news in the *New York Times* – it is destined to occupy much the same position as did Mead's, albeit on the opposite side of the barricade. Readers of *The Salisbury Review* should view such ethnographies with the scepticism proper to any attempt to condense the complexities of human existence into a blue-print. They might do worse than to nurture their preferred view of the nature of man with honest prejudice, rather than with the dubious application of a pseudo-science to a society which bears scant relation to our own. Alternatively, they could spend two years in Samoa.

FALSE EQUALITY

Antony Flew

The Economics and Politics of Race by Thomas Sowell (New York: William Morrow, 1983).

Thomas Sowell is a Chicago-trained economist. He is also a black, his family having moved from the Deep South to Harlem during his boyhood. In a Foreword to an earlier work on *Markets and Minorities* Milton Friedman wrote: 'This book is a breath of fresh air on a topic... generally the subject of unreasoning passion, emotion, and prejudice. The breath of fresh air is driven by passion – by the deep and sincere passion of a remarkable man – but the passion is disciplined by reason, by intellectual integrity, and by the careful and intelligent examination of a wide range of evidence.' The same strong tribute was equally deserved by Sowell's later books on *Race and Economics* and *Ethnic America*. It should also be paid to *The Economics and Politics of Race*.

None of these books has attracted much attention in this country, and in most cases the US publishers have not even bothered to arrange a regular UK outlet. (The Alternative Bookshop has imported a few copies, and that has been just about all.) Yet they do all carry one message which is of the last importance to a nation concerned to assimilate substantial immigrant populations deriving from various more or less alien sources. All the institutions and personnel of what the *Daily Telegraph's* Peter Simple has handily christened the race relations industry appear to be committed to denying or suppressing this vital message. The message is that the success or failure of different groups of alien immigrants in different countries – success or failure in comparison both with other groups of alien incomers and with the indigenous population as a whole – is to be explained mainly by reference, not to physiological differences of race, but to the differences which are in the broadest sense cultural.

Of course there has been, and in many places still is, a deal of racism—in the strict and only proper sense of most improperly advantaging or disadvantaging members of particular racial groups for no other or better reason than that they do belong to that particular racial group. But racism will only explain a relatively small part of the enormous total of actual differences of achievement. The rest has to be put down to culture. Thus Sowell argues: 'It would be hard to claim that Puerto Ricans have encountered as much discrimination as the Japanese—who have about *double* their incomes. It would be even more difficult to claim that the Puerto Ricans have historically encountered a level of discrimination comparable to that of blacks, who have higher occupational status and 20% higher incomes' (p. 186). Anti-Japanese discrimination peaked after Pearl Harbor, when all the racially Japanese of the US mainland were rounded up and sent, their property mostly confiscated, to concentration camps. Yet Japanese-Americans now earn 'incomes nearly one-third higher than the average American!' (p. 172).

Most surprising to us is the US record of the Afro-Caribbeans: 'By 1969, black West Indians in the United States earned 94% of the average income of Americans in general, while native blacks earned only 62%. Second generation West Indians in the United States earned 15% *more* than the average 'American'. After noticing several other ways in which physically indistinguishable West Indians stand out from the crowd of native-born American blacks, Sowell remarks: 'West Indian immigrants in London [are] not nearly so successful' (p. 107).

Were he to pursue his inquiries in Britain he would find further confirmation of the truth of his main message. The Commission for Racial Equality, for instance, gave in its last report some figures for juvenile unemployment: Afro-Caribbeans, 59%; Whites, 42%; and Asians, 40%. Recognising no doubt the threat to the future of its industry represented by the fact that culture is so very much more important than either race or racism, the Commission took care to comment only on the shocking 59% and not the remarkable 40%—a figure lower than, though perhaps not significantly lower than, that for Whites. Lower down the hierarchy you will find local race relations officials and other activists, for the same obscurantist reason, brazenly defining 'Blacks' to mean either 'all non-Whites' or, more narrowly, 'Afro-Caribbeans and Asians'.

Throughout this latest book Sowell cites fact after surprising fact showing how outrageous it is to require as an ideally non-racist society one in which all racial and other ethnic groups are represented in every walk of life in even roughly the same proportions as in the population as a whole. ('Racism' is in fact in both the USA and Britain increasingly, albeit quite unacceptably, defined in terms of departures from this racially infatuated ideal.) Thanks to various forms of 'positive discrimination' in favour of Malay Malaysians many Chinese Malaysians have to study abroad. Nevertheless, 'although there are approximately equal numbers

of Chinese and Malays in Malaysian colleges and universities, the Chinese out-number the Malays by more than eight-to-one in the sciences and fifteen-to-one in engineering' (p. 139).

Again, 'Black doctorates in the United States out-number Asian doctorates by nearly three-to-one in history, but are outnumbered by Asian doctorates by six-to-one in mathematics and nearly nine-to-one in chemistry. More than half of all doctoral degrees received by American Negroes are in education, a notoriously undemanding field of study...' It simply will not do to try to explain all this as due to the racism of white society, or capitalism, or socioeconomic disadvantage: 'Black American, Mexican American, and American Indian students from families with incomes of \$50,000 a year and up still do not score as high on the mathematics portion of the Scholastic Aptitude Test as do Asian American families with incomes of \$6000 and below. Asian Americans as a group also outscore white Americans as a group...' (p. 140).

One final tidbit comes from *Pink and Brown People*, a collection of Sowell's splendid newspaper columns: 'Back before World War I, a study in New York City showed that German and Jewish school children graduated from high school at a rate more than a hundred times that for Irish or Italian children' (p. 9). Now that really was for the Irish and the Italians an achievement in under-achievement!

NEED FOR DICTATORSHIP

David Regan

Dictatorship over Needs Ferenc Fehér, Agnes Heller and György Márkus. Basil Blackwell, £22.50

This book is an analysis of 'soviet societies', a generic term used to describe the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. The authors are three Hungarian academics now resident in Australia.

There is much that is familiar about the book. The number of disillusioned East European Marxists committing themselves to paper has risen by geometrical progression over the last half century. Their intellectual journeys tend to follow a common threefold pattern. First they become disenchanted with the reality of East European régimes but remain committed Marxists. In the second stage they become critical of Marxism itself. In the third stage their paths diverge: some embrace a religious faith in place of Marxism; some turn to Western liberalism or conservatism; others insist on retaining some kind of socialist allegiance, Marxisant though not Marxist. The three authors of this work are firmly located in the latter camp. While they launch a bitter philippic against 'soviet societies' and while they stress major flaws in Marxist theory they remain obstinately within the socialist tradition.

This book is thus of a familiar *genre* but it is lifted

above the common run by the depth and freshness of the analysis. The authors argue that a 'soviet society' is 'a social formation completely different from any that has existed in European or world history to date'. It is neither capitalism nor socialism nor a hybrid of the two; it is not some form of transitional or arrested development; it is not to be seen simply as an Asiatic tyranny or a slave society; it cannot be summed up as the rule of bureaucrats or of a new class. All these possibilities have been put forward at various times to explain the nature of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Each possibility is examined in turn and, while some offer important insights, the authors show why none may be considered an adequate explanation. Instead they argue that a 'soviet society' is best characterised as a 'dictatorship over needs'.

To appreciate the significance of this description one must first understand what they identify as the principal dynamic of a 'soviet society'. It is not to secure a rationally organised economy, nor to establish egalitarian distribution of wealth, nor even to arrange the greatest possible material rewards to the holders of power. Indeed it is not really an *economic* imperative at all. Rather it is a *control* imperative, namely to maximise the volume of the material means at the disposition of the apparatus of power. Only expenditures of resources under the disposition of the apparatus constitute real costs. Social usefulness is related to the propensity of production to remain under the control of the apparatus. Thus for instance state agricultural enterprises are invariably favoured in 'soviet societies' against, say, co-operatives, despite the higher productivity of the latter. Economically this is irrational; in terms of control, however, it is rational. Thus the imperative of maximising control helps to explain the endemic imbalances so characteristic of 'soviet societies', the recurring shortages of consumer and capital goods. It is not that the rulers *want* imbalances but that the cost of avoiding them would be an unacceptable diminution of control.

Given the pressure to concentrate economic, social and technical decisions in the hands of the power apparatus, the great mass of the people are left no effective means of expressing their social and economic needs, let alone of securing their implementation. Yet the official ideology ceaselessly proclaims the devotion of the state to their needs. There is no politically acceptable way to explain their frustration. The net consequence of this is, in its purest form, a brutal dictatorship over needs. The authors are, however, quick to point out that the pure form may often be modified. Economic irrationality and public discontent may reach such dangerous levels that some control may be temporarily sacrificed to mitigate it. Nevertheless the underlying rationale of the 'soviet society' remains unaffected.

From this basic analysis the authors go on to explore in detail a series of related aspects of 'soviet societies'. They cover the characteristics of planning (systematic overstatement of objectives and costs), of the inevitable

triple economies (command, market and informal interagency bargaining), of the ownership of the means of production (the corporate property of the apparatus of power), of sovereignty (residing in the party leadership), of the hidden conflicts of interest (for instance between urban and rural populations), of the rôle of technical experts (principally as agents of feedback) and of the paradoxical concept of forced consent (the obligatory and ceaseless public approbation of the regime). In the course of this analysis the authors comment in passing on the feebleness of several aspects of Marxist theory, for instance, the ambiguity of the concepts of communal property and class conflict. Moreover they also throw light on life in a 'soviet society' in a way which only those long resident in one could. (For instance they mention a detail which few Westerners will be aware of, namely that a citizen of such a society has to prepare frequently a *curriculum vitae* containing the most intimate details of private life). In short, the book is an intellectual *tour de force*.

This does not mean that it is unflawed. On the contrary, so profound are its weaknesses that they threaten to vitiate the whole enterprise. To begin with, the book is written in such a turgid style as to be almost impenetrable except to the most determined reader. In their introduction the authors make the surprising announcement that the book is directed at the general public in the West (although especially at its leftward inclined members). It will be only the exceptional man in the street, whatever his political leanings, who will get through this book. No book on Marxist theory and practice is light reading, but reading this one is like wading through wet concrete. Part of the trouble is that the authors are in love with parentheses. Every page is littered with brackets. Indeed the only sensible way to approach the book is by reading every sentence twice – first omitting the words in brackets and secondly including them. All this is a great pity. Beneath the verbiage and the jargon there is a book of some significance struggling to emerge.

A second flaw is even more damaging. As was mentioned at the beginning of this review, the three authors remain convinced socialists, although of an indeterminate school. This political predilection stunts and weakens the book. The least convincing parts of the analysis are those defending socialism. For instance they deny that dictatorship over needs is socialism, on the normative grounds that socialism upholds freedom and equality and is a response to oppression. Since soviet societies are unfree, unequal and oppressive, even though they began as anti-capitalist, they cannot be considered socialist. This is rather like arguing that comprehensive schools in which educational achievement is low cannot be comprehensive schools, because by definition comprehensive schools are concerned to increase attainment. It is one of the enduring mysteries of the twentieth century that, despite the gruesome realities and theoretical absurdities of socialism, it retains its superstitious hold on so many minds – like those of Féher, Heller and Márkus.

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
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In Short

Brian Lee: *Poetry and the System*, The Brynmill Press, 15, Cobwell Road, Retford, Nottinghamshire, £1.80.

Brian Lee laments the absence of a world in which poetry can be read as poetry, without having to be translated, as now, into a language which is discontinuous with literature. In this language, whose measure is mathematics, we are conditioned to take 'everything to pieces and leave it in pieces'. Contemporary 'textual criticism' confronts a text like a bulldozer a house. We may examine the fragments but we cannot put them together again into the coherent whole which is Art. With Yeats, Lawrence and Eliot, Lee traces the predicament of the poet in the modern world to the seventeenth-century and to the scientific movement which then first asserted its claim to dictate the terms of life. Lee's is an eloquent and serious voice crying out in our linguistic wilderness for a return, through language (because, as he says, 'a changed language is a changed world'), to a fullness of life in which Yeats's 'true because poetical' may again become thinkable. It is to a reassociation of sensibility that Lee looks forward, in common with several of his fellow contributors to the magazine *Gadfly*, in which this pamphlet originally appeared as a supplement. (I.C.)

Ladislav Matejka and Benjamin Stolz (eds): *Cross Currents*, — a yearbook of Central European Culture, Ann Arbor, 1983

Cross Currents is published by the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures of the University of Michigan, and represents one of the few serious attempts to display the reality of Eastern European culture under communism.

The present issue (1983) contains over 400 pages of articles, reviewing major publications and cultural developments in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, with particular emphasis on Czechoslovakia. Articles range from an affecting study of Janáček by Milan Kundera, to a consideration 'under Western eyes' of the recent *samizdat* volume on Masaryk, edited by three Prague dissidents, in which H. Gordon Skilling, addresses himself to the enormous problem of Czech legitimacy. It is interesting to find that Skilling ignores completely all those articles in the *samizdat* volume which are either explicitly or implicitly monarchist, or which look for the religious basis to Czech and Slovak sentiments of legitimate government. Despite this sin of omission, the collection is rich and rewarding, and provides the best available survey of the 'lived reality' of Eastern European culture. (R.S.)

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