




The Third Marquess of Salisbury 1830–1903

The Salisbury Review

*A quarterly magazine of
conservative thought*

*Volume 4 Number 4
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A quarterly magazine of
conservative thought

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The persecution of *The Salisbury Review* continues. As we go to press, another of our contributors – Jonathan Savery – is to stand trial before his employer, accused of ‘racism’. The proof offered by Avon County’s Director of Education is that Mr Savery wrote in these pages in a manner that has proved offensive to the anti-racist lobby. One member of that lobby, a Mr Singh, has personally led the campaign against Mr Savery, and, in a letter to *The Times*, went so far as to accuse our contributor of having denied free speech to those who are trying to silence him. It seems that Mr Savery’s very presence is a threat to the level-headed people who, but for *The Salisbury Review*, would have brought a truly multicultural spirit to the schools of Bristol.

In this issue we were to have carried another article by Mr Savery, describing some of the experiences which have led him to assert that peace between the British communities requires common institutions and a common law. Perhaps nothing is more indicative of our national decline than the fact that those who defend a common political order are accused precisely of disrupting it, while those who groundlessly brand their fellow as ‘racists’ are permitted to drive their victims onto the streets. We have been advised not to publish Mr Savery’s article, on account of the inflamed state of his persecutors.

Readers of *The Salisbury Review* will be pleased to learn, however, that the anti-racist lobby is not outside the law. The editor has obtained an apology and damages from the BBC, following a radio programme in which *The Review* was falsely accused of publishing racist articles. This small victory may discourage some of the more hysterical outbursts of the Institute of Race Relations and its associates. Perhaps, however, final victory will come only when ‘racism’ is made a crime in law, defined by statute, so that nobody could be falsely accused of it without having full grounds for an action in libel. Until that day we must continue to tolerate the abuse of those for whom words are more an instrument of battle than a vehicle of truth.

The Left’s attitude to the ethnic minorities is part of a larger strategy of disruption. As Basil Phillips Griffiths shows, the police forces of Britain are being increasingly impeded in their duties by legislation whose major effect is to foster suspicion and hatred among the ethnic minorities. Here as elsewhere, the tendency of conservatives to capitulate before the champions of liberal reform has led to an increasing enfeeblement of the law’s authority,

and an increasing licence to crime. The pursuit of conciliation at any price leads to a denial of individual responsibility, thence to an erosion of the moral sense, and so to an escalation of the conflict. As Joanna North points out, the radical desire for an administered forgiveness is not merely a denial of individual guilt; it is also a usurpation by the state of a power that lies by right with the victim. By such usurpation crime is justified, and the conscience of the criminal destroyed.

Perhaps no philosopher has stood more firmly against the sentimentalisation of crime than Hegel, our current conservative thinker, for whom punishment was not merely the duty of the judge, but also the right of the offender. In Hegel’s vision of society we find a first attempt to come to terms with the anxieties of a secular order, and to defend the idea of authority against the assaults of the individual will. Perhaps the most disconcerting social development in recent years has been the collapse of the belief in authority, even among those who profess to a faith in God. As Father Napier argues, the spread of this attitude through the Dutch Catholic Church has led to a virtual apostasy of that traditionally conservative institution. And yet the Church of Rome claims the personal authority of Christ. Not to accept that claim is to be a protestant, and to stand outside the corporate person of the Church.

The international jurisdiction of the Roman Church was the foundation of European government. Thanks to the new internationalism, enforced by Soviet power, and justified by Marxist ideology, legitimacy has been removed from the government of half of Europe – and nowhere is the loss of it more deeply felt than in Romania, the condition of whose people is described here by Lesley Chamberlain. As Miss Chamberlain makes clear, there can be no help for the Romanians while the Soviet Union continues its drive for world domination. Thanks to the Left however, whose attitude to the Soviet Union continues the dishonourable custom of appeasement described by George Martelli, we lack a foreign policy that would enable us to stand against Soviet power. Almost alone in the modern world, the brave and brilliant Jonas Savimbi defends our common heritage from the world’s most sinister Empire. Our Foreign Office spurns his calls for assistance, recognises the puppet government of Angola, and strives to dissuade Dr Savimbi from visiting Britain. It is some testimony to the prevailing spirit of the country, that it should be left to *The Salisbury Review* to provide him with a platform.

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Conservative Journals: *Commentary*

Few American conservative publications have so interesting a record as *Commentary* – the journal which has perhaps done more than any other in recent years to justify the image of America as the principal bulwark against totalitarianism. Founded in 1945 by Elliot Cohen, and sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, *Commentary* has articulated the views of the more sober members of the East Coast Jewish intelligentsia, who brought to American political thinking the crucial experience of totalitarian crime. Cosmopolitan, cultivated, and yet profoundly sober in their assessment of the modern world, the earlier writers for the journal were able to set against the pie-eyed fantasies of American liberalism an intelligent and realistic conception of what is now at stake.

Commentary has not always been so sound as first it was. During the bleak years of 'revisionism', when American intellectuals lent over backwards to blame their country for the Cold War, and to excuse the poor encircled bolsheviks for their necessary excesses, *Commentary* also wavered. Even later, during the crazy aftermath of the New Left, when Marxist thought and practice enjoyed the benefit of the most sublime and rococo excuses, *Commentary* sat in agitation on the fence. So it was in 1970, when Norman Podhoretz took over as editor, and so

perhaps it would have remained, had not Podhoretz himself seen through the mendacity and treasonableness of the received opinions, and set the journal again on a decent path. Under his courageous and outspoken guidance the journal has become an inspiration to all American conservatives (and not least to President Reagan), earning itself an enviable reputation as a sinister organ of international reaction, capitalist imperialism and American military power.

By nature a sceptic, Podhoretz has retained as much distance from his present views as the times have permitted. His own experiment with radicalism has lent authority to the journal, which speaks to the American establishment with the sad, and sometimes weary, voice of a great experience. The current (April) issue contains a sombre analysis by Arch Puddington of the famine in Ethiopia – a famine, he argues, which is the direct and intended result of communist planning. A doctor and a jurist write of the new attitude to death, which permits us so easily to dispose of our useless relatives. Book reviews, cultural commentary, and an abundance of analysis make the review into an important intellectual adventure, for those who have the time.

Commentary is available from 165 East 56th St., New York, price \$33 for 4 issues.

Ideology and Science: National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union

John Marks

‘... Science, like every other human project, is racial and conditioned by blood’ (Lenard, 1937).

Relativity ‘was a Jewish fraud, which we could have suspected from the first with more racial knowledge than was then disseminated, since its originator Einstein was a Jew’ (Lenard, 1942).

‘Fifteen years ago, when Relativity was made high goddess of science... Lenard pronounced boldly against this general madness and described the theory as nonsense... it is disgraceful to Professor Planck that he has served as Einstein’s lieutenant...’ (Stark, 1935).

These statements were made in the 1930s and 1940s in National Socialist Germany by two Nobel prize-winning physicists – Lenard and Stark. Two of them concern Einstein – the man who dominated science in the first half of the twentieth century and who ranks with Galileo and Newton in the history of science. This article will describe how these statements came to be made and discuss some parallel developments in the Soviet Union.

By the early decades of this century, Germany was probably the foremost scientific nation in the world. Many of the founders of modern physics – Planck, Einstein, Born, Schrödinger and Heisenberg – were professors at German universities such as the universities of Berlin, Munich and Göttingen during the 1920s. In other sciences, too, Germany was preeminent. One of the founders of X-ray crystallography, von Laue, was a professor at the University of Berlin. The chemist Haber, famous for his work on the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen, and the radiochemists Hahn and Meitner, who later discovered fission in uranium, were directing work at two of the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft’s research institutes. Fundamental work was also being carried out in what was later to be called biochemistry. At the University of Berlin Fischer was working on the chemistry of carbohydrates and the structure and synthesis of proteins, while Warburg later established the details of some of the

key chemical reactions involved in respiration.

The lists of Nobel prize-winners show clearly the German preeminence. Foremost amongst them was Einstein, who had been a professor at the University of Berlin since early in 1914. He was one of the few German intellectuals who would not join in the widespread support given to the German cause in the First World War. This may have made him mildly unpopular, but it was as nothing compared with what he had to endure from the early 1920s onwards. At this time Einstein was a pacifist and a keen supporter of the League of Nations. He was also a Jew and a supporter of Zionism.

All these facts made him the target for personal attacks, particularly after his scientific work had given him worldwide prestige, following the public confirmation of his General Theory of Relativity by experiments carried out during the total eclipse of the sun in 1919. In 1920 an Anti-Einstein League was formed in Germany, which offered substantial sums of money to anyone who would refute Einstein’s work. The Anti-Einstein League held public meetings at which Einstein and his work were attacked. The League became associated with the anti-semitism of Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist Party. In the early 1920s Einstein and his work were also attacked by the physicist, Philipp Lenard. Lenard had won the Nobel Prize in 1905 for his work on the photoelectric

effect, but he publicly protested after Einstein had been awarded the prize in 1921 – also for work on the photoelectric effect. When the National Socialists came to power in 1933, Einstein was in America. He refused to return to Germany, resigned from the Berlin Academy of Sciences and campaigned publicly against the National Socialists.

Almost at once the independence of the universities and of their scientific communities was threatened. On 23rd March 1933 Hitler had forced an Enabling Law through German parliament which in effect allowed him to rule by decree. Within two weeks, the National Socialists used this law to establish one of their basic aims – to make anti-Semitism legal. They did this by means of a law (7th April, 1933) which provided for the dismissal of any public official who was of non-Aryan descent; a non-Aryan was defined as anyone with a Jewish parent or grandparent. And, since the German universities were public institutions, many thousands of people, both well-known academics and minor officials, were affected.

Perhaps the most extraordinary case was that of the chemist, Fritz Haber. Unlike Einstein, who had always been pacifist and internationalist, Haber had been strongly patriotic during the First World War. Haber's research institute had then geared itself completely to the war effort and had been instrumental in developing both war gases and the Haber process for fixing atmospheric nitrogen, which was, and still is, vital in the manufacture of explosives and synthetic fertilisers. Haber was Jewish but, because of his war service, he himself was exempted from the new law. However, he lost so many of his staff that he resigned in protest on 30th April, 1933. This is how he ended his letter of resignation:

In a scientific capacity, my tradition requires me to take into account only the professional and personal qualifications of applicants when I choose my collaborators – without concerning myself with their racial condition. You will not expect a man in his sixty-fifth year to change a manner of thinking which has guided him for the past thirty-nine years of his life in higher education, and you will understand that the pride with which he has served his German homeland his whole life long now dictates this request for retirement.

Max Planck, President of the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft, tried to intervene with Hitler on Haber's behalf, but Hitler flew into a rage and was reported to have said:

Our national policies will not be revoked or modified, even for scientists. If the dismissal of Jewish scientists means the annihilation of contemporary German science, then we shall do without science for a few years.

The effects of this purge of Jewish scientists and academics were enormous. No fewer than 20 present or future winners of the Nobel Prize left their positions in German universities or research institutes in the 1930s as a direct result of the new law. Many of these men went abroad, mainly to Britain and the United States. Most

were Jewish, some had Jewish wives and a few went because of the treatment of their colleagues or because of the National Socialist attitude to science and scientific objectivity. Hitler himself regarded scientific objectivity as merely a slogan invented by professors to protect their interests. This attitude had been symbolised, early in Hitler's rule, on 10th May, 1933, in a public burning of books which manifested the 'un-German spirit'. Many of Einstein's books were included.

Moreover, it was not only well-known academics who were purged. Nearly 2000 university professors, lecturers and other scholars lost their jobs between 1933 and 1935 – that is nearly 20% of the staff of German institutions of higher education. Many dismissals took place in the Faculties of the Social Sciences, the Humanities, Law and Theology. Consequently, there was hardly a department or subject which was not affected. And even in places where there were no dismissals, the work of the academics was disrupted. For what was being attempted by the National Socialists was much more than the dismissal of Jews. They were attempting to create a totalitarian state in which everything, including the content of education, was controlled from the centre.

The ideology of National Socialism had one of its roots in Mussolini's Italy. Mussolini was originally a Marxist revolutionary, but when he came to power in Italy in 1922 he had reshaped his ideology which he now called Fascism. This is how he described it in the *Encyclopaedia Italiana* of 1936:

... the idea of Fascism is for the state, and for the individual in so far as he coincides with the state. ... It is against classical Liberalism ... which has reached the end of its historical function. ... Liberalism negates the state in the interest of the single individual, Fascism affirms the state as the true reality of the individual ... for the Fascist, everything is in the state, and outside of the state nothing legal or spiritual can exist, or still less be of value. In this sense Fascism is totalitarian. ...

What the German National Socialist Party added to the ideology was enormous thoroughness in putting into practice its main principle of organisation – the 'cell system'. The party established 'cells' of trusted followers in every building, in the workers' organisations in every factory and in every branch of business, the arts, the sciences and the professions. After Hitler came to power, this system was greatly extended and very soon there was no office, no workshop, no profession, no artistic or literary occupation, no sport or leisure activity that did not require membership in some organisation set up for the sole purpose of keeping its members under the immediate influence of the National Socialist movement.

Joseph Goebbels' powerful Ministry of Propaganda was a vital part of the strategy. He saw it as:

... a Ministry for popular education, in which Cinema, Radio, new educational institutions, Art, Culture and Propaganda would be brought together

under one administration . . . to serve the purpose of building the intellectual-spiritual foundation of our power and of capturing not only the apparatus of the state but the people as a whole.

Particular attention was given to education. The loyalty of the teachers was exclusively demanded for National Socialism, and the curriculum in both schools and universities was to be permeated by its ideology. The result was to create a society in which there were virtually no checks and balances of the sort which are taken for granted in liberal societies. And it was the absence of any check on centralised power that made possible the transition from the anti-Jewish law of 1933 to the extermination camps of the early 1940s. Put beside this appalling crime, the effect of National Socialism on science may seem of little moment. Yet it was important because Hitler was eventually removed from power after a war in which science played a major part.

The Second World War started in 1939 with Hitler in alliance with the Soviet Union and at war with Britain and France. It ended six years later in 1945 when, as well as Britain, Germany was at war with both the Soviet Union and the United States. Many factors were important in the defeat of Hitler, but one which did play a major role was the application of science and technology. Radar, operational research, jet engines for aircraft, vastly-improved radio communications and nuclear weapons were only some of the scientific and technological developments which followed from the large-scale mobilisation of science and scientists during the Second World War. It is arguable that the damage Hitler had done to Germany's scientific community was one very important factor in his ultimate defeat. Certainly many of the scientists who had fled from Germany during the 1930s were prominent in the massive war effort of Britain and America.

It is interesting to compare the destiny of science in Nazi Germany with its fate in the other major totalitarian state of the twentieth century – the Soviet Union. The Communist Revolution of 1917 marked a turning point in the development of science in Russia. The new government regarded itself as being based on the principles of scientific socialism, and it expected the natural sciences to play a key role in the new society which it intended to create. Many scientists were initially hostile to the Revolution, but the new government made more resources available for science than ever before and established many new research institutes which were directly supported by the government in a way which was unique in the world at that time.

During the Civil War which followed soon after the Revolution, the government instituted a period of War Communism which, amongst other things, abolished all private enterprise, instituted the security police, the Cheka – the direct predecessor of the KGB – with powers of summary arrest and execution, and abolished freedom of speech and information. But even during this period science was given high priority. Then in 1921 Lenin introduced his New Economic Policy which permitted a

limited amount of economic freedom to complement the primarily socialist system, and this step, together with the continuing strong state support for science and technology, created a very favourable climate for the growth of Soviet science. Zhores Medvedev calls the years from 1922-1929 the Golden Years of Soviet Science. In this period in most of the natural sciences – from mathematics to biology – many new institutes and academies were established, contacts with foreign scientists were expanded and much original work was begun. The scientific community was left relatively free to govern its own affairs – provided that it gave a vague general assent to Marxism or at least refrained from direct criticism of the government. However, this was not true in the humanities and the social sciences. Here there was much more direct ideological control, both of individuals and of the content of what was written and taught.

The interaction between ideology and science in the Soviet Union can be illustrated by describing the development there of genetics – one of the major growth points in science in the twentieth century, culminating in the discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 (perhaps the major scientific discovery of the century).

In the 1920s modern genetics was just beginning following the work of Morgan at Columbia University, New York, on the fruit fly, *drosophila*. In 1922 H.J. Muller (1890-1968), who had worked on *drosophila* at Columbia with Morgan, visited the Soviet Union and took some pure-bred *drosophila* stocks with him. Muller's visit stimulated great interest in Mendelian genetics, and a group of Russian scientists, led by S.S. Chetverikov (1880-1959), were inspired to work on the application of Mendelian genetics to the evolution of *natural populations*. Over the period from 1922 to 1929, Chetverikov's group developed simple mathematical and experimental models of inheritance whose validity they tested with both laboratory and field experiments. Chetverikov's group was the first to establish the scale of recessive variation in natural populations and to work with the concept of the gene pool of an entire population. These were key factors in the development of population genetics, which are still of vital importance today.

In the 1920s the Soviet Union was also a world leader in another field of genetics – the collection of a wide variety of naturally occurring and cultivated plants to act as a general genetic pool for selection and hybridisation. This work was carried out under N.I. Vavilov (1887-1943) in the Laboratory of Applied Botany which was set up in 1919 in Petrograd (as it then was). In the mid-1920s Vavilov organised more than 200 expeditions to 65 countries which collected over 150,000 plant varieties, forms and species and brought them to the Soviet Union with the specific aim of improving agriculture, increasing crop yields and of developing new disease-resistant strains. Thus, by the end of the 1920s, the Soviet Union was well established as a world centre for both fundamental and applied research in genetics.

All this changed dramatically in 1929 when Stalin

came to power. The Communist Party began to interfere drastically in scientific matters. At the first all-Union Conference of Agrarian Marxists, held in December 1929, Stalin effectively asserted that conformity with the rural policy of the Communist Party would henceforth be the criterion of truth and that the research workers' findings would have to demonstrate that what the politicians said was true. The results of this shift in policy soon became evident. In the practical field Stalin's policy of collectivisation was rigidly enforced over the period 1929–1932. Millions of peasants had their land forcibly incorporated into collective farms. There was widespread resistance, and agricultural output was greatly reduced. Yet even so grain continued to be requisitioned and much even continued to be exported. The result was famine—perhaps the only case in history, up till then, of a purely man-made famine. Robert Conquest estimates that there were over five million deaths from hunger and from the diseases of hunger. Stalin later told Churchill that 10 million kulaks had to be dealt with, and that 'the great bulk' were 'wiped out'. Over three million ended up in the newly expanding labour-camp system.

In science, too, drastic changes took place. T.D. Lysenko (1898–1976) and his followers rapidly acquired positions of power and influence in Soviet agricultural and biological science. Their largely incorrect ideas on the inheritance of acquired characteristics seemed to promise much more rapid practical results than the more cautious genetic approach of scientists like Vavilov. There was no reliable evidence to support Lysenko, and his rise to power and influence can be attributed to three things:

1. his proletarian origins, which enhanced his credentials as a pioneer of socialist science, as opposed to the middle-class origins of Vavilov, leading to what was claimed to be an essentially bourgeois science;
2. the claim that the idea of the gene was an 'idealist concept' incompatible with the Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism – hence genetics could not possibly be correct;
3. Lysenko's backing by the Communist Party and Stalin – a corollary of his willingness to accept party policy as the criterion of truth.

The harassment of genetics and geneticists escalated during the 1930s in the wake of the Great Terror. Chetverikov was exiled to Siberia in 1931, and for the rest of his life – he died in 1959 – he was never able to do any significant work in genetics. Vavilov continued to argue against Lysenko and his ideas, but it was a losing battle. In 1940, Vavilov was arrested while on a scientific expedition. Later he was convicted of spurious offences and died in prison in 1943.

The height of Lysenko's power came in 1948 when another personal intervention by Stalin at a scientific conference led to the dismissal, or worse in many cases, of all who taught genetics or who opposed Lysenko. Decrees were issued banning the teaching of genetics in any school or university, withdrawing books on genetics from libraries, and deleting all mention of Vavilov or other geneticists from more general books. It was even

decreed that all stocks of *drosophila* were to be destroyed. Lysenko and his supporters brought off what was in effect a political coup.

After Stalin's death in 1953, Lysenko began to lose some of his influence but, when Khrushchev's agricultural policies began to fail, he too, like Stalin before him, turned to Lysenko with his promise of quick results. So in the late 1950s Lysenko's power and influence again increased. However, the weight of scientific opinion was beginning to make itself felt, and this increased after a disastrous nuclear accident in 1958 which affected tens of thousands of people and in which the lack of any kind of widespread genetic knowledge greatly increased the suffering and loss of life.

In the 1960s the campaign for the recognition of genetics grew, with the biologist, Zhores Medvedev, playing a leading part. But it was not until 1966, two years after Khrushchev's fall from power, that Lysenko was removed from his principal positions, and many of his followers nevertheless remained in post. Even today the story cannot be told in the Soviet Union, and Medvedev was confined to a mental hospital soon after his book *The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko* was published in the West in 1970.

Thus the ideological perversion of science went on for more than 40 years, during which time the science of genetics in the West made enormous strides, not least in the development of new genetic hybrid cereal strains with greatly increased crop yields. These improvements were not available in the USSR because the essential genetic technique of polyploidy was 'not a socialist concept'. Instead, an ideologically predetermined straight-jacket was imposed on the development of natural science with the virtual exclusion of key developments in the West such as the elucidation of the structures of DNA and haemoglobin and the subsequent emergence of genetic engineering and modern biotechnology. That such appalling distortions should have been possible, even in natural science, for more than 40 years raises several significant questions. What ideological distortion can be perpetuated in other, more vulnerable, areas of knowledge? And how long would it have taken to overthrow Lysenkoism in the USSR if 'bourgeois' science had not existed in the West as a basis for correction? Would it *ever* have been overthrown?

Further light can be cast on the development of science in the Soviet Union by considering the career of Andrei Sakharov. Sakharov was born in Moscow in 1921, after the Revolution, unlike Chetverikov and Vavilov, who were born and educated in Tsarist Russia. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1942 and obtained the equivalent of a PhD in 1948. He worked in the Soviet nuclear weapons programme for 18 years from 1950 to 1968. He is widely regarded as the man who made the major contribution to the development of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. He has also published significant work on the possibility of controlled fusion reactors. Sakharov was elected a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1953 at the age of 32, the youngest man ever to be elected. For his secret research work he received –

also in secret – the Stalin Prize and three Orders of Socialist Labour. And he became one of the privileged elite of the Soviet Union receiving – along with top Communist Party members, and other key individuals – special housing, chauffeurs, access to Western consumer goods and a very high salary.

In the late 1950s Sakharov began to protest, in private, about Soviet nuclear tests, and he also, in the early 1960s, took part in the campaign against Lysenko. He also started to mix more freely with other Soviet intellectuals, such as Solzhenitsyn, Zhores Medvedev and his twin brother, the historian Roy Medvedev. In 1968 Sakharov circulated a manifesto called *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom* which was in due course widely translated and published in nearly every country in the world – except the Soviet Union and other Communist states. This led to his security clearance being withdrawn and he was dismissed from his job in the nuclear weapons programme.

Since 1968 Sakharov has taken a prominent part in the Soviet dissident movement and has issued many public statements defending those who were imprisoned for ‘crimes’ such as exercising the right to free speech. He helped to get Zhores Medvedev released when he was illegally confined in a psychiatric hospital. As a result his position has become more and more uncertain, many of his family have lost their jobs and attempts have even been made to expel him from the Academy of Sciences. He has often been attacked in the Soviet press, and early in 1980 was banished from Moscow to the provincial town of Gorky.

Sakharov quite clearly is a man who speaks with exceptional authority on both Soviet society and on scientific matters. So let us end this brief vignette of his life by quoting his views on science in the Soviet Union:

The consequences of the Party-State monopoly are especially destructive in the sphere of culture and ideology. The complete unification of ideology at all times and places – from the school desk to the professorial chair – demands that people become hypocrites, timeservers, mediocre and stupidly self-deceiving. The tragi-comic, ritualistic farce of the loyalty oath is played over and over, relegating to the background all considerations of practicality, common sense and human dignity.

Writers, artists, actors, teachers and scholars are under such monstrous ideological pressure that one wonders why art and the humanities have not altogether vanished in our country. The influence of those same anti-intellectual factors on the exact sciences and the applied sciences is more indirect but no less destructive. A comparison of scientific, technological and economic achievements in the USSR and abroad makes this perfectly plain. It is no accident that for many years in our country new and promising scientific trends in biology and cybernetics could not develop normally, while on the surface out-and-out demagoguery, ignorance and charlatanism bloomed like gorgeous flowers. It is no accident that all the great scientific and technological

discoveries of recent times – quantum-mechanics, new elementary particles, uranium fission, antibiotics and most of the new, highly effective drugs, transistors, electronic computers, the development of highly productive strains in agriculture, the discovery of other components of the ‘Green Revolution’ and the creation of new technologies in agriculture, industry and construction – all of them happened outside our country.

The significant achievements in the first decade of the space age, which were due to the personal qualities of the late academician, S.P. Korolev, and to certain fortuitous features of our programs for building military rockets, which made possible their direct use in space, constitute an exception which does not disprove the rule. And certain successes in military technology are the result of an enormous concentration of resources in that sphere.

In both National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union we have seen the kind of interference in the very *content* of science and in the key decisions about *who* is to do scientific work which have not been seen in Europe since the time of Galileo and his trial by the Catholic Church in the seventeenth century. This, as the Marxists say, is no accident. It flows from the very principles on which these totalitarian philosophies are based. These principles – and, in particular, the restriction on the free flow of information and publication and the attempt to control *all* aspects of life – are the very opposite of the principles of open public criticism on which the scientific community operates.

But there is one important difference between National Socialist Germany and the Marxist rulers of the Soviet Union. Hitler did realise that what he was doing was completely opposed to the spirit of science and the scientific community. Marxist societies, on the other hand, do not share his contempt for science. Their claim has always been that they are organising their societies according to the principles of scientific socialism. This claim is based on a total misunderstanding of the nature of science and is a clear example of scientism – the attempt to apply what are thought to be scientific principles in areas where they are not applicable and to justify this by appealing to the prestige of science.

It is the open liberal societies of the world which – by trial and error and by the processes of public criticism and attempts at piecemeal improvement – have established most current technologies and defined the acceptable limits within which they operate. And it is these societies which played a major part in toppling Hitler and developed the scientific knowledge needed to counteract the charlatanism of Lysenko and his followers. But, of course, it is much more difficult to counter such perversion in other vital areas of human activity – in the social sciences, history, literature and economics. How this can be done is one of the major questions of the last decades of this century. What has happened in science, indicates not only the scale of that task but, by revealing something of the true nature of totalitarianism, gives some clues as to how it might be accomplished.

The War Against Soviet Colonialism

Jonas Savimbi

The age of European imperialism ended in 1975, when a military coup in Portugal led to independence for Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Portugal had been the last European power to maintain sizeable colonies overseas. Now that it was relinquishing its empire, the struggles for national liberation that swept Africa and Asia during the 1950s and 1960s finally appeared to be over. The former British, French, Dutch, Belgian, Italian, and Portuguese colonies could now develop themselves free of imperial exploitation. The peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America could live at peace, for the anti-colonial guerrilla wars had at long last been won.

But this dream of peace and national self-determination could not yet be achieved. In country after country, struggles for national liberation were betrayed and hijacked, and new nations found themselves once again the victims of colonialism. This time they were assaulted by a new imperial power: the Soviet Union, acting directly or through its first overseas colony, Cuba. And so the nationalist struggles had to begin anew. Peoples tired of years of war and sacrifice were once again turned into soldiers; their nations became battlefields once more.

For eight years, the independence movement that I founded and lead, UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), fought against Portuguese colonial rule. We expected to win the free elections that had been promised by the Portuguese in 1975, for we had strength in all Angola's tribes as well as overwhelming support among the Ovimbundu tribe, which accounts for 40% of the nation's population. By contrast, the other non-Communist independence group, the F.N.L.A. (Angolan National Liberation Front), was supported exclusively by the Bakongo people of northern Angola. And the Moscow-controlled M.P.L.A. (Popular Liberation Movement of Angola) was supported only by urban leftists and portions of the Mbundu people living near the capital city of Luanda.

But suddenly in 1975, Luanda was seized by the Soviet-controlled M.P.L.A. and hundreds and then thousands of Cuban troops. Elections were called off, and Angola was recolonised. Today our land is occupied by 45,000 Cuban troops and colonial bureaucrats (at least 17,000 of whom have taken Angolan citizenship), as well as by thousands of East Germans, Poles, Czechs, and North Koreans. The Soviets have sent \$2.5 billion in arms to maintain their imperialist rule.

And so for 10 years more, UNITA has had to continue its guerrilla war—this time against the Cubans and Soviets who have replaced the Portuguese as the foreign rulers

and exploiters of our people and land. Today the peoples of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and Mozambique are also waging wars of liberation against foreign troops and foreign secret police and the imposition of a foreign ideology on their nation. They are resisting tyrannical regimes that are kept in power only by the imperialist military force of the Soviet bloc.

This is a historic reversal of roles. For many decades, Communism was identified with nationalism in the Third World, and many Communist parties came to power playing on the nationalist sentiments of the people. But the experience of countries ranging from Afghanistan to Laos to Angola to Nicaragua shows clearly that Marxist-Leninist regimes have no respect for the traditions of a people or for the tribal customs and languages that strengthen a sense of community and of continuity with the past. True nationalists around the world are therefore rejecting the Marxist-Leninist path and taking up arms against regimes that impose this failed ideology.

The spread of anti-Communist revolutions is a historic reversal in yet another sense. Until recently, the language of revolution was written entirely by Communists. From Mao to Che Guevara to General Giap, the greatest theoreticians, practitioners, martyrs, and heroes of revolution were Communists. They wrote the texts and histories; they produced the weapons of guerrilla war. It was to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba that would-be guerrillas turned for money, arms, training, and political support.

I know, because I received my revolutionary education in China. In 1965, as I was preparing to found UNITA, I met Hua Hua, the Chinese ambassador to Nasser's Egypt. He invited me to Peking, where I met Mao Tse-tung and the other military and political leaders of the Chinese revolution. They advised me to return with 12 recruits, and late in 1965 we began a nine-month course in guerrilla warfare.

From Mao and the Communists, I learned how to fight and win a guerrilla war. I also learned how not to run an economy or a nation. Collectivist agriculture does not work. Peasants must be able to own their own land, their own houses, and their own cattle. People must be free to practice their religions, and observe their tribal traditions.

Today we who fight for these freedoms are using the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare developed by the Communists. But we are using Communist military and propaganda principles in order to defeat the Soviets and their political ideology. UNITA is now in the third phase

of Mao Tse-tung's classic description of a successful guerilla war: we are waging widespread guerilla conflict throughout our country. Our forces control one-third of the territory of Angola, and protect under our political influence some 60% of the 7 million Angolan people. Soon we shall liberate all Angola and bring peace, freedom, and true independence to all the Angolan people. We are achieving victory by following the five central principles of guerilla warfare.

The first principle comes from Mao: a guerilla must be one with the people. It is more important to win the support of the people in the countryside than to take and hold cities. In Angola, as in China, the great mass of the people are peasants living in small villages. Our first goal had to be to win their allegiance and confidence. Without the support of the people, our roads would be mined with informers. With it, we have an intelligence network alerting us to enemy troop movements out of the cities, and we do not need to carry all our food and supplies with us – critical to a guerilla movement that has to travel thousands of kilometres by foot and possesses neither trucks nor access to rail travel.

When the people come to trust and support a guerilla movement, they willingly share what they can. The guerilla must therefore have strict discipline. To take food from villagers, to steal their land, to mistreat the people is to poison the waters in which the guerilla army must swim. It is treason to the movement and is punished as such.

To gain the trust and support of the people, it is also important to establish schools and hospitals throughout liberated territory – if possible, even in areas where guerrillas operate but do not control. Today UNITA administers 6,951 primary schools with 7,127 teachers and 224,811 students. We run nine secondary schools with 80 teachers and 1,860 students. Though the main hospital in Jamba, our provisional capital, has only three doctors, the French medical group *Medecins sans Frontières* has sent doctors and nurses to Angola to train our people and help administer inoculation programs. Every battalion has men assigned to treat and evacuate our wounded.

The second key to the success of a revolutionary movement is a clear political program. Soldiers cannot fight and the civilian population cannot endure the hardships of war unless the political program meets their daily concerns and is understood. We have political officers in every guerilla unit and every village. The political program of UNITA is simple and clear. We fight for an independent Angola, free of all foreign troops. We believe that peasants, not the state, should own farm land. We favor democratic elections, freedom of religion, and respect for tribal customs and languages. We broadcast daily from a mobile radio station in Portuguese and local languages so that all Angolans know why we fight and what our goals are. The United States lost its war in Vietnam when the American people no longer understood why their sons were dying. No revolution or war can succeed unless the soldiers and their families know why they are fighting.

Unity is a third vital point in the success of any guerilla movement. Guerrillas can only win if their military and political and propaganda efforts are all working in the same direction. Fidel Castro makes unity of command a precondition for Cuban support of guerilla movements. We saw this in his insistence on a popular front in the struggle against Somoza in Nicaragua. Castro also insisted on unity among the guerrillas in El Salvador, withholding arms and even engineering a 'suicide' or two to force the guerrillas to come together under a common command. Some anti-Communist freedom fighters have unfortunately hurt their effectiveness by a lack of coordination between guerilla forces.

Fourth, it is essential that the guerilla base of operations be within the territory of your own nation. This is to ensure self-reliance, as well as closeness to your own people. Another Angolan guerilla group, the F.N.L.A., was based in Zaire, and lost its base of operations when Zaire established relations with the M.P.L.A. UNITA had bases briefly in Zambia, but we were expelled after we sabotaged the Benguela railroad through occupied Angola, over which Zambian copper is exported. Never again will we rely on bases on foreign soil.

The Afghan freedom fighters are constantly threatened with losing their bases in Pakistan should Soviet pressure on President Zia increase. The Nicaraguan resistance will face similar problems, should Costa Rica or Honduras be pressured sufficiently by the Sandinistas or the Cubans or the Soviets. By contrast, a base within Angola – we now control a third of the land – allows our guerrillas a safe haven to rest. It gives us a place to train new recruits and it provides safety for the families of our fighters. UNITA was able to survive and grow, even during years without international support, because we were self-reliant. We could grow our own food, repair weapons we captured, and strengthen our ties with the people.

The fifth challenge is to establish international political ties – to find allies who will give military, political, and propaganda support. Too often the West thinks only in terms of military support. But political support and international propaganda are just as important, as I learned from General Giap of North Vietnam when I met him in China. He said that the world must know why a guerilla movement is fighting. A revolutionary movement's supporters around the world must know its successes.

The world must not be fooled into thinking that the M.P.L.A. truly represents the Angolan people or that it has control of the nation. That is why UNITA has representatives in Washington, London, Paris, Munich, Geneva, Portugal, Morocco, and Senegal. It is why we regularly invite members of the international press to come to our capital to see our successes, and to interview our prisoners so they may know about the demoralisation of the Cubans and the M.P.L.A. Some reporters have travelled with our guerilla forces and can report to the world the truth of our claims to travel freely throughout Angola, enjoying popular support and winning victories against the supposedly invincible Cuban

forces.

At first it was difficult to get the world's attention. Anti-Soviet resistance movements were supposed to be doomed. The West had not yet learned that truly nationalistic movements can use the guerrilla tactics of Mao and Fidel Castro successfully against the Soviets. Some of our first propaganda victories came when we captured Western technicians who worked in the diamond mines on behalf of the Cubans and the M.P.L.A. Finally the West was forced to realize that UNITA was not limited, as is so often said, to the southeast corner of Angola. Governments that refused to recognise us had to come and negotiate for the release of their nationals. And prisoners who were treated well and safely transported thousands of kilometres to our base camps could report to the world that we were not bandits and that we moved freely through most of Angola. Now it is unnecessary to prove these points and we do not take Westerners when we overrun mines and power stations. But we try to warn Westerners that the Cubans and M.P.L.A. cannot guarantee their safety, and we ask them to stay out of all Angola, for it is a war zone.

The goals of UNITA are clear and open for the world to see. We will drive the Cubans and Soviets and Eastern-bloc personnel from Angola. We will work with all patriotic Angolans to establish an independent, democratic, and free Angola. We reject foreign ideologies that presuppose masses of industrial workers and men without souls.

Our strategy is to raise the costs of the foreign occupation of Angola until the Cubans and Soviets can no longer bear the burden. A combination of rising military, financial, and political costs will finally drive the imperialist forces from our shores. The French gave independence to Haiti, the first black republic, when Napoleon could no longer afford the financial costs of keeping the country enslaved. He had other uses for those resources. The United States won its revolution when the cost in lives and material led to divisions among the British about whether to continue the war. Similarly, America left Vietnam as the result of rising political costs at home. America was never defeated on the battlefield in Vietnam; in fact, the North Vietnamese strategist, General Giap, told me he never expected to defeat the Americans in battle. The guerrilla does not have to win decisively to drive out the foreign occupiers of his land. He simply has to raise the price of colonialism.

A central element of this strategy is to deny the colonial forces the revenues that finance their occupation. Today the Soviets and Cubans exploit Angola with a rapacity unrivalled by the Portuguese. Soviet fishing fleets have swept our coastlines, and fish has disappeared from the Angolan diet. Our diamonds, minerals, and oil from the Cabinda province are taken in 'payment' for arms and for support of the Cuban troops. The M.P.L.A. government pays Castro \$1,000 per month for each Cuban soldier in Angola, for a total of \$480 million per year. These mercenaries can afford to stay in our nation only as long as they are paid. So UNITA attacks the diamond mines, sabotages the bridges, and destroys the industries

that support the Cuban occupation. This policy does not harm our brothers in occupied Angola, for the wealth produced there does not go to them. It is taken by the Cubans and Soviets to pay for their repression here and to finance Cuban expeditions in other nations.

When enough Cuban officers are returned to Cuba in coffins, then Castro must face the wrath of his own people. Already we learn from Cuban prisoners of war that the war in Angola is unpopular in Cuba. The United States can help our cause by bringing the truth to the Cuban people on Radio Marti and Voice of America, and thus weakening Castro's already endangered rule.

Our military strategy is designed to inflict casualties on Castro's troops and not, when possible, on the M.P.L.A. Some true Angolan nationalists have been forced by the Cubans to fight with the M.P.L.A. Not all German officers in World War II were crazed Nazis; so too in the M.P.L.A. there are Rommels and Von Stauffenbergs, nationalists who oppose the Cuban occupation. These kidnapped warriors are our brothers, and our goal is to treat them well when we capture them. Many M.P.L.A. prisoners now fight with UNITA. Every UNITA victory strengthens the hand of the nationalists with the M.P.L.A., and hastens the day when they will join with us in driving out the Cubans and Soviets.

UNITA's guerrilla war against the Portuguese colonialists was much easier than our struggle against the Soviets and Cubans. The Portuguese were perhaps better infantrymen than the Cubans, but by comparison with Angola's new colonialists, they suffered in both the quality and quantity of arms. The Portuguese used little armour and had no more than five helicopters, whereas the Cubans and Soviets will send 15 helicopters to a single battle. The Soviet Union may not be able to feed its people or build advanced computers, but it knows how to build weapons (in fact, UNITA fighters rely on the AK-47 Kalashnikov, a low-cost automatic rifle that withstands dust and water better than anything the United States offers at comparable prices). The Soviets also deliver arms in large quantities; in Angola during the last 18 months, they have unloaded \$2 billion worth of MIG 23 and MIG 21 jets, MI-24 helicopter gunships (the weapon used so effectively against the Afghan people), and T-62 and T-55 tanks, as well as trucks and armoured personnel carriers.

Relative to the Soviets and Cubans, the Portuguese were as weak politically as they were militarily. They put almost no emphasis on the political side of waging war, and they had no international support. By contrast, the M.P.L.A. was winning endorsements and awards from Soviet-front groups long before it was a factor in the war against Portugal. Communist guerrillas and occupation forces benefit from an established worldwide propaganda network. And when the Cubans and Soviets seized power in Angola, sympathetic propaganda outlets immediately sprang into action in the Organisation for African Unity, the United Nations, and front organisations around the world.

A third strength of the Communists in combating nationalist resistance movements is their ability to black

out news coverage with surprisingly little complaint from the West. Little television footage gets out of Cambodia or Afghanistan. And although UNITA works hard to bring Western journalists to Free Angola, the Cubans do not permit newspaper or television coverage of their atrocities in areas they control.

In countering these important advantages of Soviet and Cuban colonialists, the anti-Communist freedom fighter has some distinctive advantages of his own. The first is the religious faith and institutions of his country's people.

Marxism-Leninism is atheistic and materialistic. By definition it attempts to crush religious belief, and Communist governments demand a monopoly on the people's loyalty. But in deeply religious countries such as Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola, the suppression of religion has backfired and intensified the opposition to colonial regimes. The Constitution of the M.P.L.A. forbids membership to anyone holding 'any religious belief'; this is one reason why it is such a small political party, consisting of only 0.3% of the Angolan people. The majority of Angolans are animists, 27% are Catholics, and 12% are Protestants; all have suffered from persecution. Church property has been expropriated by the Cubans, atheism is constantly preached in hospitals, schools, and political meetings. The Cubans and Soviets taunt animists by flying to the sky with their helicopters and jets, and then telling the local population that they looked and found no God in the heavens. All this has resulted in strong opposition to the regime of occupied Angola. In August 1985, the Catholic Church of Angola endorsed UNITA's call for an end to the war and for a negotiated settlement.

The second weakness of the communists is economic. The Soviets may provide enormous quantities of arms but they refuse economic aid. And while it is UNITA's goal to damage the export economy that finances the Cuban war against our people, the Soviets and Cubans are doing much of our work for us by nationalising all industry and collectivising agriculture. Around the world, Communist governments lower the standard of living, destroy chances to work, and impoverish the people in a way that guerrilla wars never do.

Once a food exporter, Angola now must import some 90% of its food. Diamond and gold mines that once made Angola a wealthy Portuguese colony are now actually losing money. Only the Communists could turn gold mining into a losing proposition. The economy is sustained, and the Cuban occupation is financed, only by the offshore oil produced by Gulf Oil, owned by Chevron, an American multinational corporation. Lenin said the capitalists would sell the rope with which to hang themselves. Today they are hanging the Angolan people. But tomorrow they come for you.

Between 1976 and the summer of 1985, UNITA was able to maintain its base securely, in spite of 10 major offensives launched against its territory by Cuban and M.P.L.A. troops. Usually we stopped these offensives within little more than a month – by going behind the lines and cutting off supplies of food, fuel, and ammunition

to the advancing enemy.

The offensive of 1985, lasting from June until October, saw a change in tactics, weapons, and intensity. Prior to the offensive, the Soviet Union greatly increased both the quantity and the sophistication of weapons it was sending to Angola. And this time, the offensive was directly coordinated by Soviet officers, 15 to a brigade.

The first prong of the offensive was aimed at Cazombo, a town near the Angola-Zambia border. It appeared at first that the goal was political: to cut off UNITA's border with Zaire and Zambia, to increase the pressure on these two nations and prevent them from aiding UNITA. UNITA moved men and resources up to meet this advance and to defend Cazombo as we had successfully defended it before.

But the Soviet-Cuban strategy was a radical departure from past offensives. The Soviet, Cuban, and M.P.L.A. troops brought a much larger number of trucks and armoured cars with them, and so they were able to carry much larger supplies of food, fuel, and ammunition. They were able to move faster and farther without leaving vulnerable supply lines in their wake.

For the first time, UNITA was forced to fight a conventional war, denied the ability to follow the guerrilla strategy of intercepting and cutting off supply lines. The occupation forces surrounded their 'soft trucks' with armoured trucks, so that we could not destroy their supplies, and then moved forward with armour in flanking moves attempting to surround our defensive positions.

Under Soviet commanders, MIG 21s and 23s and MI-24 helicopter gunships would arrive within 15 minutes of each engagement to provide air cover. Artillery shelling was also better coordinated and more accurate. It was a completely different war than we had fought in the offensives of 1982 through 1984. The Soviet troops always remained in armoured cars and tanks, and their commanders stood behind three lines of M.P.L.A. and Cuban troops.

Throughout the offensive, the Soviets proved experts at using speed, manoeuvrability, and deception. On August 15th, while the greater part of our commanders, resources, and troops were in Cazombo, 750 kilometres from Jamba, the Soviets unleashed what turned out to be the real thrust of their offensive – an assault on Mavinga, a town captured by UNITA in 1982 and located only 200 kilometres northwest of our capital. This was to be the final offensive of the war, with Jamba as its goal. For should the airport at Mavinga have been captured, the Soviets would have had a strong base from which to attack our capital.

The Soviets drove toward Mavinga with four M.P.L.A. brigades, each 1,300 men strong and fully equipped with armoured personnel carriers, tanks, artillery, and air cover. Defending Mavinga, UNITA had only one regular battalion of 1,100 men and two semi-regular battalions of 600 men each. Fighting to slow the Soviet offensive, we had to call our troops back from Cazombo, and we threw up deep defensive lines and dug in in front of the Soviet advance.

Forced to bring in units from throughout southern Angola, we surrounded that Soviet-Cuban-M.P.L.A. offensive. We outnumbered their four battalions by four to one, and with mortar and infantry fire we destroyed many of their trucks, tanks, and armoured cars. We halted the advance 17 kilometres northwest of Mavinga.

By October 3rd, the Soviet officers were airlifted out by helicopter. If we had had enough anti-aircraft missiles, we could have destroyed the entire Soviet high command. But they escaped by air, and the M.P.L.A. retreated, after leaving behind many tanks, Stalin Organ rocket launchers, and armoured personnel carriers.

The offensive of 1985 was to have been the Soviets' final drive against UNITA. They will not give up after their defeat. It is now the rainy season in Angola, but the Soviets will come again next March or April (1986) when the ground hardens and the skies clear for their MIGs and helicopters. The next offensive, like this one, will rely on heavy armour, tanks, concentrated artillery, and air-power. We look to the West for the anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons that will allow us to stop the next attack, to continue to build our base among the people of Angola and move northward, to drive the Cubans and Soviets from Angola, and to win the true independence that was stolen from us 11 years ago.

The Soviets and Cubans and their friends around the world can be expected to continue their political and propaganda war against UNITA. Our success in defeating the offensive of 1985 will force them to redirect some of their propaganda. No longer can they claim that UNITA is weak, that we do not represent the popular will of the Angolan people. Too many journalists have travelled with our guerrillas and can testify to our support in the countryside. We have engaged the Cubans in virtually every province, and our support comes from every region and tribe in Angola.

A new tactic is to claim that UNITA is tied to the South African government. The Cuban troops, say the Communist propagandists, are in Angola to protect Angola from the South Africans. This claim may fool some in the West, but the nations of black Africa know the truth. They know that Nigeria offered to replace the Cuban and Soviet bloc troops with Nigerian troops. But the M.P.L.A. leadership refused, showing the whole world that their real fear is not the South Africans but UNITA, the Angolan people, and the nationalists within the M.P.L.A.

Yes, UNITA receives aid from the Republic of South Africa. We have also received support from China, Arab nations, and other black African countries, and much of that support has been shipped across the Namibian border. But it is hypocritical of the Soviets to claim that this means we somehow endorse the Pretoria government. We oppose apartheid. Fortunately, it is a dead ideology. It cannot be exported. Even everyone in South Africa talks about how to move away from the apartheid system.

The Lord did not ask our permission when he put Angola on the southwest coast of Africa. We need outside help, even if it has to come across the Namibian border. I

would remind the Communists that Stalin's acceptance of war material from America and Britain during World War II did not constitute an endorsement of liberal democracy on Stalin's part. Nor did my acceptance of Chinese military training and aid – when no other nation would help me – make me a Maoist in economics or politics.

Angola was the first nation to begin its guerrilla war against Soviet colonialism. But we are not alone. Today the brave peoples of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Nicaragua, and Ethiopia are fighting their own wars of national liberation. We fought and carried on while the West went through a crisis of faith, wondering if its traditions, values, and civilisation were worth fighting and dying for. I think that the Third World, through these struggles, has helped to give the West the courage to oppose the Soviet Union – to provide a cure for what Solzhenitsyn calls the Western disease. Our struggle in Angola, the battle of other freedom fighters, is the battle for the West and its values.

We who fight these wars of national liberation see the unity of our cause and the common enemy we face – Soviet imperialism. As a result, representatives of the freedom fighters of Angola, Laos, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua met in Jamba on June 12th, 1985 to sign the Jamba Accord and announce the formation of the Democratic International. We who fight the battle for Western values of democracy, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to own one's home and some land, have joined together. Now we ask the West to join us.

We in UNITA call upon the West, and the United States as the leader of the free world, to give us military and political support. The moral case is clear. UNITA is fighting for a free, independent, and democratic Angola. We are fighting the Cubans and Soviets who would deny us our nation.

The strategic case, the self-interest of the West and America, is equally compelling. Should massive Soviet air and armour attacks succeed in defeating UNITA when the dry season begins in March 1986, then 45,000 Cuban troops and advisers, thousands of Eastern-bloc 'technicians', and an untold quantity of tanks, fighter planes, helicopters, and artillery will stand uncontested along the borders of Zaire, Zambia, Namibia, and Botswana. Not UNITA alone, but all of central and southern Africa awaits the decision by the United States.

We were all encouraged by the decision of the United States Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, which forbade U.S. assistance to the forces of freedom in Angola and left us for 10 years alone against the Cubans. Now the United States must take the next step and commit the military aid that will allow us to defeat the Cubans and Soviets in Angola – anti-aircraft weapons, the Red-eye missile and Stinger missile, and anti-tank weapons. With those arms we can protect our people from air and armour attacks and drive back the Cubans and Soviets through the continuation of the guerrilla war that we have waged for 11 years.

We ask also for your political and diplomatic support. We need you to insist at the United Nations and other international forums that the Cubans and Soviets leave Angola and that the promised elections be held. With your military and political support, other nations will follow your lead and give us aid. Do not underestimate the importance of your decision. For Angola is the Munich of Africa. Hesitation, the refusal to aid UNITA in its fight against the Cubans and Soviets, will be taken as a signal by all the countries in the region that the United States has abandoned them to the Soviets as the West abandoned Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe to Hitler in 1938. Do not suppose that Zaire, Zambia, Botswana, and Namibia will remain with the West when faced with an unopposed base in Angola. They will be forced to make their political accommodations with the Soviets, just as most of Eastern Europe fell under Nazi

political domination without a shot being fired. The loss of the sea route around the Cape and the loss of the strategic minerals found in central and southern Africa would be a crippling blow to the economy and defence of the West. That is why I say that UNITA is the key to Angola, Angola is the key to Africa, and Africa is the key to the West.

I am not alone in this assessment. The Soviets agree.

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The Real Culprits: The Influence of the Left on British Foreign Policy 1919-39

George Martelli

It is widely believed that the 'guilty men' of the pre-war period were the Conservative politicians who believed in the policy of appeasement, that by making timely concessions to the nationalist aspirations of Hitler war could be avoided. It is true that many people, not only conservatives, saw Nazi Germany as a bulwark against communism, which threatened to spread westward after the Russian revolution. But the real culprits, as this article will seek to show, were those on the Left of the political spectrum, politicians and publicists, whose influence on public opinion prevented Britain from re-arming, and thus left the Government with no alternative other than to surrender until the British people were finally aroused to the danger they were in.

The traditional attitude of the British Left to foreign affairs is pacifist, internationalist, ideological and idealist. With a few notable exceptions, such as Attlee,

Ernest Bevin, Hugh Gaitskell, and Jo Grimmond, love of their own country never rated very high with them. In fact today they have made patriotism a dirty word, to be discouraged in schools and universities.

Winston Churchill once observed that a man who could not love his own country would find it difficult to love anything bigger. But the British Left have proved him wrong, by falling in love first with the League of Nations, and then with its successor, the United Nations. Of course one does not know how deep this passion runs. Like the anti-blood sports people, whose hatred of fox-hunters exceeds their love of foxes, the partiality of the Left to international bodies (with the exception of the EEC which socialists dislike for ideological reasons) may be motivated chiefly by their disapproval of nationalism. What they set most store by is 'world opinion', which, in so far as it exists outside the minds of those who cite it, is

usually hostile to Britain. For example, the main criticism levelled by Labour spokesmen against Mrs Thatcher for protecting British interests, first in the Falklands and more recently by refusing to impose sanctions on South Africa, was that she was acting contrary to 'world opinion'. For the slogan 'my country right or wrong' the Left have substituted 'my United Nations, right or wrong'. Since there is a built-in UN majority composed of Third World and communist countries, this means placing the fate of Britain in the hands of an unholy alliance of the world's most backward and unscrupulous foreign governments – those who have the least regard either for the welfare of their own people or for good conduct in international relations.

When the influence of the Left predominates, foreign policy will be based less on a realistic assessment of what is needed to safeguard the nation's interests, such as security, than on ideological prejudice. Countries with governments of similar political colour will be seen as friends, whether or not their foreign policies are favourable to Britain, and vice versa. There will thus always be suspicion of America, as champion of private enterprise and the market economy. That she has twice saved Western Europe from being over-run by Germans, and may still have to save it from being over-run by Russians, is discounted by the British Left. Throughout the present negotiations for nuclear disarmament they have never had a good word for President Reagan; and even to this day there are many among them who will not hear a bad one of the Soviet Union.

In fact the course of history has seldom been determined by purely ideological considerations, and when foreign policy has put them first it has usually come to grief. Examples which spring to mind are Philip II's attempt to restore Catholicism in England by sending an armada, and the European powers' bid to suppress the French Revolution by attacking France, both of which ended in disaster. The truth is that the permanent interests of any nation are governed, not by ideology, but by geographical, historical and economic factors, e.g. possession or lack of raw materials, over which it has little control and these in turn will in the long run dictate its foreign policy, although there may be temporary aberrations, as when in 1940 the Italians under Mussolini, ganged up with the *tedeschi*, their natural and hereditary enemy. But when in August 1939 the Russians signed a pact with Germany, ideology was subordinated to political realism, as it was again in 1941, when Churchill offered Russia, now at war with Germany, British aid. As he said at the time, if Hitler invaded hell he would at least invite the Devil to dinner at Downing Street. This is something which the British Left, obsessed with ideology and more interested in sociology than in history or geography, have never understood, and it is one of the reasons why they cannot be trusted with foreign policy.

Another is their intolerance of foreign governments of whose internal policies they disapprove, although they may be friendly to Britain and able to render her useful service. This was the case at Simonstown, the former British naval base, which the South African Government

was willing, not only to place at our disposal, but also to pay for, but which was closed down by a Labour Government for purely political reasons in order to satisfy its anti-apartheid supporters. Had it been available during the Falklands war, our losses of men and ships might have been much less. But with the British Left such a consideration would weigh little compared with the need to keep their hands clean from any contact with the 'racist' South Africans.

Having examined the guiding principles of the British Left in international relations, let us see, with the benefit of hindsight, their effect on British foreign policy between the two world wars. During this period there were a number of international crises which exercised and divided public opinion at home. Of these the most important were: (1) the consolidation under Stalin of a communist dictatorship in Russia; (2) the rise of Hitler and his challenge to the victors of the first war; (3) the Italian invasion and conquest of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia); the Spanish Civil War; (5) the rearmament of Germany and her threats to peace, which culminated in the outbreak of the second war.

The Bolshevik revolution of November 1917, and the signing by the Russians of a separate peace with Germany, came as a shock to Europe and particularly to Russia's allies, Britain and France. The murder of Nicholas II and all the royal family in the summer of 1918 was greeted everywhere with horror. When civil war broke out the British Government sent troops to assist the White armies in their fight against the Bolsheviks; and it was some time after their defeat, in February 1924, that Britain formally recognised the new regime and resumed diplomatic relations with what had become the USSR. Suspicion of Soviet intentions and of communist subversion remained strong, as was demonstrated in October 1924, when the publication of the famous Zinoviev letter, allegedly inciting British workers to revolt, probably cost the Labour Government of Ramsay MacDonald the election.

Very soon, however, the British Left found virtues in communist Russia. Early in the thirties it became the fashion for their intellectuals, and also leading trade unionists, to visit Russia – where of course they were only shown what their hosts wanted them to see – and to return to sing the praises of Stalinism. Among them were those high priests of Fabian socialism, Sydney and Beatrice Webb and George Bernard Shaw. Shaw's ultimate remedy for the ills of the world, after rejecting all other political systems, was gerontocracy, that is government by those old enough to have acquired wisdom. Unfortunately for his thesis he himself was the living proof of its absurdity, since the longer he lived the sillier he became. More sinister was his admiration for dictatorship, which betrayed the truth that inside every committed socialist there is an autocrat struggling to get out.

Such was the naivety, wishful thinking and refusal to face awkward facts of the British intelligentsia that not even the purges could shake their faith in Stalin as a benevolent despot doing his best for a retarded country.

It was only after the appearance in 1941 of Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* – the story of an 'old guard' Bolshevik imprisoned for querying the party line – that some doubts were sown in their trusting breasts. But these were all swept away when in June, 1941, the Germans invaded Russia. 'Ah!', I can remember a certain lady, now eminent as an historian, exclaiming, 'Now that Russia is on our side we can believe it's a *just* war and really put our hearts into it.'

While their admiration of communist Russia was at least consistent, the attitude of the British Left to Germany was more ambivalent. The ending of the 'Kaiser's' war (as it was sometimes called after the Emperor Wilhelm II who was held to have started it) brought with it a reaction from the mood of patriotism which had carried the nation to victory. Heroism went out of fashion and in its place came disillusionment and cynicism. The Left exploited the fashionable Marxist doctrine that wars were the inevitable result of the capitalist system, with the ruling class in every country competing with its rivals for power and wealth, egged on by the arms manufacturers, and using the ignorant masses for cannon fodder. Such ideas were especially attractive to young people, in revolt against the conventional mentality of their parents. Their rejection of ancestral loyalties found expression in the famous – or infamous – motion adopted by the Oxford Union that 'This house will not fight for King or Country'. Although people in England, knowing their Oxford, did not take this very seriously, its message was not lost on foreigners. Sitting next to Edda Ciano, daughter of Mussolini, at a luncheon in the Italian Embassy in 1935, I was asked the question: 'Is it true that Englishmen are degenerate?' I replied that it would be dangerous for her father to assume so, but she was not convinced. Shortly after, the Italians invaded Abyssinia and the Germans re-occupied the Rhineland, which had been de-militarised under the peace treaty.

With repudiation of the war-time ethos came sympathy with the defeated. The Treaty of Versailles had imposed punitive peace terms on Germany, including a ban on German arms and crippling reparations. The effects of these not only on the German economy, but on that of the victors also, were exposed in Keynes' *Economic Consequences of the Peace* which became the Bible of the Left. The result was a revulsion of feeling against France, who was demanding her pound of flesh, and in favour of Germany, who was no longer considered to have been responsible for the war – at least no more than anybody else – and to have been badly treated at the peace. The English intellectuals started to discover Berlin, finding a spiritual home in its defeatist atmosphere, sleazy night life, and homosexual bars.

Even when the Nazis appeared on the scene there were some on the British Left who were prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt. After all, weren't they socialist as well as nationalist, as much opposed to the rich as to communism? It was true that they had locked up, or beaten

up, most of their political opponents; but they had also solved the German unemployment problem by launching a massive programme of public works. That much, if not most of this programme, was for the manufacture of arms – for 'guns not butter' as Dr Goebbels was to put it – only transpired later. Meanwhile there was sympathy with Hitler for wanting to restore the standing of Germany among the nations, and even with his demands for a revision of the peace treaties. When he marched his troops into the Rhineland, there was no will to oppose Germany's regaining of this part of the fatherland. Under the influence of the Germanophile and Francophobe Left British foreign policy tended to distance itself from that of France. Only the conservative *Morning Post* remained suspicious of the new Germany and loyal to the Anglo-French alliance.

The last straw for the French was the signing behind their backs in 1935 of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, a cosy arrangement thought up by the British Admiralty. This agreement allowed the Germans to reconstruct their Navy provided it was not of a size to challenge the *Royal Navy*. Such an act of betrayal, as they deemed it, convinced some influential people in France that the perfidy of Albion was incorrigible; and that if Britain could not be relied on as an ally the sensible policy for France was to make friends with Germany. In any case the British, with their miserable little army and powerful pacifist lobby, would be of no use in another war. Leading this school of thought was Pierre Laval,* at that time Foreign Minister and a radical; but it also attracted right wing groups who admired Hitler for suppressing German communism. The result was that when the Germans invaded France in 1940 the attitude of many Frenchmen, even in the armed forces, was already defeatist, and this, combined with communist infiltration in the lower ranks, largely accounted for the collapse and surrender of France, which the British Left, by its opposition both to rearmament and to the alliance, had helped to bring about.

In fact the Left were opposed to any military alliances, pinning all their hopes for peace on the new-born League of Nations. Brainchild of that great idealist, President Wilson (whose country, however, refused to join it), the League was to inaugurate a new era for the human race, in which international disputes would be settled by arbitration, war would be outlawed, acts of aggression punished, and would-be transgressors kept firmly in order. There would also be an end to secret diplomacy, where, according to its critics, the fate of nations would be settled by cynical statesmen behind closed doors. (That it was this kind of diplomacy which had kept the peace in Europe for nearly a hundred years was of course ignored.) Henceforth all would be conducted in the open and 'the people' through their representatives would take the decisions. Here at last was the vision of a brave new world, with Geneva as its capital, which liberals and socialist alike could embrace: something to which they could pledge the loyalty which their non-

* Later Prime Minister in the Vichy Government, he was condemned and executed after the war for collaborating with the Germans.

conformist consciences forbade them to give to their own country.

The dream collapsed at the first test, as did the disarmament conference held under the League's auspices. This was something that anybody with a knowledge of the world could have foreseen and it only surprised utopians who believed in world government. To the 'have nots' – and they included Japan as well as Germany and Italy – the League was simply a device of 'the haves', meaning France and Britain and the other colonial powers, to mobilise international forces in defence of the *status quo*: in other words, in defence of their own possessions. When first Japan and then Germany walked out of the organisation – in February and October 1933 respectively – it was obvious that it had no role in preventing war. And yet the Labour Party in Britain, then in opposition, continued to base their so-called foreign policy on 'support of the League'; and even refused their consent to re-armament, which by this time had become an urgent need for Britain, unless the Government promised to follow a 'League policy'. As this was something that didn't exist outside their own minds, the condition was meaningless, but it was nevertheless used to justify the party's vote against conscription.

If Hitler's Germany evoked some sympathy in the British Left (at any rate until Hitler showed his hand by the annexation of Austria), Mussolini's Italy found none. Although fascism saved Italy from communism after the war, and its regime was mild compared with that of the Nazis, the suppression of all opposition was unacceptable to any democrat. So when the Duce set out on his Abyssinian adventure cries of moral indignation were heard in Britain. Now was the time, it was argued in speeches and articles, for the League of Nations to show that it had teeth. The fact that Italy was a weak nation not renowned for military valour made the prospect of teaching it a lesson all the more attractive to the righteous. Unfortunately for its champions the League had no teeth of its own, no army, and no other means of enforcing its will. It was only as strong in defence of peace as its members wished it to be, and none of them, with the possible exception of Britain, were prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of a remote and barbarous African country to which the Italians were apparently willing to bring some civilisation. Moreover, everybody knew that the sanctions against Italy, which the British Left were clamouring for, would involve, if they were to be effective, the risk of war, and that the brunt of this war would fall on an unprepared British Navy. In any case a decision to apply sanctions required an unanimous vote of the Security Council of the League, which the French were certain to veto if the sanctions were to be serious. To the Gallic mind, as to most foreign observers, it was incomprehensible that the British, who had done the same thing in a dozen African countries and others scattered over the world, should make such a fuss over Italy's rape of Abyssinia. A cynical view, widely held abroad, was that Britain must have designs on the victim herself, and as usual was covering her intentions with a barrage of hypocritical denunciations.

To escape from its dilemma the British Government devised the Hoare-Laval plan (called after the Foreign Secretary and his French opposite number) which would have given Mussolini partial satisfaction while preserving the nominal independence of Abyssinia. But when this sensible compromise was presented to the House of Commons the howls of protest, which did not come only from the Labour benches, were so loud that the Government was forced to withdraw it. Hoare resigned and was succeeded by his No. 2, Anthony Eden, who although he had approved the plan, now took the side of the angels and on his return to Geneva pressed for oil sanctions against Italy. But before the League could reach agreement the Italians were in Addis Ababa and the Emperor Haile Selassie was on his way into exile.

Thus the campaign waged by the British Left, motivated, one suspects, more by hatred of fascism than by sympathy for Abyssinia, had not achieved its object. Its only consequences were to make an enemy of Italy (a natural ally of Britain) and to drive Mussolini into the arms of Hitler and the Rome-Berlin 'axis', so making another war both more likely and more difficult to win if it occurred. Of all the mischief done by the Left in the field of international relations, this hysterical behaviour during the Abyssinian crisis, which forced the Government to act against its better judgement, was the most damaging, not only to British interests, but also to the cause of peace. The argument used in the Left's defence is that if only the League had sat on Mussolini, other potential aggressors, especially Hitler, would have been deterred. This is like saying that if only pigs had wings they could fly.

Next we come to the Spanish Civil war, which broke out in July 1936. Here again the issue was seen by the British Left, whose certainty that right was on its side was only equalled by its ignorance of the true situation, as a struggle between good and evil: between a liberal democracy defending freedom, and a military junta bent on suppressing it. The fact that at the time of General Franco's intervention Spain was rapidly sliding towards a condition of anarchy from which only the communists would profit – a fact that is now admitted even by the Spaniards who opposed Franco – either escaped the notice of, or was ignored by, most British commentators. Franco now replaced Mussolini as the arch-villain in the eyes of the Left. Most English intellectuals saw the civil war as a fight for and against fascism, and as an opportunity for every decent person to stand up and be counted. The more fashionable poets and novelists would descend on Barcelona, spend a weekend absorbing Republican propaganda, and return home to be lionised at Hampstead parties and write their 'reports from the front'.

Of all this starry-eyed band only one saw what was really happening to Spain. George Orwell, who went out there as a committed communist, came away convinced that, if the Republicans won, the communists, who were not only the best organised and most efficient of the various parties but were also supplied with money and arms by Russia, would take control of the country and

establish a Marxist dictatorship. As a volunteer with the International Brigade, recruited and run by communists, Orwell was one of the few Englishmen who actually saw any fighting – in fact he was seriously wounded – and it was rubbing shoulders with the comrades in the trenches and attending their committee meetings, that opened his eyes to the true nature of communism, its aims and its methods. This was the experience that inspired his novel *Animal Farm*, published in 1945, when the Russians were still admired for their heroic war effort (only made possible, incidentally, by supplies of arms sent by their allies, of which the Russian people have never been allowed to know). *Animal Farm* had a greater influence even than Koestler's *Darkness at Noon* in exposing the liberal and socialist mythology concerning Soviet Russia: after that no intellectual, if he wished to be taken seriously, could defend Stalinism. Probably no English writer in this century has made so great an impact as Orwell on the politically-minded of his own generation. To find a foreign parallel one would have to go back to Beaumarchais' *Marriage of Figaro* (not the opera but the play on which the opera was based), which by encouraging the forces that brought about the French Revolution had, however, the opposite effect to that created by the writings of Orwell.

Throughout the struggle the British Government were under constant pressure from the Left to cut off all supplies to Franco. Their hostility to the Caudillo was intensified by the fact that he was receiving help both from Hitler, who sent his nascent air force to bomb Guernica, and from Mussolini, who despatched 'volunteers' to join his side. This assistance, by counterbalancing what the Republicans were getting from Russia, ensured that the better fighting qualities and discipline of the General's army, composed largely of regular troops, won the day. The Republicans surrendered and many of them fled the country. Once again the British Left had backed the wrong horse and in doing so had done harm to Britain. Fortunately the Government on this occasion had the courage to resist the Left, so that British interests in Spain were not irreparably damaged. The lesson of the Spanish Civil War to Britain was: 'mind your own business'. Would that it had been learnt! It is still badly needed, and never more so than in regard to South Africa.

In fact the victory of Franco was far more important to Britain, and indeed to the cause of freedom and democracy, than appeared at the time. For had he not been there to defend Spanish neutrality when the Germans over-ran France in the summer of 1940, the German troops would not have stopped at the Pyrenees; they would have marched through Spain, seized Gibraltar and the Straits and closed the Mediterranean to the Allies. There would then have been no landing in North Africa, no 'desert war', no victory in Tunis and no invasion of Italy. Egypt and the Middle East would have been left wide open to the Axis forces; and with no need to fight an African campaign Germany could have concentrated the whole of her might against Russia and destroyed the Red armies before the Allies were ready to land

in Normandy. The war would have ended, if not in defeat for the Allies, in a stalemate, with Hitler still holding the whole of Western Europe. If any foreigner ever deserved a monument in Parliament Square it is the man who up to his death, and even after, was regarded by the British intelligentsia as ranking only after Hitler in the hierarchy of the evil.

And so to Munich. The chroniclers of our times have never ceased berating the wretched Neville Chamberlain for handing to Hitler on a plate a large slice of Czechoslovakia. But when the Conservative Prime Minister returned to England waving his scrap of paper and declaring that he brought peace with honour, none in the House of Commons cheered more loudly than the Labour Party and the Liberals. It was left to the solitary figure of Winston Churchill, slowly quitting the Chamber with bowed shoulders and a grim expression, to show any disapproval.

Miles of typewriter ribbon and reams of paper have been used up in discussing the Munich Agreement, which gave Hitler what he demanded without a shot being fired, and which convinced him he could safely attack Poland. And because the Conservatives were in power, they, and particularly Chamberlain, have been accorded most of the blame. But who were the real culprits? Surely they were those on the British Left who for the last twenty years had been working to create a climate of opinion which left the country totally unprepared for war, either morally or materially, and therefore incapable of standing up to any aggressor. They were pacifists like George Lansbury, who succeeded Ramsay MacDonald as leader of the Labour party; Liberals like Gilbert Murray, director of the League of Nations Union, which in 1935 organised the so-called 'peace ballot'; journalists like Kingsley Martin, Editor of the *New Statesman*; all of whom prated of 'collective security' when there was none, and campaigned against our own re-armament when nothing but arms could save us. Armaments alone, they preached, were the cause of war, and therefore their possession was not only wicked but dangerous. (The CND uses the same argument today.) Stanley Baldwin, who preceded Chamberlain as Premier, in one of his outbursts of 'appalling' candour, admitted that nothing was more likely to lose him a general election than the adoption of a re-armament policy. This does not excuse him for not adopting it – as a leader of principle, like Mrs Thatcher, would have done in his place; but still less does it excuse his political opponents, who at every step derided as 'war mongering' any talk of rearming, and voted against conscription even after it was clear, as it became clear in the spring of 1939, when the Germans occupied Prague and annexed what was left of Czechoslovakia after Munich, that war was practically inevitable. It is true that there was a small Conservative clique, the 'Clevedon set', who still believed that Hitler could be bought off; but their influence was negligible. It was the influence on foreign policy of the British Left, paramount between the two world wars, which left Britain almost defenceless at her moment of greatest peril.

Optional Discipline

Frank Palmer

The principle of compulsory schooling is not one I should wish to defend to the death. Nevertheless, I do not share the certitude expressed in Lionel F. Cerny's 'easily stated' conclusion that 'schooling *must* no longer be legally imposed.' ('Discipline' *The Salisbury Review* Vol.4 No. 2 January 1986). This imperative is not generated out of any criticism of the quality of 'education' currently provided in state schools (about which there *is* much to criticise) but, rather, is ostensibly justified on *a priori* grounds. Baldly stated, his argument is that it is unethical for teachers to force pupils to behave themselves in lessons they would rather not attend; unethical because the only one who has the right to impose his values on the child is the parent.

The parent-child relationship, because it is based on the fact that the child is bone of the bone and flesh of the flesh of its parents, is unique. No child can have the same relationship with other adults as it has with its parents. By virtue of that relationship, the parent stands to the child as God stands to His creation in the eyes of a believer. He has the duty, the power and the right to discipline his own children, which includes bringing them up to his own beliefs and way of life.¹

Clearly, the relation between parent and child is unique. And, clearly, parents have all sorts of obligations, responsibilities and legal rights. These rights, however, are by no means as Divine as Mr Cerny suggests. Unlike God, parents are neither omnipotent nor omniscient, nor are they wholly good. Nor is it clear how the language of 'rights' could apply to God. Whatever 'rights' are (the concept has never been entirely clear to me, nor is it clear why the language of 'rights' ought to dominate moral discourse) it seems to me that the notion brings with it the idea of a limit. My right to bring up my own children as I see fit is a limited freedom. I do not have the right to bring them up as trainee burglars, liars, cheats or wanton persecutors. It is not merely the law which forbids this (indeed the law does not in all circumstances forbid lying) but the demands of morality itself. No matter how close or special the relationship entailed by parenthood, parent and child are not one person. There is between all people, to use Simone Weil's word, a *distance* which should be respected.² And the spirit of this remark can also be found in Kant's dictum: 'So act that you treat humanity in your own person and in the person of everyone else always at the same time as an end and never

merely as a means.'³ No child, of course, can be brought up in a value-free test tube, insulated from the moral values of his parents or of the surrounding community – nor would it be desirable. If the child is treated as a *person*, he will be the recipient of, and participant in, what Strawson has called the 'reactive attitudes'.⁴

Interpreted in this way, Cerny's statement that the parent has the right to bring his children up 'to his own beliefs and way of life' is unproblematic. But he uses this as a premise for denying the 'right' of teachers to discipline bad behaviour. The immediate objection here is that he can only deny the latter 'right' at the cost of bloating parental 'rights' in a way which is morally unacceptable. Cerny's 'parent' is committed to regarding his child as an extension of 'the self'. Two different levels of difficulty follow from this. First, children tend to have two parents. In what way does an appeal to 'rights' settle the matter when father and mother disagree about how the child is to be brought up? Mr Cerny objects that the various staff who teach a particular child 'cannot be the same teacher'. In what sense could two parents be one parent? Secondly, to regard one's child as an extension of the self is *ipso facto* to blind oneself to the fact that he or she must be ultimately responsible for his or her own life. I may have the right to encourage my daughter to develop her musical talents, but if it is assumed that I have the right to make her life hell unless she agrees to concentrate her ambitions on being a concert pianist, so much the worse for the legitimacy of 'rights'. Whatever the rights of a father might be, few of us would have much moral sympathy for the father of Edmund Gosse or – if the available evidence is to be believed – with the father of Franz Kafka, for both sought to impose their own narrow outlook and restricted sensibility on their sons. The theme is a familiar one in literature, and perhaps the best example of all is that of Thomas Gradgrind. How far is it consoling to be told he had a 'right' to bring up his children as he did?

In view of these examples, recourse to the 'rights' of parents is not quite the *deus ex machina* we are led to believe. For there is a moral principle equally binding on teachers and parents alike. The matter of disciplining bad behaviour, however, is a totally different question and has nothing to do with interfering into a person's life. Parents have a duty to encourage polite, civilised, orderly behaviour and a duty to discourage the opposite. To be indifferent to bad behaviour is to be indifferent to the

child. Here I am much in sympathy with Simone Weil's view that punishment, *in the right spirit*, is an act of love.⁵ Why should it not be thought that teachers have a similar duty?

Mr Cerny considers any attempt on the part of a teacher to discipline unruly pupils to be unethical because no teacher has the right to force a pupil to study a subject he or she does not wish to pursue. Here it is necessary for his argument that 'forcing the pupil to study the subject' is the *reason* for the punishment. But why must the punishment fall under that description? Or, to put it another way, why should that be the *only* description under which the punishment is seen? I entirely share the view that the *raison d'être* of teaching is to promote the study of subject disciplines (a view, alas, not so widely shared in state schools) but all education is essentially a personal transaction. No matter how formally his role is conceived, a teacher stands in a personal relation to his pupils. He is not a teaching machine dealing with learning machines (despite the recent incursion of behaviourist dogmas into the curriculum). This is by no means a concession to progressivist or 'child-centred' ideology; the point is, rather, that even the most academically-minded teacher cannot opt out of the moral significance of his dealings with pupils. The teacher who allows the pupil to be foul-mouthed and abusive, hurl missiles across the room, rudely ignore what is being said or generally make a nuisance of himself, demonstrates culpable indifference to the pupil *as a person*. The fact that his progress in mathematics is jeopardised constitutes only one dimension of the problem. The teacher has other reasons for insisting on politeness and attention. How far the pupil makes progress with the subject or puts sincere effort into his work is ultimately the responsibility of the individual pupil (a view, admittedly, not shared by advocates of the 'accountability' ethic). Certainly teachers have *some* responsibility for that, but a love of learning cannot be imposed; it must be fostered. It is not absurd to suppose that a pupil may achieve moderate results, or even a high degree of success, despite bad behaviour. On Mr Cerny's account this would give the teacher a reason for ignoring the behaviour. Some manipulative pupils even offer this in their own defence, and it is a sad reflection of the values accepted in some schools that officials of the 'pastoral system' consider this excuse to be unanswerable.

To express this in the language of 'rights' we might say that any teacher has the right not to be subjected to abuse, discourtesy or hostility from pupils. Those of us who were fortunate enough to be educated before the present decline in standards of discipline were led to recognise the rights of our teachers to a reasonable degree of respect. But the significance of discipline is not properly explicated in terms of 'rights'. To tolerate intolerable conduct is a gross failure to respect the offender. It is tantamount to believing that the offender is not responsible for his actions, and is not therefore a person. Thanks to some modish practitioners of educational psychology who have gradually ousted moral concepts

from their descriptions of human behaviour, and thanks to radical sociologists for whom 'the individual' is reduced to a will-less representation of a social environment, teachers are now hard pressed to think of any justification for disciplining conduct which twenty years ago would have been considered outrageous. And one thing that dissuades them from trusting their own moral perceptions is the curious, yet popular, view that a child's misbehaviour is *caused* by the teacher. This moral 'Catch 22' encourages – and I often feel is designed to encourage – teachers to turn a blind eye to misbehaviour. Many of my ex-colleagues felt it necessary to conceal the truth about the behaviour of their pupils because they realised that the key to promotion consists in 'being on good terms' with pupils. The easiest way to ensure such success is never to burst that fragile bubble of conditional 'good will' which is so easily obliterated by the making of demands. Moreover, most teachers realise that if they do make demands on pupils not only will they receive no backing but may even be undermined. Not only is it the case that in some schools pupils may swear at, and even strike their teachers without fear of redress from senior staff but there is a more insidious phenomenon at work: the popularity contest. In order to win this game, the teacher – in the shape of that alter ego known as 'the tutor' – does everything he can to persuade the tutor group that he is 'on their side'. He then engages in the *danse macabre* of chatting to his pupils about their relationships with other members of staff. Where he does not actually join in their gossip, he is most 'sympathetic' to their likes and dislikes. He weaves a red carpet with his tongue, upon which those who do not like the personality of Mr X may climb so as to exhibit their discontent and dance out his demise. Since this is often a way to the top, the same antics may be enacted by curriculum directors, assistant year heads, heads of house, deputy heads of house, or those even higher up in the corridors of pastoral power – senior mistresses and deputy heads. In the days when schools were there to promote learning, such tactics would have been known as unprofessional conduct. They are now known as 'meaningful relationships'.

Few pupils are so devoid of sophistication that they do not notice that their teachers are selling out. Despite anti-establishment propaganda masquerading as 'anti-racism', 'anti-sexism', 'anti-classism', 'Peace Studies' and 'World Studies', despite the leftist vogue for undermining belief in the legitimacy of 'authority', many sensible pupils cannot understand why it is now so easy for some of their peers to treat even the most conscientious teachers with contempt. Nor can they understand why so little emphasis is placed on academic work. Pupils more adjusted to their surroundings share the popular philistine belief that academic work belongs to the past and that schools should equip pupils with immediately relevant 'skills' and fashionable moral postures.

The wisdom to be extracted from Mr Cerny's article is that the general public have improper expectations of schools and, partly for that reason, underestimate the

importance of parental duties and responsibilities. Often unable or unwilling to discipline their own children, many parents expect schools to be able to control them. They are less and less alarmed by intrusions into parental responsibility. What now passes for 'education' is often a substitute for teaching. And here I do not merely have in the mind the dubious practices acted out in the name of pastoral care, practices which reduce teachers to social workers, administrators, amateur psychotherapists and father confessors. I also have in mind those assaults upon the academic curriculum which on the one hand sally forth in the shape of new 'subjects' like 'Life Skills', 'Life Studies', 'Social Education', and which on the other hand invade the content of traditional subjects with the demand that they should foster 'positive self-images', escalate 'self-confidence' and instantly gratify the 'social needs' of the child. Where the teaching of traditional subjects is not being reduced to amateur psychotherapy, it is turned into political indoctrination (for we all know that adjusting oneself to the world as it is can never be one of the 'social needs' listed in the Marxist itinerary of global transformation).

In all of these grand schemes is the belief that schooling can produce the perfect society and the belief that now, in these enlightened days, pupils can dispense with old-fashioned ideas about painful effort, striving and learning to stand on their own two feet. They are now patients in culturally sterile clinics waiting to receive the next carefully-timed package of 'skills'. The presumption is that pupils are, and will continue to be, morons who can do nothing for themselves. They cannot be expected to order a meal in a cafe, find their way from home to school, look at the person they are talking to, get out of bed in the morning, or dial the fire brigade; for all of these accomplishments are now 'skills' which cannot possibly be acquired unless explicitly and programmatically taught. Apparently it is also a 'listening skill' to pay attention to what a teacher is saying and a 'social skill' not to jump the queue at the bus stop. Adolescents are never to blame for their own rudeness, impoliteness, laziness or lack of common sense. For, according to the new educational behaviourists, these shortcomings are due to a lack of *expertise* (to be remedied by 'behavioural objectives'). To the sociological relativists, they are not shortcomings at all; the behaviour is the causal product of a social culture which needs to be respected, and which never must be criticised from the standpoint of authoritarian, elitist, middle-class values. (Relativism, apparently, does not extend its value-free tolerance to middle class culture.)

Any teacher who is prepared to stand against these nonsensical and damaging trends requires a degree of fortitude and moral courage which will never be rewarded in the low status incurred by his inevitable lack of promotion. For the main route to promotion now lies in sycophantic adherence to the machinations of the pastoral system or the time-and-motion philistinism of curriculum management teams. The teacher who retains his integrity will be treated either as a middle-class

academic elitist or as a paradigm of inefficiency.

Only a charlatan can offer a guarantee of success. The greatest teachers throughout history are to be honoured not for having found the perfect 'scheme', 'system' or 'method' of teaching, but for being great men – men who, having achieved some degree of mastery in a subject, had the personal qualities and the character to inspire their pupils. They were neither 'facilitators' nor 'managers of learning experiences'. Such men would have little hope of surviving in the comprehensive classrooms of today; in fact the odds are they would never impress those interviewing panels who require applicants to be 'mouldable', able to fit into a 'team', willing to recognise that academic subjects are outmoded 'inventions' inappropriate to current 'needs'.

Mr Cerny is right to say that the public tend to expect guarantees and that teachers who recognise that education cannot provide them are likely to incur disfavour. However, the need for guarantees seems to impress him more than his other insights ought to permit.

Moreover, however desirable it may be for children to learn, there is no guarantee that they will possess the necessary gifts that will enable them to do so, and in that case all discipline imposed by the teacher is pointless.⁶

He cannot have it both ways. One of the many reasons that teaching cannot offer guarantees is that it is never possible – indeed it would be presumptuous – for any teacher to claim to *know* how his pupils will develop in the future. In this sense a teacher requires the quality of humility. The 'failure' who now sits before him may one day blossom into a person with greater talents than the teacher. The need for such humility is ignored by those curriculum 'experts' in the para-educational establishment who assume that there is a *science* of learning and therefore a science of teaching. It is ignored by utilitarians, who assume that schooling is primarily concerned with the production of useful workers and citizens. It is ignored by indoctrinators for whom schooling is a useful tool for recruiting new members to 'the cause'. And, at this point in his argument, it is ignored by Mr Cerny himself. He is concerned that the nation should not 'lose its own soul'. Yet the well-trodden path to loss of soul is an overriding concern for empirical *results*. Faced with a class who do not want to learn, the teacher who has not yet lost his soul will consider that Mr Cerny's two options are too restricting. He will neither settle for child-minding nor plunging the less able 'into the outer darkness'. For there is a third way: it consists in persevering. Any teacher of conscience will want to acquaint his pupils with the best and most beautiful things he knows. It is written into this outlook that the value of what he is doing may neither be immediately recognised nor appreciated nor rewarded with instant 'success'. For what such a teacher offers is, in a sense, something which is non-propositional – faith in the achievements of the human spirit. In these times of bustle, hurried conversations and enfeebled entertainment, any teacher prepared to offer his pupils the fruits of a more

ennobling culture is sowing seeds without knowing when and where they might take root and flourish. Left to themselves, it is unlikely that the majority of children would ever be put in the way of things which nurture the development of their higher faculties. Mr Cerny suggests that education could only be an 'opportunity' if it were not legally compulsory. But if it were not compulsory it is difficult to see how the majority would know what they were freely choosing or rejecting. And it would no doubt be 'chosen' not by children but by parents who simply saw it as an 'opportunity' for their children to acquire power or status in the world – an idea which is as far

removed from the true spirit of education as is the vainglorious deed from the true spirit of morality. Education is no less an 'opportunity' for its being compulsory; for it is an opportunity which *can* be rejected by the pupil who sets his mind against it. That, however, is no excuse for tolerating rude or discourteous behaviour and there is every reason for insisting on firm discipline in schools. This neither entails regimentation nor, as Mr Cerny seems to suppose, corporal punishment. What it does entail is the common sense and the decency to acknowledge that pupils are responsible for, and therefore must be *held* responsible for, their actions.

Notes

1. *Op. cit.*, p. 40.
2. 'It is impossible for two human beings to be one while scrupulously respecting the distance which separates them ... The point at which parallels meet is infinity'. *Waiting on God*, (Fontana Books, 1959) p. 160.
3. *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, 429.
4. 'Freedom and Resentment', in *Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action*, selected and edited by P. F. Strawson (Oxford University Press, 1968) pp. 71–96.
5. See *Waiting on God*, *op. cit.*, and *The Need for Roots* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952).
6. *Op. cit.*, p. 41.

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Whatever Happened to Law and Order?

Basil Phillips Griffiths

During over six years of Conservative government, crime and disorder have continued to increase. At the same time the Government has contrived to lose the once wholehearted confidence of the police, who have reacted to Conservative law and order legislation with almost universal disapprobation. Further proposed legislation may well be giving temporary comfort to the faithful, but the process of parliamentary debate may also expose the illusory nature of Government intent.

Exasperation with Government posturing on the issue was recently expressed by a Police Federation spokesman. Commenting on the new public order legislation currently before Parliament, he said 'What grates on the mind of the average police officer is the trumpeting by Government of vast new powers for the police, when at best they amount to no more than minor codifications of the existing law.'

The growing impression is that, behind a smokescreen of tough-mindedness, the Government, for no accountable reason, is surpassing its socialist predecessors in appeasing the civil rights pressure groups. A prime example is the recently implemented Police and Criminal Evidence Act. This piece of legislation has evoked the general detestation of the rank and file policeman, who sees himself as being placed in a dangerous legal maze of 'suspect's rights'. Senior officers have already warned Douglas Hurd of the devastating demands the legislation makes on already overstretched manpower resources.

The inglorious history of the passage of the first Police and Criminal Evidence Bill through Parliament, before its life was prematurely terminated by the 1983 General Election, is vivid testimony to the hostility and prejudice of the special interest groups. The original intentions of this legislation were, first to implement the proposals of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, and thus to give statutory authority to existing police practices already endorsed by the courts; secondly, to simplify the involved powers of arrest and search; and thirdly, to seek a balance between the interests of justice and those of the community. From the outset the Government began to make concessions to those who carry the banners for the ethnic minority groups, to the National Council for Civil Liberties, and to the self-interest of the legal profession. The protagonists for these pressure groups came from both sides of the House, and it soon became clear that the Government was prepared to pay any price to ensure that some sort of legislation found its way on to the statute book; and thus to appear to be fulfilling its election pledge concerning law and order.

Following the election a new bill presented to Parliament embodied all the concessions which had been made by Government during the committee stage of the earlier bill. The resulting monumental legislation is of such complexity that it has been found necessary to remove 130,000 policemen from their duties for periods of up to one week, at a cost of about three and a half million pounds, to be re-trained in the mysteries of this one Act of Parliament. The mysteries comprise a labyrinth of red tape, designed to protect those suspected of crime, but likely in effect merely to exhaust the police in burdensome duties, and to provide lawyers with a plethora of lucrative niceties.

Absurdities within the act are legion. For example the police are now required to provide a written notice of explanation to a motorist in the event of an authorised road check. A constable may search a suspect in a public place and require that person to remove an outer coat, jacket or gloves, but cannot now insist that he remove his headgear, presumably since this might offend the turban wearer. Intimate body searches of persons in custody also appear to have caused much concern to the legislators. Such searches may now only take place on the authority of a superintendent and then only when the suspicion exists of the concealment of weapons or drugs. A power to search for stolen property is not provided, even though a recent survey of articles secreted by criminals in their body orifices, revealed that there included not only drugs, but also jewellery, £200 in notes, a radio transmitter, explosives and a detonator!

Most worrying for the working police officer, is the existence of four codes of practice, issued by the Home Secretary under the authority of the Act. The codes, which comprise ninety two pages of closely written legalistic text, might have been composed by the National Council for Civil Liberties. They deal extensively with police practice in searching persons and premises, with identification procedures, and with the detention and questioning of prisoners. The most inexperienced recruit is expected to absorb and abide by these codes, and the Act provides that 'any police officer shall be liable to disciplinary proceedings for any failure to observe *any* provision of the code'. This means that the most minor and technical indiscretion can become the object of elaborate disciplinary measures, involving the Police Discipline Authority, a Chief Constable, a senior officer as investigator, and quasi-judicial proceedings. Punishments include fines, reduction in rank or pay, and dismissal. In addition, behaviour in relation to the codes is admissible in evidence in any subsequent court pro-

ceedings, and is to be taken into account in determining any question arising out of those proceedings. It will therefore be in the interest of the accused to ensure that he lodge a complaint against the police for breach of the codes, and defence lawyers will have a heyday with the ensuing trial within a trial. Even the most dedicated police officer may well conclude that to follow a career which avoids confrontation with the criminal, will be more prudent than walking the present legal and disciplinary minefield.

Perhaps the action most resented by the police, was the Government's acceptance of the Lords amendment to the bill, introduced by Lord Scarman. This made a specific disciplinary offence of racially discriminatory behaviour by police officers. The fact that the measure had not appeared in the original bills presented to Parliament was no oversight. Its inclusion had been the subject of a strenuous campaign by both the National Council for Civil Liberties and the various factions within the race relations industry, and the basis of the amendment was one of the recommendations of the Scarman Enquiry into the Brixton disturbances of 1981. The recommendation that 'racially discriminatory behaviour' should be an offence, applicable to no public service except the police force, is, however, hardly justified by the text of the report itself, in which Lord Scarman reports that: 'I find that the direction and policies of the Metropolitan Police are not racist. But racial prejudice does manifest itself occasionally in the behaviour of a few officers on the streets' (para 8.20). Such mild comment hardly justifies his conclusion, especially in view of his acceptance that the police disciplinary code's general offence of discreditable conduct already covers such behaviour.

The recommendation was bitterly opposed by the police service from the outset, since it seems to constitute an endorsement of the rabid hatred of the police propagated by some sections of the race relations industry. During 1982 the matter became the subject of discussions by the Police Advisory Board, chaired by the then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw. It was ultimately agreed by all concerned – including Mr Whitelaw – that the provision was unnecessary. And the view was accepted, despite earlier disagreements, by such redoubtable left-wing members of the Advisory Board as Margaret Simey of Liverpool and George Moores of South Yorkshire.

Despite what would, in normal industrial relations parlance, amount to an 'agreement', the Government saw fit to support the Scarman amendment when the bill was sent back from the Lords to the Commons. When called to account, the Government agreed that no specific provision was needed to prevent racially discriminatory behaviour; nevertheless, the existence of a specific disciplinary offence would not materially affect the reality of disciplinary procedures. (Which presumably means that the offence would never be used!) In addition, it was claimed that if the Government had supported the removal of the amendment, this would have created the impression that the police had some-

thing to hide. Most policemen saw the Government's action as political opportunism – a cowardly retreat in the face of the wrathful lobbyists for ethnic and civil rights. The Government, they believed, had betrayed them, and also given the lie to its much vaunted claim that it wished to support the police. Indeed, it had given credence to all the prejudicial abuse of which the police have been the mute and undeserving victim.

However, it did not come as a surprise that a Conservative government should act in this way. The earlier repeal of the 'sus' law had already warned the police that they could not depend on the Government. A law which had proved an extremely effective form of preventive street policing since 1824 was summarily written off as undesirable, after a campaign spearheaded by the racial pressure groups. The demands for repeal were very often supported by those who did not have the least inkling of the true meaning of section 4 of the Vagrancy Act of 1824. Caught up in what was essentially an anti-police campaign, they often thought that the slogan 'Scrap the Sus Laws' really meant preventing the police from acting on suspicion of crime, and removing from them the power to stop and search suspected persons. The Government was swiftly rewarded for agreeing to the repeal of that particular law by the 1981 Brixton riots. There is a school of informed police thought that holds that the much publicised intention to repeal the 'sus' law, led delinquent youth to believe that police officers had in fact lost their power to act on suspicion of crime. Hence, in the Brixton area, continued police activity seemed like a high-handed breach of the law, and a warrant for the subsequent rioting.

The 1981 riots were a watershed in both police and Government thinking on law and order. It was clear that things would never be the same again. The Government's reaction was predictable. An initial statement of support for the police by the Home Secretary was followed by the setting up of the type of body dear to the English liberal establishment: an 'enquiry' headed by Lord Scarman into 'matters connected with the policing of Brixton'. Thus from the start the enquiry assumed that when a minority in an area of high criminality runs riot and commits widespread arson and theft, the police are to be held accountable. And they are to be reprimanded, not for their sloth or inactivity, but for an excess of zeal, or for authoritarian and allegedly 'racist' attitudes.

The deliberations and accusations of the day have now passed into history. However, it is noteworthy that whilst Scarman saw fit to condemn the temporary drafting of a large number of officers into the Brixton area, he also conceded that such measures had widespread public support. Thus, tucked away in the body of his report (para 4.53) lies the statement: 'But others, though not so vocal, probably representing the majority of the community, take a different line. They support police operations designed to reduce street crime and enforce the law . . .'. Such sentiments, which undoubtedly echo the view of the 'non vocal' majority of citizens

throughout the United Kingdom, were of little account in the policing methods which very quickly became fashionable as a result of the enquiry. A new word passed into the vocabulary of the more cynical police officer – to 'Scarmanise', meaning to introduce a style of policing which avoided enforcing laws which might be contentious, particularly amongst the ethnic minorities. In effect, peace at any price.

The specific question which Scarman failed to answer is, what do the police do in an area of high criminality, where the traditional modes of policing are proving ineffective and the majority demand firm action which in turn might result in disorderly conduct? The answer, inspired more by the text than by the recommendations of the report, has been to maintain a low profile and to do nothing which could be construed as the 'hard line'. If the report has not actually led to the establishment of 'no go' areas, many inner city areas have been policed in a manner described thus by a Brixton policeman with over 21 years service: 'The emphasis is placed on low profile or containment policing rather than on firm policing to prevent crime'. Following the publication of the report it became required reading for any aspirant for promotion within the police service, and those who, during promotion interviews, failed to display the requisite liberal-minded enthusiasm were unlikely to gain advancement.

Policies of appeasement, when interpolated into day-to-day policing, often result in bitter resentment on the part of the men on the ground, who feel humiliated by the wistful philosophy of their superiors. The results of 'Scarmanisation' can be deduced from the statements of public and police alike. A black shopkeeper at Harmsworth is reported as saying after the more recent riots there, 'The sale of drugs on the streets had become oppressive, it was nothing to see forty or fifty pushers lined up outside Villa Cross pub. They were even trying to get schoolkids to take it.' A police officer with several years service described the situation at Harmsworth, which was one of the earlier experiments with 'community policing', as follows, 'Gradually more and more restrictions were placed on the officers policing the area, having to turn a blind eye to certain matters. "Low profile" policing had emerged.' He described the results of these measures saying, 'I know of occasions when officers have had to run for their lives from incidents, [which were then] "played down" or just forgotten.'

Brixton at least has received some benefit from its latest riot. The success of the police in swiftly putting down the disorder of last September, has enabled them to adopt a much firmer posture amongst the large criminally-minded section of the community. In a recent article in the Police Federation magazine *Police*, a sergeant describes the high incidence of tolerated crime which prevailed before the riots and states: 'There was open selling of cocaine and heroine, as well as cannabis, in full view of the police.' A series of raids in the Brixton area has netted some forty drug dealers, and street respect for the patrolling policeman is returning. It would even seem that the 'non-vocal majority' is moving

towards active participation in the cause of putting down crime. Even the notorious Stockwell Park Estate has set up neighbourhood watch schemes.

The story at Tottenham, the scene of the most vicious riot of all and of the tragic death of Constable Blakelock, follows the sad pattern of the other riot areas. There was a history of violence and assaults not only on the police but also upon firemen and council workers. Bottle-throwing had developed into a regular local pastime, whilst in deference to the new tactical orthodoxy, police presence on the Broadwater Farm Estate had been reduced to a maximum of two officers at any one time; even postmen had been the subject of attack, and as a result had refused to make deliveries. Another correspondent of the magazine *Police*, a police officer stationed at Tottenham, writes of Scarman-inspired police policies in relation to the area. He claims that he was witness to the establishment of a 'no go' area, with police officers discouraged from entry to the estate even in response to emergency calls. He describes an occasion (prior to the riots) when a gang of black youths had attacked and poured petrol over four residents of the estate. Whilst he, together with a sergeant and ambulance crew, were attending at the incident, they were amused by the youths; a senior officer, in accordance with policy, refused to send further assistance.

It has to be more than coincidence that, following a nationwide campaign against drugs, and a series of police raids in areas that had previously been regarded as too sensitive for firm police action, there followed the worst disorders seen on British streets in this century. Unlike their behaviour following the disturbances of 1981, the Government firmly resisted demands for another public enquiry. Perhaps they at last realised that, in appointing Lord Scarman, they had provided a platform for left-wing rabble-rousing, had given ammunition to the race relations industry, and had raised a whirlwind of liberal sentiment whose effect was to make policing within areas of high criminality almost impossible.

At least it can be said that the public order legislation currently making its way through Parliament, has not yet suffered from the destructive compromises that were imposed upon the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The bill for its most part also sets out to codify the existing law. Once again it has drawn the fire of every conceivable left-wing and civil rights pressure group. More puzzling is the Government's insistence on setting up the bill as an Aunt Sally, by misleadingly advertising it as a means to increase the powers of the police. The charge voiced by the opposition that 'dissent is being criminalised' may be preposterous; but it almost seems to be the reaction sought by government.

The bill first deals with public disorder, and creates offences which closely mirror their common law predecessors. The new statutory offence of riot increases the required individual participation from three to twelve persons, whilst the original common law offence of riot, requiring the participation of only three persons,

becomes the lesser offence of violent disorder, carrying a maximum punishment of five years imprisonment. The new downgraded offence of affray carries a maximum punishment of only three years. An offence of disorderly conduct is introduced which has already come in for severe criticism. The National Association of Probation Officers, who should know better, has even gone so far to say that the offence revives unpleasant memories of the discredited 'sus' law, and claims that the relationship between the police and young people will deteriorate since boisterous behaviour will now be penalised. Similarly the National Council for Civil Liberties has described the offence as 'unacceptably wide'. At least this new minor offence will do away with the need for the policeman to 'smell drink on the defendant's breath' and arrest on the ubiquitous charge of being 'drunk and disorderly'. The sad fact is that people no longer need the benefit of alcohol to behave badly.

The second section of the bill falls in the area of contention most dear to the civil rights enthusiast, that of marches and open air meetings. Nothing, it seems, must interfere with what most of us regard as a disruptive pestilence. The bill proposes that organisers of marches will be required to give notice to the police, who may make conditions in order to prevent serious disruption or coercion. It will no doubt surprise most reasonable citizens that the police should not have been able to make such conditions in the first place. The proposals in fact represent but a limited extension of existing police powers. The objectors, however, choose to ignore the fact that on the vast majority of occasions organisers of marches see fit to inform the police and cooperate with sensible directions.

More contentious are proposed powers to impose conditions on the size, location and duration of open air assemblies, should it be reasonably believed that the meeting will result in serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious damage to the life of the community. The proposals have caused Mr Kaufman, the shadow Home Secretary to say 'that the police will be forced to make political decisions'. Such a statement ignores the existing and centuries-old common law powers and duties of a 'constable', which establish the policeman's basic duty to prevent breaches of the peace. These powers have been codified by the new legislation. A more valid criticism would be to argue that since the police have appeared so reluctant to use their existing powers little purpose is served by providing new ones.

The bill also expands the law on racial hatred. The offence of incitement, by the use of threatening or abusive or insulting words, or behaviour, or the publication of material likely to stir up racial hatred, will be extended to cover the intention to use such matter, or to stir up racial hatred. The bill also creates an offence of possessing such material, which the police are given power to seize. The NCCL in its selective concern for our liberties appears to be silent on these measures, which must mean that in their subjective judgement they approve.

Whether the Government's resolve to see its public order legislation through Parliament in one piece will hold, remains to be seen. If it does not, then the danger exists that, like the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, legislation will emerge that will be no more than an irrelevant hotch-potch of compromise measures, making the task of maintaining order even more formidable.

When the massed ranks of the National Union of Mineworkers descended on the Saltley coke works in 1972, assaulting and intimidating other workers, the police retreated and the gates of the works were ignominiously locked. An Assistant Chief Constable in charge of the police operation declared later in response to a question posed on television, 'We wanted to avoid a police-striker confrontation'. The man in charge of that organised mob was Arthur Scargill. The subsequent events led to a 'U'-turn by the then Conservative government, a pay increase for the miners and a general election in which the Government was defeated.

It was clear from the outset of the 1985 miners' dispute that the present Conservative government was not prepared to allow history to repeat itself. The factor which was not present during the 1972 dispute was the availability of vastly increased police manpower, the result of the 1978 pay increases for the police, ironically brought about by a reluctant Labour administration already on its way out.

One of the myths propounded by the NUM leadership for the benefit of its members, was that the police, newly organised on a national basis, were enforcing new laws brought in by a Tory Government to 'smash the unions'. The tactic of using massed pickets operating on a national basis, so ensuring the presence of large numbers of police, gave credence to the notion. Yet throughout the strike the police had relied almost entirely on their common law powers to maintain the Queen's peace, when faced with the inherent criminality of massed and often violent picketing. The preparedness of an organised minority of strikers to enact the violence which had proved effective at Saltley in 1972, forced the police to don its newly-acquired riot clothing, developed as a result of the 1981 riots. The organised efficiency of police deployment no doubt came as a shock to the NUM leadership, who were relying upon the piecemeal, comparatively disorganised and amateur police response seen on earlier occasions. In the event the appearance of well-equipped, centrally coordinated and effective police in large numbers, not only enabled dissident mine-workers in Nottinghamshire and elsewhere to remain at work, but more importantly enabled coal to be transported with the minimum of disruption.

The TUC conference held at the height of the strike was notable for vociferous attacks on the police. Neil Kinnock delivered a cowardly speech supporting the strike and its leadership, and then, in a half-hearted condemnation of violence, made a point of attacking the police. The speech was in sharp contrast to his subsequent attack on Arthur Scargill at last year's Labour party conference, which has prompted the comment, 'Kinnock

would never hit anybody when they are up'. The National Reporting Centre at Scotland Yard came in for special criticism, as the embryo of a Government-controlled national police force. The centre – which was used to coordinate the movement of police, so as to match as far as possible the mass movement of pickets – represents no more than a sophistication of long-standing arrangements for mutual support between police forces. That the autonomy of individual police forces was maintained is illustrated by the varying approaches to dealing with the situation adopted in different areas. Some chief constables were prepared to authorise the stopping of vehicles carrying pickets whilst others were not. Some eschewed the use of riot clothing, whilst others went to great length to avoid the use of reinforcements from outside their force area. The appearance of squads of police equipped with riot clothing came not as a result of Government preparation for the conflict, but as a result of demands by police representative bodies for proper equipment and training, following the inner city riots of 1981. These demands had been subsequently complied with by reluctant local and central government.

It is significant that despite all the accusations of police bias and unlawful behaviour, in this instance the Government was unstinting in its support for the police. It set its face firmly against demands for a public enquiry into the policing of the strike. This was in sharp contrast to its reaction to the Brixton riots of 1981, an issue in which the survival of government was not at stake.

Faith in its resolution to maintain the rule of law and support the police, is one of the main-stays of public support for any Conservative government. Recent public opinion polls give law and order equality with unemployment as matters of major concern to Conservative voters. At last year's party conference, before the riots, a record 106 motions were submitted on the subject, whilst the single sanitised motion admitted for debate did little to assuage party disquiet. Since that time, the ever rising tide of crime has inspired such initiatives as the recent campaign against drugs, the neighbourhood watch scheme, and a crime prevention campaign launched by the Prime Minister herself. These measures are all very well, but the good middle class committee people who involve themselves in them have little effect on the mean streets where crime and violence are born and bred.

Law and order is clearly emerging as yet another challenge for the Government. At election time the judgement of the ordinary voter will not be affected by half-remembered initiatives, but by the reality of crime and disorder. The effectiveness and morale of the police force is therefore of the first concern to a Conservative administration. Should a Labour government come to power and implement its stated policies, this would be such a blow to British policing that basic liberties would be imperilled. The rabid detestation of the police regularly expressed at Labour party conferences may not find its way into an election manifesto, but Labour

policies of 'accountability' (which in effect means operational direction by local authority police committees) amount to no less than the political control and direction of the police.

The Social Democratic/Liberal Alliance, now boasts John Alderson (the former Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall and guru of community policing) and former Superintendent David Webb (who introduced community policing at Handsworth) as prospective Liberal candidates. Alliance policies enshrine the ideas propagated as a result of the Scarman Report. 'Community policing' which is in reality no more than a *Guardian* readers' fantasy, has become the cult of the liberal establishment. For the average voter, the relationship between the police, the local authority and government is an unimportant nicety. At the same time, talk of community policing evokes a deceptively warm glow of the old consensual British society, and encourages people to ignore the inner cities as they are today. The danger for the Conservative lies in the fact that this wishful thinking may become orthodoxy for just long enough to sway an electorate.

Douglas Hurd is likely to be the last appointed Home Secretary before the next General Election. His term of office has so far proved less than auspicious. Whilst Margaret Thatcher insists on promising the police more men and equipment, Douglas Hurd prefers to talk of further civilianisation and obligations to the tax and ratepayer. To the Government Crime Summit organised by the Home Secretary were invited people from a whole range of activities, including the trade unions, but no one from the Police Federation. More pointed was the Home Secretary's decision, shortly after the riots and the murder of Constable Blakelock, to deliver a lecture to a prisoner's aid group, rather than to appear (as tradition demands) on the platform of the Metropolitan Police Federation Annual Meeting. This insensitivity was not appreciated by the rank and file. To regain credibility for its record on law and order in time for the next election the Government will have to review its policies and initiatives. Above all there must be a credible reduction in crime and disorder before Conservative voters begin to ask 'Whatever happened to law and order?'

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Holland Visited

Michael Napier

The Pope's visit to Holland in May 1985 aroused a good deal of interest in the English press. Ordinary readers were surprised that the Pope, who in Third World countries always receives a rapturous reception – and in first world countries too for that matter – was received with vocal criticism and outright hostility. The cartoonists had a field day, and the Dutch were branded before the world as a rude and discourteous people. Those however who have followed the history of the Catholic Church in Holland since the Second Vatican Council were in no way surprised. The Catholic press gave more detailed coverage, and Peter Hebblethwaite, the former Jesuit who now earns his living as a journalist of Church affairs, wrote two perceptive and well-informed articles for *The Tablet*. Unfortunately, as is so often the case in *The Tablet*, the unsigned comment was almost completely hostile. Dutch Catholics were portrayed as faithful and committed, misunderstood and not listened to by the Roman authorities, driven in conscience to an attitude of 'loyal disobedience'.

Of course the truth is much more complicated. The trouble is that owing to the language difficulty and the one-sidedness of much reporting, the true situation in Holland is little known outside that country, apart from certain interested circles. What is needed are facts and in the pages which follow I have drawn extensively on the documentation prepared by the Jesuit priest, D J. Bots, on the eve of the papal visit. It is disagreeable to use the word 'progressive' and 'conservative', which are strictly inapplicable to matters of faith and morality, where the criterion is truth not opinion, but these words imported from the world of politics have been so canonised by the media that one has no choice but to employ them. In the passages that follow I will try to show that the course of events in Holland over the last twenty years is the logical outcome of progressive ideas carried to the utmost extreme, so that a church which in the fifties was devout and flourishing has been transformed into something so secularised that the Pope becomes an object of mockery and his bishops of vilification. In what meaningful sense these protesters can be called Catholics will have to be judged from the pages that follow. It is widely accepted that after 20 years the fruits of the Second Vatican Council have been disappointing in the extreme, and it is for this reason that the Pope called the November synod in Rome. If we can understand the Dutch tragedy we may perhaps better understand why he felt the need to call it. Although, as I have said, Holland is the extreme example of a false development, there are plenty of other coun-

tries in the industrial West that have gone some way down the same path, and the complacency of whose religious leaders is often amazing.

It is often asserted – by Peter Hebblethwaite among others – that the ungracious reception of the Pope must be ascribed to the Dutch national character. They are described as outspoken, hard-hitting and democratic, with no great love of authority. Yet this view is hard to reconcile with the state of the Dutch Church in the fifties. Let us begin with some facts. Out of a population of some fifteen million Holland is about 40% Catholic, a much higher percentage than in England. The congregation is however very unevenly spread, with the two Southern dioceses of Roermond and Den Bosch being 96% and 81% Catholic respectively. In 1953 the Dutch celebrated the centenary of the reestablishment of their hierarchy, three years later than the restoration in England. At that time Holland had a more developed network of Catholic institutions than any other country; Catholic schools, Catholic newspapers, a Catholic political party, a Catholic trade union, a Catholic broadcasting system. All these ensured that a Catholic's identity was promoted and protected from the cradle to the grave. Moreover these institutions were actively supported. In 1955, 97% of the Catholics subscribed to a Catholic newspaper, and 85% were members of the Catholic broadcasting system. In 1959 84% of the Catholic voters voted for the Catholic party, and 90% of the employees were members of a Catholic trade union. Dutch Catholicism also achieved extraordinary results in the social field: the working class did not leave the Church 'en masse' as was the case elsewhere. Thanks to the pioneering work of Father Henri Poels (1868–1948), Southern Limburg was the only mining area in the world whose miners did not leave the Catholic Church. In 1931 Pius XI stated to a delegation of Dutch Catholic labourers that 'there was no country in which the teaching of "Rerum Novarum" (Pope Leo XIII's great social encyclical of 1891) had been understood and implemented as well as in the Netherlands'. At the same time the spiritual life of the Church flourished with a tropical vitality. While between 1855 and 1952 the number of Catholics tripled, the number of priests increased sixfold. In the ratio of priests to Catholics there were in Holland twice as many as in France, Spain, Germany, or Austria. As late as 1967 Sunday Mass attendance was higher in the Netherlands than in the other industrial countries; at 63% (84% in rural areas) it was higher than 50% in Germany, 40% in Great Britain, and 30% in France. While constituting less

than 2% of the world total, Dutch Catholics in 1939, provided 11% of all missionary priests. Was this Church with its high level of religious practice, its abundant vocations, and its exemplary following of Papal social teaching, really made up of members who were outspoken, hard-hitting, and with no great love of authority? It hardly seems so. In 1953 Monsignor, later Cardinal, Alfrink stated that Dutch Catholics 'excelled through an exemplary reverence for ecclesiastical authority'. How then did the great change come about – a passage from one extreme of fervent loyalty to Rome to the most vocal bitterness and mistrust? One of the causes may perhaps lie in the very submissiveness of the Dutch, with their over-confident trust in their religious leaders. This may account for the slowness of their reaction when the opinion-forming apparatus of the Church was taken over by the extremists. Now the time has come to see what actually happened in Holland, how the changes came about, and who was responsible for them.

Everybody knows what the Second Vatican Council was intended and expected to achieve by the Popes and bishops who took part in it – a rejuvenated, 'open' Church, with a fresh face so attractive that the world would be converted by its missionary zeal. What in the event issued from these good intentions? At least in the richest and most industrialised nations a massive defection from the priesthood and the religious life, a catastrophic decline in vocations and conversions, a largely desacralised liturgy often abused by the clergy themselves, a widespread collapse of moral standards, and a bitter spirit of corrosive criticism directed against all authority, and especially that of the Pope and what is loosely called the Vatican. Nowhere was this more fully exemplified than in Holland although the experience was similar, in varying degrees, in all Western countries. There are many still today who just do not understand what hit the Church in the sixties, and why everything went so suddenly wrong. By looking closely at the Dutch experience we may learn useful lessons for our own country, and also understand what the Pope and some of the finest minds in the Church are trying to do to bring under control again what has been called 'the runaway Church'.

Before looking at the statistics which record the disintegration of the Dutch Church, it will be useful to look at the socio-economic background which was not without influence upon what took place. In the sixties Holland enjoyed a booming economy which placed it among the ten richest countries in the world, with an annual expenditure on social insurance which was some 7% higher than in the neighbouring countries of Belgium and Germany. The Catholics, more than any other ideological group, benefited most from this increased prosperity. A large number of university educated men and women made their way up into the middle class and rapidly adopted the values of that class, with its emphasis on material comfort and personal fulfilment, and its impatience with any form of external control. It was this group of 'nouveaux riches' intellectuals who initiated the renewal movement in the Dutch Church and established

its characteristics. It gradually assumed control of all key positions in the numerous religious institutions and by the end of the sixties had complete autonomy. It has been argued that the Dutch renewal was extremely vigorous and vocal, people were really interested in religion. That cannot be denied. It has been ascertained by sociologists that religious revivals often follow periods of economic boom, when people have time to turn their attention to higher values than merely material ones. Whether an authentic religious revival will follow, or only a pseudo-revival, depends on the attitudes of the religious leaders of the moment. Unless those are imbued with the authentic spirit of the Gospel, only a pseudo-revival will take place, masking an inner alienation from religion. This was what happened in the Netherlands in the sixties. There was an extremely lively interest in everything that concerned faith and Church, coupled with an inner alienation which surfaced in the seventies. What the progressive Dutch Catholics created was a faith-world made in their own image: a middle-class, easy prosperity faith. Or, in other words, a very limited, time-bound concurrence of economic and social circumstances in a very small corner of the world, which they proclaimed to be the total definitive reality towards which the whole Catholic Church must inevitably move. The fact that this vision has not proved attractive or persuasive even to the neighbouring countries of Belgium and Germany has added to the frustration of the Dutch progressives which they vented so notably on the occasion of the Pope's visit. Similar progressive groups flourish in other countries, but they have not been able to overcome the resistance of other Catholics who hold to the traditional teaching and prefer to take the saints as their models. Why then was the take-over so complete in Holland, where the Catholic body, having stood unanimously behind Pope and bishops moved almost 'en bloc' behind the new opinion leaders? The progressive control of the Catholic media – press, television, radio, all providing convenient 'pulpits' – must account for much; but, as has already been suggested, there was a weakness in the Dutch national character, its love of conformity, and its reluctance to take up a position of solitary opposition. Now it is necessary to look more closely at the actual process of disintegration.

We may notice the 'Honest to God' craze of 1964 when Robinson's book was translated into Dutch and immediately sold 40,000 copies in four months. The book was at first severely criticised by the Dominican Father Schillebeeckx, professor of dogmatic theology at the Catholic university of Nijmegen. However, he later retracted his criticisms when he saw how popular the book was with the progressive intelligentsia, to whom he has subsequently become a kind of house theologian, providing a theological rationale for each new development. A general collapse rapidly became evident. Suddenly, as though by agreement, there was an almost complete end of private confession; marriage practices were severely criticised, while the obligatory celibacy for priests was attacked as not only regressive but even as

incredible. From 1965 there was a wholesale exodus of priests and religious. By 1981 more than 2,100 priests had abandoned their vocation, twice as many relatively speaking as in the U.S.A., and three times the world average. At the same time, in the space of ten years, 4,300 religious (1600 brothers and 2700 sisters) had left their orders. The number of newly ordained priests dwindled from 318 in 1960 to 16 in 1977 (9 seculars for 7 sees and 7 regulars for 31 Orders and Congregations). In Belgium and Germany the number declined to 40% and 50% respectively of the 1960 figures. In the Netherlands it went to below 5%. It is hardly surprising, then, that the laity began to follow the example of their spiritual leaders and to stay away from Sunday Mass, attendance dropping from about 70% in 1961 to under 20% in 1984. The social consequences of this religious decline are rapidly becoming apparent. Catholic divorces are rising by leaps and bounds (20,000 per annum since 1975). Apart from the well known drug traffic in Amsterdam, the increase in crime is alarming. Since 1970 criminality in the Netherlands has increased every year by about 10%, the highest number of offenders, relatively speaking, being Roman Catholic.

The catastrophic decline in ordinations to the priesthood requires some explanation. We must, I believe, look at the new methods adopted for the training of priests. Here again the change was very rapid, with far-reaching consequences. Within two or three years all the seminaries in the country had been closed, and by 1969 all 32 philosophical and 30 theological institutes had been moved and concentrated in five of the larger cities: Amsterdam, Utrecht, Nijmegen, Tilburg and Heerlen. To these institutes all theological students for the priesthood were directed and for this purpose the institutes were – and are – fully subsidised by the state. What has been the result of this new method of training priests? Apart from the striking fall in the number of students – about 1,300 in 1977 compared with 2,000 in 1963 – what is significant is that hardly one (40% are female) intends to become a celibate priest or to bind himself unconditionally to a bishop or religious society. The study of theology has become just another academic discipline leading at most to employment as a lay pastoral assistant (concerning which, see below). The new theological schools, far from promoting vocations to the priesthood, have in practice become destructive of them. Three causes of this result may be singled out. The first is that no kind of spiritual formation is provided for the students, and this is openly admitted on all sides. The second is that the schools themselves are hot-beds of Church criticism with many of the students either outside the Church or marginal to it. There is a powerful current of criticism aimed against everything which has to do with the Church as an institution (structure, dogma, ethics, tradition, church discipline), and against the base of the Church, against ‘folk and rural faith’. In this way the students end in a spiritual vacuum between the top and the base, alienated from the ordinary faithful with their more intuitive, affective approach to the

mysteries of faith. The third, still more specific reason is the presence of married ex-priest teachers, who can hardly be expected to stimulate the option for celibacy. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in Rome has repeatedly requested (13th January 1971, 26th June 1972 and 23rd October 1976) that these priest-teachers should be withdrawn from the formation of future priests. Despite these admonitions, twenty-seven married priest-teachers (drawing their salaries from the state) are still teaching and practically no candidates for the priesthood are forthcoming, and in 1976 not a single one for the secular clergy. It is not difficult to presume a connection between the two phenomena: the Dutch ecclesiastical province is the only one in the world in which married ex-priests go on teaching in training schools for priests; in no country of the world is the return in priests in proportion to the student body in these institutes so low as in the Netherlands.

It is difficult to see how this situation can be rectified without dismantling the whole system, which has obtained a virtual monopoly in the training of the priesthood. Such a move would, however, be opposed both by the students, whose attachment to the Church is for the most part very slight and who like to keep everything open; and even more so by the teachers, whose generous state salaries render them immune to any sanctions by the ecclesiastical authorities. In the meantime only a proportion of those graduating can find employment as lay assistants in the parishes, leaving a growing number of unemployed and disaffected lay theologians.

The decline, almost disappearance, of priestly ordinations does not create dismay among the progressive, intellectual elite. It is seen as part of the inevitably process towards the fully secular Church, in harmony with the ‘spirit of the age’, with which all Catholics will eventually have to come to terms. This brings us to the ‘basic communities’, more often known in Holland as ‘critical communities’. Basic communities in fact they are not, because the members of the basic classes in society (workers, farmers, small shop-keepers etc.) are not found among them. In fact the members are composed of that intellectual, or semi-intellectual, prosperous middle class which has dedicated itself to freedom as an end in itself, freedom of thought and freedom of morals, drifting ever further away from the recognisable Church of Pope, bishops and tradition. In liturgy they do what they want. Only one element was missing and that was that they could choose their own priests and thereby become totally independent of the hierarchy. This missing factor was obligingly supplied by Father Schillebeeckx O.P. at a study day on December 9th 1978, when he proved (to his own satisfaction) that it is completely in accordance with the bible and tradition that the parishes elect their own priests. Man or woman, married or unmarried, was of no importance; and the professor emphasised his point at the end of the day by presiding at the eucharist, assisted by two married priests and two women, all singing together the words of consecration. It is not surprising that Father Schillebeeckx has become the darling of the

critical communities who see him as their champion against the narrow, persecuting spirit of Rome.

The time has now come to consider what has in fact been the reaction of the Roman authorities to the Dutch Church. When a whole ecclesiastical province is seen as going far beyond anything envisaged by the Second Vatican Council, and apparently heading towards total dissolution, the centre of Christendom cannot remain passive. The first major crisis arose over the new Dutch catechism published in 1966. Rome requested corrections of erroneous theology concerning such matters as the Virgin birth, the existence of angels, original sin, sexual ethics, and the sacrificial nature of the Mass. The authors of the catechism flatly refused to include these corrections, and it was left to the Dutch bishops to publish them in a supplement. In 1970 the Dutch pastoral council, a solidly middle class affair, voted overwhelmingly for the abolition of clerical celibacy and the reinstatement of married priests, despite Pope Paul's insistence that this point should not be raised. He accordingly instructed the Pro-Nuncio, Monsignor Felici, not to attend the meeting. This defiance was probably decisive in convincing the Roman authorities that matters could no longer be left solely in the hands of the Dutch bishops. What in fact could the Dutch bishops do? Themselves partly infected by the new spirit and half agreeing with it, they were yet at the same time still aware of their responsibilities and the need to keep open their lines of communication with Rome. Unwilling, or unable, to exercise any control over the course of events, they had the worst of both worlds. Rome decided that they needed to be reinforced. Rome, conscious of the needs of the poor, the humble and the simple, for whom a *bourgeois* intellectual church held no interest or meaning, looked for men of unimpeachable orthodoxy, courage, and sound judgment. It so happened that just at this time the see of Rotterdam (only created in 1955) fell vacant. In a preliminary canvas of the diocese, Father Adrian Simonis, aged 38, who had been a prominent spokesman for the orthodox minority in the pastoral council, received the second highest number of votes. Yet from the list of candidates submitted to Rome Father Simonis's name had been dropped. In December of the same year he was however appointed bishop. The reactions to this appointment were very instructive, and showed clearly how much Dutch Catholicism had come under the influence of a small tightly knit group that dominated the communications media. As one man the Deans, the Diocesan pastoral council, the heads of Catholic institutions, the professors of the Catholic School of Theology, and notables from outside the diocese, protested loud and long. But the campaign proved to be without supporters: within eight days a petition in favour of Mgr. Simonis had gathered over 40,000 signatures, nearly twenty times as many as were produced against him elsewhere. Several probes confirmed that the greater part of the diocesans, and of all Dutch Catholics, stood behind Mgr. Simonis, notwithstanding a sustained campaign against him by almost all newspapers

and magazines and on radio and television.

The upshot of the affair was that Rome was confirmed in the view, already held, that the ordinary Catholics of the Netherlands needed to be rescued from the dominant control that had been imposed by an unrepresentative clique. Here the words of Dr Böcker published in the daily *De Tijd* (9th January 1971) may be aptly quoted. 'The Dutch Church is an institution managed in quite an authoritarian way. Contrary to what is said and often believed by non-Catholics, the Dutch Church is not at all a model of democracy. Most Dutch Catholics have nearly nothing to say about the manner in which the liturgy is celebrated in their churches, about the religion classes in their schools, about the morals being preached, about the celebration and cancellation of church feasts and devotions, about the appointments and transfers of parish priests, and about the composition of the Rotterdam Diocesan Pastoral Council. All these and other matters are decided for them . . . by modern-thinking clerical functionaries who know better what is good for the people than the people themselves . . . The management of the Dutch Church is in the hands of an oligarchy of enlightened regents, supported by a number of lay persons who are allowed to join in the discussion because they know enough difficult sociological and philosophical expressions.'

The same pattern was repeated two years later when the see of Roermond in Limburg (96% Catholic) became vacant. A 40 year old priest of the diocese, Father Gijsen, was nominated bishop. All the Deans but one, the cathedral chapter, the Diocesan Pastoral Council, the theological school in Heerlen, all openly declared their disapproval through the press, radio and television. Once again, on enquiry, it was found that only a small segment (4% to 6%) of the population of Limburg opposed the appointment of Mgr. Gijsen. While other dioceses, with the exception of Rotterdam, and the religious orders passively accepted a continuing decline in priestly ordinations since the theological schools were ceasing to produce them; in Roermond a different path was followed. In 1974 Mgr. Gijsen opened a major seminary at Rolduc with a Jesuit, Fr. Van der Meer, as rector. This was entirely based upon the norms of Vatican II, creating a climate in which the students were nourished at the sources of their faith, with spiritual direction, community life and a positive bond with the bishop. Pope Paul VI supported the young plant in the difficult first years against a storm of criticism and active resistance, praising the seminary openly whenever and as as he could. The bishop had little difficulty in filling it with students, many coming from outside Roermond, but priests trained at Rolduc – with the exception of Rotterdam – were not accepted in their dioceses of origin. The statistics are revealing. From the time of Mgr. Gijsen's appointment in 1972 up to 1984 the diocese of Roermond has received 72 new priests as compared with 63 for the other six dioceses put together. This is remarkable because Roermond contains only 20% of the Dutch Catholic population, and it should be noted that this was

exactly four times as many as for the diocese of Den Bosch (which numbers about 400,000 more Catholics and has a comparable structure), namely 72 against 18. Given these figures a market researcher would not hesitate to come to the conclusion that obviously there should be not less but more of this new style seminary. This was certainly the view of Pope Paul VI who, during a general audience on April 12, 1978, a few months before his death, spoke of Mgr. Gijzen as follows: 'We recognise the great merits of this bishop, who has given his diocese and the Roman Catholic Church in the Netherlands a promising and significant stimulus towards renewal. We follow him with great admiration and with hope for such a renewal.'

It was not long after his election to the papacy that John Paul II invited the Dutch bishops to convene a special synod in Rome to be presided over by himself. It was held in January 1980; an exceptional measure for an exceptionally grave situation. The steep decline in ordinations to the priesthood, noted above, brought with it another danger which had to be squarely faced. The church in the Netherlands had begun to build up its own institution, that of the so-called 'lay pastor', in such a way that in time it would be able to take over completely from the ordained ministry. This would have meant the end of Catholicism in Holland. A few facts are relevant here. By 1980 there were 324 lay pastors (of whom 49 are women), that is 9% of the total of 3,605 religious and diocesan priests. All these male lay pastors were the products of the five theological schools, having received a complete theological and pastoral training but without any desire to commit themselves to the celibate priesthood. Moreover their number was continually increasing, while in most dioceses no new priests were coming forward to replace those who were dying. Another factor to be taken into account is that of these 324 lay-pastors about half were married priests despite the explicit prohibition of the Holy See given in 1971. In the Archdiocese of Utrecht alone there were before the synod about 30 married priests working directly in pastoral functions, and in this total number are not included the hundreds of married priests working as catechists in Catholic schools, which is against the rule that this is only permissible in state schools and then only in special cases. During 1979 pastoral workers in the dioceses of Utrecht and Rotterdam set up associations, or trade unions, completely independent of the bishops and against their wishes. The bishops could now see control of the Church fast slipping away from them, and it is against this background that the summoning of the synod needs to be seen.

The bishops whom the media had divided between 'hard line' and 'laissez-faire' – not without some justification – now found themselves united against the common danger. Among the decisions unanimously agreed by the bishops was 'the essential difference between the sacramental priesthood and the general priesthood of the baptised' (decision 17), and the obligation of clerical celibacy. In decision 21 the bishops stated that 'they unanimously wish to give allegiance to the decisions of

the popes to maintain the necessity of celibacy'. It was the decision concerning the real difference between the lay person and the priest that was the heart of the synod as the pope pointed out in his homily at the closing of the synod: 'When we come to allotting tasks and drawing frontiers between responsibility, a difference has to be maintained between the efforts of the lay people and the tasks given to priests and deacons . . . This special point is the essence of all other questions brought up.' This drawing of frontiers by the synod had the effect of clarifying what had been left too hazy for too long. The Pope had succeeded in reminding the bishops of their responsibilities, and if the result was a hardening of opposition against the Pope and bishops, at least the issues were now clearly in the open. We may even speak of a new investiture conflict. In the old investiture conflict of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the object was to free the bishop from the power of the kings. In our days the freedom of the bishops is being brought into danger by trade unions of pastoral workers, who aim at bringing the civil authorities against the Church.

Nothing has been said until now about the situation of the religious in Holland, nor is there space to go into detail. It is sufficient to say that it is every bit as bad as that of the secular clergy and in some respects worse. Between 1968 and 1984 the total of religious, male and female, fell from 43,973 to 26,775, a fall of 40%. In many Orders and Congregations community life scarcely exists any more, with the members widely scattered and living alone. At the same time there are hardly any vocations, some communities not having received a postulant for twenty years. The superiors seem unable to apply any remedy, and are in fact among the leading critics of the Pope and bishops. Yet in the few houses where community life is practised, and the rule of the founder is followed, there has been no lack of vocations. In the Benedictine abbey of Vaals there have been 18 vocations since 1960 so that the community has grown from 27 to 34, half the monks being under 35. Unfortunately, although the Holy See can nominate good men as bishops when sees become vacant, it can do little directly to improve the situation of the religious. The reform there must come from within, and throughout the world many Orders and Congregations are still in a state of crisis.

Since the synod three more bishops have been appointed by Rome, none of them to the taste of the progressives who have protested loudly through their usual channels. In 1983 Mgr. Bomers was appointed to Haarlem, while in the same year Mgr. Bär, a Benedictine monk of Chevetogne, was appointed to Rotterdam on the translation of Mgr. – now Cardinal – Simonis to Utrecht. Early this year a great uproar followed the nomination of Mgr. Ter Schure, a 63 year old Salesian and formerly Vicar-General of Roermond, to the diocese of Den Bosch on the retirement of Mgr. Bluijssen for reasons of health. The cathedral is one of the most magnificent in Holland dating from the late Gothic period, and was happily restored to the Catholics during the Napoleonic period. When the bishop arrived for his installation he had to be escorted by police through a

violent and jeering crowd. Within the cathedral however he was wildly applauded by the laity, who recognised the service the Pope had done them. From all that has been said above there can be no doubt that the Pope came to Holland knowing exactly what he would find. He was probably less outraged by the open acts of hostility than those unfamiliar with the situation. It has been the purpose of this article to provide that background information. The Pope came to encourage his loyal friends, and to confront the protesters, weak in faith as well as in morals, by publicly proclaiming the fullness of Catholic Truth. His addresses and homilies have recently been published by the Catholic Truth Society. No one can fairly describe his visit as a disaster when a crowd of over a hundred thousand welcomed him at Maastricht airport.

What are the lessons to be learnt from the Dutch tragedy? There is practically no country in the Western world that has not experienced some of the tribulations of the Dutch. Unlike Holland however, even where there have been negligent bishops, irresponsible theologians, and unfaithful priests, there have also been found zealous bishops, level-headed theologians, and loyal priests who have had the courage to resist the fashionable trend, albeit at much cost, and have looked beyond their immediate time and surroundings to Rome and the Vicar of Christ, and to the everlasting witness of the saints. Twenty years after the close of the council it is opportune that the Pope should convene an extraordinary synod of bishops – surely a collegial act – to assess the results of the Council and to try to correct the bad effects that have followed upon it, if not from it. The progressive press, whose contributors are often laicised priests, has already mounted its campaign against it; and especially against the Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Cardinal Ratzinger, its 58 year old German head, since even they dare not attack the Pope too directly. It is part of the anti-Roman complex, seen at its most extreme in Holland, which permeates this way of thinking. No doubt there will be some bishops participating in the synod who will try to argue that all is set fair for the Church and that the spirit of the Vatican Council – whatever they mean by that – needs only to be applied more vigorously. However they will be deluded if they think that they are convincing anyone but themselves and a small, if noisy, coterie of middle-class intellectuals.

Once again it is becoming more and more clear that the Church will be saved by the laity, without whom, as we know, it would look extremely silly. We are rather tired of hearing from the modernists that Newman was 'the spiritual Father of the Second Vatican Council'. Even if it were true it would not be true in the sense that the modernists mean. One of Newman's many merits was that he recognised the importance of the lay voice in the Church. He did not mean a restricted group of academics, enchanted by an existential philosophy and the consumer society of their time, but *all* the laity, for the most part inarticulate but whose faith, nourished by prayer and the sacraments, has always formed the great

body of the Church. From the beginning of his pontificate it was this audience, the Church of all the classes, which John Paul II addressed himself to over the heads of the clergy on his worldwide apostolic journeys. The enthusiastic response to his message of faith, love, sacrifice and sexual control – not least among the young – has witnessed to its validity.

We have seen in Holland how, when a bishop presents an authentic picture of the Catholic priesthood, vocations immediately flourish. It is the conviction of the Pope, and of many others beside, that there is no crisis in the matter of vocations. God is still calling the number of priests and religious that the Church needs; there is, however, a *shortage*, because vocations are being destroyed by elements within the Church itself. This is a subject to which the synod is likely to address itself. Many faithful lay people have felt let down by their priests, and grieved (perhaps silently) over their defection. It is noticeable that it is now often the laity, free from the unfair pressures which good priests are often subjected to, who are the most outspoken leaders in the counter-attack – if one must use such words – in support of Rome. The old obedience and respect for the clergy instilled into an older generation, has been replaced by a more discerning and critical spirit among young lay people. They are in fact criticising the critics. They are as well or better educated than the clergy, often with a finer understanding of human psychology, and know where to look for the true doctrine of the Church. As the Swiss lay theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar, puts it: 'the people of God must not allow their sense of what is Catholic to be dulled; instead, they must realise their responsibility, and, in the hour when many pastors fall silent or even fail, the laymen must raise their cry of protest in the name of the complete creed in which they were baptised' (*A Short Primer For Unsettled Laymen* Ignatius Press 1985, p.114).

Louis Bouyer, the French Oratorian theologian and liturgist, puts the point even more strongly: 'If those in the Church who are responsible for the faith fail individually or collectively, then it is in no way a sign of infidelity on the part of the believers, but on the contrary a sign of fidelity, to criticise and not put up with what this or that priest or even bishop or group of bishops teaches, if it is clearly contrary to what the Pope, the Councils and the whole tradition of bishops down to us have taught. The obedience of the faithful must thus always be an illumined obedience and be directed through human beings to Christ alone. If people who represent Christ put themselves in open opposition to him, to the whole tradition of the Church, and to those who are her surest representatives today, then one should not hesitate to resist: with reverence at first and, if they do not understand or accept criticism, then energetically and to their face' (*Le Métier de Théologien*, Paris 1979, p.140). Finally we must remember that the priests of the future will come from this same critical and well informed laity. There is no such thing as a priestly caste in Christianity. Our hope, then, for the future, and especially for the future of the Dutch people, is more than reasonable.

The Politics of Forgiveness

Joanna North

Resentment and anger are the natural feelings that result from a recognition that one has been wronged by another. It is natural, too, to retaliate and to desire the punishment of the wrongdoer. Feelings of anger and hostility and the desire for retribution are rooted so deeply within the human condition that while their expression might be regrettable it is always comprehensible. We do not find it *inexplicable* when a man seeks revenge even though we might condemn his methods, nor do we ask *why* a criminal is punished even while we may recoil from the harshness of some forms of punishment.

Those feelings, together with the notion of right and wrong, good and evil, responsibility and freedom, and the practices of praise and blame, reward and punishment, form part of the moral vision or ethos that comes most naturally to the common man. Human beings are bonded to one another by the love and affection which exist between individuals, the mutual sympathy and regard between friends and within families, and by the wider and more general ties of respect, compassion and tolerance for the members of one's society and species. Human bonds are enshrined in values and these values are in turn protected and expressed in moral rules and principles, social prohibitions and customs. No society could flourish in the absence of such bonds and no state could survive for long without at least paying lip-service to commonly accepted values through its laws. The connections between these elements of moral life are complex and many but the overall framework appears so natural and inevitable that any attempt to describe it in detail amounts almost to an exercise in truism.

But if this vision is obvious and taken for granted it is for those very reasons easily neglected. The conservative knows only too well that obvious truths are often the most fragile and that at times they must be spoken aloud and defended anew if they are not to become the relics of some dimly remembered age. To repeat, in the present climate, what the ordinary, uncorrupted man knows to be true – that there is such a thing as wrongdoing, and that human beings are, in general, responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished for their crimes – may inspire contempt in those who prefer the gloss and glitter of the new to the dust and solidity of the old. But it is to be hoped that to some, the sentiments expressed in what follows will be received like old friends, familiar yet always welcome.

It is apparent that the moral vision sketched above has, in recent years, been under attack, or rather has suffered a steady erosion, under the influence of various liberationist and libertarian doctrines. Certain forms of psychoanalysis, sociological analysis, radical criminology, and the liberalism of much modern permissive educational theory have conspired, unwittingly or otherwise, to undermine two central features of that moral

vision: the facts of man's rational agency and his consequent responsibility for his actions.

Too often the wrongdoer is portrayed in the guise of a victim, as the helpless plaything of unconscious psychological drives and instincts, or as no more than the end result of a process of socialisation in which he was the passive, malleable material. Too often crimes are excused as the regrettable manifestations of alienation or 'anomie', that pitiable condition which afflicts, so the sociologists tell us, predominantly working class people. Under the influence of this 'disease' people become alcoholics, drug abusers and criminals not by choice, but as a result of their confusion and sense of powerlessness in the face of rapid changes in modern society. Rather than face the frightening possibility that human beings are, and will remain, imperfect and capable of genuine good and genuine evil, the modern sociologist, educationalist, and radical politician continues to search for such explanations of wrongdoing, believing unquestioningly in the perfectibility of man, and the social determination of his defects.

When the criminal's behaviour is excused and explained in these terms, and when he is sympathetically portrayed as the victim of an uncaring home and a callous, achievement-oriented society, the *real* victim of crime, the one who has been robbed or attacked, rightly feels hard done by. *His* feelings of humiliation and rage are not analysed by the sociologist; *his* plight calls for no understanding or explanation. It is small wonder that he feels isolated, neglected and angry when, instead of public recognition of the wrong done to him, he encounters public unwillingness to see justice done.

It would be wrong, however, to say that in this situation we find a spirit of forgiveness on the part of those who accept the 'explanation' of the wrongdoer's plight. For where there is no recognition of a wrong done and no belief in the responsibility of the wrongdoer there can be no forgiveness. Forgiveness, no less than retribution, requires that moral vision which accepts as a central feature the responsibility of the human agent, and which allots praise and blame in full recognition of that feature. Any system of thought which does away with the notion of responsibility not only mystifies the meaning and practice of punishment, it must also relinquish the possibility of genuine forgiveness. Those doctrines that seek to do away with wrongdoing by explaining it in terms of psychological drives or blind social forces not only leave the victim of crime feeling isolated and angry, they also make any personal attempt of his to overcome his anger and to forgive the criminal ultimately nonsensical: for if there is no wrong what is there to forgive?

If a man is merely a victim of circumstance the appropriate response to him is not *punishment* but *treatment*. There is no point in seeing that justice be done where there has been, not an act of *injustice*, but a happening

over which the subject had no control. In such cases the primary motivation for any measures taken against the criminal can only be deterrent in nature. Similarly, if the responsible agent and his crime have dropped out of the picture there can be no point in forgiving him. He can be excused, understood, helped or treated, but not forgiven.

As responses to wrongdoing, retribution and forgiveness are linked through the notion of responsibility. We can find most of the great moralists of the past appreciating this link in the case of retribution, but the notion of forgiveness is rarely treated in such a manner as to display its inherent moral value. Kant, for example, made a distinction between punishment with the aim of deterrence and punishment with the aim of retribution; and he claimed that only the second is of direct moral worth. In the first case we are guided, Kant claims, by rules of prudence or expedience rather than by rules of morality. To use deterrent measures in our dealings with wrongdoers is to treat them as means rather than as ends in themselves. To punish with the aim of retribution, on the other hand, is fully in accord with the moral law which bids us treat others as rational beings, for it involves a recognition of the wrongdoer's responsibility for his action, and so grants him the respect which his nature as a rational agent requires.

Kant is surely right in claiming that retribution and deterrence differ, both in their aims and in their moral worth. In retribution although one may *hope* that the wrongdoer will not repeat his crime, we do not punish him *with this aim*; rather we punish him because he has done wrong and because his wrongdoing calls for such a reaction. For Kant, retribution is the fulfilment of the demand of justice, while the demand of justice is itself the call for retribution. An act of deterrence is obviously different: it does not serve the purpose of justice as such. It is an attempt to prevent the wrongdoer from repeating his crime or to prevent others from imitating him. The value of an act of deterrence lies solely in its consequences: whether and to what extent it succeeds in dissuading the wrongdoer from repeating his crime. The value of retribution, in contrast, lies in the fact that it is a fulfilment of the demands of justice, irrespective of the consequences that may ensue.

Hegel too, regards punishment as involving respect for the wrongdoer as a rational being whose act is a free expression of his will. Hegel recognises, as we should, that there are certain exceptions: imbeciles and lunatics are not responsible rational agents and in their case we try to deter them, through treatment or isolation, from harming other individuals. And if they *do* harm others we do not treat them as wrongdoers, rather, as Hegel says, we treat them as we would a dangerous animal. Those exceptions made, however, Hegel would disagree with those who allow any number of passions, instincts or forces as the reasons for wrongdoing. If we make no distinction between the normal and the abnormal and regard the actions of the wrongdoer as on the same level as the erratic gestures of the lunatic we fail, according to Hegel, 'to treat the criminal in accordance with the right and honour due to him as a man' (*Philosophy of Right*, 132).

Hegel takes from Kant the idea that the actions of a human individual are expressions of a rational being. Kant enjoins us to 'act according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law', and this is the condition of acting morally. But Hegel extends this idea of rational agency by saying that good *and* bad actions are the expression of a universalised maxim, and that when a man acts wrongly he chooses and wills violence and pain as the law of his action. Through his action he makes violence a law for himself, and it is in this self-willed acceptance of that law that Hegel locates the wrongdoer's *right* to his own punishment. By choosing violence for his law of action the criminal has in a sense called for his own punishment:

The injury which falls upon the criminal is not merely *implicitly* just – as just, it is *eo ipso* his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, his right . . .

The reason for this is that his action is the action of a rational being and this implies that it is something universal and that by doing it the criminal has laid down a law which he has explicitly recognised in his action and under which in consequence he should be brought as under his right. (*Philosophy of Right*, 100)

In being punished the criminal

himself finds in this process the satisfaction of justice and nothing save his own act (*Philosophy of Right*, 220).

We may not agree with Hegel's highly metaphysical theory of punishment. Nevertheless, he presents, as does Kant, a coherent account of its link with the responsibility of the rational agent. We might argue over the *extent* of an individual man's responsibility and perhaps agree that no human being is fully autonomous, but we cannot, if punishment and retribution are to make sense at all, deny that human beings are by and large responsible for their actions. Responsibility and retribution stand or fall together.

But neither Kant nor Hegel gave a coherent account of forgiveness. For both forgiveness involves a wiping out of the crime, a making undone what has been done, and Kant adds to this the idea that forgiveness involves the forgoing of punishment. Kant even goes so far as to deny the very possibility of forgiveness, for once wrong has been done it cannot be wiped out even by God. God is a divine judge against whose law the wrongdoer consciously and wilfully transgresses. The moral law, and hence the punishments that are incurred by wrongdoing, share the necessity and eternity of the divine nature. God, in his capacity as judge, cannot be moved by our pleadings and prayers, for this would mean that we could affect God's nature and somehow 'change His mind' as to our moral deserts:

Divine justice must reward good conduct and punish bad with unerring precision. We cannot, therefore, hope that if we implore and supplicate God He will grant us everything; for then it would not be good conduct but prayer and appeal which would matter. (*Lectures on Ethics*)

It is true that if one regards forgiveness in this light, as a

literal wiping out of sins, and as a reversal in a supposedly irreversible process of crime and punishment, then God cannot be said to forgive sins. But forgiveness should not be conceived in this way. Far from removing the fact of wrongdoing, forgiveness actually *relies* on the recognition of this fact for its very possibility, and what is annulled in the act of forgiveness is not the crime itself but the distorting effect that this wrong has upon one's relations with the wrongdoer and perhaps with others.

Nor must we suppose that forgiveness requires the forgoing of retribution. Certainly when we ask another for forgiveness we are sometimes merely asking to be 'let off', but more often the plea for forgiveness goes hand in hand with a desire to make amends, or to atone for a crime, and retribution is a way that this atonement can be achieved. And though it is possible for forgiveness to occur without retribution it is more likely that forgiveness can occur if the wrongdoer has faced the fact of his crime and recognised the justice of his punishment. If we understand forgiveness correctly there is no reason why forgiveness and retribution should contradict one another, and understood correctly forgiveness is indeed possible even for God. God's forgiveness may then be seen as the acceptance of the wrongdoer into the all-embracing love which He bestows upon us, following punishment and not replacing it. Kant should have recognised this possibility, for we do find him ascribing to God a role other than that of the divine judge, namely that of benevolent ruler. As such, God is at least granted the capacity to look kindly upon us and to help us in our endeavour to overcome temptation. It is in the recognition of God as a benevolent ruler that the Christian hope of redemption and forgiveness lies. God may still punish us, but He may also forgive: he may 'raise us up' from the position into which we have fallen through sin, and restore us to our rightful place through His love.

A coherent account of forgiveness then, must reject the view that it involves a wiping out of wrong and the view that it necessarily involves a forgoing of punishment. But more importantly it must show that forgiveness *requires* a recognition of the fact of wrongdoing and of the wrongdoer's responsibility for his action.

Forgiveness takes its place more naturally in the personal sphere than in the public. The prime examples occur when one person wrongs another. It is in relation to the element of personal wronging that forgiveness may be seen as appropriate or required. A court may try and punish a man for rape but, strictly speaking, it cannot forgive him for it: only the victim has the right to forgive, and only the victim *can* forgive. The court is a public institution and although it may share some of the features of personality (it is capable of taking decisions and imposing sentences, it may be appealed to or disobeyed, for example) it is difficult to see how it may be personally harmed or wronged. And if it cannot be personally harmed it cannot forgive. The Church is an apparent exception to this rule. But even here we should say that the institution is the representative of Christ or the instrument through which Christ forgives sins. The Church could not forgive the wrongdoer if it were merely

a public institution, like a court or a university. It is only on the understanding that Christ works *through* the Church, or that Christ's power is embodied *in* the Church, that we can make sense of the Church's ability to forgive sins.

Having said that forgiveness is a personal response it must not be forgotten that such responses often require public institutions and practices to give them coherence and meaning. Punishment is a public expression of the recognition of personal responsibility, an endorsement of that moral vision in which violence and personal attack are rightfully followed by the desire for retribution. Forgiveness, although it has its roots in the personal ties and bonds of love and affection, requires the recognition of the wrongdoer's personal responsibility and the right of the wronged party to retaliate. Public forms of retribution embody this recognition and represent that right. If there is no realisation of the wrongdoer's just deserts, if his action is explained in terms of his inability to have acted otherwise, and if the wrongdoer is treated not as a criminal but as a passive victim in his own affairs, the validity of the moral vision of the wronged party is denied. In effect he is refused access to the only focus on the other as a rational agent that can make his attempts at forgiveness meaningful. And even in those cases where the wrong done does not merit or require punishment by the law of the land (personal slights, verbal injuries inflicted through anger between friends or within a family, for example), the response of forgiveness is still meaningful. For in such cases the recognition of personal responsibility and of the wrongdoer's moral deserts may be accepted by the wrongdoer himself. Or perhaps the public recognition might be provided by the friends of the wronged party, all of whom share the same general moral vision. In any case the moral vision which allows for the possibility of forgiveness of injuries in a particular case is itself meaningful because it is shared, accepted and endorsed by the moral community as a whole.

Once we believe a wrongdoer to have been at the mercy of instinctive drives or to have been responding passively to an intolerable social deprivation, then we have accepted a redescription of his action. We no longer talk in terms of right and wrong, of moral fault and culpability. The language of morality, involving as it does the notions of freedom, responsibility, merit and blame, is replaced by a discourse using terms such as 'influence', 'environmental factors', 'drives', 'instincts', 'forces' and so on. Such 'explanations' replace the language of moral responsibility. There is no longer an action which is wrong, no longer a person to be blamed, punished or forgiven; there is merely an event which is found disagreeable and which must be prevented from recurring: an instance of antisocial or 'deviant' behaviour. Forgiveness is possible only where moral discourse can be applied: where it makes sense to speak of the other as having *wronged* me, and as meriting retribution.

Forgiveness is really a way of perceiving the moral fact of the matter. If I am to forgive I must start from the recognition that a wrong has been done to me. I must feel

aggrieved if I am to forgive. If the wrong is dismissed, explained away or redescribed in the ways outlined above, the proper object of my forgiveness is removed; I no longer *have* any wrong or affront to forgive.

Forgiveness, then, requires that a wrong not be disregarded, overlooked or dismissed. I can only begin from the often-painful realisation of another's deliberate attack upon me or upon some person to whom I am closely related. An act of wrongdoing typically brings about a distancing of the wrongdoer from the one wronged, a forfeiting of the sympathy, trust and affection of the latter. This distancing is felt as a breakdown or a distortion in normal personal relations. Initially this breakdown or distortion may be felt more or less painfully only by the wronged party. But it may be that the wrongdoer feels a similar anguish almost instantaneously. (Consider a bitter argument in which one party deliberately utters something harsh and cruel to the other. On perceiving the hurt in the other's face, or perhaps even as he says the words, the aggressor regrets his comment, inwardly recoils in horror from his action and starts pleading for forgiveness even before the other has had a chance to respond.)

Forgiveness is, first and foremost, a way of healing the damage done to one's relations with the wrongdoer, or at least a step towards 'putting things right' between one another. It is also a way of overcoming the anger and hurt that can so easily destroy the peace of mind of the wronged party and colour all his dealings with bitterness. The repentance of the wrongdoer, his recognition of and regret for his wrongdoing, and his willingness to make amends facilitate the progress of forgiveness, and retribution or punishment may themselves help to bring the wrongdoer to this state of repentance.

The wronged party, in coming to forgive the wrongdoer, must undergo an internal 'change of heart' towards him. He must accept the wrongdoer, even if this begins only hesitantly and reservedly, back into the place in his estimation which the latter occupied before the wrongdoing. But this is done, not by refusing to see the fact of wrongdoing or by trying to overlook it or explain it away, but by offering to the wrongdoer the trust and sympathy that were forfeited in the act of wrongdoing. It is to take a risk, to extend trust and love where trust and love were once willfully disregarded.

Forgiveness is of intrinsic moral worth in three respects. Firstly, as I have already argued, it can only begin from the recognition of the fact of wrong. Any account which denies the existence of wrong or which seeks to redescribe an act in terms outside the arena of moral discourse is one which leaves no room for the possibility of forgiveness.

Secondly, the act of forgiveness is a way of restoring the damage done to one's personal relations and of healing the breach created by wrongdoing. The breakdown, as I have said, is a breakdown of normal, harmonious relations of trust, sympathy and affection between human beings. The forgiver is, in a sense, in a position of moral superiority: the wrongdoer has, through his action removed himself from the realm of the (relatively) guilt-

less, and has 'cast himself down' in the eyes of the wronged party. However, the forgiver would be unwise and even morally at fault, if he proudly and loudly proclaimed his moral superiority over the wrongdoer. Indeed, to do so would, in effect, prevent the response from being a genuine case of forgiveness. The reason for this is that it would humiliate the wrongdoer still further, and negate with the one hand the affection and trust that are being offered with the other.

The terms used here to describe forgiveness – 'restoration', 'healing', 'overcoming' and 'acceptance' – all suggest the third sense in which forgiveness is of moral worth. I have spoken of forgiveness as restoring the wrongdoer to his proper place in our affections, of healing the damage done to one's personal relations, of overcoming estrangement, and of accepting the wrongdoer once more into his original place in our esteem. The idea that lies behind these phrases is that of normal, harmonious relations of respect, affection and mutual sympathy – in short, of all those basic bonds and ties between human individuals that were mentioned at the beginning. If it is right to say that these bonds are the foundations of a natural moral ethos it becomes clear just how forgiveness may be regarded as of wider moral significance. In being an act whereby such personal ties are reinforced and enhanced, forgiveness may be seen as rehearsing and upholding fundamental and basic human values.

Punishment is itself one step in the direction of restoring the wrongdoer to his rightful position. Like forgiveness, it involves a recognition of an individual's responsibility for his action, but it also forces him to recognise the full extent of his wrong and to make amends for his crime. Through punishment the wrongdoer comes to acknowledge the moral values that he has attacked and the rules he has violated. Forgiveness of the wrongdoer by the wronged is the natural completion to this process of restoration, and through it the wrongdoer is allowed to start anew the relations which his action has, for a time, suspended: those relations of respect and regard that form the basis of harmonious moral and social life.

We can now perhaps see why the doctrines of radical criminology are so perfidious. In the guise of humanitarian concern they in effect undermine the very basis for concern. For, if we accept them, then we have effectively placed the criminal for ever outside the moral community. By denying the notion of personal responsibility we destroy the process of atonement; and destroy, therefore, the possibility that a society, damaged by crime, may yet heal itself by its own natural devices.

The notions of right and wrong and of responsibility are of crucial importance to us; to ignore or deny them is to ignore and deny the very facts of our existence as beings who are more than animals, and whose happiness is to be found in the love and sympathy of our kind. If we are prevented from holding others responsible for their actions we deny them their full rights as human beings, and in so doing we deprive ourselves of the possibility of exercising one of the few truly valuable abilities of which we, as rational beings, are capable.

Lawful Espials

Charles Mosley

Recently Britain's security service has been under attack. Disgruntled ex-employees of MI5, a body with duties including surveillance of domestic subversion, have collaborated with journalists in both press and television seeking to expose irregularities. It has been alleged first that MI5 has improperly tapped the telephones of, and opened files on, among others, certain members of the CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament); secondly that information gathered by such clandestine means was used for party political purposes by members of the outgoing government in the 1983 general election campaign.

As a result, calls have been made for more public accountability of MI5, although those who agitate for greater accountability do not specify how this can be reconciled with the high degree of confidentiality necessary in effective security work. The emergence of several operatives who, through personal inadequacies, fell foul of the criminal law or who, because of grievances about their work, have been prepared to court massive publicity detrimental to the service, has suggested a basic flaw in selection methods. And the link between a 'peace' movement which condones offences against public order and the parliamentary Opposition's espousal of unilateralism does not make it always easy to differentiate between constitutional and subversive campaigning against an elected government.

In April 1984 Michael Bettaney, a former middle-ranking MI5 officer, was imprisoned for 23 years for trying to pass secrets to the Soviet KGB chief in London. Press reports later suggested that Bettaney's treachery had been linked with the death of Dennis Skinner, the Midland Bank representative in Moscow. Dennis Skinner had died in a fall from his flat in June 1983. A coroner's jury in Croydon on 16th May 1984 reached a verdict that he had been unlawfully killed. As *The Times* reported the following day, the coroner Dr Mary McHugh had given 'special attention to a note Mr Skinner gave to a neighbour two days before he died in which he stated his life was in danger and that he knew of a spy in the British security services. "It is a strange coincidence that death should have occurred such a short time after the writing of the note,"' she observed.

On 31st May 1984 the weekly magazine *New Society* published an article expressing sympathy with Bettaney. It was written by an ex-colleague of his, Miranda Ingram, who had been employed by MI5 for 18 months and who has admitted having been asked to leave the service. She sought to make a distinction between what Bettaney did and why he did it. '*Whatever the wrongs of his actions, his motives were decent,*' she wrote. Yet later in the article she wondered what those motives might have been, commenting: 'No-one understands why an intelligence officer should have chosen such an extreme course of

action in order to express his discontent.'

Although Miss Ingram revealed that Bettaney had worked for 'K' branch, which according to her concerns itself with counter-espionage, she alleged that Bettaney's attempt to betray secrets to the USSR derived from his unhappiness about the activities of 'F' branch, which monitors domestic subversion. In a properly conducted security service, however, it should not be possible for a middle-ranking officer in one section to be so closely aware of what his opposite numbers in a quite separate section are doing.

Miranda Ingram was also the author of an article entitled 'The Nuclear Warfare Tribunal' in the February 1985 issue of the CND's monthly magazine *Sanity*. This time she wrote: 'As a profit-motivated arms industry gathers momentum, the nuclear governments need to justify their possession of the "absolute" weapons by insisting on the existence of an "absolute" enemy.' She did not explain, in this simplistic mirror-image formulation, in what way the *Soviet* arms industry could be described as 'profit-motivated' given state ownership of the means of production in the USSR. Nor did she seem to see any essential difference between democratic and totalitarian societies, when she remarked that 'governments of both East and West can control their own internal dissidents because they can be said to undermine the stability needed to deal with the supposed formidable outside threat.'

The 'Nuclear Warfare Tribunal' about which Miss Ingram was writing had been convened, with CND assistance, by a body called Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament (LND). According to a report by Mikhail Bogdanov in the Soviet international affairs weekly *New Times* (No. 4, January 1985), he had been one of only three members of the press who had attended the foundation meeting of LND in 1982. The other two had been a Bulgarian journalist and a reporter from the British Communist newspaper, *The Morning Star*, and Bogdanov himself was to be expelled from Britain as one of the first 25 KGB spies ejected in the wake of the Oleg Gordievsky defection in autumn 1985.

One of the Nuclear Warfare Tribunal's 'judges' was Sean MacBride, the former IRA leader and recipient of both the Lenin and Nobel Peace Prizes. In the caption to the photograph illustrating Miss Ingram's article, only the last of these distinctions was mentioned. Miss Ingram also made no reference to the fact that the LND-CND 'tribunal' had invited from the USSR a certain Professor Tair Faridovich Tairov to act as a principal witness. Despite his academic title, Tairov is in reality the full-time Soviet member of the Secretariat – and thus effective head – of that most important and most discredited of international Communist front organisations, the World Peace Council. However, proceedings had to take place

without him on this occasion, as he was barred from entry into Britain to participate on the grounds – according to the Home Office (as reported in *The Morning Star* of 5th January 1985) – that his presence ‘would not be conducive to the public good’, and in accordance with ‘an established principle’ on officials from ‘Communist front organisations’.

On 14th June 1984, a fortnight after the appearance of Miranda Ingram’s apologia for Bettaney, *New Society* published a letter of congratulations from one Cathy Massiter, by then also an ex-MI5 employee: ‘Michael Bettaney is not some kind of exceptional anomaly who got in because of the failure of recruitment/vetting procedures,’ she wrote, ‘but is to a large extent a product of the security service itself.’ It was Cathy Massiter who later resurfaced as the principal source used by Geoffrey Seed and Claudia Milne, co-producers of ‘MI5’s Official Secrets’ – a 20/20 Vision TV documentary on alleged improprieties on the part of the security service. The IBA’s decision initially to ban transmission of this film by Channel Four caused uproar.

However, the reason Miss Massiter was no longer an officer in MI5 by the time she wrote to *New Society* was not immediately made clear. Nick Davies, a reporter who also contributed to the television programme, claimed in *The Observer* of 24th February 1985 that Cathy Massiter ‘was told to see a psychiatrist and then forced to retire early when she complained to her superiors about the work she was doing.’ But *The Guardian* told a different tale on 11th March: ‘There have been suggestions that Ms. Massiter’s decision to reveal her reservations about MI5 procedure . . . was motivated by a strong personal sympathy for Mr Michael Bettaney.’

The truth was that Miss Massiter, whilst still a serving officer of the security service, had written a letter to Bettaney expressing her sympathy after his arrest in 1983 and during his remand in custody as a category ‘A’ prisoner in Brixton. She seems to have believed either that her letter would not be intercepted, or that, if it was, the fact of an officer in her position having written it to a man awaiting trial for treachery would not be held against her. Her judgement proved faulty. It is now known that, as a result of her action, by the end of November 1983 fears had been expressed as to her reliability, and that people having to deal with her were instructed to let her see no further sensitive material. *The Guardian* report would therefore seem to have been the more accurate one, and indeed, when the author of this article gave Miss Massiter an invitation and opportunity to comment on or challenge the foregoing account, she declined to do so.

Despite (or because of) the IBA ban, *The Guardian* of 1st March 1985 published an edited transcript of the programme. Cathy Massiter was quoted as saying: ‘I’ve never been a member of CND. I’m not currently a member. I have a lot of sympathy with CND. I don’t know that I fully accept their arguments for total unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United Kingdom but I do think the issues that they raise are very important.’ Since unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United Kingdom is the

CND’s main aim, not fully to accept it yet to have a lot of sympathy with the CND might reasonably be thought to indicate a degree of confusion. Thus one might say: ‘I have a lot of sympathy with Flat Earthers. I don’t know that I fully accept their arguments that the world is not round’, and be plausibly accused of inconsistency.

Miss Massiter was much less hesitant about naming the late Harry Newton as an infiltrator slipped into the CND by MI5. Although he had died in 1983, the naming of Newton by Cathy Massiter caused outrage among his friends and acquaintances, many of whom wrote letters to the press – particularly to *The Guardian* – to protest that he could not have been an agent since he was always so sympathetic to their left-wing causes.

More serious was the naming in *The Observer* of 3rd March 1985 of an informant who is still alive. Nick Davies identified the former editor of the CND’s magazine *Sanity*, Stanley Bonnett, as someone who had subsequently given information about the organisation to the Special Branch. Davies had participated in the 20/20 Vision programme, and had also (as we have seen) skated over the true circumstances of Cathy Massiter’s departure from MI5. After considerable verbal fencing with the author of this article, Davies eventually denied categorically that Miss Massiter had been his informant about Stanley Bonnett’s role (although she would certainly have been aware of it). Since only a handful of people should have known of Bonnett’s activities, this implies that there was another leak – as yet unidentified – from inside the security service, unless Nick Davies was telling an untruth to protect Miss Massiter.

Whoever did give away Bonnett, the disclosure first of Newton’s activities and then of Bonnett’s will have seriously undermined the confidentiality which field officers of MI5 dealing with informants are entitled to expect from their desk officers. This may well hamper the security service’s ability to persuade people to impart information in the future.

During her television interview, Cathy Massiter claimed that the police Special Branch had infiltrated other agents apart from Newton into the CND. In his *Observer* article of 3rd March, Nick Davies told of a series of meetings between Stanley Bonnett and Special Branch officers, one of whom later joined MI5 as police liaison officer. Neither saw fit to point out that the Special Branch has a responsibility for the preservation of public order, quite apart from its role in combating subversion. It would therefore be failing in its duties (which are, in this respect, wider than those of MI5) if it did not monitor threats to public order from whatever direction.

As it happens, in November 1982 the CND Annual Conference voted overwhelmingly to adopt tactics of civil disobedience known as ‘Non-Violent Direct Action’ or NVDA. This committed the movement as a whole to policies of law-breaking for its political ends, just so long as violence is not used against people. NVDA certainly includes the committing of criminal damage against military property, and this has been frequently carried out by the ‘peace’ movement.

Nevertheless, despite his and his organisation’s publicly

expressed disregard for aspects of the law which happened not to suit them, on 22nd May 1985 the then CND General Secretary Bruce Kent visited the Molesworth cruise missile site and called on servicemen and MOD policemen to 'refuse to obey illegal orders such as those requiring you to guard, maintain or transport any nuclear weapons' (*Daily Telegraph*, 23rd May 1985). *The Guardian*, also of 23rd May, reported the CND's solicitor as implicitly admitting that there might be a *prima facie* case of subversion by anti-nuclear protestors to answer: 'Mr Brian Raymond . . . said that it was possible that 22 signatories to the letter [to servicemen] could be charged with incitement to disaffection.'

In the first months of 1985 alone, there were several cases of law-breaking by 'peace' campaigners. One trial in particular dealt with an incident involving major damage. On 4th February, Roger Westmoreland (secretary of Pocklington CND), Fred Gott and Steven Fogg were jailed for three years, two years and twelve months respectively, for starting a blaze after going directly from their CND meeting to what they thought – mistakenly – was a radio mast belonging to the Fylingdales nuclear early warning system. In fact they had destroyed an important communications link for the civil emergency services, rendering useless eight radio channels on which fire services and the police depended, and inflicting a total of £228,000-worth of damage.

Again, on 8th February, the *Daily Telegraph* reported Judge Gerald Butler QC's sentences on five protesters found guilty of criminal damage – they had poured red paint over the floor of the Ministry of Defence and jammed locks with glue. Judge Butler said that the CND protesters were not above the law just because they honestly believed that what they were doing was right. Such an attitude was, he said 'preposterous'. He also dismissed the defence argument that the protesters honestly and sincerely believed that they were 'protecting the building from nuclear attack'. No public condemnation by the CND of these protesters' criminal damage at the MOD appeared in the national press.

One of the most widely reported and repeated charges made as a result of the 20/20 Vision programme was that in 1983 MI5 had supplied the Conservative government – specifically Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine's Defence Secretariat (DS) 19 – with non-classified information about the politics of CND activists which was used in the run-up to the general election. The provisions of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive of 1952, issued by the then Home Secretary, say that it is essential that 'the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence'. As Cathy Massiter noted in the programme's transcript, 'Unilateral nuclear disarmament had been adopted by the Labour Party, a general election was in the offing and it had been clearly stated that the question of nuclear disarmament was going to be an important issue there.'

According to the programme, the then Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, authorised MI5 to tap one leading CND official's telephone. The official was CND vice-president and former chairman John Cox – subsequently

elected to the ruling Executive Committee of the British Communist Party. However, the tapping of his telephone did not begin until August 1983, two months after the general election had seen a shattering defeat for the Labour Party, based (according to many political analysts, including Roy Hattersley – now Labour's Deputy Leader) upon Labour's espousal of unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Miss Massiter pointed out that MI5 had contemplated instituting the tap as early as April 1983: 'We were prepared to go along with the tap before the general election. But it was deferred because it was felt it was too sensitive a matter to go ahead with at the time.' In short, it appears that, far from information gleaned from telephone tapping by MI5 having been exploited for party political ends, either the security service itself or the Home Secretary actually sacrificed efficient information-gathering in view of the proximity of the general election.

Miss Massiter's principal complaint in the programme concerned the fact that prior to the election she had been asked to pass a report containing non-classified information on the left-wing affiliations of various CND leaders to the civil servants in Michael Heseltine's DS 19: 'It did begin to seem to me that what the security service was being asked to do was to provide information on a party political issue,' she said. Peter Kellner, political editor of the *New Statesman* and an occasional columnist for *The Times*, went further than the hints of the 20/20 Vision documentary in his appearance on Channel Four's 'What the Papers Say' on 1st March. He categorically stated that it was Miss Massiter's report which had been used in Conservative speeches and attendant press reports analysing the political make-up of the CND leadership. *The Guardian* of 21st February had likewise alleged that DS 19 'received non-classified information about the left-wing affiliations of senior members of CND, which, it is claimed, Mr Heseltine used in political speeches about the peace movement.' On 3rd March *The Observer* similarly declared: 'The Defence Secretary, Mr Michael Heseltine, is understood to have used the MI5 research when he named 14 of the 26 officers and nationally elected members of CND's National Council as Communist, ex-Communist or having far-left [*sic*] Labour links, in April 1983.'

Although the programme had hinted at this by showing a clip of Heseltine making the speech in question, it had actually stopped short of making any such categorical claim. The subsequent allegations prompted Dr Julian Lewis, Research Director of the Coalition for Peace Through Security, to write a letter to *The Times* which was published on 6th March 1985 and not challenged thereafter. It pointed out that 'for nearly four years this organisation [CPS], run by three Conservative candidates at the last election, has been monitoring the activities and political affiliations of the leadership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.' This had been done without any MI5 assistance, and on at least one occasion the CND General Secretary had conceded in an internal document that the Coalition had published 'a complete "political"

breakdown of those elected at [CND] conference' to the CND Council.

Dr Lewis cited instances when his comprehensive evidence of the left-wing affiliations of the leading figures in the CND had been published in *The Times* and the *Daily Telegraph*. He stated that in January and May 1983 he had prepared detailed confidential reports on the political affiliations of the members of the CND Council and Executive Committee. These had 'provided by far the greatest part of information used by two ministers in exposing the left-wing affiliations of most CND leaders. This applies to the April 23rd 1983, speech by Mr Heseltine excerpted in the Channel Four documentary.'

On 13th March, according to Dr Lewis, he had a telephone conversation with the television programme's co-producer, Geoffrey Seed, who did not try to contradict the contents of his letter to *The Times*. When asked about the programme's position on the widely circulating claim that the Heseltine speech had been based on the Massiter report, he conceded that 'We did not say that' and claimed 'the programme didn't infer [*sic*] that either'. But attempts to get him to say this publicly or put it in writing proved fruitless.

Another interesting admission during that telephone conversation was that Seed knew nothing of the November 1982 CND Conference decision to commit the organisation to civil disobedience – which automatically brought it within the ambit of the Special Branch on public order grounds, irrespective of the question of subversion. This suggests that never, during the entire preparation of the 20/20 Vision programme, had Cathy Massiter informed him of it – a disingenuous omission given the strength of her indignation at supposedly unwarranted monitoring of CND activities.

Julian Lewis remained concerned that there should be no confusion about the role of his organisation, rather than the security service, as the source of Conservative ministers' evidence that the CND was a left-dominated body. He therefore wrote to Labour's shadow Home Secretary (Gerald Kaufman) by special delivery on 11th March, alerting him to the facts as published in *The Times* and offering to show him privately the two confidential 1983 reports he had prepared and given to ministers. He added: 'Anyone comparing my confidential material and the text of the Heseltine speech as released by Conservative Central Office [on 23rd April 1983], can be in no doubt of the heavy dependence of the latter upon the former. There is little in the one which is not in the other – even down to one or two tiny inaccuracies. . . .'

The following morning, Mr Kaufman's secretary confirmed that the letter had been safely received and would be read before the relevant parliamentary debate later that day. In fact, Kaufman ignored its contents, declined to view the confidential reports or compare them with the Heseltine text, and declared dramatically in the Commons (12th March 1985) that Cathy Massiter 'alleges that secret information obtained by covert and clandestine means for MI5 was passed on to the DS 19 Unit at the Ministry of Defence. She claims that a briefing paper on CND was specifically prepared for MI5 by the Secretary of State for Defence.' [Either *Hansard* or Gerald

Kaufman made a slip here: presumably this should have been 'prepared by MI5 for the Secretary of State for Defence'.] 'She claims further,' he went on, 'that this material was then used by the Secretary of State for party political purposes.' It is intriguing to note how, having grossly exaggerated the claims of the programme itself, the shadow Home Secretary was careful to put the exaggerations into the somewhat more cautious mouth of Miss Massiter herself.

What conclusions may be drawn from all this? First there is no doubt that the CND is an essentially left-wing organisation, its dominant members ranging from the Labour Party, through a variety of 'socialist' groups, to Communists of both the Stalinist and Trotskyist varieties. Even the CND itself has begun to be more frank about this: 'leaflets and newspaper articles appeared "proving" the left-wing affiliations of some members of the CND Council – which had never, in fact, been secret' (*Sanity*, April 1985).

Secondly, the combination of Labour's new 'defence policy' of unilateral nuclear disarmament with endorsement by dozens of Labour MPs in the CND of the movement's commitment to illegal, albeit non-violent, 'direct action', inevitably blurs the distinction between a parliamentary Opposition and an extra-parliamentary pressure group which may (a) be manipulated by far left elements themselves either sympathetic to or controlled by the USSR, and/or (b) indulge in offences against public order.

Thirdly, the quality of some personnel recruited by the security service has been gravely deficient and individuals have been insufficiently impressed with the need for confidentiality.

Further evidence of inadequate personnel selection is to be found in the conviction in late April 1985 of one Derek Card for sexual offences. The court heard (*Daily Telegraph*, 27th April 1985) that Card's work was 'stressful, difficult employment'. Actually Card was described as working in the MI5 vetting section (i.e. screening personnel) by *The Guardian* of the same date. This is not considered to be one of the more stressful sections. Besides, the 'stressfulness' of the vetting section was not advanced as the sole unsettling factor in Card's history, thereby weakening stress at work as a plausibly mitigating circumstance. His defence counsel said that 'as a child Card had faced "a considerable number of traumas" but overcame them to work his way up the civil service' (*The Guardian*, 27th April 1985). Evidently these traumas had not prevented his recruitment into MI5.

Bettaney's disturbed behaviour at a time before his arrest had already given cause for concern. *The Guardian* of 10th May 1985 noted that 'According to the Security Commission's report there was no reason to doubt Bettaney's [*sic*] loyalty at the time he was recruited, even though at Oxford University he was a member of a right-wing group with a keen interest in Nazi politics. He had subsequently lived for a year in West Germany with a priest from Eastern Europe.' Bettaney's eventual sharp lurch to the left – joining the Labour Party during his stint with MI5, and ending up claiming to be a Marxist – argues an ideological volatility wholly unsuitable for an

officer in the security service.

Although it is Bettaney who provides the starkest example of unacceptable political aberrations, it is by no means clear that the political outlook of other MI5 entrants is sufficiently scrutinised. Since her 'resignation', Miranda Ingram has, by her uncritical coverage for the CND of the Soviet-approved 'Nuclear Warfare Tribunal', at the very least assisted a crude Soviet propaganda line, whether consciously or unconsciously. Cathy Massiter, probably the least irresponsible of the three younger people, has shown herself as naive and muddled – both in behaviour while still a serving officer towards Bettaney after his arrest, and in her attitude towards the CND and its unilateralist policies.

Can the security service seriously afford to continue recruiting those who are so unstable or so 'apolitical' and detached as to be neutral (as Sir Winston Churchill once put it) 'between the fire and the fire brigade'? Whilst the CND clearly contains many decent idealists, it is also inevitably going to be a prime target for infiltration by those actively hostile to Britain's independence and parliamentary democracy. The very heavy concentration in the CND's upper ranks of far left figures must call into question the judgement of those others at the top of the CND who are of the more moderate left. For no prudent democrat allows himself or herself to be so consistently associated with people of dubious credentials.

Miss Massiter gave evidence of the then CND chairman Joan Ruddock's poor judgement, as well as her own, in *The Observer* of 24th February 1985: 'Mrs Ruddock ... gave an interview to a Soviet journalist based in London. "The journalist was actually a KGB officer," said Miss Massiter – incidentally informing those KGB members who peruse the *Observer* that MI5 knew about that journalist's KGB membership at that time – "Joan Ruddock didn't know that, but it provided the grounds for recording her as a "contact of a hostile intelligence service", which was ridiculous".'

Was it? Joan Ruddock is widely regarded as a personable television performer and an asset to the CND; but she is presumably no more immune than the rest of us to being manipulated by undercover agents, and since her position at that time as CND chairman had exposed her – however unwittingly – to a meeting with a KGB oper-

ative she was clearly more likely than most to be subjected to attempts at exploitation as a 'contact of a hostile intelligence service'. People in political positions of sensitivity and responsibility usually take good care to adopt a stance of extreme caution in dealing with Soviet emissaries, whether 'journalists' or diplomats. Anyone with the slightest experience of international politics is aware that Soviet journalists in Britain almost invariably have a KGB role, as the Gordievsky expulsions have recently re-emphasised. Joan Ruddock's having headed a CND delegation to the Politburo-controlled 'Soviet Peace Committee' in Moscow in May-June 1982 was, in any case, more than sufficient justification for recording her as having had undesirable Soviet contacts.

The policies of the CND have an international dimension, not just a national one. Indeed, its very *raison d'être* is a presupposition about international relations. Since the CND's central argument rests upon nothing more solid than the assertion that its judgement of Soviet intentions in the event of British unilateral nuclear disarmament is superior to everyone else's, it would surely be wise to show evidence of sounder judgement as to whom it chooses to sit on its Council and the choice of people with whom its leaders consort. Lastly, the CND's commitment to illegal direct action by its members clearly makes it a fit subject for investigation and monitoring by such bodies as the Special Branch which exist to maintain the rule of law and public order.

*Postscript: In April 1986, the same 20/20 Vision team of Geoffrey Seed, Claudia Milne and Gerry Gable, backed up by a complementary Nick Davies article in The Observer (13 April), thought to 'expose' a junior civil servant – Brian Gentleman – as a spy for Czech Intelligence. Cathy Massiter was produced again to argue that a 'scaling down of the [MI5] effort against the Soviet bloc' in favour of a greater emphasis on domestic targets 'like trade unionists and peace campaigners' was responsible for a failure to apprehend Gentleman and his controller. However, a Sunday Times investigation (27 April and 25 May) found the story to be 'bogus', and reported Gentleman to have been 'foolish but innocent' and 'misled by the assistant producer Gerry Gable'. According to journalists Barrie Penrose and Mazher Mahmood, 'When we asked Gable for any comment about Gentleman's allegations he said: "Why don't you f*** off!"'*

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In Search of Central Europe

The Sad Face of Romania

Lesley Chamberlain

Far more than the hunger which has been widely publicised, fear has cast a shadow over Bucharest, a city once famed for its *joie de vivre*. Today ask any Romanian and he will say gaiety has fled the communist city, for reasons which are not only economic. Under the watchful eye of Moscow the country's politics have become unpredictable and inscrutable, and their very secrecy seems to have engendered social decline. Fifteen years ago, when Romania was the most independent member of the Soviet bloc, outspokenly critical of Soviet economic and foreign policy, the atmosphere was very different. When the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia to put an end to the Prague Spring in 1968, President Nicolae Ceausescu, after only three years in power, deplored the action as a grave mistake. I was in Bucharest earlier this year listening to a man of my acquaintance remembering his happiness on that occasion. There were public meetings out of doors and even those Romanians who were not Communists at heart relished the excitement and relative freedom which the 'maverick' political climate had created.

Today the same Communist leadership, as suspicious of Russian intentions as ever, but anxious for its own survival, has cast an immobilising and dispiriting spell over Romania's 22 million inhabitants. Tighter security, a Maoist-inspired contempt for intellectuals and, above all, economic decline have worked a terrible transformation during Ceausescu's reign. The economic problems – leading to the undermining of the national currency (the *leu*, or lion) – are partly the result of enslavement to Russian needs and a huge war debt payable to Moscow. Because of the growing force of those needs and the harsh clampdown in fear of protests, displays of foreign policy independence no longer mean much. Misery may now be reaching saturation point.

This year's New Year festival – the most important date in the Romanian festive calendar, with decorations, fairs and feasts – was celebrated by many people in a mood of bitter irony. *La multi ani!* was on everyone's lips; but happiness was at best only a personal wish in a country which offers little hope to its young people of travel or diversion or a job of their choice. Party men and women regretted the fates of their children. Others called the traditional banquets, at a time of shortage and discomfort, repugnant.

Apart from a few bad weeks, the winter was fairly kind this year, with no repeat of the unusually cruel weather of 1984/5 which provoked a lethal energy crisis lasting into

the summer. Last year in Timisoara, a city of 100,000 inhabitants in western Romania, hot water was still rationed in June to the early hours of the morning and lights were out in the streets. I spent a sticky, eerie and hungry four days there, trying to make sense of Romania for the first time. But food shortages and the queues for basic commodities – bread, sausage, chicken, cheese – persist. Shops in Bucharest are today empty, dreary, echoing halls. The central market, though colourful and lively, is a forlorn sight with its apples, tiny pears, some chicory and tomatoes, herbs, spices arranged like heaps of coloured sand, and occasionally a bowl of eggs, a slab of soft white cheese, or a box of salted fish. Away from the food huge balls of coloured wool are on sale, alongside thick undyed woolly coats, blankets and rugs, and rough pottery and wooden kitchen implements and basket work, and giant mousetraps. This is unchosen peasant life, thrust upon a capital of nearly two million people, and it is poorer than I remember Moscow six years ago.

No doubt Western expectations exaggerate the difficulties. As one Bucharester told me: 'As far as food is concerned we manage. It's not as bad as it looks. I took a parcel of food to an old man and found his fridge already full.' For food is generally acquired through friends and contacts, perhaps through someone who works in a hotel or a restaurant or manages a grocery store, while in the country there is much small-scale private enterprise. But it is an ugly business relying on the Communist equivalent of the old school tie merely to eat your fill, and as in all Communist countries, the daily treasure hunt takes up much time and patience.

And that was what my friend meant. The grumbles of the belly are nothing beside the greater, less easily identifiable pain which begins in those moments of personal compromise and waste. Romanians cannot remember such a terror since Stalin. They are haunted by a Kafkaesque fear of the unpredictability of a Party which has subordinated ideology to power at home and yet which seems to be powerless before the demands of Moscow. The best of Romanian manufactured goods and machinery and some of its precious foreign currency are siphoned off to the Soviet Union in exchange for oil, and the economic catastrophe is increasingly seen as the mark of social and political enslavement. Intelligent, otherwise calm men and women talk about their fear openly, so that it is hard to dismiss it as fantasy, induced by forced existence in a political vacuum. A contemporary novelist struck an apt image when he said that while Romanians do not go to prison nowadays for their political views (few of them are active enough for that), yet every man in his silence has received a bit of that

prison into himself. Another writer told me of the pain and the necessity of self-censorship. According to the ideology, the Party will wither away when it has sufficiently penetrated the consciousness of individual citizens. Perhaps then the time is almost ripe for its dissolution.

The plight of intellectuals is particularly vivid; pressurised from within by their own sense of loyalty, they are also constantly and remorselessly censored from without. Cautious journalists with long experience cannot tell in advance if next week's column will be accepted. Critics and writers see their works criticised for political messages they never intended to convey, while controversial points are unaccountably passed over. Students are frustrated by tiny admission quotas for the artistic professions, and puzzled by the restrictions on the courses they can study and the hours they can devote to them. As one told me, an hour's work was all that was possible after lectures if the authorities insisted on closing the library at 5.30. And of course the usual Communist absurdities remain, so that few students of English can ever hope to see England or to buy the English books that they so desperately need.

A Western observer is privileged not to have to care or to take sides. But when Party members, fearing each other as much as the observations of Westerners, are jumpy and slick, when the men and women in the street look apprehensive and quickly confess to their fear, then one cannot escape the impression of a society afraid to look at itself in the glass. I was invited to hear about Romanian culture from a high official with immaculate Western manners and clothes, and he in his warm, old-fashioned, red-carpeted official drawing room, in the presence of a huge walnut-cased pre-transistor radio and a framed photograph of Ceaucescu, treated me most generously. I played my role as guest and he his role as master academic, and we both were lying. Politeness and erudition are standard means of evasion, traps of non-truth, but neither of us was prepared to look the tactic in the face that morning. Without the evasions there could be no society between us at all, and above all I wanted contact. The lie that we enacted is the lie upon which Romanian society as a whole is founded; this is the price that must be paid if life is to go on.

Which is to say deviousness need not be immediately unpleasant, especially since surface relations, for all their caginess, adhere closely to the ways of the old, ultra-courteous and chivalrous Francophile civilisation of the pre-war years. The one true collective dream of Bucharest is that it should be a second Paris. My hotel was perhaps bugged but it was comfortable, civilised and relaxed. In public Romanians were warm and helpful in the Latin way. I took coffee in their midst, sat in packed restaurants and trains, and I was never left alone. I became so used to Italianate manners that when a voice in the dark behind me kept saying '*hallo, buna sera!*' I determinedly ignored it until a young policeman angrily imposed a spot identity check. The authoritarian intrusion mattered the more, because the surface reality is so peaceful and unviolent.

But any personal relations which go beyond the surface are immediately difficult. It is forbidden by law to entertain foreigners at home and even casual social contact is frowned upon. People in good faith would give me neither their names nor their true message over the telephone, even if the intention was only to name the place of a personal meeting. In my hotel I was persuaded to ignore a new acquaintance because 'it would not be right for a capitalist woman and a communist man to be seen breakfasting together'. For a while it was a game to play. But the jokes about those who listen in in the bedroom and the microphone in the flowers quickly wear thin, giving way to a dull, acquiescent misery. My score of educated, politically aware but hardly dangerous acquaintances braved 'difficulties' they could not specify but which made them hugely anxious in order to give me hospitality. None of them would thank me here for mentioning their names in tribute.

Romania today runs the tightest ship in Eastern Europe, not quite a Stalinist vessel, but hardly a cruiser for human rights, as U.S. Secretary of State Shultz tardily reminded the world when he at last went there before Christmas. Romanians dive beneath the surface to avoid collision. A national axiom has it that the sword will not cut the head which keeps low, and they insist that their history of occupation, first by the Turks, now *de facto* by the Russians, has taught them the valuable lesson of non-resistance. Romania is a world apart from other Communist states in Europe – from Czechoslovakia, or Poland, and even Moscow, where underground dissent is traditional, articulate and fiercely political. The head which ducks low turns rather to art, to books, to craft and the countryside, and to the pleasures of daily life. Dishonesty and fiddling also drive Romanians back to the pleasure of helping themselves; hence the ingenuity with food and a remarkable fashion for knitting. Amongst the most popular pastimes today is going to church, which thanks to the Romanian Orthodox tradition is the cosiest and least political of social activities outside the Party purview – so much so that officials, while representing official atheism, are beginning to advertise the church as a safe conduit for frustrated social feeling. We shouldn't, however, be misled by this – another lie upon which a semblance of normality can be founded.

A current joke has it: 'If we had meat today it would be like the war.' This winter a *de facto* curfew forced restaurants, bars, theatres and cinemas across the country to close by 9 pm. The rhythm of the day belonged to the workers: up by 7, at work until 4, then early to bed, saving energy and appetite. Romanian television was broadcasting for two hours a day in mid-evening, one hour news, one hour films: Richard Burton as Wagner, Laurel and Hardy. Western films appeared without titles or credits, so as to save the cost of broadcasting rights. Wise Romanians were buying aërials enabling them to tune in to the nearest better and longer-running foreign stations – Bulgarian, Hungarian, or Russian, depending on where they live. Meanwhile the theatre and cinema queues are as long as those for bread.

Neither for the terror nor for the material emergency do Romanians entirely blame Ceausescu. They view their country and its Party as an insoluble puzzle, and chide Western analysts who put forward answers to problems which they themselves can barely understand. As they said to me wryly, what can you, who are 'good reporters, but bad portrayers of life', expect to learn of the Romanian enigma in a week? Well, one thing: its core is a blinding hatred of the Russians, which is perhaps the strongest domestic card in the hand of Ceausescu, an avowed nationalist strapped by an 'internationalist' (i.e. pro-Moscow Communist) mentality. Arguments still rage over the precise order and political colour of events in 1944, when Romania, which fought with the Nazis, went over to the approaching Russians in the vain hope of staving off invasion. The then-nascent Communist Party claims some of the credit for the turn. But today everything is academic save only the bitter memory left by the Russian arrival. The Russian troops wanted wristwatches, and Bucharest was in this as in every respect, far more advanced than Moscow. A young Romanian heard the Russian phrase of the day from his father and it was still ringing in his head when he relayed the experience to me: '*Davaite chasy!*'

A monumental column topped with a Soviet soldier was erected in Bucharest's Victory Square in memory of the Soviet 'liberation'. People say it is one good thing about the present construction of the Bucharest Metro that because of it *he* has been translated indefinitely to a nearby field. For it was no happy memorial to have a foreign soldier in the one site in the city named after Romania's final independence from the Turks. The Russians come now as tourists, as Imperialists waving thick bundles of roubles and expecting everyone to understand their language, which almost no one in this non-Slav country does. The second language of Romania – and once the preferred cultural language – is French.

A joke tells of a Russian general who is asked how long

it will take to subdue Romania. 'Two days, if the army resists; otherwise a week, so profuse will be the welcome'. Romanians show their fear through fawning. The habit has been institutionalised at the highest level, with Ceausescu's cult of personality. This cult, as is well known, embraces his wife Elena, and his son Nicu, and allows him to give his relatives top posts and medals. The term 'dynasty' is in common use. On Elena's birthday this year, January 8th, the Party newspaper *Scinteia* devoted nearly three of its six pages to her and her husband, and every day the press carries formal photographs and tributes. The intellectuals purse their lips fastidiously; less tortured men and women laugh. Political scientists see in the cult something of the Ottoman tradition of leader worship, but they say it has reached original proportions in Romania under Ceausescu. Indeed. The man who needs adulation also needs compensation for his abased position as a leader without real power. Someone has room to stand on the bridge of the towed ship. Is he not making the most of it, posing as captain for the photographers?

The sickly worshipping tradition filters down. Party men and women introduce each other with laudatory speeches, while important men praise their colleagues in public, counting aloud the heads of their immediate clientele. The absence of any criterion of sincerity in public life generates an intense desire for objectivity. Some find it in the study of foreign literature and foreign affairs, anything to take them out of the immediate Romanian environment. One man told me how much he had admired the BBC during the Falklands conflict for its disinterested preamble to war reports, 'The British government said . . .' Another admired Mrs Thatcher. She is appreciated for her forthright management of another country in decline. I heard the sentiment expressed last year and this year, at either end of Romania. More valuable than a food parcel, she is taken as a symbolic antidote to the prevailing political mischief.

Hegel as a Conservative Thinker

Roger Scruton

The suspicion with which Hegel has been regarded by English writers generally, and by British and American conservatives in particular, is not wholly unfounded. The grandiose metaphysical system, which claims completely to embrace the actual and the possible, to unite them in a total vision of man's becoming, and to explain and justify everything that is, was and will be – such a system must inevitably awaken the scepticism of the empiricist philosopher, as well as the alarm and repugnance of the compromising politician. Nothing seems further from the pragmatic hesitation of Toryism than this supremely arrogant and supremely unified vision of the world, in which the sublime conceptions of theology are re-cast as

a secular parable, and human history transformed into its own redeemer.

Yet no philosopher is more pertinent to our times, or to the intellectual task faced by modern conservatism, than is Hegel. It is precisely Hegel's recognition of modernity as a distinct spiritual condition, which gives to his analysis the depth and the authority that are missing from 'neo-conservative' thinking. Modern man is severed from history, from custom, from religious usage, and at the same time burdened with a conscious yearning for these things – a yearning from which he vainly attempts to rid himself by turning upon his inheritance the fires of a self-made animosity. If this spiritual condition is so

often ignored or mis-described by conservative theory, it is at least in part because the lesson of Hegel has not been learned. Thanks to Sir Karl Popper, whose negative ideal of an 'open society' takes such scant notice of real human interests, neo-conservatives have forgotten the important task which Hegel set them – the task of providing to the spiritually homeless, a promise of their proper home.

But how is this task to be accomplished? To defend the unthinking prejudice of the normal active man was easy in an age when prejudice followed at once from the dogmas of revealed religion, or when social continuity ensured that those who rose to self-consciousness nevertheless departed only in the smallest items of belief from the happier mortals who were fated never to question what they knew. But already in Burke – the first modern conservative – the defence of custom and prejudice has assumed a distinctly paradoxical air: what is defended is precisely that which is destroyed by its own defence. Prejudice is discredited by self-discovery. It is because he recognised this fact, and sought to re-constitute the truths of prejudice at the level of reflection, that Hegel is, for us, the most substantial and authoritative of modern conservatives. He too doubted that the task was possible; he too doubted that conservative thought would ever be timely. For there is a sense in which the recovery of prejudice must always come too late:

When philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the gathering of the dust. (*The Philosophy of Right*, preface).

At the same time, Hegel's philosophy points the way to a recovery of faith: faith in what is concrete, complete, and knowable. The modern man, to whom Hegel consciously addressed himself, is the man for whom all connection with an order greater than himself must be won through some effort of his own, and who will never be able to accept unquestioningly that which stems from his own imperfect labours. Such a man is discontented with every faith that may be offered to him. It is no defect in Hegel that he provides the faith which is most worthily adopted in a state of uncertainty, and praises the irony with which we must, in our unbelief, receive it.

One of the greatest problems for a radical conservatism is that of distinguishing the conservative from the liberal visions of society. How can we give to conservatism a plausibility that is something more than the reflected glory of the liberal idea? The philosophy of liberalism reposes all politics and morality in an idea of freedom, while providing, as a rule, no theory of human nature that will tell us what freedom is, or why we should value it. It isolates man from history, from culture, from all those unchosen aspects of himself which are in fact – according to the Hegelians – the preconditions of his true autonomy. When the modern liberal tries to make concrete the ideal of freedom that he proposes, he finds himself always constrained to endorse (whether wittingly or

not) the habits and predilections of a particular way of life – the way of life of the emancipated urban intellectual. Human nature survives in this philosophy only in a peculiar and attenuated form. Our fulfilment lies in the satisfaction of as many choices as short time allows. Such a philosophy presents no idea of the self, as an entity over and above the desires and beliefs which compose it. It therefore provides no idea of self-fulfilment other than the free satisfaction of desire. The problem of politics is reduced (as in J. S. Mill) to a problem of coordination: how to ensure that the satisfaction of one person's desire does not impede the satisfaction of another's?

Hegel was the first systematic thinker to attack the intellectual roots of liberalism. The liberal he noticed, represents as 'chosen' every institution on which men have conferred legitimacy; however, men's sense of legitimacy stems precisely from their respect for themselves as beings formed, nurtured and amplified by institutions. It is not that men have desired and chosen their institutions, for without institutions there would have been no choice to make. Nor is it that they know how to draw back from every inherited arrangement and pronounce it legitimate by some act of will – any more than they can stand back from themselves and ask, 'Shall I, or shall I not, be this thing that I am?' The error of liberalism lies in the attempt to found a vision of society on the idea of rational choice alone – on an 'abstract' notion, as Hegel put it, of practical reason, which makes no reference to history, community and the flesh. Liberalism esteems choice above everything, and regards justice – the securing of rights – as the procedure whereby each person's freedom may be reconciled with the freedom of his neighbour. The concepts of freedom and justice thereby become intertwined: as they are intertwined in the liberal theory of John Rawls. The modern liberal goes further, arguing with Rawls that the idea of justice must be freed from every particular conception of the human good. No particular scheme of values, no particular historical community, no particular custom, circumstance or prejudice, can be incorporated into the abstract statement of our basic rights, which reflects only the fundamental requirement, that justice is the guarantee of freedom, and respect for freedom the sole ground of legitimate government.

Behind the abstract ideas of freedom and justice, Hegel argued, lies an equally abstract idea of the individual person. The liberal assumes (in the words of Rawls) that 'the self is prior to the ends that are affirmed by it'. Our values and aims are 'possessions' – variable circumstances which cannot be considered sacrosanct by any idea of justice that seeks to be universally imposed. To achieve such a universal standard, the liberal must abstract from all that distinguishes individuals one from another, so as to approach the hypothetical position (the position of the 'original contract') in which individuals have no other basis for their choice than choice alone. The self becomes, for the liberal, the 'transcendental subject' of Kant, a noumenal creature, divorced from 'empirical conditions', whose *principium individuationis* can never be defined.

Hegel accepted the Kantian idea of a 'transcendental subject', as the premise of practical reasoning. But he disagreed with the liberal conception of society, arguing that the self is not prior to its history, to the community from which it derives, or to the historical values and customary morality which attaches it to the world. The liberal self, and the liberal morality, are alike abstractions, which must be made real and concrete through the morality of custom – or *Sittlichkeit*. The liberal individualist, who identifies himself as outside the moral order, self-motivated and self-created, bestowing or withholding legitimacy through his own sovereign acts of will, is dependent upon the order of *Sittlichkeit* for his existence. The liberated self is a social artefact, made possible only by institutions whose authority transcends whatever may be bestowed on them by a liberated will. Autonomy, which is the highest gift of political existence, cannot be the ground of political order.

For Hegel, political philosophy is not a self-sufficient realm of enquiry, independent of logic, historiography and the philosophy of mind. We must understand the realm of institutions through the study of *Geist* (spirit). We must show the relation between outer and inner, between free institutions, and the free choice of the individual who is nurtured by them. To approach Hegel's political philosophy, therefore, we must pass through the complex argument of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The premise of traditional epistemology is the immediate knowledge that I have of my 'subjective' states. From the very same premise the liberal individualist derives his peculiar vision of man, as constituted by his subjectivity, and fulfilled in the free choice which stems from it. The final recourse of Cartesian epistemology is the same as that of liberal political theory: the immediate knowledge of the self, as subject. The certainty 'I am' matches the equal certainty, 'I want'. We arrive at this certainty by abstraction from the material world (Descartes), or from the empirical conditions of agency (Kant). But what is given to me by this abstraction is precisely nothing – as Kant himself had recognised in his arguments against Descartes. The immediacy of subjective awareness is an index of its emptiness. Nothing can be deduced from the content of this awareness, since it has no content. What is immediate, in being abstract, remains to be 'determined'. Immediate knowledge – subjectivity – gains its content only by a progressive removal of its abstraction, a progressive 'determination', whereby its immediacy is 'mediated' and so overcome.

This process, which, for the subject, is a process of self-understanding, is mirrored objectively, in the development of the individual person. I repeat in my thinking the destiny which made thinking possible. I owe my self-conscious existence to a process (a *Bildung*) which I also re-enact within myself, in my attempts at self-discovery. Only a certain kind of being can have either the 'immediate awareness' from which knowledge begins, or the capacity for choice which is the premise of practical reasoning. The task of philosophy is to derive conclusions not from the premise of self-knowledge, but

from the fact of it. What is given is not the object of awareness, but the subject, and to understand this given we must study the form of life (in Wittgenstein's phrase) through which it is created.

The great truth that Hegel dramatises in all his philosophy can be glimpsed in that idea: the self is an artefact, which comes to reality through the process whereby it becomes an object of its own awareness (the process of *Selbstbestimmung*). The self is created in society, through our dialectical resolution of conflict, and our emergence into custom, morality and civil association. These constitute the immovable 'given' of the human condition, for without them there cannot be the self-conscious awareness that would enable us to question our existence. From such premises Hegel derives his masterly description of man's social essence, and of the inextricable ties which bind us to culture, institutions, morality and law.

This vision of man is given its first political resonance in the celebrated description of the relation between master and slave (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, ch. 4, part I). Enslavement, Hegel argues, is the first resolution of the 'life and death struggle' with the other. This struggle results from the self's need to affirm itself against others, and to compel their recognition of its freedom. Without this recognition the self is essentially incomplete, 'unrealised', without 'self-certainty' – without the assurance of its objective reality as an estimable agent in a public world. In resolving the life and death struggle by a trial of strength, one side wins the power to deprive the other of life. To kill the other, however, is to destroy the possibility of compelling the recognition that is sought – it is to foreswear precisely the self-certainty that was the aim of the conflict. Hence the victor must content himself with enslaving the vanquished. By presenting him at every instance with the unanswerable demands of his master's will, the master compels the slave's acknowledgement.

This project, Hegel argues, is inherently paradoxical. Precisely in the act of enslaving, the master relinquishes the power to obtain what he desires. For what he desires is not bare power, but *freedom* in a 'positive' sense of the term, according to which freedom presupposes a certain kind of social existence. Freedom is not simply the ability to obtain what I desire: it is the ability to value what I can also obtain, and so to find confirmation of my significance. Not every social order can confer this freedom upon those who belong to it. Consider the 'freedom' enjoyed by the citizens of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, who can obtain all that they desire, and differ from us only in this: that their desires, implanted in them by those who seek to control them, add no significance to their moral life. They cannot say whether it is worthy or unworthy, wise or foolish, to possess or fulfil their inclinations. In their desires, the self of the agent is not engaged: to satisfy them is not to express oneself in an act of self-realisation, nor is it to exercise the freedom which is proper to our rational nature. The sense of oneself as present in and confirmed through one's desires requires a specific kind of social context – one in which a sense of validity can

form the ground of self-esteem.

The enslavement of the other renders him incompetent to provide this context. Precisely in being compelled to respect, the slave ceases to respect. The master, hungry for recognition, cries out for it tyrannically; without it, he has power but no authority, and the slave's servile obedience is no more than an irksome reminder of the moral emptiness which his power conceals. At the same time, released from the need to labour for his advantages, the master enjoys another kind of freedom: freedom from necessity. But this freedom is the freedom of the consumer, who seeks in vain for that which will assure him of the value of his actions, and whose gratification is always abolished in the moment of attaining it.

To understand the master's predicament, we must understand also the predicament of the slave. Hegel argues that we can do this only if we first understand two fundamental components of the human world: labour and the fear of death. It is the nature of rational activity to possess an end or purpose, and to seek to change the world so as to realise that purpose. The final end of every rational being is the building of the self – of a recognisable personal entity, which flourishes according to its own autonomous nature, in a world which it partly creates. The means to this end is labour, in the widest sense of that term: the transformation of the raw materials of reality into the living symbols of human intercourse. By engaging in this activity, man imprints on the world, in language and culture as well as in material products, the marks of his own will, and so comes to see himself reflected in the world, an object of contemplation, and not merely a subject whose existence is obscure to everyone including himself. Only in this process of 'imprinting' can man achieve self-consciousness. For only in becoming a publicly recognisable object (an object for others) does a man become an object of knowledge for himself. Only then can he begin to see his own existence as a source of value, for which he takes responsibility in his actions, and which creates the terms upon which he deals with others who are free like himself.

Hegel argues that the power of the master cannot amount to freedom, since it contains no active engagement with the world. The master has only a diminished sense of his own reality as a responsible agent. The slave, by contrast, does not lack that sense. On the contrary, he becomes increasingly aware of it, and aware, too, of the unjust usage which deprives him of the power to do for himself what he has the mental and physical resources both to undertake, and to value, on behalf of another. Of necessity, therefore, the slave must grow to resent his position, while the master must cease to find value in the dominion which he enjoys. The first acquires the desire to overthrow the power that oppresses him, the second loses the will to retain it. Their relation contains the seeds of its own collapse. And as it develops, the inner contradiction gradually bursts their unstable intercourse asunder, and places the slave in the master's shoes, and the master in the slave's.

The outcome of this 'dialectic' – this to-ing and fro-ing of power between master and slave – is, according to Hegel, the eventual 'overcoming' (*Aufhebung*) of the contradiction which binds them. The relation of master and slave is transcended into that of equals, in which the partners cease to treat each other as means, and begin instead to treat each other as ends in themselves. Then, at last, in the emergence of an 'ethical' relation, the contradiction is resolved. Each now has the whole of freedom – the power to exercise it, and the social recognition that makes its exercise worthwhile. The 'recognition' that led to the original conflict requires just this resolution: it is *this* – the acknowledgement of the personal autonomy and individual right of the other – that confers the true recognition that was sought. Thus Hegel argues for the thesis that true freedom and true fulfilment necessitate obedience to the 'abstract right' of Kant; and in particular to the law which enjoins us to respect all persons, and to treat them, not as means only, but as ends in themselves.

Many thoughts are suggested by the parable of the master and slave – and conservatives have no monopoly over its interpretation. (The outlines of Hegel's argument survive, for example, in Marxist humanism, and even in the theory of history expounded in *Das Kapital*). For the conservative Hegel's parable is important primarily as a challenge to the liberal conception of the self and society. If Hegel is right, then freedom is a social artefact, born out of conflict, submission and struggle. Moreover, the 'equality of respect' which liberals and socialists esteem as the foundation of civilised order comes into existence inherently tainted by conflict. Such equality is to be *won* out of inequality, and the ideal of an absolute equality, free from the marks of power, bondage and exploitation, is no more than a delusion. The history of freedom survives in the very quality of freedom, and it is a history of bondage. We must understand our social condition as emerging from an unequal struggle, the basis of which could never be finally destroyed or overcome. The freedom that Hegel ascribes to us is both political, and profoundly anti-utopian. Moreover, whatever equality exists in this state of freedom is a negotiated equality, compatible with the greatest inequalities in advantage, wealth and power.

The encounter between master and slave represents what Hegel calls a 'moment' of consciousness – that is, an archaeological layer of our being, which is revealed in all that we say and do, and which can be separated from the fullness of rational activity only by such fictions and parables as those which Hegel relates to us. The parable represents as a process what is in fact a structural component of the product. The 'dialectic' is a temporal rendition of an unchanging spiritual condition. It is neither absurd nor unilluminating to represent the structure of human consciousness in this way. For time is the condition of our being, and consciousness involves the constant need to mythologise its past, and to find within itself the fossilised remainders of a history that proceeded from elsewhere, and immemorably.

Represented as process, the dialectic involves a tran-

sition from immediacy, through separation and estrangement back to a self-conscious acceptance of a new and comprehended unity. The resolution of the life and death struggle in a purely abstract conception of right – the ‘natural law’ – leaves the subject’s ethical experience still only partly ‘determined’. *What* he should value, and to *what* he should submit: such questions are still without meaning for him, and gain sense only through his ensuing separation from others in the sphere of ‘morality’. In this sphere we are governed by specific obligations, and are set at odds by the need to judge every action, every person, and every content, in terms of the individual history that renders it recalcitrant to principles. The conflicting demands of abstract justice and concrete duty are overcome only in the ethical life – *Sittlichkeit* – in which customs, laws and institutions give reality to our moral scruples, and reconcile in us the conflicting demands of autonomy and community.

Sittlichkeit is the label which Hegel bestows on man’s social and political condition. It too contains within it the structure of the dialectic. The individual moves, in this realm, between the immediate ties of love, marriage and child-bearing, and the wide-ranging and open bond of competition and contract. The resulting tension between ‘family’ and ‘civil society’ (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) finds its resolution and realisation in ‘the State’, as the highest of human institutions. In the State man’s ‘immediate’ attachment to his circumstance, which is alienated in the flux of the great society, is finally restored, ‘realised’ and ‘determined’, as a form of fulfilled self-certainty. Hegel cautions us, as always, against a literal reading of his temporal metaphors:

... In the ethical sphere we again start from an immediate, from the natural undeveloped shape possessed by the ethical mind in the *family*; then we come to the *splitting up* of the ethical substance in *civil society*; and finally in the State, attain the unity and truth of these two one-sided forms of the ethical spirit. But this course followed by our exposition does not in the least mean that we would make the ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) *later in time* than right and morality, or would explain the family and civil society to be *antecedent* to the State in the *actual* world. On the contrary, we are well aware that the ethical life is the foundation of right and morality, as also that the family and civil society with their well-ordered distinctions already presuppose the existence of the State. In the *philosophical* development of the ethical sphere, however, we cannot begin with the State, since in this the ethical sphere has unfolded itself into its most concrete form, whereas the beginning is necessarily something abstract. (*Encyclopedia, Zusatz* to §408).

By ‘family’ Hegel means, not the specific arrangements with which he himself was familiar, but all those relations of ‘natural piety’ (in Wordsworth’s phrase) which provide to the individual the core of moral identity and support from which his social nature develops. Piety is the ability to recognise and act upon obligations which were never contracted. Such obligations surround the

individual at birth, forming his self-consciousness and invading his freedom, even before he has fully possessed himself of either. Such obligations belong to the household (and are symbolised, for Hegel, in the Roman *penates*). Disloyalty to the household is a form of disloyalty to the self, since it involves the rejection of the force without which freedom, will and reason would be empty gestures in a moral void. Hence it is an essential part of rationality to recognise these obligations which are not self-imposed. All the arguments for thinking that a rational being *must* (as the liberal urges) recognise a legitimacy in contractual rights, are therefore also arguments for saying that he must recognise legitimacy in something else. It is this something else which the conservative philosopher must describe, and the conservative politician defend.

It is easy to see why Hegel rejected the liberal theory of legitimacy, as founded in a ‘social contract’. For it is only in the condition of mutuality, when he recognises himself as a social being, bound by a moral law which constrains him to recognise the selfhood of others, that the individual acquires (or ‘realises’) his autonomy. By then society already exists. Society could not, therefore, have been based in a contract, since the individual autonomy, without which no genuine contract could be made, presupposes the very social order that is supposedly formed through it.

In place of the liberal idea, Hegel introduces a concept of legitimacy which transcends individual choice. This non-contractual legitimacy originates in the sphere of piety, concerning which Hegel has many interesting things to say. He argues that marriage, which originates in contract, cannot be understood as a contractual obligation. Rather, it is a ‘*substantial tie*’, and the life involved in it is ‘life in its totality – i.e. as the actuality of the race, and its life-process’ (*Philosophy of Right*, §161). In such an arrangement the species lives in us, and the transcendent obligations which stretch from generation to generation become real and vivid in the immediate love between individuals. This union, which is a ‘self-restriction’, is also a liberation, since it endows the parties to it with a new consciousness and certainty of the validity of their common world. (*The Philosophy of Right*, §162.) Such relationships are inevitably endowed with a sacral character by those party to them, and the sense of political obligation can be seen as a recuperation at the highest level of the sense of the sacred, the orderly and the unquestionable that is first acquired through these ties of the flesh.

We may speak of civil society as the *sphere* of contract, for its principle of order (in its natural, realised form) is voluntary association. However, this ‘sphere of contract’ is not itself either founded on, or justified by, a contractual tie. Rather, it is the arena of spontaneous institution-building, in which obligations are undertaken and fulfilled, not to society as a whole, but to its members. Still less is it true to say that the *State* is founded on a social contract. Just as marriage cannot be construed in contractual terms, so is it

equally far from the truth to ground the nature of

the State on the contractual relation, whether the State is supposed to be a contract of one with all, or of all with the monarch and the government. . . the intrusion of this contractual relation, and relationships concerning private property generally, into the relation between the individual and the State, has been productive of the greatest confusion in both constitutional law and public life (*Philosophy of Right*, §75).

The contractual mode of thinking introduces an illusion of choice where there is no choice, erodes the habit of obedience, and leads us to treat in instrumental terms an arrangement – legal sovereignty – which can be understood or realised only as an end in itself.

The State is therefore an entity whose authority transcends anything that might have been conferred on it by contractual choice – much as its historical reality transcends the life of any historical subject. Taking a hint from Rousseau, and also from the Roman Law, Hegel goes on to argue that the State is in fact a person, not merely in the legal sense of possessing adjudicable rights and duties, but also in the moral sense. It has agency, will, answerability and identity through time. It forms plans, entertains reasons – which may be good or bad – and takes responsibility for its actions. (Or at least, that is its nature in its correct or 'realised' form). This personal State is, in Hegel's words, 'the actuality of the ethical idea' (*Philosophy of Right*, §257). By this he means that it both embodies and upholds the ideal of free personal existence which is the *telos* of our endeavour. The great person of the State has rights that no individual human person can have (for example the right to put the individual criminal to death, or to demand the supreme sacrifice from those who fight in its defence). It also has duties which transcend the duties of individuals – such as the duty to uphold an impartial system of law, whereby all conflicts (including conflicts with itself) might be peacefully adjudicated. Like any person, the State must be treated not as a means only, but as an end in itself – in other words, its survival and its rights are non-negotiable.

It is because the State has this identity as an ethical person that it must be distinguished from civil society. Associated with the contractual theory of legitimacy, is the equally dangerous idea, that society and State are one and the same. Hegel gives a succinct and complex warning against what may reasonably be described as the ruling fallacy of Victorian liberalism (the fallacy that almost entirely vitiates J. S. Mill's argument in *On Liberty*):

If the State is confused with civil society, and if its specific end is laid down as the security and protection of property and personal freedom, then the interest of the individuals as such becomes the ultimate end of their association, and it follows that membership of the State is something optional (*Philosophy of Right*, §258).

In other words, to confuse State and civil society is to take an instrumental view of government, and to loosen the tie of political obligation. It is to re-cast the ties of citizenship and sovereignty as relations of interest, defeasible and extinguishable in the manner of a busi-

ness partnership. It is to neglect precisely that which makes obedience a habit, and civil association a profound ethical force: the transcendent authority of the political order.

Perhaps the most significant development in modern politics has been the emergence of political systems with the opposite vice to that criticised by Hegel: the vice not of dissolving the State, in the provisional order of civil society, but of destroying civil society by means of a coercive State. The modern totalitarian polity – which ignorant Popperians like to blame on Hegel – is as much the antithesis of Hegel's ideal as is the disposable, take-away State of the liberal. For here too the distinction between State and civil society has been destroyed. The autonomous institutions (or 'corporations', as Hegel describes them) – which are the core of civil society – have all been subverted, and no association is permitted that is not a branch of the central system of control. Totalitarian government is, in the true sense, impersonal: subject to no corrective influence from civil society, it ceases to be answerable for its actions, and begins to stand above the law through which it endeavours to impose itself. Perhaps nothing vindicates as well as the history of totalitarian power the two major conceptions of Hegel's political theory: the theory that State and civil society can flourish only when not confounded, and the idea that the State, in its proper form, has the identity, authority and manners of a person.

This is not to say that the relation between State and society is either easy to characterise or easy to defend. Hegel's description of that relation in terms of the 'dialectic' adequately expresses the fact that what are here distinguished is also intimately conjoined. We should perhaps understand the relation between State and society, in the spirit of Hegel, by analogy with the human person. The human person is neither identical with his body nor distinct from it, but joined to it in a metaphysical knot that philosophers labour fruitlessly to untie. When treating someone as a person, we address ourselves to his rational and decision-making part: when treating him as a body (when he is ill or incapacitated) we study the anatomical functions which lie outside his will. Civil society is like the human body: it is the substance which composes the State, but whose movements and functions arise by an 'invisible hand' out of voluntary associations which in no way intend them. And the State is like the human person: it is the supreme forum of decision-making, in which reason and responsibility are the only authoritative guides. State and society are inseparable but nevertheless distinct, and the attempt to absorb the one into the other is the sure path to a stunted, crippled and pain-wracked body politic.

Hegel's development of the idea of a personal State is full of interesting asides, and has lost none of its urgency. Like de Maistre, he argues for the sanctity of constitutions:

The constitution should not be regarded as something made, even though it has come into being in time. It must be treated rather as something simply existent in and by itself, as divine therefore, and

constant, and so as exalted above the sphere of things that are made. (*Philosophy of Right*, §273)

Hegel is here arguing for a truly conservative 'as if'. By seeing the constitution *as if* it were divine, we recognise the life of the State as beyond choice, a 'given', which is neither instrumental to our aims, nor without rights against us. It is in such a way that persons must be regarded. To lose the inherent respect for what is historically given is to embark on an endless sea of choice, upon which we float without guidance beneath nihilistic skies.

Again like de Maistre Hegel recognised monarchy as the concrete embodiment and symbolic enactment of the individuality of the State. In the person of the monarch

the unity of the State is saved from the risk of being drawn down into the sphere of particularity and its caprices, ends and opinions, and saved too from the war of factions around the throne, and from the enfeeblement and overthrow of the power of the State. (*Philosophy of Right*, §281).

Hegel goes on to argue for the stabilising effect of a hereditary establishment, which conveys more cogently than any other mode of succession the historical contingency of the body politic, and the 'given-ness' of its loyalties. He adds, however, that it is always dangerous to give utilitarian arguments for an institution whose authority depends, in the last analysis, upon simple piety. To offer consequential reasons for hereditary monarchy is

to drag down the majesty of the throne into the sphere of argumentation, to ignore its true character as ungrounded immediacy and ultimate inwardness, and to base it not on the idea of the State immanent within it, but on something external to itself, on some extraneous notion such as 'the welfare of the State' or 'the welfare of the people' (*ibid.*).

In such passages one discerns the fertility of the dialectic, which enables Hegel to do justice not only to human institutions and the individual experiences which they engender, but also to our sense that political order, like life itself, contains a core which is sacred, unconditional, and central to all that we are.

The detail of Hegel's theory is immense and far-reaching. As well as providing plausible and imaginative defences of the basic civil institutions – of private property, law, civil rights and the freedom of contract – he deals subtly with the more delicate features of political order, such as education, ceremony, welfare and the division of powers. Hegel was not a democrat, although he advocated representative government in which parliament would balance and correct the executive power. He perceived that representation may be as much threatened by democracy as engendered by it, and that it could exist only when mediated by constitutional provisions of the

utmost delicacy. The maintenance of these provisions requires active cooperation from the majority, and this cooperation would never be secured in a condition of need. Hegel therefore advocated the creation of a welfare state, and gave, for the first time, what is perhaps the most important argument for such an institution. The State, he suggested, cannot stand in a personal relation to its citizens and at the same time remain indifferent to their needs. Although their needs are not rights – it being one of the peculiar corruptions of socialism so to conceive them – they are nevertheless duties on the sovereign.

At the same time, the free market – as the core institution of civil society – is the necessary instrument for the transfer of wealth. Moreover, Hegel argued, there could be no security in the household, and no established order from generation to generation, without the accumulation of capital. Capitalism is therefore the inescapable consequence of the distinction between civil society and State, and the necessary instrument of social continuity. This surprising defence of the 'bourgeois order' presents an important challenge to the modern socialist: for it is a defence that refuses to see the 'economic structure' of capitalism as the fundamental or decisive feature of a personal body politic. On the contrary, it is a consequence, an epiphenomenon, made necessary by law and continuity. A similar consequence is the system of classes, which, in Hegel's eyes, has none of the cruelty or oppression upon which socialists so insistently dwell. In all these matters, Hegel implies, the socialist confuses what is accidental with what is essential, and directs his resentment to features of the human condition which are both unobjectionable in themselves, and also natural offshoots of an order which is uniquely suited to the development of human happiness.

If one were to express in a brief compass just why Hegel is so supremely important as a conservative thinker, one should say that it was because he rescued the human individual from the philosophy of individualism. By seeing institutions and individuals in their true interdependence, he overcame both the simplifications of liberalism, and the dangerous desire of the socialists for an end to politics – a final goal in which men will be equal, unconstrained and free, and in which power will no longer be exerted. An understanding of the human individual as a social artefact, shows inequality to be natural, power to be a good, and constraint to be a necessary ingredient in the only freedom that we can value. The *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* is neither historically transitory, nor morally corrupt: it is simply the highest form of ethical existence, in which man's enduring but imperfect nature is realised to the full. It is, as Hegel rightly said, the ethical reality upon which all our individual satisfactions depend, and without which we are disordered, alienated and unfree.

ERRATUM

In the April issue Brian Micklethwait was referred to as the manager of The Alternative Bookshop. Mark Roger is in fact the manager.

out of the deep . . .

an item of infernal correspondence recently intercepted by Frances Gardom

collage of all fouls
level minus nine
lethebridge

hon. principal:
h.r.h. prince nicholas d.g., o.l.d., prin. imp.
vice principal:
professor s.o. drugstick, l.s.d., ll.d.
from the vice-principal
my dear slaghandle,

as your old tutor, let me be the first to congratulate you on your recent preferment in the lowerarchy.

such praise, i fear, may have in your ears a somewhat hollow ring, since the depths which you have so ably attained are not, alas, esteemed as they once were in the world of demonology. but let me offer, with all the sincerity at my command, my felicitations and hope that the assignment will be both *entertaining* and *profitable*. of the former i have little doubt; the latter, as they say, will depend on what you make of it.

o tempora! o mores! time was, dear boy, when to be an under-secretary in the department of infernal affairs with special responsibility for the church of england was the height of every young tempter's ambitions – a step on the road to the eternal city itself.

such a post today it is regarded by many (not myself, let me hasten to add) as one of the *softer* options – a promotion *sideways* rather than *downwards*, comparable in secular terms with the ministry of detritus and wastage – a job consisting largely in hanging around whilst things degenerate of their own accord.

as an old fiend i warn you, slaghandle, that to take such a view of your new job would be a *grave* mistake. many of your predecessors saw it as a push-over, a sinecure, allowing scope to develop their personal interests, and a chance to settle private scores. without exception, those who so regarded it paid dearly for their complacency, coming to a *very* sticky end as orange preserve on some senior-devil's breakfast table.

so allow me to give you some fiendly advice.

at present the church of england is certainly in an advanced state of decay: her fortunes are at a low ebb, and given the right help in the next year or two we may find that she has ceased to be part of the universal church in any recognisable sense at all.

but that situation, i assure you, will *not* have come about, as humans so quaintly put it, *naturally* (meaning by that term 'without intelligent cause'); on the contrary, it will have been achieved by *ceaseless activity* in the lower regions, which, god knows, is the home of the most intelligent society that has ever existed!

i suggest you borrow (and read!) a good book from the library on the english situation to-day. for its very success is due to a policy change in the '50s which i was instrumental in bringing about.

after trying for years to persuade the english to be beastly to each other (and neurotically afraid of everyone else), the resulting two world wars yielded abysmally poor returns.

the new strategy was to find out what the english imagine to be *virtues* and surreptitiously *modify their direction* so that what began (in the enemy's view) as something inspired and approved by him, could, by misapplying it, be turned into a weapon to be used *against* him.

it took endless research to find virtues which were not so damnably *soggy* that the very idea of using them as *weapons* was ludicrous; but it was eventually agreed that *tolerance* and *equality* were best suited to our purpose.

we drew heavily in both cases on our experience with individuals: *tolerance* because if a man thinks himself tolerant it is a sure sign that he is also overwhelmingly *complacent* and *self-satisfied* – well advanced, in other words, on the downward path; *equality*, because it is the very stuff of which infernal diplomacy is made. the decision, taken many years ago, to do away with capital letters is an outward sign of our determination to remove all *distinctions* save those of *merit*. why, after all, did our master dissociate himself from the enemy? – because heaven is a place of the most outrageous (and quite arbitrary) distinctions, based not upon *merit* but *grace* – though *favouritism* would be a more honest term for it!

in many cases we succeeded in turning those virtues into vices; it took much persistence but the results more than justified the expense.

we started simply. we pointed out how grossly *intolerant* it was to expect others to conform to any standards above those which made civilisation *just* tolerable. from there we *lowered* people's expectations little by little: first what they expected of others, ultimately of themselves.

let me give an example: instead of the so-called 'golden rule' *do as you would be done by* we got them to put the adage *do whatever you like as long as you don't hurt anyone* – a substitution so subtle that most of them couldn't see that there was *any* difference; and those with the acumen to see that there *was* a difference – and said so – found themselves facing the grave charge of *intolerance*.

as a result, our figures for unchastity, marital infidelity, broken families, abortion, divorce and general self-

centredness grew in a most gratifying way throughout the '60s and since.

nor had our education department been inactive. it had extruded the notion of *tolerance* in the *intellectual* field to such a degree that in the popular mind it was felt to be wrong to disagree with or even to question another man's views. (we persuaded them to make an exception of those views which came from anyone in *authority*, when questioning, accompanied by disobedience wherever practicable, was *de rigueur*).

in this we were greatly helped by the propaganda department. they managed to give the word *authority* a thoroughly nasty taste in people's minds, with overtones of repressiveness, obscurantism and *them up there* who 'make all the decisions'.

this policy was particularly successful with church-people. for various reasons most of them had already given up reading or hearing the old testament, and this enabled us to get away with tempting them to commit *precisely* those misdeeds against which its teachings were so often directed.

at the same time we managed to generate a new breed of bishop. someone who combined *exactly* the sort of disdain for scripture and tradition and *exactly* the appetite for public recognition of which real honest-to-goodness heresiarchs have always been made.

for anyone to contradict their pronouncements was (according to the new thought) *intolerant* or (according to the old) *disloyal* – and therefore wrong. we have thus engineered a state in which, so far from representing *unity*, such bishops epitomize the entire gamut of prevailing *disunity*. some favour gays; others doubt the resurrection; some champion the marriage of divorcees; others are determined to 'go it alone' regardless of what damage they may do.

but unlike many of your contemporaries who suppose all to be so well that they can afford to rest on their toasting-forks, i have detected some *most disturbing* signs: one being that some humans have become seriously alarmed by the discovery that *tolerance* (in the above sense) makes it virtually impossible to administer any kind of *discipline* even where it is clearly called for – a state of affairs which has largely come about thanks to our success in making the very word *discipline* have the same reek in their minds as *authority* with its overtones of *restraint*, *responsibility*, *respect* – things which revolting young people affect to despise, but in fact alternately fear and yearn for.

others are tumbling to the fact that if such notions of tolerance and equality were carried to their logical conclusion, then human life, instead of being a series of grave and irrevocable *decisions* involving personal *commitment* will become a mere continuum of *open-ended choices* which commit nobody to *anything*.

of course we are fighting back. we point out that for a man to be committed is *bound* to make him more *intolerant* (o blessed word!) of anyone who is unwilling to take such a step. ordinary people have stopped thinking of *commitment* in relation to marriage, the priesthood,

even the faith itself. lifelong commitment to any of these is regarded as an impossible ideal in the modern world. the few who still think of it as realistic can be labelled 'old-fashioned'.

sometimes i wake up with the conviction that the truth must surely dawn on them. but sleep returns to my troubled breast when i remember the other string to our bow – that the blessed concept of *equality* remains as popular as ever with them – especially if it is not seen to affect them personally by placing demands upon them.

like most of their absurder ideas, equality has its root in something which the enemy favours – *justice*. what *we* have done is to apply to this root the human enthusiasm for invariable and universal *principles*.

thus, they are soon behaving and talking as if equality, freedom, fairness, or whatever were the *only* things he had ever commanded. and from there it is only a short step to persuading them that such precepts (in their distorted form) are actually *more* important than listening to and obeying what the enemy is actually saying to them individually.

does that sound absurd? you and i, being pure spirit and free of that disgusting and debasing *matter* with which the enemy has chosen to afflict humans, find it incomprehensible. but their very eagerness to obliterate or disguise as many distinctions as possible is an unmistakable sign that they see themselves for what they really are – spirits entombed in matter. god alone knows what he was thinking about when he created such revolting hybrids.

however the fact is that he *has* made them with individual minds, individual souls, of different sexes, differing abilities, even down to giving each of them an individual set of finger-prints.

our task must be to persuade them to obliterate, disguise or at least ignore those differences. for by so doing we can encourage the *homogenising* processes of hell, whilst discouraging the use of the *mind*, which can be so dangerous when important things are at stake.

instead they must be taught to 'trust their *feelings*' in making any serious decision. for what could be more *tolerant* and *equalising* than to reduce life's choices to a matter of *feelings*? – *you* feel like *this*. *i* feel like *that*. let each of us do as he *feels right* and above all *respect one another's feelings*.

but our goal will have come within spitting distance if we persuade the church of england to 'ordain' women as 'priests'.

however slight your knowledge of the enemy's mind you realise, i am sure, that there is and never can be *any such thing* as a woman priest. he never intended that women should be given that status in creation, any more than that men should give birth to children. but with the twin weapons of *feelings* and a penchant for *equality* we have made admirable progress during the past few years. what was once only a dream now looks like a possible reality.

so long as they remain ignorant of what has *really*

happened in places where they *have* tried to 'ordain' women as 'priests'; *so long as* we persuade them that anyone opposing the idea is psychologically more unbalanced than they; *so long as* we can convince the majority to be *tolerant* by respecting the *feelings* of those women who *feel* they are called to be priests; *so long as* we can pass off the whole movement as another step towards *equality*, a move *away* from the 'material' and *towards* the 'spiritual' (regardless of the fact that the enemy, to his eternal discredit, debased himself to the extent of becoming a human being); – if these positions can be held, we shall see the most successful recruiting drive into the nether regions that there has been for many years.

so there it is, slaghandle. the future is in your hands. i

shall follow your career with consuming interest. should you have time to visit your old collage and see your tutor he will be delighted to give you a warm, nay a red hot welcome.

incidentally the collage cellar remains as good as ever. we have on draught the most perfectly fetid brew of stagnant liquor in the university.

but there i must end. it is five to six and the chapel bell is summoning us to black mass followed by malediction.

yours affectionately
drugstick

('Out of the Deep' is one of a series of leaflets published by Irenaeus Publications, available free from St. Stephen's Vicarage, Cressingham Road, London SE13 5AG.)

The South Slav Journal

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Editorial

In April of this year Mrs Thatcher's government was defeated in the Commons. The Bill which proposed to lift the restrictions on Sunday trading failed to win the support of a substantial minority of Conservative members, and was also opposed (but on no discernible principle) by the Labour Party. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the rebellious Conservatives were reacting against the libertarian philosophy of the market – perhaps even that they had recognised its fundamental weakness as an instrument of Conservative government. Contrary to the libertarian belief, a free market does not suffice to generate adequate social institutions. Civil society exists and endures not merely because people associate freely and are guided by negotiation, but also because their lives take place against a background of institutions endorsed and upheld by the law.

It may look faintly ridiculous to a Londoner that Sunday should be regarded as a holy day, and that the laws of the market should be set aside for the sake of religious observance. But it is not ridiculous to a countryman, to a Scot, or to any British citizen born and bred before the war, in the great non-conformist tradition which then dominated the manufacturing towns. For such people the separateness of Sunday is both a fact and a value – a record of centuries of institution building, by which a thousand social threads have been carefully intertwined. The law is the only proven bulwark against the ambitions of the market, and without the law, neither the British Sunday, nor the peculiar social and political temper which has grown from it, would have survived to assert itself before an astonished House of Commons.

One thing seems clear from the fate of the Sunday Trading Bill: that, in this matter, the Government was badly advised, and led against its will into conflict with conservative sentiments that are still very much alive in the nation. The Bill was, in a sense, a perfect embodiment of liberal thinking, and an attempt to impose upon a whole nation the values and expectations of its capital city. It was, in short, an exercise in social urbanisation. Those who make the laws, and the civil servants who advise them, are increasingly responsive to the fashions and agitations of London, and increasingly unable to perceive that London is merely the head of an organism whose life is engendered elsewhere. We must therefore always expect that social legislation will be distorted by the ethos of a city where tolerance, trade and negotiation form the pillars of daily life, and where materialist values, rapid pleasures, and unruly fantasies dominate the available time of leisure.

Another, graver, instance of bad advice – the Anglo-Irish Agreement – shows the same inherent defect. It is a

popular misconception that the Unionists of Northern Ireland are a purely Protestant faction, and that the Catholics are animated by a desire for a united Ireland which can somehow be captured and rendered harmless by compromising our national sovereignty. In fact there are many Catholic Unionists, and many Catholics who, while not Unionists in any political sense, are nevertheless apprehensive of the Irish Republic. The Irish government has shown many times that it is unwilling to extradite terrorists; it has promised to sign the European Agreement on terrorism, but has given no evidence that it seriously intends to do so. Moreover, terrorists who operate from the Republic seem to go largely unapprehended. Notwithstanding this appalling record, our Government has decided that major decisions about security, and about almost everything else that it is within the competence of a government to decide, should be taken in consultation with the Republic. It sees this gesture as a necessary move to appease the minority, and imagines that the majority – which in this case is motivated by the most urgent concern for its own survival – can be brought to negotiate over matters that it has every prudential reason to regard as non-negotiable.

The fact is that, until the predictable and violent reaction of the Unionists, the reality of the situation in Ulster played no part in the Government's reasoning. The control exerted by the IRA over the Roman Catholic population depends not on admiration or sympathy but on terror. Ulster Catholics can neither denounce the IRA nor turn from it in the smallest particular without risking the most cruel penalties. We may appear to win Catholic support by compromising our security operations; in fact, however, we simply enhance the grip of terror in which the minority is held. It is for this reason – rather than from any theological concern for a united sovereignty – that the Unionist majority is so deeply opposed to an Agreement which, in effect, renders its own survival negotiable.

The reaction to the Agreement has been so forceful as to prompt the Government to hesitate in its implementation. Nevertheless, an important lesson has been offered to the Government, and it is of great significance to the nation to know whether the lesson has been learned. Is the Conservative Party to be guided by those social forces which combine so reliably to bring it to office? Or is it to be guided by the circle of libertarian crackpots, failed academics, and self-doubting converts from socialism, who occupy such important positions in its advisory institutions, and who manage collectively to engender, in the place of conservative instincts, the uprooted politics of an urban clique?

LETTERS

Sir: Although I am not a member of the Conservative Party, I have always voted Conservative and expressed Conservative politics to friends, neighbours and workmates both in blue and white collar jobs I have held. Even when I was made redundant and out of work for 8 months I still fought the Tory Corner, believing (and still believing) this was the price to be paid to kill inflation and make industry competitive in world markets again.

However, the attempt to change Sunday trading coupled with the infamous Anglo-Irish agreement have forced me to withdraw further support from the Conservative Party. I have written to around half a dozen MPs expressing my discontent. From the replies, there seems little enthusiasm for either of these two policies, yet Central Office won't hear of any policy change.

Obviously Central Office does not realise the damage it has done to Fundamentalist/Loyalist support for the Conservative Party. A friend of mine who was to be ward chairman this year has resigned, leaving the ward party leaderless. Last year that man raised £120 for Central Office funds. Other friends in Scotland telephoned the Conservative Central Office to voice their opposition to the Anglo-Irish agreement. They were told over the phone that H.Q. had received only half a dozen other complaints on this issue. I know for a fact certain Conservative councillors in Scotland are not happy about the agreement, however – and this suggests Central Office is oblivious to how certain sections of traditional Tory support are thinking.

Perhaps the Fundamentalist/Loyalist vote is smaller than other power blocks, but at least we are consistent, or have been in the past, and are usually so in areas where the Tory candidate needs every vote he can get.

C. Richards
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W. Midlands B76 8JB

Sir: I agree with the argument of Lionel Cerny's article, 'Discipline', except that the possibilities for the future seem brighter to me than he suggests. He says that, if education becomes 'an opportunity, that is something to be accepted or rejected at will', then 'industrial progress might cease, and the number of academically educated people might decline'.

There is an escape-route from this dead-end, because many children, who cannot learn in a school or university, can learn rapidly through an apprenticeship. Nor do they need expensively-trained teachers but are taught on the job by the operators who are their immediate bosses – a sort of Monitorial system. The Army seems to adopt such a system, whereby a large part of any intake will serve, at some stage, as corporal-instructors; the process results in an amazing level of technical expertise (which was maintained even under the adverse conditions of the Falklands war). At a more academic level, apprenticeship operates in the offices of solicitors and accountants and in some scientific research departments.

Very many of those who 'cannot learn' will discover that, after all, they can, once apprenticeship has been widely re-established as an honourable estate and they have enlisted themselves in it.

P. Crowson
3 Croft Lane
Adderbury OX 17 3NB

Sir: Your correspondent D.A.J. Simpson, discussing 'The Omncompassionate State' foreshadowed by the Grand Inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov* writes, 'in modern terms', of the state in which 'everything is either compulsory or forbidden'.

This formula is in fact very far from modern. As a boy in the thirties I remember being told by my father, who was a student in Marburg before World War I, that among his contemporaries the stock description of Imperial Germany was 'the country in which everything which is not forbidden is compulsory'.

Much later, when I came to study Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, I discovered that he had written of law in general, and not of the law of any particular and egregiously illiberal state, 'what it does not command, it forbids' (1138 A6–7). The passage was, as well it might be, a notorious stone of stumbling for Victorian commentators. For that was a period when even leaders of the Liberal Party were not semi-socialists but classical liberals.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE HIDDEN GOD

Shirley Lancaster

Jung and the Christian Way, Christopher Bryant, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1983, £4.75 (0 232 51559 X).

'To gain an understanding of religious matters', remarked Carl Jung, 'probably all that is left us today is the psychological approach'. Jung believed that psychology had much to offer theologians and pastors in the task of re-vivifying religious concepts for use in a secular age. That relatively few of them paid serious attention to his work was a surprise and deep disappointment to him. Had this book arrived in Zurich Jung would have had less reason to complain. Christopher Bryant, a former member of an Anglican religious community, has precisely the receptive mind that Jung was looking for. If the conceptual worlds of Jungian psychology and Christianity appear alien to each other before reading the book, the experience underlying the two viewpoints proves to be very much the same by the end of it.

Jung was critical of theologians for failing to help people experience religious truth for themselves. The religious practices of his father's church seemed to him a sham; the congregation, he believed, had no real experience or conviction of the reality behind the truths they dutifully said or cheerfully sang. Rejecting this ritual of make-believe, Jung produced a mass of evidence to show that religion can have a dramatic and transforming influence on our lives, so long as God is no longer kept at a discrete distance through dogma and liturgy, but known as an inner reality. For modern men and women, who are more likely to meet the divine in a concert hall or art gallery than a church, re-discovering God as a psychological experience can make ancient religious teachings grippingly real and relevant.

Jung thought of himself as a scientist, and set out to study the workings of the psyche without the interference of philosophy or theology. Experience as an analyst convinced him that psychic energy is at work in every individual, pressing him to realise his innate capacities and to live out his own individual truth. This organising centre, or archetype of wholeness, he called the 'self'. Whereas the ego represents only the conscious part of the psyche, the self unites both conscious and unconscious contents to form a new and more complete personality. To live from the totality of the self, and not just from the limited functioning of the ego, is to achieve 'individuation': to discover our 'innermost, last and incomparable uniqueness' – and with it, our life's meaning.

Centuries ago Irenaeus, an early church father, said something similar: 'The glory of God is man fully alive'. We give glory to God by becoming that unique

individual we were intended to be, just as a bird or animal glorifies God in simply being what it is instinctively. To discover that the God of theism is also the God who is most accessible in our own souls, urging us to selfhood and maturity, restores the flesh to the dry old bones of doctrine. As Christopher Bryant explains:

So long as I thought of God's providence as an abstract truth, part of theistic belief, it made no powerful impact on me. But it was quite another matter if God's guiding hand was within my own being, within the fluctuations of mood and the ups and downs of health . . . I came to understand that to resist God was to run counter to the law of my own being: God's judgement worked through a kind of in-built psychic mechanism; it was self-acting and imposed from within me.

This transforms our notion of obedience to God's will. Traditionally obedience was understood as the habit of submission to an exterior authority. Such a view seems to belittle our dignity and proper autonomy. Indeed, Feuerbach's classic critique of Christianity accused the Christian God of stealing man's 'essence': by projecting his powers, freedom and virtue onto an object in obedience and worship, man diminished his self. But if the authority to which I submit is within me as my most real and whole self, the more I follow the dictates of this inner guide, the more I shall affirm and live out my own individuality. 'God's service is perfect freedom' when the law I obey is the deepest law of my being.

Christopher Bryant shows us a God who is 'nearer than hands and feet', and who addresses us from within. Such a deity was no stranger to the bible or the early church, both of which took dreams seriously as communications of God's will. But Bryant's achievement is doubly important for us. Firstly, for the majority of people who do not outrightly reject religion, but simply fail to see its relevance to their lives, he makes a Christian viewpoint worth considering. For we all experience the influence of the self on our conscious aims and intentions without connecting it with the God whom Christians worship.

Secondly, in sharing aspects of Jung's work which have enriched his own faith, the author shows Christians that by facing their unconscious energies they can deepen their relationship with God. By paying attention to dreams, fantasies, thoughts and impulses which rise unbidden from the unconscious and through which God speaks in images and symbols, we may be guided in our daily living. For what Jung referred to as the psyche's drive towards wholeness or individuation is nothing less than the soul's quest for union with God.

This is not to suggest that the God of Abraham, Isaac and today's Christian can be reduced to a psychological function. Jung remained humble before a transcendent God, who is the primary concern of theology and faith.

But the divine nature operates also in the depths of the psyche, as the 'immanent God' who makes himself known directly through recognisable symbols. Psychology can say nothing about the nature of God, but as an empirical science it can observe and describe his psychological reflection. If an 'image of God' is no substitute for God, then this is simply one of the reasons why we must distinguish the integrated personality from the saint.

For Christopher Bryant, a personal relationship with God is part of mature Christian faith. Equally important, however, is the expression of this relationship in orthodox worship. The creed grew out of a need to define and represent an intense spiritual experience, and serves as a vital tool for explaining a reality which transcends human grasp. It is not a final expression of ultimate truth, but rather an attempt to give symbolic form to an unfathomable mystery.

But the church is now part of the same mundane reality from which people are turning away in their search for inner experience and meaning. 'About a third of my cases are not suffering from any clinically definable neurosis', said Jung, 'but from the senselessness and aimlessness of their lives. I would not object if this were called the general neurosis of our age.' Jung saw modern secularism as the final stage of a centuries-long reaction against the one-sidedness of medieval Christendom, which exalted spiritual values at the expense of material ones. The modern quest for meaning was simply correcting another imbalance, in a world where scientific rationalism had failed to give spiritual values their due.

Interest in religious cults, self-growth therapies and all things esoteric, from astrology to ESP, suggests a willingness to embrace any system promising to provide an answer to our malaise. 'God' may rest as peacefully in his coffin as the day that Nietzsche nailed it down, but the need for the meaningful, shared symbolic life which religion once provided is evident. But how shall this need be satisfied? Jung insisted that only out of a tradition could any new seed bear fruit. In an age of religious pluralism we may indeed learn from the religions of the East. But the 'mantras' and 'bodhistavas' do not resonate deeply in the Western consciousness, however loudly they are sounded. Our task is to re-interpret our own Judaeo-Christian tradition through the conceptions of a modern mind.

With clarity and simplicity Bryant makes the daily challenge to become more 'whole', rather than perfect, a spiritual quest for today's men and women. Yet the new wine we are offered is not a blend which has lost its vintage. An openness to ideas which can re-vitalise the Christian faith is matched by a commitment to its shared life in the visible church. Dressed in monk's habit at 'The Society of St. John the Evangelist' Bryant would happily discuss Jung's theory of 'psychological types' as a valuable aid to prayer. But it was a disciplined life of devotion, adherence to the teachings of Christ and humility before the ultimate mystery and law of God which gave the fruits of his own dialogue with the unconscious their integrity and wisdom. He had little time for mere

'individualism', which ignores our social and collective responsibilities in the pursuit of a dubious 'authenticity'. The individuation process Jung described was, in religious terms, a call to live out our own truth in the world as creatively and courageously as Christ lived his.

But if in Genesis, Act One, God walked off the stage and hid himself in the most secret place of all – man's own unconscious – unearthing the God image in ourselves, as a symbol of our totality, may be more than just a path to our own salvation. The God archetype, or 'absolutist tendency', which Jung found to be latent in us all, leads people to give exaggerated value to objects of real, but limited worth. It is therefore the source not only of faith, but also of idolatry. Failing to find the right object (as St. Augustine put it, 'our hearts are restless until they find their rest in thee') the archetype may be summoned into activity by a substitute – hero-worship, a political 'cause' or even the mad rantings of a dictator. No fact, therefore, is of greater political significance than our loss of faith, and no task is more important than the task set before us by Christopher Bryant – the search for conceptions that will reconcile modern man to the God of his fathers.

GUILT IS GOOD FOR YOU

Ian Crowther

The Psychoanalytic Movement, Ernest Gellner, Paladin, 1985, £3.50 (0-586-08436-3).

Liberation and its Limits, Jeffrey B. Abramson, The Free Press, Collier Macmillan, 1984, \$14.95 (0-02-900210-9).

Guilt, the Grey Eminence Behind Character, History & Culture, John Carroll, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, £20.00 (0-7102-0357-8).

The Therapeutic State, Thomas Szasz, Prometheus Books (0-87975-239-4).

The Myth of Neurosis, Dr Garth Wood, Papermac, Macmillan, 1983, £4.95 (0-333-38302-8).

We are indebted to psychoanalysis, and in particular to Freud, for a truth from which our forebears had been temporarily shielded by the Enlightenment, namely, that natural man is often beastly and that no earthly circumstances can be imagined which would turn us into angels. As Ernest Gellner reminds us, it was Nietzsche first, then Freud, who between them exploded the innocent, salon-bred illusion of the eighteenth century *philosophes* that man is good by nature and bad only by reason of the circumstances in which he accidentally finds himself. With the hindsight afforded by twentieth century psychoanalysis, we may find it incredible that Hume could contemplate with such apparent equanimity our 'enslavement to the passions'. But of course the passions he celebrated were of the mildest, most tepid kind; in one of the many striking metaphors to be found

in Gellner's book they are likened to the currents of an 'artificial lake in a landscaped park'.

However, this image of 'secularised, literally *naturalised* man freed from . . . the endless inner battle between Beast and Angel' could not last, since it bore no relation to the turbulent and twisted creatures we actually are. That it was in the end Freud's doctrine and not Nietzsche's which overthrew the Enlightenment's anodyne vision of natural man, Gellner ascribes to the former's superior marketability in an atomised, individualistic society. 'Analysis,' he vividly observes, 'is the bespoke transvaluation of values. The demand for it is brisk.' Freudianism has the added advantage of operating with a familiar scientific idiom, albeit one which accommodates while seemingly rendering harmless the darker side of our natures. It is this last point which must make one wonder whether Freudianism really represents such an advance over the Enlightenment picture of man. Unlike the former inhabitants of Plato's cave on their journey towards the light, it is doubtful whether those who have emerged from the tunnel of psychoanalysis experience any such 'turning around' or *metanoia*, as the Greeks called it. From analysis we may have learned that the emotional currents which ebb and flow within us no longer resemble in their strength and depth those of the 'artificial lake'; that in other words our passions are rather less sedate than the Humean variety; but we are no less disposed than Hume to follow their direction. So firmly wedded is our liberal culture at once to the Freudian picture of the unconscious and to the romantic idea of man as essentially good that there is a natural tendency to interpret the one in the light of the other. At any rate the reign of necessity, of our inner drives, holds no great terrors for us. Which is why I think Gellner simplifies too far in saying, as he does, that Freudianism has replaced 'the Enlightenment/empiricist model of the gourmet/accountant, avidly adding up pleasures and subtracting pains'. The 'model', though dented in places, remains essentially intact, having successfully assimilated, as we have successfully domesticated, our deeper and more devious drives.

Freud in fact comes towards the end of a long line of gifted thinkers, all of whom since the seventeenth century have sought to reconcile man to the causal world of modern science. Freud was adamant in his rejection of free will. Determinism 'in the psychical sphere', he wrote, 'is carried out without any gap'. Jeffrey Abramson, in whose book on Freud's moral and political thought this quotation appears, thinks that Freud did less than justice to his project by so firmly rejecting free will. Abramson argues that there is such a thing as psychical freedom, and that it consists not in some 'Reichian living out of repressed desire' but rather in the self-mastery which Freud conceived as 'the process of distancing oneself from the hold of the past, an undoing of the fate one has been living and of the arrests in development that come from keeping mind ignorant of its own origins'.

More generally, and one must suppose more in a spirit of pious hope than out of regard for present reality, Abramson believes that the 'analysed self' cannot help

but face up to questions which psychoanalysis raises but admits it cannot answer. For example, 'once the need of the infant within the citizen . . . expires', once in other words we have pierced the unsatisfactory disguises which are the products of our infantile desires, to what new attachments and forms of political life or community can we pledge allegiance? Abramson is wary of the 'unsituated subjectivity' to which we are condemned both by psychoanalysis and by the fragmented conditions of contemporary existence. The 'analysed self', though no longer a stranger to its 'self', remains 'a stranger to the civic set of virtues which once completed the development of character'. Freudian theory is an incitement, Abramson argues, to constitute a society appropriate to the mature self-understandings of psychoanalysed man. It is unfortunate for Abramson and others who wish to rescue Freud from his followers that psychoanalysis's most conspicuous public achievement to date has been the permissive society. Forgotten now is the Freud whose hero was Moses and who lamented the weak characters of his patients. We remember only the therapeutic Freud, the absolver of guilt and the preacher of an ethic of openness.

John Carroll's term for our modern therapeutic culture is 'remissive', and in his latest book *Guilt* he broaches again and at greater length a theme he first explored in an earlier work, *Puritan, Paranoid, Remissive*. That theme is the crumbling of an authoritative culture, embodied in strong fathers and strong kings, and typified in England by puritanism and the patriarchal family of the period 1530 to 1660. Not unnaturally the sons of such a culture harboured murderous impulses towards their persecutory fathers, experiencing as a result powerful feelings of guilt, to counter which they developed strong characters like their fathers, fitting them for the hard work and pious practices which their society both demanded and provided. The culture in other words 'housed' their guilt. As it also did according to Carroll in the period of 'civilised guilt' (1660-1800), except that in this later stage the sublimations 'became progressively more differentiated and moved through a much wider span of human activity' than had been the case when they were confined to the 'plain and blunt Puritan forms' of the earlier period of 'parricidal guilt'.

Guilt has been the making of Western men and their culture: such is Carroll's unfashionable thesis, which he illustrates with the aid of a wealth of examples, drawn from literature, history and myth. It was not until our own century that there emerged the increasingly mother-dominated family in which parental sanctions are more likely to take the form of threats of withdrawal of maternal love than of any type of exemplary punishment. Modernisation has dealt a succession of blows to the authority of the father and the values he once embodied and asserted. For example, consumerism makes the austere father look ridiculous, while egalitarianism has toppled him from his pedestal, putting him on the same level as his children with whom he is supposed to be a 'friend'. Instead of growing up with a yearning for redemption, in the forms of 'the masculine virtues of

strength, courage, work, discipline, striving, industry, technology, mastery and conquest', our craving now is for instant remission 'shaped by the ubiquitous maternal presence' in childhood and the fear of its loss. As a consequence, our ideals have been maternalised: we are pre-occupied by questions of identity, self-realisation and personal development. Psychotherapy, far from providing a cure for this modern disease, panders to it through its regressive notion that the child is father to the man. Psychology has weakened the authority of commanding institutions, most notably those charged with making and enforcing our laws. As Carroll puts it, 'the criminal has become someone who is mentally disturbed (that is whenever the sociologists have not already excused him as socially disadvantaged), and therefore in need of cure or therapy rather than punishment. There is no responsibility, no independent and absolute moral universe, only normality and abnormality'.

Thomas Szasz, himself a professor of psychiatry at the State University of New York, agrees with Carroll that the provision of psychiatric alibis for criminal acts is immoral. Szasz has been prolific in the number of books and essays he has written on what he has called 'the myth of mental illness'. Anyone not acquainted with his work will find *The Therapeutic State* an excellent introduction to it. The book is a collection of pieces written over the last few years, often in response to current events. Whether reviewing a so-called 'psycho-biography' or reflecting upon fraudulent sex therapies or exposing psychiatric 'treatments' imposed on individuals against their wishes, Szasz is constantly coming across instances of what he describes as 'the substitution of the language of medicine for the language of morals, and the consequent condemnation of individuals as "sick" rather than as "bad"'. A society thus rendered incapable of passing moral judgments is driven to define evil with words that are wholly inadequate to its manifestations. For example, the Reverend Jim Jones, whose 'rehabilitation centre' for aimless Americans in Jonestown, Guyana, ended in the massacre of its members was characterised as mad, insane, crazy, paranoid (often by the same people who had earlier characterised him as a beautiful human being, a brilliant healer of minds, a great therapist), but not evil or depraved or cruel or cowardly.

What Szasz castigates as the Orwellian debauchment of language and thought by psychiatry, is now so endemic in Western society that its citizens are on the whole bereft of an alternative and pre-scientific language with which to articulate their moral intuitions. Szasz has always seemed on the point of proposing a moral therapy or discipline in place of the psychiatric remedies he abhors, but has shrunk from doing so, perhaps because as a self-declared libertarian he is unwilling to substitute one form of social control for another; and yet his often reiterated preference for the censorious terms of traditional moral discourse suggests that he is far from being a moral solipsist or relativist. Szasz might well reply that whereas the older moral language is consonant with human dignity and autonomy, the new is not.

That would certainly be the view of Dr Garth Wood,

whose 'case for moral therapy' may have an authoritarian ring to it, if only because the word 'moral' grates in modern ears, but is actually a call to each individual to obey the dictates of his own conscience (another much neglected word these days). Dr Wood believes that while it is well-nigh impossible to fathom the subterranean processes of the psyche, without getting hopelessly out of one's depth, it is within our grasp as thinking beings to elucidate our present problems and their likely consequences. Instead of devoting our energies to delving into an irretrievable past, in a vain effort to discover the underlying causes of our present personal predicaments, we would be wiser to consider every day as 'an opportunity for a new beginning'. As for guilt, Dr Wood sees it as an early warning sign, like chest pains, that there is something wrong with us. What is giving rise to the guilt, not the guilt itself, is what must be rooted out.

Those fortunate enough to have been raised in traditional surroundings, and guided to maturity by wise parents and teachers, may wonder at first why this book was written at all, since it will seem to them no more than a catalogue of commonplaces, a recital of commonsensical propositions which are surely familiar to everyone. But of course it is precisely because such propositions, moral heirlooms which were once passed on from generation to generation, are now the property of only a few, that books like this one are so valuable and necessary. Happily, and as the books reviewed here variously demonstrate, Dr Wood is not alone in seeking to dispel the illusions of an era. If indeed the psychoanalytic movement is finally petering out, under the assaults of critics both from within and without, then we should not mourn its passing. Rather we should rejoice in recovering sight of ourselves as we really are. Perhaps we shall soon be able to read *Hamlet* again without reference to Freud. 'What a piece of work is a man!'

THE FIGHT TO SURVIVE

Jillian Becker

The War of Desperation, John Laffin, 1985, 218 pp., Osprey Publishing, £9.95 (0850-456-037).

'The war of desperation' is John Laffin's name for the war Israel finally fought, after long and intensifying provocation, in 1982 against two enemies: the PLO, whose armed strength had become all too menacing, and whose active aggression against northern Israeli towns and settlements had become intolerable; and the PLO's patron, Syria.

The battle with the armed Palestinians and their mercenaries was fought in southern Lebanon. The PLO had usurped the territory by stages. An encroachment had begun in 1968 and 1969, which was speeded up in 1970 and 1971 as armed PLO men poured into the Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon after their expulsion from Jordan. In 1975 and 1976 they led Lebanese anti-democratic factions in a civil war against the Lebanese Christians, providing Syria with an excuse to impose a

peace by defeating the nearly-victorious PLO. Yet it was to the PLO leader Yasser Arafat that Hafez Assad, the Marxist dictator of Syria, handed over West Beirut when he withdrew his forces under threat of Israeli intervention if they remained. The PLO hold was then tightened into total gun-rule over most of the south, and West Beirut became Arafat's capital and a headquarters for his parasitic horde, wild fighters armed with more Kalashnikovs per fighter than any man could carry in a barrow. Long-range Soviet guns, manned by al-Fatah boy terrorists, were trained on Israel.

The Syrians remained in the east, and there the Israelis engaged them in 1982, on land and in the air. Assad's Soviet-supplied SAM missiles were ranged in the Bekaa, between the Lebanon mountain and the Anti-Lebanon on the Syrian border. The Israeli airforce knocked out the Soviet missiles and shot 90 Syrian aircraft out of the sky in three days, without the loss of a single Israeli plane.

After six days 'the Israelis were conscious of an impressive victory'. There were still pockets of resistance, however; the long siege of Beirut was yet to come, and discontent was voiced in Israel with the extent of the advance, which had gone beyond the 45 kilometres first announced as the intended limit. And Israel was soon to learn that though the military victory was hers, the propaganda victory was to go to the PLO. The international press corps proved itself to be, largely, on Arafat's side. Most reporting was heavily biased and grossly inaccurate.

A reliable account was therefore lacking and very much needed, and it could come only from a thoroughly informed and objective observer, taking time and trouble to collect facts for himself and ponder them. Fortunately, John Laffin undertook the task, for which he is admirably suited. He is a military historian of considerable reputation, and he is expert in the history and politics of the Middle East. He has personal knowledge of the region, acquired over many years of visiting it for long periods. He writes with the straightforwardness of a soldier and the carefulness of a scholar. His values are not coloured, nor his principles bent, by irrational antipathies or personal vanity, or by any urge to patronise or flatter, as is the case with so many British 'authorities' on the Middle East, from T.E. Lawrence to contemporary journalists and many an anonymous Foreign Office pundit.

He travelled in Lebanon during the months of the war, and moved from one battlefield to another, during and after the engagements. He chronicles, step by step, how Israel conducted her offensive. He is familiar with the weaponry, of which he gives precise descriptions, and he explains the function and efficacy of the arms used on both sides. Tribute is paid to the bravery of Palestinian fighters, both by the author himself and, as he reports, by Israeli soldiers. But bravery was not enough, and good fighters were wasted by the inept command of Arafat and his chief officers, lack of co-ordination among the PLO forces, and their inadequate training. Syrians fought well, but were no match for the Israelis on the ground or in the air. The Israelis quickly became the unchallenged

masters of the air, but, contrary to news reports, they did not bomb Beirut flat nor subject any part of Lebanon to 'carpet-bombing', but hit chosen PLO targets accurately. Throughout the war, as John Laffin witnessed, they took pains to warn civilians to move out of targetted areas, often to their land-forces' own peril, since they sacrificed the advantage of surprise.

Of all the causes of media distortion, I would give pride of place to sheer ignorance, even above prejudice and fear. Ignorance of the recent history of the region produced serious misjudgments. But sometimes the mistakes were almost comic, as newsmen made asses of themselves striking moral poses in an alien land. 'Some of the reporting' John Laffin found 'breathtakingly false, as in the case of the American crew filming the results of "indiscriminate Israeli bombardment from the sea"'. The ruins they were photographing were much older than the war. They were older than the ruins in the middle of Sidon made by the Syrians in 1976 (from which weeds were sprouting, yet which were pictured over and over again in Western newspapers as the result of the Israeli offensive). They were older even than the vast devastation of Crusader fortifications, inflicted by the armies of Islam hundreds of years ago. Here, behind the American television crew, the stone walls had been felled by the slow hand of time itself. They were Roman ruins.

Humanitarians whose sympathies for the PLO are engaged because they mistakenly believe it to be the champion of a suffering people, might do well to take note of the passages in the book which describe how civilians, children, hospital patients, old men and women were used as shields by the PLO fighters. 'The thinking was that the Israelis would be reluctant to fire on children.' 'Arms, ammunition and petrol dumps were sited in refugee camps, hospitals and schools.' Some report of this did reach the news columns, but mostly as 'Israeli allegations'.

Persistent distortion of the truth by the media might have raised the question, has the free Western press become an instrument of the same anti-Western power-groups as manipulate the United Nations?

John Laffin records the following of the UN 'peace-keeping' force, UNIFIL, interposed between the PLO and the Israeli frontier:

PLO terrorists gradually infiltrated the area nominally controlled by UNIFIL Once established, the terrorists' presence was sanctioned by retro-active agreement with UNIFIL. More than 700 terrorists were deployed throughout the UNIFIL zone; UNIFIL soldiers were barred from approaching within 500 metres of some PLO posts, and even provided escorts for PLO supply convoys arriving in the zone from the north. PLO bands passed through the UNIFIL zone to pursue their terror operations against Israel The PLO achieved an important victory when it managed to institutionalise its relations with UNIFIL, thus gaining the status of a legitimate party to the conflict in southern Lebanon. This enhanced the prestige of the PLO at the UN

In August 1982 the PLO was expelled from Lebanon. The Organisation, which had never been cohesive, was broken apart and has never recovered even the appearance of unity. In the end its propaganda victory was of no use to it. That was the main achievement of the war for the Israelis, who gradually withdrew, having made their border towns and settlements much safer, but not safe, and without a normalisation treaty with their neighbour. The greater part of the Arab world is still theoretically at war with them. They have still to guard their frontiers and remain alert for terrorist incursions. For the Lebanese, the bloodshed, the faction fighting, the civil strife resumed with the same bitterness as before, atrocity again became commonplace, and the interests of the various political and confessional groups have remained patently irreconcilable. Syria, which had always coveted Lebanon as a Syrian possession, never recognising it as an independent country, and had placed the PLO inside it in order to shake the little state apart, has emerged, as John Laffin concludes, 'the only beneficiary After more than ten years of effort the Syrians could feel confident that they controlled Lebanon . . . since all the Lebanese leaders were dependent on Damascus.' Now the Israelis, he points out, are left alone 'to hold a front line' not only against militant Islamic fanaticism, but also 'Syrian and Iranian expansionism, and international terror – and, behind them, the opportunist ambitions of the Soviet Union.'

CATHOLIC ADMINISTRATORS

Charles Mosley

The English Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century, Edward Norman, Clarendon Press, 1985, 408 pp, pbk, £8.95 (0-19-822955-0).

To many this book will seem an irony. It was Dr Norman after all who in his Reith Lectures criticised the Church for a preoccupation with socio-economic issues at the expense of spirituality. Yet his study now dwells almost entirely on the organisational aspects of the Catholic Church in nineteenth century England. It is certainly leavened by biographical sketches of its leading figures, but it eschews discussion of the Church in any non-material sense other than administration and what I suppose one can best call the 'ideological' tug of war between Ultramontanists and 'Gallicans' (for want of any better English equivalent of the term). It is true that Dr Norman himself remarks 'This is a study of the Church;

it is not a history of ideas or of Catholic thought' – albeit three-quarters of the way through the book and in an aside about Newman at that. Yet it is surely not unreasonable to expect some discussion of the immense spiritual and emotional (even aesthetic) force which was arguably the predominant characteristic of the nineteenth century Catholic Church in this country. A long line of illustrious converts eloquently testifies to the Church's power in this respect and is indeed a visible criterion of a denomination's strength in any age.

Dr Norman quite rightly observes that converts were statistically a small part of the expansion. Nevertheless (to take a readily available sample) some 70 peers and peeresses alone became papists between 1850 and 1900. That is a not negligible number, particularly in Victorian England, where the upper classes still formed the apex of wealth, influence and prestige. A book of this kind which omits any mention of the third Marquess of Bute (Disraeli's Lothair) and the immense frisson his conversion caused in polite society, or – at the upper middle class level – the fact that almost the whole of Bishop ('Soapey Sam') Wilberforce of Oxford's family circle 'went over' is surely deficient. Lord Ripon and Ambrose Phillips de Lisle are covered adequately, but no more.

Dr Norman could also have given us more on the Old Catholic party and their special point of view. As things are the account is seen almost exclusively through clerics' eyes. That is only an advantage in historical writing when one is dealing with a Protestant sect, where the notional priesthood of all believers may be thought to confer an element of comprehensiveness on such an approach. Where the author excels is in another kind of irony – a dry, subtly disparaging innuendo which, if it were cloaked in richer language and came from anyone less noted for piety, might approach the Gibbonian: 'Wiseman had a special devotion to the miracles of St. Philomena (now no longer included within the calendar of the saints) . . .'; or 'Vaughan sensed a "haunting wish to get away from civilisation altogether"'. This, initially, he interpreted as a call to work in Wales.; or 'As a boy he (Vaughan) had been keen on sports, and used, apparently, to say his rosary beneath hedgerows on summer evenings, with his gun in his hand, waiting for the rabbits to come out.'

The dearth of spirituality, combined with anecdotes like Bishop Bagshawe's threat to withdraw the sacraments from Catholic members of the Primrose League, hint at an ever so slightly distasteful flippancy in the author. Heaven knows one would rather have the erudite Dr Norman's tone than that which must have infused St Edmund's, Old Hall, in Hertfordshire about the time Mgr. Knox went there (if the dismal portrait by Evelyn Waugh is to be believed). All the same, this is a curiously unsatisfying work.

The proof reading is lamentable. What can the Oxford University Press be coming to? Even that old shibboleth 'dessicated' has been left unaltered. 'Lady Lyttleton' is plain distressing. Supreme disfigurement in such a publishing house is 'Univeristy of Oxford'.

IN SHORT

A Besieged Culture, A. Heneka *et al* (eds.) Charter 77 Foundation, Stockholm–Vienna, 1985, £9 (Available through *The Salisbury Review*)

This remarkable volume brings together many of the most important and eloquent testimonies to the cultural assassination of contemporary Czechoslovakia. Distinguished writers from the West, Czech writers living at home but forbidden to publish, others living in exile and cut off from their roots – all bear witness to one of the nastiest crimes against the intellect that modern Europe has known. To read these accounts of harassment, imprisonment and exile; to study the huge and ever-growing list of forbidden writers, many of whom are already dead; to read of the heroic efforts of those who remain in their homeland, striving to keep alive the memory of the Czech and Slovak nations – to enter into these experiences is to acquire a deep respect for a people whose hopes and trust we have twice betrayed – first at Munich, and then at Yalta. Everyone with a concern for Europe and its survival should read these fragments, and ponder what they mean for us, who have so far escaped the fate to which they bear such melancholy witness.

(R.S.)

The Minimal Self, Christopher Lasch, Picador, 1985, £3.50 (0-330-28996-9).

Hobbes made vivid the idea that men, by nature, are concerned above all with their self-preservation. Against the turbulent background of his time, Hobbes may be forgiven for so reducing man to the level of his lupine instincts. Rousseau and Marx were among those who argued, contra Hobbes, that selfishness was not inherent in human nature but a symptom of conditions of scarcity. Now comes Christopher Lasch to tell us that in modern Western society, and principally among its more prosperous denizens, there is a widespread preoccupation with self-preservation or 'survival'. Hobbesian man is still with us, ever mindful of life's misfortunes, though cushioned against them as never before. As in the fourteenth century, when the objective conditions were obviously far worse than anything experienced in the West today, we again believe in the end of the world, or at any rate of our world. And, like our medieval forebears, the belief disables us, for example, from making plans or children. Survival is about 'keeping one's options open' and avoiding commitments and consequences. Hence

the 'Minimal Self' with its 'ability to play a variety of roles and to assume an endless variety of freely chosen identities'. A society which has lost any sense of shared purpose and public belief is bound to see its members retreat into themselves in the manner Lasch describes. Lasch has given a name to a phenomenon which conservatives have every reason to take seriously. Moreover, he is sympathetic to the conservative position in so far as 'it attempts to hold society together by means of moral and religious instruction, collective rituals, and a deeply implanted though not uncritical respect for tradition.'

(I.C.)

The Needs of Strangers, Michael Ignatieff, Chatto & Windus/The Hogarth Press, 1984, £3.95 (0-7011-2867-4).

A rather belated review, this, of a book which perhaps deserves more and better of us. The 'strangers' of Ignatieff's title are those unfortunates in our society (a growing army) who live on the impersonal charity of the Welfare State. Ignatieff is concerned here less with whether their 'needs' are adequately met, more with the ties of obligation binding the powerful to the powerless. Many conservatives are impatient with the very idea of dependency: it is dependency, they say, that is degrading and must be discouraged. But, alas, accidents of circumstance or fortune make most people dependent at some time or another. Shakespeare's King Lear, whom Ignatieff discusses at length, was reduced to begging the common necessities of mankind. And 'common humanity' was all he had left after the trappings of kingship had been stripped from him. He then became one with poor Tom, a specimen of 'unaccommodated man'. The point at which Ignatieff is driving is insufficiently appreciated in our time. It is that only when we are, as it were, clothed in institutions or recognised roles can we be relied upon to pay our proper respects to one another. But out 'on the heath', on the margins of society, we will be hard put to justify the needs which once mattered to us; King Lear's needs were for respect and a retinue, neither of which seemed due to the 'poor, bare, forked animal' he had become. Undifferentiated by merit, rank or station in life, only the bare minimum is owing to us. Liberals have long celebrated the naked self, 'unaccommodated' by the continuities of culture, but without reflecting, as Ignatieff does so subtly in this book, on how many of their other ideals may be endangered by this one.

(I.C.)

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
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