
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The Salisbury Review

A quarterly magazine of conservative thought



The Third Marquess of Salisbury
1830–1903

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The Claridge Press

The Salisbury Review

A quarterly magazine of conservative thought

Editor Roger Scruton
Deputy Editor Joanna North
Literary Editor Ian Crowther

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Readers of this *Review* will know the dangers involved in discussing the issues of race, culture and immigration. We have given a platform to views which, however natural to the people of this country, have been consigned by their leaders to silence. Thanks partly to our contributors, however, the climate of opinion has changed, and we feel confident that E. J. Mishan, the concluding part of whose article is published in this issue, will not be forced to flee the country whose interests he so ably defends. Nevertheless, his message will not prove popular with the race relations industry, whose need to identify racial antipathy in every clash of cultures has been one of the major causes of social conflict. Nor will it appeal to those liberals who believe (with John Gray, whose vigorous counter-argument is also included in this issue) that political order and political stability are, or ought to be, detachable from those pre-political forms of unity for which 'race', 'nationhood', and 'culture' are the names.

Whether we perceive the cultural separatism of the ethnic minorities with alarm, as Professor Mishan does, or whether we still hope, with Dr Gray, for the emergence of a liberal *Rechtsstaat* which is open to every culture and threatened by none, it is clear that the time has now passed when discussion of this issue could be reasonably prevented, even by those who fear a 'backlash' from a society whose patience has been so much presumed upon. If there were such a 'backlash' then blame for it would lie squarely on our politicians, who have never permitted the British public either to vote on, or even rationally to consider, changes which question the very identity of the British nation.

That the problems are formidable is brought out in another way, and by reference to another context, by Mervyn Hiskett, whose timely reminder of the nature of Islamic education ought to give pause to the advocates of a 'multicultural' curriculum. As Anthony O'Hear suggests, those who defend this curriculum have all too frequently failed to understand the nature and purpose of the education which they seek to reform. Education is not an instrument of social engineering; still less is it a means to bring about the 'multicultural' society of the future. Properly understood it is an end in itself, and is threatened by every attempt to confer on it the 'relevance' which is so dear to educationists. In this context 'relevance' means relevance to the experience of the uneducated; its effect is therefore to close the mind of the child on its existing preoccupations. Perhaps we may, with Paul Helm, still hope for an educated public; but it can be created only by a habit of irrelevance which is rapidly disappearing from both school and university. And one may reasonably doubt that, with the continued erosion of its Christian base, our culture can sustain the weight of real education that Dr Helm demands of it.

The hope that a culture might persist without the support of faith was never more lucidly or agreeably expressed than by our current conservative thinker, Matthew Arnold. But did he really mean what he said? Turn from *Culture and Anarchy*, with its exhortatory and over-eager tone, to the poems, and quite another picture emerges: the picture of a bleak resignation, a folding of the self within the lap of its own quiet sadness; and surely this is the truer, if smaller, voice of Victorian England.

One thing at least is certain. However hard it was for Arnold to persuade his contemporaries to put culture in the place of anarchy, it will be far harder to persuade the children of a 'multicultural' - which, if it means anything, means de-cultured and secularised - Britain to do the same. The best we can hope for is that our national loyalty will survive, and that we shall not have to suffer what the Cypriots once were forced to suffer, through lacking a common sense of nationhood. As Lady Olga Maitland points out, the Cyprus conflict is near to being resolved, thanks largely to a remarkable leader of the Cypriot Turks. Moreover, English common law and British democracy survive in transmuted form on both sides of the Green Line. But how much of the wonderful island culture has survived the conflict - and how much did the existence of that culture serve to forestall the final anarchy?

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Conservative Journals: TIDEHVERV

The defeat of 1864 was a blow from which the Danes have never recovered, and one which left them as wary of patriotic sentiments of their own as they have been fearful of the patriotic feelings of their neighbours. Now, after a century of radical and democratic movements, Danish opinion is dominated by the anxious voices of social democrats and radical socialists. Wavering in its commitment to the Western alliance, mindlessly progressive in its values, and hopelessly naive about the political conditions of modern Europe, the Danish elite stands ghostlike and ineffectual on the bridge, as the ship of state drifts onwards into the mist.

Only one conservative voice can still be heard, softly recalling the Lutheran inheritance, and defending the vision of Kierkegaard against the corruptions of his modern countrymen. Founded in 1926, *Tidehverv* prides itself on being the only *true* opposition in Denmark: the only public organ which stands against the tide of secular materialism, and which is prepared to say not only that there can be no final justice on earth, but also that it is wrong to look for it. Identifying totalitarianism as the supreme anti-Christian force, *Tidehverv* also criticises the fashionable leftism which prepares the way for it, and sees, in the humanist superstitions of modern Denmark, a danger that is not only spiritual but also political. Edited by Søren Krarup, the journal engages in discussion at the highest level, drawing not only on the native Lutheran tradition, but also on Burke, Johnson, Hume and their successors. Articles are devoted to conservative thinkers, to the Danish philosophical tradition, and to the religious life, while an educated plea is made for a culture that is all but lost beneath the tide of flippancy and unbelief.

Tidehverv appears 10 times a year: annual subscription 230 Kr. from Sognepraest Hans F. Beck, Veerst, 6600 Vejen, Denmark.

What Future for a Multi-Racial Britain? Part II

E.J. Mishan

(This is the sequel to E.J. Mishan's article in the previous issue of *The Salisbury Review*)

Scarman Revisited

'What's done cannot be undone!' But if we will be guided by experience we may be able to avoid or discontinue doing those things that are either futile or else serve to aggravate the problem. And experience suggests that we look with suspicion at those conventional liberal policies ostensibly contrived to woo the cooperation of aggrieved minorities by concessionary measures, by special legislation, and by repeated resolutions to eliminate prejudice. If we are in earnest about the goal of race harmony, or at least race tolerance, we have to open our minds to two possibilities neither of which are seriously considered in official reports of the Scarman type: (1) that the publicity generated by such reports invariably does more harm than good, and (2) that legislation designed to alleviate the various social and economic disadvantages allegedly suffered by minorities is generally worse than ineffectual.

Concerning (1), from bitter experience we now know that media coverage of mob violence tends to incite similar outbreaks in other localities.[1] Bearing in mind the constitutional freedom long enjoyed by the media in this country, Lord Scarman's recognition of the resulting dilemma, along with appeals for the exercise of responsibility, will do nothing of themselves to restrain the media. So long as newspapers and television stations are in fierce competition to attract a larger public, they will continue to seek to be first on the spot and to give maximum coverage to these audience-riveting episodes. The unbridled ferocity of the Brixton riot of 1981, as revealed in newspaper reports and on television, succeeded only too well in compelling public attention and, indeed, in spurring government activity calculated to appease black grievances. Such reports, of course, precipitated outbreaks of disorder in other parts of the country.

Turning to the proposal (invariably surfacing after demonstrations of race hooliganism), of further measures to overcome social and economic disadvantage, nobody who has followed events here and in America can have any confidence in their efficacy. Although the immediate knee-jerk reaction of British governments is roundly to condemn the rioters and to praise the police, it is not long before they are again giving assurances to, and mooting schemes to improve conditions in, the rioting community. The notion that expressions of race militancy and police antipathy, no matter how furious, will eventually yield to conciliating stratagems and generous expenditure programmes is one that dies hard.

British governments - indeed, nearly all people in the country - are loathe to believe that within our cities are now ensconced refractory elements of a new ethnic group who are apparently unable and unwilling to conform with, or even to recognise, the conventions of a modern democratic society: people, that is, who show a contempt for its institutions and an inveterate hatred of its police force. There is an understandable aversion to admitting to helplessness before such untoward developments and, therefore, a powerful temptation to believe that the unruly segments within the inner city black communities do have genuine and remediable grievances. Such beliefs certainly inspired the Scarman Report.

To illustrate, although Lord Scarman followed convention by paying tribute to the police[2] and by condemning the rioters, he was unable to resist invoking the familiar liberal rationalisations. With ostentatious impartiality he went on also to deprecate the behaviour of the police, citing their ineptitude (4.53-4), their prejudice[3] (2.21-2), and their arrogance (4.49), and recommended closer liaison between minority representatives and police officers and more elaborate procedures to avoid repetition of alleged errors of judgement.

Consistent with the conventional wisdom, much space was given in Part VI of the Report to the economic and social factors. Having quoted with approval a passage from President Lyndon Johnson's address to Congress in 1968 - to the effect that in the name of national conscience race problems would be attacked by a vigorous programme of economic reform - Lord Scarman followed precedent in dwelling on the factors he believed contributed to the anger and frustration of young blacks. There followed a vivid description of urban decay and poverty, along with mention of discrimination, high unemployment,[4] educational deficiencies and lack of recreational facilities. Thus there emerges from the tenor of the Report, nothing less than overt recognition of the alleged disabilities and mistreatment of blacks by the white community and its institutions. The diagnosis, along with the Report's recommendations, amounted

to a clear vindication of the use of physical violence, at least in an affluent liberal democracy, as a highly effective political weapon.

In the wake of the several riots in the autumn of 1985, Conservative reaction was more guarded. Its spokesmen, conscious as they were that so many of Lord Scarman's recommendations had been implemented, were reluctant to make allusion to economic factors. Nonetheless, in their natural desire to appear in control of events, and to be seen taking positive action, ministers managed to convey the impression that the causes of the unrest were still to be found in the economic conditions to which black communities were exposed. It is hard to construe in any other way the remarks of the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, addressed to the Cambridge Tory Reform Group on 18th October 1985. After forthrightly denouncing the Tottenham rioters, he went on to say that the riots had shown 'racial disadvantage to be among the most intractable problems'. In the inner cities, members of ethnic groups had been particularly hurt in terms of employment and housing despite all the valuable work done since the Scarman Report, despite the £1.5 billion allocated since then to the Urban Programme, and despite the special employment measures prevalent in the inner city areas.

Mr Hurd appealed to everyone in the country to make efforts 'to ensure that people from every ethnic background had a fair opportunity', and spoke discreetly of a number of specific changes the government were setting in train which should contribute to building greater confidence. A trifle elliptical Mr Hurd's statements may sometimes have been, but there could be little doubt that, once again, new conciliatory schemes and more expenditures were to be deliberated.[5]

It is surely time to suggest a shift of perspective, enough to entertain the possibility that the economic and environmental factors associated with the recent unrest and disorder are not so much their causes as their consequences. True, nobody would claim that, say, Brixton, as it has become since the Fifties, is an ideal recreational area. But the blacks who now sojourn there were not torn from their suburban villas in the Caribbean islands, shipped to Britain by force, and herded into sleasy Brixton tenements, thereafter to become the chosen victims of police harassment. Indeed, to a mind unschooled in the conventional enlightenment, other licentious reflections are apt to occur. For instance, just what extenuating leverage should we attribute to those allegedly extenuating circumstances? After all, there were quite a few areas of Britain in the Thirties where unemployment was as high, and economic conditions harsher, than they are today even in Brixton. Yet no significant increase in criminal violence was observed.

Let us dare to imagine that instead of a black community settled in Brixton, it was instead occupied initially by a refugee community of poor Germans, Jews, or Dutchmen. Do we honestly believe that the area would have been allowed to deteriorate to the same extent; that buildings would have become so dilapidated; homes so neglected? Would the place have looked equally bleak and demoralising? Would the same proportion of young people have been as aimless and cynical? Would street crime, dope-peddling, mugging, and other forms of lawlessness have been as high?

Is it then wholly impertinent to wonder if there might be one or several singular characteristics that act to retard achievement, to encourage waywardness and promiscuity in young blacks, so making it difficult for them to accept the ordinary vexations of life and assimilate into the larger community? Such a question is not broached in official reports. But there is a revealing paragraph (2.17) in the Scarman Report which comes close to a broad hint of such a possibility: the extremely high proportion of one-parent families within black communities.[6] To quote the disarmingly tactful remarks in the Report, this phenomenon reflects the pattern of Caribbean society where it is 'the custom for women - mothers, grandmothers, aunts - to hold the extended family together' since 'the role of the man was at best supportive, but seldom dominant'. Apparently this loosely extended matriarchal family structure is ill-suited to British conditions, or rather to modern conditions generally. But the absentee father is not an institution that is peculiar to the Caribbean blacks. 'Living without father' has long been the experience of an incredibly high proportion of black children in the teeming ghettoes of America.[7] It is a feature of these black communities that, so far at any rate, legislation and economic aid have been powerless to alter.

Conferring Person Grata Status on Minorities

From painful experience, programmes of economic aid to communities of 'disadvantaged minorities' may justly be regarded with scepticism. Let us turn now to those other official policies designed to propitiate resentful minorities and to promote racial amity. I restrict my observation to two popular policies that have to be resisted if there is to be any hope of racial concord. One of these policies, that of special legislation protective of ethnic minorities, is generally in favour. The other, which can be seen as complementary to programmes of economic aid, is legislation devised to foster a more balanced participation of minorities in the economic life of the country. Elements of both, in fact, combine in the proposal, sometimes blessed by the designation 'positive discrimination' which was briefly debated in Parliament in December 1981 at a time when Mr William Whitelaw, the then Home Secretary, spoke of a trial plan to introduce 'ethnic monitoring' into the Civil Service.

The impetuous recourse to special legislation as a means of correcting apparent inequities is, generally speaking, among the less felicitous political developments of the post-war period, and is the outgrowth of

four interrelated phenomena: (1) the spread of liberal-socialist sentiment favourable to detailed legislation for a just society; (2) the emergence of a new class of engineer-administrators inspired by visions of centralised planning and controls; (3) the public demand for more government regulation in response to the hazards of new technologies; and (4) the growth of factionalist pressures as groups, bound together by common interest or aspiration, come to realise their latent political leverage. Such developments are in tune with the spirit of the times, which rejects older ideas of bearing bravely with the vicissitudes of economic happenstance and, instead, favours active state intervention.

Yet it has to be acknowledged that despite this climate of opinion supportive of powerful and centralised government, the last two decades have also seen the stirrings of reaction against it, heralded by the libertarian counter-reformation associated by economists with the Chicago School. People have begun to discover that seemingly commendable social legislation necessarily entails bureaucratic monitoring and coercion and therefore, necessarily, a diminution of personal freedom. Above all, evidence has accumulated to bear out libertarian allegations that state controls not only provide opportunities for malfeasance but are seldom effectual and often 'counter-productive'. Influential thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic are today less beguiled by grandiose programmes and more conscious of the limitations of government agencies as instruments for social improvement.

Those on the political left, including nearly all of a polymorphous legion of welfare-state appointees loosely referred to as 'social workers', may continue to quarter their faith in the better world of the future in yet more 'positive' action by a yet more powerful state. For allegations of race prejudice and discrimination, in particular, they would prescribe specific legislation, undeterred by the arguments and evidence that such legislation is self-defeating in much the same way as, for example, are price and wage controls, and succeed only in aggravating and prolonging the problem. The good intentions that inspire such legislation and the legal ingenuity which frames its detailed provisions are not at issue. What is pertinent is the train of consequences, the reactions precipitated by the new injunctions and controls.

It is one thing to remove existing forms of *official* race discrimination of the sort associated with the government of South Africa or of the sort which, until recently, prevailed in many of the southern states of the US. But since race-discriminatory laws never existed in Britain, no reform in this respect was possible. It is quite a different thing, however, to introduce penalising legislation in the attempt to secure racial tolerance, or even to repress manifestation of racial hostility. And it is a different thing again to introduce constitutional innovations in a bid to accommodate the demands of discontented and 'disadvantaged' racial minorities.

No matter how enlightened are the views of the people who propose or administer legislation designed to penalise expressions of partiality or prejudice in respect of race or ethnic characteristics, their implementation entails coercion and, to that extent at least, may be said to violate the canons of traditional libertarian doctrine - bearing in mind always that the ramifications of this sort of legislation extend in coverage to the choice of customer, tenant, servant, or club member, and also that bureaucratic bumbledom is such that ordinances and directives are sure to be carried to absurd lengths.

To the consistent libertarian, it is no more unreasonable for a white family to express its preference to let a room in its home to a white boarder than it is for a black family to express its preference for a black boarder, or for a Jewish or Muslim family to express its preference for a Jewish or Muslim boarder. Nor is it any less reasonable for a private club to wish to restrict its membership to white Protestants or white Catholics than for a private club to wish to restrict its membership to Nigerian blacks, for a Cypriot club to wish to elect only members of the Cypriot community or for the Women's Institute to enrol only members of their own sex. Any legislation contrived to prohibit the choice of clients or company that may be enjoyed by a person or group cannot but anger people: and it will anger not only members of the indigenous population, who will compare the easy atmosphere prevailing prior to the influx of ethnic minorities with the range of new restrictions on their choice of company, but also members of these ethnic minorities themselves who, on occasion, want to gather together to communicate in their own language or dialect, to rekindle fellow-feeling and the sympathies of kinship, and to share a warmth which springs from evocation of a common folklore and of times gone by.

Again, an employer who prefers a white salesman, waiter, or barmaid, is not necessarily expressing racial prejudice. He may believe, rightly, that the employment instead of a non-white person will diminish his trade or custom. And there can clearly be circumstances when the reverse is true; when the employer, whether white or not, believes that it will be better for his business prospects to employ a black or Asian person rather than a white one. Certainly, the assumption that any advertisement for a specific ethnic type, or for a male or a female, is *prima facie* evidence of race or sex prejudice is wholly unwarranted.

It cannot be denied that the declared ethnic preferences of some small businessmen may well be irrational, in that their businesses would prosper as well if, instead, they were to employ members of any ethnic group. But in an imperfect world, solutions that will satisfy everyone are not to be looked for. The basic disagreement on these sensitive issues is between those, on the one hand, who are intolerant of the preferences and prejudices of others in the matters of race, sex, age, or any other differentiating characteristic, and those, on the other, who are tolerant of them - provided always that such prejudices are not actively

malign. The libertarian falls into the latter group since he is essentially opposed to bureaucratic coercion, even where the social objectives are commendable. And he is joined by the traditional conservative in a general presumption against enacting measures that require for their implementation contingents of mini-bureaucrats eager to impress the community with their own importance.

In the United States, for instance, the zest with which 'anti-discrimination' is pursued has reached the stage at which employment advertisements in some newspapers dare not make allusions to age, education, or appearance, much less to the sex or ethnicity of job hunters. Words such as 'young' or 'attractive' are frequently disallowed, since they clearly discriminate against the old and the unattractive. Inanities of this sort, perpetrated with dead-pan seriousness, can be expected to proliferate in official organisations run by dedicated do-gooders. A few years ago, an English newspaper was taken to task for printing a classified advertisement, submitted by a Scotsman resident in England, for a Scots cook. And newspapers in Britain now comply with the provisions of a sex-discrimination act that is responsible for those preposterous classifieds seeking 'Topless barmaids, male or female'. An advertisement for a steeplejack was recently disallowed by the commission on grounds of sex discrimination, Jack being the name of a male.

The palpable absurdities that arise from application of anti-discrimination laws are not, however, of primary concern. It is more important that we recognise such laws to be constitutionally unacceptable, inasmuch as they place legal obstacles in the way of ordinary citizens who, either for business or social purposes, and without any malicious intent, simply wish to exercise choice in respect of sex, race, complexion, religion, or any other personal characteristic. Anti-discrimination legislation conciliates only those witless enough to support it. In its operation, however, it tends to exasperate people, so reinforcing prejudice, and also to encourage legal evasion, so contributing to the increased contempt in which the law is now held.

What of the occasional outburst of anti-racial vehemence? Laws against the deliberate disparagement of an ethnic group in public would seem to be acceptable. (Indeed, such laws have long existed in our own common law tradition.) Nonetheless, the libertarian will recognise the persistent difficulty of drawing a line between, on the one hand, public addresses calculated to inflame racial hostility and, on the other, observations critical of the attitudes or behaviour of members of a minority group[8] and casual private remarks whose tenor is uncomplimentary. On the former side of the line is the hackneyed rhetoric of National Front leaders when addressing public meetings in areas heavily populated with one or other minority group. Certainly, if a constitutionally acceptable way could be found effectively to prevent these contrived provocations, a sigh of relief would be heard throughout the country.

As a general rule, however, the introduction of legislation that serves to strengthen the race relations industry is to be discouraged, if only because its preconceptions and its activities are not likely to win support among moderate or sophisticated people. A primary objective of such an industry is to survive and expand, as indeed it is for all government bureaucracies. And it is an unfortunate paradox that an official 'good-race relations' agency thrives on bad race relations. Just because its power and its prospects depend upon the publicity it can generate about racial disaffection and prejudice, there is a strong incentive to encourage complaints, to report even trivial incidents, and to magnify grievances. And it misses no opportunity of tweaking the conscience of the white population and its connivance at race prejudice and its seeming indifference to the plight of minority groups. A strategy less conducive to racial harmony is hard to imagine.

Minority Participation - Tokenism

Damaging also to the aspiration toward racial concord is the enactment of measures directed to eliciting more 'participation' of minorities in the life of the nation. Particularly to be condemned are proposals for 'ethnic monitoring' which involve setting targets or quotas for ethnic representation in the higher ranks of business and government, and in the professions or in the universities. Of less consequence, in this connection, are those informal understandings within public and private organisations to promote ethnic participation - or, rather, using the media, to diffuse the impression of increased ethnic particication in the economic and cultural life of the country. In America, the popularity of these racial pump-priming operations seem to have culminated in a convention which may be referred to as 'race tokenism'. A word or two about it before turning to more critical matters.

For over a generation now the media in the US have been trying to spread the myth that racial harmony is an emerging feature of the American way of life. In poster and magazine advertisements, in television commercials, documentaries, and entertainment, in newscasts, in films, and in television debates, blacks of both sexes and all ages are to be seen working and playing amicably with their white counterparts, smiling and chatting nonchalantly together, all of them equally self-assured and happy members of a colour-blind community. A visitor to the United States may be excused for concluding that there is an unwritten law requiring a minimum of one black person for every group of three or more persons portrayed in any advertisement. Dedication to the token black convention went so far recently as to present a Central Park audience in New York with the spectacle of a black King Lear, his virtuous daughter Cordelia equally black, the remaining two daughters, Goneril and Regan, being white and wicked.

To be sure, the ubiquity of the token black, which has become something of an American institution, cannot be shown to have severely damaged race relations. For the most part it excites amusement and derision, if only because these recurrent scenes of friendly intercourse between the races, these visual intimations of a multi-racial Arcadia, are at variance with the facts of life as experienced daily by minority races such as those living in black Harlem and in Hispanic Los Angeles.[9]

Minority Participation - Reverse Discrimination

Far more questionable are the Federal policies seeking to implement 'Equal Opportunity' and 'Affirmative Action' programmes throughout America, these being the chief products of executive orders that interpret and give effect to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an Act intended to bring about 'racial balance' in the overall pattern of employment, particular regard being paid to blacks, hispanics, orientals, and women.

Such Federal policies, were they successful, would be so far-reaching as virtually to constitute an economic revolution. The conditional clause, however, can bear emphasis. For the endeavour to establish through legal coercion a radical redistribution of economic power, one reflecting norms of equity that accord with radical emancipatory doctrines, comes into collision with the alignment and operation of economic and social forces. Up to the present, at all events, the underlying reality is at variance with the constitutional façade.

All sectors of the American economy, both public and private, are covered by the Federal Act and therefore by the subsequent orders giving effect to it. Among other requirements, each corporation, agency, and institution, is obliged each year to file an Affirmative Action programme indicating the progress made toward realising the approved goals of employing women and members of the designated non-white minorities (at each level of skill and responsibility) in proportions commensurate with those in the population at large. Inasmuch as the racial mix varies enormously as between states, and even within states, the burden on American management of meeting the required racial balance also varies enormously according to location.

Affirmative Action goals are, not surprisingly, pursued with greater ardour and determination in the public sector of the economy than in the private sector. After all, government departments do not face commercial competition. In addition, they come under the immediate surveillance of the enforcement agencies. As for the universities, nearly all of them have come to depend in some measure, directly or indirectly, on Federal funds. They have to be seen, therefore, to be persevering in Affirmative Action programmes. Private business, however, is more evasive and resistant, being concerned as it is primarily with profits or survival and therefore being sensitive to costs.

As noted earlier, discrimination with respect to race or sex by small businesses, particularly those that render direct services to the public, cannot be presumed to arise from prejudice: it may arise simply from the desire to maintain sales or customers. But for other and larger business concerns, a preference for employing whites rather than blacks may reflect the management's conviction that black employees are, on average, less reliable or less efficient than white employees, or that the employment of blacks above a certain number would cause labour troubles.

In passing, it may be remarked that if blacks, or women, were in fact no less reliable and no less efficient on average than white males, blacks and women could not long continue to suffer from greater unemployment or lower pay than white males, at least in the non-service sector of a competitive economy. According to the standard economic argument, a clear business preference for white male labour takes market form as a differential in favour of the wages of white male labour relative to those of blacks and females. If, and to the extent that, such a preference is economically untenable then - without any government intervention - the initial wage differential could not long continue. For so long as the wage differential continues, labour-cost advantages accrue to all firms that employ the relatively cheaper black or white female labour, advantages that continue until - in the competitive search for profits - the wage differential disappears.

Be this as it may, the endeavours of Federal officials to compel corporations to employ personnel they do not wish to employ, along with the tactics used by some black and Hispanic militants to break employer resistance to hiring more of these racial minorities, appears to have been more productive of litigation and mutual antagonism than of 'racial balance', much less racial tolerance. The pressures exerted on corporations by government officials and minorities are also economically wasteful and socially pernicious, resulting in a misuse of the time, resources, and ingenuity of executives (both within the corporations and the labour unions) as they seek new ways and means of outmanoeuvering the other - ways and means that incidentally involve connivance by and corruption among public servants.

Finally, since the modest improvements in the economic status of non-whites that have taken place over the period during which these Federal programmes have been in force have fallen far short of the expectations they had aroused, the suspicions of non-whites about the 'white establishment', far from having subsided, have been reinforced. In conclusion, then, perseverance in such Federal programmes is more likely to contribute to racial tension than to alleviate it.

Minority Participation - The Universities

Affirmative Action programmes perforce adopted by institutes of higher learning also carry disturbing consequences. American universities, seeking as they now have to do, to give expression to the objectives of

the programme, have adopted minority quotas which, if they could actually be met, would produce a racial mix of the student and faculty populations of each college that would, statistically speaking, reflect the proportions existing in the country. For this purpose, incidentally, the Women's Movement has seen to it that women also are to qualify as a 'disadvantaged minority' along with blacks and Hispanics, these now being the chief groups among those which are collectively referred to as the 'protected groups' and which, over the last two decades, have shown increasing acrimony about their being woefully 'under-represented' in government, industry, and academia. Typically, a university will proclaim a target of about 60% of its teaching staff to be recruited from members of the 'protected groups', the bulk of it being reserved for white females, the remainder being apportioned among non-whites, male and female. Yet despite the strenuous efforts to meet these targets, few universities, and none of distinction, have come within sight of achieving their declared goals, owing to the persistent shortage of suitable applicants.

Conceived as a programme to extend to the 'protected groups' preferential consideration and readier access to university positions than are available to other members of the community, chiefly white males, the case made for implementing Affirmative Action policies is patently unconvincing. Regarded as a form of redress for real or imaginary iniquities committed in the past, it is wholly inappropriate. In general, the appropriate form of compensation to persons who have suffered injury, either through the actions of others or through inequitable laws or institutions, is pecuniary, not promotional: it is certainly not easy access to seats of higher learning or to positions of executive responsibility.

Thus if there has indeed been academic discrimination in the past against members of minority groups, the only amends open to a university which are consistent with the maintenance of academic standards is the removal of all forms of racial and sexual discrimination. A policy, instead, of actively discriminating in favour of 'protected groups' implies adopting a policy which, prior to this new age of populist pressures, would never have been contemplated, much less proposed, by the universities; namely, a slackening of the entrance requirements for students and the hiring requirements for staff within appointed categories, a policy that necessarily erodes academic standards.

I say *necessarily* erodes academic standards because the faculty of a university that is conscientiously pursuing Affirmative Action objectives is impelled to reject merit as the sole criterion for the selection of teachers. Instead, it is constrained to adopt a dual criterion: academic eligibility must be marked by ethnic eligibility. But however the balance between them is determined, more of one component in the criterion necessarily entails less of the other. So long, therefore, as there are not enough properly qualified candidates to fill entirely the quotas reserved for the 'protected groups' the required discrimination in their favour – and, consequently, the required discrimination against qualified white males – unavoidably entails a diminution in the level of academic excellence.

Such officially approved forms of 'positive discrimination' not only tend to undermine standards of excellence; they actually damage the prospects and the status of those members of the groups for whose benefit they were enacted. Casual questioning among students and academic staff in American universities reveals that a person belonging to a 'protected group' is more often than not already the victim of a presumption against his academic ability. Thus, those members of the faculty, be they black, Hispanic, or female, who would in any case have made the grade in open competition with others, become tarred with the Affimrative Action brush: as a result of this unfortunate piece of legislation they are effectively robbed of the full recognition they deserve. A similar fate awaits those protected minority students who would have been accepted and would have done well at the university even in the absence of Affirmative Action programmes. They are not likely to fare any better than those protected minority students who would *not* have been accepted by the university in the absence of such programmes – at least when it comes to seeking a position in the world.

Thus, the one certain achievement of Affirmative Action legislation has been the creation of a universal suspicion about the qualifications of any recruit who is also a member of one of the 'protected groups'. A black graduate hired, say, by a Federal agency has to be pretty thick-skinned to remain unaware of traces of condescension among his compeers who cannot altogether repress the idea that he is, after all, a 'quota black', a political creation. No matter how competent he really is, no matter how determined he is to prove that he is not in fact merely a 'quota black', he can never be sure of commanding the respect warranted by his ability and position. The stigma placed on him by Affirmative Action cannot be erased until the legislation supporting it is removed from the statute book.

In conclusion, and addressing ourselves more specifically to the ethnic minorities in Britain, legislation devised to increase their participation in the life of the nation by approving and monitoring ethnic quotas in industry, in government, and in the universities, is not only likely to fan white resentment. Inasmuch as the unavoidable consequences of such legislation is that of reducing the public credibility of genuine merit and achievement among minority personnel, it is as hypocritical for whites to espouse it as it is folly for non-whites to accept it.

The Seductive Myth of White Exploitation

A final remark on the current situation of blacks in America forms a fitting epilogue to this essay since, in so far as it is valid, it undermines the long-cherished preconceptions which played so large a part in the Scarman Report.

American blacks regard themselves to this day as being an economically underprivileged minority, and

tend to offer three alternative rationalisations for the seeming impasse in which they find themselves. They can choose to believe either (1) that in some essential respect they are indeed an inferior breed; or (2) that they themselves are, for the most part, responsible for their relative economic disadvantage; or else (3) that they continue to be, albeit in covert and surreptitious ways, the victims of white injustice. To believe (1) would involve forgoing their self-respect. To believe (2) would be to burden themselves with much searching remorse and also with far more arduous and sustained efforts at community regeneration than they have hitherto contemplated. There is, then, an irrepressible temptation to continue to believe (3), encouraged to do so as they are by many white middle-class liberals seeking to ease twinges of recurrent 'guilt'[10] both by supporting schemes of material aid and differential advantage for blacks and by themselves subscribing to the myth of the white man's abiding inhumanity to the black man.

Yet one might be forgiven also for thinking that, by now, the more popular leaders of America's black communities would have begun to realise that there is no more real sustenance to be squeezed from their coveted heritage of bitterness; that the remnants of race prejudice have in fact long been over-balanced by the partiality in their favour, occasionally bordering on the extravagent; that a black person no less than a white also has a hand in shaping his own destiny; and that many of the frustrations and perplexities of modern life bear sorely on black and white alike. And perhaps these black leaders would indeed have made the effort to come to terms with reality were it not for the clouds of smoke thrown up by a profusion of amateurish reports on race by newspapers and television, most of which seek to be scathing of an alleged neglect of the plight of minorities by the government and the white community generaly.

As things stand, however, the pertinacity of this sort of uninformed and opinionated 'enlightenment' has been such that, notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary, all too many American blacks succumb to the seductive but fatal myth that the black man remains the victim of an insidious white bondage which prevents him from prosperity in a white culture. As such, then, he has no moral obligation to respect white laws or white authority. This myth saps the will of black people to assume greater responsibility for their community and their future. It releases them from the need eventually to come to terms with the social and economic realities that surround them. It is far from implausible to conclude that blacks in America would by now have achieved more, and would by now have been better integrated into the larger society, if there had been no race relations industry, no special legislation, no economic hand-outs, and very little media publicity.

Turning to Britain, many of Lord Scarman's proposals for closer police collaboration with local ethnic communities have been adopted, and his hope that plans for economic assistance be so coordinated as to ensure that public funds find their way to specific areas of 'racial disadvantage' have largely been realised. But as we have seen, they have not availed. And already among us voices can be heard urging that economic aid be given in new forms and on a larger scale - as, indeed, it has been urged time and again in the United States.

The truth of the matter is that no kind of legislation and no amount of economic aid, no matter what form of scale it takes, can provide what Afro-Caribbean spokesmen in Brixton, Tottenham, Handsworth, and elsewhere in British cities have been demanding for members of the black community: status, respect, dignity. In the nature of things, these can only be earned - and, in the existing circumstances, earned grudgingly perhaps and in the face of initial distrust and suspicion. Other racial minorities, however, have eventually succeeded by their own unaided efforts and under conditions no less daunting.

Some new ethnic groups in Britain are already making progress in these respects. Since their arrival in this country, Asian communities have also suffered, to some extent, 'the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune', and have done so in the main with more philosophy and patience. They work hard - some might say too hard - and notwithstanding habitual allegations of the widespread prevalence of 'racism' among white teachers and in school curricula, their children do well in British schools.

To conclude, legislation contrived to offer special facilities or differential economic or educational advantages purely on the basis of ethnicity are constitutional innovations that run strongly against the grain of traditional notions of fairness. Since their implementation would unavoidably discriminate against the white population of this country, and discriminate on grounds of ethnicity alone, such innovations can be depended upon to aggravate racial resentments and beget contempt for the law. What is more, explicitly discriminatory legislation of this sort, gratuitously patronising in its implications, inevitably tends to mark the presumptive beneficiaries as an inferior breed in the eyes of the public at large.

Admittedly it will take foresight and resolution - especially in the face of the occasional frustrations and affronts which arise from the remnants of racial prejudice - for the new ethnic minorities to resist official interventions of this sort putatively on their behalf, welcome as they will generally be to militants and to troops of race relations personnel ever eager to expand their bureaucratic functions and powers. But a resolution of the ethnic minorities not to be made wards of a condescending officaldom may be strengthened by the recognition that only with the abolition of all specific race legislation will the economic and social advance they make by their own efforts prove to be secure and earn them the respect and acceptance

which they seek in their adopted country.

Allowing that their numbers become stabilised in the near future, the unfeigned acceptance of members of the minority groups by the white population of Britain may well be slow and grudging. But only if this acceptance is won - and won through the manifest patience, forbearance, and achievements of the minority groups - will it be genuine and enduring.

Notes

1. So acutely aware of this sequel are the police that the Chief Constable of the Merseyside police defended their policy of not publicising race attacks on them in June 1985 for fear of triggering off further race attacks elsewhere.
2. The forbearance of the British police on such occasions is quite extraordinary. The figures given in the Scarman Report of 279 policemen injured in trying to quell the Brixton riots of 1981 during the Saturday as against 45 'members of the public', and of 122 policemen injured on the Sunday as against 3 'members of the public', is eloquent testimony to their restraint. In the Tottenham riots of October 1985, an estimated 250 police officers were injured, including one who was hacked to death by a group of youths.
3. There was a reminder in the Report, however, that 'police harassment' in areas such as Brixton does not necessarily spring from racial prejudice; a stronger police presence and more 'sus' activity being the conventional response in areas where street crime is high.

   As an aside, the Report made the interesting observation that the Asian community, in contrast to the black, tended to complain not of police *harassment* but of police *neglect* - of insufficient protection by the police especially in the face of 'racist incitement to violence'.
4. This high unemployment he attributes in part to race prejudice. But the extent of *irrational* discrimination in hiring practices is difficult to ascertain when account is taken of the real difficulties which beset young blacks genuinely seeking employment; namely, their unrealistic expectations, their lack of qualifications, their poor command of English, and their unwillingness to travel.
5. On 30th September 1985 there were newspaper reports that a government scheme had been launched to promote black business enterprise in the run-down black areas of the country. Mrs Thatcher did not, of course, wish to be thought of as responding to waves of rioting with cash prizes, and it was officially denied that the scheme had anything to do with the rioting.
6. I hasten to add that there has also been an upward trend in one-parent families in the West generally which can be expected to have disturbing implications for society, but at present it is one that lags far behind that in evidence in black communities.
7. During the year 1980, the number of children born to single black women between the ages of 18-49 was more than ten times that of white women in America - 945 per 1,000 for black women as compared with 91 per 1,000 for white women, and this notwithstanding that the legal abortion rate among black women was more than twice that among white women. Source: *Statistical Abstract for the US* 1982-3.
8. Such as a candid opinion of the effect on educational standards of school children of classes formed preponderantly of a particular ethnic group, or more generally, critical observations on 'multi-cultural' curricula, which opinions led to a Bradford headmaster, Mr Ray Honeyford, being pilloried and threatened as a racist and being compelled to retire in December 1985. Max Beloff writes of the episode in *Encounter* May 1986.
9. The token black presence is generally supplemented by what we might call the token black absence - the convention which suppresses mention of race or colour in newspaper descriptions of lawbreakers in a bid to prevent inflaming race or colour prejudice. The predictable result of this *entente cordiale* among the quality newspapers - which, until recently, also prevailed in this country - was that, in the absence of such information, people tended to assume as a matter of course that the culprit or suspect was black or, at any rate, 'non-white'.

   For comments upon the anomalies arising from 'positive discrimination' in reporting and in employment, see the two articles in *Encounter* by Melvin Lasky, 'Suspicion by Omission' 1984, and 'Race, Press and Chromatic Deceits', 1986.
10. This quite fashionable cultivation of 'guilt' is more properly speaking *shame* - a shame occasionally felt by middle-class whites in America arising from the constant reminders today of the comforts and privileges they enjoy in a world where poverty and suffering is the lot of hundreds of millions of people.

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Matthew Arnold as a Conservative Thinker

Angela Ellis-Jones

The Victorian Age produced many eminent thinkers. Some, like Marx, were fated to become outdated almost before they had put pen to paper; others, like Mill in his facile optimism, were quintessentially men of their age. But there were yet others, who are as relevant to our age as to their own. One of the most notable of these was Matthew Arnold (1822–88). Inspector of schools and Professor of Poetry at Oxford, Arnold announced in 1859 that his mission in life was to 'inculcate intelligence' upon the nation. Finding a need for criticism on many sides, he wrote extensively on education, politics, social affairs, literature and religion.

Although Arnold never thought of himself as a conservative, he was one of the foremost exponents of a 'cultural conservatism', which derives from reaction to a state of affairs prevalent in the Britain of his day and ours:

> Culture says: 'Consider these people then, their way of life, their habits, their manners, the very tones of their voices; look at them attentively; observe the literature they read, the things which give them pleasure, the words which come forth out of their mouths, the thoughts which make the furniture of their minds; would any amount of wealth be worth having with the condition that one was to become just like these people by having it?'[1]

In these words Arnold poses a question relevant both to his age and to us in the centenary year of his death. Essentially Arnold's quest was for the means by which democratic society could be rendered civilised and humane. A principle of authority was needed to counteract the tendencies towards 'Anarchy' which Arnold observed in Victorian society. For him 'Anarchy' had many manifestations, all of which led to a diminution in social cohesion. Amongst the aristocracy, Anarchy manifested itself in materialism and a preoccupation with social status to the exclusion of any interest in ideas. The middle classes or 'philistines' were similarly seduced by materialism, but for them it took the form of obsession with money-making and economic freedom. Among the working classes Anarchy appeared as the assertion of the Englishman's right to 'do what he likes': his right to march where he likes, meet where he likes, enter where he likes, loot as he likes, threaten as he likes, and smash as he likes. A force was needed both to unify society and to give guidance to the individual's life. This Arnold found in the idea of 'Culture':

> ... the idea which culture sets before us of perfection – an increased spiritual activity, having for its characters increased sweetness, increased light, increased life, increased sympathy – is an idea which the new democracy needs far more than the idea of the blessedness of the franchise, of the wonderfulness of its own industrial performance.[2]

This is a notion highly apposite to our times – 'Great' Britain implies more than a nation of shopkeepers. Culture gives us values and enables us to avoid the snare of materialism:

> Now, culture, with its disinterested pursuit of perfection, culture, simply trying to seize on the best and make it prevail, is surely well fitted to help us to judge rightly.[3]

Culture is a study of perfection, 'which consists in becoming something rather than in having something, in an inward condition of the mind and spirit, not an outward set of circumstances'. We are in constant need of reminder that our perfection lies 'not in having and resting, but in growing and becoming'. Culture is the antithesis of the passive 'entertainment' offered to consumers in mass society.

Following Heine, Arnold saw culture as deriving from a synthesis of two strands – Hebraism, which consisted in right conduct, and Hellenism, the development of all the faculties of intellect and aesthetic appreciation to perfection. (The fact that Arnold's somewhat Arcadian image of Greece is at variance with much of classical history and literature does not invalidate the term as useful shorthand.) The synthesis of Hebraism and Hellenism, juxtaposed as 'sweetness and light', is a characteristically conservative combination: the true conservative endorses an Aristotelian striving towards perfection in the context of firm moral principles.

Some critics have seen Hebraism as having a subsidiary importance to Hellenism in Arnold's schema. Insofar as right conduct can be seen as one component of all-round perfection, the criticism may be sustained. But Arnold must in no way be taken to undervalue 'conduct'; the son of Dr Thomas Arnold of Rugby, who inherited his father's belief that conduct was 'three fourths of life' would have been horrified at Bloomsbury's exaltation of amoral personal development. He saw morality as an 'indispensable' component of true culture:

> The philosophers and the prophets, whom I at least am disposed to believe, and who say that moral causes govern the standing and falling of states, will tell us that the failure to mind whatsoever things are elevated must impair with inexorable fatality the life of a nation.

We must be clear what Arnold means when he deprecates the 'Puritanism' of the middle classes. Puritanism

has two meanings. Firstly, it denotes the view of life which sees purity of thought and action as important; Arnold, who believed that 'kindness and pureness, charity and chastity - if any virtues could stand for the whole of Christianity, these might' and who considered that 'the Renaissance had died by obeying its lusts', would have endorsed this. But it also describes a view of life which condemns sensuous as well as sensual pleasures, and beauty for its own sake. Arnold, in his advocacy of Hellenism, was criticising this latter 'narrow' and 'inadequate' attitude.

But if morality was part of the definition of culture, so also did culture in its more narrowly intellectual sense - 'the best that has been known and thought' - have a moral value, both from the standpoint of the individual and from that of the community. Adopting an Aristotelian ideal of human striving towards perfection, Arnold saw high culture as conducing to 'a harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature'. Any form of excellence has moral value; high culture specifically is synonymous with the eternal verities, the yearning for which is the essence of morality. For Arnold high culture embodied a shared moral experience and conveyed a sense of historical continuity.

While one can see that culture in the Hellenistic sense ought to have the effect of producing a more refined and morally sensitive person, the link is by no means inevitable. One need only think of the highly gifted but dissolute Greek Alcibiades, or, nearer our times, of Lenin, who was a cultivated person, but who also advocated revolutionary violence. Hitler gained power in the most cultivated nation in Europe and was not without a measure of culture himself.[4] The Socratic assumption that to know the good is to do it, and the Greek view of the necessary fusion of the beautiful and the good - the *kaloskagathos* - is untenable. Culture alone cannot make men moral.

This point was taken by John Henry Newman, for whom the insuperable defect of humanistic culture lay in the fact that 'it still provides no means for transcending the limits of the natural man'. Newman recognised that:

> It is well to be a gentleman, it is well to have a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste, a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bearing in the conduct of life ... but still, I repeat, they are no guarantee of sanctity or even of conscientiousness, they may attach to the man of the world, to the profligate, to the heartless - pleasant, alas, and attractive as he shows when decked out in them.[5]

What is needed in addition to culture as a means of making men good is religion. Arnold's thesis is flawed because he makes conduct depend on no sanction other than the moral intuitions of cultivated people. But Hebraism almost by definition implies an external and transcendent discipline. Religion is needed to resolve the following dilemma: Hellenism enjoins us towards perfection yet, owing to the ubiquity of sin, we are destined never to achieve it; there will always be a 'fly in the ointment'. As St Paul was so painfully aware, we do the evil that we do not wish rather than the good we know we ought to do. Religion enables us to understand this flaw of nature, to accept our limitations, and to attempt to better ourselves. Knowledge of what is good is insufficient; we need grace, given by religion, to enable us to do good. Religion also presents us with self-perfection as an obligation rather than merely an ideal.

In addressing itself to the dark side of human nature, the irrationality, suffering and contradiction of which Dostoyevsky was so well aware[6], religion shows itself to be more comprehensive than a culture which reflects merely 'sweetness and light'. Indeed cultural conservatism can be criticised from a Nietzschean point of view[7] for failing to recognise that *et in Arcadia ego*. But this is perhaps unfair. The best that has been known and thought will tell us how to die as well as how to live, but will not become overly preoccupied with mortality and morbidity. In its concern with such matters much post-Nietzschean art commits the opposite error to Arnold. There are some things into which it is best not to enquire too closely: 'seek not to know the reason why, for therein lies madness' - or, at any rate, nihilism.

For Arnold, culture, or the pursuit of an intellectual and moral perfection which would benefit both the subject and others, was religion, or rather its substitute in a secular age. He declared his own 'faith in culture' and takes from the Gospels his prefatory quotation to *Culture and Anarchy: estote ergo vos perfecti.* In this work Arnold suggested that a naturalistic culture and perfection are 'known absolutes' and that they could serve as a substitute for religion.

Culture does indeed have a spiritual dimension, insofar as it provides for a source of value and discipline outside the self. It enables a person to rescue his life from 'thraldom to the passing moment and to his bodily senses, to ennoble it, and to make it eternal'. Arnold would have agreed with his contemporary Walter Pater that culture represents a quest for a 'sort of religious phase possible for the modern mind'; perfect culture strives for the preservation of a permanent spiritual element in life, an element which survives in a small number of mental states and religious graces - longing, chastening, joy - even in the absence of the objects that formerly excited these states and of the systems to which they were erroneously attached. He would have endorsed the view of the French philosopher Renan that 'science, art, and philosophy are valueless except insofar as they are religious. That is to say inasmuch as they furnish the spiritual food that religion used but can no longer supply'. But such statements concede the primal importance of religion and the derivative nature of its substitutes.

Arnold was writing at a time when religious certainties were beginning to dissolve, although the moral precepts enjoined by Christianity were still largely obeyed. An agnostic, he recognised the value of religion

in giving man moral norms by which to live, and considered that an interest so deep and abiding should be recognised by state establishment. But as Plato argues in *The Republic*, people may continue to cultivate certain virtues and practise restraints when the principles which would alone have justified them have ceased to be held. This may go on for a long time, but ultimately, when the rationale for such habits has disappeared they will collapse at the first impact of adversity. While unbelievers of Arnold's day lived off religious capital, both the beliefs which inspired moral behaviour and that behaviour itself have now collapsed, with devastating consequences for the health of individuals and society.

Arnold's despondency in the face of a faithless world, in which Christianity no longer serves to establish man in an ordered providential universe with assured religious and moral guidance can be seen most clearly in his short poem *Dover Beach* (1851). Here he speaks of how 'we are here as on a darkling plain/Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight'; by contrast:

The Sea of Faith
Was once too, at the full.

In the poem, which was composed on his honeymoon, as in his life, Arnold finds his refuge from 'the vast edges drear' in human love; but for those to whom this inestimable privilege is denied, life without faith is bleak indeed.

Arnold was well able to appreciate the cultural value of religion, especially Catholicism. It is somewhat surprising that he did not consider that the Catholic version of Christianity, with its embracing of life in all its fullness, a trait conspicuously absent from Hebraic Protestantism, incorporated a large measure of the Hellenism he was seeking. His vision of man's future demanded a religious and specifically Catholic form of ritual and poetry: 'The need for beauty is a real and now rapidly growing need in man; Puritanism cannot satisfy it; Catholicism and the English Church can.' Thus the Roman and Anglican Churches invest with beauty those elementary truths of inescapable depth and value, yet of extreme simplicity, which form the basis of Arnold's outlook.

On several occasions Arnold acknowledged his deep indebtedness to that most famous of nineteenth century Catholics, John Henry Newman.[9] No other man of the nineteenth century - neither Goethe, nor Sainte-Beuve, nor Emerson, nor Carlyle, nor Wordsworth - evoked from Arnold such a continuous and detailed intellectual response combined with such intense personal veneration. For Arnold this 'exquisite and delicate genius' represented the epitome of a cultured and self-perfected individual. (The fact that Newman was an intensely religious person strengthens the point I made a few paragraphs back about the indispensability of religion to the wholly-perfect person.) In writing *Culture and Anarchy*, Arnold was aware that Newman's 'influence and writings' were 'mixed up with all that is most essential in what I do and say'[10]; it is fair to say that Newman's *Idea of a University* set out the manifesto for cultural conservatism which Arnold developed in *Culture and Anarchy*. Many passages in the earlier work prefigure those in the later, and the similarities in vocabulary are striking; both writers attribute qualities of energy, spontaneity, freedom, harmoniousness, cultivation, unity, taste, flexibility, interiority and inwardness, beauty, perfection, excellence, power, ease, clarity and comprehensiveness to the critical intelligence.

Both men recognised the importance of the European dimension in British culture. This concept of Europe as a cultural unity is one that we might profitably endorse. Our country is properly part of a Europe not of Eurocrats who attempt to impose spurious and unworkable homogeneity with respect to trifling and materialistic matters, but of a Europe which nurtured a Christian culture unique in its development of the human person and shared among its constituent nations.

Arnold also shared Newman's 'antipathy to liberalism'; he considered that 'in a serious man a strong sense of the insufficiency of Liberal nostrums, of the charlatanism of Liberal practitioners, as also of the real truth, beauty, power, and conformity to nature of much in the past of which these practitioners are intolerant, is abundantly permissible'. He was highly contemptuous of the tendency he had noted of freedom in England coming to mean freedom to affirm the irrational, ordinary self, or, in other words, the Anarchy implicit in the philosophy of 'doing as one likes'. In this he returns to the earlier philosophers who accorded a priority to virtue over liberty. He considered that extreme individuality in thought was characterised by a tendency to Anarchy, for it implied the equality of all values and was against the triumph of right reason. He criticised the baneful notion that there is no such thing as a high, correct standard in intellectual matters; that every one may as well take his own way. To the contemporary boast that every Englishman could believe what he liked, what was true for him, Arnold kept asking whether it was not important that what people were free to believe should be worth believing. While freedom of speech was good, what was said was equally important and liberty and publicity were not substitutes for right thinking. The anarchy of individualism should be checked by the authority of culture.

One of Arnold's main fears was of 'Americanisation', which stemmed originally from de Tocqueville's warnings about democracy. In his classic study,[11] Lionel Trilling described Arnold's fear in terms of a fear of vulgarity, loss of distinction and, above all, that presumptuousness which occurs when each man, no matter what his training or intellectual endowments, considers his ideas to be as valuable as those of the best instructed. Democracy exalted the ordinary and mediocre, and made the present the only valid dimension of time - the passing whim was to be satisfied, without a regard to the counsels of past experience or a proper consideration of the demands of the future.

In the 'Americanisation' syndrome, we see the union of liberalism and egalitarianism. Both derive from a

materialistic view of the world. If there is no basis for value, there are no constraints on what the individual should be able to do and one person's experience is as valuable as any other's. This is the doctrine preached by exponents of libertarianism outside and within the Conservative party. The High Tory, by contrast, considers that there are objective values such as beauty, truth and goodness; that there are consequently better and worse forms of entertainment, deriving from the fact that some cultural products are intrinsically good and evil, and that they demand a higher or lower degree of understanding in their production and consumption. For the cultural conservative one person's taste is emphatically not as good as the next person's. (It should, however, be noted that Americans have made a distinguished contribution to theories of cultural conservatism, most notably Irving Babbitt, P. E. Moore, T. S. Eliot and Russell Kirk.)

It need hardly be stated that Arnold's view of Hellenism with its exaltation of development of all the faculties is diametrically opposed to the one-dimensional view of man as a being for whom self-expression is the highest mode of functioning. In his insistence on 'the best that has been known and thought' Arnold realised that to be a self worthy of expression, the self must be formed by values extraneous to itself. He would have had no time for the subjectivist view that experience for its own sake is valuable, 'irrespective of the quality of the experience, the object of the experience, that upon which the experience is, as it were, directed, being left out of account' which derives from the view that there are no objective values. Professor Joad sees such a materialistic perspective as characteristic of 'decadence'[12].

Although Arnold would have agreed with Mill in holding that one of the aims of culture was the turning of 'a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions and habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically', he parted company with the liberal in believing that there was need for a principle of authority, both moral and intellectual. He considered that all experience showed that there are two selves in man, an ordinary and best self, and that the aim of culture was to encourage behaviour in accordance with the latter. Happiness was to be found by obeying the law of one's being, by acting righteously. If anything distinguishes a conservative from a liberal, it is this belief in the validity of norms of conduct which must be inculcated into the young so as to give them a moral framework for their lives and enable them to override passing fancy. The *anomie* which ensues if this is not done has recently been illustrated in Arnoldian fashion by Professor Allan Bloom.[13]

Arnold believed that culture had a social as well as an individual aspect; that it must be released from its narrow definition (specialised learning) and broadened to encompass the whole process of human development:

> There is a view in which all the love of our neighbour, the impulses towards action, help, and beneficience, the desire for removing human error, clearing human confusion, and diminishing human misery, the noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we found it – motives eminently such as are called social – come in as part of the grounds of culture and the main and pre-eminent part.[14]

In extending the ambit of 'culture' beyond the sphere in which it would usually be understood, Arnold may be thought to be pressing the term to meaninglessness. How will 'culture' enable us, for example, to solve the problems of the Health Service? What is the difference between culture, and sensible administrative structures? Has Britain's problem not indeed resided in the fact that the higher echelons of the civil service have been staffed by the products of a classical education, and would not some technocratic competence have been desirable?

These are issues which have become clearer since Arnold's time, as has that of his advocacy of the state as the agent of general perfection and 'centre of light and authority'. Arnold considered that the State should promote the ideal of a humane life through authoritative institutions – a national system of education, a national church, and if possible an academy similar to the Academie Française. He called upon the middle class, which of the three classes he saw as having the most potential to take the initiative in creating a system of secondary education. He considered that education was the proper function of the state because of its great importance; organisation by the state would impart to education a certain grandeur that private institutions could not. This is a fallacy that has been exposed in post-war Britain. But Arnold considered that of equal importance to the fostering of formal education was the engendering of the 'discipline of awe and respect' through the action within the community of a cultivated group.

The advocacy of an educated elite was common to many nineteenth century thinkers. Coleridge's clerisy was the prototype of a theory which held that the practical life of society was vitally affected by the life of the mind. It was considered that 'there has historically been or that there ought to be a group in society which sees more clearly, describes the permanent and truly important behind the ever-shifting, untrustworthy phenomena, and consequently knows society's needs better than its ostensible rulers'.[15] This group was to 'render susceptible of comprehension the raw matter of experience under the headings of transcendent principles'. These thinkers, unlike Mill, did not see the intellectual as having a prerogative to eccentricity but as pursing the life of the mind within the framework of moral order; this could not fail to have effects on the polity.

Perhaps Britain's greatest tragedy is that she has never had a very influential conservative intellectual establishment. (This is so despite the fact that Arnold notes the existence of 'this large class of gentlemen in the professions, the services, literature, politics ... not of the nobility, but with the accomplishments and taste

of an upper class, is something peculiar to England ... It is aristocratic in this sense, that it has the tastes of a cultivated class, a certain high standard of civilisation'.)[16] Until relatively recently the idea of a conservative intellectual was seen as a contradiction in terms; that era has fortunately passed, and we now have the scope for a much-enriched conservatism. Conservatism should be intellectual and cultured: it is all part of a wider philosophy of getting the most out of life. What passes for an intelligentsia in this country has been predominantly left-wing and conspicuously lacking in 'sweetness and light'. It poses as the champion of culture, but understands by this not Arnold's idea of the 'best that has been known and thought' but rather the mediocre products of the 'artariat', that assorted bunch of contemporary writers, dramatists and artists who demand state subsidies in return for foisting on the public their work of dubious merit. The present government is doing culture no disservice by ignoring them.

The notion of an educated elite is an attractive and sensible one, but education alone does not guarantee the cultivation or moral behaviour of its recipient, nor is association with the state any guarantee of respectability. The optimists of the last century failed to conceive of the possibility of influential positions in the state being taken over by an anti-elite hostile to the values of true culture; one doubts whether there can be any worse *trahison des clercs* than has been seen in post-war Britain. The influence of this group on broadcasting has been devastating. The state supports such outfits as the National Theatre which has staged plays prosecuted for obscenity. The state, to some extent under Arnold's influence, progressively introduced an excellent system of education. But the education bureaucracy was infiltrated by egalitarians who, since the early sixties, have reversed earlier attempts to create equality of opportunity in education. The introduction of GCSE marks the ultimate justification for mixed ability teaching and lowering of standards. Arnold's faith in the state has been sorely betrayed; it will be left to the non-state sector to develop rival systems of examination.

But perhaps the main reason for the failure of Arnold's ideal is that the British, particularly the English, have no natural inclination towards high culture, a tendency which has been compounded by the preference of mass society for entertainment over culture. British society is permeated by a widespread disdain for excellence, as the vulgar usage 'culchah' and contempt for and mistrust of the intellectual attest. Consider how parents of exceptionally gifted children often react when their child receives publicity: 'Oh, he's such an ordinary boy really. Prefers playing football.' Anything requiring the slightest degree of mental exertion is dismissed by most Britons as 'too much like hard work'.

But although Arnold considered that culture begins with the realisation 'that the sweetness and light of the few must be imperfect until the raw and unkindled masses of humanity are touched with sweetness and light' he recognised that 'knowledge and truth, in the full sense of the words are not attainable by the great mass of the human race at all'. His ideal of a humane life was both aristocratic and democratic; aristocratic insofar as only a few could hope to pursue it adequately, democratic in that all could and should be encouraged to participate to some extent.

Have Britons become less cultured than in Arnold's day? Despite compulsory secondary education children are still leaving British schools in a state of almost benighted ignorance. As regards the stratum of society from which the 'clerisy' are to be drawn, there is little ground for optimism; *The Salisbury Review* stands as an oasis in a cultural desert whereas in Arnold's day there flourished half a dozen similar reviews.[17]

What would Arnold, if he were alive today, recommend should be done? Undoubtedly he would suggest a return to the sound principles underlying the 1944 Education Act. He would probably admit that this was as far as any state could go in promoting 'the best that has been known and thought', and would settle for urging the government to do more to prevent the worst that has been known and thought in the way of pornography from circulating freely.

Although Arnold's advocacy of 'perfection' is a conservative ideal to which we must aspire (while realising that we are unlikely to attain it in its fullness), he was somewhat unconservative, although typical of his age, in believing that man was destined to progress and that good was ultimately bound to triumph in the world. The continuing decline of religion since his day has revealed more strongly the tendency to original sin and made the triumph of good somewhat less probable. His confidence in the state has been shown to be misplaced, as has that in the British people's capacity to interest itself in cultural matters. One notes with irony that it was Arnold who apostrophised Oxford as that 'home of lost causes, and forsaken beliefs, and unpopular names, and impossible loyalties!' But for all that, Arnold has given us a vision of the sort of people we should aim to be, and of some of the values which must complement those of the market if we are to avoid 'anarchy'.

Notes

1. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, 1869, Dover edition, New York, p. 41.
2. *Op cit*, p. 67.
3. *Op cit*, p. 38.
4. It might be supposed that the more cultivated Germans offered Hitler below-average support. But the opposite was the case, due to their fear of Communism and acceptance of a Volkish ideology which advocated national rebirth under the leadership of a Führer. Their scant attention to the more morally obnoxious parts of Hitler's programme is proof that high intelligence, aesthetic sensibility and moral sensitivity are by no means always to be found in the same people.
5. Newman, *Idea of a University*, OUP, p. 107.
6. 'A Note on Dostoyevsky', Angela Ellis-Jones, *The*

Salisbury Review, Autumn, 1983.
7. As for instance by John Carroll, *The Salisbury Review*, July, 1985.
8. Renan, *Reflèctions sur l'état des esprits (1849), questions contemporaines* in *Oeuvres*, Paris, 1898, vol. 1, p. 219.
9. See 'Cardinal Newman as a Conservative Thinker', Angela Ellis-Jones, *The Salisbury Review*, September, 1987.
10. David De Laura, *Hebrew and Hellene in Victorian England*, University of Texas, p. 79.
11. Lionel Trilling, *Matthew Arnold*, New York, 1939, pp. 254-5.
12. C. E. M. Joad, *Decadence, a Philosophical Enquiry*, Faber, 1948, p. 54.
13. Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1986.
14. *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 34.
15. L. C. Knights, *The Idea of the Clerisy in the Nineteenth Century*, CUP, 1977, p. 6.
16. Arnold, 'Equality', in *Matthew Arnold, A Collection of his Essays*, edited by M. Allott and R. Super, OUP, 1986, p. 437.
17. Including *The Nineteenth Century, Cornhill Magazine, Saturday Review, National Review*, and several Catholic reviews. Nearly everything Arnold wrote was published in a periodical before incorporation into a book.

President Denktash

Olga Maitland

When, in 1974, the Turks of Cyprus were threatened with annihilation, Rauf Denktash, their leader, had no alternative but to call on Turkey for help. The British, one of the guarantors of the 1960 constitution, would not move to protect the beleaguered Turkish Cypriot people. The British had already seen their own soldiers shot, and did not want to lose any more men in an internal struggle. In any case, they had lost interest in Cyprus, as they rapidly lost interest in all their former colonies. Harold Wilson, our Prime Minister at the time, is now bitterly criticised by the Turkish Cypriots for doing nothing in 1974.

The Commonwealth is likewise condemned for refusing to hear the Turkish case, in the face of relentless lobbying from the Greeks. Today, the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) is still excluded from the Commonwealth, and it rankles that not even the Queen will listen to people who have never formally been excluded from her protection. It amazes the Turkish Cypriots that Mrs Thatcher's government will receive acknowledged terrorists like Oliver Tambo of the ANC and representatives of the PLO, but will still not meet Denktash, towards whom Britain has a measure of responsibility.

The British failed to recognise the intimidation of the Turks by the Greeks which began in 1956, and which intensified between 1960 and 1974. It remains a fact, however, that the events which led to the partition of Cyprus were initiated by the Greek Cypriots, who first withdrew the constitutional rights of the Turkish community, ejecting them by force of arms from the Parliament in 1963, and then mounted a campaign of harassment, shooting men, women and children indiscriminately. This campaign reached such a pitch that the Turkish Cypriots had to withdraw into enclaves for safety: the Greeks then took revenge by cutting off all their postal and telephone services, and ensuring that nobody could enter or leave without permission or an escort.

The crux came with the Greek civil war, when a revolt among the Cyprus National Guard was deliberately encouraged by the military regime in Athens. Officers from the Greek army, commanded by the ruthless terrorist Nikos Sampson, entered the island with orders to seize control and to assassinate Makarios. Although the attempted murder failed, Sampson nevertheless proclaimed himself President and ruled for seven days of unparallelled bloodshed, largely between the mainland Greeks and the Greeks of Cyprus. It soon became clear that the Turkish community was in imminent danger, and when Sampson announced his intention of occupying the enclaves, Turkey, as one of the signatory powers guaranteeing the 1960 constitution, invoked her legal right to intervene - a course which has never been challenged in international law.

The Turkish Rescue Mission may have seemed an outrage to the Greeks. It caught them totally by surprise. But they had completely failed to heed the warning signs. They never believed that the Turks whom they had goaded for so long would at last fight for their survival. When once the shooting had died down, and the Green Line had been established, ending the atrocities of which they had been victims, the Turkish Cypriots began to look around in a state of disbelief. For the first time in their lives they had total freedom of movement. They could drive anywhere, and they did not need to live in fear.

To begin with they were stunned by their good fortune, and overcome by a kind of lethargy, contemplating the magnitude of the task before them. An infrastructure and economy had to be built from scratch, by a people who had had no government, no civil service, no major business experience, and little technical know-how. Only one person could forge a future for them, and this was Rauf Denktash.

Denktash is a fighter, who because he can fight against great odds, had led the Turkish community successfully through the war. He knows how to fight

because he can see ahead, and this, together with his strong personality and his very conviction, carries everyone with him.

That is why today, he is still the undisputed leader of the Turkish Cypriots, at once father figure, brother and friend. Even his critics find it hard to say anything harsh against him. In a small community of just 154,000 familiarity could breed contempt; but in Denktash's case it is otherwise, and many of his childhood friends still work alongside him, happy to accept his command.

What is it that makes Denktash so exceptional? To the visitor he is an ebullient charmer; and a call at the Presidential Palace is a relaxed affair. The house itself, with its green tiled roof and pale yellow walls set in shady gardens on the ancient ramparts, is the most elegant house in the Turkish side of Nicosia. Armed guards are at the main gate; but inside there is just one ante-room from which you walk straight into the President's office. Denktash keeps an open-door policy. The room reflects his personality: comfortable, stylish, with books, a tape recorder and a large collection of tapes. The room also abounds in cameras, for Denktash's great hobby is photography. The last photograph of his son Raif, killed in a car crash a year ago, is displayed on the wall alongside a gallery of others.

Of all the many blows in his life, it is his third son's death which hit Denktash the hardest. (The other sons died in early childhood.) Denktash surprised his friends in seeking consolation from the Koran: he quotes freely from it and meets daily in private for prayers. Immediately after the death, it was feared that he could not carry on, so deeply was he affected. But it is precisely when he feels most low, that Denktash bucks himself up by taking action: his dedication to his office has therefore been at the root of his very survival.

Denktash was born in 1924 at Paphos, the youngest son of Judge Raif Bey. He did well at the English school in Nicosia, and was an active child, keen on sports. His fast repartee enabled him to defend himself and other boys against the taunts of Greeks; sometimes, too, he would use his fists. As he finished his schooling he was spotted by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr Kucuk. Kucuk was galvanising the younger generation, so as to start a movement which would encourage the Turkish community to demand equal rights. In 1944 Denktash, aged 18, obtained a rare scholarship from the British Council to study law in London; he was called to the Bar in 1947.

Back in Cyprus he practised as a lawyer and a year later began to climb his way to power within the Turkish community, becoming Chairman of the Federation of the Turkish Cypriot Association in 1957 and in 1960 being elected President of the Turkish Communal Chamber. Meanwhile he had made a name for himself, lobbying for the Turkish Cypriots at the UN General Assembly. His activities led Makarios to ban him from Cyprus for four years: undeterred he continued his lobbying from Turkey. In 1973 he was elected Vice-President of the Republic and President of the Turkish Cypriot administration. In 1975, after the Turkish Rescue Mission, he declared the Federated State of Kibris (Cyprus) and established the constituent assembly.

Inter-communal talks with the Greeks, which had continued since 1968, had shown precious little progress. Finally Denktash exploded again. Despite foreign condemnation, he knew that having gained their freedom, his people wanted a future and a status as far as possible. The next stage was formally to set up the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. Nine years of fruitless talks had gone by since 1974, during which the Greeks, by heavy lobbying and playing on the sympathies of the Western powers, had set themselves up as the Government of Cyprus. In 1986 the question was raised at the Council of Europe for the second time, as to the legality of such a title, when the Turkish community is expressly excluded from this 'government's' protection.

After years of work, the UN General Secretary, Perez de Cuellar, finally made a proposal for the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-national Federal Republic. Denktash agreed to sign this in 1985; but it was rejected by the Greek leader Kyprianou. A second draft was again accepted by Denktash in April this year, and again Kyprianou, after a visit to President Papandreou (who has his own reasons for wishing to keep alive his many self-induced disputes with Turkey) refused to sign.

Could it be that the Greeks are afraid that the Turkish Cypriots will get recognition after all? While Denktash would much prefer to have a settlement, with all the undoubted and immediate benefits which issue from world-wide recognition, he also knows that he can relax. He is not so desperate: *de facto* recognition is happening in any case, and each month that passes can only strengthen his negotiating arm with the Greek Cypriots in the south.

At first it was only thanks to Turkey that the Turkish Cypriot community could survive. And Turkey still contributes half the annual budget, amounting to around £30 million and 17,000 troops. It is a heavy price for a country with serious economic problems of its own. Prime Minister Özal, on his visit in June 1986, made it clear that it is about time Northern Cypriots learnt to stand on their own feet, suggesting the ways in which they can go about it. Saudi Arabia has contributed a major highway and a council housing estate. Small Islamic countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh have given support, and it is likely that the Islamic league will provide help before the West decides to follow.

The Turkish Cypriots regard themselves as Europeans, heirs to democratic institutions and a British rule of law, and with the same Kemalist attitudes as their mainland cousins in Turkey. It is a great sadness to them, as well as a danger to us, that, in the face of Western hostility, they have been forced to look Eastwards for the help necessary to their survival.

At home Denktash drives himself and his colleagues

impossibly hard. He works 18 hours a day, and his colleagues have to rotate to keep up. Sometimes he gets very angry at their failure to stand the pace. He also keeps close tabs on his politicians, and they can expect him to call day and night with instructions. Even his own Prime Minister wonders just who is running the country.

Denktash justifies his close involvement in the political process as the single continuing factor in a parliament which has four political parties, ranging from the right wing to a sizeable socialist party, and led by endless, somewhat unsatisfactory coalitions. The coalitions rise and fall with monotonous regularity: and as elsewhere on the Mediterranean fringe of democracy this does not encourage efficiency. The continuous falls of government enrage Denktash, who is rightly proud of the existing pluralism, while also frustrated by the absence of the continuity necessary to carry out far-reaching policies. The difficulties are aggravated by an as yet raw civil service which still contains far too many political appointees.

With his eyes constantly on the horizon, Denktash finds his temper on a short fuse. Internal bickering irritates him. He can see only too clearly the wider strategy being hampered by domestic upheavals. Furthermore, he is deeply aware that the needs of a new generation must be met. The new graduates have only dim childhood memories of Greek domination. Their only language is Turkish and a smattering of English. Their only world is the TRNC of today and tomorrow.

The problems of today are those of a nation on the move: in particular a rapid increase in the cost of living. Small-scale strikes have also made their appearance, but partly because new businesses are mushrooming, and providing opportunities for industrial action which never previously existed. Building in particular is booming; apartment blocks, as well as new and splendid villas. Prize plots of land are being snapped up. Mercedes cars are everywhere to be seen, nosing impatiently behind the old bangers which even the poorest family now possesses. Cypriot Turks who emigrated during the troubles are beginning to return, bringing with them foreign exchange and foreign expertise.

Denktash views all this with paternal satisfaction. He moves freely in public with no ceremony and no bodyguards; when not on official engagements he drives himself up into the villages. It is common for him to walk into a shop and enquire after the family. He knows everybody by name. Nor does he ever forget to visit privately the women whose husbands and sons were killed during the years of conflict. July to September every year are busy months, when memorial services are held in communities, in some of which an entire generation was wiped out.

I watched him at one such event in Tashkent. He stood in mourning with the widows and orphans of 84 men who were taken by the Greeks from their homes in 1974 and shot in a wood. A gunfire salute in honour of the dead rang out. Fiery speeches were made following an address by Denktash. Then he moved among the families, though it was not a special visit for them – only the most formal of many. All year he calls in to see how they are getting on.

As he continues to lobby the United Nations, Denktash is aware that the sacrifices commemorated each summer must not be in vain. As he says:

> The legitimate government will be the bi-communal one. At the moment the Greek government does not represent the whole of Cyprus. The world has been hoodwinked into believing they are the legitimate body. I have been vindicated, in that twice I have shown that I am ready to sign a settlement.
>
> I have gone far enough. There will be no changes. If the Greeks fail to sign, so be it. We are strong enough. After 12 years on our own we have shown that despite sanctions we can hold up our heads and survive. At least our country lives in total peace and harmony. Not a single life has been lost in fighting or terrorism since 1974.

'An Educated Public'

Paul Helm

The phrase is a two-fold abstraction. There is no such entity as 'the public'; there are many overlapping publics, embodied in societies, clubs and in less informal groupings. To refer to what 'the public' thinks or needs identifies hardly anything at all, at best a lowest common denominator. 'Education' is also an abstraction, even though the word is a particular favourite, not surprisingly perhaps, among educationalists. For such people education often seems to be regarded as if it were a commodity, like coal or milk, which, given the appropriate 'mechanism', can be 'delivered'. Nevertheless, for all its potential misleadingness the phrase 'an educated public' is useful for denoting a prime goal of education. For if education is a good thing, then presumably it is also a good thing that it be as widely diffused as possible, to inform public attitudes and actions.

But the phrase 'an educated public' suggests more than the education to a high degree of large numbers of people, the 'public'. It carries with it the idea that such education should also inform and influence public life, permeating the consideration of public issues and matters of general concern. And is it not better that the fruits of learning and scholarship should be made

available to the public in an attractive form rather than not? The alternative is to leave popular culture in the hands of purely commercial forces and, if current trends are extrapolated, to allow new generations to grow up with no sense of their own history and national identity, nor of the literature and institutions of the nation, and so to become a prey to old hat dressed up as a novel discovery. One duty of the teacher is to fortify his students against nonsense.

So, in what does an educated public consist? One condition is obvious enough - possession of a body of general knowledge and the ability and appetite to think critically and reflectively about it; to promote and debate it, at a high level of articulacy. To say, as many do, that the essence of education is being able to think for oneself, is misleading because incomplete. For it fails to emphasise that thinking needs something to think about. Thinking for oneself is not thinking *ex nihilo*, it is thinking at a certain level about a corpus of opinions or hypotheses that have been handed on in 'education', whether formally in the classroom or informally in the wider culture. And the thinking of an educated person is principally directed to the elimination of errors about the world.

In higher education, the current emphasis is almost wholly upon being 'critical', or on being technically or professionally equipped, on being what Matthew Arnold called 'mechanical', a word which applies not only to machinery or technology, but to all that is conventionally meant by one's 'standard of living' or 'quality of life'.

Perhaps the state of higher education harks back to the days when school-leavers could be guaranteed to possess a body of general knowledge and received opinion about which it was realistic to invite them to reflect, and which also provided them with instances on which they could model their own critical reflections. Those days have largely gone, at least if the general knowledge of the typical undergraduate is anything to go by. As a result the invitation to be 'critical' is either one that is accepted in a vacuum or in the context of one highly developed and specialised discipline.

A second condition is the development of an appetite to 'go on'; to explore what is regarded as intrinsically worthwhile, whatever its other, incidental values may be. There has to be a zest for knowledge, and for the refining and criticising of that knowledge in debate. A third condition is the existence of facilities to carry out that debate; the necessary health and leisure, arenas of written and oral discussion, exhibitions, theatres, libraries, computer terminals and whatever else.

A fourth condition is the development of what F. R. Leavis called the discipline of intelligence and sensibility (and what Matthew Arnold called 'sweetness and light'), a critical intelligence which informs any of the special disciplines in which an educated person may be knowledgeable or expert. Leavis looked to literature to provide such a discipline. In earlier times it was sought from Christian divinity, but the study of divinity has also become 'mechanical' and directionless. Whether or not Leavis was correct in his estimate of the power of literature, it is clear that it provides *one* vehicle for the development of an understanding of what is worthwhile, of what ends a man or woman can live and die by, some scale of values, a check and a control on the worship of whatever can be given statistical expression. As Arnold put it in *Culture and Anarchy*:

> Culture says: 'Consider these people, then, their way of life, their habits, their manners, the very tones of their voice; look at them attentively; observe the literature they read, the things which give them pleasure, the words which come forth out of their mouths, the thoughts which make the furniture of their minds; would any amount of wealth be worth having with the condition that one was to become just like these people by having it?' And thus culture begets a dissatisfaction which is of the highest possible value in stemming the common tide of men's thoughts in a wealthy and industrial community, and which saves the future, as one may hope, from being vulgarised, even if it cannot save the present.

So what is involved here is something more than the acquisition of knowledge, any knowledge, for its own sake, namely a critical estimate of the kinds of knowledge that are worth pursuing, and the pursuit of such knowledge.

Where such conditions are fulfilled among tolerably large numbers in a society, and across and among a range of disciplines, it is reasonable to conclude that one has, or is beginning to have, the growth of an educated public. For these conditions make possible other changes, notably the development of public debate, not in one large public debating chamber, but in many overlapping debates, some of which quickly form, only to disappear as issues become resolved or move out of fashion or out of public concern, others of which are more long-standing.

Without doubt there are definite obstacles in the way of these goals being realised in the United Kingdom at present. But Alasdair MacIntyre[1] has recently defended a more dispiriting thesis, namely that it is *impossible* for there to be an educated public because the social and cultural conditions which prevail do not permit it. For MacIntyre it is necessary not only to have a tolerably large group of people to whose verdict an appeal can be made in matters of intellectual debate and controversy; there also have to be both a sense of what is important for shared social existence, and also shared standards of rational justification which give some prospect of finality in debate. MacIntyre cites the conditions that prevailed in the Scottish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, the era of Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, Adam Ferguson, and Thomas Reid, as being exemplary in this regard.

It is highly likely that MacIntyre is chasing a will o' the wisp in laying down such conditions as these, particularly the need for shared standards of rational justification leading to some prospect of finality in debate. The phrases he uses suggest that he is inclined

to think of society as a seminar, dominated by one issue at a time, with carefully drawn up rules of what is acceptable and what is not. But, as was noted above, educated society is likely to give birth to dozens of such debates at any one time. In some of these the standards of justification are agreed and settled, while in others the debate is *about* the standards of justification themselves. What is needed at the present time is something more modest than the prospect of finality, namely the re-establishing of intellectual standards of informed and fair debate and of impartial investigation, which in turn inculcate a willingness to follow the truth wherever it might lead.

It is not so much a lack of social role that inhibits the growth of an educated public at present, as MacIntyre claims, for employment and its associated social positioning provide this; but rather a failure of people to become equipped with a wider intellectual role for debating the cultural and intellectual setting in which they live. Specialisation which is necessary for work is not an evil. But the problem lies with the exclusiveness of that specialisation, the belief that to possess such a skill or array of skills is to be educated.

While it is not impossible to re-establish these standards it is certainly difficult. And part of the difficulty arises from the character of the institutions which, surprisingly perhaps, I have not so far mentioned: the universities and colleges. As things are at present arranged it is inconceivable that there should be the creation of an educated public without the universities, since most intelligent young people take a degree before taking a job.

The failure to develop an educated public commensurate with the amount of money spent on education and with the opportunities afforded through leisure, travel and the information explosion, is not altogether the fault of the young people concerned. We can see this most clearly if we consider the case of the humanities within the universities, because education is as good or as bad as the humanities within it.

A university lecturer is paid to teach and to do research. Research in the humanities usually consists of gaining a PhD and engaging in further specialist work arising from it and from a lecturer's developing interest in his field. Typically, the lecturer cultivates a narrow research field, one that may seem to the outsider to be extremely esoteric, and he looks for acceptance by an 'invisible college' of his peers in other universities at home and abroad. Through his 'research output' of articles, books and reviews, he seeks to advance his career by promotion. The courses that he teaches are either related to his research, in which case in all likelihood they reflect his narrow specialism, or they are not, in which case typically he sees them as a chore. In other words, the lecturer's academic work, and how he regards what is valuable in that work, is research-driven.

Here is seen what Sir Jack Plumb called the 'sickening, deadening process of increasing specialisation'. Professionals talk only to professionals. Professional work is undertaken at the behest of what might be called the Fallacy of Research, the view that because education justifies itself everything to do with education justifies itself. So that, for example, texts are edited not in order to make an accurate text more widely available, but because the text-editor's art is considered to be an end in itself.

One effect of such an attitude is a narrowing and intensifying of the lecturer's own education, a concentration upon the fine points of his research interest, on 'machinery'. Often this results from the 'need to publish', devouring time which could be devoted to imaginative teaching. As a result there is among many undergraduates (who are on the receiving end of teaching arising out of such research) a loss of intellectual focus, a failure of integration, a narrowing of vision: evils made worse by the inadequacies of their secondary education.

Instead of a sixth-former's horizons being extended by an introduction to new cultural vistas, he is invited, almost from the start of a university education, to specialise and to develop an interest in the fruits of his teacher's specialisation. As a result the student finds his interest in the subject waning, partly because he cannot see the point of what he is being taught, and partly because of the intrinsic difficulty and narrowness of the work he is being asked to do. He is not being intellectually challenged or fired with enthusiasm for his subject, but turned away from the sphere of ideas altogether.

One consequence of this is that the student's work is a continual struggle to comprehend sufficiently, for the purposes of satisfying the examiners, what there does not seem to be any other point in comprehending. This pointlessness is not because the student thinks that his work is irrelevant to getting a job, but because it is beyond his own capabilities, and out of touch with what he already knows. The cumulative effect of several such courses of study is disillusionment with the subject, and a resolve to abandon it upon graduation. Instead of graduation becoming the vestibule to a lifetime's interest in the subject, it is the exit from it, into the real world. Intellectual pursuits cease to be perceived as part of reality.

Beyond such failures, institutional failures as they might be called, there lurks an intellectual failure of a deeper kind: the tolerance of cultural relativism and subjectivism, making the enterprise of rational debate, which is a presupposition of an educated society, strictly impossible. Such tolerance, Arnold maintained, 'must tend to prevent the erection of any very strict standard of excellence, the belief in any very paramount authority of right reason, the recognition of our best self as anything very recondite and hard to come at'.

It is one thing to concede that the attainment of truth is difficult; it is an altogether different matter to maintain that there is no such thing as objective truth, that truth is what you make it, what grabs you, what 'turns you on'. Such claims make rational debate of any kind impossible, for they rule out of court the

meeting of minds in commitment to common standards, let alone common standards of rational justification. The observance of such standards is the essential precursor of rational debate, and hence of the development and maintenance of an educated public.

What can be done to remedy this state of affairs? Education must come to be seen as providing an entry into the general culture, to one or more aspects of the sensibility of the nation. This applies particularly to the humanities, in contrast to the natural sciences. There is a vivid reminder of the intellectual difference between the two in the fact that a mathematician or an engineer need know little English in order to graduate in his discipline from a British university. But a student of English history, or literature, or philosophy must have a thorough grasp of the language, not because these subjects are taught in English, but because they form a part of 'Englishness'. 'English science' is a non-sense, except to describe what, as a matter of historical fact, English scientists have done; but 'English literature' or 'English philosophy' are parts of our cultural endowment, at the heart of which are literary and philosophical canons. The study and reinterpretation of these canons constitutes the respective disciplines. This is one reason why there is no 'progress' in the humanities. Another is that in the humanities there is no equivalent of the electron microscope.

So higher education is not merely teaching someone to be 'critical' or to think for himself. It is primarily, both in time and also in logic, the imparting of beliefs, values, ways of doing things, a sensibility. Only then is it a criticism of the culture and here 'criticism' becomes a constructive rather than a destructive activity, which connects the aspects of a culture together, debates their worthwhileness, and their adaptation to new knowledge and capabilities. So that the teaching of literature, for example, is justified because it produces an intelligent enjoyment of what is read, and with it an enlargement of sympathy and of the imagination.

In order to fulfil their educative role the humanities in universities require to be promulgated in a less specialised way, and what is meant by 'research' in these areas needs redefinition and redirection. True research in such disciplines ought not to consist in narrow specialisms between which there is no communication - so that the philosophers have no dealings with the psychologists, for instance. It should consist in the development of a choir of voices, making critical connections across disciplines, and assimilating and subtly modifying what is received from the past.

Such less-specialised humanities teaching should also inform the teaching of science and technology. It is not sufficient that attention is being paid (rightly in my view) to the organisation of universities, to their 'management structure'; these are mechanical matters. There is need also to consider, in universities of all places, what is being managed and where we are being led. Arnold once again:

> Faith in machinery is, I said, our besetting danger; often in machinery most absurdly disproportioned to the end which this machinery, if it is to do any good at all, is to serve; but always in machinery, as if it had a value in and for itself.

The humanities need, not to acquire yet more machinery, but to take to themselves the role of refining the awareness, perception and judgement of those who are going to carry forward the application of science to society.

Put institutionally, what is needed is the development, once again, of genuine academic communities, not 'multiversities' or a series of discrete departments which do not communicate except to quarrel over 'resources'. The pattern of narrow 'research' and discrete 'research areas' is a fairly recent phenomenon in the humanities. There is nothing sacrosanct about it. Genuinely collaborative work can both stimulate the teacher and foster pride in and loyalty to the university or college that makes such interdisciplinary work possible.

There is an acute need for those with an influential voice in the humanities to restate in unmistakable terms what they are about. For as there is a strong tendency among humanities scholars to ape scientific research methods, so there is a strong tendency for teachers in the humanities, where they are called upon to justify their existence as teachers, to do so in utilitarian or instrumental fashion. (One could almost hear the sighs of relief when it was said, fairly recently, that arts graduates do better as computer programmers than do computer science graduates.) So there is need to assert the primacy of the humanities as exemplifying those values which make a society of people *civilised*, and also to reassert the nobility and worthwhileness of teaching as a prime method of passing on cultural and intellectual traditions.

If there is to be any prospect of an educated public, therefore, an attempt needs to be made to halt, and even to reverse, the process of specialisation in the humanities and to encourage a concern at all levels for the broader culture. The question of whether there should be a basic curriculum in the schools is hotly contested. But there is need to consider whether there should not be a basic university curriculum in history, literature and philosophy (to look no further) which will stimulate and reinforce a student's cultural commitment after graduation, and which will also condition and constrain the application of the fruits of science. And there is nothing ignoble in providing further reinforcement by publishing the results of scholarship in a form that is accessible to the public.

Note

1. Alasdair MacIntyre, 'The Idea of an Educated Public' in *Education and Values*, ed. Graham Haydon, University of London Institute of Education, 1987.

Opting for Islam

Mervyn Hiskett

What do the Government's educational proposals portend for British Muslims? This article gives a short, and disturbing answer to the question.

The nature of Islamic education

It is a truism that Islam is more than a religion. It is a total way of life, an all-embracing culture that leaves neither the individual nor the society any leeway. For the Muslim *bid'a* ('innovation'), is what is above all to be deplored and avoided. The safeguard against *bid'a* is the *sunna* or 'Way' of the Prophet Muhammad, a code of religious, social, legal, economic, political and personal behaviour based on the Koran, and on *hadith*, the recorded *dicta* of the Prophet. This was laid down not later than the 10th century AD. Some movement has of course taken place since that time by way of analogy and allegorical interpretations that have allowed a measure of adaptation. Yet the substance of the *sunna* remains intact and Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and the Shari'a (canon law) still govern such matters as marriage, divorce, inheritance and personal status today precisely as they did in the 10th century.

Islamic education, to which the *sunna*, *hadith* and *fiqh* are basic, requires, among other accomplishments, word-perfect memorisation of the Koran by early adolescence and then mastery of classical Arabic. This leaves little time for anything else until it is completed. It is certainly the most literate and the most conformist of all educations, being based wholly on the authority of written texts. It is Thomist, not Baconian, in that, while it permits interpretation up to a point, this must remain strictly within the limits prescribed by revelation. It is also immense. Islamic education is in the hands of the *'ulema* - Muslim literates who teach, preach and otherwise officiate to perpetuate the societal expression of Islam. Their conception of education involves a devotion to study - Islamic Law, Koran Studies, Arabic language, and Arabic literature in all their numerous branches - which can and often does consume a whole lifetime. It is this immensity, and the all-demanding requirements it imposes, that need to be grasped by non-Muslim educationalists who engage in the debate about the education of British Muslims.

Equally important to understand is its exotic nature. Islam is a medieval Middle Eastern culture. It is alien, for example, to Africa, despite its long-established presence there; and the central problem it presents in that environment is its incompatibility with indigenous African cultures. This problem has not in fact been resolved in 500 years. Such incompatibility may be marginally less in Western Europe, where Islam meets the residual Judaeo-Christian Biblical culture, rather than the animism of Africa. Nonetheless, the disjunction is severe. And whereas the Jews have had many, painful centuries in which to adjust to the majority Christian interpretation of the Biblical tradition, Muslims in the UK have had barely forty years.

The ancient and venerable institution from which traditional Islamic education is dispensed is the *madrasa* (from *darasa*, to study) and I shall use this term in future to refer to the kind of education I have briefly described above.

Islamic education and Western secularism

There is a pattern discernible in the way that Muslim communities react to the pressures of secular education. The example best known to me is that of northern Nigeria. Here the first stage was the introduction of an education system by the British colonial administration around 1920. The system was based on the contemporary British model but the target was a wholly traditional Muslim society. The educational provisions were almost entirely ignored by the people, and a measure of coercion was needed to persuade at least the emirs and chiefs to send their sons to school. In the event, they sent more often not their own sons but the sons of their slaves! This had some interesting consequences when these enslaved children emerged as beneficiaries of the excellent public school education which their masters lacked.

The second stage came close on the heels of the Second World War and the dawning prospect of independence. The northern Nigerian public and its traditional teachers perceived the danger that they would be overtaken by Christian West Africans from the coastal and riverain areas, for generations the darlings of the mission educators, and would lose out on the benefits of independence. They therefore began to demand Western-style education. At the same time people remained reluctant to abandon the Islamic heritage, all the same. The result was a secular education by day, and a traditional Islamic one in the evening. This situation was maintained with great tenacity for many years, but it was unable all the same to stem the march of secularisation.

The third stage was that of independence - an unseemly rush for Universal Primary Education, Western-style secondary and higher education, directed

by a highly centralised bureaucracy of bungling social engineers. Thirty years or so of this has produced little worthy of the name of education, at any rate not at primary and secondary level. But it certainly has produced widespread secularisation, as a result of which Islam has gradually changed from a way of life, to a species of Third World nationalism.

The cost is now apparent: the rise of Muslim 'fundamentalism' - an activist expression of Muslim bitterness in the face of cultural and moral disintegration. This fundamentalism expressed itself with verbal violence - and much colour - in Hausa Muslim verse. It moved on into devastating physical violence during the unlamented Shagari administration of the Second Nigerian Republic. All that now keeps it in check is the ruthlessness of a military government unhampered - perhaps mercifully, given the alternative - by liberal scruples.

In Egypt and elsewhere in the Islamic world, the pattern has been much the same - reluctant surrender to Western-style education as the unavoidable condition of economic progress, a losing battle against consequent secularisation and the final, explosive outburst by those who cannot come to terms with such an outcome. There is no reason to suppose that the Muslim experience in the UK will be any different.

Demands of the UK 'ulema

The *'ulema* in the UK are alert to the threat of secularisation. Their strategy against it is straightforward, and is most authoritatively expressed by the Union of Muslim Organisations. This, as its name implies, claims to speak for all major Muslim groups in the UK:

> Religious education as such will not be sufficient to create the motivational pull [towards the Islamic way of life] for a student unless the religious ethos pervades the entire curriculum.[1]

This at once makes it clear that the multiculturalism at present in favour in state schools is, at best, a feeble irrelevance as far as the *'ulema* are concerned. What they call for is the unalloyed *madrasa*:

> In principle, therefore, the Muslim will not be able to accept a secularised curriculum as it will create a conflict of values. The English education system lays emphasis on the materialistic side, on churning out students for employment in industry and the civil service.[2]

Again:

> It is clear that the true Islamic ethos can be [imbued] in Muslim children in their educational system only by the establishment of Muslim schools.[3]

The *'ulema* are fully aware of the potential opportunity offered by opting-out, but they are uneasy as to the extent to which the reality will fulfil the promise:

> Firstly, it is not clear whether the present state schools where the ratio of Muslim pupils is over 50% (in some cases it is 90%) will be automatically given permission for being converted into a denominational Muslim school if the parent governors so decide... Secondly, and more importantly, how much freedom will the parent governors have in promulgating an Islamic ethos in such schools?[4]

This is shortly followed by a comment on HM Inspectors 'whose reputation of enforcing uniformity in state schools is well-known.'[5]

Clearly, all of this boils down to a demand to be allowed to set up culturally autonomous enclaves in schools where Muslims are in a majority - even if up to 49% of non-Muslim pupils are as a result involuntarily involved within that enclave, and forced to be educated in the Muslim way.

But the demands do not stop at schools with a 50%-plus Muslim roll. The *'ulema* are equally concerned about those schools in which Muslim pupils are in a minority. In these cases the Union of Muslim Organisations has the following requirements: such schools must be single-sex; supplied with *halal* food (meat obtained from animals - not including pigs - slaughtered by throat cutting without prior stunning); there must be no mixed swimming and 'Muslim boys and girls must be exempt from performing mixed or nude showers'. (This last demand conveys a slightly bizarre notion of what goes on in even the most progressive of English schools.) Muslim pupils must be allowed Muslim-style school uniforms, PE dress, etc. A special room must be set aside for Muslim prayer, and the timetable must be so constructed as to permit performance of the daily prayers at their appointed times (certainly one and possibly two of these times would fall within school hours). Muslim festivals must be official school holidays. Sex education must take account of Muslim susceptibilities and there must be a ban on all forms of music and dance for Muslim pupils. How far such a ban would affect the musical education of non-Muslim pupils is not clear.[6]

It must be stressed that these demands apply to all schools where there is a Muslim presence, not just those where Muslims are in the majority. The extent of the change envisaged in the latter becomes stark in consequence.

Other demands, articulated this time by the Muslim Education Co-ordinating Council of the UK, are for the appointment of more Muslim teachers in all schools, not just those designated as Muslim; and for more in-service training 'to train them for executive posts in educational administration'; also a demand that UCCA change its admission procedures to meet Muslim requirements.[7] But there appears to be no awareness among the *'ulema* of the extent to which some of these demands might drive a coach and four through existing 'equal opportunities' legislation. For instance, assuming a 50%-plus Muslim school is granted formal Muslim denominational status, would it continue to employ teachers of other religions - not only Christians but also Sikhs and Hindus? What would be the position of women teachers in erstwhile state schools turned Muslim denominational, to say nothing

of their prospects of promotion? The view of the present writer is that if Government is so misguided as to grant Muslim denominational status to state schools, it should also grant them the right to discriminate frankly on grounds of sex and religion. Anything else would be absurd. Be that as it may, to grant the demands of the *'ulema* would, among other undesirable side-effects, simply make existing bad laws yet more partial and divisive.

Further implications

Not all the Muslim demands are unreasonable. Few would object to variants in school uniform required to accommodate Muslim sensitivities. The wish to restrain nudist cavortings in the school bath house is by no means peculiar to Muslims! Nor is there anything to be said against the parental right to withdraw children from so-called sex education, which is often more realistically described as permissive indoctrination. Single-sex schools are an existing, if declining, feature of the British educational system, and many would agree with Muslims in preferring such schools. Prayer facilities, at first sight simple enough, may pose intractable difficulties where space is at a premium. It is not far-fetched to foresee endless squabbles as to whether scarce classroom space ought to be utilised for a prayer room or a music room. Also, to recast the timetable to allow one or even more breaks in the school day for prayer - which includes the time-consuming ritual ablution - simply for the benefit of the Muslim minority is to disrupt the process of teaching to such an extent that few non-Muslim parents would tolerate the resulting disadvantage to their children. Much the same objection applies to the official observation of Islamic festivals as school holidays, especially since these festivals are determined by the lunar calendar and fall on different dates in each solar year.

To the non-Muslim the demands to ban music and dance, and for the provision of *halal* meat, are likely to be disturbing both aesthetically and morally. It should be understood that music and dance do not refer just to pop music and the disco. If it were conceded, the ban would extend to classical music and ballet. It is very doubtful whether a school could offer a satisfactory musical education to any of its pupils under such circumstances.

The concession to supply *halal* meat, already made in some areas, is an issue of concern to more than just animal rights activists. There is already much disquiet in this country about the appalling treatment of food animals. As Anne Sofer pointed out in *The Times* some months ago, an increasing number of young Jews are turning to vegetarianism because they have scruples about the Jewish method of slaughter - or perhaps about any method of slaughter. The recent report by a Government committee on the treatment of farm animals underlines the growing national concern. To provide a vegetarian alternative that fulfils *halal* requirements in *all* schools would be commendable.[8] To grant Muslims their demand for *halal* meat in particular schools would substantially increase the volume of meat procured by this method and would further institutionalise it. Many people would regard this as morally indefensible.

One flinches, too, at the prospect of wrangling at governors' meetings if no firm guidelines on such issues are laid down by Government. How will, say, the 30% of non-Muslim governors react to the decision to convert to the *madrasa* in Birmingham or Brent? Ought it to be enforced in the teeth of substantial minority objections? And is it realistic to rely on harmonious compromise where, say, 45% of ardent *'ulema* on the governing body press their demands in the putative interest of a Muslim minority? What happens if Sikhs and Hindus decide to play the same game? It is an interesting, if at present largely hypothetical speculation whether the *'ulema* would acquiesce contentedly in the 50%-plus rule where Muslim pupils were a minority on a Hindu-majority roll!

I spoke above of the immensity of Islamic education. I was for many years Vice-Principal, under an African Muslim Principal, of a large *madrasa*-type school in northern Nigeria. The only 'secular', that is non-Islamic, subject in the curriculum was English. There simply was not room on the timetable for anything else. And even English, which the vast majority of students wanted, had to be dropped at certain levels where the demands of the traditional Islamic syllabus became overwhelming. The graduates of this school were courteous and honourable. They were learned in the Islamic disciplines and steadfast in the Faith. In northern Nigeria, thirty years ago, they had a place. They would have been unemployable, however, in the British economy.

An attempt was made at one point to introduce classical Arabic, Islamic History and Islamic Religious Knowledge as subjects for the Overseas School Certificate in Nigerian government-secondary schools. It foundered because the schools were unable to teach even this much-reduced Islamic curriculum without unacceptable loss to the secular curriculum. Only Arabic survived to any worthwhile future.

There was an alternative. The Ahmadiyya, an enlightened but undoubtedly zinditic Islamic splinter movement of Indian origin, ran a number of secondary schools in Ghana and elsewhere on the west African coast. They provided an excellent education, comparable to that of the Christian mission schools, on which they were modelled; and they insisted on only a modicum of Islamic observance. They appealed to the faintly Muslim peoples of the coast. But they were rejected out of hand by the stern *sunni* majority, who regarded them as academies of unbelief and preferred instead to take their chances in the secular government schools. There is no evidence that the Union of Muslim Organisations or the Muslim Education Council envisage anything along the lines of these Ahmadiyya schools; and clearly such a milk-and-water compromise

is not what the *'ulema* in the UK are looking for.

Is there a solution?

Some measure of Muslim frustration with the surrounding secularism is no doubt inevitable. The problem is how to minimise it without doing damage to the native British tradition on which social and political stability depend. It is not an answer simply to grant the demands of the *'ulema*. Their Draconian proposals will not overcome secularisation, but simply increase the stress which is caused by it, so that frustration becomes more certain and more intense. It will also condemn a significant proportion of the nation's children to cultural segregation, not to say impoverishment.

It needs to be borne in mind that the *'ulema* are, for the most part, representative of the first generation of immigrants. There is much anecdotal evidence that the younger generation of British Muslims is already chafing at many of the restrictions these elders impose, especially those on dress, music and dance[9]. It is also clear that Muslim parents are by no means as reluctant to send their children to the present, largely secular state schools as the *'ulema* like to believe. It is therefore doubtful whether British politicians are well advised to court the *'ulema* too assiduously. It may redound to their discredit sooner than they think.

That Muslims should have the right to found their own schools, from scratch, at their own expense, or even with the help of grants-in-aid, is reasonable. Indeed, this procedure would have the advantage that such schools would only survive if Muslim parents supported them. This they would probably do only if the schools did in fact provide their children not only with the instruments of spiritual salvation, but also with a viable education 'for employment in industry and the civil service'. It is only by submitting to this market discipline that the education of Muslims in Britain will find its proper level. That such schools might, later on, be granted full maintained status, when they have proved their usefulness, seems also desirable.

In their own interest, British Muslims would do better to follow this path. To convert existing state schools into Muslim strongholds, with an unwilling non-Muslim minority either displaced, or forced to make the best of it, is to take a dangerous step towards social confrontation.

Notes

1. 'In the Name of Allah, The Benificent, The Merciful', paper presented by Dr Syed Aziz Pasha, General Secretary, Union of Muslim Organisations at Policy-Search, 27 April 1988.
2. *ibid.*
3. *ibid.*
4. *ibid.*
5. *ibid.*
6. *ibid.*
7. Broadsheet issued by MECC, dated April, 1988.
8. In fact, UMO indicates that such a vegetarian alternative would be acceptable.
9. See R. Sharif's startling account of the attitudes of young Muslim women of Pakistani orign in *Research Papers*, 'Muslims in Europe', Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, No. 27, September 1985.

Notes on Contributors

Barry Bracewell-Milnes works as a consultant to academic and industrial bodies on government and international fiscal and monetary policy.

George Chowdharay-Best is co-author, with Sir John Biggs-Davison MP, of *The Cross of St Patrick* (1985).

James de Candole is a postgraduate student in philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London.

Francis Dunlop is a Visiting Fellow in the School of Education at the University of East Anglia.

Angela Ellis-Jones is a freelance writer.

Paul Gottfried is editor of *The World and I.*

Simon Gleeson studied history at the University of St Andrews and is now a stockbroker.

John Gray is a Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford.

Alexandra Hardie is a lecturer in economics at Exeter University.

Paul Helm teaches philosophy at the University of Liverpool.

Mervyn Hiskett was Vice-Principal of a school in northern Nigeria.

Michael Johns is assistant editor of *Policy Review*, the quarterly journal of the Heritage Foundation.

Dieter Kotschick is a research student at Wolfson College, Oxford.

Ryszard Legutko teaches philosophy at the University of Kraków, Poland.

Lady Olga Maitland is director of Women and Families for Defence.

David Matthews is a composer.

E. J. Mishan is a distinguished economist and the author of *The Limits to Growth*, among other books.

Anthony O'Hear is professor of philosophy at Bradford University.

Dennis O'Keeffe is a senior lecturer in education at the Polytechnic of North London.

Françoise Thom is co-author, with Isabelle Stal, of *L'école des Barbares*, published as *Schools for Barbarians* by Claridge Press.

Geoffrey Thomas has been a Baptist Minister in Aberystwyth since 1965.

Martin Tyrrell is engaged in PhD research on Northern Ireland.

In Search of Central Europe

The following article, sent to us from Poland, shows how Western liberalism is viewed in a country which has had to pay the cost of it.

Do Liberals Love Liberty?

Ryszard Legutko

Do liberals love liberty? To many the question might seem strange. After all liberalism is the only political philosophy (except perhaps anarchism) which claims that liberty, like breathing and eating, is ineradicable from man's nature and that therefore to deprive man of freedom is tantamount to assaulting his life. Yet in spite of the concept of natural liberty, liberals are often confused in their judgement as to what is and what is not the most dangerous menace to freedom. Sometimes they love it too much, raging against every minor encroachment, and sometimes they love it too little, condoning even the most brutal offences. The confusion into which they fall arises from the fact that there is no easy way to translate the concept of natural freedom into empirical freedom and to use the former as a yardstick to measure the latter. It is my thesis that liberals are in a constant danger of misjudging political reality, and that the development of liberalism has made this danger more, rather than less potent. In other words, to explain the often analysed peculiarity of liberalism - called by some, naiveté, and by others myopia or foolishness - which makes liberals choose astonishingly wrong alliances.

Let me begin with two quotations from John Stuart Mill, a philosopher of impeccable liberal credentials. The first quotation:

> The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome and England. But in old times the contest was between subjects... and the Government... A time, however, came, in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed to interest to themselves.... A democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and... electing a responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as 'self-government'... do not express the true state of the case.... The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community.... The 'tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard.

The second quotation:

> We may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its non-age. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means of overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable.... Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion.

The quotations are instructive because they show two approaches to the problem of how natural liberty can become a political fact. Those approaches are, I will argue, characteristic of liberalism in general, not only for John Stuart Mill. According to the first approach - we may call it radical - freedom is to be chiefly understood in its permanent conflict with authority, and every success of freedom depends on how far its defenders can contain the expansion of government. As no truce between them is possible, the party of freedom must remain in a constant opposition to every status quo, whether republican or monarchic, tyrannical or democratic. By contrast, the second approach is evolutionary. Freedom is believed to be a product of civilization and to have emerged through a gradual process of social improvement. There is no distinct party of freedom, no demarcation between opposing sides. The advocates of freedom are not radicals but moderates and conservatives, who cherish the virtue of patience and who trust the wisdom of historical experience. If in the first approach the enemies of freedom were to be found within society (the government, majority, elite), in the second approach they are mostly outside society, among the 'barbarians'.

What is wrong, one may ask, with those two approaches? In a sense nothing is wrong. What the first approach implies can hardly be denied, namely, that political authority is the primary source of coercion and the most obvious enemy of freedom. The second approach is no less persuasive: political freedom is a delicate plant and serves its purpose best when it is secured by traditional loyalties and good institutions; it cannot be created out of nothingness by a magical fiat.

Yet, convincing as they are, the philosophies which underlie those approaches lead to dubious, and some-

times dangerous consequences. Let us look more closely at the first approach. Since it is claimed here that the conflict between freedom and authority is permanent, and that as far as freedom is concerned there is no fundamental difference between tyranny and democracy, one can rightly conclude that there is no essential difference between the old freedom fighters whom historical mythology described as sacrificing their lives to abolish despotic regimes, and the present advocates of freedom, who oppose the tyranny of the majority in democratic countries. In fact this thought was not foreign to John Stuart Mill himself. When he wrote about the analogy of the relations 'between Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and roturiers, between men and women', he obviously conceded that the feminist movement had taken over the banner of freedom from revolutionaries fighting against the Throne and Altar, and that the success or failure of this movement would testify to the success or failure of liberty in the modern world. When he said that the tyranny of the majority enslaves the soul and is more sinister than political autocracy, he certainly meant, though he refrained from admitting it openly, that democratic orthodoxy is the modern counterpart of the Spanish Inquisition, and the victims of this orthodoxy - anarchists, moral radicals, or homosexuals, are in fact burned witches, or condemned Galileos.

These absurd implications are not only figments of the imagination of those who are not sympathetic to liberalism. John Stuart Mill's idea that in the never-ending fight for freedom a new oppressed group takes over its banner, to lead the campaign against the party of authority, has been one of the most frequently employed ideological paradigms in modern times. Western feminists, pacifists or so-called sexual minorities are never tired of aspiring to this role, and are eager to see their cause as a litmus paper of freedom in general. There is a tendency to interpret the ideologies of these groups as being primarily influenced by socialist or leftist thinking. This may be true to some extent; but they can also be explained as perfectly legitimate, though not particularly likeable, offshots of liberalism, especially in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States which have strong liberal traditions. One of the most astonishing examples of this thinking comes from a group which has absolutely no sympathy for the socialist movement and is the very antithesis of it. I am thinking of libertarians, the most dedicated propagators of a free economy and individual liberty, who even postulate the abolition of the State. They are far more radical than the radical Mill; not only do they believe in the conflict between freedom and authority as the essence of history and politics, but they are quite certain that this war can be won. To what their philosophy leads them I can demonstrate by summarising the political views of Ludwig von Mises, a distinguished economist, the spiritual father of American libertarians. Let me quote Murray Rothbard, another libertarian, who summarised von Mises' views - I think accurately - in the following way:

> a proclaimed pacifist, who trenchantly attacked war and national chauvinism; a bitter critic of Western imperialism and colonialism; a believer in non-intervention with regard to Soviet Russia; a strong proponent of national self-determination not only for national groups but for subgroups down to the village level - and in theory, at least, down to the right of individual secession, which approaches anarchism; someone so hostile to immigration restrictions that he almost endorsed war against such countries as the United States and Australia to force them to open up their borders; a believer in the importance of class conflict in relation to the State; a caustic rationalist critical of Christianity and of all religion; and an admirer of the French Revolution.

The passage is a good illustration of my point and of the absurdities of what I called the radical approach in liberalism. Since authority is wicked in principle, we have to accept all consequences which follow from opposing it, no matter how strange and contrary to common sense they might seem. Thus communist totalitarianism cannot be actively opposed, for that would jeopardise the right of secession of a village in Oklahoma; the Gulag is equally dangerous to freedom as anti-immigrational regulations in the US and Australia; Christianity and other religions are hateful because they teach humility, the French Revolution is especially lovely because it introduced a free market (it does not matter that it did so by means of the guillotine).

But Ludwig von Mises was still moderate when compared to some of his disciples. The most extreme and in my opinion the most bizarre conclusion derived so far from the radical approach is that which I have found in the theory of a libertarian psychiatrist Thomas Szasz. He believes that the line between the party of authority and the party of freedom is drawn along the question of health. The party of authority postulates the compulsory hospitalisation of people who are considered abnormal by the majority but who are in fact different. He calls compulsory hospitalisation 'a crime against humanity', fundamentally parallel to slavery:

> Perennially, men have oppressed women; white men, coloured men, Christians, Jews. However, traditional reasons and justifications for discrimination have lost much of their plausibility. ... Modern liberalism ... allied with scientism, has met the need for a fresh defence of oppression and has supplied a new battle cry: Health!

Since the psychiatric oppression is supported by scientism, the greatest assault on freedom is launched in the technologically and intellectually most advanced countries, like the United States, where emerged a particularly sinister, almost totalitarian form of oppression, 'a therapeutic society'. The United States is therefore not only comparable to the Soviet Union, but

it loses by this comparison. Szasz even maintains that the total number of people incarcerated for political reasons in the psychiatric hospitals in the Soviet Union is but a small fraction of those incarcerated in the American hospitals for their opinions every year. As I said before, this seems to me so far the most extreme interpretation of John Stuart Mill's concept of the conflict between freedom and authority. Frankly speaking, I doubt if any one could go further than that at all[1].

Let me now turn to the second approach, the second way to make natural freedom a political reality - through evolution and conservation. The disquieting implication of this view can be seen in the way the Western liberals treat the aspirations to freedom in societies with different cultures. Having made the explicit or implicit assumption that the order of freedom is essentially a Western phenomenon, they are forced to admit that outside the West, freedom may be entirely absent, or interpreted differently, or dominated by other values. The fate of liberty becomes important only for Western democracies, whereas the degree of freedom elsewhere ceases to be a matter of genuine interest. Some might even maintain that those who are unfortunate enough to live in non-Western countries, either deserve to be unfree because they are not sufficiently mature, or are incapable of freedom on account of their different social constitution. Such an attitude may prompt liberals to hasty recommendation as to what is beneficial for the countries which cannot have Western freedom. They might thus support modern enlightened tyranny, because it can overcome traditional inertia, or, using a slightly different argumentation, they may suggest traditional autocracy as the best remedy against the insanities of a premature freedom. Let us remember that it was John Stuart Mill the liberal who wrote:

> Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.

Such conclusions are not infrequent in the writings of twentieth century liberals. We can take as an example Bertrand Russell's well-known book *Theory and Practice of Bolshevism* (1968) which, for reasons that I fail to understand, has gained the reputation of being the first uncompromising critique of the Bolshevik regime. In fact the critical aspect is very modest and can be summarised in a slogan widely used by official propaganda in Poland - socialism yes, distortions no. In Russell's book one can find many gems. Here are some of them.

> I recognise to the full reasons for the bad state of affairs, in the past history of Russia and the recent policy of the Entente.... The Bolsheviks have only a very limited share of the responsibility for the evils from which Russia is suffering....
>
> While admitting the necessity and even utility of Bolshevism in Russia I do not wish to see it spread or to encourage the adoption of its philosophy by advanced parties in the Western nations.
>
> Even under present conditions in Russia, it is possible still to feel the inspiration of the essential spirit of communism, the spirit of creative hope... to replace individual competition by collective action... This hope is not chimerical, but it can only be realised through a more patient labour, a more objective study of facts and above all a longer propaganda to make the necessity of the transition obvious to the great majority of wage-earners.

The quotation illustrates the absurd implications of what I called the evolutionary approach. If communism is brutal, and therefore rejected as a solution for the West, why is it recommended for the Russians? How can brutality express the spirit of creative hope? It seems quite extraordinary that a liberal should favour 'a longer propaganda' in Russia while at the same time praising free inquiry and critical discussion as essential components of the Western tradition.

More examples are supplied by another giant of liberalism, John Dewey, in his book on Russian communism. Like Russell he believed that Russian communism was a fascinating experience, but should not be imitated in the West. The Soviet regime was for him the

> achieved revolution of heart and mind, [the] liberation of a people to consciousness of themselves as a determining power in the shaping of their ultimate fate... In spite of secret police, inquisitions, arrests and deportations of Nepmen and Kulaks, exiling of party opponents... life for the masses goes on with regularity, safety and decorum.

Dewey did not explain why life in the presence of 'secret police, inquisitions, arrests and deportations' is 'liberation of a people to consciousness of themselves' and why it gives 'regularity, safety and decorum'. The only possible explanation is that in his opinion liberation had a different meaning for a Soviet citizen than it has for a citizen of Chicago, who would never think of associating secret police, arrests and deportation with liberty.

New examples of this approach appeared after the defeat of the Solidarity movement in Poland. In spite of enormous sympathy for the union, many liberal commentators said more or less explicitly that its aspirations were unrealistic and immature, considering the lack of sufficient political culture in Poland. Some went even as far as to assert that the defeat was after all not a bad thing because, to use John Stuart Mill's phrase once more, Poles were fortunate enough to find their 'Akbar or Charlemagne'.

Against the implications of the two approaches to freedom in liberalism - radical and evolutionary - one can raise an objection. One can say that the seemingly absurd consequences are in fact extreme,

irritating to be sure, but purely theoretical speculations, which we can afford to accept in view of other great advantages of liberalism. After all no doctrine is totally immune from absurdities. If we depreciate the rights of homosexuals, we depreciate the principle of liberty itself and deprive ourselves of a weapon which has been very effective and which, who knows, each of us might need in the future. The same applies to the second approach to freedom. It may be that loyalty to a particular free society makes its members insensitive to the abuses of freedom elsewhere; but it is a price, not too high, that has to be paid for identifying oneself with a certain community. One can also add that to draw absurd implications from the two approaches is unjustified since they are complementary, the one balancing and limiting the absurdity of the other. In other words the combination of the two approaches successfully reconciles the radical and the reformist. A tendency to overestimate current conflicts with the government and to underestimate the global danger to the liberal order (the first approach) is countervailed by loyalty to the Western tradition of liberty (the second approach); while indifference to the abuses of freedom elsewhere (the second approach) is corrected by the moral support of all those who defy authority in the name of freedom (the first approach).

The above counter-argument is, however, unsatisfactory. Of course, no one in his senses can accuse John Stuart Mill of being pro-Soviet *avant la lettre* solely on the grounds that he wrote some silly things about suffragettes or their predecessors. Nineteenth-century liberals could of course not predict modern challenges to freedom. And of course, no theory is safe against deformations. Granting this, however, one must say that the experience of suffragettes is not the best basis for coping with modern dangers. It is not a question of constructing a third approach, a new theory of liberalism. I doubt if that is possible, or useful; we have had enough of such theories. It is rather a question of something which no theory can provide and without which every theory is worthless - experience, a sense of reality, open-mindedness. To a visible degree these qualities have disappeared from many modern versions of liberalism. The old harmony of the radical and evolutionary approaches no longer exists as a general rule; instead of minimising, each maximises the defects of the other. They have no longer mutually moderating effects, since they are applied to different realities. Radicalism has become an approach to problems within a society, and evolutionism to problems outside it. Radicalism stresses the conflict between authority and new freedom-fighting groups, while evolutionism justifies non-intervention (political, ideological, even moral) in the non-Western areas. In short, liberalism, still paying lip service to natural liberty, has acquired a suicidal inclination to encourage the enemies of freedom, propagating the worst of all combinations of the two approaches - civil disobedience at home and political neutralism abroad.

Do liberals love liberty then? My answer is: many of them do not love it enough or they love it in the wrong way. The difference between the former and the latter is immaterial.

Note

1. It is worth pointing out that the thinking represented by Szasz has been so successful that US law has been revised so as to forbid compulsory hospitalisation of the insane. The chaotic and disturbing result of this change can be witnessed in every major American city - *Editor.*

Sophists' Corner

Memorandum on Racist Harassment, 25th July 1988. From Jim Baker - Director, Ethnic Minorities Department, London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham.

With regard to your request at Ethnic Minorities Committee on the 29th June for clarification.

Racism is a phenomena (*sic*) caused by a particular set of historical factors, those being economic and political, and relating to the ability of past white societies to determine the past and present life chances of black people. This power relationship has expressed itself through a particular form of discriminatory practice which we refer to as 'racism'. As the development of this process has taken some 500 years of effective control by white people over black people's lives, it is not possible at this time for the reverse to be true.

Therefore, the definition of racist harassment is seen as being a white on black occurrence. If a black person were to harass a white person because of colour, race or religion it would not be racism but racial discrimination, cultural discrimination or sectarianism.

With respect to an Irish person, clearly that person would suffer a form of discrimination based upon the ethnocentrism of the English race's anti-Irish feeling. They are clearly not, as a rule, black and therefore would not suffer racism.

Against Relevance

Anthony O'Hear

On Monday April 11th 1988, an article appeared in *The Daily Telegraph* entitled 'Wind of Change for College Teaching Methods'. In it we were informed how Mrs Anne Jones, the director of education of the Manpower Services Commission, envisaged the future of higher education. According to the article, under pressure or encouragement from the MSC, universities are increasingly to become places where students learn vocational subjects of direct relevance to getting a job. 'This is all about changing the whole culture of higher education, really' pontificates Mrs Jones. 'We are not just asking universities to bolt on a few modules but to change the whole way they teach things.' As an example of what this means (the only one actually given in the article), history dons at Anytown University are in for 'a rude awakening'. Apparently they will have to come to terms with the idea that history is not just about cramming facts about monastic orders in the thirteenth century and the fate of the Spanish Armada, but about matters of 'direct relevance' to the twentieth century (as if in a human sense, the fate of thirteenth century monastic orders and even of the Spanish Armada were not of profound relevance to our twentieth century predicament). Instead of this sort of 'irrelevant' fact cramming, students will be sent out to conduct their own archaeological investigation. In doing so on their own, they would undoubtedly wreak irreparable damage on whatever physical traces of our past they succeeded in finding, but let us not worry about that; from the point of view of the MSC they would have learned a lot about the 'more important' skills of undertaking team activity, organising transport, food, accommodation, administrative back-up, book-keeping and the analysis of results, all essential qualities in today's employment climate, we are told.

Meanwhile, and from a rather different perspective, the Committee for Humanities of the CNAA was recently presented by one of its working parties with a document which argues in favour of the importance of achieving equality of opportunity for people from all races in social and economic life. As with the MSC's objective of helping young people to respond to the current employment climate, it is difficult to see how anyone of good will could object to such equality of opportunity as a political and social aim. But the CNAA working party did not see equality of opportunity in political and social terms alone. Its desirability requires, as an immediate consequence, that 'the arts and humanities curriculum should be informed by the study of race relations, and of religious, class and gender relations'. I will not dwell here on the *non-sequitur* involved here, in thinking that dwelling constantly on race relations and the rest is necessarily going to promote equality of opportunity or better race relations generally, though events at Burnage High School should surely make us think twice about that. What I want to bring out rather is the way the CNAA working party, like the MSC, wishes to use and mould education as a means to worthwhile and desirable social ends, ends which are not specified in educational terms. In their terms, this is what is meant by making education relevant, and when I say that I am against relevance, it is partly this instrumentalising of education that I am against.

In the case of the MSC, it is clear that in its corridors there is no grasp of the old, but still valid distinction between education and training. This is hardly surprising, perhaps, given that Lord Young, a former director of the MSC, denies the existence of any such distinction and that the body itself is soon to be renamed the Training Commission, with Mrs Jones presumably to be the director of training. Let us then begin by considering this distinction.

Training is always to be considered as a means to some other end, and is not regarded as an end in itself. The value of a particular training will always be determined in terms of its efficiency as a means to whatever end is envisaged and in terms of the value of the end itself. Thus, one can talk about a good training in a particular technical skill, such as that of a motor mechanic or a watch-maker. But such a training is not seen as an end in itself, as will be obvious when a particular craft or trade becomes extinct. People no longer go in for such training, and it is no doubt the rapidity with which technology is altering that is leading training agencies these days to indulge in conceptually questionable talk of training in transferable skills, skills, that is, which are useful for a number of types of activity. But even here, the skill and the training are not valued for themselves. While the skill of book-keeping may be learned in conducting an archaeological dig and then used in the running of a fish and chip shop, a heritage theme park or even the Society of Applied Philosophy, I do not think anyone, least of all accountants of my acquaintance, would suggest that such a skill would be worth acquiring at all if the keeping of accounts were not a necessary adjunct of business activity of the sort we engage in. Such a skill as accountancy lacks the cognitive or human breadth to be an end worth acquiring for its own sake.

Education differs from training in that it is not an instrumental good. If it is worth being educated in a particular field, it is because being educated in that

field is worthwhile in itself. Wisdom, knowledge of the natural and human worlds, and the ability to relate aspects of knowledge to each other and to the whole of knowledge, are things worth having in themselves. Even is being educated in this sense makes one a more useful member of society, this is not the primary and central goal of education, but rather a by-product of something engaged in for other reasons than its social utility. Being thoroughly Aristotelian here, I would say that one basic human good is the exercise and fulfilment of one's powers of reason; and the development of this power in each of us means our acquiring some insight into the way the world is, as revealed in natural science; some knowledge of human history; and some acquaintance with the best that has been thought and said in the fields of literature, philosophy and the arts. Of course, I realise that some might not regard the development of one's powers of reason in this way as a basic human good; at this stage, I would simply want to assert that there is a concept of education which corresponds to this enterprise, and which is to be distinguished from the activity of training someone for a specific or generalisable skill. Education, but not training, is to be undertaken, if at all, because it is worthwhile in itself, independent of its extrinsic benefits. Education, but not training, produces a wide cognitive perspective, which shows the deep relation between the elements of knowledge.

The distinction between education and training is valid even for those who do not think education is worth going in for at all. How, though, does the distinction bear on the CNAA's working party, which after all does not advocate training of a narrowly instrumental sort? It bears on it in the following way: in implying that the study of a given subject is to be informed by the study of race relations and the rest, the working party is foreclosing possibilities within that study in the name of something (namely equality of opportunity) which is quite extrinsic to the study itself. Questions of race, class and gender may of course arise within certain studies, particularly in the humanities. But not only would concentrating on these things mean that we should overlook a great deal of what a Shakespearean play, say, might have to teach us on other matters of human importance. It is by no means clear that what the play has to teach us on questions of race, class and gender would actually reinforce the type of commitment envisaged by the working party's document. The teacher who, in the spirit of the CNAA document, is using a particular text for political purposes here faces a dilemma: is he to allow the text to speak for itself, in which case he faces the possibility of raising doubts in the minds of his students as to the goal of his teaching? Or is he to distort what the text actually has to say, in order to preserve what the document refers to as a 'critical and challenging attitude to manifestations of unequal power relationships' in our society? The way out would surely be to insist that *Othello*, say, is not about anything that could easily or directly be translated into questions or race, class or gender relations as these might apply in our society, but about matters at once more particular and more universal. That Othello is a Moor and only tolerated in Venetian society, that Desdemona is a defenceless woman involved in a racially volatile marriage: these facts tell us little or nothing about questions of race or gender relations in modern Britain, belonging wholly to another context and another time. But we can, of course, learn a great deal from the play about the universals of human motivation, and also about stupidity, innocence, impetuosity and evil. Taking this way out is hardly open, however, to the teacher committed from the start to promoting equality of opportunity in Britain in 1988.

My illustration of how having a political end for education might well subvert a true education undertaken in pursuit of the development of reason for its own sake has come from the highly contentious field of multicultural education. But it is worth mentioning that Mrs Jones of the MSC does not simply want organisational and other business related skills from university graduates. She, in common with others speaking on behalf of the MSC, desires also the 'right kind of attitude' from graduates, along with the 'ability to make decisions and be creative'. Now I do not know exactly what the right kind of attitude is in this context, or what exact type of decision-making and creativity she is looking for, but I have more than a suspicion that it would hardly be fostered by taking seriously that most English strain in the great tradition of English literature and criticism, which would include Blake, Dickens, Arnold, James, Lawrence, Eliot, Leavis and, above all, Ruskin: all those writers, in other words, who have taught us in so many ways that manufacturing wealth is not the same as manufacturing men, and that we should count the human loss as well as the material gain in every kind of 'progress' and every kind of 'enterprise'. How seriously are we to take what she says about changing the whole culture of higher education? Are we to expect any day now that a thrusting university English department will start to offer MSC approved degree courses, purged of the elitist and reactionary authors I have just mentioned, and exclusively devoted to the banalities of Wells, Snow, utopian science fiction and novels (there must be some on station bookstalls) which show business and enterprise in a glamorous light?

We live in a world that is not of our making, that existed before we did and will continue to exist after we have gone. The processes which govern activity in the natural world are processes over which, at a fundamental level, we can have no control. Indeed to a large extent (some would say completely) our own activity is governed and circumscribed by these processes. We are substantially if not completely the effect of natural processes. They control us and we can do very little to control them at a fundamental level. Nevertheless we are not purely passive and uncomprehending in the face of this objectively existing world, of which we are a part. As Aristotle put it at the beginning of the

Metaphysics, all men by their very nature feel the urge to know, and he saw this urge to know as something over and above the pursuit of utility. We have a desire to know, a desire to understand not just what happens but why things happen, the causes of natural phenomena in other words. And this knowledge of causes Aristotle saw as a type of wisdom.

Now it should be obvious how all this bears on the question of relevance and instrumentality in education. In Western science we do not only have the urge to know. We have also, because of its central employment of a systematic critical method, an actual body of knowledge. We have been strikingly successful in the uncovering of the causes of natural phenomena, and in the development of theoretical accounts of the essence of the natural world. Science aims at truth, and in Western science since the sixteenth century at least, there has been a clear understanding that this aim is to be furthered through theories, which have to be tested by the predictions they make, and that the relevant tests are made by appeal to a humanly impartial nature. No amount of vulgar Kuhnianism, or even the less vulgar appreciation of the difficulties in giving a fully satisfactory philosophical account of the fact, can have any tendency to undermine the view that in science theories are tested empirically, and that those which do not do so well are in the end abandoned as failing to satisfy the goal of truth. Science has an intrinsic and guiding commitment to giving accounts of the natural world whose truth is quite independent of their human relevance.

It will, of course, be said that modern science has Baconian aspects as well as Aristotelian: that it subserves not just our desire to know but also what Bacon referred to as 'the relief of man's estate'. In response to this quite correct observation, I would make two points. The first is that, as Bacon well recognised, if we would command nature, we must first obey her. In other words, the pursuit of utility and the pursuit of truth are not incompatible. Quite the contrary, in science the pursuit of utility without the pursuit of truth is likely to be unavailing. The Baconian may reply that in science we should be more concerned with the pursuit of humanly useful truth than with truth for its own sake. However, it has been common enough in the history of science for apparently quite useless investigations to turn out to be highly useful. (Consider, for instance, the researches of Rutherford and Turing.) Besides - and this is my second substantial observation - we need to assert the moral and human value of engaging in disinterested research. Only in this way do we fully come to terms with the fact that the world in which we live is something that is not just a resource for our own convenience, but something which has an existence, a nature and a mystery quite apart from us, and of which indeed we ourselves are a part. Our being in such a world and our discovery of its nature cannot be entirely separated from the humanly relevant task of self-understanding. But we understand how the nature of the world bears on our self-understanding only by attempting to understand the world as it is in itself, independently of our interests.

If it is conceded that the study of the natural sciences ought to be conducted without regard for immediate human relevance, it might still be felt that in the humanities the case is quite different. Are not the studies of history, literature, the arts, religion and philosophy essentially studies of the human and of the humanly relevant, exercises in reflection on what we feel about ourselves and our world, and on what we believe are the forces that have made us what we are?

There is indeed an essential difference in nature between natural science and the humanities. In the one we strive for an absolute view of the world, while in the other we are concerned with human response and self-understanding. But it does not follow from this that the study of the humanities is to be conducted in the light of what appears to be immediately relevant to contemporary needs or concerns, nor indeed that this study should centre on what is initially graspable or attractive to those undertaking the study.

We are products of traditions - traditions not only of thought, but also of experience. Our minds do not exist fully formed prior to any acculturation, but they are structured through existing forms of knowledge and response. Our identities, and our possibilities of self-expression and self-understanding, are given to us initially and substantially from the culture into which we are born and within which we are educated. But our culture contains different levels and types of expression and reflection; upon which of them, therefore, should we concentrate in a formal education?

Matthew Arnold rightly insisted that in a formal education in the humanities one does not 'track down to the level of inferior classes', fobbing people off with an 'intellectual food prepared and adapted in the way (others) think proper for the actual condition of the masses'. Where traditions and forms of high culture exist, they should form the subject matter of a formal education in the humanities. This not for snobbish reasons, but rather because it is in works of high culture that feeling, sensitivity and receptivity are at a maximum; these works show a maximum alertness to the human in all its forms, and from them we can learn most of what we are and what we might become. As we see from the examples of Dickens, Dostoyevsky and Lawrence there can be great and sensitive treatments of the life of the lower echelons of society, just as there are trashy and humanly worthless treatments of life in wealthy and aristocratic circles.

The humanities are concerned with possibilities of self-understanding and self-expression open to us, with our actual lives and history. It is therefore natural enough that in this country our starting point should be English and European history, literature and art, for these are the substance of our culture. But this does not mean that we should approach everything we study with a view to establishing some immediate relevance or connection with our own life or problems. On the contrary, part of the point of an education in the

humanities is to learn from works and deeds which, while causing some resonance in our own lives, actually take us beyond our narrow concerns, giving us a perspective from which to judge between the trivial and important, the eternal and the transitory, in our own lives and time. Such an education aims to distance us from our immediate present. Only by such distancing can we come to any reasoned evaluation of the norms, tastes, values and imperatives that guide us, or to an understanding of their roots.

If we are really to learn from a work of art or literature, or even from a passage in our history, we must be prepared to undergo the discipline of letting it speak to us in its own terms, in and for itself; this submission to the object itself is the antithesis of the 'relevant' use of art or history. (There is an implicit criticism here of much current work in the theatre and the opera house.) The point has been very well expressed by Frank Whitehead, who once wrote a book called *The Disappearing Dais*, but who it appears is now concerned about where the teacher will stand. He writes:

> Increasingly literature has been 'used' - 'used' to propagate a social or political message ... 'used' to illustrate a pre-determined theme such as 'Witchcraft' (bring in an extract from *Macbeth*) or 'Colour Prejudice' (duplicate copies of *A Little Black Boy*); 'used' ... as a launching-pad to get children talking or writing about their own experiences ... All these now fashionable activities seem to me to imply an erosion of belief in the power of literature as such, in the value of exposing oneself to the impact of a poem or story or novel for its own sake. At its worst the approach seems to carry with it an assumption that anything a pupil says or writes after reading a work of literature must somehow be relevant to it.
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> ('The Present State of English Teaching' in *The Use of English*, Vol. 28, no. 1, September 1976, p. 14.)

This article is headed 'Against Relevance'. It might be said that what I have to say is not necessarily against relevance as such, but only against *immediate* relevance. And it might also be said that the way to initiate pupils into the wider and more distant realms of natural science and culture is by beginning with matters to which pupils can relate from their own experience. I have argued against this influential pedagogical view on numerous occasions, on the grounds that it is an unproven dogma. There seems to me to be no reason to suppose that all a child can cope with is what comes from or relates directly to its experience, or that his mind will be widened rather than narrowed by the constant reference to experience that he already has. On the other hand, I will not deny that it may at times be pedagogically effective to begin from the child's experience. My fear is that those who rigidly insist on always using the child's experience as their educational starting point are all too likely to stay within that starting point. The child will never learn to transcend his narrow concerns and interests through insight into the natural world as it is in itself, and into forms of expression and self-understanding more adequate than those provided in the all-too-readily accessible works of popular culture. Such transcendence of the already fitting, familiar and adequate seems to me to be the only justification for eleven years of compulsory education.

Heidegger and the Nazis

Paul Gottfried

In view of the debate it continues to generate in Europe, Victor Farias' indictment of Martin Heidegger should be read with special attention.[1] The work of a distinguished Chilean student of Heidegger, already translated into German and French, *Heidegger and Nazism* is supposed to include shocking revelations about its controversial subject. Contrary to the received opinion that Heidegger only toyed with the Nazis after Hitler's accession to power, Farias claims to demonstrate that Heidegger was always an incipient or practising Nazi. From his Catholic boyhood in the Swabian village of Messkirch through his ultramontanist education at Constance and Freiburg down to his exposition of an anti-modernist existentialism and his identification as rector at Freiburg with the 'German revolution' in 1933, Heidegger, it is argued, clung to a cohesive, nationalist ideology. This ideology flowed into Nazism as soon as the opportunity presented itself.

Farias makes much of Heidegger's lifelong fascination with the seventeenth century Viennese court preacher and satirist, Ulrich Megerle (also known as Abraham a Sancta Clara). A Swabian who received his early education at Messkirch, Abraham was the subject of both Heidegger's earliest published writing and some of his last meditations. Farias observes that Abraham was both a virulent anti-Semite and an enthusiastic German nationalist. His most famous exhortations, addressed to the Viennese during the plague of 1679 and the Turkish siege of 1683, abound in slighting

references to Jews and foreigners. Out of Abraham's preachings, South German and Austrian Catholics drew their own German nationalism, as an alternative to the North German Protestant form embodied in Bismarck's Second Empire. Anti-Slavic, anti-Semitic, and neo-medieval, this South German and Austrian variant of German nationalism defended village life against economic and cultural modernisation as well as foreign contamination. It found its representative figures in Karl Lueger, the Christian social mayor of Vienna at the turn of the century. Heidegger's family and other Catholic Swabians admired Lueger, who combined strong, honest municipal government with anti-Semitic and xenophobic rhetoric. Farias notes that Lueger, an anti-modernist Catholic, was fond of citing Abraham a Sancta Clara in his speeches. Lueger's admirers included not only the adolescent Heidegger but the young Adolf Hitler, who chose him as a role model.

Such facts, which are piled up throughout the book, do not prove that Heidegger or most of his companions had early proclivities toward Nazism. Indeed, many of the facts marshalled are of limited biographical interest, unless one accepts certain doubtful assumptions about the nature of Nazism. One such assumption is that converts to Nazism came typically from the Catholic Right and were the heirs of the romantic tradition. Farias would have us believe that Nazis were religious authoritarians who rejected economic modernisation and blamed Jews for destroying their medieval sense of community. Certainly Nazi politicians exploited anit-modernist sentiments and blamed Jews and Communists for social crises. Moreover, Farias is probably correct to assume that German Catholicism and its explicitly medieval heritage was more open to anti-Semitism than German Protestantism. Despite Luther's anti-Jewish outbursts, the Reformation he launched gave new emphasis to Christianity's Hebraic roots for the first time since the primitive Church.

Yet there is reason to question the assumptions about historical causation apparent in Farias' work. The Catholic Centre, which Farias associates with anti-modernist views, was one of the two German parliamentary parties that resisted Hitler in January 1933. The ultramontanist opponents of the Catholic liberals in Germany, with whom Farias identifies the young Heidegger, were forced into opposition against extreme German nationalism. Richard von Gralik, J. Weiss, Josef Nadler, and other Austrian and German Catholic conservatives whom Farias mentions defended the multinational Habsburg Empire, which Hitler detested.

The attempt to relate the *Gralbund* (founded by Viennese Catholic traditionalists in 1920) to a Nazi-type *Bund* illustrates Farias' strained argumentation. Here, as elsewhere, he relies too much on associations that are insignificant or only phonetic. Not only Heidegger and von Gralik but countless other South Germans and Austrians, including intellectuals of Jewish descent (for example, Hugo von Hofmannsthal), praised the satires and sermons of Abraham a Sancta Clara. Not only Hitler but the staunchly anti-Nazi Social Christian Party in Bavaria identified itself with the politics of Karl Lueger. As mayor of Vienna, Lueger took Jewish advisors and let it be known that '*Jude ist den ich bestimme* [I determine who's a Jew].' In a similar way, George Wallace and George McGovern both expressed admiration for FDR and his New Deal, from opposite sides of the spectrum.

Farias exaggerates the connection between Catholic romanticism and Nazi ideology. He cites the literary and cultural historian, Friedrich Schlegel, as the ominous source of those references to 'Christian, Germanic civilisation' among Heidegger's teachers. But Schlegel was neither an anti-Semite nor an extreme German nationalist: he was a Francophile married to the daughter of Moses Mendelsohn. The reference to 'Christian Germanic' civilisation in Schlegel's *Lectures on Universal History* designates the world built by Northern Europeans. Schlegel was describing those who succeeded the Romans and who took over their civilising mission. And though the *Lectures* defended the Holy Roman Empire, they exalted primarily its Christian European character, and only secondarily its ethnic German component. Farias presents as another sorcerer's apprentice the Redemptorist monk, Clemens Maria von Hofbauer, who preached in Vienna during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Having studied his life while doing a book on Catholic romantics, it is hard to imagine what possible link Hofbauer has to the antecedents of Nazism - or to Heidegger's philosophy.

Throughout the first half of the book, Farias proposes links of all kinds between Heidegger's support for Hitler as rector of Freiburg and his earlier life. We are told that Heidegger hung out with professors and students who had glorified Germany's 'war of aggression' in 1914. But academics *throughout* Europe had justified their countries' participation in the Great War, sometimes in hysterical tones. Viscount James Bryce had gone through the United States, swearing falsely that he had seen Belgian children whose arms and legs had been cut off by German soldiers. Even gentlemen - and Bryce was most assuredly a gentleman - made exaggerated, mendacious claims for their countries in what was generally seen on both sides as a war of survival. That Germans who had lost the war and subsequently been humiliated expressed resentment was also natural and by no means exclusively characteristic of proto-Nazis or of Heidegger's social circles.

Nor was Heidegger's popularity among students at Freiburg and other universities, as Farias suggests, evidence of an anti-Semitic nationalism. His student admirers included Jews and even leftist ones, such as Georg Lukacs, Herbert Marcuse, and (his one-time mistress) Hannah Arendt. Adolf Grimme, the Prussian minister of education who contrived to obtain a chair for Heidegger at the University of Berlin in 1930, was a social democrat. Grimme had also studied under

Heidegger's major academic patron, Edmund Husserl, a German Jew. In 1930 Heidegger was a lapsed Catholic with a politically heterogeneous following, not one that could be described as uniformly anti-Jewish.

Farias notes Heidegger's references to 'struggle', 'community', and 'work' both in his philosophical writings and in his addresses as the Nazi-appointed rector at Freiburg. Farias even uncovers the fact that Heidegger referred to 'national purification' in his youthful publication on Abraham a Sancta Clara and, then again, in a speech to German workers undergoing party indoctrination at Freiburg in October 1933. Undoubtedly Farias spent many years establishing such interlocking patterns, and his meticulous sifting through Heidegger's rectoral addresses and wartime correspondence yields convincing results. Farias' documentation argues against the illusion that Heidegger simply went along with Hitler's revolution. In the beginning he served it frenetically, as an ally of Ernst Röhm's SA, and even after Heidegger resigned as rector in April 1934, he went out of his way to sound like a Nazi. Drawing on the exhaustive archival work of a Freiburg professor, Hugo Ott, and on his own research in Berlin, Freiburg, Paris, and Marburg, Farias proves that Heidegger tried to ingratiate himself with the Nazi educational bureaucracy even after 1934. Heidegger also maintained cordial relations with Eugen Fischer, the director of the Institute for Racial Hygiene in Berlin and an SS member until the end of the war.

All the same, Farias does not demonstrate significant continuity between Heidegger the philosopher, and Heidegger the Nazi activist. Against this view Farias quotes Benedetto Croce and other scholars who expressed shock at Heidegger's adaptation of his philosophical terminology to Nazi ideological needs. Farias also insists, however, that Heidegger's remarks as a Nazi rector dealt specifically with 'topics treated in a more general and abstract way in *Being and Time*'. References there to 'what is immediately given [*Zuhandenes*]', to 'instruments [*Zeuge*]', and to 'being together [*Mit-sein*]' are presented as conceptual points of entry into a Nazi community of blood and soil.

Such a proof system ignores the likelihood that an intellectual joining a political movement (and surely a totalitarian one) may feel compelled to justify his commitment by reference to his earlier thought. Should Heidegger, while trying to convince others of his Nazi beliefs, have stressed the disjunction rather than links between his philosophy and his political career? Farias shows that Nazi academic opponents questioned Heidegger's intellectual compatibility with the Third Reich; some also pointed to his previous and even continuing association with Jews.

What Farias, perhaps inadvertently, makes clear is Heidegger's opportunism before and after Hitler's accession to power. Unlike conservative Catholic and republican professors at Freiburg whom the Nazis found unreliable, Heidegger gladly embraced the new order. He did so without the excuse of the brilliant jurist, Carl Schmitt, whom Heidegger brought with him into the party. Schmitt had written against the Nazis in the early thirties and may have become a party member to hide his past indiscretions. Heidegger disgraced himself while seeking public and academic honour. He may also have been looking for compensation after his perceived snubbing by the philosophy faculty at the University of Berlin in 1930. As Farias proves beyond question, Heidegger turned down the offer from Berlin because it came through political channels. Though the object of student worship, this magnetic lecturer discovered that most philosophy professors greeted his writings with scepticism. The Nazi revolution, particularly as represented by its militant SA wing, seemed to offer him an opportunity for recognition and power. Heidegger's proposals for educational reform in 1933 and 1934 reveal far more megalomania than admiration for Hitler.

From what may be gathered about his publishing success, Farias has won acclaim for the defects as well as merits of his book. Articles in *l'Express, Der Spiegel, The New York Times* and the preface to the French edition of his work by Christian Jambet, all indicate that Heidegger's philosophy, particularly his critique of modern liberal society, has created the storm that once again surrounds his reputation. Jambet moralises about a rhetorical question that Farias poses in his introduction: is it really possible to dissociate Heidegger's existential philosophy from his political activities?

Both Farias and Jambet present Heidegger as an unprecedented problem in the history of ideas. Having served a uniquely evil regime in defiance of the examples of good living set by the 'philosophers' Plato and Marx, Heidegger should be viewed as a special case of intellectual irresponsibility that requires critical study. But did Heidegger know that he was serving a uniquely wicked and brutal government when he joined the Nazi party? And even assuming he did, are all his philosophical thoughts henceforth to be placed under judgement of damnation? Contrary to what Jambet and Farias suggest, Marx too behaved unpleasantly. In his polemics against a moderate socialist, Ferdinand Lassalle, Marx delivered anti-Semitic and racist tirades far more extreme than anything attributed to Heidegger. As another example, let us note that Prokofiev fawned on Stalin; the composer even exerted himself to find orthodox Communist justifications for his musical creations in the 1930s. Do these facts discredit historical materialism or the musical achievement of Prokofiev's symphonies? One need not be an enthusiastic devotee of either to recognise that an *ad hominem* argument should have no standing in a discussion of intellectual or artistic value.

Allow me then to speculate on what may really be at work in the present assault on Heidegger. His obnoxious pandering to Nazi officials in 1933 has long been known. So has his refusal to face up to his dishonourable behaviour during the early years of the Third Reich. Though Farias has certainly expanded the

dossier à charge, Heidegger's opportunism should not surprise anyone who has studied his life. Farias and his admirers are tarring with a Nazi brush what Fritz Stern refers to as 'illiberalism', the view that a democratic capitalist or social democratic society is somehow demeaning to human existence.

Disgust with Heidegger as a teacher of illiberal values comes dramatically to the fore in remarks in the February 5th issue of *l'Express* by a French philosopher, Luc Ferry. Faulting Farias provocatively but unfairly for trying to 'save Heidegger's philosophy' while criticising his Nazism, Ferry sees the Heidegger debate as one between democracy's partisans and critics. Heideggerians, particularly in France, have 'equated democracy with corporate capitalism and the world of technique'. They reject 'modernity', which Heidegger condemned along with the technological rationalism of the Enlightenment: 'Heidegger himself sees a continuity between men's mastery of their own destiny and the emergence of a world of technique'. In reaction to the 'project of autonomy which is the meaning of democratic individualism', Heidegger preached 'anti-voluntarism' and 'authenticity' through a return to primitive communal ties. In his desperate flight from the anonymity of urban technological society, Heidegger proceeded to exalt death as an experience 'having no reference to another's ontically limited being [*Dasein*].'

In all fairness to Ferry, it should be said that he finds something to praise in Heidegger's view of personal authenticity. He refers to it as 'the last vestige of humanism, the final defence that one can raise against Nazi inhumanity'. Moreover, *l'Express* gave generally balanced coverage to Farias' indictment - unlike *Der Spiegel* which used it to launch into a tiresome sermon on the still atoned-for German past. Yet, Ferry also tells us by his own passions what has occasioned, in the words of one Heideggerian, François Fedier, the 'big media attack against the person of Heidegger', the philosopher's persistent illiberal anti-modernism. This tendency is seen not only in Heidegger's postwar refusal to apologise for his Nazi past, but also in a controversial interview he granted to *Der Spiegel* in 1966. In that interview Heidegger declared that German and Greek were the only two languages suitable for philosophical investigation. Though Heidegger's impenitence about his career as a Nazi should cause dismay, his remarks about German and Greek are arguably true. The fact that a disproportionately large number of great philosophers were German and Greek may have something to do with the languages in which they expressed themselves.

But Heidegger's casual statements about language became the pretext for a renewed war against his influence in 1966, just as Farias' book served the same end in the winter of 1987-88. Heidegger's enemies in both cases have been modernist provincials flaunting an anti-fascist banner. Heidegger's most inexcusable sin seems to have been that he challenged an even now dominant mind-set. He dared to state that human fulfilment is not at all keyed to an ever-expanding technology or to a managerial society. He also taught that democratic individualism has resulted in the loss of cultural specificity and in de-legitimating long-established community.

What strikes me about some of Heidegger's detractors is their savage opposition to any culture but their own. For example, politically suspect passages that Farrias draws from Heidegger's writings may just as easily have come from classical sources. In *Politics*, Book One, it is Aristotle, not Heidegger, who delineates the ideal of an organically interrelated community (albeit one in which those who are ruled also come to rule). Xenophon's *Hellenica*, written several thousand years before *Being and Time*, praises Spartan society in which all members rejoice and mourn over their communal fate like one unified body. In *History of Rome from the Founding* and *Examples of Courage*, the Roman historian Livy goes beyond the revolutionary conservative Heidegger in celebrating filial piety and the willingness to die for one's city. Moreover, the commercial and technical activities which at least some of Heidegger's critics hold up for emulation found little support among pre-modern thinkers. Both Plato and Aristotle despised *chrèmatistikon*, commerce, and relegated most aspects of an urban economy to near the bottom of their hierarchy of significant activities.

Though no one is seriously proposing a return to ancient society, it is unsettling to see philosophers who apply older cultural standards to the latest modernism delivered to the inquisitor generals of respectable opinion. *The New York Times* on February 3rd justified the need for Farias' book when it offered this 'value-neutral' comment: 'The German philosopher's hostility to what he saw as the rise of an American-inspired technocracy as well as to revolutionary violence melded easily into his early enthusiasm for National Socialism. But after World War Two his anti-technocratic, faintly-neutralist message had a wide, if diffuse, political reach, touching both environmentally-minded Marxists and neo-fascist rightists.' Thus the liberal mainstream deals with critics of managerial, technological globalism: it dismisses them cavalierly as neo-fascists or environmentalist cranks.

It may finally be useful to note a penetrating review of Carl Schmitt's *Concept of the Political* by the young Leo Strauss in 1932. Translated by George Schwab and attached to Schwab's highly readable translation of Schmitt's tract, the essay stands out for its rigorous, honest examination of historical reality. Strauss observes that though Schmitt considers Thomas Hobbes his teacher, Schmitt, nonetheless, has gone beyond Hobbes in discerning liberalism's limits. Hobbes, who came at the beginning of the liberal epoch, welcomed the new dispensation with open arms. He defended absolutism because he thought powerful princes would provide for individual security in a 'value-neutral' culture. Though Schmitt exalts Hobbes' mechanistic state (aptly called a leviathan), he seeks to transcend 'the horizons of liberalism'. Schmitt deals

positively with states and statecraft inasmuch as civil society, not established institutions of government, is what he sees as the gravest threat to political life. Unlike Hobbes, Schmitt as interpreted by Strauss identifies politics not with the protection of life, but with the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the good of the whole. By associating politics with the 'critical situation [*Ernstfall*]', Schmitt as understood by Strauss challenges the liberal view that life consists of 'entertainment' and individual gratification.

Strauss' favourable reading of Schmitt deserves attention for two reasons. Firstly, Strauss' self-described disciples, claiming to be guided by his post-war writings, have become conspicuous upholders of democratic individualism. In defence of 'democratic capitalism', today's Straussians seek to impose through political and academic means the technically controlled emptiness that their teacher criticised in regard to twentieth century liberalism. Secondly, though Strauss, following Schmitt, was correct that impersonal technique and homogenised private pleasure are basic to modern politics, he was wrong to identify modern liberalism with 'value-neutrality'. The leviathan has produced passionate zealots, not merely neutralised subjects pursuing individual pleasure. The present brouhaha over Heidegger offers one more proof that the world of the political machine and uprooted individuals still commands loyalty. One may even have cause to fear that these partisans of mechanised life are now after the rest of us.

Note

1. Victor Farias, *Heidegger et le nazisme*, trans. Myriam Benarroch and J.B. Granet, Paris, Verdier, 1987.

The Politics of Cultural Diversity*

John Gray

In 1946, the subtle and neglected Hungarian philosopher Aurel Kolnai wrote of the Habsburg Empire: 'Imperial Austria, like Switzerland, notwithstanding the numerical disproportion of their different nationalities, did not have "minorities" because they had no ruling nation'.[1] I begin my reflections with this thought, since it seems to me to embody a solution to a problem which besets much contemporary political thought and practice. The problem I have in mind may be defined, provisionally at least, by a question: What are the political forms best suited to a condition of society marked by substantial cultural diversity? This question ought to arise naturally, when we consider the novelty of our condition.

Almost all of us live in societies which are not unified by any single cultural tradition, but which contain a variety of traditions and ways of life. Our great cities shelter vast enclaves of traditional life, often introduced by recent immigrants, at the same time as they nurture liberal bohemian milieux where conduct is governed by taste and preference rather than by any set of established mores. Within every modern state, we find forms of family life based on romantic love and on arranged marriage. We meet, each of us in his daily life encounters, those for whom religious faith pervades their sense of life, and those for whom it is a barely intelligible irrelevance. Our societies encompass a kaleidoscopic diversity of attitudes to sexuality and gender, death and the human condition, even as they harbour a prodigious diversity of ethnic inheritances and styles of life. It is this condition, in which society intimates a diversity of possibly incommensurable values and world views, which is often characterised as cultural pluralism, which I believe ought to be at the top of the political agenda of modern states. Yet, though the fact of cultural diversity is noted often enough, its political implications are rarely explored. We find the reason for this strange neglect, I believe, in a doctrine that is held in common by most modern political thought. It is this modern doctrine, or heresy – the heresy that political orders ought to embody or express the cultural identity of homogeneous moral communities – which I seek to attack and undermine in the course of developing these reflections.

At the most abstract and fundamental level, the question I am addressing has to do with how the human subject is to be conceived, and what are the implications for political order of a well-founded conception of the subject. On the negative or critical side, my concern is to expose and overturn a presupposition about the human subject which is held in common by the political theories which dominate the contemporary scene. It is an assumption about human identity or subjecthood which animates all the dominant forms of liberalism, conservatism and socialism, which I wish to stigmatise as erroneous in theory and pernicious in practice. This assumption – the assumption that the varieties of human identity, if they are not altogether constructions of political practice, ought nevertheless to be mirrored or imprinted in the central institutions of political order – is made in varying ways in the different political perspectives in which it is found.

In some perspectives, the role of political institutions is to shore up tottering identities, to heal the scars

inflicted on established traditions by cultural change, whereas in others the project is that of constituting new identities by the use of political power. The project of constituting new forms of human identity through political practice is, indeed, the pre-eminent contemporary form of this modern heresy, and is found in many current varieties of liberalism. It finds its starkest and crudest form in Marxism, however, and, above all, in the species of Marxism contrived with opportunistic genius by Lenin. For Marx, as for Lenin, and all of Marx's followers, the historical forms of human identity, as they are expressed in inherited cultures' traditions and folkways are in no way to be taken as authentic expressions of human nature and creativity. Instead, all the forms of life in which human beings have hitherto found their identities are condemned as contingencies, shadows cast by underlying structures of production. In this reductionist perspective, all the varied cultural achievements of mankind are epiphenomena, transitory reflections of changes in the economic base of human society. With this much (or little) we are all familiar. But the positive, and mythological aspect of Marxian historical materialism,[2] is less obvious, and less commonly commented upon. It is the Marxian conception of true or essential human nature as being hidden and submerged, thwarted and mutilated by all the historic forms in which human beings have ever lived.

Now in the real world of human history, men are not abstract instances of the human species, but articulators of definite ways of life that reflect their circumstances and at once express and confer on them a distinctive identity. Marxian Communism, by contrast, seeks to expunge the cultural inheritance of mankind, and thereby also to roll back the most powerful achievements of the modern world in the interests of a mythic entity - that of universal humanity. That this myth - the myth of a human essence shorn of religion, family, locality and all the accidents of time, purged of conflict and contingency - is a gnostic rather than a Christian or a Jewish myth is unimportant here, save to illuminate the fact that the character of Marxism-Leninism as a religion, remarked upon in a thousand academic clichés, is extremely disputable. The peculiarity of Marxism, in both its primitive form and its more developed Soviet version, is its fusion of gnostic ambition with scientific pretension. If Marxism is a religion, it is only in the sense that occultism and theosophy - modern forms of magical thought which seek an abatement of tragedy and mystery through a sort of rationalistic gnosis - are religions.

Marxian philosophical anthropology is commited to the view that all the forms of human identity which have achieved concrete historic realisation are aberrations, unavoidable episodes (perhaps) in the growth of human productive powers, but nevertheless episodes which conceal rather than disclose the human essence. Men are not, as they suppose themselves to be, Poles, Spaniards, Englishmen or Scots, Catholics, Jews or Muslims. They are only men, instances of the human species which have acquired an ersatz cultural identity through the accident of belonging to a particular class in a given historical epoch. It follows from this essentialist anthropology that, except insofar as they are instrumental in promoting the expansion of production and so in building up the necessary economic conditions of Communist society, all the historic realisations of human identity - in religion, art, and cultural tradition - are alien and inimical to the realisation of the human essence.

It must not be supposed for a moment that this Marxian philosophical anthropology has been unimplicated in Communist practice. It is a central element of Marxism-Leninism that, when it comes to pass, Communist humanity will be unlike any that history has known. All the cultural attachments which have granted real men their identities will have been effaced, and only quintessential humanity will remain. It is one of my chief arguments that, contrary to Marxism, the quintessential humanity which is to appear on the historical stage has no existence and, in fact, designates nothing. For this reason, the practical result of Communist policy has not been to liberate men from ersatz and oppressive cultural identities, but instead to make war on the only identities their subjects possess.

It is, perhaps, worth noting that the practical nullity of Marxian conceptions of socialist man is evinced in the bizarre phenomenon of displaced patriotism which may be observed in generations of Western leftist intelligentsia. These groups adopted the Soviet Union, and later China, as a focus for the needs for allegiance which they denied in themselves by their repudiation of their own inherited loyalty. The result was an ersatz patriotism in which allegiance was transferred to a remote and largely imaginary society and state. It is only by reference to this displaced patriotism, I believe, that we can begin to comprehend the many absurdities in Western intellectual perceptions of the Soviet system. The grotesque representations of the Soviet system evident in the work of Shaw and the Webbs, Aragon and Sartre, are at least partly explicable in terms of the demands of a repressed need for patriotic allegiance and collective identification. Nor is this phenomenon only of historical interest. We need to remind ourselves that it is probably only the relative brevity of the Pol Pot regime, and its defeat by Vietnamese occupying forces backed by the Soviet Union, that explains the fact that it is not now routinely described by the Western academic class in terms of iconoclasm and innovation in urban planning.

What do the catastrophic results of the Marxian project of constituting a universal human identity, shorn of local and historical attachments, tell us about the nature of human selfhood? In the simplest terms, the history of Communist practice can be seen as the practical self-refutation of Marxian philosophical anthropology. Seventy years after the Bolshevik Revolution, most subjects of the Soviet system still define their identities in religious and national, rather than class or political terms. They are, and remain,

Poles, Ukrainians, Muslims and Christians. The self-defeating effect of Communist practice should lead us to jettison all theorising about human society which treats the historic cultural identities it contains as spurious or merely contingent.

To a very considerable extent, human beings are self defining animals: they differ from the other animal species precisely in their ability partly to constitute for themselves their own identities. This is to say that, for humans, personal identity is not a natural fact but a cultural artifact. We are what we are, not because nature has made us this way, but because we (and 'we' here includes our ancestors) have made us what we are. It is neglect or suppression of this truth that goes far to account for the pernicious absurdities of racist thought and practice. If the identities of persons are artifactual and not natural, if they vary within the broad constraints imposed by our biological endowment and exhibit a rich variety of kinds and forms, then any essentialist or naturalistic conception of the human species as possessing a single identity, peculiar to the species as a whole but thus far hidden from it, is to be rejected as false if not incoherent. We are left with human beings in all the miscellaneous diversity with which they present themselves to each other.

This conception of human beings as partly self-defining creatures has a critical leverage on contemporary theorising which far extends its impact on Marxism. For it cuts against at least the dominant forms of Western liberalism, which all turn on the philosophical fiction of abstract individuality. All of them, that is to say, found their theorisings on a conception of the human subject in which its identity and moral powers are conferred on it, not by a moral inheritance or a cultural tradition, but by the attributes of universal humanity. But the idea of a universal human individuality, which is a feature of the currently dominant liberalisms, misrepresents a distillation of our own experience as a universal truth. By contrast with other and earlier societies, ours is one in which status hierarchies are permeable, roles complex and often conflicting and social monitoring of personal behaviour intermittent and weak. These features of our culture are, indeed, ones we take a pride in, and which (insofar as they are conditions of the values of personal independence and privacy that we cherish) are parts of our freedom. The complexity of the social networks in which each of us moves, and the fact that none of them, or their associated moral communities, ever claims the entirety of our life or loyalty, is the source in common experience of the liberal idea of the autonomous individual.

Among us, and in some measure in every society touched by modernity, the liberal individual is an historical reality, a cultural achievement perhaps more precious than any other bequeathed to us by European civilisation. To deny the historical reality of liberal individuality is then absurd, but to turn it into a universal theory - or, after the fashion of the Enlightenment, to appoint it the *telos* of history - is to traffic in illusions. To acknowledge liberal individuality as a distillation of modern experience, and thereby to recognise the historicity of liberalism itself, is to relinquish the pretensions of doctrinaire liberalism to universal validity. In coming to understand liberal individuality as an appropriate rendition of our own experience as moderns, however, we abandon the distinctively modern (or Enlightenment) project of grounding liberalism on the universal maxims of autonomous reason. That in so recognising the time-bound modernity of the liberal individual we do not (in the jargon of recent thought) deconstruct him, but rather initiate a form of post-modern individualism that is fully conscious of its own historical particularity, is a paradox to which I shall shortly return.

It is in its insistence on recalling to us the local character of our experience of individuality that the strength of conservative philosophy lies. It dispels the hallucinatory perspective of abstract humanity, and draws us back to the narrower, but more substantial standpoints of real human beings, in all their quiddities and miscellaneity. Conservative thought has inestimable value in correcting the illusion that we are, or can ever be, dispossessed or unencumbered selves, free-floating sovereign subjects, distanced from all social convention and heirs to no tradition. Conservative philosophy contains, then, an incisive critique, not only of the stupendous delusions of Marxism, but also of the lesser, but no less mistaken errors of the dominant liberalism. From conservative thought, we can glean a devastating criticism of the liberalism of J.S. Mill's *On Liberty*, where uncriticised and flawed conceptions of autonomy and individuality combine with an obsessional enmity to tradition and convention to yield a liberalism in which rationalistic hubris, antinomian individualism and a sentimental religion of humanity reinforce and strengthen each other.

At the same time, the conservative critique of the abstract individualism of liberal theory often, if not typically, issues in a conception of the human self, and a prescription for political order, which can be shown to be radically flawed. The conservative theorist, like the communitarian critic of liberalism from the Left, moves unreflectively from the truth that we are none of us encumbered or disembodied selves to the very different, and indeed manifestly false proposition that we are, or ought to be radically situated selves - that is to say (I am here explicating the idiom of recent communitarian theory[3]) selves whose identity is contoured by membership in a single moral community and mirrored in the institutions of a single political order. This is the belief, shared by Leftist communitarian theorists such as Sandel and by Hegelian conservatives such as Scruton,[4] that moral life flourishes only when personal identities are constituted wholly by embeddedness in a single moral community, and, further, that such moral communities demand and are entitled to the protection of a political order with which they are or ought to be coextensive. It is to this belief that I referred when I spoke of a modern heresy as the target

of my thoughts. In its simplest form, this belief is expressed in modern thought as *nationalism*, which has been characterised by Isaiah Berlin as the claim that:

> the essential human unit in which man's nature is fully realised is not the individual, or a voluntary association which can be dissolved or altered or abandoned at will, but the nation; that it is to the creation and maintenance of the nation that the lives of subordinate units, the family, the tribe, the clan, the province must be due, for their nature and purpose, what is often called their meaning, is derived from its nature and purposes; and that these are revealed not by rational analysis, but by a special awareness, which need not be fully conscious, of the unique relationship that binds individual human beings into the indissoluble and unanalysable organic whole which Burke identified with society, Rousseau with the people, Hegel with the state . . .[5]

The belief that political order presupposes moral solidarity, and its deeper presupposition, that the identities of persons are or ought to be defined by membership of a single moral community, else they be deformed or estranged, is not restricted to nationalist theorising. Rather, it animates most modern thought, and it is especially prominent in contemporary criticism of liberalism.

I have acknowledged important truth in the conservative and communitarian critique of liberalism which fastens on weaknesses in the dominant liberal conception of the human subject. Against the presently dominant kinds of conservatism, however, I wish to argue that they exhibit a remoteness from historical reality which is peculiarly damaging in a form of thought which rightly seeks to elevate the particulars of concrete practice over the delusive universals of abstract theorising. For the communitarian-conservative conception of the radically situated self can be shown to have no application to modern experience and to model what is, at best, a limiting case. We can see this, to begin with, when we reflect on our own experience. We are none of us defined by membership in a single community or form of moral life. We are 'suckled on the milk of many nurses', as Fulke Greville put it, heirs of many distinct, sometimes conflicting, intellectual and moral traditions. Further, the traditions to which we are heirs are not windowless monads, self-sufficient and fully individuated entities which (like pebbles) may coexist without interacting. They are rather prisms, each of which refracts the light cast by the other traditions which environ it, and which together throw into each of us a shifting pattern of colours. The complexity and contradictions of our cultural inheritance give to our identities an aspect of plurality and even of multiplicity which is not accidental, but (if we are to use such a term) essential to them. For us, at any rate, the power to conceive of ourselves in different ways, to harbour dissonant projects and perspectives, to inform our thoughts and lives with divergent categories and concepts, is integral to our identity as reflective beings.

This same point can be put in other terms: the experience of *marginality* is familiar to all of us as a dimension of our identity which is integral to it. Because it is our condition to belong to many different and often discrepant networks and communities, we belong wholly to none of them. The power of distancing ourselves from any relationship or attachment, of imagining ourselves to have severed or altered any one of the many involvements which enter into our identities, is a central element in our identity. Even as we are constituted by our attachments, *we* (perhaps not all men) are constituted by the knowledge that we can alter or dissolve any of them. To wish this to be otherwise, to seek to suppress the experience of marginality, is to seek to alter our nature.

To wish to alter our nature, however, is also to seek to expunge our history. For the condition of moral complexity to which I have alluded is not a novelty of modern decadence, but instead a phenomenon that manifests itself in European life at least since the last medieval period. We find an accurate reading of European history, I believe, in Michael Oakeshott's observation that:

> The urge to impose upon a state the character of a *solidarité commune* is certainly a notable disposition, but, so far from being the dominant disposition of the modern European political imagination, it is easily recognised as a relic of servility of which it is proper for European peoples to be profoundly ashamed . . . no European alive to his inheritance of moral understanding has ever found it possible to deny the superior desirability of civil association without a profound feeling of guilt.[6]

That Oakeshott's reading of European history is superior to any advanced by communitarian conservatives is confirmed by even a cursory glance at the rudiments of the history of the modern European state. It is a plain fact that few, if any, modern European states coincide with any national community. The sovereign state of the United Kingdom is precisely that, a kingdom encompassing four nations, and not a nation-state. Again, what is Spain but an artifact of monarchy? And, lest we neglect an apparent counter-example, let us recall that as late as 1870, a survey of French school children reported that the majority of them were unable to name the nation in which they lived, but instead named their province or region.[7] The belief that national consciousness is a long-established feature of European peoples is, in fact, profoundly historical, and for that reason deeply unconservative. It is a chimera produced by a mistaken theory which understands political order in a quasi-naturalistic fashion as an expression of a pre-existent community, when it is properly understood as a matter of strictly political allegiance to the artifact of sovereign authority. As Kolnai again puts it well:

> human society is not composed of nations . . . in

the same clearcut way in which it is composed of individuals, or, for that matter, of sovereign states. The spectrum of nationalities is full of interpretations, ambiguities, twilight zones. It follows that the conception of nationalism (as a universal principle), the conception of a 'just' or 'natural' order of nation-states is - in fact the in theory - pure utopia. There can be neither an order of states nor of frontiers in which there does not enter to a large extent the factor of arbitrariness, contingency and historical accident. Pretending to 'purify' the body of mankind - like other enterprises of a naturalist pseudo-rationalist sort, purporting to lay down 'evidence principles' which generally prove illusory - means to push arbitrariness to its extreme limit.[8]

I have ascribed to conservative thought deep insights into human identity which much liberalism neglects. It is a conservative insight that the Whig (and Marxian) idea of historical folkways and concrete forms of life as aberrations - as veils behind which is to be found (in Stuart Hampshire's words)

> an abstract universal man dressed in neo-classical drapery, as in some Reynolds paintings, to indicate that he belongs to no particular place or time, (framed in) the unearthly light of the ideal, classical and timeless scene (wherein) reason cannot tell him how he should be married or how he should speak to his children... or give one local loyalty precedence over another[9]

- that this idea is a mirage.

I have found in conservatism the important truth that liberal and Marxian conceptions of universal humanity are false or incoherent and harmful in practice. I want now to develop further a criticism of the dominant forms of contemporary conservatism, which are communitarian and often nationalist in temper, by trying to delineate more positively the sort of politcal order which does *not* depend on a pre-existent moral solidarity. My submission is that, in the subtle mosaic of traditions which is modern society, government is ill-fitted to act as guardian or protector of any of the traditions it shelters. It cannot claim to express any undergirding moral community in the society, since no such community exists. In this circumstance, the task of the state is to keep in good repair what Oakeshott calls civil association - that structure of law in which, having no purpose in common, practitioners of different traditions may co-exist in peace. Modern states are peculiarly apt to be distracted from this vital task by the reflex of governmental hyperactivism which they all exhibit. Every problem or evil, from drug abuse to family breakdown, is perceived as a dire threat to an established order which is the duty of government to protect. Against this modern prejudice, I would cite Wittgenstein's remark that trying by deliberate contrivance to shore up an ailing tradition is like trying to repair a broken spider's web with bare hands. There is special absurdity in invoking the authority of government to intervene in problems to which government has no solution. None of the manifestations of contemporary decadence about which conservative opinion is so alarmed are threats to the survival of society, and a true conservative policy would rather be one that in most things left society to look after itself. The resources of renewal and self-repair in society are surely far greater than any that can be mobilised by the ramshackle action of government.

The implication of this perspective for the character of the modern state is that (contrary to the conventional wisdom, socialist and conservative) modern government must be limited government. Where moral solidarity is lacking, where (as in all modern societies) there is cultural diversity rather than seamless community, the role of government is first and last that of preserving liberty in civil association under the rule of law. The liberty that is preserved is that of the liberal individual, but it is a liberty that thereby guarantees cultural freedom - the condition in which individuals may opt to explore an inherited form of life, or migrate across traditions to a chosen lifestyle, if they wish. Cultural diversity is protected, in this perspective, by a political order which protects the old liberal freedoms of conscience, occupation, contract and enterprise. The form of government distinctive of such a political order is not the minimum state of recent libertarian theory, but it is akin to the limited state of classical liberalism. It is a form of government in which each person, and therefore also each cultural tradition which the society contains, possesses an equal freedom to develop, compatibly with equal freedom of the others to do likewise.

Two points of clarification are worth making about this conception of government in a society characterised by substantial cultural diversity. The first is that, according to the view I am developing, the place of government is to respect diversity in cultural traditions, and so allow for the emergence of rival and perhaps incommensurable forms of human flourishing, but not to attempt to institutionalise traditions or ways of life in state-subsidised ghettoes. The political order which I am commending is accordingly at the farthest extreme from that promoted by contemporary agitators for multiculturalism. For these latter, animated by a moral hatred of the dominant traditions and a voyeuristic fascination with submerged, overwhelmed or oppositional cultures, seek to entrench minority traditions in protected institutions and to confer on them arbitrary privileges.

This multiculturalism is bogus and pernicious, because it expresses a racist conviction that minority cultures can never maintain themselves without paternalistic support and because it seeks to replace one form of cultural imperialism by another. (That minority cultures do not always need political protection is shown by the history of the Indian immigrant population in Britain and of the Chinese and Japanese in the United States, where in each case governmental institutions have proved a hindrance rather than an aid to minority advancement.) Further, as the tragic history of the American black population shows, such paternalistic

and welfarist measures typically serve only to complete the devastation of traditional family and cultural life, already damaged by social prejudice and economic hardship. The final result of contemporary multiculturalism, if it could be achieved, would in fact be a mirror image of the system of privilege and separatism favoured by authoritarian conservatives - in short, the institutionalisation of a cultural apartheid.

Nevertheless, if government is to shelter the variety of traditions which our society contains, then it should favour none of them particularly. This, in turn, implies that there is no guarantee that long-established traditions and forms of life will succeed in reproducing themselves. It may well be, in fact, that the withdrawal of government to limited and definite functions would actually quicken the pace of cultural change in some areas of social life. In particular, the form of life of the liberal individual will in the liberal political order I am outlining be only one way of life among many, and nothing (except its own resources of vitality) guarantees that it will retain primacy among the cultural traditions which have found a home among us. We do not need to see every social change as an improvement to accept this as an inevitable result of the proper limitations of governmental power. Traditions and ways of life that require for their successful reproduction more from government than protection from the rule of law and the provision of opportunity for those with few resources probably do not deserve to survive.

It is not the office of government to buttress failing identities, to confer identities on persons afflicted with anomie, or, in general, to make the world safe for cultural traditions endangered by the freedom that is protected by civil association. Nor is it the task of government to protect waning traditions by confining their practitioners to tax-funded institutional reservations. This has been the increasing tendency of governments in their policy toward minorities in many Western states. But it is this protectionist policy in respect of social movements and ways of life, I believe, that John Anderson was criticising when he wrote his remarkable essay on the Servile State.[10]

I have criticised that form of liberalism (the dominant contemporary form) which seeks through government to impose upon all the form of life of an alienated fragment of the Western bourgeoisie. My argument is nevertheless consonant with a liberal tradition, sounder and truer than that which has been dominant since John Stuart Mill, which sees government not as the pacemaker for any specific conception of progress, but instead as providing the framework within which different ways of life and styles of thought may compete in peaceful coexistence. It is this conception which animates the Scottish Enlightenment and the writings of Tocqueville and Constant and which inspires much in *The Federalist Papers*. It is this conception of limited government, with its origins in classical liberalism, which I believe to be most appropriate to our condition as persons living in a society which is not unified by any single tradition. It is a conception which should be studied with special care, I believe, by reflective conservatives and by liberals who have not lost the skill in self-criticism on which they pride themselves.

The conception I wish to commend here confronts serious difficulties, all of which arise from the fact that it appears to go against the spirit of the age. In the first place, it is not clear what are the institutional forms appropriate to a state which respects cultural diversity and does not seek to bolster or embody any specific form of cultural identity. The example of the Habsburg Monarchy, with which I began and which certainly did shelter myriad nationalities and traditions, is not an encouraging one for us. Contemporary sentiment is relentlessly inimical to imperial institutions, despite the evident historical fact that their desuetude or destruction has mostly been attended by dictatorship or tribalism. Further, the instance of Switzerland, which Kolnai cites as evidence of the possibility of several linguistic and religious communities being integrated within a single political order based on extensive decentralisation and localisation of governmental functions, does not seem easily exportable. Such success in harbouring diverse communities within a single political order depends in Switzerland on political traditions which are centuries old and which have very distinctive historical origins. Moreover, the record of local or federal schemes of governmental devolution and decentralisation is not elsewhere particularly impressive.

In Britain, local government has proved more vulnerable to capture by extremists than has national government, and has been the scene of many conflicts between ethnic and cultural majorities and minorities. Again, in the United States the massive apparatus of federalism, separation of powers and judicial review has not prevented (and may well have facilitated) the extensive politicisation of social life via the exploitation of litigation and the invocation of constitutional rights, whose content is often not liable to strict construction. There is, finally, a danger in all schemes of consociational or confederal devolution of government powers, that (save in exceptional circumstances, as in Switzerland) they leave the association of states open to conquest or subversion by external aggressors. For these reasons, we go up a blind alley if we suppose that we can forge the political institutions appropriate to a circumstance of cultural diversity by recourse to traditional devices of devolution and localisation which have almost everywhere failed.

There is a deeper difficulty in the view I have been developing of the relations between political order and cultural identity, and that is a dilemma of allegiance. Political orders which have successfully transcended the need for moral solidarity or community have, historically, either been empires (as with the Romans and the Habsburgs), religious institutions (such as those of medieval Christendom and Islam in their periods of greatest toleration) or else monarchies, as in

the splendidly anachronistic case of the United Kingdom. None of these sources of allegiance is available on any large scale today. There are no true empires left, few monarchies, and the examplars of religious political order with which we are, alas, becoming increasingly familiar are examples of a rabid and barbarous fundamentalism, as in Iran. We may go yet further. Allegiance to liberal orders, where it has not had its roots in religious faith, has typically been imposed by secular myths which few of us any longer take seriously. Thus liberalism in France and America was sustained by the historical theodicy of the Enlightenment, with its mythology of natural rights and global progress. These are the myths which suffuse modernity and underpin the modern project of giving moral and political life a secular foundation. When we cease to subscribe to them, we acquire the paradoxical character of post-moderns, heirs to all the achievements of modernity but not to its seminal myths. From the perspective of my problem here, the question naturally arises, what might sustain a political order that encompasses many traditions and varieties of human identity, if both the traditional and the modern sources of allegiance to such an order are unmistakably on the wane?

I address this question in the hope that the dilemma it marks is not of that Polish variety - hopeless, but not serious - which it is the fate of those subject to Communist domination to suffer. I hazard the guess that we may go some way to resolving it by looking back to the early modern period, when many of our current dilemmas were perceived with a drastic clarity which we have lost. It is perhaps in the works of Hobbes, who wrote for an age of religious wars and barbarous movements much like ours, that we glimpse the outlines of a form of government suited to our circumstances. It is a form of government devoted to securing the peace, and that first of all, thereby leaving the largest space for liberty of thought and action. It is a unitary form of government, without complicated devices for devolution, in which all or most of the activities not essential to the primary peace-keeping task of the state are left to private initiative. It is in this notion of a form of government having such strictly limited functions that we may, possibly, find a clue to our present dilemma. What it suggests is the salience to our condition of a state that is strong but small, in which the little that is not privatised is centralised, and in which practitioners of diverse traditions are left at liberty, so long as they do not disturb the common peace, to refine and develop their forms of life. This is a form of government devoted not to truth, or to abstract rights, and still less to any conception of progress or general welfare, but instead one which by securing a non-instrumental peace creates the possibility of civil association.

It is in this possibility, and in this alone, that we may hope for a revolution of the perplexity with which I began my reflections. It may still be doubted, all the same, if the kind of state I have envisaged could command allegiance when it lacks the support of an inspiring mythology. Here I would like to suggest the possibility that, in recognising that we lack the moral solidarity sought by socialists and most conservatives, we may yet be able to draw on the resource of another kind of solidarity - that of civilised men and women, practitioners of different traditions, who nevertheless have in common a perception of enmity in regard to the totalitarian states and re-barbarising movements of our time. We - the heirs of European traditions who have enjoyed the freedoms of civil association, or who have come within its sphere by forced or chosen migration - are few, feeble and not mankind. We know that (as Hume observed of liberty in England) our freedom is a singularity, not the upshot of any inevitable source of events, and has no future that is guaranteed. We do not pretend that our identities express the essence of the species; we recognise them to be products as much of chance as of choice. In short, we take ourselves as we are, and are not ashamed of our identities. It is this sensibility which I defend here and which, despite its clumsiness, I am tempted to call post-modern liberal conservatism.[11]

The name we give to this sensibility is unimportant. What is important is the possibility of a form of political solidarity that does not depend on shared moral community, but only on the mutual recognition of civilised men and women. Such solidarity may be, as Spinoza says of wisdom, 'as rare as it is precious'; and the freedom that it expresses and engenders may well prove to be an exception in the life of the species. Yet, so long as we can learn the skill of defending with inflexible resolution an order we know to be underwritten neither by nature or history, we have reason to hope that the idea of a society of many distinct but interpenetrating traditions, a society in which men come to respect and cherish their differences and are ready to act together to protect them, is more than an idle dream.[12]

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Notes

1. Aurel Kolnai, 'Les ambiguités nationales', *La Nouvelle Releve*, Montreal, 1946/47, pp. 533-46, 644-55. Translated by W. Grassl and G. Smith in 'The Politics of National Diversity', *The Salisbury Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3, April 1987, pp. 33-37.
2. On this, see my 'Philosophy, Science and Myth in Marxism' in *Marx and Marxism*; Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, Vol. 14, Cambridge University Press, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson, Summer 1982, pp. 71-95; and my 'Marxian freedom, individual liberty and the end of alienation', *Journal of Social Philosophy and Policy*, Vol. 3, Issue 2, Spring 1986, pp. 160-87.
3. See M. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*

Cambridge University Press.
4. Roger Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism* Penguin Books 1980.
5. Isaiah Berlin, *Against the Current* Hogarth Press, 1979, p. 342.
6. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* Clarendon Press, 1985, pp. 320–21.
7. For the late nineteenth century transformation of France, see Norman Stone, *Europe Transformed* Harvard University Press, 1984, Ch. III, Sec. 5.
8. Kolnai, *op. cit.*, p. 536.
9. Stuart Hampshire, *Morality and Conflict* Basil Blackwell, 1983, pp. 138–39.
10. See John Anderson, *Studies in Empirical Philosophy.*
11. I intend to associate my conception with the rather different view offered by Richard Rorty in his 'Post-modernist Bourgeois Liberalism', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 10 (1983).
12. I am indebted to Isaiah Berlin and Michael Oakeshott for conversations on some of the themes of this lecture. Responsibility for the thoughts it expresses remains mine alone.

Gorbachev's Politics of Religion

Françoise Thom

The traditionally hostile attitude of the Soviet authorities towards religion seems recently to have been undergoing a *perestroika*. Over the last two years the Party has multiplied the gestures of good will: chapels and monasteries have been returned to the Orthodox Church - including the monastery of Saint Daniel, destined to become the administrative centre of the Moscow Patriarchate. (It will preside over the Patriarchate's most important sector, which is, as it happens, the department of external relations.) In Moscow those who get married in Church, or baptise their children, are no longer required to submit their passports for registration. There is also talk of revising the religious legislation, and even of according to parishes the status of legal persons. The media occasionally denounce the bureaucratic hang-ups which impede the registration of religious communities, and in doing so give a platform to the religious dignitaries themselves. Archbishop Pitirim appears on Soviet television, pleading for *glasnost* and *perestroika*, while the review *Kommunist* (no. 4 1988) suggests that believers might be respectable citizens. A kosher restaurant is about to open in Moscow. Finally, Gorbachev has just welcomed with great pomp to the Kremlin the patriarch Pimen and the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church.

Moreover, since April 1987 we have witnessed a steady stream of religious personalities passing through Moscow: Mother Teresa, Cardinal Jaime Sin of the Philippines, the Dalai Lama, the French bishops, and a delegation from the World Islamic Conference.[1] Nothing further was required for the Western media to begin speaking of an 'historic compromise' between the communist regime and believers, and to renew their admiration for the innovating spirit of Mikhail Gorbachev. It is therefore worth examining Soviet policy towards religion in the era of *perestroika*, partly to avoid hasty judgement, but especially because this policy is typical of Gorbachevian strategy and tactics in general.

What, then, is the Orthodox Church in the eyes of the Party? A recent article in *Pravda*[2] gives a clear answer to this question:

> Since the Orthodox Church began to operate in our society, its social position has been considerably modified. Originally it was a feudal church, a state institution of the Russian empire, upholding the interests of the oppressors and living from the exploitation of the masses; it was transformed into a voluntary association of believing citizens, independent of the State and financed by its members. Its sphere of influence shrunk, as did its field of activity. Unlike Orthodoxy during the first years of the Revolution, which defended overtly anti-socialist positions, and stood against the power of the people, contemporary Russian Orthodoxy recognises the socialist regime ... The very fact of this profound change, without precedent in the history of religion, eloquently testifies to the deep and radical nature of socialist transformation, which has succeeded in leaving its mark even on so conservative an organism as the Church. It is thus that we see refuted the principal thesis of theology, according to which the Orthodox Church has a divine foundation.

That last sentence is particularly revealing. The Orthodox Church is not merely necessary to the Soviet regime in supporting its internal and external

objectives. The Church must also be at hand - humbled and mendacious - in order to demonstrate *a contrario* the validity of historical materialism: since God tolerates the handing over of His Church to the atheist State, it follows that He does not exist. The spectacular favours offered by the Kremlin to the Orthodox Church, in exchange for its public support for the cause of *perestroika* and disarmament, compose one part of the anti-religious battle conducted by Gorbachev and his team. It was Gorbachev, after all, who said in Tashkent, in November 1986: 'we must lead a determined and pitiless struggle against religion, and we must reinforce atheist propaganda.' To display Patriarch Pimen expressing himself in pure communist newspeak on the nation's television screens, is more effective than hundreds of conferences unmasking the impostures of the priesthood and describing 'religion in the service of militarism and reaction'. For who could the Patriarch succeed in convincing, when he congratulates himself on the fact that the spiritual life is becoming 'ever richer and deeper', and that morality is becoming 'charged with new meaning'?[3] In the same way, what is the good of putting Christ on stage in works of literature - as was done by Aitmatov in his latest novel *The Scaffold* - if it is merely to fill his mouth with slogans from *Pravda*?[4]

However, it is not from the measures adopted towards the official churches - measures which show hardly more than the hem of the Party's cassock - that one can judge the present Soviet policy towards believers. Much more revelatory are the attitudes adopted towards the non-registered sects and towards dissidents within the official churches. Equally important are the instructions given to the propagandists, and the analyses presented by the Party ideologues. Let us begin with the last of these:

> Religious conversion is linked not merely to survivals of the past, but also to the limited character of human practice, and to its lack of development. It is clearly impossible to deny that the process of social deformation of every kind has contributed much to conserving religiosity in the country.[5]

The boldness of the Soviet theoreticians here consists in applying the Marxist vision of religion, as 'the opium of the people', to communist society itself: belief endures among the people because they depend upon the promise of a better world, so consoling themselves for the deficiencies of the present one. The 'social causes' of religion not only have not disappeared, they make themselves felt more than ever. Other disturbing elements preoccupy our theoreticians:

> In reflecting on the moral problems of contemporary society, in encountering the phenomena of spiritual emptiness, corruption, and illegality, certain people, lacking in firmness of principle, persuade themselves that the Church was once an obstacle to evil, and call for a return to religious morality... This state of mind is particularly widespread on the eve of the millenium of Christianity in Russia. And it is necessary to explain this event from the Marxist-Leninist point of view, without idealising it, and without blackening it. In particular, it is necessary to show that it is not religion which brought the norms of common humanity to people. These norms were elaborated by the masses, during their centuries-old struggle against the inhumanity and amoralism of the system of the exploiters.[6]

The text is addressing a state of mind which is widespread in the Soviet Union, and which was best described by the peasant writer Astafiev, in his story of 1986, 'The Blind Sinner':

> What has become of us? Who has plunged us into an abyss of evil and calamity? Why? Who extinguished the light of Good in our souls? Who has blown out the candle of our conscience, throwing us into a pit of impenetrable darkness, where we grope our way forward, seeking the bottom, seeking support and also a glow which will show us the future. What good is a light which leads us to a Gehenna of flames? We used to live with a light in our souls - a light which had once been lit by the saints, so that we should not err in the darkness, so that we should not stumble against the trees in the forest or against men in society, so that we should not tear at each other's eyes, or break the bones of our neighbour. Why did they take all that from us, and give us nothing in exchange, in disseminating unbelief...? To whom can we direct our prayers? From whom can we demand forgiveness?

Given such terrain, there can be no question of relaxing ideological vigilance, even when faced with a perfectly docile Orthodox Church:

> The political loyalism of the Church, its orientation towards the crucial problems of the contemporary world, could well be accompanied by a certain reinforcement of its ideological position within society. This is why an intensification of atheist propaganda at every level of the population, and above all among the young, is indispensable.[7]

This realistic vision of the situation explains why the propagandists are recommended to behave with 'tact' and 'direction' in educating the people to atheism, and why *Literaturnaya Gazyeta* castigates the 'anti-religious demagoguery', with which the Soviet citizen has been 'familiar to the point of nasuea'.[8] The army is perceived as the ideal place for ideological indoctrination. In this domain nothing must be neglected:

> The leaders, propagandists and activists of the Party and the komsomol introduce anti-religious propaganda not only into the units, but also into the heart of the local population, and into the work collectives whose members enter into frequent contact with soldiers ... Among them there are believers. And they have regular contact with soldiers whom they attempt to convert to

their views. We must not neglect this fact.[9]

Here alas, as elsewhere, there has been a certain deplorable lack of zeal:

> Unfortunately not everyone has always been energetic, persevering and patient in the re-education of believers... Certain activists avoid concerning themselves with a believer since they don't know how to behave towards a soldier who has religious tendencies - they are ignorant of the elementary basis of his belief... (nevertheless) despite all these problems, in most army collectives the propagandists have taken a creative approach to the questions of atheist propaganda.[10]

It is interesting to discover that the religions most often mentioned in the military press as religions to be combated are Islam, the Protestant sects (notably the Baptists and Seventh Day Adventists), and the Uniate Church.

The great innovation in the anti-religious argument lies in the recourse made to historical and cultural relativism. We read in the press that Christianity was 'progressive' in its time.[11] The Orthodox Church is no longer represented as a bastion of obscurantism; its role in the diffusion of literacy and art is given prominence, along with its contribution to national unity ('the Church inspired the struggle against foreign invaders'[12]), and its contribution to public morality. The attempt is made to do to faith what once was done to national sentiment: to reduce it to folklore. This 'enlightened' approach is given added credibility by the attacks emanating from the dynosaurs of ideology, who rage against the 'flirtation with God',[13] as well as by those who endeavour to make sure that the nationalist ingredient in the ideological potion does not surpass the prescribed dosage - thus A Yakovlev: 'Render unto God what is God's, unto the Church what belongs to the Church, and unto us Marxists the fullness of truth. Apart from that, it is necessary to rebut implacably those who try to present Christianity as the matrix of Russian culture.'[14]

These new subtleties do not prevent gross and brutal methods. In 1987 the sects were virulently attacked in the press: unregistered Baptists, Adventists, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the disciples of Hare Krishna continue to be considered as enemies. These sects excite the hatred of the authorities for the reason that it is extremely difficult for the KGB to infiltrate them and to use them for the ends of foreign policy. The repression directed towards the Uniates has been in no way diminished: Catholic churches are invaded by the militia, or even handed over to the Orthodox Church, as in Kalynivka in January 1988; one Catholic priest in the Ukraine was forcibly sent to Chernobyl,[16] while atheist instruction has been reinforced in Galicia. Despite numerous petitions from Ukrainian Catholics, the Uniate church has still not been legalised.

The authorities are particularly hostile to any attempt to contest the official Churches from below. In Lithuania, for example, the press has violently attacked the group 'Renaissance and Renewal', which denounces communist manipulation of the Lutheran Evangelical Church.

Despite the promises of K. Karchev, the Councillor of State responsible for religious affairs, who announced the liberation of all believers detained before November 1987, at least a hundred believers remain in prison, in the Gulag, or in the psychiatric hospitals. To these we must add the conscientious objectors, whose numbers remain unknown. And we should remind ourselves, too, that, while a Bible will cost 100 roubles on the black market, the *Dictionary of Atheism* costs only 2 roubles and 70 kopeks.[18]

At the same time, *perestroika* requires that the various official Churches practice 'autogestion' of their own dissident members. During the symposium of December 1986, which brought together the representatives of all the official Churches, delegates criticised 'the existence of circles of dissidence in this country', and underlined the fact that 'the Churches dispose of spiritual forces which could cure them'. The various churches are invited to police their own dissidents who, 'by advocating religious purity detract from the spiritual reality and render themselves guilty of undermining the bonds which ought to tie them to their churches'.[19] As was said by Metropolitan Juvenal, 'the fact that people are speaking now of *glasnost* and *perestroika* does not mean that there can be anarchy in the churches.' Hence at the end of March 1988, a short while before their visit to the Kremlin, the Orthodox bishops, gathered together in Moscow, condemned the dissidents within the churches.[20]

Why, however, this change of tone towards religion and the churches, if it is not also a change of tone towards believers? A few considerations, both internal and external, explain Gorbachev's war of charm. In the interior, the Party is not averse to enrolling the churches in its campaigns for the restoration of public morality - notably in its crusade against alcohol, and its population campaign. The official local churches can also contribute to the development of 'friendship between peoples': thus the Armenian Catholicos is praised in *Izvestia*, October 1985, for his tribute to 'the humanism of the Russian people'. This 'internationalist' posture of the local churches is all the more necessary in that 'one cannot fail to see that nationalist sentiments are associated with religious opinions.'[21] As in 1941, the Party remembers the church in situations of crisis: after Chernobyl, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* opened its columns to the Metropolitan Philaret, who undertook to explain to a population seized with panic that the catastrophe should not be envisaged in terms of the Apocalypse, and that the end of the world was not imminent.[22]

The recent invitation of the Orthodox hierarchs to the Kremlin is an index of the gravity of the present situation in the Soviet Union. The regime is turning to the Orthodox Church in the same way, and for the same reason, that it makes discreet appeal to Great Russian nationalism. And internally, this flirtation with Orthodoxy signifies not a desire for integration

into Europe (as is suggested by propaganda designed for external use) but on the contrary, a wish to negate Western influence. On the occasion of the 1100th anniversary of the death of Saint Methodius, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* recalled the persecutions to which Cyril and Methodius were subjected by the Catholic Church, and quoted the words of Metropolitan Pankraty: 'The conception of a "united Europe", as this is understood in the West, is not for us... We are for a Europe in the spirit of Helsinki, a Europe based in the co-existence of states with different political systems.'[23]

In matters of foreign policy the Soviet Union had powerful reasons to engage in an offensive on the religious front. The Soviets have always deployed considerable efforts in order to manipulate world opinion. Today, at the moment when the Soviet state and its satellites have more need than ever for Western aid, at the moment when the ruin of their economy incites them to disarm the Western powers rather than continue to win the arms race, at the moment when the traditional channels of Soviet influence, such as the communist parties, are discredited on account of their too obvious affiliation to Moscow, it has become urgent to renew the techniques for influencing world opinion, and to repossess the ground lost under Brezhnev. The courting of believers answers to two aims of Soviet policy, one traditional and the other reflecting the 'New Thinking' of the Gorbachev era.

The first is to diversify to the maximum extent the ways of influencing world opinion. Innumerable foundations, organisations and institutes spring up everywhere like mushrooms, whose *raison d'être* is one: to promote peace and disarmament, along with the latest guidelines launched by the communist propaganda machine. It is good that churchmen participate in these organisations: hence Metropolitan Pitirim is one of those responsible for the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity, created in Moscow in January of this year. Metropolitan Philaret is the president of the Commission for Relations with Churchmen Struggling for Peace. Mother Teresa is received by G. Borovik, responsible for the Soviet Committee for Peace. 'We have before us an essential task,' declares Patriarch Pimen 'to concentrate our efforts on ridding the earth and the heavens of nuclear armaments.'[24]

The second aim is tied to the Soviet desire to 'change the image of the USSR' in the Western consciousness, to induce the non-communist world to renounce the 'stereotype of the enemy'. Thus, according to a pertinent analysis in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*,[25] the negative image of the Soviet Union in the West is based on three conceptions: the USSR is perceived as a State which is expansionist, atheist, and totalitarian. Soviet propaganda has attacked these three conceptions with considerable skill and with its habitual ability to follow things through. In the United States and West Germany above all, it has been necessary to destroy the connotation of 'atheist' which had become attached to the Soviet State. In the course of his interviews with the American media, Gorbachev did not fail to invoke the name of God on several occasions; he also attended the Washington summit in the company of Metropolitan Philaret. In August 1987, during the conference at Chautauqua devoted to Soviet-American relations, Metropolitan Juvenal and the Chief Rabbi of Moscow, Adolf Chaevich, defend *glasnost* and *perestroika* and affirm that believers experience no problems in the USSR. In West Germany the Soviet Council of Evangelical Baptists undertakes to spread the same message.[26] Very recently, at the World Hindu Conference, the lama Chimit-Dorji Dougarov declares that Buddhism is flourishing in Soviet Bouratia.[27] The celebration of the Christian millenium offers an additional opportunity to stage conferences and colloquia, both in the USSR and abroad, in which *perestroika* and *glasnost* are the principal points of discussion, such as the colloquium organised by the Evangelical Academy of Tutzing in Bavaria.[28]

The gestures in favour of the churches testify, then, to no change in the regime's attitude to religion; the re-activation of the official churches, the propaganda focusing on their so-called 'independence' from the State, indicate a revitalising of the KGB, both at home and abroad. In times of crisis the Party is obliged to have recourse to an increased manipulation of public opinion; churchmen are solicited in the same way as scientists and other 'representatives of the intelligentsia'. It is possible that the official churches might be authorised to engage in charitable activity: the example of Poland shows that there is here an important channel for free Western aid, which offers no very serious secondary effects in the ideological sphere. But a change in the religious legislation signifies nothing, so long as there persists the state of affairs described in this letter from a Russian believer, addressed to Father Yakunin, and recently published in the *samizdat* journal *Glasnost*:

> You have recently addressed a letter to the leaders of our country, asking them to change the laws on religion. Do you believe that an adjustment of the laws will achieve anything, when the laws are never obeyed? The principal pressure exerted on the church is that of the KGB, and what laws govern this organisation?... Today the KGB has appropriated the task of recruiting all those who enter into a seminary... I do not understand how one can speak of the liberty of the church, if tomorrow priests are all to be stooges. What is the good of such a 'free' church? The fundamental sickness of our church today consists in the fact that its hierarchy has been bought. Erstwhile this sickness affected only the higher echelons. Day by day it spreads through the whole church, from top to bottom... And for contact with foreigners only the super-Judases are selected... To put an end to the full-scale perversion of the clergy by the sin of Judas - this is the principal demand that people like you should address to the authorities.

And questioned on the present attitude of the Soviet regime to the Church, the young dissident Orthodox priest, Vladimir Chibaev, replies:

> Its intention is to annihilate the Church. To annihilate it purely and simply. The form has changed: previously they mainly employed terror, now they destroy churches from within ... This is all the more terrible. Such today is the principal weapon of the atheist power: to do everything from within.[29]

If we are to judge *perestroika* from the angle of the politics of religion, this remark of Father Chibaev must give us considerable food for thought.

(Translated by Roger Scruton)

Notes

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2. *Pravda*, 7 December 1987.
3. *La Croix*, 15 January 1988.
4. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 15 October 1986.
5. *Pravda*, 2 February 1988.
6. *Pravda*, 28 January 1988.
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8. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 19 November 1986.
9. *Bulletin of the Armed Forces* No. 2, pp. 59-61, 1988.
10. *ibid.*
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12. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 9 September 1987.
13. *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, 30 July 1986.
14. *Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences*, No. 6, 1987.
15. *Service de presse ukrainien*, No. 3, March 1988.
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17. *Possey*, No. 12, 1987.
18. *Ruskaya Mysl*, 22 January 1988.
19. *La Croix*, 15 January 1987.
20. *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, 6 April 1988.
21. *Pravda*, 8 April 1987.
22. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 25 July 1986.
23. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 29 May 1985.
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Is Speculation Immoral?

Alexandra Hardie

Speculation can occur with either commodities, such as wheat, or assets, such as equities. For a commodity, speculation implies a transaction which is not motivated by a desire to sell some quantity of that commodity which the person already owns, either because he has produced it himself or because he trades in it as a normal part of his business; nor motivated by the desire to obtain some of that commodity for purposes of production, or for resale as a normal part of his business; but motivated solely by a desire to make profits out of taking advantage of price changes in the commodity. Merchants and middlemen may reasonably make profits out of trading in commodities, but this is how they make their living, and they are providing services in exchange; they buy grain when farmers harvest it, and store it until millers need it; they transport food from where it is grown to where it is wanted for consumption; they break down large quantities into the small quantities needed by consumers; they may carry out part of the processing of raw materials. Specialist knowledge is usually necessary. In contrast, the true speculator has no wish to possess or even to see the good, nor does he have detailed knowledge of it. Goods attract him not by virtue of intrinsic qualities, but because of their degree of price volatility. If futures markets are available, a speculator routinely buys goods he does not want, and sells goods he does not have. Selling 'short', i.e. selling a good not yet owned, is quite normal in such markets. Provided only that he can sell for more than he paid, the speculator has made a profit, and is quite satisfied. A speculator likes risky markets i.e. those with substantial price movements, because, if he guesses right, he can make large profits. Of course, he may guess wrong and make large losses instead, but this is what it means to take a risk. Speculation in assets is very similar. The speculator does not want to acquire property for his own use, or for letting; he merely wants to resell at a profit, preferably quite soon. In financial assets, such as equities, he does not look for dividends, but only for a quick capital gain. An investor who holds shares in the hope of long-term capital gain cannot be deemed a speculator, since much of the return on equities does come from capital gains, not from dividends. A speculator in equities will usually make frequent transactions, a long-term investor will 'buy and hold', and may well have an active interest in his companies.

There seem to be two main reasons why speculation is so often criticised; firstly, because the speculator is making a profit which seems to be unjust; secondly,

because he is often blamed for causing destabilising price movements. I shall answer the second criticism first. It it were true, speculators would not merely be taking advantage of risk which already exists, but actually increasing it. Speculation would tend to undermine the operation of a free market, because excessive price movements can cause a market to collapse. A defender of free markets would be in an untenable position; freedom must include freedom to speculate, yet speculation might destroy a free market. In fact, speculation does not normally destabilise markets. On the contrary, it tends to have a stabilising effect on prices. The reason is simple; speculators want to buy cheap and sell dear. However, they can only do this if they buy when other people are tending to sell (which causes prices to be low), and sell when other people are tending to buy (which causes prices to be high). Trading of this kind goes against the trend and therefore reduces price fluctuations. With speculators in a commodity or stock market, there is always someone ready to buy, however low the price, and ready to sell, however high the price. Without speculators, there might be times when no-one was prepared to buy, and other times when no-one was prepared to sell. Clearly, a situation like this would be very bad for people who really had to sell, or to buy, as the case might be. Without speculators, the price would tend to collapse, or to soar, depending on the underlying situation. The speculator performs the economic role of ensuring that there will be an effective market in the good at all times that the market is trading, which means that other people can always buy or sell. Prices will fluctuate, but not as much as if there were no speculators. The role of the speculator recalls Adam Smith's 'hidden hand'; the idea that individuals, in seeking their own ends, promote the general good. For futures markets, speculators are essential; hedging demand, in a typical commodities market, is heavily one-way. Producers or merchants hold stocks of a commodity, and wish to hedge against a price fall by selling futures contracts in the commodity. Relatively few people have forward selling contracts which they need to hedge by buying futures contracts. Speculators take up the buying contracts, in the hope of gain. In financial futures markets, both kinds of hedging will take place, but speculators perform a useful role, by increasing the volume of trade in the market, so that large transactions can take place without affecting prices unduly.

Speculators are essential if markets are to work properly. Anyone who favours the market system, and the benefits it confers on human beings, must at least tolerate speculation. But speculation might still be evil in itself, although a necessary evil in a market system. My approach is to consider various moral codes, and ascertain which of these is against speculation.

Historically, Britain has been a Christian country, so it is proper to evaluate speculation first according to Christian criteria. My own heritage is that of Protestantism, and therefore I would advise a Christian to consult the Bible, and not to trust to any authority. The Ten Commandments, in forbidding theft, and covetousness towards other peoples' property, recognise the right to private property. Other passages in the Bible acknowledge the right of the individual to make use of his own property, providing that he follows certain rules. He must avoid not only theft, but fraud of any kind in trade. For example, he must take care to use just weights and measures. The Bible accepts an economy based on the market system. The only logical alternative to the market system is the command economy, and the Bible does not advocate this. Such economies were known in the ancient world: Sumeria was run on this basis and these ideas must still have been familiar when Abraham left Ur of the Chaldees, a city which had been founded in the Sumerian period. Many rulers in the ancient world, as throughout the centuries since then, did substitute authority for the free working of the market; they fixed wages and prices, taxed their subjects heavily, engaged in large-scale public works, and enriched themselves by debasing the currency or despoiling foreign peoples. The Bible is critical of despotic rulers of this kind, such as the Assyrian kings. Jewish and Christian scholars have traditionally accepted that the Bible favours sound money, based on a precious metal standard. Nor are heavy taxes appropriate in terms of the Bible; it is clear that theft is wrong, whether committed by ordinary people or by rulers, as the story of Naboth's vineyard reminds us. People were enjoined to give to the poor, to let the poor glean from the fields and vine-yards, and to give a tithe i.e. a tenth of their produce, which was used for various purposes, including poor relief. Christ taught that the individual should give freely to the poor; he did not teach that rulers should impose confiscatory taxation for welfare purposes. The Bible does forbid interest on loans (although Calvin and others argued that this did not apply to loans made for productive purposes), but there is nothing in the Bible to forbid profit sharing, or by extension, investment in equities. The Koran also forbids interest, but Muslim scholars have always approved of profit sharing, provided that there is no suspicion of a fixed return. It was considered meritorious for a man to invest his spare funds in some one else's business (so offering opportunities for production and employment) rather than leave them idle. It seems to me that a sincere Christian should likewise disapprove of fixed interest loans, and favour profit sharing or equity investment instead. The advantage of these forms of finance is that, if the investment turns out badly, there is no fixed charge which the other party is expected to pay at a time when he cannot afford to do so. The Bible says nothing about speculation, and it seems to me that a sincere Christian cannot condemn speculation while tolerating interest. However, the Prophets did condemn the tendency of wealthy people to buy up large tracts of land, leaving poor people with nowhere to live. It is a striking fact that the Church of England frequently criticises 'big business' or 'finance' i.e. it condemns people who

produce useful goods and services, or those who provide the necessary equity finance, yet it never criticises the principle of taking interest on bank loans, or landowners for keeping far more land than they can use efficiently. Indeed, the rules set out in the Bible, relating to the Jubilee, would require the redistribution of land at regular (fifty year) intervals, and this practice would probably alleviate poverty and promote economic efficiency. Yet the Church of England has never proposed it. My interpretation is that there is nothing in the Bible to forbid speculation, but that greed is discouraged. However, greed amongst speculators is no more immoral than greed amongst rulers, landowners, or indeed, welfare recipients. The truth is that the ill-thought out set of ideas which purports to reflect Christian belief about ecomonic matters, as evidenced by the present views of the Church of England, and the other churches also, has no authority from the Bible.

These views seem to represent a watered-down version of Marxism; they display the same contempt for private property, and the same failure to understand the working of the market economy, that Marxism exhibits, combined with the same determination to expropriate the fruits of the market economy for their own purposes. They talk about compassion, but they rely on coercion, not compassion. They favour the welfare state, which is based on coercion, as the state always is; but they do not rely on voluntary giving, which is the only true form of compassion. They condemn a person who seeks his own interests by using his own money in speculation, at his own risk; yet they approve of a person who seeks his own interests by demanding that the government take other people's money away from them for his benefit.

In the 18th century, a viable alternative to conventional views was developed, in the form of Utilitarianism. This moral code took as its criterion of human behaviour, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. It is not possible to do justice here to this doctrine, but if behaviour is to be judged by its contribution to human welfare, then speculation easily passes this test, as it is necessary to markets, and markets best promote human welfare.

Modern Libertarianism also reflects a moral code developed in the 18th century, although based on earlier ideas. It is conceptually distinct from Utilitarianism, but Libertarians would accept many of the ideas of the Utilitarians, such as those set forth in John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*. Libertarians hold that every individual has the right to do as he or she wishes with his or her own life, liberty, and (justly acquired) property, provided only that he or she does not interfere with the corresponding rights of other people. By 'interfere' is meant the use of fraud or force. From this view-point, free trade in all goods is acceptable and, indeed, the normal way to make a living. Speculators are welcome to make use of markets. Anyone who dislikes speculative markets is free to eschew them as there are many markets which offer no scope to speculators. Speculators have no power to force people to deal with them. The inherent dishonesty of the anti-speculation position is that very large speculative gains are usually due to government interference in the economy, and would seldom occur in truly free markets. This is true of gains from currency speculation, and from property development. Libertarians are happy for speculators to take on the risk which is an inevitable aspect of free markets. It means that there is less risk for other, more risk-averse, people to face. The net gains made by speculators, which in a free market would not be large, can be seen as appropriate recompense for taking on risk. Large speculative gains could not persist in any market for long, because they would attract speculators from other markets. Unsuccessful speculators will lose money and either learn from experience or move to some more appropriate occupation. They have only lost their own money. In contrast, governments waste tax-payers' money on a vast scale and never seem to learn from experience; their usual response is to coerce tax-payers into paying yet more. Although speculators are sometimes accused of fraud, there is no evidence that they commit more fraud than other groups of people. Fraud is a trivial proportion of the trade which takes place on a thriving market. Speculators are sometimes accused of fixing prices, for example by cornering the supply of some good. With a large market, it would be difficult to buy up the whole supply of any good, and as a matter of observation, all traders do prefer large markets. Moreover, the body which controls a market is keen to maintain the reputation of its market, and therefore takes action against any trader acting improperly. It is worth noting here that not the slightest hint of dishonesty has so far been associated with any of the deals made on the London International Financial Exchange, Britain's most important new market. In contrast, in addition to routine coercion, such as excessive taxation, legislation which restricts rights over property and freedom of speech, dawn raids by Customs and Excise officials, military conscription at times, governments cheat people on a large scale. In 1980 alone people who had invested in the securities of the British government lost £10 billion worth of purchasing power from these assets, as a result of inflation, despite very high nominal interest rates. Governments decide what currency will be legal tender, maintain a monopoly on the note issue, and control the banking system, so they must take responsibility for inflation, which results from an excess supply of money. Governments tend to encourage, or condone, inflation, because it reduces the real value of debt, and all (Western) governments are heavily in debt. In contrast, although equities do fall in value at times, this is never due to deliberate attempts by companies to reduce share prices, and equities have maintained their real value over the long term. Anyone who had invested in a dozen, or so, randomly selected equities in 1950, and kept them to the present time, would have achieved far better returns than if he had invested in British government bonds. Yet the British government compares favourably with most govern-

ments. The moral is that anyone who disapproves of fraud and force must prefer markets, and speculators, to governments.

From a Libertarian view-point, there is no doubt that speculation is both necessary and morally acceptable. I accept this position myself. I would go further than this, and argue that speculation encourages personal qualities which have traditionally been regarded as virtues. A speculator needs boldness and courage: he is taking, especially in commodity markets, very large risks indeed. Speculation also requires skill and intellectual effort, as shown by the elaborate trading systems now in use, relying on computers or advanced statistical techniques. Speculation requires determination, perseverance, and equanimity in adversity. Historically, the desire of gamblers and speculators to know more about probability encouraged mathematicians to develop probability theory, and thus statistics; and in recent decades, attempts to explain stock exchange investment have led to the development of modern finance theory, a branch of economics that I would judge far superior, in logical consistency and utility, to most of macroeconomics. Moreover, anyone concerned about sexism and racism ought to approve of the speculator, a person who will trade with anyone, male or female, irrespective of race, creed, colour, age, qualifications or disability. Finally, it is quite untrue to suggest that speculators need to be wealthy. There are many small-scale speculators who make profits and get enjoyment out of speculation as a hobby.

Cambodia at a Crossroads

Michael Johns

It has been nine years since Hanoi, fresh from its long-fought victory over South Vietnam, expanded its influence west to Cambodia, sending 200,000 troops across the Cambodian border to assume control from the Khmer Rouge government. Today, the brutal Khmer Rouge regime and its deposed leader, Pol Pot, are bitter memories for the Cambodians, but the Vietnamese troops remain their bitter reality; still occupying the embattled Cambodian nation, they continue to deny the Khmer people the right of self-determination.

Not surprisingly, Cambodia now exhibits the characteristics of many other communist dictatorships: the country faces severe economic collapse (the average worker's monthly wage is $2); terror is frequently employed against the population; religion is on the verge of extermination; freedom of speech, press, and assembly are denied; people are suffering from starvation and undernourishment; and human rights are systematically violated. To date, 275,000 Cambodians have fled Vietnamese repression for refugee camps in bordering Thailand, and tens of thousands more have picked up weapons hoping to liberate their homeland from the occupying forces. A Cambodian refugee camp, Site 2, where 130,000 refugees now live, is the second-largest home for Cambodians after Phnom Penh. And not unlike the Soviet occupation of Afganistan, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is evoking both global outrage and significant domestic rebellion.

There are approximately 61,000 Cambodians presently under arms and actively engaged in combat against the occupying Vietnamese military, making this combined resistance movement the second largest in the world, after the Afghan mujahideen. The war has received scant attention in the West; only a handful of Western journalists have ever visited these resistance fighters. Against 140,000 Vietnamese troops, liberally supported by the Soviet Union, their chances have generally been considered slim.

In September 1987, this author was among the first American journalists permitted to visit with both the leadership and armies of the two non-communist Cambodian resistance movements, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), headed by Son Sann, and the Sihanoukist National Army (ANS), headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, in their clandestine camps in both Thailand and Cambodia. Though these fighters face an uphill battle in their effort to restore self-determination to their homeland, they are pressuring Vietnam in a gritty conflict that has Hanoi visibly concerned. The same Vietnamese military that only a couple of decades ago prided itself in its ability to outwit a powerful American army through jungle-based guerrilla tactics now finds itself frequently outsmarted at what was once its own game.

Both the ANS and KPNLF resistance fighters consider America's defeat in Vietnam the core of the problem they now face in their homeland. Critics of the Vietnam War might have scoffed when President Richard Nixon expressed his 'domino theory', but the dominoes - Laos and Cambodia - did indeed fall. 'If the United States stayed in Indochina,' says Jum Sombat, an aide to the KPNLF chief of staff based near Poipet, Cambodia, 'I think life would be very good - not like this, not like now. Right now in Indo-china, life is very bad.'

Sombat believes that the establishment of democracy

in Cambodia will eventually come because 'everybody, all the Khmer people, hate communism... since 1975, we lost everything, even the mind, even our spirit, so we have to restore everything.' He claims to speak for all of the KPNLF when he praises the American system of government as a model for what they hope eventually to bring to Cambodia. 'I like the American system,' says Sombat, 'because we have tested communism and suffered in human life.' He says he listened with interest and appreciation to coverage of the 200th anniversary of the American Constitution by the Voice of America.

Slightly to the north, from extremely clandestine and well-guarded bases, the ANS resistance forces operate both their military and radio broadcasting efforts. Lu Lai Sleng, head of the ANS broadcasting programme, believes that 'a big majority of the Cambodian people support [ANS leader] Prince Sihanouk, even the PRK [puppet Cambodian government] forces are with us... it is easy to talk to our people.' 'It is not hard to explain,' says Sleng. 'You see, the Vietnamese and the Khmer do not mix; they cannot mix.' Immediately after the Vietnamese invasion, he claims, 'We had trouble explaining this because of the Pol Pot atrocities... the genocide became the main propaganda weapon of the Vietnamese because they came to Cambodia not as invaders, but as liberators.' Later, according to Sleng, Vietnamese motives became much clearer and the Cambodian people became sympathetic to resistance efforts. Today, all three resistance factions have established significant intelligence contacts with Cambodia, which frequently advise them of Vietnamese troop movements and other vital information.

Both the Vietnamese and the resistance are plagued with considerable natural barriers in pursuit of military success. The Cambodian jungles are malaria-ridden and little medicine is available. During the wet season (June through October), it is virtually impossible to move throughout the country, and both armies have difficulty acquiring adequate food and water. The resistance seems to think these difficulties work more in their favour; the Vietnamese army is easily discouraged in these circumstances and frequently has difficulty manoeuvering properly.

But if the natural barriers of Cambodia favour the resistance, the Vietnamese have gained ground in other ways. The Vietnamese army is the fourth largest in the world, supported by $2 billion a year in Soviet military assistance. The puppet Cambodian government, the Heng Samrin regime, receives another $200 million in military assistance from Moscow and benefits greatly from its trade relationship with Japan and Indonesia. Meanwhile, American aid to the resistance has been limited to $3.5 million in non-lethal assistance, hardly an indication that Washington is very serious about driving the Vietnamese out of Phnom Penh.

Furthermore, the Vietnamese have attempted to extinguish Cambodian culture and to depict the resistance merely as remnants of the hated Pol Pot regime. In an effort to dilute Cambodian nationalism, Hanoi has settled approximately one million Vietnamese inside Cambodia. Adding insult to injury, Soviet films and television, broadcast into Cambodia via satellite, frequently depict the Vietnamese invaders as heroes. While few Cambodians are taken in by this propaganda, the Vietnamese have been somewhat successful in reeducating the young. Like Afghans, young Cambodians are often taken to the Soviet Union for training and indoctrination, then sent back to Cambodia as 'converts'.

In the diplomatic world, ironically enough, the Cambodian resistance has fared considerably better. The umbrella coalition of the three resistance forces, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), headed by Prince Sihanouk, who ruled Cambodia from its independence in 1953 until the rise of Lon Nol in March 1970, is recognised by the United Nations as the official Cambodian government. This past October, a United Nations vote overwhelmingly condemned the Vietnamese occupation, called for their withdrawal, and expressed support for the resistance coalition. And while the United States has hesitated to provide significant assistance to those fighting the Vietnamese occupation, the resistance has been assisted by the PRC - which has a direct interest in countering Soviet influence in the region - and the noncommunist nations of Southeast Asia, known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The three separate resistance groups which comprise the Cambodian resistance coalition each staunchly oppose the Vietnamese occupation, but each is led by a different leader and has varying political views. The largest of these resistance movements is the communist-oriented Khmer Rouge, which, despite the absence of Pol Pot, is still dominated by many of the leaders that oversaw the 1975–79 Cambodian holocaust. Now led by Kheiu Samphan, the Khmer Rouge fields an impressive 45,000 fighters. Although it has cooperated recently with the other resistance movements in the field, the Khmer Rouge continues to be viewed with suspicion by the two non-communist resistance forces. The largest of those resistance movements is the KPNLF, led by a pro-Western democrat, Son Sann, who fields 10,000 fighters, and who counts at least half of the 275,000 Cambodians in Thai refugee camps among his followers.

The other non-communist resistance movement, the ANS, led by Prince Sihanouk, fields approximately 6,000 fighters. Though Sihanouk did collaborate with the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s, permitted North Vietnamese supply lines to operate in Cambodia during the Vietnam War, and continues to maintain a summer residence in Pyongyang, North Korea, most analysts believe Sihanouk was manipulated by the Khmer Rouge and wielded no real power during that era. Today, however, he appears to be committed to democratic principles. His fighters also appear wedded to the principles of democracy; moreover, Sihanouk himself continues to remain extremely popular inside Cambodia. His 17-year reign as Prince of Cambodia, before Lon Nol, the Khmer Rouge, and the Vietnamese,

is considered by most Cambodians as the nation's days of glory.

As the brutality of the Vietnamese occupation becomes increasingly evident, the Cambodian resistance is acquiring greater sympathy and gains more recruits among the Cambodian population. During the author's stay at an ANS camp, several defectors from the PRK army arrived who, wishing to join the resistance, were immediately placed under arms. These defectors spoke disparagingly about Vietnamese abuse of power inside Cambodia.

Several Vietnamese initiatives are generating particular outrage. One is the hated K-5 plan, Vietnam's effort to close the entire border with Thailand in order to keep refugees from fleeing the country. In doing so, the Vietnamese have used slave labour to build the obstructive barbed wire fences and booby traps with sharpened bamboo sticks, as well as the gun towers that guard the border. Up to 30,000 Cambodians have died of malaria, undernourishment, or mine accidents while working on the project.

Resentment of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is now at an all-time high. Resistance radio remains extremely popular inside Cambodia, even though the Vietnamese imprison those caught listening to it. Part of the result of the growing domestic and international outrage over the Vietnamese occupation is that Vietnam has now promised to withdraw its troops from Cambodia by 1990; as that date approaches, however, questions are growing about Hanoi's sincerity.

Recent talks between ANS leader Sihanouk and PRK Prime Minister Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge deputy regional commander, in Fère-en-Tardenois, France, brought no significant understandings except an agreement to meet shortly once again in France. Sihanouk was unable to bring Hun Sen to include a call for Vietnamese troop withdrawal in the meeting's final communiqué or to declare the historic temples of Angkor Wat an area of access to international scholars. The Vietnamese and its ersatz Cambodian government have long wished to se Sihanouk put down his arms because of his immense popularity within Cambodia. This past September, Hun Sen even went so far as to offer Sihanouk a high position of state if he would return to Cambodia.

The Sihanouk talks, however, were not universally endorsed by the other resistance factions. The Khmer Rouge, who staunchly oppose the negotiations, refused to answer Sihanouk's request for their participation in the France meeting. Ieng Mouly, an assistant to the KPNLF's Son Sann, remarked that the agreement reached between Hun Sen and Sihanouk contained nothing that would urge the Vietnamese to withdraw and refused to support it. Shortly before Christmas, however, Son Sann announced he would join in negotiations if Hanoi will announce withdrawal of its occupation troops once the negotiations begin. Unless Vietnamese troops depart, Son Sann remarked, the resistance will be 'accepting an occupation'. The PRC, one of Sihanouk's largest supporters, was also known to be sceptical about the negotiations.

Other analysts believe the talks might be counter-productive if they bestow legitimacy on the illegitimate Heng Samrin government that Hun Sen represents. Yet when talks last broke off, Sihanouk accused Prime Minister Hun Sen of being a lackey for the Vietnamese. Virtually everyone continues to question the motives of the Vietnamese in their behind-the-scenes role. They have long wished to see Cambodia as part of their empire. Vietnamese Defence Minister Le Duc Anh has written that close cooperation among Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos is vital to Vietnam's survival, suggesting that Vietnam, much like the Soviets in Afghanistan, is unlikely to end its occupation without a loyal, unthreatened communist regime in power.

Today, Cambodia is clearly at a crossroads. The Vietnamese have promised to withdraw in two years, but pressure must continue to be applied if this is to occur. In addition to increasing aid to the non-communist resistance forces, the West might push for Vietnam's removal from the United Nations and for granting diplomatic recognition to the resistance coalition. Currently, it is the Soviet Union and the PRC that are flexing the most muscle in the region. The Reagan administration did not bring the Cambodian issue up in talks during Mikhail Gorbachev's recent Washington visit and US aid to the resistance cause continues to be slim. 'If we could fight the Vietnamese with (American) M-16's, as opposed to (Chinese) AK-47s,' one resistance fighter told me during my visit, 'the people would rise up because they would know the Vietnamese are wrong, that this is not a fight to restore the past.' Meanwhile, it is Moscow and Hanoi, not the Khmer people, that own the future of Cambodia.

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Editorial

The conservative mentality has thrived in Britain as it has thrived nowhere else in the modern world. When Burke first unfurled the flag, in his *Essay on the Revolution in France*, it was to plant it in the midst of history, and to show the colours of a worldview which had been for centuries implicit in the Common Law of England, and which was to endure through all the turmoils of modernity, calling us back to the 'contract between the dead, the living and the unborn' which is the last guardian of social order. The banner was passed on, to Coleridge, Arnold and Ruskin; to Bradley, Eliot and Cecil; to Chesterton, Leavis and Oakeshott. In each successive period - whether of calm or of crisis - the conservative vision has been upheld, and always in language suited to the times.

It is no easy matter to discover this language or, armed with it, to step forward into the public arena. Nevertheless, in each generation, our country acquires some writer who forges anew the concepts of conservatism, and who is not afraid to give voice to them, even when the cost of doing so is high. Such a one was T. E. Utley, Founding Father of this *Review*, and the most articulate conservative of his generation.

Much has been written about Peter Utley's blindness, and the remarkable warmth of spirit which enabled him to turn this - perhaps the greatest of physical disabilities - into a source of mental strength. But it has been insufficiently remarked upon that his physical blindness was intimately connected with the intellectual vision which compensated for it. Peter Utley knew the world not as a shifting screen of colour, not as movement and display, but as a landscape of hard and tangible things - things which could be leant upon, and things which might also give way; things which threatened injury, and things which fitted to the hand and supported it. His world was one of primary rather than secondary qualities: a realm of mass, force and tactile presence rather than of fleeting appearance. No mere fashion had the faintest power to move him; no attitude or posture could ever charm him from his settled, sceptical ways. Only real and permanent things commanded his respect, and it was through justifying them to people touched by flippancy that he developed his remarkable style.

Peter Utley's paragraphs were stately, measured and serene; their conclusions, however overlayed with subtleties, emerged always with clarity, and with a force which was all the greater for the rhythmical syntax which conveyed them. His powers of argument were matched by an equal power of observation, and his use of words to convey the concrete reality of a world which was, for him, an object more of thought than sensation, would have been the envy of every poet. It is to Mrs Thatcher's credit that, during her first years as Prime Minister, she chose Peter Utley to be one of her speech writers; and while his influence over contemporary Tory rhetoric has been less than that of the marketeers, it has been both real and lasting. Without his steadying hand the Tory Party would have rushed far more impetuously towards its new uncertain doctrine, and the conservative elements in its programme would have been seriously curtailed.

Like Burke, Peter Utley was an advocate of free trade and a free economy, recognising that the collective wisdom of the market could never be matched by the collectivised ignorance of a central plan. But like Burke he recognised that economics is not the whole of politics and that, without a framework of institutions, the market is as much the solvent of order as the means to its survival. He shared Enoch Powell's fear that national sovereignty had been needlessly put at risk by the flippancies of postwar politics; and he knew that sovereignty is an empty notion, unless supported by local custom, and until linked to a public morality that stretches across generations. As a devout Anglican, he deprecated the divorce between the liberal oligarchy of the Church and the conservative laity whose aspirations it now seems so eager to betray. He knew too that our country is far more seriously threatened by its disaffected elites - who, excluded from political power, occupy themselves with the destruction of society - than by any economic failure. In consequence he would direct all the lively rhetoric at his command against libertarian fashions, reminding his readers that the individual is nothing without community, and that freedom is a chimera, until subject to the discipline of moral judgement.

Peter Utley had a lifelong attachment to Ulster, where he would spend his holidays surrounded by a large and lively family and where he once stood for election, hoping to persuade the followers of Ian Paisley that their loyalty to the Crown would be better served by an English Tory than by a tub-thumping preacher whose rhetoric, sounding in the distant halls of Westminster, struck an increasingly hollow note. It was through his analysis of Ulster - delivered many times, but nowhere more powerfully than in a little masterpiece of political wisdom, *Lessons of Ulster* - that Peter Utley gave most lucid expression to his ideal of British sovereignty. The lessons that he drew from

Northern Ireland were many: but one in particular should be recalled, since it came from the heart of his philosophy, and shows both the value of his conservative vision, and the reason why the elites of Britain will never easily partake of it. The true motives of the IRA, he suggested, are not to be found in any deprivation suffered by the Catholic minority, nor in any real or imagined hostility between the two confessions. They consist rather in a potent combination of sentimentality and myth - sentimentality nourished on myth, and myth bred in the emotional slums of sentiment. Without a common national idea, and the public morality which springs from it, men cease, he suggested, to grasp the social realities which surround them. Instead they take refuge in sentimentality, which exalts the self above the other, and rewards the individual with an instant hero's accolade. Sentimentality is the enemy of politics, replacing the patient work of understanding and compromise with a self-intoxicated desire that the world should have the simplicity of our own dramatic feelings. It is from this corrupt state of mind that terrorism springs, not only in Ulster, but in all the places where revolution has made its mark.

The world is threatened by the sentimentalist's search for an easy glory. Those brave and patient people who ceaselessly remind us of what is real, are the guardians of peace and continuity. In losing Peter, we have lost a person who was not only a wise and inspiring teacher, but also one of the true heroes of our time.

Letters

Sir,
Two Hungarian friends have provided some comments on the article 'Hungarians and Romanians' by G. M. Tamás (*Salisbury Review*, December 1987).

While welcoming nearly everything Tamás wrote, particularly his account of the Romanian rage at the publication of the *History of Transylvania* they make the following points:

1. The Romanian majority never existed on Hungarian territory in Transylvania but on the plains south of the Carpathians to the Danube. And Romanians on Hungarian territory were never 'excluded from towns, wealth and glamour' but were a primitive, backward community living under the same under-developed conditions all over the country, both in Transylvania and in the original Romanian territory which is south of the Carpathians. This backwardness is not due to the Hungarians.
2. The authors of the *History of Transylvania* have taken especial care to support the claims that they have made with facts and reference to reliable documents, particularly in view of the political delicacy of the matters with which they are dealing. The *History* was written in order to save that part of Hungarian history from final distortion by the Romanians.
3. When Don Nicolae Ceausescu departs, the Ceausescu family will remain, and this will ensure that Romania does not change. 'It is not enough "to get rid of Ceausescu", they have to get rid of the whole gang. And there is certainly no way to do that "peacefully and honourably"'.

Paul Helm
10 St. George's Road
Formby
Merseyside L37 3HH

Sir,
Reflecting on Dr Gareth Bennett's suicide, you call for the church to return to its primary task of saving souls, instead of responding to the passing fashions of a secular world. And you are surely right: leading souls to salvation is the main concern of the church.

A significant factor in the church's decline, however, is that its message of salvation is addressed to a generation which feels no particular urge to be 'saved'. Society is not necessarily full of closet Christians who would eagerly embrace the church were it not for all those wishy-washy liberals. Many are staying away simply because the truths of religion - and its very language of sin and redemption - no longer seem relevant to their lives.

You are right in saying the duty of the church is not to be fashionable. But it does not follow that reinstating the Book of Common Prayer, returning the Bishop of Durham to academic obscurity or pruning the Christian message of its socialist gospel would return the faithful to their pews.

Shirley Lancaster
21 Chalsey Road
Brockley
London SE4 1YN

Sir,
Your editorial in *The Salisbury Review* of March 1988 refers to the vindictive reaction of the Anglican hierarchy to Dr Bennett's preface. The reaction from York could perhaps be described in this way, but there was nothing from Canterbury, and since Dr Bennett's tragic death it seems to me that vindictiveness comes from the other side. Pompous advice to Dr Runcie in editorials in the *Times*, scathing cartoons in *The Telegraph*, fables about his personal devil in the journal of the Prayer Book Society and now your talk about the 'antics' of the Anglican establishment.

Is it not clear that Canterbury has to rule over a church containing Evangelicals, Anglo-Catholics and Liberals, those who believe in the Virgin Birth and those who do not, and must try to keep them together? Should we not, as urged in Peter Walker's book *Rediscovering the Middle Way*, try to see what we have in common? Of course, for all of us, there is something we would like changed; I for one, though a liberal, agree with you in deploring the banalities of Rite A and much else in the New Prayer Book. But I was sorry to see in a periodical that I respect, liberalism in the church attacked almost as if it were socialism in Romania.

Sir Nevill Mott
63 Mount Pleasant
Aspley Guise
Milton Keynes
MK17 8JX

Sir,
It is no secret that Murray N. Rothbard is a provocative fellow who loves controversy. However, in his recent piece 'The Hermeneutical Invasion of Philosophy and Economics' (*Salisbury Review*, September 1987), Rothbard provokes by abuse and paralysing ignorance of his subject matter.

Rothbard claims that theological hermeneutics gave way to philosophical hermeneutics in the 1920s and 30s in the work of the phenomenologist, Heidegger (e.g. *Sein und Zeit*, 1927). But what has happened to Dilthey? Most authoritative accounts accept Dilthey as the founder of hermeneutics with earlier luminaries such as Schleiermacher lurking in the background. But maybe this is an uncomfortable fact because Mises, Rothbard's 'mentor', on several occasions invokes Dilthey's ideas (along with the ideas of those other 'terrible old convoluted Germans', Windelband and Rickert, who thought along similar lines). Notwithstanding this, the major influence upon Heidegger, apart from Aristotle, was the 'strict' phenomenologist, Husserl, and he too is recognised and used by Mises in *Human Action* (1949), in a reference to Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal-Time Consciousness*. Oh, the pain the legacy of radical subjectivism can bring! It may further be noted that Mises' intellectual debts extend not only to Husserl, but to Husserl's pupil, Alfred Schutz (a member of the Mises-Kreis and a close friend of Mises), and to Bergson (another of Rothbard's bogey-men). The fact is, Mises' own work is greatly indebted to precisely those schools of thought Rothbard condemns.

Briefly returning to the issue of Heidegger: Rothbard uses some disparaging remarks about Heidegger's terminology made by Eric Voegelin, to attack Heidegger. But has Rothbard ever got to grips with Voegelin's own terminology as used in the set of papers published as *Anamnesis*? Not what an Englishman might call a model of clarity.

Of course, in all this, Rothbard must first realise that historically, contemporary hermeneutics has been to a great extent an aspect of phenomenology, and not a type of deconstruction. But most extraordinarily, Rothbard seems to have linked deconstruction to Heidegger's pupil, Gadamer. In no sense is Gadamer a deconstructionist; any more than is Heidegger, or Ricoeur, or Husserl.... Hermeneutics and phenomenology are concerned with an interpretation of the subject; either in relation to perception and reflection upon the constitution of consciousness (Husserl), or in relation to the historicity of existence at the ontological and the ontical level, (Heidegger). Both these views imply the givenness of a subject, and this givenness deconstruction seeks to eliminate by arguing that the endless metaphorical modes of referring, break up that subject within the domain of language. Deconstruction is a radical attack on Heidegger and come to that, on Mises - it is an attack on the position of the subject in the world, and in language (and action). Hermeneutics as a phenomenology, positions the subject, not in a transcendental realm, but in an historical realm of self- and intersubjective interpretation. But hermeneutics precisely resists the destructiveness of deconstruction. They are opposites. Goodness only knows where Rothbard receives his philosophical hearsay from.

Graham B. McBeath
Graduate Student
Department of Politics
University of Keele
Keele, Staffs ST5 5BG

Sir,
Dr Reid accuses me of 'misunderstanding or confusing (his) definition of illegal absence from school'. The point I was making was that it is grossly misleading to refer to truancy as school absenteeism because the latter includes those pupils who are absent from school for genuine reasons, e.g. illness. It is important that researchers use the correct terms and the word for illegal absence from school is *truancy*. For example, persistent school absenteeism, a term popular with writers on the subject, would not be truancy in the case of a pupil suffering from a protracted illness. Such a case might be rare but it does illustrate the importance of using the correct term. Reid makes the same error in his subsequent book *Combating School Absenteeism* and here the very title of the book is misleading.

Truancy is an activity engaged in by disaffected pupils who are wholly disenchanted by an inappropriate curriculum. I am pleased to hear that Reid has 'strongly criticised the existing curriculum'. However a curriculum comprising mainly the basic subjects seasoned with some technical and vocational input, although eminently preferable to what so many 14 and 15 year olds have to sit through at present, is not the complete answer. No doubt Reid has found in his research that large numbers of senior boys and girls are daily rejecting the curriculum on offer by not attending school at all or, more significantly, by selecting lessons from the curricular menu which they consider to be palatable after they have registered.

In *Combating School Absenteeism* poor attenders, ineffective schools and uninterested parents are seen as social ills which can be administered to by remedies provided by school pastoral staff, Education Social Workers and Social Services. 'On-site' sanctuaries and day care projects although well-meaning are mere palliatives. Furthermore, it is a huge misuse of scarce resources to put so much effort into reintegrating a minority of young people. How much better to go straight to the root of the problem and organise the senior school curriculum in such a way that pupils will want to be at school. No 17 year old has to be coerced into attending driving lessons!

My review attacked Reid for his gratuitous abuse of Mrs Thatcher. In his latest book, *Combating School Absenteeism*, Reid is at it again, attacking Conservative politicians. This time Norman Tebbit is rebuked for explaining truancy in London as a recoil from the teaching of 'anti-sexist, anti-racist, gay, lesbian, CND rubbish' (page 161). Tebbit's views sound very sensible to me. I would not sit listening to such nonsense so why should London school children be expected to? Should not education researchers think again about this strange convention which makes it all right to attack elected politicians in writings on education, but unacceptable to talk about the low or corrupted standards of teachers and other experts?

Patricia Stoll
Policy-Search
14 Tufton Street
London SW1P 3QZ

Sir,
Dr Barrett points out that bedrock realities in Northern Ireland are 'history and demography'. The Ulster Protestants are planted there and 'failed to assimilate with the current natives'. Therefore, a politically united island is impracticable and immoral.

Ditto, the Afrikaaner Protestants in Southern Africa? The geographical circumstances are not exactly similar, but are not the crucial cultural and national issues ethically comparable? Why then force the Boers into a 'politically

united' subcontinent? Why not look again at the proposals of the Conservative Party in the Republic of South Africa?

Arnold Harris
Wilderness Lodge
Nr. Buxton
Norfolk

Sir,
Edgar Jones invites us to regard Freemasonry as a 'harmless eccentricity' and a 'friend within the fold' of Christianity while at the same time deploring those forces outside the fold which have 'relegated Christianity to just one among equally valid religions'.

This ignores the fact that it is the regular practice of lodges throughout the world to treat all religions on an equal footing. It is not true that 'all initiates to Freemasonry are earnestly adjured to consult' the Bible: the Volume of Sacred Law, yes, but that may be anything the initiate chooses, the Koran, the Gita or any other sacred text.

Freemasonry's attitude towards the truths of Christianity is frankly agnostic: it uses prayers from the Anglican liturgy and deliberately omits the coda, 'Through Jesus Christ Our Lord'. Again, its use of Pope's Universal Prayer is dismissive of the uniquely Trinitarian nature of the Christian God: it's sufficient to cite the first stanza:

Father of All! in ev'ry Age,
In ev'ry Clime ador'd,
By Saint, by Savage, and by Sage,
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord!

William Hutchinson published his *The Spirit of Masonry* in 1775 with the official sanction of the Grand Lodge. He wrote:

> Masonry directs us to divest ourselves of confined and bigoted notions and teaches us that humanity is the soul of religion. As Masons we only pursue the universal religion. All Masons, whether Christians, Jews, Mahommedans, who fear the Almighty and work for righteousness, we are to acknowledge as brethren; and though we take different roads ... we mean to travel to the same place.

There we have that egalitarianism in religion which inspires today's experiments in 'multi-faith' education, so rightly deplored by Mr Jones.

Bernard Smith
Flint House
30 Clifton Road
Worthing
Sussex

Sir,
In his article 'Freemasonry and the Far Left' (March 1988), Edgar Jones welcomes the Archbishop of York's denomination of Freemasonry as 'a fairly harmless eccentricity'. He goes on to denounce the Church of England's General Synod for its opposition to Freemasonry, which he sees as a diversion from the more important business of stopping its 'implacable foes hacking away at its foundatons'.

What Mr Jones fails to see is that both the Archbishop of York's views on the acceptability of Freemasonry (long held in the Church of England establishment) and the Church's elevation of social over spiritual concerns, are traceable to a common root. Not based on any secure foundation, the Anglican Church has never really known what it believed and has always put social acceptability before doctrinal orthodoxy. This can take many forms, whether it be a policy of not upsetting the middle classes by patronising Freemasonry, or as nowadays one of currying favour with the underclass by placing material above spiritual matters.

The incompatibility of Freemasonry and Christianity should be unequivocally stated. All Christian institutions, other than the Church of England whose hierarchy has for two hundred years been a stronghold of Masonry, which have seriously investigated the religious teachings and implications of the practice, have roundly condemned it. In the ninth Papal condemnation of Freemasonry, *Humanum Genus* (1884) Pope Leo XIII classed it as a grouping of secret societies in the 'kingdom of Satan'; any Mason should realise that the name of the Masons' God is given as Jarbulon, the middle element of which refers to Baal. He also condemned it for its rejection of Christian revelation, for although Masons acknowledge a 'Great Architect of the Universe' they ignore Christ. In 1917 Canon Law declared practice of Freemasonry to be an excommunicable offence. (The post-Vatican II latitude is yet another result of that baneful gathering.)

Masons believe that their practices are just a bit of fun, and defend Freemasonry as a 'pillar of the society in which we live'. The naive view that anything apparently so respectable cannot possibly be either evil (inability to recognise the reality of evil is far more widespread than one might think) or damaging to our society (links between the KGB and Freemasonry are well-established) deserves to be clearly exposed.

Angela Ellis-Jones
26 Carmichael Court
Grove Road
London SW13

Sir,
The letter in which I blamed feminism for the permissive society is criticised by two of your correspondents on the grounds that men are as much to blame for it as women. I agree. The sexual behaviour of many men today would disgrace a farmyard.

However, it is the women in any society who in the last resort determine its sexual mores. Men have always been, and always will be, potentially promiscuous lovers. (Which of us in his youth has not aspired to be a Don Juan?) They will go on making the same demand of the opposite sex, but woman has it in her power to accede to or reject it. In other words, the decision whether or not to go to bed with him is in her hands, not the man's.

In the past most unmarried women rejected it, if only from fear of pregnancy. But then came the pill, and with it the feminists' demands for equal rights with men, including that of being just as 'free' to indulge in sexual adventures. It thus became fashionable for a girl to say 'yes' instead of 'no', and naturally the men took advantage of the change. Those of an older generation could scarcely believe in their good luck.

Having thrown away the weapon of chastity (and thereby incidentally losing much of their attraction) women are now discovering they are the losers in the sex game. Their subsequent lamentations can be studied in any woman's magazine or newspaper column, and I believe this message is gradually seeping through our society, which is good news.


Unhappily, for many women - deserted wives, abandoned mistresses, unmarried mothers, childless (as a result of abortion or disease) females - the discovery has come too late. They are victims of the pernicious indoctrination of a whole generation by progressive pundits of both sexes, among whom some, though not all, feminists must be included.

George Martelli
Wooth Manor
Bridport
Dorset

Malcolm Bradbury, Michael Foot, Henry Kissinger, Cecil Parkinson, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Helmut Schmidt, Rupert Murdoch, Duke of Devonshire, Yehudi Menuhin, John Cleese, Seamus Heaney, Milton Friedman, Mary Kenny, Alexander Chancellor, George Will, Bernard Levin, Michael Heseltine, Max Kampelman, Tom Stoppard, Milovan Djilas, Claus Von Bulow, Paul Nitze, Daniel Moynihan, William F. Buckley, Susan Sontag, Ian McShane, Jeffrey Archer, Anthony Thwaite, Kingsley Amis, Gavin Lyall, Lord Carrington, Arnold Beichman, David Frost, Leo Rosten, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Leon Levy, Leszek Kolakowski, Melvyn Bragg, Noel Annan, William Boyd, Robert Elegant, Max Beloff, Harold Lever, Anthony Burgess, David Owen, John O'Sullivan, Brian Redhead, Nikolai Tolstoy, Irving Kristol, Bruno Bettelheim, Conrad Black, Ron Burr, Edward Teller, Eric Rhode, David Pryce-Jones, James Goldsmith, Graham Greene, Octavio Paz, Michael Caine, William Simon, Donald Regan, Gerald Ronson, Andrew Knight, Studs Terkel, Walter Rostow, Peter Parker, David Hockney, Paul Volcker, Lord Bauer, Frank Shakespeare, Roy Jenkins, Harvey Tyson, Auberon Waugh

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


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REMEMBERING CEAUSESCU

Dieter Kotschik

Red Horizons, Ion Pacepa, Heinemann, London, 1988, £12.95 (434-574-880).

As someone who left Romania less than a month after General Ion Mihai Pacepa defected, I read his memoirs with avid interest. Here is the then chief of Romania's foreign intelligence service and close aide to President Ceausescu writing about his former boss and his family. What he has to say comes down to a portrait of this communist dynasty and a suggestive glimpse of some of Romania's influence, operations and industrial espionage during the mid 1970s.

The title *Red Horizons* derives from the name for Ceausescu's 'Horizon', a programme of deception and disinformation aimed at creating a positive image for Romania and himself in the West, in order to obtain Western support, credits and, most importantly, Western technology to stabilise the country's economy and enhance its leader's power. The success of this programme was demonstrated over and over again by the praise Western politicians and news media showered on Ceausescu and his 'independent' policies until recently, in spite of his Stalinist rule.

Now the tide has changed. At least since the Brasov riots of November 1987, the Western press is taking a closer look at Romania's domestic situation. Unfortunately the main issue is the ongoing economic crisis and not the repressive regime itself. On the other hand there is the fact that already before the current wave of unrest in Brasov and other places, the United States Congress suspended Romania's Most Favoured Nation status for half a year because of its denial of human rights to its population. Then, in February 1988, when the eyes of the Western press were focused on Armenia, Ceausescu very deliberately requested the US Congress not to renew Romania's MFN status. He thereby almost severed the links between his gloomy empire and the free world. Shortly before this, following standard absolutist practices, he had emptied some prisons by having an amnesty for ordinary criminals on the occasion of the monarch's birthday. He is thus pursuing the classic Stalinist pattern that leads to a crackdown and a purge amongst possible rivals to the throne for his son Nicu. Part of this pattern is a minimal improvement in food supplies to soothe a potentially rebellious population.

The loss of MFN status will destroy Romania's trade relations with the US. Paradoxically this may lead to an improvement of supplies within the country if foodstuffs can no longer be exported.

Thus Pacepa's book comes out at the right time. Ten years ago most reviewers would have called it fictional and accused the author of slandering his former boss. Today the Western public is more likely to 'believe' Pacepa when he depicts Ceausescu as a petty megalomaniac dictator thirsting for adulation. It is a sober account of Ceausescu's court, dominated by his decrepit, greedy wife, who imagines herself a world political leader and an original scientist, and his son and heir, Nicu, a randy alcoholic cartoon-version of Cesare Borgia.

Pacepa gives a detailed description of how Ceausescu steals Western technology, engages in international terrorism and the arms trade, smuggles drugs and sells them to his minority populations, while at the same time fooling the West into believing him to be a communist reformer and peace loving statesman. Occasionally Pacepa makes points which seem a little tongue-in-cheek, though they are probably accurate. For example, he mentions Soviet (and Romanian) efforts to develop a strategic defence as early as the mid 1970s. While I am convinced that these efforts have to be taken seriously, one cannot 'prove' that Pacepa's mentioning them wasn't a service rendered to his new American employers.

As important as Pacepa's inside description of 'Horizon' are the little sidelights on Ceausescu's personality. For example, his belief that Macy's in New York was only filled with goods to put on a show for his visit, and his refusal to accept any 'explanation' nearer to the truth, reveals the *Conducator's* (=Fuehrer's) total lack of a sense of reality. It is seemingly unimportant anecdotes like this that make the ridiculous puppet figure come to life. By comparison the passages describing the prolific surveillance of the population, stretching as far as registration of all typewriters, routine mail checking and large scale bugging of private homes are less exciting, perhaps because they present facts everybody interested in Romania has known for a long time.

Some people will object to Pacepa's oral style, reconstructing conversations more than ten years later without any records. Obviously, those conversations may not necessarily have taken place as related, but that is not the point. Having lived in Ceausescu's inner circle for many years, Pacepa can be relied on to 'invent' the 'authentic' conversations.

What bothers me about this book is something else, it is the question: What was Pacepa's role in all the dirty games he describes so well? Like other people (e.g. Albert Speer) who wrote memoirs about their service to a dictator, Pacepa tends to play down his own contribution, though sometimes the reader senses that he still takes some pride in some of his successful operations in Ceausescu's service. Pacepa depicts himself as 'Mr Niceguy', a dedicated Christian all the time. In his interview with the *Sunday Times Magazine* on

the occasion of the publication of *Red Horizons* (7th February 1988), Pacepa claims that he had no choice, his rise in the communist hierarchy was automatic, from chemical engineer to master spy. This is absurd. Pacepa should have the courage to plead guilty to the charge of collaboration. It is to his honour that he defected and put his knowledge at the disposal of the CIA, and many people will be grateful to him for that. There is no need for him to act the saint.

NOTES ON A LIFE
David Matthews

Klemperer on Music, Otto Klemperer, Toccata Press, 1986, pp246, £12.95. (0-907689-13-2).

The enterprising Toccata Press, which is run by a true amateur of music, Martin Anderson, has begun a series called 'Musicians on Music' of which this is the second title. *Boult on Music* was the first; future collections are promised from the composers Holmboe, Koechlin and Dallapiccola - which shows that for this publisher idealism outweighs commercial considerations. But admirable as this series is, Toccata Press should be careful about barrel-scraping. In his editorial introduction to *Klemperer on Music*, which gives us virtually everything Otto Klemperer wrote, Martin Anderson admits that some of it is rather slight, and that the subtitle 'Shavings from a Musician's Workbench', which was suggested by Klemperer's daughter Lotte, is an accurate one. The only essay of any length here is on Mahler, and like other essays on people Klemperer knew, it is mostly anecdotal; but any first-hand Mahler anecdote is worth having, and there are also some valuable recollections of Mahler's conducting from someone who began as a devout disciple. Klemperer in fact heard very few of Mahler's concerts and seems to have attended only one Mahler premiere, the Seventh Symphony, which Mahler conducted in Prague in 1980 (not 1909 as Klemperer states). 'It was not a success', Klemperer bluntly recalls. He has a curious comment on the fourth movement of this symphony: it was, he says, 'the only piece out of all his work which Mahler loved'. In 1966 I heard Klemperer conduct the Seventh Symphony at the Royal Festival Hall. I did not know then that he hadn't conducted it since 1922. Klemperer was notorious in later life for his slow tempi, but the first movement in particular was about the slowest performance of anything I can remember: at every moment it threatened to fall apart. It remains in my mind as the most extraordinary Mahler performance I have ever heard.

What else is there here? Some fragments of autobiography, including a short history of Klemperer's association with the Kroll Opera, the full story of which may be found in Peter Heyworth's exemplary biography. Of his last opera performance in Berlin, after Hitler had come to power (it was *Tannhaüser*!), Klemperer laconically remarks: 'Two weeks earlier I had been awarded the Goethe Medal, and eight weeks later I was thrown out of Germany as harmful to society.' There are thoughts on conducting, on new music (Klemperer remained open-minded, though he personally disliked serialism), a touching speech made on the occasion of his receiving an honorary doctorate from Occidental College, Los Angeles, and many short essays on composers and individual works. It doesn't amount to very much; yet Klemperer *was* a great conductor, and a great man: even his simplest thoughts have a certain gravity, and what he had to say about music should be available to us as an adjunct to the recordings which are his major testament. Toccata Press have done him proud, and the book is embellished with over fifty drawings by nineteen different artists, including an exceptionally lively series of cartoons of Klemperer rehearsing the *St John Passion* in 1931 done by Richard Ziegler, a member of the Berlin Philharmonic Chorus which he was conducting. These cartoons show us the demonic Klemperer that recordings from the 1920s and 1930s, now reissued, prove: a very different interpretative style from the magisterial classicism of the final years. And there is a further bonus in an appendix listing Klemperer's compositions. I knew Klemperer was a manic-depressive personality who composed during his manic periods. Even so, it is scarcely credible that during the period from 1968 to 1970, when he was in his mid-eighties, he composed some forty works including five symphonies, eight string quartets, the second versions of two operas and fifteen works for voice and orchestra. Are any of these pieces any good? When asked by Peter Heyworth if he would like to be remembered as a composer, Klemperer wisely replied: 'I would only like to be remembered as a *good* composer. If people find my compositions weak, then it is better not to be remembered.' It would be nice to be given the opportunity to find out.

GO EAST OR SOUTH, YOUNG MAN
Dennis O'Keeffe

Two Centuries of Overseas Trading: The Origins and Growth of the Inchcape Group, Stephanie Jones, Macmillan, 1986, £33 (0-333-37172-0).

Business history is a growing and fascinating branch of economic history. Its interest lies partly in the wealth of untapped material in firms' archives. Also significant is the way in which the history of a particular firm or group of firms may intersect with so many other histories, local or regional, national or international. In particular, business history is crucial in the study of how the world's wealth is augmented and mobilised.

Among many engaging stories the emergence of what is now the huge Inchcape Group of Companies is especially notable. Formed as recently as 1958, the Inchcape Group was the outgrowth of British - and

more especially Scottish - mercantile activity embracing most parts of the British trading orbit as this had developed between the 18th and the 20th centuries. The men who established far-flung British trade are not, perhaps understandably, a breed as much studied as the more colourful explorers of the same period. But they are arguably more important; their history provides a paradigm of the centrality of specialised knowledge and independent initiative in human innovation. They demonstrate that so far from impeding the world's welfare the 'brain drain' - highly mobile human capital transferring to overseas uses - is indispensable to such welfare.

Historians of British economic history have typically focused on the metropolitan operations of British entrepreneurs. Stephanie Jones in this absorbing study of British enterprise abroad, an enterprise involving remarkable determination and shrewdness, concentrates on the *overseas* decision-making of British merchants and their employees. She shows the extraordinary diversity of trade carried on by foreign-based forerunners of the Inchcape Group. Some of the constituent companies of the Group, like the Inchcape companies themselves, were big names long before the foundation of the Group. Others operated until recent times on rather small capital bases and budgets. But whether their companies were large or small the 18th and 19th century traders and entrepreneurs in the less developed world operated in conditions of appalling difficulty. The account of 19th century Sarawak is a colourful example in point in an often colourful book. In Sarawak a mere century ago there were European 'rajahs', opium-addicted Chinese indentured labourers and Dayak head-hunters. (A grisly photograph of the work of these last lends an exotic touch). There were also less then 100 whites.

The lack of infra-structure has sometimes persisted to the very present, as in most of Sub-Saharan Africa; but where such backwardness is only an historical memory, as in many parts of South-East Asia today, intrepid Britons were often at work long ago, preserving trading lines and spotting and promoting new ones. Dr Jones' exiles traded in Australasia, in the Persian Gulf, in Africa, in India, and in the Far East, their legacy at its best a highly developed economic life.

Jones agrues that sheer luck played its part in the survival and prosperity of the companies whose histories she traces. But she insists that the facilitating circumstance was the huge growth in world trade. That growth has continued through and after the 20th Century's two World Wars. Indeed it has now intensified, while losing its pre-eminently European character. For modern British companies to succeed they need the same determination and imagination as the precursors of the Inchcape Group. If the general pattern of British economic life in the 20th century is to be reversed, it seems likely that the presence abroad of British interests, skills and brains, must become more important than ever. It can anyway be achieved in more comfort than Dr Jones' quiet heroes enjoyed.

INDIAN BASHING

George Chowdharay-Best

Thy Hand, Great Anarch! India: 1921-1952, Nirad C. Chaudhuri, Chatto & Windus, 1987, £25.00 (0-7011-2476-8).

Dr Chaudhuri has written a very long book of over 950 pages and managed to persuade his publisher to print it in its entirety, complete with footnotes on the same page as the text. That is an achievement in itself. But is the book worth it for the reader? I read it with attention to the very end but then I am not a typical Briton or even a typical *Salisbury Review* reader, for I share Dr Chaudhuri's Indian ancestry if not his former Indian residence and have been passionately engaged since my earliest years in the arguments for and against Independence.

There seems to be no doubt in Dr Chaudhuri's mind that Independence was a disaster for the sub-continent. That feeling I do not wholly share, nor do I take kindly to some of the aspersions which he casts upon his fellow-countrymen, or indeed upon erstwhile British residents of the commercial and business classes. I even found some of his remarks about Indian nationalist politicians hard to take, and he is particularly hard on members of the former Indian Civil Service whom the Nehru Government took over after Independence and turned into the Indian Administrative Service. Even the generals do not escape his criticism. The only people he is at all nice about are some of his fellow Bengalis like Sir Rabindranath Tagore, of whom he paints a notable portrait, and some other writers of lesser note in English but of equal or even greater note in Bengali, a language in which Dr Chaudhuri writes with great fluency.

Not being myself of Bengali extraction, I cannot follow him there, but it is interesting to note his view that Tagore was not a good translator of his own work and that is why so much of it reads so flatly in English. There is nothing flat about the following, however, which is said to have been a favourite of Ghandi's:

Walk Alone

If they answer not to thy call,
walk alone,
If they are afraid and cower
mutely facing the wall,
O thou of evil luck,
Open thy mind and speak out alone

If they turn and desert you when
crossing the wilderness
O thou of evil luck,
trample the thorns under thy tread,
and along the blood-lined track
travel alone

If they do not hold up the light
When the night is troubled with storm,

O thou of evil luck,
With the thunder-flame of pain ignite
thine own heart
And let it burn alone.

For me the poem expresses the Bengali hopelessness, which at one level is the theme of Chaudhuri's book. For a large part of the period of British rule in India, Calcutta was the *de facto* capital; and the partition of Bengal and the transfer of the capital to New Delhi meant a lot to all Bengalis. Chaudhuri himself eventually moved to Delhi in the 1940s, before Independence, and his account of the old City as he first discovered it and as it may still, in some sense, be discovered today, is one of the delights of the book. Eventually however he left Delhi too and came to live in England. By that time the books which be began publishing in 1951 had made him famous here and almost infamous in his native land. Many Indians took particular exception to *A Passage to England* (1959) in which the author seemed to them to be praising everything British at the expense of anything Indian. Better-received in India was *To Live or not to Live* (ca. 1970) which has I believe not yet been published in the UK. Dr Chaudhuri's other books include the first instalment of his autobio-graphy (of which this is the second), and books about Clive of India and Sir Max Muller the orientalist.

In his own way Dr Chaudhuri is a considerable scholar, though Calcutta once refused him an M.A. and his doctorate is honorary. The book is replete with quotations from French authors, as well as much Latin, and the information on offer is often of a somewhat recondite, but nonetheless usually authentic nature. In a book of nearly 1,000 pages I noted only three small factual inaccuracies[1] and hardly any misprints. On the other hand the index, though often containing information additional to that in the text, is idiosyncratic, perhaps deliberately so. Pandit Motilal Nehru (Jawaharlal's father and thus the great-grandfather of India's present Prime Minister) is the subject of a brief but vitriolic attack on p. 830 (unindexed). Similarly the index does not mention the Punjabis at all, although on p. 749 'all Punjabi Hindus' are described as having 'cunning worldliness exuding through the pores of their young and fair skins' and on p. 726 the Punjab is described as 'never properly a part of real India'. Both these statements are of course highly contentious and would be hotly disputed by most Punjabis. One is in fact driven back on the explanation that Dr Chaudhuri, whilst he has a number of Punjabi friends, cannot in fact forgive Punjabis for having of necessity somewhat taken over the role which the Bengalis used to play in the days when Calcutta was the capital of all-India. For Delhi, until the State of Haryana was created, formed part of the Punjab, and hence it was inevitable that Punjabis should flourish there as they have done, especially since Independence, when so many of the Hindus among them were driven to Delhi as refugees from what is now Pakistan. Of course the language of the Punjab is different from the great central language of Hindi, but so is the language of Bengal.

Neither does the index contain any reference to General Williams or the I.C.S. (as the former Indian Civil Service, now succeeded in India by the Indian Administrative Service, is still known). Again, this may be because the author does not especially want to call attention to the fact that at a dinner-party in New Delhi at which General Williams was present, Dr Chaudhuri remarked that 'all the Indians in the I.C.S. should have been hanged from the nearest lamp-post on 15th August 1947' (the date of Indian Independence). General Williams, who was then advising independent India's defence forces (this was 1951) promptly left the room. The remark is indeed somewhat puzzling. Dr Chaudhuri remains in many ways a very puzzling man.

However, he is also a very erudite one, and there is something for almost everyone in this book.

Note

1. *The Lost Dominion*, published in 1924 (p. 262) was written over the pseudonym 'Al. Carthill' not 'A.L. Carthill'; Lord Curzon (p. 621) was Chancellor, not Vice-Chancellor, of Oxford University; and the Geological Society of London (p. 943) unlike the Geographical Society, is not 'Royal'.

THE GLOOM OF BLOOM

James de Candole

The Closing of the American Mind, Allan Bloom, Penguin, 1988, £8.95, (014-011-217-0).

The American democratic personality is no longer capable of friendship - this is the disquieting though hardly original thesis of Professor Allan Bloom's book, a work which updates, revises and confirms anxieties first expressed by de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. The disappearance of friendship, swept aside in the name of the liberated, the necessary, the equal and the relative, has allowed democracy to show its ugliest face. The solution, according to Bloom, lies with the university, which alone is capable of providing the space in which friendships built upon a shared concern for the good can grow again, undisturbed by the vulgur blandishments of majority opinion. A space in which survival value is thrown aside in favour of that which gives value to survival - as C.S. Lewis expressed the impulse of friendship in *The Four Loves*.

Friendship consists in the sharing, in discussion and thought, of those things for the sake of which life is worth living. For some, as Aristotle wrote,

> ...drink together, others dice together, others go in for athletics or hunting together, or for philosophy, each type spending their time together

in the pursuit of that which gives them most satisfaction in their lives...

(*The Nicomachean Ethics* Bk.9 Ch.12)

The friendship which Bloom no longer finds amongst his colleagues and students is the 'philosophic friendship' in which the friends are bound together by a common concern for the truth and its activity, a never-ending discourse in pursuit of the truth. Such friends, whilst disagreeing about the nature of good, share a belief in the existence of the good and the value of striving to know it. It is this belief which the democratic personality rejects and which, this book argues, is so essential in saving democracy from itself.

The book is divided into three sections which examine, in turn, the contemporary American student, his language and the role of his university in democratic society. The scene is set with an introductory chapter full of a timely contempt for the greatest of democratic 'virtues' - openness:

> Openness - and the relativism that makes it the only plausible stance in the face of various claims to truth - is the insight of our times... The true believer is the real danger... The point is not to correct the mistakes and really be right; rather it is not to think you are right at all. (p.26)

The openness of tolerance which is valued as a way of coming closer to the truth, of correcting the mistakes, the 'openness of knowing' as Bloom calls it, has been replaced by the 'openness of indifference'. 'Our virtue' is indiscriminateness:' the capacity for disapproval and even contempt, which forms a crucial part of the attitude of toleration, gives way to an empty respect, a sweetened niceness which accepts everything (and therefore values nothing) for fear of trampling on another's 'authentic' self:

> This folly means that men are not permitted to seek for the natural human good and admire it when found, for such discovery is coeval with the discovery of the bad and contempt for it. (p.30)

Today's student is 'liberated': in search of an 'identity' and 'self-fulfillment', he 'does his own thing'. Any signs of outside interference are swiftly condemned as 'authoritarian' and the acknowledgement that there are ideas, people, institutions to whom one should defer: a sign of servility rather than maturity. In the past, Bloom tells us, American students arrived at university, their minds modestly furnished with a knowledge of the Bible and the Founding Fathers. But the insistent and self-centered 'Why?' of openness has long since shown these traditional pieties to be 'ethnocentric', inauthentic restrictions on 'growth' and 'self-awareness'. Country, religion, sex, language - indeed all those things that make us what we are, which constitute our identity (rather than our 'identity') and form the resources by and through which we relate to each other, all of these are being 'questioned' into extinction. 'In democratic societies,' wrote de Tocqueville, 'each citizen is habitually busy with the contemplation of a very petty object, which is himself.' The relentless purging of the inauthentic and 'other-directed' has left, not surprisingly, very little to contemplate. As Bloom puts it, we can now be anything we want to be but have no particular reason to be anything in particular.

The other characteristic of the contemporary American student is his instinctual egalitarianism. All cultural, sexual, religious and intellectual baggage is left with the porter and the student arrives on campus with, quite literally, nothing to lose but his 'self'. Friendship involves finding distinctive qualities in others which one values and which set the friend apart from everyone else: the Revd. Sydney Smith, for example, swore a bond of eternal friendship with the lady who shared his dislike of gravy. On the campus of American universities, it has become just another aspect of equal opportunity.

The second part of this book, entitled 'Nihilism - American Style', reveals how the democratic personality trivializes most of what it touches; the soul is transformed into the psychiatrist's 'self', culture is reduced to 'ethnicity' - funny food and folk-music - the religious has become the 'sacred' and any measure of good and evil collapsed in 'values' and 'life-styles'. We need a glossary to untangle this 'In-Speak':

> ...what lies behind the formulas? Would 'living exactly as I please' be a substitute for 'life-style'? Would 'my opinion' do for 'value'? (p.238)

Even nihilism has been 'packaged'; Nietzsche's 'God is Dead' was not some whoop for joy at being liberated from all values but a plea that men recognize the banality of a life lived 'beyond good and evil'. We must set about creating new values for ourselves and so create the conflicts between values and find anew that which would give meaning to survival. But America heard the Nietzschian proclamation and enthusiastically replied: 'Long live psychiatry!' The despair of nihilism would become neuroses to be cured on a therapeutic couch, 'nihilism with a happy ending' writes Bloom (p.147).

Value philosophy - the creating of values for ourselves - was welcomed as a way of resolving conflicts, not by consensus on the nature of the good but by indifference to it. After all, as Bloom points out,

> If it is only a difference of values, then conciliation is possible. We must respect values, but they must not get in the way of peace. (p.229)

The consequence of this substitution of 'value' for good and evil is that any talk of evil releases a flood of sophisticated scorn. Thus President Reagan's 'focus of evil' speech was found unacceptable for at least two reasons: it represented a claim of superiority for the American political order over the Soviet - the democratic personality immediately flinches at such 'moral imperialism'. And it was too belligerent. The fact that 'focus of evil' is a philosophically accurate description of communist doctrine which is founded upon the 'institutionalization' of hatred is quite beside the point.

The extraordinary thing is the 'dogmatism with which we accept such relativism' (p.239). The complete abnegation of responsibility and friendship to your

culture, its hopes and its fears, is presented as some kind of perverse moral right, whether it be a collection of transvestite 'nuns' indignantly claiming their rights against an authoritarian Pope or the 'survivalism' of the Peace Movement:

> Sometime ago our newspapers printed the photograph of a young man bearing a placard at a protest action against nuclear rearmament by the West; the slogan read: 'No Issue is Worth Dying For!' I felt very distressed...what did that sorrowful figure think was worth living for?
> (Joseph Hradec, *The Salisbury Review*, 1986)

It is much easier to reduce the tension between values than between good and evil since values, in the end, don't really matter.

Part three illustrates the unsteady status of the university in a democratic society; the openness of knowing, a precious achievement of such a society, is constantly undermined by the insinuating advances of indifference. To rebuff such advances, the university must follow 'one simple rule':

> ...it need not concern itself with providing its students with experiences that are available in a democratic society...it must provide them with experiences they cannot have there. (p.256)

Most importantly this means providing students with the experience of friendships founded upon shared concern for the good. It must set about restoring the distinctiveness of intellectual life and encourage the willingness to make claims of superiority, to separate the high and the low, the profound and the superficial. Universities should aim at exclusiveness because the society around them hates to exclude, thus abandoning all standards in an inflation of values.

The university should seek to focus on the permanent questions and shun the ephemeral, the 'relevant', and the useful. Friendship, as Montaigne wrote, 'hath no idea but of itself' - a person who chose and broke off his friendships on the basis of some 'criteria of relevance' or standard of utility would have misunderstood the nature of friendship. The same reasoning is applicable to a university education, and it is this self-sufficient quality that the democratic personality finds unacceptable:

> ...the democratic concentration on the useful, on the solution of what are believed by the populace at large to be the most pressing problems, makes theoretical distance seem not only useless but immoral. (p.250)

Bloom is not denying that the university has a responsibility to the world and its demands but that it meets this responsibility through resisting, not following fashionable causes. Majority opinion, the new measure which takes the place of class, family, church, and friendship (all of which helped to keep the demagogic demands of the necessary and the relevant in perspective), weakens the will to resist by removing the grounds for any sense of superior right, and diminishes any resource with which to bolster mental independence. As a result, we become easy prey to those less 'nice', less 'open' than ourselves. The university must, consequently, encourage the non-instrumental use of reason. It should seek,

> to provide the atmosphere where the moral and physical superiority of the dominant will not intimidate philosophic doubt. And it preserves the treasury of great deeds, great men, and great thoughts to nourish that doubt. (p.250)

The Closing of The American Mind shoots down many of liberal democracy's most cherished prejudices, not least its dogmatic insistence on relativism. In their place it offers us friendship, and this will surprise many. In modern times, friendship has been banished to the private realm, and our surprise, as Bloom so convincingly argues, reflects not the fundamental incompatibility of friendship and the public sphere, but the extent to which we have been 'homogenized' by the mask of democratic indifference, a mask which this book has happily torn aside.

AFRICAN DEMOCRACY

Martin Tyrrell

After Apartheid - the Solution for South Africa, Frances Kendall and Leon Louw, ICS, San Francisco, 1987, $17.95.

Recently, 'The Belfast Newsletter' chided Ian Smith for his having defined African democracy as 'one man, one vote, one time'. Back in the days of UDI Smith was held in near unanimous contempt because it was supposed that he was crying wolf; now that it is clear that he cried merely so as to attest to an emperor's nakedness, that same contempt ensures that he has few sympathetic listeners. Majoritarian, territorial and other such considerations are redundant in Black Africa where every state, from Angola to Zimbabwe, is justified instead via an appeal to what Ali Mazrui (*Towards a Pax Africana*, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1969) defined as 'racial sovereignty'. 'Racial sovereignty' is a nicer way of saying that 'if it's not White, it's all right'. In the end, Smith's only fault was that he was not black; that was all that put him beyond the pale as far as contemporary concepts of legitimate state and nationhood are concerned. African democracy has yielded much that is bad indeed - Bokassa, Nkrumah, Amin - but Smith is seen as all the worse because he would not chance being placed at its disposal.

The South Africa question, too, hinges on the issue of African democracy/racial sovereignty and, principally, upon whether it is better to defer to it and its consequences or to rule so as to prevent its coming into effect; whether it is better to rule undemocratically and illiberally so as to prevent being ruled all the more undemocratically and illiberally. This is a problem which Kendall and Louw feel that they have solved, by proposing an arrangement in which none will have much chance of ruling at all. Specifically, they argue for a radical decentralisation of political control in South Africa so that the locality is empowered at the expense of the central executive. Such, it is argued, is the surest means by which to enable the co-existence of a multiplicity of diverse cultures such as exists in the region.

Among the least satisfactory aspects of the book is its attempt to eulogise the sort of groups likely to gain in terms of political autonomy in the event of any decentralisation of power. The Afrikaners, for example, are upheld as virtual libertarians, who trekked northwards so as to escape manipulation by the imperialist British. However, the British interference to which they objected was primarily liberal in thrust, involving repeal of the pass laws, the abolition of slavery and the introduction of a non-racial franchise. That is why, given state power under the legislation of 1910 and 1931, the Afrikaner Nationalists set about reintroducing the pass laws and systematically introducing an all-white electoral registrar.

Nor is Ciskei any model for the kind of entity which Kendall and Louw would like to see benefit under their solution. Ciskei, an independent homeland, has, under its President Sebe, had a five year state of emergency, in the course of which action has been taken to inhibit political freedom. It is, in fact, in the finest tradition of African democracy, since it depends upon massive foreign aid, used to bolster heavy state expenditure on defence, internal security, presidential opulence and bureaucracy.

If central government is diminished only so as to permit the development of local governments characterised by local prejudices of the Afrikaner or Ciskeian variety, then the result can scarcely be commended on liberal grounds. For a liberal, local prejudice is something to be dissolved in a metropolitan culture, not something to be exalted into a principle of self-government.

Where devolution works best, it is as a federation of ethnic, usually linguistic, statelets. In such an instance, the devolved structure acts as a barrier to centralist majoritarianism of the sort exhibited by Mussolini in his attempts to Italianise the South Tyrol in the 1920s. That is the function of decentralisation in Kendall and Louw's model state of Switzerland; but even in Switzerland, since the War of the Sonderbund in 1847, there has been a strengthening of the central authority as a guarantor of individual rights against local intolerance.

Kendall and Louw are vague on the ultimate function of central government in their cantonised South Africa. They talk of a bill of rights (p. 213) but they talk also of local administrations being empowered to disenfranchise those citizens under their own jurisdiction (p. 125). Empowering the locality to this latter extent leaves open the possibility of a South Africa transformed into a patchwork of Afrikanerdoms, Ciskeis and Marxist dictatorships with, perhaps, the odd island of liberal democracy here and there.

One is left with the conclusion that the 'solution' is presumed to be such merely because it would serve to make the ensuing federation less vulnerable to African democracy - brute-force majoritarianism pending one-party rule - by so rigging things that local power and national power would balance each other out. But why should this happen? Why shouldn't the ANC, which is South Africa's principal advocate of African democracy and the likely beneficiary of universal suffrage, not simply dominate at both local and national level? And, having done so, what would there be to prevent it from launching a sustained war to eradicate any non-ANC cantons and, ultimately, to establish one-party dictatorship?

South Africa would not succeed on the Swiss model for precisely the same reasons that it would not succeed on the British model; namely, that there exists no liberal consensus on the need for government to be curtailed and individual rights upheld. Constitutions and bills of rights are not magical formulae. Where they exist as other than pieces of paper, it is because they have the real support of a popular consensus. Where people are indifferent towards, or opposed to, individual rights, however, there is African democracy.

In the end, therefore, Kendall and Louw's faith in the power of legislation is ill-founded. It would be sound only in the context of a general consensus regarding the worth of a liberal rule of law. Only in the long term is the pen mightier than the sword; in the short term, the constitutional lawyer, faced with the ANC guerrilla, would do well to avail himself of South Africa's relatively liberal laws on gun ownership.

CAPITALISM AND SOCIETY

Barry Bracewell-Milnes

The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equality and Liberty, Peter L. Berger, Gower Press, 1987, £6.95 (0-566-05390-X).

This book offers a comprehensive social analysis of capitalism embracing class, political liberties, personal liberation, economic culture and religion as well as economic activity and economic development. Comprehensive analysis of this kind has hitherto been cornered by Marxists; Berger seeks to redress the balance.

It is worth quoting the author at some length on what he is trying to do and how. 'The purpose of this book is to draw the outline of a theory concerning the

relation between capitalism and society in the modern world. Each chapter ... contains various propositions which I put forth on the basis of the empirical evidence cited. These propositions are hypotheses, in the strict sense in which this term has been used within the social sciences. That is, these propositions are not of a philosophical, ethical or any other a priori sort' (page 3).

'As the argument of the book develops, a number of propositions (fifty in all) will be formulated. I want to stress, as emphatically as I can, that *each one of these propositions is to be understood as a hypothesis within an ongoing empirical inquiry*. The book constitutes a prima facie argument for these propositions. It follows, though, that *each proposition is, in principle, falsifiable.* My own view of the likelihood of this happening varies from case to case' (page 8; emphasis in original).

'Socialism' is used in the sense of communism, not Western-style democratic socialism or social democracy. Although no real economy is or ever has been purely capitalist or purely socialist, the choice between them is one-dimensional: no '"third way" has been effectively institutionalised, and it is possible to argue that, whatever its ideology, every modern or modernising society will eventually have to choose between capitalist or socialist forms of socioeconomic organisations.' The effects of industrial capitalism are carefully distinguished from those of modernisation.

'I have no a priori principles to proclaim,' says the author (page 9); his demonstration of the superiority of capitalism over socialism by almost all relevant criteria rests on empirical foundations. His criteria would command wide assent, although I differ from him in the weight he attaches to equality. ('Capitalism, then, does not come out very well in the perspective of this vaue; but neither does socialism ...' page 219.) A principal merit of the book is that it contests and refutes the widely held notion that capitalism achieves its material successes at the cost of other, perhaps more important, human values: on the contrary, capitalism scores here too, for example in personal liberty and the material wellbeing of the poor.

Why then has capitalism inspired less devotion than socialism? This is the subject of Chapter 9 ('Capitalism and the dynamics of myth'). The answer is that it is probably in the nature of things. 'The mythic deprivation of capitalism is, very likely, grounded in the fact that capitalism is an economic system and nothing else (by contrast, socialism is a comprehensive view of human society)' (page 206). Berger is not seeking to make good the dearth of capitalist 'myth' (in the neutral or non-pejorative sense in which he uses this word). Gilder and Novak are cited as having made a contribution in this area (page 252); Ayn Rand is not mentioned.

Berger seems to me to understate the commitment and devotion to capitalism that is to be found among a number of classical liberals and libertarians. But most of them (and here he is right) would repudiate any suggestion that capitalism represents 'a comprehensive view of human society'. This repudiation is also in line with conservative thinking. It is therefore all the more important to give capitalism full credit for its power to do good, while recognising that there are also important values that have little or nothing to do with capitalism. Berger's effort to give credit where credit is due deserves a warm welcome.

The book is not elegantly written, and there are infelicities; but it is at least readable.

UNNATURAL RITES

Geoffrey Thomas

Women-Church: Theology and Practice of Feminist Liturgical Communities, Rosemay Radford Ruether, Harper & Row, 1985, £11.95 (06-066-834-2).

Rosemay Radford Ruether is an American who acknowledges herself to be a 'Christian Feminist'. Does she represent the lunatic fringe of the movement? Not at all. As far as feminist 'theologians' go she is comparatively moderate. Her writings are far tamer than the work of Mary Daly. She is Christian Reformed, and she has given the Abraham Kuyper lectures at the Free University, Amsterdam. She has also given them at the Institute for Christian Studies in Toronto. Her first book on feminism was *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology* (published by Beacon Press, 1983). And now she has followed that up with *Women-Church.*

Ruether's book is full of liturgies and litanies for 'Women-Church'. One is a 'Coming-out Rite for a Lesbian' (pp. 173–181); it is 'designed to celebrate the new birth that occurs for a woman who comes out to herself and her community and affirms her identity as a lesbian women' (p. 173). The form declares: 'In a time when lesbians and gay men are rejected and oppressed, our gathering here is a protest against unjust persecution and false judgement. We renounce the homophobia of the church and proclaim the sacred worth of every child of the Holy One, as we welcome this sister with joy' (pp. 173–174).

Ruether is convinced that churches should celebrate many more occasions and turning points in life than in fact they do. Thus she also includes a 'Puberty Rite for a Young Woman' (pp. 188–190) in which the participants 'bathe together, perhaps by taking a sauna or a swim together' (p. 188).

Later on in a woman's life we come to the 'Birthing Preparation Liturgy' (pp. 200–203). 'The father of the coming child holds a bowl of seeds' and recites some sentences about seeds in general. The seeds are shared with the participants, who then lie in a circle, touching one another's stomachs. Eventually the pregnant woman winds up squatting in the birthing position, while the whole group chants: 'Let the primal Mother-Spirit empower you. Let her great birthing energy flow

through you. Bring forth with victory and joy the promised child.'

Menopause is not forgotten either (see p. 204–206). The woman undergoing this transition is told by the group: 'Welcome to the community of women who no longer ovulate and bleed and who create now with their minds and spirits'. Next comes the 'Croning Liturgy' (pp. 206–211), in which old age is celebrated. There are also some ties with Christianity (even though much of the liturgical inspiration comes from other traditions). We find, for example, a section on 'Rite of Baptism' (pp. 128–130). Yet the liturgy suggested is not quite the recitation of Anglicans around the font of the Parish Church. It includes a 'liturgy of disaffiliation from patriarchy', in which the participants are invited to say: 'Powers of destruction, while withholding food, education and medical services from the poor, begone!'

Perhaps the saddest liturgy is 'A Ritual of Divorce' (pp. 163–168): 'We, their family and friends, join them today to mark the completion of their married life, and to ask God's blessing upon them as they face the challenge of a new journey' (p. 164). The woman declares: 'Love once called us together, now life demands our separation' (p. 165). The separation is a peaceful one: a kiss of peace or a handshake is exchanged. The separation is even called 'holy'. What is holy about it? 'It is the holiness of letting go ... It is the holiness of blessing one another's freedom ...' (p. 166). The man and the woman empty a cup together and say: 'As the remainder of this cup is emptied, the remainder of our marriage is poured out upon the ground' (p. 166).

While much of this congregational activity takes place outside the sanctuary, Ruether does take note of the implications for church architecture. What should a modern church facility look like and include? (see pp. 146–148). The furniture should be movable, obviously; there should also be an area 'containing a hot tub, a cool plunge, and dry and steamy saunas.' The accompanying drawings call for a jacuzzi.

Obviously Ruether has real problems with reconciling all of this, or even a moderate feminist vision of things, with the Scriptures. Naturally she turns to 'hermeneutics', though first acknowledging that 'Women-Church is not confined to texts of the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament for its readings. It may draw from a variety of texts, both ancient stories and modern poets and writers, particularly feminist writers' (p. 135). She sees all Biblical texts as man-centred and they must be accompanied by a feminist hermeneutic for interpreting them. Only those texts whose intention is to liberate women should be accepted as the Holy Word. That is a change from the usual device of assigning troublesome texts to a study committee to be suitably reinterpreted.

What conclusions can we draw from this latest example of feminist theologising? First that feminists are much happier and safer when pointing out and commenting upon the second-class status of women in society rather than in the church. Second, that women who began by writing about feminist issues from within the evangelical group have long been drifting out of it, as feminist theology itself cannot indefinitely remain as Christian. Other religions and philosophies have clearly influenced this book. Thirdly, we all have to decide whether we are focusing our worship on a transcendent God whose otherness from man is emphasised, or something within created reality which is elevated and proclaimed divine, in which latter mold is Rosemary Ruether. Fourthly, liturgical committees abound today and plunder all kinds of books for new ideas, so that the materials of this author may soon be popping up in unusual circles, in new 'service books' of Anglicans, Wesleyans, United Reformed and Presbyterians. So a dubious theology enters a church by the back door.

BYZANTINE LABYRINTHS

Simon Gleeson

The Formation of Christendom, Judith Herrin, Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 530, £29.95 (0-631-15186-9).

When presented with a work entitled a general history of anything, the first thing a prudent reviewer does is to turn to the back flap to see in which field the author has specialised. The danger is that the author will either overemphasise his particular field or be drawn into rash statements about unfamiliar topics in order to broaden his thesis.

There are several methods of avoiding these ancient traps. One is the Gibbonian method of becoming a universal expert, a procedure usually requiring at least one lifetime. A second is to argue a thesis with examples rather than providing a balanced view: the 'Golden Bough' approach, and liable to the same problem - that the initial admission that one is doing so is almost never made. A third method, and the one employed by Miss Herrin, is to decide that one's pet subject is the only thing of importance within the wider framework. She is a Byzantinist, and indeed a very good Byzantinist, and what she has written is a history of Byzantine orthodoxy from the fifth oecumenical Council in 553 to the end of the second outbreak of Iconoclasm in 843. To be fair she offers informed comment on the rise of Islam in so far as it affected the Byzantine Church, and provides a rarely-considered Byzantine perspective on the coronation of Charlemagne. Nevertheless, her book is firmly Constantinopolitan.

This is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that from an historical point of view Christendom is usually regarded as being more concerned with Popes than Patriarchs. Far from being the foundation of a Universal Church the Patriarchate evolved into a fully-fledged historical irrelevance, fully integrated into the Byzantine civil service and interesting principally as the force preventing the unification of the interests of West and East against Islam.

Miss Herrin's argument with this perception is that Byzantium is important not as a foundaton but as a model. Looking for western efforts to emulate the empire she makes great play of the attempts of Isodore of Seville and others to create a theological framework for a kingship independent of all outside interference. This, she maintains, failed in Spain only through the inadequacy of the Visigothic kings and was promptly resurrected by the Carolingians as a model. As with many of Miss Herrin's arguments this one has a point. Although Isodore seems to have been known only as the author of the *Etymologies*, it is quite probable that his political thought would have disseminated alongside that work. Comparable with the position of the eastern church, in Miss Herrin's view, is the Carolingian adoption of the western Church as a means of controlling the newly-formed western empire. She develops the likeness as direct - even evolutionary - descent, and draws an immediate parallel between the Carolingian court's discussion of theology and the Byzantine integration of theology and politics.

This picture of Western religion is interesting chiefly for its marginalisation (to exhume a phrase) of the Papacy. Popes commence the book receiving theological instruction from the Emperor Justinian at the fifth oecumenical Council and end receiving theological instruction from the Emperor Charlemagne at the Synod of Frankfurt. In the interim they are an insubstantial fringe to the squabbles of the exarch of Ravenna and the king of the Lombards.

The difficulty in discussing religion and religious organisations has always been the interdependence of the medium and the message. To take a simple example, the modern Papcy is, looked at from this point of view, at an all-time low, having no significant land, money or political sway. Nonetheless the present Pope is certainly the most influential individual in western Christianity and arguably in the world. If this dichotomy between the Papacy's real and perceived power was not also in force in the eighth century then its influence on the development of the Frankish empire must be ascribed to the direct intervention of the Almighty - which seems even more improbable. In short, Miss Herrin has argued herself round to the position that the force which dominated mediaeval and still dominates modern Christendom was, in one of its most exciting periods of development, an irrelevance to the formation of Christendom.

The substantial positive value of Miss Herrin's book lies in the very unease with which its contents sit with its title. Most of us are so set in our historical perspectives that the whole history of the Byzantine empire tends to fall through the gap between Christendom and Islam. The huge contribution of what was after all the lineal descendant of the Roman Empire to both the preservation of the West and the maintenance of an intellectual tradition is frequently either neglected or forgotten, and for all its inaccessibility to modern generalists it is an essential part of their world. As to whether this is a book for anyone starting out into the vagaries of Byzantine religious politics I am not certain. Much is lucid, but much more is oustandingly complex, and the authoress's thematic structure necessitates the retention of much detail from one point to another. The book also skims too lightly over theological disputes - Miss Herrin clearly understands the Iconoclast controversy, and although I accept that a full rehearsal of the arguments would be impossible, it would be nice to have more than a thumbnail sketch of the points at issue, even if the details were not immediately reflected in events. However, for someone who knows a little early Byzantine history and wishes to deepen that knowledge it is hard to think of a better rehearsal of the subject, and it is such a reader who will best appreciate Miss Herrin's insights. It is, however, a great pity that this is the last reader who will be attracted by the misleading and inappropriate title.

ACCOUNTING FOR HUMANITY

Francis Dunlop

Man: His Nature and Place in the World, Arnold Gehlen, translated by Clare McMillan and Karl Pillemer, Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. xxxvi + 418, $50.00, (0-231-05218-9).

This book originally appeared in 1940 as *Der Mensch, seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt.* Since then it has been extensively revised on more than one occasion and has had numerous reprintings. Although Columbia University Press brought out a translation of one of Gehlen's shorter works a few years ago, this is the first English edition of any of his four most important books. As such its appearance is to be unreservedly welcomed.

Gehlen was born in 1904 and died in 1976, after a successful academic career. He was something of a polymath, a philosopher of the old school, a survivor of an age when academic specialisation had not broken up the culture of the educated. He wrote with authority on a great variety of topics in the humanities and social studies and addressed extensive audiences on public affairs. But the centre of his interest was always the nature of Man, and the ideas presented in *Der Mensch* formed the foundation for all his subsequent work, whether in philosophy, sociology, anthropology, art criticism or his frequently controversial social and political commentary. Although he was most frequently attacked from the Left, the foundations of his work are not ideological.

Like almost all those who have given a philosophical account of Man, Gehlen is impressed with the great differences between human beings and other animals. For him the main difference is that, whereas the life of animals is laid down for them by Nature, Man has no naturally given environment or way of life. This is shown by the paucity of his instincts and the unspecialised nature of his physical organs - in short, by his constitutional neediness. Thus he must make a

life for himself, indeed, make himself, by adapting the world to his own purposes. Whereas animals are enclosed within a predetermined milieu. Man is 'open' to an as yet unspecified world. It follows that he must *act*. Man is, then, essentially an *acting* being, and everything else about him must be understood in terms of this overriding need to act on the world in order to keep himself in being. These basic ideas are first expounded in nine introductory chapters.

They are fleshed out more fully in the three following sections of the book. Part I is devoted to Man's special morphology. Gehlen uses the work of specialists to argue that there is an archaic primitiveness about human organs which makes them specially adaptable. Again, his foetal and infant development are unusually retarded, so that he may be able to adapt himself to the life of his group whatever it happens to be. In a third chapter he discusses the question of the descent of Man in the light of these data.

The second part is entitled 'Perception, Movement and Language', and is designed to show how Man's originary deprivation becomes an advantage. The burden of having no ready-made life to live is compensated for by a series of characteristic 'reliefs' (*Entlastungen*). Language plays a key role here, its primary function being to put the world 'at his disposal'. Man's lack of natural fixity and orientation means that he is in danger of being overwhelmed by a flood of disturbing impressions, of failing to move effectively in the world from a sheer superfluity of possible movements. Language enables him to bring the necessary order and definition into his sensory-motor equipment, so that the world can be mastered and made available to him in the form of a familiar field of possibly useful objects and a repertoire of movement-types detached from the pressures of immediate need.

In the third part Gehlen carries the analysis into the realm of moral character and the spiritual sphere of Man's being. Since all human life must become, in Gehlen's term, *sprachmaessig*, or conceptualised, everything is also 'objectified'. This must include Man himself, who is thus willy-nilly a being of detachment, self-governance and discipline. This enables Gehlen to argue that his central conception of Man as *acting* being does away with the old metaphysical problems about body, soul and spirit, and the relations between them, since they are all necessarily present in every act. Even the highest cultural achievements are forms of action, ways of mastering the world to keep a hold on the life he has wrested from it, and will involve bodily, psychic and spiritual (or self-directed, intelligent) activity.

It is not surprising that the chief criticism levelled at Gehlen's book is that it is 'biologistic', since everything is in the end reduced to a matter of staying alive, of maintaining oneself in being. And yet the work is not reductionist in the crude sense at all. No attempt is made to argue that, say, altruistic behaviour is 'really' self-interested, or 'nothing but' covert self-love. Moral and spiritual phenomena are accepted as they are, without distortion. Indeed, there are many fine analyses here of such things. Gehlen lays himself open to the reductionist charge rather by his refusal to raise the metaphysical questions than by taking up any position on them.

A striking feature of Gehlen's work is his theory of categories. His aim was to shed philosophical light on Man's nature and life. But he thought that the concepts and ideas traditionally employed to do this were no longer serviceable. Metaphysics was in retreat. So he produced a new set. These 'categories', such as *Entlastung* (relief), are to be *durchlaufend* (one might render this 'applicable all along the line'), and suitable for characterising physical movement, psychic functioning and willed activity alike. There is no doubt that the unity and interconnectedness of everything human is thereby brought into high relief. Gehlen's analyses are often fresh, subtle and illuminating. But, inevitably, the discontinuities and inevitable *splitness* of human being is lost to view. It is also arguable that no account of a thing that does not relate it to other things will suffice for philosophy. Man is certainly complex enough to stand a great deal of 'internal' analysis. But, in the end, the really big questions for an adequate philosophy concern his relation to the Whole.

The translation contains errors - quite a few if my sample was representative. But, in general, it seems a workmanlike achievement, especially in view of the difficulty of Gehlen's German, which is sometimes involved and obscure. It is, however, to my mind unfortunate that the translators have made no real attempt to convey the sometimes delightfully ironical touches of Gehlen's style, which form a counterbalance to what they rightly call his 'ponderous and didactic' traits. However, that may be, one may be very thankful that they persevered in their formidable task, since the book has long deserved to be accessible - even in a 'penny plain' version - to those who do not have much German.

Errata

Keith McFall, the solicitor who advertised in the June 1988 issue of the *Review* would like to point out that his correct London telephone number is: 01-808 3237.

The author of *Kant's Political Philosophy*, reviewed in the March 1988 issue is **Howard Williams**, not Howard Robinson.

In Short

Another Gospel? Rachel Tingle, The Christian Studies Centre, 8 Victoria Square, London SW1, 75pp., £3.95. (0-9513721-0-6).

In this disturbing booklet, Rachel Tingle eloquently displays the extent of the Church of England's conversion from pastoral to political interests, and the alarming gap which now separates the hierarchy of the Church, in faith, doctrine and morality as well as in political stance, from the laity over which it presides. Missions have been replaced by political activism, individual salvation is renounced on behalf of 'social responsibility', and evil ceases to be viewed as a matter of individual will and is seen instead as the product of social 'structures' and 'unjust' allocations of property and power. Thus the Anglican church blunders sheep-like along the path prepared for it by the World Council of Churches, aligning itself wherever possible with the causes of the left, with the 'enemies of racism and imperialism', and even with the Soviet Communist Party, against the civilisation which it once endeavoured to sustain. The facts marshalled by Rachel Tingle are spine-chilling. Inspired by secular fashion, and tolerant towards all the easy-going moral counsels of the age, the bishops blithely undo the work of centuries, throwing away all but their cassocks in the vain attempt to make the Anglican church 'relevant' to a world which could never be impressed by their frivolous endorsement of its all too secular ideals. If Miss Tingle is to be believed the unChristian hatred of the 'anti-racists', and the libertinous morality of 'gay liberation', seem to carry as much weight with our spiritual guardians as the centuries old habit of obedience which they once upheld. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Alas for the Anglican church that it has no answer.
(R.S.)

Less Important than Opulence, Christopher Coker, IEDSS, 13/14 Golden Square, London W1, 53pp., £4.50 (0-907967-92-2).

Few defence analysts are as knowledgeable as Christopher Coker, and fewer still write so agreeably. In this challenging work he argues that the Conservative Party owes its reputation as the 'party of defence' only to the failure of the Labour Party to have any defence policy at all. During eight years of Conservative government military spending has been maintained at a dangerously low level (lower even than the Labour Party had projected in Callaghan's day). Our navy has been allowed to decline, at the very moment when, as every student of Soviet strategy knows, naval power has become crucial to the policy of deterrence. The Conservatives have failed to offer any alternative strategy to NATO, in the face of increasing evidence that the Americans will soon reduce their commitment to Europe. Under Mrs Thatcher's impetuous leadership, they have accepted the gift smilingly held out by the Soviet Union: the gift of nuclear disarmament, the first stage of which has been accomplished in the INF agreement. Thus Mrs Thatcher has led us, just as President Reagan has led the Americans, into what Lord Chalfont calls the 'arms control trap' - the trap of organising defence on terms dictated by one's enemy. This fact, combined with the astonishing ignorance among Conservative MPs of the first rudiments of strategic thinking, and the widespread failure to understand the present dangers, has left the country all but hostage to events which it may not be able to control. The message of this booklet to the Tory government is the message which must now be shouted from the rooftops to the entire Western world: wake up, for God's sake, before it is too late!
(R.S.)

Political Violence in the World, 1967-1987, The Lebanese Centre for Documentation and Research, P.O. Box 4216, Limassol, 2 Vols., 654pp and 402pp.

To have lived through the past twenty years in Lebanon is to have known the meaning of political violence, and to have understood the difficulties that democracies have in defending themselves from it. In this astonishing work, the members of the Lebanese Centre for Documentation and Research have tried to catalogue in sequence every recorded instance of political violence over the past twenty years, describing each event with scrupulous impartiality, and including a bibliography of 7,000 items, together with the most important national and international declarations. The result is the most comprehensive existing survey of the phenomenon, which will remain indispensable to political analysts for years to come.

The most striking impression which the reader obtains from these volumes is that of the indefatigable nature of the violence they describe. There is an entry for almost every day over the twenty years covered, and the same terrorist groups, the same places of operation, and the same hideous crimes against the innocent are being described at the end of the period as were mentioned in the beginning. Among the democracies, the United States seems least often to be afflicted: a fact which testifies as much to the vigilance of the FBI as to the conciliatory nature of the democratic process. At the same time actual violence is more deliberate in the US than elsewhere: the target is usually the President, or some other holder of highest office. In Lebanon, by contrast, the target is everyone, including the patient authors of these impressive volumes.
(R.S.)

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