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The Salisbury Review

A quarterly magazine of conservative thought


The Third Marquess of Salisbury
1830–1903

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Teaching the Professor	**M. F. Strachan**

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The Salisbury Review
A quarterly magazine of conservative thought

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Editorial address: 7 Lord North St., London SW1
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The Welfare State emerged as the consensual answer to the 'Social Question' of Victorian England. And like every political solution guided by conscience, it was not final. The creature of the Welfare State proved to be devoid of the very moral responsibility which had originally created him. Either he was a beneficiary of the system - in which case he began to claim as a right what had once been offered as charity. Or he was a provider of the system's resources - in which case he was encouraged to regard the poor as beyond his personal concern, the pampered recipients of wealth which was his by right and unjustly extorted. Gratitude and compassion were alike displaced from the centre of human affairs, and the more the State took charge of welfare, the less it permitted by way of active charity. In the fully socialist states of Eastern Europe charities are illegal, or else unprotected by the law. Only in America does private charity now play a major role in offering relief and education to those who cannot otherwise obtain it.

David Marsland gives reasons for doubting that the Welfare State is reformable. As a monopoly provider, subject to no market constraints, its resources are increasingly devoted to its own expansion, and less and less used for the benefit of those whom it was designed to serve. The result, A. D. Harvey argues, is a new kind of feudalism, in which the intermediate 'estates' are attached to bureaucratic offices rather than to land. Socialism arises in the modern world as the ideology of the feudal class: it is the doctrine which justifies the power of that class and secures the submission of those - the private businessmen and their employees - whose duty it is to feed the superfluous army of bureaucrats.

The rise of this new class explains the 'corruptions' described by Antony Flew. The 'clerks' are part of the welfare establishment, paid by the State to provide education to those who have no other means of obtaining it. Their first concern is the concern of rational economic man everywhere: to ensure maximum benefit to the self, at minimum cost to the self. Their interest lies in increasing the 'resources' devoted to their profession, and in obtaining an ever greater share in them. Their ideology is the one suited to this aim: egalitarian, relativistic, and favourable to 'initiatives from above', in the form of new academic 'disciplines' whose merits can be judged only by those who have an interest in promoting them. Nothing is more threatening to such people than the attempt to assess them by academic merit rather than ideological conformity; hence we should not be surprised if intellectual corruption is so frequent a result of their efforts to increase their power.

The growth of the 'soft-left' bureaucracy was clearly envisaged by Michael Polanyi, our current conservative thinker, for whom the new feudalism constituted a threat not only to individual responsibility, but also to the attitude upon which order and constitutional government depend. Those who attack Mrs Thatcher's policies for their 'individualism', 'short-sightedness' and 'self-seeking', and who represent market mechanisms as inimical to the long-term view of things, ought to pay more attention to the thought of Polanyi. It is not the pursuit of profit which destroys the sense of responsibility, but rather the pursuit of profit in the absence of personal risk - the phenomenon exemplified to perfection by the bureaucracies of the Welfare State. The long-term view of things is threatened whenever the penalities of wrong conduct can be transferred to persons unknown, and whenever the unborn and the dead have no say in present decisions. The individual who bears the full cost of his own excesses, who chooses unprotected and who risks himself in all his transactions, has a far greater respect for authority and tradition, and a far closer relation to the unborn and the dead, than the bureaucrat cushioned from the results of his choice, and endowed with the means to shift the burden onto heads that he will never love or know.

To emerge from the condition of 'protection', as Buckle called it, is not easy, as the parents of Dewsbury have discovered. Writing in this issue, one of the teachers who has given his time to these victims of the system shows the enormous obstacles placed in their path. The Dewsbury parents have committed a terrible crime. They have refused to accept that their children are the property of the State. Mr Flint's article appears along with three others from teachers in the State system, all of them illustrating the crisis which monopoly provision has brought to our schools, and all of them providing powerful arguments for the kind of reform which the Government is at last seeking to initiate. Let us hope that this reform will be successful, and that the next generation will be inducted once again into that condition of reverence and responsibility without which the hope expressed in these pages by Quinlan Terry - the hope for beauty and lastingness in the things that we build - can never be fulfilled.

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Conservative Journals: THE INTERCOLLEGIATE REVIEW

With the notable exception of *The Salisbury Review*, Britain lacks intellectual journals, in which academics defend the values, institutions and power-structures of Western civilisation. As our experience testifies, it is not decent for British academics to give public support to British conservatism, and the persistence of *The Salisbury Review* is probably a violation of fundamental academic freedoms. Like Britain, America now possesses an enormous dirigiste bureaucracy within the universities. Nevertheless, thanks to a still resilient patriotic feeling, conservative academics can call on outside help in publishing their journals, and can establish, within the universities, institutions whose windows remain unbroken for weeks at a time, and publications to which university libraries still subscribe.

Among such publications is the *Intercollegiate Review*, edited by Gregory Wolfe, and published 2–4 times during the academic year. Its orientation is peculiarly its own – a synthesis of Voegelinian conservatism, robust American patriotism, and old-fashioned democratic decencies of the kind celebrated by Lionel Trilling. The *Review* has given comfort to many who are not persuaded that Marxism, feminism, deconstruction and third-worldism are the true inheritors of the United States Constitution, or that the *New York Review of Books* is the authoritative commentator on that document's meaning.

The issue from autumn 1987 contains an important symposium on the humanities, inspired by a courageous speech in which Secretary of State Bennett defended Western civilisation as the object and reward of humane education: something that would have gone without saying until the arrival of Mass Campus Man. (Bennett's speech was greeted by a storm of outrage. The University of Stanford is now considering whether to cancel its course on Western Civilisation, arguing that it is not fitting for a university to give support to cultural elitism, or to run courses that are founded on colonialist, and racist attitudes.)

In a splendid contribution to the symposium, Peter Shaw defends the Arnoldian answer to the question, 'What, and why, should we read?', while Lee Congdon gives the lie to Marxist historiography in an essay that is sure to cost him all further prospect of promotion. The symposium should be read by all British academics in the humanities. As experience shows, the absurd fashions generated on the American campus soon make their way across the Atlantic, to take up a residence that is more permanent here than any fashion can be in America.

The Intercollegiate Review is available, price $10 for 4 issues, from ISI, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010.

The Welfare State as Producer Monopoly[1]

David Marsland

For some observers, let us call them socialists, the Welfare State society represents a transitional stage in the passage between capitalism and socialism. Others, whom we might call welfarists, see it as a distinct type of social organisation, which transcends capitalism and socialism and their equal and opposite contradictions. For a third group, conservatives, the Welfare State is the outcome of unavoidable concessions that have had to be made to the demands of socialists and organised labour, regrettable to a degree, but tolerable provided it is contained within reasonable bounds such that conservative interests are not fundamentally challenged.

In Britain particularly, and in the liberal capitalist free world more generally, an unholy alliance of social forces resting on these three mutually contradictory conceptions - socialist, welfarist, and conservative - has for three decades effected the imposition on the population of the bureaucratic apparatus of the Welfare State.

Throughout this period, sociologists, social policy analysts, and social researchers have for the most part treated the Welfare State thoroughly uncritically. Many accounts of it indeed breathe the awed and reverend tones of a priest speaking of his church, or even his God (Halmos). Even criticisms have been largely restricted to insider complaints about the apparent ineffectiveness of the Welfare State in redistributing wealth or eliminating poverty, and associated with demands for elaboration and strengthening of the welfare apparatus (Townsend, Room, Hindess).

Yet by the end of the seventies a crisis in the Welfare State had become widely acknowledged, and by the eighties elected governments in many liberal democratic societies were actively involved in dismantling the apparatus of welfare built up since the beginning of the century. This process has so far, however, gone much less rapidly or successfully than supporters of Reaganite and Thatcherite principles had hoped and expected. Moreover, sociologists, social policy analysts, and social researchers, together with their media allies, have continued, with few exceptions, in their defensive apologia for the Welfare State. They have contributed significantly to the sabotage of Welfare State retrenchment by embarking on a frenzied campaign of resistance (Hindess, Bosanquet, Mishra).

The contention of social scientists like myself who are sympathetic to Reaganite/Thatcherite, or in short, libertarian, principles, and who refuse to join in this campaign is that the Welfate State is inherently and inevitably damaging to freedom and democracy as much as to economic efficiency. This case has not so far been well taken by social scientists, nor has it been fairly and seriously attended by its opponents. Its analysis continues to be portrayed as belonging to a strident right-wing minority of reactionary capitalist collaborators who hardly merit inclusion within the community of social science. This is certainly how the important research and publications of the Institute of Economic Affairs have been treated, for example (Seldon).

There are good grounds, however, deriving from both conceptual analysis and empirical evidence, for allowing a little credit to the thoroughgoing libertarian critique of the Welfare State. I intend to show this by examining:

- First, the crucial importance for effective and equitable welfare provision of consumers' preferences and of competition between producers and providers in the welfare sphere;
- Second, the extent to which in practice, whatever the pretentions involved, the Welfare State objectively represents a major arena of producer monopoly control, with all the damaging and dangerous consequences routinely associated throughout history with producer monopoly;
- And third, the particularly dangerous extent to which producer monopoly in the welfare sphere threatens freedom and democracy when it is in the hands of the State - pointing the way, as Hayek argued long ago, along the road to serfdom.

This analysis is intended as just one small part of an overall critique of the collectivist and statist assumptions shared equally by socialists, welfarists and conservatives. It is part of a project aimed at constructing a libertarian and genuinely liberal sociology which can provide a social analysis of our times which is as objectively justifiable as it is politically requisite.

Socialists in socialist societies are at least consistent. They trust neither producers nor consumers, and seek (or at least sought until very recently), inevitably by authoritarian procedures, to bring the producers and consumers of all goods and services under the control of the State. By contrast, those who defend the Welfare State in liberal democratic societies involve themselves in establishing and justifying an illogical and senseless distinction between some goods and services and others.

For there are today very few supporters of full-blooded socialism left. It has been conceded by all except fellow-travellers and backwoodsmen that even the 'commanding heights of the economy' in the manufacturing sphere are better left to private initiative than brought within the clumsy and inefficient control of a State.[2] In this major respect, indeed, even the Soviet Union and China are endeavouring, manfully if perhaps vainly, to follow a capitalist road from within the limitations of a socialist infrastructure.

Apparently, however, what is acknowledged at last to be good for steel is still bad for health care, and what is essential for high technology manufacturing is deemed still to be inconceivable for education. For in the Welfare State societies consumer sovereignty remains negligible in the welfare sphere, and producer monopoly under State control remains absolutely dominant. Thus in Britain education and health care are still, almost ten years after Mrs Thatcher's first election, almost entirely State monopolies; pensions and social security provision are dominated by the State to an almost equally huge extent; even in housing, for all the talk, the State retains a powerful hegemony as far as lower income families are concerned. And the issues of poverty, inner city problems, and urban regeneration are still largely conceived in welfare terms, and thus assumed to be primarily arenas for State initiative and State expenditure. Again at local State level monopoly power is wielded by politicised bureaucrats in areas as diverse as planning, refuse collection, and social services.

Why should this be so? Can it be shown that *any* of these services are different from goods and services in general, or that they are in any way or to any degree immune from the well-established arguments supporting consumer choice in general? The most important of these arguments seem to me to be as follows:

1. Consumer tastes and needs vary over a wide range and unpredictably. Only markets, that is to say mechanisms specifically answerable to consumer demand can address this variety effectively.
2. Consumer tastes and needs are subject to rapid unpredictable change. Only markets can adjust with reliable rapidity to such change.
3. Entrepreneurs and technologists, in the social field as much as any other, tend - unless they are prevented - to produce innovations and improvements. Only a market answerable to consumer preferences allows reliably for effective testing and implementation of such improvements.
4. Only those forms of organisation of the production of goods and services which are oriented to consumer preferences and subject to consumer sovereignty are likely, through competition, to minimise costs and prices.
5. Only those forms of organisations of the production of goods and services which are oriented to consumer preferences and subject to consumer sovereignty are likely, again through competition and the effects of prices, to reduce waste and more generally to maximise efficiency.
6. Only consumer sovereignty is capable of determining optimum levels of investment and expenditure. In its absence investment and other expenditure is likely to be artificially and damagingly either held down (as in health) or exaggerated (as perhaps in education).
7. Only consumer sovereignty within a competitive market prevents the need for excessive and dangerous political controls, ramifying bureaucracy, and rationing in one form or another.
8. Only organisations which are answerable to competitive markets and consumer choice are capable of resisting exaggerated trade union demands.

These arguments in favour of the general benefits of consumer sovereignty are still resisted in some quarters. However - as is demonstrated by developments in the socialist world, by the de-regulatory action of socialist governments in France, Spain, New Zealand, and elsewhere, by the British Labour Party's comprehensive review of its hitherto unblemished collectivist and welfarist policy commitments, and by the Fabian Tract I have referred to earlier - socialist practice is leaving socialist and social scientific thinking behind.

Increasingly, and increasingly rapidly, the general arguments in favour of consumer sovereignty have gained ground even in relation to welfare services. Increasingly it is being acknowledged that opposition to consumer liberation in the welfare sphere is not grounded in rational argument or empirical evidence at all, but is based simply on a lethal combination of conservative dogma and vested labour and professional interest. As Taylor-Gooby has put it recently[3] '... many people experience real freedom in choosing their supper from the supermarket shelves, whereas they are treated more like subservient clients than equal citizens in the GP's surgery or in choosing schools.'

Perhaps even this useful formulation is to some serious degree misleading, and deficient precisely to the extent that it remains shaped by welfarist rather than liberal-libertarian assumptions. For:

a) Presently most parents have no real choice of school at all. Dissatisfaction arises because they know they are not actually choosing, even if the authorities pretend they are.
b) Patient subservience and professional paternalist domination are not accidental, trivial, or capable of remedy by any merely administrative reform, nor by an augmentation of resources, however substantial. They are inevitable so long as competition between doctors is outlawed.
c) The belief that citizenship rights can somehow encompass or replace consumer benefits is myth deriving from welfarist dogma. Democracy requires both political rights and consumer sovereignty, and a proper demarcation of their spheres of relevance.

In short, consumers are not genuinely consumers at all in any coherent and legitimate sense of the concept unless:

1. The consumer has a choice between at least two

producers or suppliers;
2. Producers and suppliers are in competition with each other;
3. Producers and suppliers can lose out as a result of a loss of profit occasioned by consumers choosing their competitors.

I have proposed that the general arguments in favour of consumer sovereignty are unanswerable, that there is no evident reason why they should not apply as much to welfare provision as to other goods and services, and that the concept of 'the consumer' entails profit-oriented competition between a multiplicity of producers or suppliers. There are, however, at least four special arguments which are commonly and still influentially deployed by way of resistance to removing welfare provision from State monopoly control and handing it over to private, voluntary and cooperative initiatives.

- It is argued that consumer sovereignty can be provided for at least as well, if not better, by alternative mechanisms which avoid the damaging effects of markets.
- It is argued that, while market provision may be appropriate for many, it is bound to be inadequate and unfair in relation to the poor and deprived, or to lower income groups generally.
- It is argued that 'two tier systems' - with the market providing for a prosperous majority and the State providing special schemes for the minority excluded from the market as a result of low income - must necessarily result in damaging stigma attaching to the latter.
- It is argued that the Welfare State is not and should not be intended merely to 'provide services', and that libertarian welfare policies such as I wish to see implemented would prevent the attainment of the new levels of 'justice', 'equality', or 'citizenship' which the Welfare State *is* in the business of facilitating.

The first argument here, which proposes that there are adequate alternative sources of consumer sovereignty besides the market, is little more than a counsel of despair on the part of reluctant converts to the validity of consumer preferences. Does *anyone* really believe that consumers' associations, publications such as *Which?*, or even consumer protection legislation can conceivably serve as effective alternatives to competition between manufacturers and suppliers? Useful complements certainly, but patently not an alternative mechanism of anything like the same force.

Again, regulatory bodies, such as for example OFTEL in relation to tele-communications, are doing necessary and useful work, but they offer a very pale imitation of consumer sovereignty indeed compared with real competition, in this instance between BT and a number of genuine rivals. Community Health Councils are no doubt also useful, but they can do very little to serve patients' interests so long as health care is organised as a State monopoly. And in education neither State supervision and inspection, nor the appointment of parental school governors, nor the establishment of Parents' Associations have been of more than marginal assistance to parents dissatisfied with the education provided for their children by so many of our schools. It will take real competition, such as the Government is now providing for in its Education Reform Bill, and the possibility of genuine choice between different schools before significant consumer benefits begin to appear.

The second argument is an expression of the long-standing British plea on behalf of 'the poor', who it presumes cannot be catered for adequately by market mechanisms. This argument has been a major source of support in Britain for those intent on supplanting the market by State organisations. I find it difficult to conceive how it has managed even to achieve plausibility.

After all, if it were suggested that cars, or clothes, or food should be removed from the market and supplied by the State because of income differences, the idea would be regarded as absurd and rejected out of hand even by socialists. Yet many besides socialists apparently accept the same argument unhesitatingly in relation to libraries, hospitals, and schooling.

There are two distinct sorts of answer to this argument. First, to the extent that it may be judged politically that some groups are inequitably disadvantaged in economic terms, their situation is likely to be much more effectively remedied, with less damaging effects on them, on the economy, and on the population as a whole, by fiscal means, or more generally by monetary transfers, than by State take-over.

Secondly, historical analysis reveals increasingly persuasively that much larger proportions of the so-called poor are capable of taking advantage of market systems than apologists for paternalist state control have generally claimed. Thus, for example, E.G. West[4] has demonstrated that large numbers of ordinary people, including the poorest, were successfully and contentedly paying for their children's education before the Foster Act of 1870 killed off private educational development in Britain for all except the wealthy. Again, David Green has shown[5] that a combination of market and mutual systems was providing health care for the poor at least as good as the nationalised Health Service has managed since, until doctors noticed the syndicalist advantages to themselves of monopoly control.

The third argument for resisting the natural extension of markets into spheres reserved still in Britain and other Welfare State societies for State mercantilism urges the damaging effects of two-tier systems, with the prosperous taking advantage of private sector provision, and the minority poor restricted to inadequate public services. There is quite clearly some validity to this argument, as is evidenced by the fact that people of all sorts do opt out of public provision in education, health, and housing whenever they can afford it, even at the cost of paying twice over. However, to that extent it collapses into the previous argument,

and is answerable in the same terms.

For if second tier provision is inherently or generally inadequate, it is manifestly preferable to shift as rapidly as possible to first tier provision for all through the market, with the poor assisted in taking advantage of it by monetary rather than administrative measures. No one, after all, has to my knowledge complained about private squalor and public affluence, and there is no plausible argument, except in terms of political dogma, for a movement in the opposite direction, with two-tier systems unified by outlawing entirely all market provision.

Moreover, there may be positive advantages in the apparent weaknesses identified by opponents of two-tier systems. For provided the lower quality public provision is small in scale compared with the totality - in the proportion we find in housing in Britain, for example, of 30/70 or better, rather than in education (90/10) - then the dissatisfaction and even the stigma associated with public provision can serve as a dynamic motivator for the aspirations of even the poorest - as seems to happen in the United States and especially in Switzerland, where the statist and collectivist assumptions of welfarism have been consistently rejected.[6]

Where the tilt is in the other direction, however, the psychological effect is also in the contrary direction, gradually reducing incentives and motivation for self-help and progress on the part of consumers, and destroying all commitment to standards of excellence on the part of producers. This seems to me the main lesson we should learn from Eastern European socialism.[7]

The fourth and last argument acknowledges in principle that welfare services, like others, could be provided entirely effectively by market and other non-State mechanisms. Its supporters - in Britain most notably Richard Titmuss[8] - insist, however, that this is not the point, since it is a measure of a decent society that such services are rights, and should be provided not merely adequately but equally for all.

The case is thus transferred from the economic to the philosophical sphere. As such it has been answered more than adequately in my judgement by critics of socialism such as Hayek and Nozick and by historians of socialism such as Kolakowski. At least, the onus of proof, at this level, now rests with the socialist, who shows no great ability to discharge it.

No doubt socialists will remain unpersuaded, but that is not my concern here. For if the only remaining defence of State monopoly welfare provision rests entirely on the commitment to socialism, it is not one which need much concern rational analysts of welfare provision as such, even if they happen to be socialists, or even democratic politicians, provided they are neither knaves nor fools. If there is not a better argument for resisting the disestablishment of State welfare than socialism's need for it, then - given the evidence about the inevitable inadequacies of monopoly provision of any goods and services, and the manifest incapacity of State welfare to answer consumer needs - so much the worse for socialism.

Naturally market provision of welfare services, as with market supply of other goods and services, is unequal. What matters for this analysis, however, and what matters most to all except fundamentalist egalitarians, is that it appears to be the only mechanism capable of answering reliably, effectively, and at reasonable cost, consumer needs in all their variety. Only in the market is the consumer sovereign and protected from abuse by monopoly exploitation. This is no less true in relation to welfare than with other goods and services. If, from time to time, this leaves some consumers too much disadvantaged in terms of disposable income to take full advantage of the market and of their normal rights as consumers, then this is a case not for limiting the market's operations, but adjusting the tax system.

In general, supporters of the Welfare State are sceptical in the extreme about economics as a disipline. References by liberal and libertarian social scientists to 'economic reality', or 'market forces' or 'the law of supply and demand' are usually treated by them with outright derision. There is, however, one aspect of economic analysis they commonly accept and even acclaim: this is the demonstration of the harm done by monopolies. Yet curiously, in relation to welfare services, the serious harm done by monopoly is consistently ignored by socialists and welfarists, and played down even by conservative supporters of the Welfare State. This is, to say the least, disturbing, given the demonstrated benefits of consumer sovereignty in general terms, and the mounting evidence of the inefficiencies and destructive effects of monopoly welfare. As an example of some topical significance in Britain, take health care.[9] In Britain, as also everywhere else where market mechanisms and consumer choice are systematically excluded or held in tight check, the amount spent on health is substantially less than where the public are allowed and encouraged to choose and spend for themselves. In monopoly conditions, the professional associations and trade unions of health workers are able to slow down innovation, to seize for themselves disproportionate amounts of available resources, and to treat patients insensitively. In these circumstances, effectiveness, efficiency, standards, and patient satisfaction are inevitably gradually reduced.

In Britain this process has now reached such a point that it is becoming clear even to the most zealous defenders of the status quo, that no amount of extra resources can make any significant difference in the long term. In any case, as a recent poll by Grosse shows,[10] less than a third of people want more spent specifically on health, and only 17% are willing to pay more tax for health spending (only 10% would pay as much as 3p more on the standard rate of tax). Furthermore, OHE figures for 1987 show that there are in Britain more than twice as many nurses proportionately as in West Germany, and at least 50% more than in the USA or France, and still there are apparently and

allegedly not enough.

Quite new approaches - relying on genuine insurance principles, ensuring competition, and allowing real consumer choice - are essential. It is in my judgement one of Mrs Thatcher's gravest errors to have boasted that the National Health Service was safe in her government's hands.

Green's analysis provides more than sufficient evidence of the damage done to British health care by monopoly control and of the potential advantages of shifting towards a more competitive system. However, let me illustrate the gravity of the harm which can be done in this sphere by monopoly with an extreme case which suggests where denial of consumer preferences leads to if it is applied consistently and systematically. This is from a recent report of the situation in Poland:[11]

> The corridors of Orlowskiego hospital are clogged with beds. Some of the sick lie in sheets covered in blood and streaked with excrement because the laundry cannot cope and the nursing staff is so small that bedding could not be changed regularly, even if the laundry worked.
>
> Visitors not only bring food to supplement inadequate diets, but bring clean sheets and clothes as well as any medication they can get their hands on which is requested by doctors.
>
> Thirty-five per cent of Poland's patients come out of hospital with at least one more illness than they entered with because of the almost total lack of disinfectant and inadequate sterilisation methods.

And again:

> A free medical service is claimed, but nothing could be further from the truth. Patients cannot even hope to see a general practitioner without the occasional box of chocolates or bottle of vodka.
>
> Anything more elaborate and you are talking serious money. The average bribe for an operation is 10,000 zloty (£18), two weeks' salary, paid to the surgeon or the head sister.
>
> People are so used to employing bribes and gifts as a means of easing wheels in Eastern Europe that no one thinks the behaviour of medical personnel to be particularly abhorrent.

Take as a second example housing. Here welfarists have fortunately been less successful in Britain than in health, education, or social services. Even in the worst phase of the campaign for monopoly control, family home ownership remained fairly high, indeed increased somewhat, and private rental was not quite squeezed out of existence entirely. This is not to claim much, however.

Labour governments and Labour controlled councils continued throughout the sixties and seventies to build council housing in large amounts, despite evidence of its costs and its damaging psycho-social effects. Labour politicians continued to resist the Conservative government's policy of sale of council houses right up to the point where even they could no longer ignore the fact that it was an immensely popular policy. Even after the purchase of hundreds of thousands of homes by their tenants, the proportion of council housing units (significant phrase) in Britain remains enormously high compared with any other free society. In Scotland local authority monopoly in housing is scarcely less than in communist societies. In many of the inner areas of the big cities there is hardly any privately owned or rented housing at all, even if housing association and charitable housing is included. Furthermore the Rent Acts introduced by the Labour Party as part of its systematic campaign of welfarist housing remain even today - owing to Conservative timidity - largely in force. They continue to have the entirely predictable effect of reducing the amount of available reasonably priced housing and swelling the number of homeless people. Consider more broadly the effects of monopoly housing. First, Alice Coleman[12] has demonstrated that careless yet paternalistic local authority housing policies must accept a large share of responsibility for rampant crime in inner city areas. Defensible family territory has been destroyed, and replaced by huge high rise towers and massive blocks set in concrete urban wastelands which are indefensible even by the police, let alone by normal local community action.

Secondly, Ian Robinson[13] has shown from his research how council housing creates - as a result of the inferior status associated with it, and the poor quality of its design and management - a destructive stigma and an even more destructive dependency which combine together to prevent social involvement and enterprise. Where capitalism failed to produce a proletariat according to Marxist prescriptions, monopoly council housing has succeeded at least in generating a lumpenproletariat of exploited tenants. Their liberation is essential if democracy is not to be put in danger.

Another aspect of the damage done by monopoly control in this sphere is illuminated by a recent report by the Audit Commission on councils' management of the huge tracts of land and swathes of property they bought up to advance their monopoly welfarist concepts of housing and employment. The Commission, whose job is to monitor local government efficiency, accuses councils of the following deficiencies:[14]

- Failing to adopt a commercial approach in the management of their vast property portfolios, often in prime town-centre sites, and in some cases not even knowing what they consist of. If they did, the report says, they might conclude they would achieve a better return by selling and investing the money;
- Holding on to 100,000 acres of surplus land instead of releasing it to developers;
- Failing to estimate how much they need to spend on repairing buildings, especially schools.

One of the councils in question, Sheffield City Council, owns *seventy five per cent* of all the property in the town centre, a level of monopoly - with its usual

effects - which would cause an indignant outcry from the opposition benches in parliament, from the media, and from most social researchers if it were private rather than public.

One could extend this analysis of the harm done by monopoly considerably into all the areas of social life where welfare provision has been allowed to fall into unilateral control. I will not enter into that longer analysis now, but content myself by referring to a study which has demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt the destructive effects of monopoly across the board of welfare and other provision. This is E.S. Savas' *Privatizing the Public Sector* (Chatham House, 1982). His analysis is all the more compelling because it relates to the United States, where welfarist beliefs have never taken the intractable hold on the imagination of intellectuals, politicians, and other influentials which they have had in Britain for many decades. His conclusions apply *a fortiori*, therefore, to the British case - namely that monopoly domination of welfare, as of other sectors, can be and should be radically reduced in the interests of the free citizen in his or her role as a consumer.

A primary rationale for State control, still heard from some on the left and used when it suits them by those of a different political complexion, is that it provides an effective antidote to private monopoly and oligopoly. This has always been a nonsense, and in many of its expressions a disingenuous undercover argument against capitalism. The State is the *monopoly of monopolies*. All the deficiencies of private monopoly are multiplied a thousandfold by State monopoly, which is a precondition of socialism and a contradiction both of capitalism and of democracy. In the welfare sphere, State monopoly control threatens an open road to serfdom, as Hayek recognised and demonstrated long ago. By escalating public expenditure, it inflicts on societies inflation and eventually bankruptcy. By destroying incentives and motivation, it strangles enterprise.[15] By pulling all the diverse threads of control over the population into a single power centre, it threatens democracy at its roots and promises totalitarian rule.

If monopoly as such is dangerous and damaging, a singular State monopoly in welfare such as prevails still in Britain holds out far worse dangers and threatens even more destructive damage. Its gross inefficiency compared with provision through the market and through market-related voluntary and cooperative mechanisms is patent. The harm it does to the poor in particular by reducing them to abject dependency is transparent. The danger that it will snuff out altogether the role of the independent consumer, and with it all the benefits of consumer sovereignty, producer efficiency, and a dynamic, open, free society is apparent to all except those who are in principle opposed to the continuance of liberal democratic capitalism - that form of society which uniquely produces and guarantees those benefits.

I began by arguing that support for the Welfare State is not restricted to socialists and welfarists, but extends crucially also to conservative forces. This conservative support for the status quo in welfare has been at least as important as the power of vested interests and the influence of welfarist intellectuals in limiting so effectively the democratically mandated programmes of Mr Reagan and Mrs Thatcher to cut back the State and return welfare provision to the diverse market, cooperative, and charitable initiatives where it belongs in a free society.

If the social forces which provide the structural and ideological support for capitalism and democracy in the face of socialist tendencies and challenges are to succeed, a more systematic and more explicitly radical programme of welfare reform than has hitherto been available is needed quickly. That this will involve political risks is no more than a measure of its importance. For risk-free policies serve by definition to do no better than sustain the status quo - and since the status quo in welfare is already much more than half-way socialist and one hundred per cent deleterious to the interests of the people, this will hardly be good enough. The risk will have to be taken, and a systematic, radical programme of welfare reform put to the people. The intellectual and practical materials for the construction of such a reform programme are already available. They are summarised and crystallised powerfully in three studies of welfare: E. S. Savas, *Privatizing the Public Sector*; A. Seldon, *Whither the Welfare State*; and M. Forsyth, *Re-servicing Britain.*

Moreover, the general social values in the context of which the welfare policies proposed in these studies need to be located have also been enumerated and argued coherently very recently. I refer of course to Peter Berger's *The Capitalist Revolution,* which demonstrates the value of democracy, the role of capitalism as the economic system of democracy, and the crucial role of the consumer both as end and means, subject and object, within the structure of a truely liberal State.

Notes

1. A paper presented to the University of Oslo Conference on the sociology of consumption.
2. 'Market Socialism', Fabian Tract 516, November 1986.
3. 'Cuts and Votes', *New Society*, October 2nd 1987.
4. 'Education and the State', IEA 1971.
5. *Working Class Patients and the Medical Establishment*, Gower, 1985.
6. R. Segalman, *The Swiss Way of Welfare*, Praeger, 1986.
7. M. Matthews, *Poverty in the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, 1987.
8. *Commitment to Welfare*, Allen and Unwin, 1973.
9. D.G. Green, 'Challenge to the NHS', IEA, 1986.
10. Grosse, 'Welfare Without the State, IEA, 1987.
11. Robin Gedye, *Daily Telegraph*, December 11th 1987.
12. *Utopia on Trial*, Hilary Shipman, 1985.
13. In *Home Truths*, edited by D.C. Anderson and D. Marsland, Social Affairs Unit, 1983.
14. *Sunday Times*, December 20th 1987.
15. R. Segalman and D. Marsland, *Cradle to Grave: Comparative Perspectives on the State of Welfare*, Macmillan, 1988.

How Should Architecture Be Developing?[1]

Quinlan Terry

The question before us enshrines an assumption characteristic of our age. We are asked not whether architecture *should* develop, but *in what direction.* We are asked, in other words, for a theory of architectural *progress.* In this we see reflected the great difference between the ancient world and our own. Whereas ancient man looked to the past for his wisdom and inspiration, modern man looks only to the future, in the blind faith that 'progress' will solve the problems which he himself has made.

Before suggesting a direction for architecture, I should like to take stock of our present position. The soil in which we grew was tilled by our Victorian forefathers, and fertilised with the humanistic, secular and agnostic ideas which they had acquired from the Enlightenment. Into this soil, around the middle of the last century, there fell a seed of thought - a very simple seed, yet one capable of the most alarming consequences, and proving ultimately to be the most revolutionary force in the modern world. I refer to the doctrine of evolution, and the superstition that *development is inevitable.* Until we acknowledge the effect of such ideas upon the mind - particularly when clothed in the language of Darwin and Marx - we fail to see the nature of our present problem. For art is the visual transcription of the things that are upon the minds of men.

As a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, we experienced an enormous growth in prosperity; man was freed from want, and enlightened legislators worked for the political emancipation, first of slaves, and subsequently of workers, and of women. Scientific knowledge constantly augmented the store of human competence, and the old dim light of religion was eclipsed by the sun of Reason. By degrees, it seemed, man was becoming master of his material circumstances, and in this mastery he found his meaning and his goal. It was precisely in such materialistic terms that the Modern Movement conceived itself.

The belief in progress even made itself felt through the medium of romantic poetry. In 'Locksley Hall' Tennyson depicts one rising from his personal sorrows to confront a vision of the future, in which 'the war drums throb no longer and the battle flags are furled'. Solace comes to him with the thought that

> ... through the ages one increasing purpose runs
> And the thoughts of man are widened with the
> progress of the suns.

The belief in progress, elevated thus from the material to the spiritual sphere, seized hold of the popular imagination. It was translated at last into a kind of universal law: a law controlling every sphere of thought, and enslaving the realms of religion, art, music and architecture.

The first effect of this way of thinking, was to cause people to reject all time-honoured practices. In architecture the rules of traditional classicism gave way to a succession of experiments, as though architecture should pursue the unexpected in the same way as science. All at once we find the most remarkable changes in the art of building. For example, the plan of a house, which used always to be symmetrical, with the front door in the centre, was revised in favour of wilfully asymmetrical layouts, with the main entrance at the side or back. (You will find plenty of examples of this along the Banbury Road.) The windows, which used almost always to be vertical sliding sashed, placed in the most obvious position for the purpose of lighting the rooms beyond them, were replaced by bays, with large sheets of glass bulging outwards from the facade. This development - motivated by technological change rather than aesthetic judgement - led at last to the picture window: for that is the direction which 'progress' dictates.

The roofs in old work were always pitched from a simple rectangular plan. This was soon replaced by a complicated system of bays, valleys, hips and ridges, which was further 'developed' (following the advent of asphalt and roofing felt) into the notorious flat roof (which, incidentally, bears a guarantee no longer than that of a refrigerator). The walls of all traditional buildings were made in solid load-bearing brick or stone, with lime mortar. Although the Victorians used these materials, the burning desire for change soon destroyed their authority; the wall was then 'developed' into a frame of concrete or steel, to be veneered with brick, plastic, or whatever other material should take the architect's fancy.

Most important of all was the rejection of the Classical Orders. Traditional buildings had expressed their personality (which was also a kind of good-mannered conformity) through the use of the three orders: Doric, Ionic or Corinthian. The Victorians, for a short time, replaced the Orders with the debased and vulgar excesses of the Gothic revival. This in turn soon gave way to the doctrinaire conviction that incrustation is nothing but meaningless ornament. All detail thereafter became vestigial, and was eventually done away with as an impurity and an irrelevance.

It now seems self-evident that those changes were not really improvements. If we persist in calling them 'developments' then that only means that 'development' may not be worth having. To be more accurate, however, they were part of a scision in the lifeline of

traditional architecture. They erupted into architectural thought with all the violence of conquest: conquest by an alien culture, fired by a new and zealous faith.

It may sound a little extreme to describe the Modern Movement in those terms, but let me quote from two of its leading protagonists. First, Walter Gropius, writing in 1935:

> A *breach* has been made with the past which allows us to envision a new aspect of architecture corresponding to the technical civilisation of the age we live in. The morphology of dead styles has been *destroyed* and we are returning to the honesty of thought and feeling.

Secondly, Le Corbusier, in his great polemic of 1927, *Vers une architecture*:

> A great epoch has begun. There exists a new spirit... we must create the mass production spirit. The spirit of constructing mass production houses. The spirit of living in mass production houses. The spirit of conceiving mass production houses. We must eliminate from our hearts and minds all dead concepts in regard to the house.

Such statements demonstrate that modern art and architecture are in no real sense 'developments': they are the visual manifestations of a faith. What posed as a 'development' of the established practice, was in fact an ideological attack on it, and one which proved sigularly incapable of founding a tradition of its own.

This is not to say that there could not be real development, of a kind, in architecture. By this I mean a slow accumulation of knowledge, perhaps over a vast time-span, guided more by reverence for the past than by love of novelty. A prime example of such development is the classical tradition: the line which reaches from the Greek temple, through Roman, Romanesque, Renaissance, Baroque, Palladian and Risorgimento, to the neo-classicism of our own times. The changes displayed in such a tradition are not necessarily improvements, nor are they brought about in a spirit of improvement: they are attempts to emulate what is worthy, in altered spiritual circumstances. Change and development involve no sacrifice of principle.

In order to highlight the difference between the old attitude to art and the new, let me turn for a moment to the art of painting. Picture to yourself a painting by Raphael or Mantegna, or a fresco by Tiepolo or Veronese, or the work of some lesser Dutch or English master. You will recognise that they all exhibit skill in anatomy, in colour and perspective, in composition and the rendering of landscape. They are easy on the eye, and the source of inexhaustible pleasure.

Now compare these works with paintings typical of the modern age - with the works of Franze Kline, Gorky, Pollock or Rothko. You find none of the skills to which I have referred: neither anatomy, nor colour, nor landscape nor perspective are handled with any sense of their depth or value. The message, moreover, is invariably negative: in such paintings we see the image of a world gone wrong, a world of cruelty, violence, filth and hopelessness. They are not easy on the eye: on the contrary they assault the senses. It is significant to me that the four artists to whom I have referred (and who are, to my mind, both peculiarly horrific and at the same time characteristic of our age), all committed suicide. The message behind their art is exactly as it appears: that there is no hope. As the horror and realism of modernity crowds in upon their unbalanced souls, they are overwhelmed to the point of annihilation. The promise of modernism is reduced in their works to the pornography of despair. That is, indeed, the destiny of modernism, in architecture as in all the arts: to destroy the faith which inspired it, and so to destroy itself.

A similar lesson is illustrated in the history of architecture. Since we are in Oxford, I can point to many beautiful examples: to the Radcliffe Camera, to Hawksmoor's buildings at Queen's and All Souls, to the Gothic and Classical work of St Mary the Virgin in the High, and even to the little Georgian shops and houses along St Giles. All these buildings exhibit great skill and variety in the use of classical Orders; great wisdom and constructional knowledge in the jointing and placing of stones in arches, pediments, columns, battlements and pinnacles; great mathematical knowledge in the proportion and spacing of triglyphs and metopes in the frieze between columns. And they also have a message. They bear witness to a timeless beauty and to a civilised age which is fast disappearing. And yet two or three hundred years later we still use these buildings every day, with no sense of incongruity.

Now compare those buildings with the typical award winning designs of our era: with the new buildings at Christ Church, Brasenose and Wolfson; with the Florey building at Queen's, the History Faculty building in Cambridge, the Leicester Engineering Laboratory (which I worked on as an assistant 30 years ago), or with the teenage tower blocks in London and Liverpool. These buildings exhibit no skill in the use of the Orders, no real appreciation of mathematics or proportion, no understanding or use of traditional materials; no knowledge of traditional construction. And what do they have in common? First that they have received awards, maximum media attention and endless discussion in all schools of architecture; secondly, and more importantly, that they are all about to collapse. They have failed the test of wind and weather. All the buildings I have referred to leak; all have terrible problems with condensation, in all of them the cladding panels fall off and have to be removed - in one case after less than a decade. One has been seriously considered for demolition, and most have been at the centre of prolonged litigation. I am only repeating what we have all read in the popular press. But this is something which we should all take note of; that the most admired and spectacular examples of the modern movement are enormous technological failures, despite the fact that they were conceived in a spirit of technological faith. That is why I say that the modern movement will lead to its own

demolition. Such is the fate of any art, that places technique before beauty, and means before ends.

I have given my opinion concerning the word 'development'. There may be some among you who agree with what I have said, but who feel that development, even if nasty, is nevertheless *inevitable.* I would remind them that the Darwinian and Marxian theories also argued for the inevitability, rather than the desirability of progress. In this way, they encouraged people to abdicate from the crucial task of judgement and evaluation. We have no choice in the matter, they told us, since we are driven on regardless, by the 'material' forces of nature and economics. Such theories do not describe the world: they change it. Once they are believed, they have a tendency to become true, as people renounce the desire to control their own lives, and surrender to the 'forces of history'. This surrender is especially evident in those spheres of life where the utilitarian spirit prevails: in commerce and industry. Our Georgian and Victorian forefathers embellished their factories and offices just as they did their houses; however useful, their buildings had also to be beautiful, and fitting companions to the streets in which they were placed. With the modern movement, however, 'economic necessity' acquired a new imperiousness. Offices and factories, since they display our commitment to technological progress more clearly than any other buildings, had to be as 'modern' as possible. It is in this sphere, therefore, that we see what the 'inevitability of development' has amounted to: and the change in the face of our historic cities is evident.

London, the town immortalised by Hogarth and Canaletto, is now a city of office blocks: a drab, depressing desert uninhabited at night, and by day offering nothing to the eye or the imagination. Nor is the catastrophe merely visual. The modern ways of building, with steel or concrete frame, and floor after floor of identical cells, have created their own legacy of psychological and physical disorders. Electric lifts destroy the last opportunity for exercise; artificial light corrodes the eyes, and artificial air the lungs. People are packed into these deep unwholesome buildings like broiler chickens, glimpsing the day only distantly, through some window which cannot be opened, and breathing the re-cycled air from a thousand neighbouring lungs. You will have heard of Sick Buildings Syndrome: the disease which causes 70% of the workforce to suffer from lethargy, discomfort of the nose and throat, headaches and eye irritation. It has been admitted that this syndrome is most common among those who work in the supposedly comfortable, 'energy efficient', air-conditioned offices, which are the principal legacy of the Modern Movement. If you allow yourself to believe that this way of building is *inevitable*, then you deserve your fate. Alas, however, it is not only the apostles of 'progress' who are destined to suffer from its effects, but also the rest of us. We must therefore break free from the prevailing deception, and return to the simple and desirable commonsense of traditional building.

How, then, should architecture be developing? I think I have said enough to persuade you that, for me at least, it is time that it stopped 'developing'. It should stop in its tracks, and look back to the past for wisdom and inspiration. I would go further: it is time, I believe, for some public acts of repentance. What is needed today is not a little more of this, or a little less of that, but a *protest* against the whole system: not accommodation but defiance - defiance which goes further than the realm of architecture, and which confronts the whole culture of permissiveness which is so accurately portrayed in the buildings of our age.

We, the sons of Darwin, conceive of a world which took millions of years to *develop*: and for us, 'development' has all but replaced 'creation'. We reject the traditional teaching that God *created* the world and man and woman for His own Glory. Our only conception of the future, therefore, is one of more and more 'development', more and more 'inevitable' steps along the accustomed path. But has it not occurred to us that the 'developments' of the last hundred years - nuclear technology, for example, the ever-increasing exploitation and pollution of nature, not to speak of those 'developments' in morals (approved or connived at by the recent Synod) - that these things prophecy the end of history and also the end of man? By believing so firmly in our technological nostrums, and by making the work of the spirit subservient to technology, we surrender our freedom, and so destroy ourselves. After all, we are *permitted* to destroy ourselves: and the God whom we have rejected will have us in derision. These are Advent thoughts!

I am not here to talk about Salvation, but about the development of architecture. Nevertheless, as my colleague Richard Rogers has already said to you this evening, architecture cannot be separated from ideology. We cannot think seriously of architecture, without raising, at the same time, the fundamental questions of man's life on earth. Let me conclude, therefore, with a piece of serious advice. While we are spared - while the Lord tarry, as we say in non-conformist parlance - let us build smaller and gentler buildings. Let us make walls of solid brick or stone; let us roof them with slates, and pierce them with sash windows of the kind that have recommended themselves to generations of Englishmen. Let us use the Doric, Ionic and Corinthian orders. And let us take inspiration from the wisdom of our forefathers, so that our buildings will be signs and heralds of a more natural, more stable and more beautiful world.

Notes

1. Forum at the Oxford Union, Monday 30th November, 1987.

Corruptions Among the Clerks

Antony Flew

It is a fundamental fact, as notorious as it is uncomfortable, that everything human will always degenerate save in so far as well-directed efforts are continually exerted to maintain it. The physically minded may care to formulate this most important practical truth as a Second Law of Human Dynamics - describing the universal tendency of everything to go downhill, unless checked by some countervailing force. Others will prefer some less demythologised version - along the lines of the IXth Article of Religion in the Church of England, the church by law established: '... man is far gone from original righteousness and is of his own nature inclined to evil.... This infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated.' Yea, it doth remain also in them that are appointed with tenure, up to and beyond retirement.

Applied to our institutions of tertiary education and to their personnel, the moral is that the price of sound standards is eternal vigilance. Although it is often difficult to suggest acceptable measures which might be effective in preventing or reversing the degeneration, certainly the first step always is to recognise what has been and is going wrong.

The first cause for concern is those associations of studies introduced into institutions of tertiary education as allegedly required for the training of some actual or pretended professional set. (By Cantor's Axiom for Sets the sole essential feature of a set is that its members share at least one characteristic, any kind of characteristic.) Such associations of studies are usually miscellanies bound together by no authentic internal uniting principles; and, if and in so far as any of them are indeed relevant to and helpful in the sorts of work for which they are supposed to constitute the indispensable preparation, they would be best pursued as the reading and writing requirements of some practical apprenticeship programme.

The two most populous subject areas of this sort are Education and Social Work. Both are, as is well known, intellectually somewhat undemanding. Certainly too there is reason to believe that what such departments actually teach to intending schoolteachers and intending social workers, if judged as training for the tasks for which it is said that their pupils are being prepared, is, in many cases, at best useless and at worst positively harmful.

Yet the whole business is institutionally self-sustaining, being very effectively protected against any external and independent critical assessment. For who are the people expected to do research on the public education system or on the efficacy of social work and on the training of social workers or of schoolteachers? Why, of course, it is the people employed to teach, and to research, in departments, schools, and institutes of education and social work. And who are the people appointed to government committees set up to enquire into the effectiveness of these operations, and of the training of their future personnel? Why, of course, it is directors of education or of social work, and heads of those organisations which derive their sustenance and growth from the training of those future personnel. (It would seem that no one either in Whitehall or in the media ever attends to that wise proverbial maxim: 'Never ask the barber whether you need a haircut.')

We ought to be disappointed, yet scarcely surprised, when people who have powerful interests in the results of their enquiries produce either gravely distorted results or else no results at all. Certainly it is, quite apart from all wider political considerations, entirely understandable, that those making comfortable livings out of training teachers or social workers should be reluctant 'to foul their own nests', and perhaps 'to work themselves out of jobs', by discovering either that an entirely different and perhaps even a less extensive training would be more effective; or that considerably fewer teachers or social workers are really required in order to do the same or perhaps a better job.

Such very personal and particular interests become the more formidable when, as is often the case, they are perceived as justified by some system of more general and impersonal ideas. Yet if we introduce the term 'ideology' here it has to be with two immediate warnings. First, that the interests which the system of ideas is thought to sanctify are usually those of some set normally much smaller than any which Marxists would want to admit as a social class. Second, that it is never or almost never the case either that everyone sharing the interests also accepts the ideology summoned in their support or that that ideology has no clients outside the interest group in question. (Indeed, if it had no power to persuade the disinterested it could scarcely serve the purposes of the interested.)

That our departments, schools and institutes of education do in fact produce precious little good policy-related research is suggested most strikingly by the lack of work relating improvement in learning to the 'improvements' in teacher/pupil ratios. Everyone in what Tom Lehrer would have us call Edbiz speaks of teacher/pupil ratios as *improving* when the average size of the class taught by each teacher goes down. It seems never to occur to any of those speaking in this

way that in any other industry a higher ratio would be construed as revealing not improvement but inefficiency and overmanning. Yet when challenged to produce evidence that smaller classes do in fact make for more or better learning no one is able to cite any British research, and almost no one is willing to attend to what has been done in the USA and other countries. (The US evidence seems to show that, if anything, larger classes tend to be pedagogically *more* effective.[1])

About the world of social work and of social work training the best source remains still a swingeing book by Colin Brewer and June Lait entitled - I fear too cheerfully - *Can Social Work Survive?* (London, Temple Smith, 1980). But for us it will be sufficient to consider how, and to ask ourselves why, one great research opportunity was wasted.

Our story begins when the London Borough of Tower Hamlets was - as North Americans say - struck by its two hundred and seventy-five social workers. Unlike most, this particular strike seems not greatly to have inconvenienced anyone. Certainly we saw no TV news flashes of desperate clients fighting their way through howling picket lines to secure the services of whatever social workers were still social working. (Could it have been that there simply were no 'scabs' or 'blacklegs' from the ranks of these famously compassionate and professional 'carers'?) At the end of the day the Department of Health and Social Security directed the London Region of Social Work Service to launch an inquiry which was eventually published as *The Effect on Clients of Industrial Action in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets: An Investigation.* (It is typical that the outfit charged with initiating this inquiry was itself part of the social work establishment.)

This whole affair had provided a rare and to any true social scientist an irresistibly seductive research opportunity. 'Clients' abandoned during the ten months of the strike constituted a perfect control group to set against an experimental group of those not so neglected in some subsequent ten months. It would not be callous researchers who were proposing to deprive that control group of what might or might not be valuable services; but, instead, professedly and professionally 'caring' social workers who had already done so. The wasting of this precious research opportunity deserves to become, and has indeed been made, a textbook example.[2]

The report, apparently accepted without protest either from the Minister himself, or from the concerned Department, or from the general or specialist press, should have the alert reader in no doubts about either the nature or the quality of the investigation. One single feature, however, is alone totally discrediting. For the two investigators appointed by the London Region of Social Work Service were asked to discover the effects *on the 'clients'*. Believe it or not, they do not so much as pretend to have asked for the views of even one. So who truly wanted to know?

Our first cause of concern was those 'associations of studies' which are 'miscellanies bound together by no authentic internal uniting principles . . . introduced into institutions of tertiary education as allegedly required for the training of some actual or pretended professional set.' The second is various job lots of studies defined by an uniting principle which is insufficient or otherwise improper: as, for example, Womens' Studies, Black Studies, Peace Studies, or World Studies. Although those who advocate their establishing do not always emphasise the occupational training role of programmes of this second sort, it is often crucially important. For they certainly do prepare their students for the business of propagating those theoretical beliefs and practical commitments which the programmes themselves are expressly designed to promote. Thus those taking Peace Studies at the tertiary level qualify themselves primarily, if not solely, for organisational and propaganda service in the 'Peace' movement. The tax-financed openings here are numerous. For the Labour Party, sometimes sustained by the wimpside of the Alliance, is now resolved to intrude this form of indoctrination into every school over which it gains control: in 1985 *Labour's Charter for Pupils and Parents* laid down that our young people must be offered 'a balanced view of modern society through political and trades union education'; and, central to this 'balanced view', there must be 'Education for peace'.

This is not the time or place to demonstrate how heavily the balance in all such courses in fact biased to the more or less extreme left. One excellent introduction is C. Cox and R. Scruton, *Peace Studies: A Critical Survey* (London, Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1984). Scruton's equally useful *World Studies: Education or Indoctrination?* was published by the same organisation in the following year. So far as I know, the UK has been spared Black Studies, at least at the tertiary level; but not, of course, Women's Studies.

Even if all the bias, falsehood, and fallacy were to be purged - none of these programmes could even then constitute a suitable area for first degree study. World Studies, for example, does not in the beginning so much as attempt to define one field among others as to combine all into one. Its protagonists soon prefer to concentrate their favours on countries of the Third World, and perhaps especially the more strongly Soviet-aligned of the professedly non-aligned. The original definition is grotesquely wide. Of the actual practice one might say that spreading the rubbish which Peter Bauer has devoted his life to removing was the occupational disease of the practitioners; were it not so obviously their intended occupation.

Peace Studies too is impossibly and unacceptably all-embracing. This is because 'peace' is an essentially negative term: peace is, by definition, the absence of war. This conceptual truth provides the basis for an answer to the plausible challenge: 'If War Studies then why not - since peace is so much to be preferred - Peace Studies?' But the mere absence of war, gratifying though that must be in itself, cannot provide a positive uniting principle sufficient to define an academic area.

Overlooking that freedom (unlike 'positive freedom')

is also essentially negative, and contending that nothing which really matters can be thus negative, some therefore go on to argue for an 'extended definition of "peace"'. One such spokeswoman, at a National Council of Women conference on *Peace Education in Schools* (3rd March 1984) proceeded: 'this could include bad housing, poor educational and medical provision, systems of apartheid and discrimination, high unemployment and poverty. At the international level one could name systems of imperialism, the arms race, or even the international monetary system.'

Certainly any academically respectable programme of Peace Studies would not merely name but actually devote a large part of its attention to by far the biggest of all extant 'systems of imperialism' - that which dominates the subject peoples of the USSR and Eastern Europe, and which Labour would and will encourage to swallow us all. It is the clearest possible indication of the dishonest, partisan and indoctrinatory character of all existing programmes of Peace Studies, at every level, that they take care to omit this fundamental but uncomfortable topic.

Black Studies and Women's Studies are open to the same objections. In so far as they purport to be concerned with everything involving blacks or women these programmes claim an impossibly wide scope. It is not that there are not many, all too many, worthy and important subjects for study potentially included; just as there are within the even more widely embracing areas of Peace Studies or World Studies. The points are: both that they are far too many; and that a proper treatment of any requires a grounding in other, unsexed, colourblind, older established disciplines. Less academic but perhaps more serious is the objection that Black Studies and Women's Studies are, respectively, paradigmatically racist and paradigmatically sexist. For consider: even if there is not, as too often there has been, an insistance that the teachers must be, correspondingly, black and female, how would our anti-racist and anti-sexists react to proposals for White Studies and Men's Studies?

Our third and fourth causes of concern are the invasion into many parts of the academic world of ideas and commitments inconsistent with an unqualified devotion to enquiry as the pursuit of objective truth; which is to say, truth. (Truth qualified is no more truth than positive freedom is freedom or Soviet democracy is democracy.) We may distinguish two sorts of source of academic failures persistently to pursue truth: one is the conviction that truth is unattainable; the other is the absence of any desire to attain it, or even positive commitments to suppression. Signs of that conviction can in our time be detected in many academic areas, and they becomes an ever ready excuse for shoddy and dishonest work. The absence of such a desire is revealed by the refusal to subject various preferred and privileged candidate propositions to thorough critical examination.

There are two main modern developments which, combining with ancient arguments for various relativistic conclusions, often produce a demoralised defeatism. One is in the new history and philosophy of natural science, and in particular of physics. ('In Science,' as Lord Rutherford was saying in the Cambridge of my boyhood, 'there is only physics; and stamp-collecting!') The other is the sociology of belief, miscalled the sociology of knowledge, but then perversely misinterpreted as showing that there neither are nor can be any true beliefs deserving the diploma title 'knowledge'.

In *Counter Course: A Handbook for Course Criticism*[3] and in a similarly radical collection of essays entitled *Ideology in Social Science*[4] we learn what is supposed to have been established. In the former a professional historian tells us: 'It is now generally realised that the claim to record facts and reconstruct the past "as it happened" is not tenable... "facts" are defined as worth recording at all, in terms of some model in the historian's mind' (p. 284). In the latter the Editor promises proof that 'the assumption that there exists a realm of facts independent of theories, which establish their meaning is fundamentally unscientific.' This pretended proof was provided by a person soon to be elected to an Oxbridge Fellowship in History. He wrote: 'Carr attacked the notion that "facts" and "interpretation" are rigidly separable. Pointing out that all writing of history involves a selection from the sum of facts available, he demonstrated that any selection of facts obeys an implicit evaluative criterion.' (pp. 10 and 113).

Again, in a collection widely adopted as a textbook of the sociology of education, we find one contributor asking, in high Kantian style: 'How is sociology possible?' It is, he concludes, 'easy to see that the methodical character of marriage, war and suicide is only seen, recognised and made possible through the organised practices of sociology. These regularities do not exist "out there" in [a] pristine form to which sociologists functionally respond, but rather, they acquire their character of regularities and their features as describable objects only through the grace of sociological imputation. Thus, it is not an objectively discernible purely existing world which accounts for sociology; it is the methods and procedures of sociology which create and sustain that world.' The pretended discoveries of social science simply consist in 'the negotiated understandings of sociologists'.[5]

It is a black day for scholarship when professional historians dare thus slightingly to dismiss the great Leopold von Ranke. For he it was who claimed, famously and truly, that his and their proper professional business was to discover and tell '*wie es eigentlich gewesen*' (how it really was). Anyone who truly believes that it is, necessarily and in all cases, impossible 'to construct the past "as it happened"', and who nevertheless accepts employment as a historian should ask himself, and tell us, what honest claim he has to draw his pay; and what reason is left for the rest of us to believe anything which he now chooses to say about the past.

Nor is it compatible with any sort of science, whether social or other, much less required by it, to deny 'that there exists a realm of facts independent of theories'.

For if it was not possible - as of course it is - to describe experimental and other data in ways logically independent of rival theories offered to explain such data, then no one could ever show that any theories are inconsistent with the facts, and, therefore, false. It is, surely, significant that the same radical historian proceeds in the same article to cover his embarrassment over the finding that real wages rose between 1790 and 1850 with bluster, sneering, and abuse (pp. 107-9). For to demonstrate the falsity of one of its main logical consequences, the 'Immersion Thesis', is, necessarily, to falsify the cherished theory of *Capital.*

Criticism, in the only sense in which it can be admitted as self-evidently good, is not necessarily hostile. It consists in open-minded appraisal, and open-minded questioning whether that which is criticised truly is what it pretends to be. To bring out the reason why refusal to criticise or to attend to criticism is a mark of academic bad faith we need to show the logical links between the concepts of sincerity, of rationality, and of monitoring. Sincerity in any purpose whatsoever absolutely presupposes a strong concern to discover whether and how far that cherished purpose has been or is being achieved. Furthermore, if and in so far as the agent becomes aware that it has not been or is not being achieved, we cannot, unless there is a readiness to attempt alternative tactics, truly say that that purpose continues to be sincerely cherished.

Rationality comes into the picture since not only Descartes, but all the rest of us also, preferred, or prefer, to estimate the actual intentions and the sincere beliefs of other people, and even of ourselves, by looking to what is done, or not done, rather than to what - with whatever appearances of impeccable integrity - is merely said. Indeed it is impossible to identify a particular belief as having whatever particular content it does have unless we attribute some minimal rationality to the behaviour of the believer.

The aim of theoretical inquiry is, I dare to insist, truth. Given this aim then the critical approach must follow. The person who truly wants the truth, like the knight who with pure heart and single mind seeks the Holy Grail, cannot and will not embrace unexamined candidates. He must and will be ever ready to test, and test again. But, in this present context, testing for truth is precisely what criticism is.

Whereas the single aim of theoretical inquiry is truth, the purposes of practical policies, and of the institutions established for the implementation of those policies and the fulfilment of those purposes, are as multifarious as human desires. Yet parallel considerations apply here too. If, therefore, you want to claim that it was in order to secure some particular reliefs of man's estate that the policy was originally introduced, and that it is with those objectives that it is still sustained, then you have to show that both those who first introduced, and those who now support and sustain that policy and those institutions, were, and are, eager to monitor their success or failure by that stated standard. Indeed the originators would have been well advised to make sure that the policy itself embraced provisions both for monitoring and for adjustment in response to consequent discoveries; while those manning the institution, in so far as they are individually devoted to its official collective aims, are likely to find themselves doing a deal of detailed and informal monitoring every day of their working lives.

The preceding paragraphs may now seem to have been labouring the obvious. Their implications are, nevertheless, explosive. For they have provided a simple, easy to use, devastatingly effective, diagnostic tool. It is a tool which should be in constant employment both within academia and outside. In deference to the law of libel I refrain from applying it here and now to any living British academics. But Roger Scruton in his studies of fourteen *Thinkers of the New Left*[6] first listed the names of several of the most powerful critics of Marx, from Weber to Popper, and then asked himself a rueful question: Since all these 'have made *no impact whatsoever* on the fundamental items of left-wing belief', and have apparently failed 'even to *attract the attention* of those whom they have sought to persuade', then 'how can *he* hope to make an impact?' (p. 5, original emphasis). He went on to give case after case of that refusal even to attend. Thus 'Althusser praises the labour theory [of value] and purports to be persuaded by it' (p. 89). So what does the prophet Althusser make of the overwhelmingly critical literature, from the early marginalists, on through such giants of the Austrian school as Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk and Ludwig von Mises? Nothing. All profane peasants are silently ignored.

It is as important to recognise both that the fundamental, historicist conceptual scheme of classical Marxism was originally derived not from empirical research but from what Marx was pleased to call a philosophical analysis;[7] and that the refusal to attend either to difficulties with the theory, or to the likely practical consequences of the policies recommended, was from the beginning both as characteristic, and as revealing of the true purposes of the Founding Fathers, as it remains with their followers to this day.[8]

It is instructive to examine the contention of Engels, in the address at the graveside of his lifelong friend, that the achievement of Marx in social science was comparable with that of Darwin in Biology.[9] Notice for a start that - unless you count the *Communist Manifesto*, which is scarcely composed as a theoretical document directed towards scientific colleagues - neither Marx nor Engels ever produced a crisp, clear-cut and unambiguous statement of exactly what it was which, in their correspondence, they always referred to as 'our view', or 'our theory', or the like. By contrast, many years before he ventured to publish anything about evolution by natural selection, Darwin wrote for his private, purely scientific purposes a 'sketch of my species theory'; a sketch which was intended to force him to recognise the difficulties which, if they could not be overcome, would demand the abandonment of that theory. When finally he did publish *The Origin of*

Species there was, of course, no attempt to deny or to evade those difficulties. Now, can anyone point to any passages in all his massed volumes in which Marx accepted that anything at all constituted even a serious difficulty for 'our view'?

Again, can anyone point to any reiteration of a known falsehood, however trivial, in Darwin? Yet Marx frequently reiterated fundamentals which he knew to be untrue. Thus the Immiseration Thesis, as restated in *Capital*, is that: 'The accumulation of wealth at one pole is ... at the same time the accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalisation at the other...' Faced with falsification Marx simply suppressed the data. Hence, in the first edition, various available British statistics are given up to 1865 or 1866, but those for the movement of wages stop at 1850. In the second edition all the other runs are brought up to date, but that of wage movements still stops at 1850. Then, in his Inaugural Address to the First International, Marx supported this same, crucial, false contention by misquoting W. E. Gladstone as having said in his 1863 budget speech the diametric opposite of what with perfect clarity and truth he actually did day. *So war dieser Mann der Wissenschaft.*

Notes

1. See, for a review of this evidence, R. A. Freeman 'The Income and Outcome in Education' in his *The Wayward Welfare State*, Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1982. For a consideration both of some 'gravely distorted results' produced from within the bureaucratic-educational complex and of how its media allies mistreat the more robust findings of independent researchers, see my second one-man volume of philosophical *Black Papers, Power to the Parents!*, The Sherwood Press.
2. See my *Thinking about Social Thinking*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985, pp. 202-3.
3. Edited by T. Pateman, Penguin, 1972.
4. Edited by R. Blackburn, London, Collins Fontana, 1972.
5. *Knowledge and Control*, edited by M. F. D. Young, London, Collier Macmillan, p. 131.
6. London, Longman, 1986.
7. See my 'Prophecy or philosophy, historicism or history?' in R. Duncan and C. Wilson eds., *Marx Refuted*, Bath, Ashgrove, 1987.
8. See Leopold Schwartzschild, *The Red Prussian*, London, Pickwick Books, 1986.
9. I do this at greater length in *Darwinian Evolution*, London, Granada Paladin, 1984, III 3.

Sophists' Corner

' ... the methodological character of marriage, war and suicide is only seen, recognised and made possible through the organised practices of sociology. These regularities do not exist 'out there' in a pristine form to which sociologists functionally respond, but rather, they acquire their character of regularities and their features as describable objects only through the grace of sociological imputation. Thus, it is not an objectively discernible purely existing external world which accounts for sociology; it is the methods and procedures of sociology which create and sustain that world.'

(Alan Blum, in M.F.D. Young (ed.) *Knowledge and Control*, London 1971. Alan Blum, now of York University in Toronto, is not to be confused with Allan Bloom, of Chicago University, author of *The Closing of the American Mind*.)

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What Future for a Multi-Racial Britain? Part I

E. J. Mishan

I. BLUNDERING INTO MULTI-RACIALISM

'One general lesson can be learnt from the past. Governments can incite men to intolerance: they cannot bully them into tolerance.'

Charles Wilson[1]

Since the chief object of this essay is to call into question the attitudes and suppositions that have long been popular among members of the 'Established Enlightenment' in this country, initial reference to the Scarman Report of 1982[2] on the Brixton riots of that year is hardly avoidable. For the document was *par excellence* a product of our liberal intellectual heritage, its views also reflecting those prominent within the race relations industry. It was, moreover, widely acclaimed at the time as a model of lucidity and fairness, and most newspapers welcomed it as a valuable contribution to the understanding of the problems besetting racial minorities in Britain.[3] If some of its recommendations were questioned in editorial columns, it was only because they were believed to be politically premature.

Whatever the general impression produced by the Report on politicians and journalists, a question remains in the minds of thoughtful people who follow the course of race relations on both sides of the Atlantic: whether yet another report, broadly similar in tenor and tone to earlier reports on racial disorders both here and in America, will do anything to redress racial grievances and to promote racial harmony.

The future prospects for racial harmony will, of course, be influenced by prudent policies. But at a more basic level, they depend crucially upon the characteristics and the behaviour of the racial minorities themselves, on the one hand, and upon the circumstances of their entry into the country, on the other. Attention to both factors in Britain go far to explain why official and media-reflected views on race relations in this country continue to be at variance with the facts. To put it mildly, notwithstanding some 30 years of exposure to a multi-racial environment and to official and media-reflected pro-racial sentiment, it hardly requires the astuteness of a Tocqueville to discover that the indigenous population of Britain is not particularly enthusiastic about the new ethnic groups. Nor does it take easily to the implied presumption that, as a nation, it is directly responsible for the material welfare and the living conditions, for the grievances and frustrations, of the new races that have chosen to settle here since the Fifties.

Allegations of race prejudice are quick to the tongue of race militants. But prejudice, properly understood as an irrational or superstitious reaction, is not of itself enough to explain the persistent reluctance of many among the white British population fully to accept the new races. Certainly it is possible to deplore the emergence of a multi-racial society while not being, oneself, a 'racialist' in the ordinary sense of harbouring an antagonism against others on grounds of race alone. Opposition to the creation of a multi-racial society may well spring primarily from a deep concern about the future of one's country, one arising from a belief that its transformation over a short period from a relatively homogeneous population to one of a particular racial mix may, on balance, have adverse effects on its institutions and character or, at any rate, may be more likely to do harm than good.

1. Multi-racialism before the Fifties

Thinking of the British experience in which the misuse of language has served to obscure issues, it is important first to understand the sense in which Britain was *not*, before World War Two, a multi-racial society and, therefore, the sense in which it has become one since then.

To begin with the obvious, there was not before World War Two a real colour problem in Britain for the simple reason that the proportion of the population that was coloured was almost negligible.[4] Secondly, although Britain had assimilated the conquering Normans over three centuries since 1066 and had, indeed, continued to absorb migrants until World War Two - some coming to these shores for commercial gain, others for political asylum - they came predominantly from Europe. Moreover, if the number of families from any one ethnic group settling in Britain sometimes appear large when taken over a longish period, they were for the most part skilled or industrious, and no persistent difficulties dogged their eventual integration into the life of the nation.

The arrival here of between 40,000 and 50,000 French

Huguenots between 1660 and 1720, refugees from religious persecution, caused no real problem. They were for the most part middle class with a sprinkling of the lesser nobility. Many were artisans, craftsmen bringing with them new skills. Their numbers also contained professional men and enterprising merchants who conferred visible economic advantages on their host country. Given their character and convictions, and their regard also for the institutions of the country of their adoption, they were soon successfully integrated into and became a part of the British nation.

Again the relatively large number of Jews who entered this country during the last two decades of the nineteenth century - roughly some 70,000 which was, however, a small fraction of the total number who were driven from their homelands by barbaric pogroms in Central and Eastern Europe - did, at times, excite some commotion and local antagonism since so many of them were concentrated in the East End of London. Such antagonism would occasionally take vocal expression as anti-semitic prejudice. And no informed person today would deny that traces of such prejudice still linger in this country.

Yet notwithstanding initial hardships and animosity, Jewish immigrants as a whole managed over time to blend themselves into the mainstream of national life. Their success in doing so is attributable to a number of factors. Being of much the same complexion as the indigenous population, they could avoid being conspicuous and, indeed, became less so as they advanced in economic status and moved up in the social hierarchy by their own efforts, making no special demands on the host country. In particular, they imposed no perceptible burden on the nation's education system, on its social welfare services, or on its police force. It occurred to nobody to regard Britain as a multi-racial society in consequence of their presence here.

With the postwar influx of well over two million immigrants of African or Asian origin, for the most part unskilled and - because of their colour and other racial characteristics - decidedly visible, the situation was altogether different. This massive inflow of coloured peoples brought in its train new legislation. A race relations agency, currently the Commission for Racial Equality, was established and, in conjunction with it, a diffused 'race relations industry' sprang up, variously occupied in counter-racialist propaganda, in drawing the attention of the public and the government to alleged mistreatment of the newcomers, and in pressing for more radical legislation designed to offer them greater protection and also ease the existing restrictions on further immigration into the country.

It is by reference to such distinctive features associated with the postwar inflow of coloured peoples that it may be affirmed that Britain was not hitherto, but since then has become, a multi-racial or multi-ethnic society.

In order to retain perspective, however, we are to bear in mind also that we are not yet a multi-racial society in another sense of the word. Certainly Britain cannot be regarded as a multi-racial society if the term is used to describe a political unit composed of different racial groups of comparable size and influence, or a confederation of separate racial communities inhabiting different areas of a common political territory. Nor, contrary to the elements of fantasy that occasionally captivate the race relations industry, is a multi-racial Britain to be conceived as a free assemblage of diverse races committed to interfusing their diverse cultures into a richer whole guided by the initiatives of a benevolent bureaucracy.

Thus, no matter how vociferous or flamboyant the local manifestations of the culture of the new races in Britain, they do not disguise the fact that the prevailing and wholly dominant culture of these islands is the culture of Western civilisation as it has evolved in a white Britain. And although this white British culture is admittedly embroidered today with some exotic slivers, and large segments of a number of British cities such as London, Liverpool, Birmingham and Bradford seem to have been transformed into foreign enclaves and incipient casbahs, the racial aspirations of the mass of the indigenous population do not, at their most liberal, extend beyond a vague hope that in the fullness of time new ethnic minorities may somehow become assimilated into a white British culture or, at least, comfortably grafted onto its main trunk.[5]

Be that as it may, the sort of multi-racial Britain that has actually emerged from the postwar immigrations is one faced with formidable minority problems turning on race, colour, culture, and creed. Whether one welcomes the event or regrets it, no one will seriously deny that the consequences for the future of the nation could be profound.

2. How did it happen?

For the record, it should be mentioned that there were a small number of reputable public men who, sometimes with the American experience in mind, did indeed speak out in the Fifties and early Sixties against the unprecedented scale of this inflow of Afro-Asian immigrants - as a result of which they were, of course, promptly dubbed racialists. Unwarrantably so, for there was no question but that Britain could cope comfortably with, say, 50,000 or even 100,000 coloured people, especially if they were dispersed over the country. However, once the new immigrant population far exceeded these manageable numbers, there could be no such confidence.

Put more brazenly, the liberal hypocrisy of affirming libertarian principles in this respect could be continued indefinitely - always provided it should never be put to the test. We could, that is, go on vaunting our traditional 'open door policy', so long as the numbers coming in through the open door were not large. As events turned out, however, the annual number of those entering became so large that the door had to be officially closed in 1962 - by which time it was manifestly too late. We were already in the throes of multiracialism.

Although there is no question but that freedom of expression is a reality in this country, only the brave or the rash give voice to sentiments that are not more or less in tune with the prevailing *zeitgeist* or, more properly speaking, with the views of the 'Establishment Enlightenment'. Such is the temper of this 'Enlightenment' in Britain today, such is the unwritten accord to maintain what we might call racial quietism, that it is considered bad form, at least, to raise awkward questions about the country's gratuitous conversion into a multiracial society - indeed, rather bad form to regard the event as anything other than a natural phase in the development of a civilised country and, for Britain in particular, something akin to the fulfilment of a historic destiny.

Yet the day will surely dawn when the professional historian will feel free to investigate this singular episode in a determined endeavour to ascertain its causes: whether, for example, it might reasonably be interpreted as the culmination of official deliberations on the issues involved, or else as an outcome arising simply from the lack of any policy or from, perhaps, an effective paralysis of policy, the result of myopia, bewilderment, or failure of nerve.

Rationalisations of the event, that in some sense we 'owed it' to our once-subject people inasmuch as we ourselves had once occupied their territories - although as conquerors and as the bearers of a technically superior civilisation - might be expected from the politically Left. But such beliefs were unlikely to have much influence in government circles. My own guess is that our professional historian will conclude, if he is also charitable, that a long heritage of liberalism and tolerance acted over that relatively short but critical period to blind the political establishment to the growing tensions within the country of the gathering pace of Afro-Asian immigration.

This same heritage of liberalism and tolerance found expression before and during World War Two in the frequent criticisms by people in this country of the American treatment of the black man, criticisms that carried the implication that British conduct in this respect would be, if not exemplary, more benign and hospitable. And doubtless there were many people who, during the early Fifties, fondly imagined that this inceptive 'silent invasion' (as Lord Elton called it) presented to the British nation the sort of challenge that, in virtue of its imperial experience and political wisdom, it was eminently qualified to meet.

To this political illusion should be added the argument of 'economic necessity' - conceived and propagated by Cabinet Ministers, and by others who ought to have known better - that the country was suffering from an overall shortage of labour.[6] The consequence of such beliefs among the political cognoscenti during the Fifties was that the population at large was made to bear for some few more years the discomforts and the concomitant apprehensions unavoidably associated with the settlement of hundreds of thousands of coloured families in the country's major cities.

Looked at in global perspective, this mass migration to Britain is part of the postwar movement of world population from 'South' to 'North' by means both legal and illegal. And in view of the political climate, it is difficult to monitor. Today, however, the United States is unquestionably the most favoured destination, the bulk of its immigrants coming from Mexico and to a lesser extent, though still in large numbers, from South and Central America, from the Caribbean and particularly from Puerto Rico. The annual number of illegal immigrants into the United States is believed by Americal officials to be growing, current estimates varying between one million and three million. The countries of Western Europe, on the other hand, attract immigrants not only from the Caribbean but also from Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean.

There is no shortage of literature describing the fate and fortune of particular ethnic groups that have settled in the various Western countries during the past few decades and the problems which arise in part from the reaction of the local populations.[7] I do not wish to add to this literature: only to remark that this global phenomenon - seen by some scholars as an element in neo-Malthusian theory - is but one of the many far-reaching consequences of the rapid growth of technology since the turn of the century, one that is obviously related to the so-called revolution in transport and communications.[8] Seen in that light, this South-to-North migration might be regarded as inevitable, and if so it might then be concluded that nobody after all is really to blame for the postwar transformation to a multi-racial Britain.

But this philosophic view of events is unacceptable. Allowing that the momentum of science and technology cannot be arrested, what was perhaps inevitable after World War Two was the *attempt* of millions of people to migrate from the poorer countries of the 'South' to the wealthier countries of the 'North'. Indeed, it required no imaginative gift to foresee that British subjects from India, from the West Indies, and from parts of Africa, would arrange to come to Britain as soon as it was economically feasible for them to do so. Yet anticipated or not, British governments could well have reacted to these attempts by firmly resisting mass immigration of this sort - at least until the issues had been thoroughly debated in the country.

As we know, successive British governments initially took no measures to stay the tide of immigrants: if anything, they encouraged it in the belief, as indicated above, that the country was suffering from a 'labour shortage'. Indeed, agents were sent to the West Indies in order to recruit labour for public transport and nursing. Thus until 1962 Afro-Asian families continued to move into Britain in increasing numbers - by which time it was abundantly clear even to the most obstinately enlightened member of the government that something had to be done. The groundswell of popular resentment was shaking the country.

It was, of course, too late. Indeed, by 1962 the sizeable ethnic minorities in Britain, encouraged and

represented by enthusiastic members of the race relations industry, had already begun to agitate for less restrictive immigration controls on humanitarian grounds. For one of the unsettling consequences of so large an influx of the new ethnic groups is the political influence they come to wield, not only through the race relations lobby, but simply as voters in marginal constituencies, especially on issues in which their own interests are in conflict with those of the host country. Yet even were the country united behind governments determined to prevent any more immigration of this sort, it would be increasingly difficult and costly to implement in view of current expectations of demographers that the populations of Asia and Africa will multiply exceedingly over the next few decades.[9]

In view of the higher reproduction rates of the newcomers, to say nothing of their continued illegal entry, it is virtually certain that the proportion of the white population of Britain will decline over the future.

To conclude simply that successive Labour and Conservative ministers were short sighted and complacent, being as unworldly as only politicians can be in their understanding of most things save political manoeuvre and intrigue, is not enough. Betrayal is, perhaps, too strong a word to describe the action - or, rather, the persistent inaction - of those governments in the circumstances. Or, again, perhaps not. For the pros and cons of the proposal to join the Common Market were extensively debated in Parliament, in the press, on radio and television programmes, and at public meetings all over the country - although, for the most part, with more rhetoric than sagacity. And even after the union had been consummated and celebrated, a Labour government took the constitutionally unprecedented step of introducing a referendum in order putatively to offer directly to the British people the option of withdrawing from the EEC.

Yet the transformation of Britain into a new multiracial entity is a political and social event of far greater moment than that of wedding it to the EEC. Such a transformation goes further than any other episode in our long history to unsettle the institutions and traditions of centuries, to change abruptly the complexion and the texture of our national life, and to assume grave burdens and to incur grave risks - notwithstanding which the question was never even debated in the House.

In sum, the British people had no voice in a decision of epochal proportions, one that was to alter intimately, radically and irrevocably, the face, the character and the very cohesion of their society. In effect, they awoke one morning to discover a once-familiar environment mushrooming with Afro-Asian communities, soon to be girt around with the bureaucratic paraphernalia of a new multi-racial welfare state.

3. The Economic Consequences

The economic consequences of immigration of this kind and on this scale, though not paramount, cannot be ignored in any historical appraisal.

The interest of economists in migration has in the main been academic in both the institutional and pejorative senses of the word. The mass movement of people between countries is conceived by them as a movement of labour - similar, that is, to the movement of any other productive resource - and therefore as an aspect of international trade in which the general presumption is in favour of unimpeded movement between countries of all productive resources.

Under a number of familiar assumptions, the movement of labour from poor countries (or low labour productivity) to rich countries (or high productivity countries) can be shown to increase world output. With the same assumptions, however, such a movement of labour acts to lower both the productivity of labour and per capita real income in the rich countries - and, of course, to raise them, at least temporarily, in the poor countries.[10]

Once we confine our attention to the economic effects of net immigration into the host country, their broad direction is unambiguous. Although any estimate of the actual magnitudes are always open to debate, the short term economic effects of large scale immigration of labour with limited skills are adverse. They include a worsening of the balance of payments (inasmuch as, at the existing exchange rate, the current expenditures of the immigrants adds immediately to the import bill). At a time of high employment, as in the Fifties and early Sixties in Britain, they also include an aggravation of the existing inflation (since then both the residential requirements of the immigrants and the industrial capital needed to employ them adds to the excess aggregate demand for social and industrial capital). In general, the greater the scale of immigration the more adverse is the balance of payments and the greater the inflationary pressure for a number of years.

Again, over the longer period of time necessary for relative prices to reflect new equilibria, net immigration turns the international terms of trade against the host country and - in so far as the greater proportion of immigrants have little capital and are not highly skilled or professionals - tends both to reduce the growth-path of per-capita income there and to increase capital's share of the national product at the expense of labour's share.[11]

Frequent claims that the new immigrants have in fact reduced the labour shortage in particular sectors of the economy - in particular, the apparent shortages of labour in transport, in nursing, and in what are popularly believed to be the more menial and less attractive occupations - are naive. Managers of public services in Britain who, along with some private firms, sent agents to the West Indies in the 1950s in order to recruit labour were only acting as good capitalists would in such circumstances - attracting lower-paid labour from outside their area in order to prevent wages from rising within it. For in the absence of a flow of immigrant labour ready to take up the existing and growing vacancies, economic forces would have prevailed so as to raise both wages and fringe benefits

in these particular occupations and also to encourage innovation and the substitution of capital for labour.

It is not possible to single out any clear economic advantage to the host population of this massive immigration into Britain. The fact that a sizeable proportion of the physicians currently employed by the National Health Service is of Asian origin ought not properly to be included on the positive side of the ledger for the obvious reason that qualified physicians could always have been admitted into this country under a specific quota system *if we really needed them* without having to throw open the doors to immigrants generally.

The italicised clause above is not superfluous. As a result of the restrictive entry policies applicable to the study of medicine in the UK, large numbers of willing and able candidates for a medical degree are turned away each year. In addition, of those who graduate each year a proportion elect sooner or later to emigrate, often to North America, where the material prospects are more promising.

The fact that there are, and will continue to be, many instances of individual success among the new minorities does not qualify the general verdict. It is, of course, very human and very understandable that members of the new ethnic groups point with pride to their various contributions to the life of the nation, to their achievements in business, in sport, and in the arts and sciences. But although understandable, such facts in themselves have no decisive economic significance.

A random sample of, say, a million white British families would be sure to contain a proportion of distinguished individuals in all fields of endeavour that is much the same as the proportion to be found in the nation at large. We may depend upon it that for every additional million families imported into this country from almost anywhere in the world there would emerge - given time enough for the educational process to filter through - roughly the same spread and incidence of achievement. From this consideration, nothing follows to favour mass immigration into this country.[12]

4. Unavoidable Racial Tensions

The extent of the economic and social disruption which has to be borne by the host country increases with the number of the immigrants, their rate of arrival, their relative poverty and lack of skills, and the degree of their concentration in populated areas. As for the resentment generated by their settlement among the host population, the more alien are the physical characteristics of the newcomers, the more alien their behaviour, attire, and manner of speech, the more intensely it is felt. Finally, the overt and latent hostility toward them varies with the general level of prosperity and employment.

Thus, bearing in mind only the numbers and the racial characteristics of the new immigrants[13] it was almost inevitable that there would be signs of growing hostility in various parts of the country; indeed, that there would be racial incidents from time to time, and occasional clashes between opposing groups arising from race antipathies. And I should be the last to deny that many of such disturbing incidents, many racial brawls and scuffles, were deliberately provoked by white extremists. For that matter, instances of black hooliganism are not always without extenuating circumstances.

Nonetheless, when Enoch Powell spoke with what seemed at the time to be characteristic exaggeration of his vision of 'rivers of blood', he was not, I am sure, attacking the morals of the newcomers or assuming that they were innately malevolent. He was simply forewarning his countrymen of what he believed to be the unavoidable consequences arising from the nation's endeavour to assimilate a coloured population of that size and composition.

Let the newcomers be without moral blemish! Let them be industrious, adaptable, unassuming! Yet once their numbers exceeds a critical fraction of the population they will not escape scorn or mistreatment. Thus, the arrival in an almost wholly white island community for the first time in its long history of coloured peoples in numbers large enough to constitute an unmistakable and conspicuous foreign presence can, unfortunately, be depended upon to act as a catalyst to racial friction - if only because within every modern nation, no matter how seemingly tolerant, there lurk brutal and neurotic elements; persons eager to find a focus for their latent pugnacity and paranoia.

It must be conceded in passing, however, that forms of organised violence and hooliganism originating from causes other than race have indeed increased in Britain since World War Two. But this unfortunate development does not of itself provide any warrant for agreeing to suffer, in addition to the domestic brands of rampage, those which arise from massive immigration. What is certain, at least, is that the so-called race riot - perhaps the most abhorrent and dangerous form of gang violence - is an experience Britain could have averted by the simple expedient of preventing the mass entry into the country of coloured immigrants.[14]

5. White Ambivalence in Britain

Seen in retrospect, there can be little doubt that the Establishment during the Fifties and Sixties was out of touch or out of sympathy with the mood of a large part of the indigenous population. Ministers of the Crown, churchmen, artists, academics, and members of the professional classes generally, their cultivated cosmopolitanism unruffled by the resentment gathering in localities within the cities, did not themselves live in neighbourhoods where, seemingly, swarms of West Indians or Asians were settling, sometimes several families to a house. For the type of black or Asian that British officials or professional men were accustomed to communicate with or entertain was also an official or a professional man, perhaps a diplomat or a scholar. And if white and black and coloured mingled socially, it was generally in an atmosphere effusive with decorum and expressions of good will.

Thus while the comfortable domestic life of the more privileged classes in Britain continued its smooth course, lower-income and working-class families in different parts of the country watched helplessly as the neighbourhoods in which they had lived for years were, as they saw it, being taken over by hordes of alien people, often noisy, sometimes gaudy or garish, and not infrequently unkempt and unintelligible.

Admittedly, many such neighbourhoods at the time were already rather shabby, and the houses somewhat dilapidated. But for the families originally inhabiting them they provided a home within an environment of familiar sights and sounds. They offered the semblance, at least, if not the reality, of a community along with a sense of continuity built on past associations - a shelter or enclave in an otherwise abrasive world. It is all too easy, then, for those untouched by this aspect of immigrant settlement to underrate the extent of the dismay endured by so many hundreds of thousands of their less fortunate countrymen.

Among the many political fashions today skirting the edge of fatuity is that of proudly declaring oneself 'in favour of change'. Such phrases come readily to the lips of a man deluded enough to suppose that he himself is engineering and controlling the change. Few people, however, like to have change simply thrust upon them, especially a change so apparently devastating and irreversible as that described. In the circumstances, it is surely irresponsible to lump together the understandable indignation of local populations at this gratuitous transmogrification of their familiar environments with those traces of virulent xenophobia that still lodge in the body politic of a modern nation.

It is irksome also to have to bear with those savants who, preening themselves on their farsightedness, airily dismiss the disconcerting repercussions arising from this mass influx of coloured peoples as being no more than a transitional phase in the grand chronology of events, or as being no more than the 'growing pains' of a new multi-racial era. For countless numbers of British families, however, the distress associated with this 'transitional phase' could never be surmounted. Considering the tribulations to which so many of them were subjected, it is a tribute to the good nature and forbearance of the British working class that there was so little recourse to violent resistance and that, indeed, genuine attempts were made to adjust themselves to the immigrant presence in very trying circumstances.

Looking to the future, and whether or not the white British population comes to terms with this new multiracial dispensation, it constitutes nonetheless a pronounced deflection from the historic course of the nation's social and political evolution. One consequence is that the ordinary British white today suffers vaguely from the tensions generated by an ambivalent attitude toward the coloured races that have taken abode in his country, tensions aggravated by a disjuncture between his often-repressed instinctive feelings and the feelings he has come to believe he ought to have - namely, the 'proper' and 'decent' feelings as articulated by the Established Enlightenment and transmitted by the media.

Another and related consequence is the irrevocable loss of a source of national strength and stability. As Lord Radcliffe remarked in 1966, 'National feeling is the strongest bond of union that exists in the world today.... Nothing else offers an association so satisfying in breadth and depth, sharing as it does tongue, culture, history, a political home, and a political order.'[15] The omnipresence in his native land today of peoples of Afro-Asian origin with whom the white Briton does not share the pride of a common heritage or culture and with whom he cannot, in the nature of things, share that atavistic sentiment of kith and kin, acts over time to confuse his sense of national wholeness and to weaken his sense of national identity.

Although patriotism will always be in ill-odour among self-styled liberals and humanists, it is for the nation a cohesive force of incalculable worth. The nation is that much stronger the greater is the willingness of its citizens, from a traditional sense of pride if nothing else, to restrain on occasion their self-seeking propensities for the common good, and to sink all differences and rally to their country's defence in times of emergency.

6. Immigrant Disaffection

Although the new immigrant populations are aware of the turmoil they incite in the host country, so wild have blown the 'winds of change' that the once-favoured policy of their keeping a low profile seems to have been blown off the planet. Certainly it is no longer regarded as an acceptable strategy by ethnic minorities on either side of the Atlantic. On the contrary, some of them have become omniverous for attention to their grievances, real and imaginary. Once settled in the promised land, they tend to become fixated with a new ethnic awareness, one that is nourished by the publicity given to allegations of mistreatment by the hyperactive race relations industry.[16] The most pertinacious source of their disgruntlement, however, turns on the issue that has come to be known as 'economic opportunity'.

If you are unemployed or if you believe yourself to be economically 'deprived' or otherwise frustrated, you cannot, if you are white, make a race issue out of it. If, on the other hand, you are black, you can, and there is, therefore, a temptation to do so; to join vociferous militants who intend 'to do something about it', generally by making a public nuisance of themselves.

Yet the evidence adduced for their supposed deprivation of economic opportunity is invariably made up of nothing more impressive than statistical comparisons of average incomes and employment rates as between the particular ethnic minority and the population at large, or else occasional data revealing their 'under-representation' in executive positions, public and private. It is evident that it is not always equality of economic opportunity that is being sought as a right of citizenship, but rather equality in the distribution of economic prizes.

This persisting dissatisfaction with their material status, particularly associated with black communities in Britain, has the incidental effect of continually directing attention to the material aspects of life and, therefore, of exaggerating their importance as a component in the well-being of society. True, there has been an unmistakable tendency since World War Two toward invidious economic comparisons within all the Western countries, a consequence of the rapid growth in communications and the economic obsessiveness of governments. But this increased sensitivity of working populations to pay differentials is reinforced by the routine complaints of ethnic spokesmen who focus attention on such indices of economic differentials as though they were exact readings on an infallible barometer of social justice.

It is instructive in this connection to recall how different was the fate of the immigrant in, say, the nineteenth century. Since public welfare services in Britain, as in other Western countries, were rudimentary, he was expected to make his own way toward economic salvation either alone or with a little help from the local immigrant community, and sometimes in the face of distrust and antagonism among members of the host population. The nation, then, did not consider itself at all responsible for economic deprivations endured by the immigrant. In the event, some immigrants departed, a few perished, and a few prospered. But most of them clung on tenaciously and, by a mixture of luck, guile, and industry, managed to keep their heads above the poverty line and gradually advanced in social and economic status.

In one vital respect, however, the nineteenth century immigrant had the advantage over his Afro-Asian counterpart today - in the control over his children. For there were at that time in Britain accepted norms of decorum and distinct notions of right and wrong. There was no all-embracing welfare state to make youthful promiscuity relatively painless. As noted in Lord Scarman's Report (2.16), immigrant parents today face a problem of parental authority in view of 'the relatively permissive attitude toward the disciplining of children'.

It is, of course, a problem shared also by many white families who have to struggle today to maintain control over their prematurely rebellious youngsters born, as they are, into suburban environments littered with the gadgetry of postwar affluence, environments studded with tasteless boutiques, drenched with entertainment media currently dedicated to wringing the utmost out of sexuality and violence. The abandon and exhibitionism of so many of the young in this over-spiced and hedonistic milieu is not to be wondered at. And the realisation among improvident juveniles that the safety net of the welfare state is stretched wide to catch them if they come to grief does nothing to check their excesses.

7. The Strain on our Institutions

The underlying preconceptions of the Scarman Report, as with nearly all reports on racial disturbances, are of a piece with those informing what I have called the Established Enlightenment. Particular to it is the belief that an outbreak of hooliganism, especially one involving a racial minority, is *prima facie* evidence of institutional defects in the system - 'an instance of social failure', to quote the sapient diagnosis of a Labour MP after the 1985 Handsworth riots - which naturally call for new legislation and new procedures. It is, of course, a beguiling conviction inasmuch as it holds out hope for relief in the near future and assures us that we are in control. Although Conservative members of Parliament are rather less wedded to this belief than are Labour or Alliance members, they have certainly not divorced themselves from it.

The contrary view - that so far as the bulk of the white population is concerned existing institutions are satisfactory enough and, although they are expected to evolve over time, there is no imperative to refashion them drastically as better to accommodate the cultural peculiarities and material exigencies of any segment of the new minorities - is one that would, of course, be dismissed with impatience by members of the Establishment.

To be sure, some irksome changes have perforce to be borne with. The effects of new immigrant settlements on the physical environment and on the provision of social services are apparent in industrial and commercial centres. Again, the large proportion of their children in many British schools has brought about changes in school curricula and in the style and quality of teaching, changes that have not been universally welcomed by white parents and teachers. Such 'white prejudice' is not peculiar to Britain. As Glazer observes: 'The German parent who sees his child in a classroom with increasing numbers of foreign children worries about how good an education he is getting. The Frenchman, no matter how liberal and enlightened, is concerned over how well his child will be learning French in a classroom dominated by foreigners.'[17] And the disquiet of white parents has been increased by new pressures on schools exerted by ethnic communities. 'The immigrant parents want their children to learn ancestral languages and traditions: but progress in their new countries demands effective education in that country's language and customs.'

Although the adoption of any proposal devised to meet the supposed needs of the children of immigrant parents is, in the last resort, a matter of choice for the nation, there are now quite a few 'authorities' among the teaching profession who have found a vocation in the detection of 'racial bias' and continue to recommend that more government money be spent and more school time devoted to improving the 'language skills' of immigrant children; to recommend also the introduction of what they call 'multi-cultural' curricula, and an increase in the number of black teachers.[18] These pressures have, however, been running into resistance, even if it is largely the resistance of inertia.

Consider also the burden now being thrust on the British police constable entrusted as he is with the thankless task of maintaining the Queen's peace in areas populated with minorities many of whom are suspicious and resentful of his presence there. Increasingly he is expected to assume the role of social worker in addition to his other duties, and assiduously to study the 'culture' and to court the good will and cooperation of the new ethnic groups. He must bear with dignity, or at any rate philosophically, repeated and sometimes vicious attacks on his person both by racist agitators and by delinquent juveniles. He must endure with resignation repeated accusations of brutality and prejudice whenever he is called upon to cooperate in preventing or containing sporadic outbreaks of racial hooliganism which, in several black areas, have escalated in ferocity in the last few years.[19]

Endeavouring to maintain law and order in these trying circumstances is virtually certain over time to drain the patience and sour the temper of the British police - and, sadly, to erase the once-universal image of the friendly bobby on the beat. The indigenous population are aware of this, and it contributes toward their resentment. And to this resentment can be added revulsion at incidents such as the orgy of black rioting in Handsworth in September 1985. The sheer barbarity of the onslaught on the police is a phenomenon new in British history.

In the event, facile liberal recommendations of the sort once made by Lord Scarman (5.42) that the normal penalty for racially prejudiced behaviour by the police be dismissal are not likely to arrest the phenomenon or placate Black Pantherism in Britain.[20] Indeed, formal enactment of measures designed to constrain traditional police procedures and to render officers more liable to charges of racial discrimination must of itself act to damp the morale and reduce the efficiency of the ordinary constable. Such legislation would find little support among the white population. It would, however, quicken the pulse of race relations militants and gratify the bellicose elements in Brixton, Handsworth, and Tottenham, who would undoubtedly regard it as vindication of their allegations of police harassment, so encouraging their insolence and criminal activity. And it can be depended upon to tempt policemen who are patrolling black areas to avoid the risk of being charged with racial prejudice by adopting a strategy of laxity and lenience in dealing with instances of black crime.[21]

8. **The Last Straw**

Finally, if we were ever minded to make this excursion into a multi-racial wonderland we could hardly have picked a worse time. Was ever a generation in our long history made simultaneously to bear the burden of so many unpromising developments? Was ever a civilisation in the history of the planet compelled to live amid so much gas and clamour, so choked by traffic, so assailed by media, so frantic with the mass movement of freight and people? Was there ever a time when men's appetites were so distended by despair and ambition? Was there ever a life-style bereft of all purpose save that of 'keeping up in the race'?

The second half of the twentieth century, the beginnings of the so-named post-industrial society, has spawned a new citizen, one besieged by technological compulsions, overloaded with appliances, strained, edgy, restless, discontented, eager to discover panaceas and scapegoats for his inevitable frustrations.

There are also the more transient difficulties. Currently the nation is absorbed by the problem of high unemployment, an undetermined proportion of it technological and virtually irremediable. Although in this respect, the under-utilisation of our resources is comparable with that existing in the Thirties, prices were then quite stable, and technology was not galloping so fast that the skills of the unemployed were virtually obsolete. As for the anxiety experienced then by the growth of Fascism, it has been eclipsed in our day by a universal apprehension over nuclear annihilation.

To such secular afflictions and temporary problems must be added new sources of conflict, both local and global, that are unique to this generation; the contradiction between two visions of justice, the meritocratic and the egalitarian, and also between two political doctrines, the collectivist and the libertarian. Cutting across these is the growing opposition between the technocrat and the conservationist, and that between the commercial lobby and the environmentalist lobby. Related to this conflict is the drawing of lines of battle between, on the one hand, those who place their hopes for a brighter future in the gathering momentum of scientific research and industrial development and, on the other, those who - taking alarm at the rapid poisoning and depletion of natural resources since the turn of the century - seek to place ever tighter controls on commerce and industry.

Nor should we overlook the gnawing anxiety in affluent countries at the uninterrupted rise in crimes of violence, notably among the young, and at the wildfire spread of political and criminal terrorism as a result of which, among other new perils, metropolitan areas have become highly vulnerable to sabotage and blackmail.

The postwar period has also witnessed another development fraught with a more subtle form of menace. It passes by the name of the new permissiveness - or, more euphemistically still, the new pluralism - and is an ineluctable consequence of the decline in the West of an ecumenical faith and a moral consensus. Yet this phenomenon has itself given rise to dissenting voices and dissenting movements, as a result of which Western society is today riven by dissension - dissension about the legitimacy of self-styled liberation movements and of licentious cults, and dissension about the propriety of porno-violence and of obscenities in film, literature, and television. There are currently irreconcilable conflicts of opinion, or rather faith, about marriage and divorce and the relations between the sexes generally, about abortion and euthanasia,

and about crime and punishment. Above all, and in part as a corollary of these dissensions, there has been a diminution of trust and civility between people accompanied by a growth of intransigence, if not fanaticism, for new causes and movements, and a readiness among organised groups, or even among disorganised ones, to resort to direct action or to physical confrontation with the authorities in determined and repeated bids to influence policy.

Engulfed as it is by problems of a character and severity unknown to earlier generations, the nation has yet undertaken to subject its beleaguered civilisation to the frictions and stresses inseparable from a metamorphosis into a multi-racial society - or, more precisely, into that novel brand of 'multi-racialism' that is the product of a rapid influx into white society of sizeable minorities of different colour, character, and culture.

Given the circumstances in which the new minorities find themselves, it is not surprising that economic status is at the centre of their political preoccupations. Absorbed as they are in their own factional disputes and in the daily struggle for social acceptance and recognition, the range of hazards that has begun to threaten the survival of our high-technology civilisation, and the conflicts it has engendered, are of very secondary concern to them.

This fact of itself need not exercise us. What should, however, is the increasing attention and coverage given to racial issues by government and the media. In consequence, the problems arising from race come to engage a quite disproportionate share of the nation's political energies - diverting its passions and its scarce resources from the many prevailing problems of the post-industrial era mentioned above.

(The sequel to this article will be published in the next issue of *The Salisbury Review*.)

Notes

1. 'The Immigrant in English History', in *Economic Issues in Immigration*. Institute for Economic Affairs, London, 1970.
2. Report of an Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. the Lord Scarman, OBE Cmnd. 8247, H.M. Stationery Office, 1981.
3. Peregrine Worsthorne's article in *The Sunday Telegraph* (29th November 1981) was among the few noteworthy exceptions, being wholly sceptical of the Report's recommendations. Another exception was the short report from Washington, D.C. by Angus Macpherson which appeared in *The Daily Mail* (27th November 1981) and which contended that Scarman's recommendation of 'positive discrimination' in favour of disadvantaged minorities was more likely to inflame racial tensions than to reduce them.
4. As a result of the slave trade, there were over twenty thousand negroes in Britain in the 1760s, concentrated for the most part in London. In 1774, for instance, there were, according to the *Gentleman's Magazine*, nearly 20,000 negro servants in London. The magazine went on to say that 'the main objection to their importation is that they cease to consider themselves as slaves in this free country, nor will they put up with an inequality of treatment, nor more willingly perform laborious offices of servitude than our own people.'

   In 1807, after the ending of the slave trade in Britain, slaves became too valuable to export from the colonies to the mother country, and the English black population - by then estimated at about forty thousand - began to decline and to be absorbed into the host population.

   During World War Two, however, there was an influx of black colonial seamen and munition workers. Returning white soldiers, bitter over the lack of employment, turned their anger on employed black workers, accusing them of 'stealing' their jobs while they (the soldiers) were away fighting for their country, and some rioting erupted in Liverpool and Cardiff in 1919.

   Seen in historic perspective, however, such incidents were more local than national. They made little impression on the country at large which had to face the problem of coloured race on a national scale only in the Fifties when West Indian families by the boatload began arriving at British ports.
5. Nathan Glazer (*Encounter*, July 1981) discusses the failure of the United States to bring all ethnic groups to a level of approximate social and economic equality in spite of the country's traditional and ardently repeated commitment to a multi-racial society. Yet he doubts, as indeed he may, that the British are reconciled even to the idea of becoming a multi-racial society. Occasional political statements that suggest otherwise, such as that by Mr Roy Hattersley (at the Labour Conference in Bournemouth, September 1985) in which delegates were told that the Labour Party 'is determined to build a multi-racial society in Britain', have no operative significance. They are part of a race relations' ritual and are made by politicians with an eye to the votes of coloured people.
6. This economic nonsense is dissected in chapter 15 of my *Twenty-One Popular Economic Fallacies*, Penguin, London 1969.
7. These immigrant families are no longer being made welcome in West European countries. On a recent visit to Berlin (December 1985), the economists I spoke to were far from being reticent in reporting the resentment among citizens about the number of Turkish families living there.

   Some pertinent remarks on the hardening of attitudes towards foreign workers as social and cultural problems become sharper may be found in Nathan Glazer's perceptive article, 'The Ethnic Factor', *Encounter*, July 1981.
8. A development that has augmented this South-to-North movement is the brutal racialist policies prevalent in parts of Asia, Africa, and the Far East.
9. According to 'World Population in Transition', a report by the Population Reference Bureau released in April 1986, nearly all of the world's increase in population over the foreseeable future will occur within the poorer

countries of the world. Of the expected increase of 3.4 billion over the next 40 years, 3.1 billion will be in Africa, Asia, and South America. The population of India alone is expected to grow from just under 800 million today to something over 1,600 million by the year 2100, and that of Nigeria from just over 100 million today to over 500 million.

10. Unlimited mobility of labour motivated solely by material prospects would in fact culminate in an equal per capita income in all countries. The resulting average living standard in each country would, however, be only a little higher in the once-poor countries while being substantially lower in the once-rich countries.

    Introduction into this model of population growth, the accumulation of capital, and the advance of technology, would move world per capita income in either direction over the future according to the values selected for the crucial parameters. Bearing in mind, however, that per capita income is conventionally measured without reference to the proliferation of the overspill effects associated with increasing numbers of people on a planet with finite natural resources, the general standard of welfare would be unlikely to grow.

11. For more detailed arguments and sensitivity estimates of the more important economic magnitudes, see the following articles by Mishan and Needleman, 'Immigration, Excess Demand, and the Balance of Payments', *Economica*, May 1966; 'Long Term Consequences of Immigration, Part A', *Economia Internazionale*, 1966; and 'Long Term Consequences of Immigration, Part B', *Economia Internazionale*, 1988.

    A relatively non-technical version of the first paper appeared in *Lloyds Bank Review*, July 1966, with the title 'Immigration: Some Economic Effects'.

    For a popular but quite comprehensive exposition of all the technical papers see my article, 'Does Immigration Confer Economic Benefits on the Host Country?' in the booklet, *Economic Issues in Immigration*, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1970.

12. Unless it were evident that the more populous nations enjoy advantages that arise from sheer numbers, which it certainly is not. Familiar propositions about economies and diseconomies of the size of the market form a taxonomy rather than dependable (numerical) relationships. Many of the smaller countries of the world - Denmark, Holland, Austria, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden - are among those enjoying the highest living standards.

13. I am conscious of continually interchanging such adjectives as racial, ethnic, cultural, immigrant, and others, guided as much by euphonic considerations as linguistic ones. But in the present context, in which there is no need as yet to distinguish between those of West Indian and those of Asian origin, linguistic distinctions are not of prime importance.

    Some relevant observations on the conept, definition, ambiguity, and overlap of the word ethnic as widely used have been made by Nathan Glazer in his article, 'The Universalisation of Ethnicity', *Encounter*, February, 1975.

14. Aggravating matters is the psychological fact, to which the British form no exemption, that nationals take a more lenient view of the lawlessness of their own people than they do of the lawlessness of foreigners or new ethnic groups.

15. 'The Dissolving Society', Oration delivered at the London School of Economics December 1965. Monograph published by the London School of Economics, 1966.

16. A recurring grievance, occasionally aired in Parliament, is the discrimination practised by immigration officials. If it were true, however, a sense of prudence might suggest that the coloured minorities should connive rather than protest. As race relations enthusiasts persist in affirming, a lot of colour prejudice continues to be in evidence in this country. It serves no good purpose, then, to inflame it by adding to the size of the coloured population.

17. Nathan Glazer, 'The Ethnic Factor', *Encounter*, July 1981.

18. The style of the common penny-dreadful revelations of incorrigible prejudice in British schools is well illustrated in a *New Society* article, 'Racism in Schools' (5th November, 1981) which begins: '... Last June, the Rampton inquiry's interim report identified racism as one of the main reasons why West Indian children perform so badly in British schools. Some teachers are unintentionally racist, and racist assumptions are built into much of our education ...'

    'The government has now published a noncommittal consultation document on the interim report' continues the article, 'which asks local authorities, and organisations of teachers, educationalists and ethnic minorities, for their comments ...'

    'They are asked for views on topics like the teaching of English as a second language, the development of multi-cultural curricula, and so on. Are too many West Indian children suspended from school or sent to special units? How can children from ethnic minorities best be prepared for working life? What changes should be made in teacher training?'

    'Racism there is - even the National Union of Teachers admits as much. What's more, "Colour-blindness" is not enough says the NUT. There must be real commitment among teachers to multi-cultural education, more in-service training, more black teachers. Unintentional racism, in the textbooks used, in patronising attitudes, in low expectations, is even more widespread ...'

    It is amusing to discover that an innocent remark slipped in toward the end inadvertently but effectively dissolves all the pretentious froth about 'unintentional racism': viz., 'The question of why Asian children achieve while West Indians don't - which seems to throw doubt on the racism explanation - could not be explored in the interim report.'

19. *ibid.*

20. It is increasingly hard for policemen in Britain to remain uniformly good-tempered and even-handed when life for them has been made so troublesome and dangerous by the new immigrant populations, especially by those from the West Indies. While Labour and Alliance spokesmen could not desist from political opportunism, even after the horror of Handsworth, and blamed the orgy of arson, mayhem, and looting, on the Tory government's economic policy, the men on the spot had no time to indulge in such fantasies. According to Chief Constable Geoffrey Dean, 400 young blacks 'driven on by bloodlust' started the riot and the 'orgy of thieving'.

    At all events, in so far as we are concerned with the attitude and the behaviour of the police, what matters is their own belief that elements within the black community are the direct instigators of the recent eruptions of savagery, and that these instigators are viciously anti-police.

21. According to Peregrine Worsthorne, '... the police have been encouraged, even compelled to go soft on crime in the inner cities as a result of Lord Scarman's thoroughly anti-social recommendations' (*Sunday Telegraph*, 6th October 1985).

In Search of Central Europe

(The following unsigned article, a joint production by Czechoslovak scholars, was issued last year by Charter 77, as one of their official documents. We reproduce it here by courtesy of the Palach Press, which prepared the English translation.)

Gaudeamus igitur

The development of culture and education, and thus also the ability of a society to solve acute problems inherent in each era, depends to a large extent on educational institutions. Higher education, and universities in particular, occupy an important place. Their traditional aims were twofold: firstly, to provide and protect space for the free development of cultural and spiritual values, which shape the society's unique and unchangeable image; secondly, to educate future generations of intelligentsia and provide people with the necessary qualifications to enable them to embrace their adopted cultural inheritance, add new features to it, as they develop over time, and finally, bequeath this to future generations. Each era naturally interpreted this inheritance in its own way - be it its content or the form of protecting it. The interpretation of the meaning of education has been changing throughout history: from the medieval interpretation, based on theology, through the Renaissance and Enlightenment up to the present, when its norm and dominant content are scientifically oriented. In spite of these historical changes, respect for education has survived. Society has preserved the consensus that if it is not to degenerate spiritually, it must provide the bearers of education with conditions for their task which are as favourable as possible - for the benefit of the whole society.

In the past, universities in our lands were important centres of the development of culture, science and the life of society in the widest possible sense. But what role do they play now? We believe that the current state of our higher education, in universities particularly, is not good. If these establishments are to fulfil their original and socially vital role, it is necessary to change the conditions in which they function as well as the style of their activity.

A Glance at History

Universities, traditionally placed in the centre of the European educational system, emerged in the Middle Ages as the realisation of the specifically European 'idea' as the expression of a European approach to education and culture. Although the spiritual dimensions which led to the formation of universities often remained concealed (as in the case of Gothic cathedrals), one can deduce something of the 'original idea' from the existence and history of universities, and to a degree reconstruct it.

Universities were founded by the decrees of rulers or popes, as autonomous, self-governing and independent bodies, as independent communities of teachers and students, for the 'study of sciences'. To be able to exist they were endowed with privileges which guaranteed their social, legal and spiritual autonomy and protected them against local powers, be they feudal, municipal or religious. They elected their own chancellors and deans, and retained their rights of examination and graduation, their own jurisdiction. For instance, at Charles University in Prague in its early period, the chancellor was elected for one year or even six months (elections always being beld on St George's Day and St Havel's Day) by the assembly of all members of the university body, with any doctor, master or student being able to stand as candidate. The chancellor was expected, in the words of Stanislav of Znojmo at the election of M. Kristan of Prachaticein 1412, to be 'just in judgement, accurate in the execution of duties, and with a degree of leniency and tolerance' (*iustus in iudicando, strenus in exequendo et pius in tollerando*). Only under such leadership could a university preserve its independent status and devote itself to its purpose. It is important to note that in its original function the university was neither a religious nor a state institution. It was of course by its very existence dependent on the power of the church and the ruler, of whom it also sought protection and support, but by its unique character it retained within itself a struggle for independence.

The 'original idea' of the university also included the idea that the reason for creating universities was not the need for a general or specific type of education, that universities were not created for state or church benefit, but that the very substance of a university is the desire to explore and know, in other words scientific interest. In the words of Sieger von Brabant, life without knowledge is death and a miserable grave. And it was the university which became the place where the love of knowledge, the pure desire for education, was to be fulfilled.

The history of the universities, like Prague University, is not always an idyllic story of gradual fulfilment of this love under the protection of religious and secular authorities, but above all the history of their rises and falls from glory, their periods of growth and of decay, when the original idea faded into the background and was forgotten. This past incorporates of course the history of politics, of social history; it reflects changes in the spiritual climate, cultural transformations, briefly everything that every era brings with it, and that locates universities again and again in a specific temporal context. Nevertheless, there remains a timeless element there, something like a nucleus of the historical idea of universities: the attitude to the 'original idea' of the university, the historically changeable ability of man to perceive this idea and make it a reality. Whenever this idea drifts out of man's consciousness to the very edge of oblivion, universities are in *crisis*. Such a situation means not only a decline in university life but at the same time a revival of the question as to what the original idea was. In decline it becomes that much more urgent to review the state of affairs, to revive the declining spirit of the university, to renew and reform the university as an institution of its time. Every crisis in the universities revives the idea of their *reform*.

University reform was imminent for instance at the beginning of the nineteenth century when the secular authorities had long forgotten why secular rulers once established universities and tended to regard them as a mere instrument in the hands of state power, as institutions which exist solely to abide by the requirements of the state. The Austrian Emperor Francis I said this to Lublin professors in 1821: 'We do not need scholars but good citizens. To this end you shall educate the young. Whoever takes his wage from me must teach as I order. Whoever cannot do that or bothers me with some new ideas may go, or I shall have him removed.' Faced with this kind of 'interpretation' of the idea of the university, intellectual opposition soon grew, realising that on that basis the universities would be bound to degenerate rapidly. Among the thinkers who concerned themselves with the problem of university reform at that time was Wilhelm von Humboldt, who worked out a new 'organisational plan' for the restructuring of universities on a new model. Humboldt criticised the current practice on these points:

Universities had developed into one-sided, specialised schools, mere preparation ground for the professions – above all for state administration. The aim of university students then was to get acquainted with information from the non-theoretical spheres of life, to acquire particular practical knowledge and to pass a prescribed number of examinations. Endless examinations were driving students to despair, producing in them a nausea and dislike of the information that was being forced on them, stifling their thirst for knowledge.

'Higher' education, where scientific truths were presented to students as finite, solved, complete and valid for all time, was nothing but a continuation of lower school forms. Universities were thus evading their original purpose: to be places where new vistas and outlooks open up, where knowledge is cultivated and viewed as the ability to see reality in a new way and transform this view into knowledge of man and his world, to instil in students an education which is general and universal, to cultivate scientific perception which aims at the 'totality' of knowledge and truth, and which has as its constant focus and goal the all-encompassing significance of the world and of man.

Philosophy becomes the fundamental guideline of university reform as presented by Humboldt, the aim of which is to combine all university studies in a unity and endow it with universality. Philosophy is in his opinion simply the point of interaction between the theoretical knowledge of individual sciences and morally motivated human conduct, between the specific and the general in human life, between man and the world. It is philosophy which induces in man a new feeling for life and a new view of the world, an awareness of the *openness* of the world, of man and the future. Humboldt's 'organisational plan' incorporates this fundamental idea in an institutionalised concept of university with these words: 'The specific feature of institutes of higher science (i.e. universities) is to treat science as an unsolved problem, thus continuing their research, while schools deal with and teach ready-made and finite facts.' Hence Humboldt's emphasis on the *freedom* of the university and its independence from bourgeois society, which occupies itself predominantly with the 'technical' problems of its existence, above all the economy, and which thinks largely in terms of social demand and supply.

It is not within the scope of this article to analyse the complex development of the idea of the university and its practical realisation in various countries over the course of the last two centuries – regardless of whether they were following Humboldt's plan or opposed to it. What strikes us, though, is the fact that in time the importance of the universities grew enormously.

As regards this country, it was not by accident that the first Czechoslovak republic was nicknamed 'the republic of professors', and it was not by accident that one of the first repressive acts of the Nazi occupiers was the liquidation of Czech universities and colleges and the brutal persecution of students and professors. Let us note at least that Czechoslovak universities between 1918 and 1938 preserved or revived most of what we have mentioned here in connection with the original idea. Formally, universities were granted significant autonomous powers *vis-à-vis* the secular power (and of course also *vis-à-vis* the weakened power of the Church): from the election of university officials to the immunity of academic premises. Even more significant was the preservation of the 'original idea' of the university in the field of pedagogic practice: professors were more or less free to choose the content and timetable of their lecture cycles in accordance with their individual creative and didactic orientation.

Students were not restricted by any fixed numbers per class, and had a far-reaching freedom of choice as to which lectures to attend in accordance with their interests.

Even the more modern argument of whether university studies are to be above all preparation for a profession or rather the highest independent and non-utilitarian form of education, was solved in its own way, albeit not quite satisfactorily from the social point of view and still in need of revision: there were two forms of studies - one with an 'absolutorium' (i.e. state examinations) giving a guarantee of practical application, the other concentrating purely on academic interests and appropriate titles and degrees.

Our Present Situation

The current shape and organised life at Czechoslovak universities is codified in the law on higher education, issued on 10th April 1980 (no. 11/1980). This defines universities and colleges as the highest level of the Czechoslovak educational system. This by no means implies any great difference between this level and lower ones. On the contrary, this means that universities and colleges are not intended to have the character of 'liberal studies' but are merely part of a unified, state-governed school system. By this law state authorities, the Ministry of Education and so on have the final say in practically all aspects of the life of universities and colleges - from the appointment of officials, financial budgets, contact with international institutions and the awarding of academic ranks, to publishing textbooks and approving the teaching syllabus and research planning. The so-called academic freedoms, which had previously been the basis of all university activities and which gave them their unique spirit, ceased to be recognised not only *de facto* but also *de iure*.

Their dependence on state institutions and the state apparatus increasingly cripples universities and colleges and is in our opinion the main obstacle to their development. The result is that the most important element in decision-making regarding the contents of higher education is no longer the fundamental need of human society to cultivate the arts and sciences, develop a cultural heritage and transmit it from generation to generation, but state interests, be they socio-economic or politico-ideological.

a) *The so-called guideline figures (fixed numbers of students admitted to universities)*

The ministries of education fix the numbers of students allowed to enter each branch of study for every school year. This is based on the needs of the centrally controlled state economy, or more precisely, their interpretation by those who happen to be the responsible ministry bureaucrats at the time. This of course has had an adverse effect on those disciplines which cannot prove their immediate practical utility. In particular, some fields of the humanities open their classes irregularly and to a limited number of students. For instance, classical philology which once had a noble tradition in this country, is forced to vegetate - ancient and medieval culture is of hardly any use to 'an actually existing socialist' economy. (At Charles University classical Greek is now studied by only seven students in the second year. There are apparently two more in the more advanced years, but one is an Argentinian who studies here as part of an international exchange.) And of course, whenever society's actual needs clash with the prevailing ideological slant, the latter always wins. Witness its permanent aversion to theology or quantum theory (and before that to psychoanalysis, genetics or cybernetics).

b) *Entry regulations*

In spite of all the measures designed to select candidates by objective criteria - standardised tests and computerised results - entry into universities is too often decided on the basis of interests which have nothing to do with objective selection. The cause of this is not only the examiners but also the very nature of the procedure. The decisive element is not first of all the candidate's qualification for scientific or other creative work, his attitude to his chosen field of study or his ability to pursue it, guaranteeing that his decision and choice of subject has been well thought out. On the contrary, he is judged on the basis of things irrelevant to these criteria, such as his marks from secondary school or references by his former teachers which emphasise his 'political profile'. He goes through an interview whose aim is to ascertain his socio-political attitude, i.e. whether or not he is well versed in the 'scientific view of the world' - in other words, whether or not he is able to reproduce the currently prevailing evaluation of international and local issues or show an erudition in his use of dogmas and established theses which pretend to be in line with Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The candidate thus faces a corrupting pressure: instead of being given the opportunity to formulate his thoughts or to defend the factuality and consistency of his views and show that he is educated in the true sense of the word, or to prove that he is well equipped for university studies, he is forced if he wants to pass the entry examination to say what is expected of him, to prove he is well-versed in uncritical repetition of what others have said or written on the subject, that his views are identical to those preached in official quarters. In such circumstances a specialised text (whose function is often only that of ascertaining the candidate's passive knowledge), plays a secondary role in the entry examination. On the whole, it is evident that the favourites in these examinations are not those who are truly interested in their chosen subject or who have the disposition for scientific or artistic work, but those who have the best political profile and are most willing to respect the rules of the game, who can prove their positive attitude to the state system by their membership of the Communist Party or the Socialist Union of Youth or at least have patrons and other protectors in the Party and state apparatus.

c) *Form and content of studies*

The incorporation of the universities and colleges into the centralised state educational system erases the difference between them and lower grade schools. As with primary and secondary schools, teaching at universities and colleges is strictly in accordance with a unified syllabus approved by the ministry of education. That of course means that all Czech or Slovak universities or colleges where the same disciplines are studied teach exactly the same content and in the same manner, year-in year-out, on the basis of the currently prevailing syllabus, leaving no room for true innovations, new scientific discoveries, or collaboration between professors and students. The emphasis is on the volume of information set by the syllabus, with attendance at prescribed lectures being obligatory and monitored. Examinations are on the whole just a means of ascertaining how well the student has mastered the information given in the lectures. Czechoslovak universities and colleges do not offer their students time or scope for real study, the opportunity to spend time in libraries, study rooms or laboratories, meet professors, consult them and discuss things with them. On the contrary, students are swamped with duties, forced to spend long hours in lecture halls and to memorise the prescribed material. Little or no time is left for the student of a particular field to get deeply into his subject and to work on it. Within the present rigid system, it is virtually impossible for the student to find his own approach to the subject matter, search for its problems, and confront them. Working seminars, colloquia or lectures which the student could choose himself so as to get acquainted with the style of work of a particular 'school', make useful contacts, or start actively participating in such work, are practically non-existent at our universities, or are very rare, remaining on the fringes of the prescribed syllabus. It is impossible to choose one's own combination of subjects or form one's own approach to these, thus adapting the content of study to one's interest. No wonder then that such a straitjacket style of study cannot lead the student to any creative independence, or teach him to ask meaningful questions and search for their answers in his chosen field of study.

A particular problem in our opinion is the teaching of subjects which belong to the so-called core curriculum, and which take up some ten hours a week, i.e. a whole third of the syllabus. Apart from sport and languages, these are the social sciences: Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the history of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and of the international working class movement, scientific communism, political economy, and others. What was said in connection with entry examinations applies here also. Students are not encouraged to think independently about social and scientific issues, to evaluate critically the problems presented by the studied material. Again, they are expected to master the material as presented, to memorise dogmas and social theories which are ideologically safe and approved by the state institutions. They are strictly forbidden to express anything that might challenge or complicate these dogmas. The thinking of future scientists or creative workers is thus again and again corrupted and forced, for purely existential reasons (since the student must get through his studies without any collisions if he wants to safeguard his future career), to renounce the elementary criteria by which critical and unprejudiced thinking should always be judged.

d) *The possibility of scientific and creative work*

Since universities and colleges do not have the character of independent institutions endowed with the right to decide on their own scientific or artistic activity, they lose their role of important spiritual, cultural, and creative centres, from which new stimuli could grow for the benefit of the whole society. Universities and colleges - like any other state-controlled and state-financed institutions - are given tasks by their appropriate ministries which they must fulfil within the framework of their educational, scientific and artistic activity. These tasks are co-ordinated with the needs of the Plan for the development of the state economy.

Without trying to trivialise the relationship between theoretical study and the practical problems of the world in which we live, we believe that basing theoretical study exclusively on the demands of practice, moreover one that is above all economic, is unwise. What often results is that technical and scientific fields of study are given exclusive importance, particularly those which can, often only ostensibly, prove their immediate practical usefulness. Less practical branches of study, concerning other - but for the life of man perhaps more important - areas of knowledge, naturally suffer. Within the framework of such planning, whole university departments are disbanded if their field of study is considered to be unnecessarily universalistic and thus of little use to this (apparently too small) country. (For instance, in 1970 at the faculty of mathematics and physics the authorities dissolved the department of mathematical logic and the department of general mathematical structures.) It is often discovered later how unwise such a decision was, even from the practical point of view. The state of a science, as characterised by the problems which it is trying to solve and the methods it uses, could to an extent be in advance of the society's current practical requirements, and it is therefore unwise if the prevailing social requirements try to regulate it or even plan it.

In view of the importance attributed by ministries to various circulars, bulletins, decrees and reports which serve to show that plans are being fulfilled even in the field of theoretical study and research, to prove the social usefulness (real or potential) and economic contribution of a particular branch of science, scientists and university professors are turned into mere clerks in their fields. Research and teaching then naturally suffer, and mere formalism and meaningless paperwork are encouraged.

e) *Appointment of teachers and scientists*
State and Party regulations in the appointment of teachers in individual departments form a chapter of their own. It is shocking that the conferring of teachers' ranks (professor, associate professor, etc) should now be entirely in the hands of state institutions, with dissertation papers no longer required. A university teacher may become associate professor if throughout a certain period of time he proves to have 'behaved correctly' in his position of assistant professor. Heads of departments must be confirmed in their positions by the municipal Party committee, the all-important criterion being - and this is true for all academic appointments - their membership of the Communist Party or the Socialist Union of Youth. The result often is that departments are headed not by experts devoted to their field of study, people with critical sense and culture, but above all by people who are politically adaptable. If one of the teachers stands in the way of incompetent career-hungry men, they can easily classify him as politically unreliable. He can then be simply dismissed by not having his contract extended, or punished in a less conspicuous way - by being transferred from a teaching post to a research job. He is then not allowed to teach and must retire at the age of sixty, rather than sixty-five as university teachers do. Though even that works only on paper: all teachers over sixty can only continue to teach if they meet with political approval.

f) *International contacts*
It is obvious that free contacts with international institutions, participation at international conferences and symposia or in postgraduate studies and fellowships abroad can only enhance the expertise of scientists, university teachers and studies. International exchanges of this kind are common throughout the world. Professors, scientists and students travel freely from country to country, visit each other, exchange information about their research, and often collaborate on specific projects; unless, of course, they happen to have the misfortune to be Czechoslovak citizens, which puts them in an unenviable position *vis-à-vis* their foreign colleagues. All international contacts of professors and students of Czechoslovak universities and colleges are subject to strict control by the state authorities and to their approval. Such contacts are reduced to an absolute minimum, and they are regarded more as exceptions merely to be tolerated rather than as useful. Even here the criteria are not scientific but ideological - the so-called 'interests of the state'. And as with practically all aspects of university life, here too professors and students are under a corrupting pressure. Civil obedience is the prerequisite for an approved trip abroad. When a trip is not approved, even in the case of a top expert, it becomes a sign that not quite everything is in order as regards his political profile, and he could be suspected of having been blacklisted. Real experts and talented students travel abroad very rarely: this privilege is given to those who like travelling and are prepared to do anything for it. If they cannot show sufficient qualification as experts, they substitute it with a 'positive political attitude' or exemplary socio-political activity. Of course the situation is not so clear-cut, and some experts do also get the occasional opportunity to travel. But it is made clear to them that this is to be understood as a one-off privilege, not something which is the right of every scientist, professor or student.

It seems to us that our system of higher education - and above all the university - is today again in crisis. The 'original idea' of the university has again been forgotten and dissolved in an educational system governed and regulated by the state authorities. Again the emphasis is on ready-made, finite, and technically usable discoveries. Again students are fed quantities of seemingly ready-made truths and unshakeable certainties. Again we witness the disappearance of that universal requirement by which the university used to abide and to which it should be receptive - the requirement which once stood at the birth of the medieval university and which for instance Wilhelm von Humboldt repeated and propagated in another context.

The borderline which separates the university from other spheres of human society and which delineates the scope of university freedoms, which are protected by privileges against authoritarian interference on the part of the powers that be, is again not respected. One keeps hearing of university traditions, of the 'ancient and glorious' university. Alas, these traditions in their substance have practically died out. At various ceremonies, such as matriculation, graduation and so on, held in ancient university halls, professors still dress up in traditional robes, officials still put on their glittering chains as symbols of their office, they still address each other in Latin, and the beadle still brings in the university insignia. But forgotten is all that should have been remembered in these ceremonies, and one feels that all that remains of university traditions is mere ritual, decently and mercifully hiding the present hollowness.

The university spirit and with it the whole system of higher education in this country are irrevocably in decline, a decline which impinges on the whole of society and is visible in practically all spheres of life, not excluding the national economy and the material well-being of its members. As in von Humboldt's time, so today the university crisis calls for reform.

The Premise of Reform

The university crisis makes the question of the original idea more topical and invites us to reflect upon it. The more topical too is the question of the relationship between science and technology.

We believe that it is necessary to take into account the various reflections of current thinkers on the legitimacy crisis facing the sciences, and in particular the natural sciences. They reached a fundamental conclusion: sciences which aim merely at technological

success and seek their fulfilment outside their own intrinsic purpose, which give up their universalistic character and instead blindly specialise, are missing their fundamental goal and lose their orientation in human life. Instead of helping man to improve his world and making it more dignified, they tend imperceptibly to enslave and endanger him. Science *per se* is legitimised not by its technological miracles but by constantly testifying to an origin anchored in the elementary relations between man and his world: 'As long as it feels competent to search for and recognise truth and as long as it acknowledges truth as a human virtue.... Free and truthful science cannot be tied to any functional or other model which obstructs rational science's search for knowledge. Science must be open and in diverse directions.... Science must be free in that its activity is not restricted by immediate aims, social utility or economic interests. This does not mean that it must be clearly separated from practice. But if it is to have any bearing on practice, it must be subjected to truth, and it must be free to seek truth.' It is worth noting that the author of these words is a man who stands at the helm of an institution which first helped to create the freedom of the university but later for centuries waged an uncompromising battle with free-thinking science, using all the powerful means at its disposal - the current head of the Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II.

If the university is to be a place where science, thus interpreted, can be cultivated and developed - which is in our view its fundamental purpose, the 'original idea' of its existence - it must be able to practise and realise this freedom for the sake of truth with all its consequences, and its freedom must not be obstructed.

There is another principle of the development of the university: scientific research and teaching should be interconnected and united. A university professor does not merely present the subject matter as in lower grade schools but leads students into the existing problems of his science, presenting his own scientific views. The purpose of a university is not just to master some finite and closed set of knowledge but to cultivate the ability to think actively and responsibly, i.e. above all, learning how to ask the right questions and how to acquire a 'roving scientific spirit'.

The word 'university' originally meant the community of teachers and students (*universitas magistrorum et scholarum*), but also - at least since the time of Erasmus of Rotterdam - an institution which cultivates a 'universal' approach to the subject of study (*universitas scientiarum*). Research and acquisition of knowledge are basically one, however much they might be divided into individual branches of study. The vitality of science, its ability to ask appropriate questions, its unceasing search for truth - all that depends on the relationship between science and the whole, the complete interconnection of human life and its natural world. This spontaneous gravity towards the whole is philosophical in its substance, corresponding with the archetypal purpose of philosophy: to enable man to know himself, to maintain his open relationship with the world and its truth. Thus every single science is basically philosophical. The purpose of the university is above all to educate students in the idea of science as a whole and in the idea of knowledge as a whole, and to instil in them philosophical thinking, responsibility and courage for the truth.

Conclusion

The aim of this essay was not to provide a substitute for systematic and thorough analysis of the theme, and no doubt some important aspects are omitted here. Also, its basic premise and the way in which it tries to grasp the matter may not be generally acceptable. Only the very basic requirements can thus be deduced from it.

Firstly, it would be useful and important to start the widest possible discussion on the problems of universities and colleges. The fundamental question, in our opinion, is the actual place of the university in contemporary society, the role it can play in the search for a way out of the crisis (social, political, ecological, etc), a role appropriate to the development of civilisation in the Europe of the second half of the twentieth century. How is the university to be incorporated into society, into the socio-economic and politico-administrative structure? Or, on the other hand, how could it be separated and protected from influences which deprive it of its 'original idea'? To what extent is it possible today to follow the positive aspects of earlier university life, for instance during the First Republic (1918-38), or even those existing abroad today? The results of such discussion should in the long run lead to a reform of the law which governs universities and their position in this country, and to comprehensive conceptual solution to this matter, to a radical and wise university reform.

But even now, a fundamental change of the atmosphere in which universities and colleges exist is needed. For it is obvious that it is above all the university community which is particularly sensitive to the observance of all human rights (which are of course valid for the whole of society): freedom of thought, conscience and belief, freedom to hold opinions without hindrance, freedom of expression, freedom of travel, banning of all discrimination on the grounds of religion, political persuasion, nationality or social origin.

It also needs to be understood that science never has been and never can be just an instrument of the state, that for its development it needs its own independent university space, because in the human world, freedom is that which best 'neutralises errors and defends truth'. The state authorities should therefore realise that by restricting the autonomy of universities and colleges and by their bureaucratic regimentation of university life, they stifle the latter's basic creativity, fetter the creative spirit which would otherwise bear much fruit for the whole society, and contribute to a

general revitalisation of the social atmosphere, to the solution of those problems in all spheres which society faces at the close of the second millennium.

We believe it is high time for a fundamental and profound university reform and a reform of the whole structure of higher education, for a revival of the 'original idea' of the university. We believe that in spite of possible resistance on the part of those who do not favour any idea of reform, this will sooner or later prevail. And the sooner the better, for the sake of us all.

The New Feudalism

A. D. Harvey

The class structure of Britain is changing. The most obvious signs of this relate to the passing of the former dominance of a public school or Oxbridge-educated elite speaking with a particular kind of accent. Since no other country in history has ever been in the slightest degree dominated by an elite that went by definition to a particular kind of school or to two particular universities, or that spoke with a particular kind of accent, this change in British social life is probably only of the most superficial importance.

Another change is that involved in the Thatcher government's fostering of an enlarged property-owning class, by means of the selling-off of council houses and former public companies. To a great extent, however, this merely brings Britain into line with the rest of Western Europe. Previously the ownership of significant property had been rather more limited in Britain than elsewhere; few other countries had such extensive public housing schemes and none had a population so largely detached from proprietorship even of small tracts of agricultural land. But when one talks of 'significant property' one touches on the question of the meaning of 'significant'. 'Significant property' in electoral or social terms means enough property to influence the owner's self-image and social and political attitudes. This kind of 'significant property' has of course been increased in recent years. But in economic terms 'significant property' would mean enough to live on without the need to work, or at least enough to provide a major supplement to earned income. This kind of 'significant property' has not been substantially increased by the present government and was in any case already up to or ahead of levels to be found elsewhere in Europe; and of course only a tiny percentage of the population has ever enjoyed such wealth. This tiny percentage, in the days when the only real hereditary wealth was land, ruled Britain and the other countries of Europe; but even in the days when new forms of transmissable wealth were being invented, the political power of wealth as such was on the wane. At present, the few people who live on inherited income have little more than mythic importance in the overall social and political structure of the country. Perhaps somewhere in Loamshire a Duke still asserts the *jus primae noctis* over the womenfolk of his tenantry; perhaps somewhere in Smith Square a Marquis still pulls the strings of the Cabinet from behind an embroidered screen; perhaps somewhere in the City an Earl - or more plausibly the third holder of one of Lloyd George's viscountcies - still enacts various primal scenes with millions belonging to other people; but in every case the mere fact that they can still do it argues personal skills that would have guaranteed their possessor success even without the accident of birth.

Behind the gilt of a surviving aristocracy and the gingerbread of British Telecom and BP shares, more important changes are in progress and have been for decades: changes which cut across the conventional but increasingly anachronistic distinction between lower (or working), middle and upper class. The concept of 'class' is essentially political. It has never been very useful to define economic classes simply in terms of income, and today when a cabinet-maker or a plasterer may earn more than a shop-manager or even a professor, definitions in terms of income are almost completely beside the point. More relevant is the question of how that income is derived, at what point tapped, from the economic system: the earner's relationship to the means of production, if you like.

As far as traditional definitions are concerned almost nobody today falls neatly into single categories. Even manual workers in privately owned factories may well, thanks to Margaret Thatcher, have small incomes and large dreams as *rentiers*; and of course the mere manual worker in a privately owned factory is an increasingly rare phenomenon in our increasingly complex society. Equally the distinction between large privately owned and publicly owned corporations has long been realised to be non-existent at the level of organisational structure, job-satisfaction and (it seems from the example of British Telecom) efficiency. Of course it has long been argued by the Left that British Coal is as much a capitalist entity as General Motors; but there seems no reason to consider the average municipal authority, seen as an organisation employing a large number of people as providing certain services, as essentially different from British Coal except in that

it derives an even greater part of its income from fiscal extortion than from sales on an open market.

If one abandons the traditional categories and attempts to rethink the concept of class in terms of current experience, and if one holds to the notion that class must ultimately relate to essentially political aspects of the economic framework - not how big your bag of money is but how you managed to obtain it - then it begins to appear that the basis of class is inequalities in the distribution of power: specifically the types of power relevant to the maintenance, and improvement of, one's own particular economic and social status.

The middle-grade executive in a large public or private corporation, the school teacher, the social worker, the municipal parks attendant or street sweeper, all have different levels of income, different life-styles; but they all know that they will not be sacked except for the most flagrant incompetence or malfeasance and that - provided they do not speak openly against the system or its ideology - they are effectively protected from bullying and harassment at work both by the personnel structures of their employing body or, if these fail, by their powerful professional association or trades union. They also know that their wages will be paid regularly, though the myriad twists and turns of the channels through which these wages are siphoned from out of the overall economic activity of society and into their pockets would defy analysis even by the most curious of them.

On the other hand, the self-employed craftsman, the independent retailer, the small businessman, the wage-labourer in a small company have none of this security. Every Friday, thousands of small employers congratulate themselves on having once again achieved the small miracle of having enough cash in hand to pay the week's wages: and I have seen small bosses struggling to persuade their workmen to accept only half the wages due, with the rest to be deferred till the following week; what is more, I have seen the workmen agreeing to this. The same workmen also know that to fall into the bad books of such a boss means the end of the job: industrial tribunals hold as little terror for the small employer as the factory inspectors. Such a boss holds a greater power over his men than even the Chairman of I.C.I., except in the one crucial respect that he always knows they could find a more secure or better-paid job elsewhere; but he has no power to guarantee his own job, for his own miscalculation or the vagaries of the market might sweep away his whole business at very little notice. He has in fact no more certainty of remaining an employer than his men have of remaining employed. It is possible that people in this sector, both employers and employed, have more opportunities for fiddling their taxes than those belonging to larger and more structured organisations; but on the other hand, they get much less back from the taxes they pay: they receive no government or local authority contracts, no subsidies and usually no grants; they derive their income not from allocations out of public funds but from the ability, day by day and every day, to find private individuals who want to buy something they have to offer.

Psychologically the lower echelons of employees in large corporations - the people who actually do the work rather than merely discuss it, as a cynic would say - are often closer to employees in small business than to their own colleagues in the higher grades. This is not because they are equally, in the traditional terminology, 'working class' but because they are not interested in exploiting the political opportunities provided by a large corporation. They simply want do to their stated number of hours, mind their own business, grab their pay-packets and run, and are as impervious to the efforts of union officials to enlist them in group activity as they are to the would-be allure of personnel management schemes to 'involve' them with their jobs. They have the same marginalised and disadvantaged position in relation to the better-paid grades within the organisation as individual members of the public have in relation to the organisation as a whole. Notionally, therefore, the dividing line between the two classes - what we might call the *insider class* and the *outsider class* - is that between public sector/large corporation and self-employed/small business. In practice, however, it is to be found within the lower levels of public sector/large corporation employment. The distinction is essentially one between a class of organisationally-orientated people and a class of atomised, individualistic, unorganised people on whose backs the first class are, to a large extent, living: for of course, it is the latter class which does more in the way of actually generating, rather than merely recycling, the nation's wealth. The *insider class* has the advantages both in income and levels of education. But these advantages are only incidental, and in practice there are some rather rich and rather well-educated, though still essentially insecure or at least free-floating, individuals amongst the *outsider class*: successful writers, for example.

This two-fold division is very far from being in keeping with any sort of free-market capitalist model, and in its essential characteristics is to be found equally in Soviet bloc societies. As long ago as 1941 James Burnham's sociological pop-classic *The Managerial Revolution* pointed out that economic systems dominated by large corporations and government agencies would be effectively indistinguishable from those in command economies in communist countries where private enterprise had been eliminated. Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution* was much celebrated in its time - it was approved even by George Orwell - but from a latter-day perspective it seems to have taken far too narrow a view. The managerial elites which exercise control over large corporations are only a tiny component of a much larger class, and by no means the only component to have important influence on the way society is managed, especially as there is more and more a tendency to disguise individual responsibilities behind a smoke-screen of consensus,

consultative procedures, group decision-making and so on. In a culture where committee-viability is the principal recommendation for any proposal, the men who write the newspapers read by the people sitting on the committee have as much influence, ultimately, as the chairman; and the advertising consultant who invents the marketing campaign possibly has more. In different ways, at different levels, decisions are being made all the time about the objectives of society as a whole, or of little groups within it, about the methods by which these objectives may be secured, about priorities and values and the relative status of society's different elements. There is no easy distinction to be made between *loci* where decisions are made and *loci* where decisions are merely carried out: except that these *loci* are to be found much more within the structure of large public and private organisations than at the corner shop or in the dole queue.

The concept of class involves more than the simple fact of inequalities at a given moment: it also implies some sort of principle of exclusion and some sort of mechanism of self-perpetuation. No class has ever been completely exclusive of course: if the castes of India had their origin in economic classes, they have long since detached themselves from the realities of material status. It is today easier for a self-employed handyman to become a corporate executive or a trades union leader than it used to be for a farm labourer to make a fortune through his business acumen, buy an estate and marry into the gentry: easier but still not easy. The fact that there are three million unemployed in Britain suggests that there are much greater facilities for downward mobility than for upward.

Of course membership of the organisational class does not relate to inheritance or acquisition of property as such, but to the possession of the peer-approval that will provide a niche in the organisation, and this means that entry into (or survival within) the insider class depends on the possession of certain skills and personality traits - or perhaps one should say, on the *recognition* that one possesses the appropriate skills and traits. The salary of a job with two secretaries in a municipal office will be a more remunerative and securer property than ownership of a business employing four people and of the maximum permitted number of BP shares - but one cannot buy such a job; one has to be co-opted.

Our school and university system is not merely one of the great havens of employment for the insider class but is also, of course, the principal agency in the process of self-perpetuation and recruitment. Obviously a complex society like ours has an insatiable demand for a wide variety of intellectual skills: our schools and universities, having the responsibility for passing on these intellectual skills, do so in the manner most appropriate to the insider class's need to preserve its cohesion, stereotyping and encapsulating these intellectual skills and reducing them, as far as possible, to a matter of standardised paper qualifications which eliminate ambiguities concerning individual suitability for particular jobs. All large organisations work to fit round pegs into square holes in personnel terms, and the process necessarily begins at Primary School. The education system also fosters those types of skill most required by corporate structures at the expense of those which appear irrelevant: we are still over-producing graduates in English Literature and Sociology and under-producing people like engineers who might have the bad taste to set up as independent entrepreneurs or emigrate to countries where their technical expertise might obtain more social approval. In the 1950s and 1960s, at least the education system managed to a great extent to take the children of small businessmen and independent entrepreneurs and convince them that the only true citizenship consisted of 'serving other people' as civil servants, teachers and social workers. This is now perhaps less obviously the case; but our education system still privileges the skills - particularly in communication - which will be necessary for success in large organisations where decision-making involves meetings and memos. Emphasis on verbal skills coincidentally favours the children of parents who already possess these skills, these being most easily transmitted from parents to children: but of course, the articulate child of inarticulate parents can get on too - providing he adopts the same style and vocabulary as the peer group into which he is trying to integrate. Accent, as already mentioned, is not as important as it used to be: the more subtle factor of 'attitude' is perhaps increasingly vital, though more research needs to be done on how 'attitude' affects success and failure in careers. Ability, even in the limited sense of ability in the specific skills required by organisational structures, is less important: this explains why the people signing-on at Department of Employment offices always seem much more intelligent than the staff behind the counter.

The two-fold division so far described has a more than passing resemblance to the social structure of the Middle Ages. Then the vast mass of the population lived crude, simple, unintellectual and arduous lives, tilling the soil to create an agricultural surplus which could support a minority of landlords and clergymen (and their servants) who performed functions of vast importance to themselves but somewhat beyond the comprehension of the peasants who paid for them. The landlords and the clergy (the most powerful of whom derived of course from the landlord class) kept the peasants in order and provided them with an image of higher things: particularly after the Black Death, when there were no longer enough peasants to go round, aristocratic notions of law and order and clerical notions of higher things encountered some consumer resistance, and no doubt the word *ingratitude*, in its various linguistic avatars, was bandied about. It will be recollected that landownership in feudal times - in northern Europe at least - did not consist of absolute proprietorship. The landlords were granted lands by other landlords higher up in the hierarchy, in return for certain services, and in proportion to some assess-

ment of their personal capacity to carry out these services; amongst the powers partially devolved was that of civil and criminal jurisdiction. This system with its two-fold division of society broke down under the pressure of economic change, but as capitalism has become less vital as an organisational principle of society it has come back, in a different guise perhaps, but in its essential features: the assumption by a dominant class of the right both to expropriate another class and to tell it what to think.

The biggest difference is that the new feudal aristocracy is at least as numerous as the new feudal peasantry. This enables it to conceive of itself as essentially democratic: but that's another story....

The Situation in Our Schools

Recent discussions in *The Salisbury Review* have led to our receiving a great number of articles and letters from school teachers, wishing to acquaint us with their experiences and also to confirm, deny or qualify things written in our pages. The following four articles (one anonymous) have been chosen as representative of the concerns that are uppermost in the minds of our correspondents.

Comprehensive Collapse

Marcelle Papworth

'Relevance' and 'efficiency', according to the purveyors of current state educational orthodoxy, should be the yardsticks of our schooling system, criteria indicating what subjects should be taught and how they can be adapted to the needs of our technological society. In this context efficiency means processing the maximum number of children through the education mill at the minimum cost. Hence a minimum size for schools is postulated of around 1,100 pupils. It is also suggested that a centralised, unified structure, with better trained teachers and even larger schools, will produce the educated, skilled and disciplined young citizens who will be the pride and joy of our educational reformers tomorrow.

Current reports, however, and my own recent teaching experience clearly confirm that large comprehensive schools are often out of control. Far from bringing out the best in children and staff, they can bring out the worst. The most dedicated and imaginative teachers (and there are some), the most expensive equipment, the widest possible choice of subjects offered - all these have failed to stimulate the children, or to change their general demeanour from one of boredom and resentment.

The atmosphere which permeates the schools with which I am familiar, from the first to the sixth form, is a mixture of cynicism and open revolt against anything or anyone remotely concerned with authority. Truancy, lateness to lessons, violence (especially against teachers), and vandalism are on the increase. Foul language is too frequent to be remarked or checked by teachers, smoking in lavatories, even among the first year pupils, is commonplace, and in some schools drug trafficking is by no means unknown. In mixed schools, kissing and petting in corridors is apt to occur without regard to the passage of other pupils or of the teaching staff.

To enter a sixth form room, the classroom reserved for the exclusive use of the privileged group, is to find oneself generaly choking from cigarette smoke, stupefied by the loud taped beat music and to observe the pupils either reading tabloids or playing cards. In such circumstances any form of conversation or attempt to study is virtually impossible. In at least one London school a crêche has been provided for babies who are brought there by their schoolgirl mothers. The dominant impression which anyone with a modicum of awareness is apt to receive in most of our comprehensive schools is that of educational failure.

When I am confronted with any of my classes, frequently of thirty or more children of varied cultural backgrounds, whose abilities may range from the extremely bright to the very dull indeed, and some of whom tend to express distinct symptoms of chronic maladjustment, I find myself asking: What is the object of my work? To train them for their future careers? To transmit culture? Or simply to act as a remedial social worker? And if I am expected to do any or all of that how is such a task possible with such a large and heterogeneous group in a teaching milieu which appears purposely designed to eliminate individuality? The policy currently imposed upon us, is that of teaching to the level of the lowest denominator of receptivity. In classes frequently of thirty or more pupils, this inevitably tends to demoralise the brighter children, whilst those below the class average become virtually unteachable. Class disruption ensues and 90% of lessons tend to be spent on efforts to keep the

class under control. A teacher feels a sense of achievement if a lesson finishes without a violent incident or without grossly offensive behaviour.

As so little actual teaching can be done, the syllabus has to be much less demanding. More indeterminate subjects such as Social Studies, Integrated Studies and Social Education have therefore replaced the traditional academic subjects such as English Language and Literature, Languages, Maths and Sciences, which require more intellectual effort. The net result is a decline not only in standards, but also in the ability or willingness of young people, even the more able ones, to exert their mental faculties. Only the exceptionally strong-minded pupils tend to survive such 'schooling'. It is little wonder that so many of our school-leavers are inarticulate, semi-literate, innumerate, unable to spell and without knowledge of English history or literature, and with no culture, skills, tradition, vision or hope. Having been for years unteachable they emerge unemployable, and henceforth rely on the State to provide them with the means of survival.

Faced with these problems, teachers naturally feel a sense of futility verging on despair, many are frequently in a constant state of apprehension about their work and even experience fear at the prospect of entering a classroom. Nor is it surprising that some teachers should resort to extreme forms of politics inside the school as a means, however unconscious, of giving vent to their personal and professional frustrations - a resort frequently connived at and even financially backed by the education authorities. It is almost inevitable that such teachers should join the 'struggle' against racism, sexism, heterosexism - or whatever other 'ism' might momentarily seem 'relevant' to their disordered classrooms. From time to time highly paid officials visit the schools and, the pupils having been duly sent home, the staff sit through lengthy lectures on such abstruse topics as 'racial awareness' - a proceeding which in this case appears to have the reverse effects to those intended. Classroom and staff-room walls become covered with Sovietesque posters of ever-increasing stridency, informing staff and pupils of their presumed responsibility and guilt for the issues prompting racial, class and freedom struggles, past and present, around the world.

Why do parents fail to protest more strongly against the prevailing collapse of standards and of achievement, and the increasing politicisation of the curriculum? I can only assume that some parents (the minority?) believe that their children are in expert hands, and that they are being properly educated. It is possible that the majority feel alienated from the school system: certainly, very few of them are members of school governing bodies.

The fact is, however, that if parents do not act, taking advantage of the Government's new legislative proposals, then our school system will collapse entirely. Large schools under remote bureaucratic control have proved to be a social disaster. Only if they are broken up, and replaced with more flexible neighbourhood schools run by parents, teachers and members of the community who wish to contribute their skills and expertise, can decency and order be restored to the classroom. Only then can we look forward to higher standards of discipline, teaching and achievement, and to a proper use of public funds.

The LEA Gravy Train

(From a teacher in Staffordshire)

The last few years have seen a remarkable expansion in the educational bureaucracy in Britain. According to *Hansard* of October 21st 1986, the education service employs 525,000 teachers and 362,000 - i.e. two thirds as many - full-time non-teaching staff. The number of administrators in the maintained sector should, by any normal expectations, have reached a peak; but it manifestly has not done so, new jobs and opportunities being created at an alarming rate, and in accordance with the law of bureacratic expansion. Teachers are increasingly oppressed by an ever-growing army of unelected, unaccountable 'experts', aided and financed by central government.

This bureaucratic expansion was particularly noticeable during the reign of Sir Keith (now Lord) Joseph as Education Secretary - the period of 'make maths exciting', 'liaise with industry', 'multi-cultural education', 'relevance', etc. But since April 1987, under the new reign of Kenneth Baker, another form of 'in-service training' - Grant Related In-Service Training, or GRIST - has been invented, ostensibly with the purpose of controlling the number of bureaucrats, but in fact encouraging those bureaucrats to describe themselves as 'advisory teachers'. Thus the Local Education Authority, already swollen with power and influence, must justify its existence by recruiting more teachers to its own ranks. In our LEA, in two months alone, the following posts have been advertised, asking for more of these bureaucrats:

(a) An advisory teacher for design;
(b) Five part-time advisory teachers for diversification of first foreign languages in schools;
(c) An advisory teacher for the National Oracy Project;
(d) An advisory teacher for bio-technology;
(e) *Twelve* advisory teachers for E.S.G. information technology;

(f) An advisory teacher for equal opportunities and gender;
(g) A senior advisory teacher for matters relating to the administration and management of a team of teachers working principally in the primary sector;
(h) A senior advisory teacher for the co-ordination and general direction of a team of advisory teachers working in secondary schools;
(i) Senior County Advisory Teacher for planning and delivering of training and development programmes for advisory teachers.

Jobs (g), (h), and (i) show the law of bureaucratic expansion at work: each job can be used to create another, which rides comfortably on its back, and there is no reason in principle why an LEA should not employ an advisory teacher to advise the advisory teachers who advise the advisory teachers etc. who advise a single lonely real teacher, in the sole remaining classroom. Of course, you may think that such redundancy will soon be apparent, and that funding will be withdrawn. But not a bit of it. Thanks to the device of 'In-Service Training', upon which a teacher's prospects of promotion can be made to depend, all these so-called experts have an instrument to hand, whereby they can compel teachers to attend their 'advisory' classes. So who are these 'experts'? I will content myself with two examples:

When I first started teaching, after obtaining a Distinction in 'The Practice of Teaching', I took the place of a primary teacher who had been oriented towards art and craft. After three months I discovered that the headmistress had been glad to get rid of my predecessor, having received so many complaints about his mathematics teaching, or lack of it. Indeed, one girl had no mathematics in her book over a six months' period. Imagine my surprise, therefore, to discover that my predecessor is now an advisor in primary mathematics to our LEA.

My second example concerns a newly appointed headmistress, who has decided to take the LEA's advice, and to invite the advisors into her school. Her staff are now completely demoralised. One week an advisor told them to take everything off the classroom walls, and mount the class work on the same coloured frieze paper; the next week another 'expert' toured the school, and insisted that work in the classroom should be mounted on different coloured frieze paper. Unfortunately, the independent heads, who used to forbid the Local Authority to interfere in this arbitrary way in the headteacher's domain, are increasingly being replaced by LEA clones, compliant to the bureaucratic ways of thinking. This means that teachers no longer have a buffer against the local bureaucracy, and the LEA ideology strikes directly into the classroom.

Which brings me to GRIST. This new form of in-service training is financed directly by the Department of Education and Science, ostensibly for the purpose of keeping teachers 'abreast of current developments'. As Geraint Lloyd-Evans has already argued, 'in-service' training does no such thing – often because there is no such thing to be done. ('Out With In-Service', *The Salisbury Review*, April 1987.) Indeed, as he rightly says, 'such courses destroy a teacher's natural confidence in his subject'. But at least, the courses tended to take place outside school hours, and therefore did not detract from the work in the classroom. GRIST courses, however, are often arranged to coincide with school days, so that the teacher's place in the classroom must be filled by a supply teacher. Far from contributing to the education of children, therefore, GRIST tends to detract from it.

Furthermore, it is a bureaucratic nightmare. If a teacher wishes to attend one of the courses, the relevant form must be completed, checked and agreed by LEA advisors and administrators. Our Deputy Head, having completed all the forms, had them returned to her six months later, since a new form had been published, which she was required to fill in with the old information. One colleague received notification that she had been placed on a six weeks' course two weeks after the course had finished. Notwithstanding the bad effects on the children, and the bureaucratic nonsense, teachers still attend these courses, since the only way to be sure of promotion is to attend as many of them as possible. Another colleague has therefore applied to go on three GRIST courses during the coming year, which will deprive her children of 48 days of her teaching.

As with every bureaucratic expansion, the principle is to use all the funds allocated, and to claim more from year to year. This means that the LEA has had to be extravagant. Our head teacher joined a party of other head teachers of schools with ethnic minority children, to visit a mosque in London in the company of advisors 'qualified' to take charge of such a trip. They all travelled first class, with meals included. A weekend in the Lake District was arranged for High School staff (even the NUT thought this was going a bit far); while a party of Craft, Design and Technology teachers were taken to a 'centre of excellence' in Holland in a specially chartered aeroplane.

With the introduction of GRIST came the Baker days. During 1986–7 I worked 197 days in my classroom. Mr Baker tells me that I need work only 190 days with the children, devoting another five to 'in-service training'. On my first Baker day I arrived at school for a staff meeting; it being a Baker day, however, I was under the direction of the headteacher, who even-tually hit on the idea of asking me to tidy the infants' attic. On my second Baker day we met in a museum, for a course on Urban Studies. Between 9 and 9.45 we drank five cups of tea. For the next hour an advisor told us about the philosophy of geography teaching in secondary schools: something which contributed nothing to my own competence as a teacher of 4–5 year olds. Two more cups of tea refreshed us before our next educational venture, which was to plan lessons for 7, 9 and 11 years olds, using the street as a resource. Between 11.30 and 12, I and two other teachers rested our 70 years of teaching experience on a cold wall opposite a bus station. For the next two hours we tried

to get warm again in various pubs, and, after an hour reading the newspaper, we were again addressed by the advisor, this time on the philosophy of geography in primary schools. The half hour of banalities that we were offered was simply an insult to our professional standing.

On Baker day 3 I did nothing in the morning; at 1.30 we were greeted by an advisor on computers, who asked how many of us were infant teachers. Half of us said that we were, and were told that the work we were about to engage in was not applicable to infants.

5 Baker days subtracts a week's education from every child each year: in other words, a full term during his educational life. What educational value does that represent, I wonder?

As I write, another great educational initiative has been taken: the 'professional interview'. A supply teacher comes to the school for three days, while each teacher in turn goes to the Deputy Head for a career interview. The first two questions that I was asked were: 'Where will you be in one year's time?' and 'Where will you be in five years' time?' If I could answer such questions, I would be a soothsayer on Blackpool front, and not in a classroom. This new means of bureaucratic expansion has its own process of duplication built into it. The professional interview is now used by the LEA in order to determine who shall go for a professional interview: thus a colleague, who had applied for promotion, was first interviewed by advisors before being recommended for an interview by advisors.

As Caius Petronius said in 66 AD:

> We trained very hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganised. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganising, and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress, while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralisation.

In teaching we are now at this final stage.

Pastoral Care in Schools

(From a special needs teacher working in Cornwall)

In a recent speech calling on parents to take more responsibility for educating their own children, Mr Kenneth Baker said, 'Teachers should not be expected to be surrogate parents, although in many cases that is the burden which society places on them.'

He added: 'Why should dedicated teachers have their energies drained by having to cope with children who bring into the classroom attitudes which are antipathetic to the learning processes?'

Mr Baker might also have asked why it is that more comprehensive schools should devote so much of their scarce resources on maintaining a system which is precisely geared to taking on the role of 'surrogate parents.' If he were to announce the demise of that system, the Education Secretary would be signalling to parents that schools were no longer prepared to take on responsibilities which belonged to them, but would henceforth concentrate on teaching and learning.

But with his Bill to make our schools more responsive to parental choice, to concentrate the resources of schools on efficient, relevant, and measurable teaching and learning; to expose our schools to the harsh but invigorating winds of Thatcherite realism, Mr Baker has missed an opportunity to dismantle that aspect of comprehensive schools which should be anathema to Thatcherism: pastoral care. Pastoral care in schools is a message to parents that the school is prepared to take over their responsibilities.

It is truly astonishing that the new right, scornful of social work and of the ineffectiveness of social workers; opposed in principle to Welfare State-induced dependency and mollycoddling, should have overlooked there in schools a system of 'care' which combines the worst features of ineffective and misguided social work and mollycoddling welfare state-ism.

It should come as no surprise to discover that pastoral care in schools really took off as a major industry during the liberal and sociological swinging sixties. 'For the time being I shall merely state my belief that pupils who have been coming into secondary schools, especially in urban areas, since about 1964 have been notably different from their predecessors as a result of their upbringing. This has intensified the pastoral need in a number of ways', wrote Mr Michael Marland in 1974, a leading pastoral care enthusiast, headmaster, and member of the Bullock Committee. Such people were greatly impressed by the work of Erik H. Erikson (*Identity, Youth and Crisis*, Faber, 1968) whose barely comprehensible writings already appear irrelevant in today's climate. A host of sociological studies in the sixties sought to demonstrate that factors outside the classroom had massive classroom implications.

After sociology, it was the sheer size of the new comprehensive schools which persuaded headmasters to introduce pastoral care. Such headmasters, concerned to preserve in their larger schools the sense of community commonly believed to exist in smaller institutions, saw pastoral care as the answer. Another factor moving schools to introduce pastoral care was the diversity of the new comprehensives. Alongside a diminution of the role of the form teacher (with whom pupils perhaps spent two thirds of the week) there developed strong subject departments and a variety of pupil grouping arrangements. Pastoral care seemed to

be the obvious way of dealing with this fragmentation of the pupil's school experience.

These influences, along with the need to meet the career aspirations of staff who could have no place in the academic hierarchy of the new schools, led to the development of pastoral care systems in comprehensive schools in the sixties and seventies. Those systems remain in place today although they have long ceased to be relevant - if, indeed, there was any justification for their introduction in the first place.

As long ago as 1970 a DES paper hinted at the dangers of the new enthusiasm, 'some schools, in attempting to remedy social deprivation, venture beyond their province and ... other professional workers could perform some of the time-consuming tasks which are performed with varying efficiency by teachers' (P.F. Smart, 'Social and Pastoral Organisation in Comprehensive Schools', *COSMOS Paper* 2, 70, DES 1970).

The enthusiasm for pastoral care had other implications for schools. Michael Marland, writing in 1974, declared, but approvingly, that 'the personal and social needs for pupils have achieved prominence in teachers' minds, at least as important factors in effective learning ... many [teachers] have begun to see "pastoral care", as it now became called, not merely as a way of supporting academic work, but as having a central educative purpose in itself' (Michael Marland, *Pastoral Care*, HEB, 1974).

There is today an overwhelming case for the dismantling of pastoral care in schools. At a time when schools are under great pressures, the resources tied to pastoral care could be better used in other areas, the academic in particular. One aim of pastoral care was to provide a disciplined environment for learning. But the increase in truancy, indiscipline and violence in schools clearly demonstrates the failure of the pastoral care approach to the problems of indiscipline. Another aim was to develop pupil independence and responsible autonomy. Few schools could claim success in this respect. But it is easy to see how in many schools pastoral care has led to a mollycoddling of a minority of pupils often at a cost to the majority. If you set up a system to deal with 'problems' it may be necessary to find problems and clients in order to justify the existence of the system.

Many schools which have created expensive pastoral care systems would today be hard-pressed to justify those systems in terms of 'clients'. Schools in areas where there is little deprivation of any kind are wasting scarce resources on pastoral care. If schools do wish to introduce or maintain a system of pastoral care they should be required to demonstrate a real need through, perhaps, a deprivation index. Staff involved in pastoral care, often without any training in the appropriate disciplines or skills of psychology, psychiatry, counselling etc, are grappling with problems better tackled by other professional workers.

Pastoral care systems have created their own problems. Many pupils, and even more parents if they were fully aware of what was going on, resent the interference by teachers in areas of their lives which have little to do with school. 'She'll make a drama out of anything,' is the sort of comment one sometimes hears from pupils, as problem hunting becomes an end in itself in order to justify the presence of pastoral care in a school.

Almost every book on pastoral care warns against a pastoral/academic split developing in schools. But inevitably it does develop and in some schools a major function of both systems is how to avoid stepping on the other's toes. The presence of pastoral care in today's schools is in conflict with the prevailing ideological thrust of Mr Baker's reforms and the mood of the country. Academic excellence and relevant learning, not 'the personal and social needs of pupils', should be prominent in teachers' minds. And many teachers would welcome the abolition of the pastoral care system in their school so that *all* staff could become involved in the all-round development of their pupils. If 'whole school' approaches to the teaching of English ('language across the curriculum', and TVEI) why not pastoral care? Teachers recognise that the best context for genuine and useful counselling and guidance is in apparently casual interactions with pupils in informal situations, and in the classroom during lessons.

The institutionalisation of 'care' in schools must now be seen as a major blunder. It has led to the creation of an ineffective and often obstructive administrative system which has little or nothing to do with genuine and constructive responses to pupils' problems. The demise of pastoral care would release much needed resources and at the same time involve parents and teachers in the all-round education and care of pupils. If Mr Baker wants properly to complete his programme of reform, the phasing out of pastoral care should now be high on his agenda.

A School In A Pub
L. K. Flint

It was undoubtedly 'their' school. Some of the parents had themselves been pupils there, brothers and sisters of the 23 children were already there and Ian's sister had been Head Girl - what more natural than that he should wish to follow in her footsteps and aim to become Head Boy? The school was conveniently situated

and could be reached safely either by bus or on foot. That school was Overthorpe Church of England Junior school within the Kirklees authority and situated on a ridge overlooking the Calder Valley town of Dewsbury. There was no doubt about it when the parents placed it at the top of their list when asked by the local authority to express their choice.

Some few days before the Autumn term was due to begin they learned that contrary to expectations their children had been allocated to Headfield Church of Englnd Junior school by the Kirklees Education Department situated 11 miles further along the Calder Valley in Huddersfield. In order to reach this school from their homes the children, aged 8/9 years, would need to walk for one mile through an industrial wasteland of demolished mills, across a deserted canal and through an eerie tunnel beneath the railway. No bus route served this area. What made matters even more inexplicable was the fact that Overthorpe had two empty classrooms, one of which could easily have accommodated the children. Small wonder that the parents were wrathful.

As the whole country was made aware during the weeks which followed when the parents refused to allow their children to attend Headfield, of the pupils there, 9 out of every 10 are of Asian origin. Ironically, a Church of England school standing next to the vicarage of the local Anglican church, Christian children are vastly outnumbered, English is not necessarily the language used in the playground and Saville Town, the neighbourhood immediately adjacent to Headfield, is almost wholly Asian where traditional Pakistani dress is worn by men and women, a white face is rarely seen and the area is dominated by its mosque together with a school for Asian children.

On the one hand the need to ensure peaceful coexistence between the Asian and white communities must link with the reasonable expectation that one's own culture be cherished. Sadly, but perhaps inevitably, the parents, on setting up their own school in the function room of a nearby public house owned by the father of one of the children, were accused by those who should have known better of being racists. Equally sadly, the charge of racism seems to be sufficient in itself, like that of sexism (whatever both terms mean and I must admit I do not fully understand either of them) and no proof is required for the charge to be upheld. Be that as it may, the school in the pub was established to be staffed within a few days by two retired teachers forming a partnership of which the writer is one. Both are university graduates and qualified teachers, with a total of 75 years' experience in all kinds of schools. We stood aside from the major issue and simply concerned ourselves with providing an education for the children whose anguish and bewilderment had been shown to the nation by television. The subsequent exposure to television and the press did not assist the school in its endeavours, though the children soon learned to take a television video camera in their stride. I, on the other hand, never became accustomed to the intrusion, though it has served the purpose of letting the country know that we are still here and that a solution is still required. One reporter described our school as a lifeboat and indeed that is just what it is. Following upon the débâcle in September of last year the survivors, some 23, are in good shape, with morale high amongst the parents. The lifeboat is well found, being the size of an assembly hall in a typical junior school, has been provisioned with a blackboard, exercise books, paper, writing equipment, paints and books by local well-wishers and from further afield, yet we are still, some six months later, awaiting rescue.

Just what form the rescue will take is an open question. With hindsight it is easy to see that the situation need never have arisen. Headfield, origin-ally catering for a white population in the prosperous Saville Town area to the south of Dewsbury, gradually saw a rise in the number of Asian children attending as the shoddy mills drew into the area an increasing number of Pakistani workers. It is to the credit of the Asian community that, centered around their families, they live peacefully and have caused not one moment of trouble as far as the school in the pub is concerned. Indeed, some support has been indicated, since our school follows principles dear to the Asian community, which wishes to set up its own schools in areas where Asians are concentrated. As the Pakistani workers moved in to Saville Town many white workers moved away, so accelerating the rise in the percentage of Asian children being educated at Headfield. Should then someone in the Kirklees Education Authority have seen which way the wind was blowing and taken action? What in fact could have been done? Clearly in such a situation no section of the community must be wholly outnumbered, certainly not the members of the indigenous population. Would bussing have been the answer? Those economically able to do so can always move house and this has been the case with three of our children already. This implies that if bussing is not to take place then the falling roll of white children will be from those who cannot move to another school's catchment area - i.e. the children from the poorer families. What sort of a pupil mix is that?

There is a school of thought which argues for the complete segregation of schools on a religious basis. After all, if the Roman Catholic and Anglican schools can be separate why not the Muslims and Sikhs? Whatever solution might have been possible in past years the present eyeball to eyeball confrontation is not the way to proceed. Indeed, each side is becoming more deeply entrenched. One wonders why, for instance, the two empty classrooms, which had stood on the Overthorpe School premises for 15 years and on which the parents of our children pinned their hopes, should be removed by what might seem to be a heartless Kirklees authority. A judge in the Court of Appeal has given leave for the parents to have a judicial review of the matter in the High Court. It was, said the judge, desirable that the hearing should take place as soon as possible in the new year for the benefit of the children.

That set up for late January was postponed so as to allow for four days instead of two. That set up for February was postponed so that the Minister of Education could on the eve of the hearing examine new evidence (but he has been singularly silent thereafter). At the time of writing the third attempt at a judicial review is to be early in May - meanwhile the parents, the teachers and the children soldier on.

We have many friends who have offered support, whether simply moral or more tangible in the form of donations or gifts of books and stationery. But there were those who perhaps saw the charge of racism automatically as a verdict of guilt and preferred to have no truck with us. The local authority offered places in other schools in and around Dewsbury; but the distances involved for the 8/9 year olds made this hardly practicable in an area where public transport from time to time goes on strike. The Chairman of Kirklees Education Authority offended us greatly with the charge that the children 'were not receiving a proper education'; this was said more than once without his setting foot in our school to see it in action. The local Labour Member of Parliament whose major interests are said to include education did not in six months call to see us. One cannot help but ponder why it is that, in an issue involving young minds, nobody seems to be able to bring together with any degree of urgency the two sides or to take any steps towards a solution. A Ministry of Education whose minister does not see fit to intervene after more than six months and many letters, including at least two to the Prime Minister, is an indication of the nature of the difficulty; yet far more formidable problems have been resolved with goodwill on both sides.

In the larger and wider view of world affairs the Dewsbury business is a tiny incident; but it concerns the freedom which an earlier generation fought to protect: the freedom for parents who are the ratepayers of the borough to choose the school they think best for their children. Had they been rich then there would have been no problem, and as a corollary to this one wonders whether those in power, whether in local authority or in central government, would allow their own children to attend schools such as are thrown into prominence by these issues; or whether indeed the problem is really understood by them.

Meanwhile our school bell continues to ring at 9 am....

Notes on Contributors

R. T Allen was a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Education at The University of the West Indies in Trinidad.

Lord Chalfont was a defence correspondent for *The Times* and a minister under Sir Harold Wilson.

Ian Crowther is the Creative Director of an advertising agency, a freelance writer and literary editor of *The Salisbury Review*.

Antony Flew is Distinguished Research Fellow at the Social Philosophy and Policy Centre of Bowling Green State University, Ohio.

L. K. Flint is one of two retired teachers who established a partnership to teach informally the children of Dewsbury School.

S. J. D. Green is a fellow of All Souls, Oxford.

A. D. Harvey read Modern History at St John's College, Oxford. His fourth book *Literature into History* is published by Macmillan.

Ray Honeyford was the headmaster of a multi-ethnic school and is now a freelance writer.

David J. Levy is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Middlesex Polytechnic. His book *Political Order* is published by Louisiana State University Press.

David Marsland is the author of *Education and Youth* (Falmer Press, 1987) and *Seeds of Bankruptcy* (Claridge Press, 1988).

E. J. Mishan is a distinguished economist and the author of *The Limits to Growth*, among other books.

Marcelle Papworth teaches French in a London comprehensive.

Quinlan Terry is a well-known neo-Georgian architect.

Roger Watson is a biochemist and freelance writer on religion and ideology.

In the last issue **Anna Bramwell** was incorrectly described as the Director of the Centre for Policy Studies.

Michael Polanyi as a Conservative Thinker

R. T. Allen

Michael Polanyi (1891-1976), FRS, was born in Hungary to a distinguished family, read medicine, soon turned to chemistry, served in the Austro-Hungarian army as a medical officer during the First World War, took a doctorate in chemistry and left Hungary in 1919, to work in Germany in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Fibre Chemistry and then in the Institute of Physical and Electrical Chemistry. He left Germany in 1933 because of Nazi persecution of Jewish scientists, took up the Chair of Physical Chemistry at Manchester, and then in 1948 was given a personal chair in Social Studies to enable him to continue with his recent interests in philosophy and especially to prepare for the Gifford Lectures (1951-2) which became *Personal Knowledge*.[1] He left Manchester in 1958 to go as Senior Research Fellow, to Merton College Oxford, where his ideas were not well received at the time. But, like Whitehead and Collingwood, with whom he also compares in respect of breadth of interest, he has attracted much more interest in America, where he gave the Terry Lectures at Yale in 1962, which became *The Tacit Dimension*, and lectures on 'Meaning' at the Universities of Texas and Chicago (1969-71), which were edited and rewritten up by Harry Prosch as *Meaning*. An amateur in everything except medicine,[2] he published 219 scientific papers, and wrote on economics, patent law, philosophy, religion, art and politics.

Indeed, it was political issues that turned his attention to philosophy. In 1935 he visited Moscow where Bukharin told him that in the USSR pure and applied science were the same and that Soviet scientists would still work freely while being directed in accordance with the Five Year Plan. At the time Polanyi could 'still smile at this dialectical mystery-mongering' (*SFS* p.8). And even in his youth he had been sceptical of the socialist ideology espoused, and always maintained, by his elder brother Karl: 'In a flock of black sheep, he shocked many by seeming almost white'.[3] But three years later, with the persecution of Soviet scientists and the propagation by Hogben and Bernal in Britain of the idea of the State planning of science, he had to take it seriously and then took a leading part, with J.R. Baker, in the defence of the freedom of pure science. Despite opposition at first (*SFS* p.9), by 1945 the tide in favour of planning had turned (*LL* p.3n). He was also active in the Congress of Cultural Freedom, and was on its Executive Committee until 1968.

But, and this is what both led him into philosophy and gave his philosophy its distinctive orientation, he found that the usual defence of science and scientific freedom in fact conceded the case. It was based on scepticism and Utilitarianism, and so are the totalitarian ideologies of the age. What really had to be defended was science's claim to be *true* and therefore the claim that there is such a thing as truth with its own independent power and claims upon us. But the prevailing modes of thought - sceptical and Reductionist, in Empiricism, Positivism, Freudianism, Marxism - denied any independent reality and value of truth. Human life, and science with it, was to be explained instead in terms of power, economic interests, subconscious desires. Revolutionary totalitarianism feeds on scepticism (and relativism) whereby it subverts confidence in the present order and prepares the way for the acceptance of its own creed, tacitly exempted from the otherwise all-corrosive scepticism. Modern scepticism is dynamic, for, behind all the debunking and unmasking, there lie the moral and humanitarian passions of a secularised Christianity. The Enlightenment's campaign against superstition has been turned against the very ideals of truth and justice themselves, yet, as in the Enlightenment, this is still done in the name of humanity and in protest against the imperfections of the existing order. But the tacit appeal to moral ideals is hidden by the supposedly merely factual and scientific language in which it is put (*LL* Chaps. 1 & 7; *PK* Chap. 7 - see especially section 7 'The Magic of Marxism'; and *KB* Chaps. 1 & 2 - 'Beyond Nihilism' and 'The Message of the Hungarian Revolution').

It follows then that the defence of the freedom of science to pursue the truth in its own way and in its own good time, requires a defence of a free society generally, and of the ideals of truth and justice on which it depends. But the scepticism of post-Galilean and post-Cartesian thought denies any such ideals. As a Hungarian who had lived in an atmosphere of Rationalism, through war, Bolshevik uprising, the consequent dictatorial reaction, and then the Nazi take-over in Germany, Polanyi appreciated, as far too many Britons and Americans have failed to do, that what he called the 'suspended logic' of Anglo-American Liberalism cannot last. In short, the tradition from Milton and Locke, starting with the anti-authoritarian belief that each should pursue the truth in his own way, has turned more to philosophical doubt for its

arguments. Thus Locke argued for freedom of religious belief on the grounds that we can never be so sure of the truth in religious matters that we can impose our beliefs on others.[4] There (until these last two decades) the logic of the position has remained suspended in Britain and America, whose attachment to liberty Polanyi greatly appreciated. But in Continental Europe scepticism went beyond this Lockean and then Voltairean Liberalism to a radical and Rationalist Liberalism of revolution: from Prince Bolkonski, for example, to the intellectual nihilism of Barazov and Raskolnikov, and then to the political nihilism and revolutionary activity of Marxists, Nazis and others (*LL* Chap. 7). Liberalism has carried the seeds of its own destruction, as Marxists and Nazis would agree.

Polanyi, then, approaches politics as a Liberal, as one whose primary attachment is to freedom. Yet he found that he had to go beyond Liberalism as so far formulated and understood. While his attitude to the Enlightenment remained one of admiration for its positive ideals and achievements and of rejection of its negative assumptions and effects, he moved to, or found himself articulating, what I think is best termed a Liberal Conservatism, based on faith and tradition. Now we have heard in recent years attempts by some persons to justify as Conservatism their *fainéant* maintenance of the Liberal-Socialist status quo, on the grounds that Conservatism is 'scepticism'. (Twenty-five or so years ago the apologists of Macmillan's similar lack of policy talked about the allegedly Conservative belief in an otherwise undefined 'good government'.) But while Conservatives should be sceptical of nostrums, panaceas, 'piece-meal social engineering' (as if people and institutions were *things*), and ideologies (systems of abstractions substituted for concrete reality), as defenders of civilisation they cannot be sceptical of its achievements and foundations. To say that we must stand on the ancient ways because nothing is, or can be known to be, right or good (a merely Fideist Conservatism), undercuts what it would preserve. For if there is nothing right or good, or known to be such, then there is nothing right and good in preserving the established order, nothing right in teaching the young to stand by it, nothing wrong in teaching them to despise it, and nothing wrong in overthrowing it with revolutionary terror. Hence Dr Johnson was right in saying that Hume was 'a Tory only by chance'. Rather Conservatism is an attitude of belief - of belief in the value of civilisation and of that particular form of it which we have inherited, and belief in our right and duty to defend it. An articulate Conservatism requires a philosophy, not of doubt, but of faith. As the French say, 'the fish rots from the head', and radical scepticism has escaped from Hume's drawer and from lecture rooms onto the streets, where it feeds revolution. An antidote is needed against it, so that faith may be revived. And that is what Polanyi sought to provide, especially in *Personal Knowledge*. His significance for Conservatism goes much deeper than his diagnoses of our present discontents, which I have but briefly summarised above.

I shall now briefly summarise the main aims and argument of *Personal Knowledge*, Polanyi's general philosophy. There he sought to reject the ideal of scientific detachment, which may not have done much damage in physics and chemistry, but has been destructive in biology, the study of man and life generally. That ideal requires knowledge to be detached, impersonal, critically tested throughout by subjection to a thorough-going doubt, and thus a function of the object alone, without any contamination by the subject. Hence it results in Reductionism: the denial of reality to everything which is not, or cannot be explained in terms of a merely factual, value-free, experimentally established, exactly measured, precisely stated and wholly explicit body of theory, itself employing a wholly explicit body of rules. That is what Polanyi calls 'Objectivism' and what he seeks to overthrow as an ideal of knowledge because of its destructive results.

He takes his cue from the findings of Gestalt pyschology and aims to show that in all acts of understanding there is a personal participation of the knower in his knowing. For knowing is a skilful performance, and all skilful performances operate by 'subordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools, to the shaping of a skilful achievement, whether practical or theoretical'. We do not use nor observe clues and tools in themselves, and so are only 'subsidiarily' and not 'focally' aware of them. Hence such performances are irreversible and non-critical. But the knower's knowing is not therefore subjective, since comprehension is 'neither an arbitary act nor a passive experience, but a responsible act claiming universal validity'. It is *objective* as establishing contact with a hidden reality. It is a personal commitment and hazardous: 'Only affirmations that could be false can be said to convey objective knowledge of this kind.' In sum: 'into every act of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known, and ... this coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component of his knowledge' (*PK* pp.vii-viii).

In Chapters 1-3, Polanyi deals with Objectivism on its chosen ground - physics and chemistry, which it assumes to embody, or to closely approximate to, its ideal. In contrast, Polanyi shows, with many examples (an uncommon procedure in philosophising about science, at that time at least) that necessarily involved therein are acts of personal judgement and decision, even in respect of its most precise observations and formulations. Equally, he argues cogently that the notions of 'simplicity', 'economy', 'symmetry', and 'falsification' in at least any exact sense (and later 'fruitfulness' and Kantian 'regulative principles' which we use while pretending not to believe) are all 'pseudo-substitutions' which tacitly rely for their meaning on the very notions of rationality, truth and reality which they are supposed to replace as a result of the perceived failure of science to meet the Objectivist ideal and of a desire to hold on to both it and science. Polanyi, showing that science inherently requires acts of judge-

ment, interpretation, application and appraisal, even of the exactest measurements and most precisely stated rules, affirms even more strongly that it cannot meet the Objectivist ideal, and so rejects that ideal and upholds the ability of science to comprehend the truth of things.

In Chapter 4 he presents his central positive thesis: that all knowing and doing are skilful performances, what he later called 'tacit integrations', wherein we attend *from* a set of particular details, thereby known only subsidiarily and not in themselves, *to* the comprehensive entity known or complex action performed, which is known focally and in itself. In all our activity, practical and theoretical, we have the joint operation of these two modes of awareness. We may say that Polanyi replaces the dyadic relation of subject and object (X knows or does Z) with the triadic one of X attends *from* Y and *to* Z. Insofar as we can also attend *to* what we previously knew only subsidiarily, by using and by attending *from*, then we thereby still attend *from* some other things to it. These two modes of awareness are exclusive: we can focus only upon one thing at a time. And switching attention from the whole to the details destroys, immediately or soon, our awareness or performance of the whole. This means that, while in human knowing, we can always (in principle) make explicit and articulate what we do or do focally, we can make explicit and articulate at most only a fraction of what we know subsidiarily. It remains largely tacit, unknown in itself and known only as we employ it in knowing or doing something else. In *Personal Knowledge* and in the essays collected in Parts Three and Four of *Knowing and Being*, Polanyi gives many and varied examples and applications of the tacit integration of these two modes of awareness. Other philosophers have been aware of some of these,[5] and, if of an Objectivist or Critical disposition, have fought shy of them. Only Polanyi has articulated this structure and based his thinking upon it.

His later writings elaborate and apply in many directions the structure of tacit integration. It has both an epistemological and an ontological aspect. On the one hand, it is a structure of tacit knowing and performance, and, on the other, a structure of the comprehensive entity known or the complex act performed, which themselves are integrations of subsidiary details upon lower levels. Polanyi thus gives a general answer to all forms of Reductionism: our awareness, the meaning, the appearance and the reality of higher levels are lost as we focus upon their lower levels and subordinate. Especially in *The Tacit Dimension*, he sets out the ways in which higher and lower levels are both autonomous and yet interact.

One application of tacit integration which is of immediate significance to us, is presented in Chapter 4 Section 3 of *Personal Knowledge*: the importance of tradition. How can one teach what one knows only tacitly and not in itself? By example. The central paragraph is worth quoting in full:

> To learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyse and account in detail for its effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of another. A society which wants to preserve a fund of personal knowledge must submit to tradition (*PK* p.53).

Here is the basis for a Conservative philosophy of education.[6] Polanyi immediately draws upon it for a Conservative conception of politics. Since what is spoken and written down can never be all that we know - 'we know more than we can tell' (*TD* p.4) is the basic Polanyian text - knowledge can be kept alive and passed on only by personal example and imitation, and thence by a living tradition. Once that is lost, texts lose their meaning, which has to be painfully regained over a long period. Science itself is essentially the tradition of scientific research, and not the texts produced by it. Hence as Polanyi points out in the same place, while what is contained in scientific texts, its articulate theories, is taught in hundreds of new universities, '*the unspecifiable art of scientific research* has not yet penetrated to many of these'.

Political understanding likewise requires tradition. Thus only the British doctrine and not the art of political liberty, developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, could be transmitted. But it could be properly under-stood only by those familiar with the art. Thus:

> the doctrines of political freedom spread from England in the eighteenth century to France and throughout the world, while the unspecifiable art of exercising public liberty, being communicable only by tradition, was not transmitted with it. When the French Revolutionaries acted on this doctrine, which was meaningless without a knowledge of its application in practice, Burke opposed them by a traditionalist conception of a free society (*PK* p.54).

In its context, that is just an aside. But the social and political implications of tacit integration are developed in Chapter 7, after Polanyi has shown that language and articulate thought have their tacit dimensions, and that science and mathematics are necessarily directed by the personal efforts and judgement of those who engage in them.

Chapter 7, 'Conviviality', is concerned with the social setting of intellectual enquires and the emotions which motivate them and which they satisfy. They require a certain sort of society, one which respects the truth and which can be respected because of that. Thus Polanyi mounts an interesting defence of ritual, and the traditionalism that goes with it, as fostering comm-

unity, especially over time. But it is vulnerable to external reflection upon it (i.e. to merely factual and hence debunking sociology) which shows it as something which we not only submit to, but also create (pp.210-11). This is the general problem of self-set standards, which he takes up in the following chapters.

In Section 5 on 'The Organization of Society' he sets out the bases of a community: sharing of convictions, which needs institutions of culture; sharing of fellowship, and institutions to promote group loyalty; co-operation, especially for material benefits, i.e. an economy; and the exercise of authority and coercion, the public power to protect and control the others. Whereas static societies have acknowledged the power of truth (unlike modern Reductionist theories), as shown by their establishment of specific beliefs, modern dynamic societies, aimed at the progressive reformation of themselves, threaten to become totalitarian regimes wherein truth is made subservient to welfare. Polanyi's aim is to distinguish and defend that kind of free society, which while allowing self-determination, respects truth as a fundamental value. It accords 'both independent status and a theoretically unrestricted range to thought, though in practice it fosters a particular cultural tradition, and imposes a public education and a code of laws which uphold existing political and economic institutions' (p.214).

This free society he later called 'A Society of Explorers' (*TD* Chapter 3). And previously (*SFS* Chapters 2–3) he had outlined the model of scientific authority, which up-holds general standards and exercises discipline over the scientific community in their name, but not any specific theories: it is a General and not a Specific Authority. But science, law, morality and the other institutions of culture can exist and flourish only as people believe in the general validity of that which they serve and uphold. A free society, as in Britain, has several such institutions, each autonomous, and together forming that public opinion which guides government. But today they are threatened by the sceptical and relativist debunking of political and other ideologies, which themselves nakedly and 'honestly' parade their own freedom from moral scruples, exposing the scruples of others as 'false consciousness' or 'hypocrisy'. Marxism is the most dangerous of these ideologies. For it proposes as its own tacitly moral imperative the radical reconstruction of society in the name of a human welfare that is allegedly thwarted by the existing order. It thus offers, to those like Sartre, in its totalitarian ideology and moral unscrupulousness, freedom from the very self-doubt which it had served to induce. Polanyi concludes the chapter with the affirmation that, no matter how liberal a free society may be, it is also profoundly Conservative. The problem, therefore, is to re-establish that power to believe, uphold and commit oneself to truth, and thus to justice and freedom, and to do so in the context of a specific society with its specific institutions and traditions, with all its faults as well as its merits. Those values are controlled by the ideologies spawned by Objectivism:

> An absolute moral renewal of society can be attempted only by an absolute power which must inevitably destroy the moral life of man.
>
> This truth is unpalatable to our conscience. Does it follow that we must suppress our conscience, or else accept the totalitarian teaching that violence alone is honest? I said in the introduction to this chapter that I would renew within a social setting the question, how can we keep holding beliefs that can conceivably be doubted? The attempt made in this book to stabilise knowledge against scepticism, by including its hazardous character in the conditions of knowledge, may find its equivalent, then, in an allegiance to a manifestly imperfect society, based on the acknowledgement that our duty lies in the service of ideals which we cannot possibly achieve (p.245).

That task occupies Polanyi in Part Three, 'The Justification of Personal Knowledge' with its chapters on 'The Logic of Affirmation', 'The Critique of Doubt' and 'Commitment'. Here he disposes of the claims of 'critical' and 'justificatory' philosophies which begin with doubt. Instead we can begin only with acceptance of the facts of experience, scholarship and science, and the reliability of the tacit processes whereby we have established them. What explicit rules and premises of experience and science we may be able to formulate, are acceptable only secondarily as being elicited from the primary level of accepted facts. He thus endorses St. Augustine's principle: *nisi credideritis, non intelligitis* (p.266); (cf. his endorsement of *fides quaerens intellectum, SFS* p.45). He explicitly states that his is a fiduciary programme (*PK* p.299), but not an arbitrary or subjectivist one. For, 'The freedom of the subjective person to do as he pleases is overruled by the freedom of the responsible person to act as he must' (p.309). It is a responsible freedom of dedication to transpersonal ideals and standards.

In Part Four, 'Knowing and Being' he moves to the ontological dimensions of tacit integration – a vision of a multi-level universe, rising from matter, to life, to consciousness and then to man. These latter themes are further developed in his following books and essays. There he achieves a restoration of meaning in human life and in the world.

Thus his 'Post-Critical Philosophy' (from the sub-title of *PK*) is also a post-Modern philosophy, ontologically as well as epistemologically. He opens the way to a return to the traditional type of cosmology wherein the world, or God behind it, presents a Law, Way or *Tao* for man to follow and to embody in himself and in society. The reductivist interpretation of the new science, which accompanied it at its birth, saw the universe as a meaningless mechanism, and men as either radically free and self-defining subjects, having individually (Liberalism) or collectively (Socialism) to define their own way.[7] It seems to me that the Conservative belief in the traditional social order cannot survive for long within the Modern cosmology, which logically and

historically ends in nihilism, first intellectual and subsequently political and therefore revolutionary. Conservatism is above all piety, primarily to the past, but then also to the present and future. Therein, I suggest, it presupposes a piety to what is beyond man and time, to an eternal Law or Way and perhaps also to its Author.

I have given a brief conspectus of Polanyi's general concerns and central arguments, for there, I suggest, is where his fundamental significance for Conservatism lies. More could be said about the details of his treatments of social and political themes, especially tradition and authority, two ideas at the heart of Conservatism.

But, some of us may say, he did not go far enough. He could still uphold the dynamism of the French Revolution, although recognising that 'the new self-determination of man can be saved from destroying itself only by recognising its own limits in an authoritative framework which upholds it.... Today the ideas of Thomas Paine can be saved from self-destruction only by a conscious reaffirmation of traditional continuity. Paine's ideal of unlimited gradual progress can be saved from destruction by revolution only by the kind of traditionalism taught by Paine's opponent, Edmund Burke' (*TD* pp.62-3). But can they be reconciled? The question arises on two levels:

(a) Is a General Authority and commitment to *formal* ideals of freedom, justice and truth, sufficient and possible in itself? Or is not every actual society formed around some nucleus of determinate belief - a dogma - which is reflected in its traditions, laws and institutions?

(b) Did Polanyi himself go beyond the Modern cosmology and anthropology, or did he prepare the way for others to do so? Specifically, given his own references to Christianity, did he take us into the Church or only to the porch?[8]

Perhaps Liberal Conservatism is not enough and, at a higher level, has its own suspended logic out of which Polanyi may not have extricated himself.

Notes

1. Reference to Polanyi's work are given in the text using the following abbreviations:
Science, Faith and Society, London, OUP, 1946, 2nd ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964 = *SFS*;
The Logic of Liberty, London, Routledge, 1951 = *LL*;
Personal Knowledge, London, Routledge, 1958 = *PK*;
The Study of Man, London, Routledge, 1959;
The Tacit Dimension, London, Routledge, 1966 = *TD*;
Knowing and Being, London, Routledge, 1969 = *KB*;
Meaning, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975.
2. E.P. Wigner and R.A. Hodgkin, 'Michael Polanyi' in *Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society*, Vol. 23, December 1977, p .425, quoting Sir W.M. Cooper.
3. *ibid.* p. 413, quoting P. Ignotus.
4. See Mill's argument (*On Liberty*) for freedom of speech; the arguments of our contemporary philosophers of education against 'indoctrination' - i.e. any substantive teaching in religion (or, world-and-life-view), morals and politics; and Popper's *The Open Society*, especially his attacks on Plato and Plato's belief in 'a right law', the origin of the doctrine of Natural Law.
5. Ryle and Oakeshott appreciate that we can know more than we can tell, but have not formulated the difference between the two types of awareness. Merleau-Ponty in *The Phenomenology of Perception* argued at length from the implicit dimensions of human knowing and doing, and almost formulated the structure of tacit integration.
6. See my 'The Philosophy of Michael Polanyi and its Significance for Education', 'Rational Autonomy: The Destruction of Freedom' and '"Because I say so!" Some Limitations on the Rationalisation of Authority' all in *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, respectively, Vol. 12, 1978, Vol. 16 No. 2, 1982, and Vol. 21 No. 1, 1987.
7. I take this formulation from Chapter 1 of C. Taylor's *Hegel*, which gives a very illuminating account of the types of modern cosmology and how Hegel sought to restore meaning to the world and to stabilise society against the destructiveness of radical or absolute freedom, while not reinstating the idea of a superior Law or Way.
8. The religious bearing, or lack of it, of Polanyi's philosophy, and his own personal beliefs, have been recently debated in America: see my 'Polanyi and the Reality of God', *Convivium* No. 17, October 1983.

Teaching The Professor

(The following article, by M. F. Strachan, originally appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine* for 1949, over the signature 'M.F.S.' The 'professor' is Enoch Powell, and we are reprinting the article in order to mark his much-to-be-regretted departure from Parliament.)

Breakfast was not a success. The fire smouldered dejectedly until the Professor teased it with a gill of petrol, and then it sprang up in a fury and singed his moustache; when he assaulted the sausages the tin counter-attacked and cut his finger; the water refused to boil and while he was not looking tipped itself over into the fire. 'Oh, the malice - the cursed, diabolical malice of inanimate objects!' muttered the Professor ferociously between clenched teeth. 'Here, let me help,' I said. 'You keep away,' he snarled. 'If they want to be bloody-minded, I'll show them, by God I will,' booting the empty sausage tin into a cactus bush. I knew from past experience that it was no good interfering. I had given 'Pinafore' her fuel and water and tested the tyres,

so I picked the tin of cigarettes out of the ration box, sat down on the tail-board and watched him begin to rekindle the fire.

It was half-past six on a June morning in 1943. 'Pinafore', a thirty-cwt truck, was parked in a disused railway cutting about sixty miles east of Algiers. The Professor really had occupied a distinguished chair of learning until the outbreak of war, when he had enlisted as an infantryman. Now he was my senior officer, and if he was a singular and in some ways unorthodox Lieutenant-Colonel, he certainly looked more like a soldier than an absent-minded scholar. He was still in his early thirties, stockily built, with a pale face and brown hair *en brosse*. His eyes were greenish, very penetrating and rather sinister; they indicated something of their owner's intellectual brilliance and something of his force of character.

When we had begun to make our plans about three weeks previously we had realised that there would be difficulties, and at times it had seemed to me that the whole project would dissolve into a day-dream. It was I who had named the truck 'Pinafore', as a kind of safeguard against disappointment - 'Pinafore', a comic theatrical ship which never really existed; the name symbolised my secret feeling that our plan was never really practicable. My doubts were not shared by the Professor. He had decided that we should drive from Algiers to Cairo, and drive we would. Looking back now, I am still not sure that the plan was practicable from a sane man's point of view. We reckoned that the distance, including certain detours we wished to make, was about three thousand miles, and that we would cover this in fourteen days. The choice of vehicle was dictated by what we had to take with us; and the seating accommodation, combined with the difficulties of posting a soldier from one theatre of war to another, precluded us from taking a driver.

The Professor's life had been crammed with scholarly achievement; but in the days of his youth he had never been a Boy Scout, and during the war he had been too busy for sixteen hours a day creating confusion in the ranks of the enemy to have time to learn how to look after himself in the open. It is true that before the war he had on a number of occasions, for several days on end, trudged the English and Welsh roads on foot at an average rate of five and a half miles per hour (about half a mile an hour slower than his normal rate of progression for short distances). But on these expeditions he had never cooked his own food; and he had slept on railway station platforms, in barns, or in even more civilised places. Another consideration of some importance was that he could not drive. He was quite candid about this. He possessed a certificate, carefully tucked away in his pocket-book, stating that he was authorised to drive any Government road vehicle; but I gathered that this had been presented to him when he had been a cadet by an over-optimistic Sergeant Instructor before his first and only driving lesson. Since then he had displayed characteristic courage and determination, and quite remarkable ineptitude, in endeavouring to master an Army motor-bicycle.

The Professor recounted all these shortcomings to me in detail, and it may well be wondered why I consented to make the journey with him at all, let alone agree to teach him to drive on the way. My motives were various; apart from my personal desire to travel to Cairo by road, I felt sure that the Professor was minimising his abilities. Moreover, although I did not really profess to be a hardened campaigner or knowledgeable mechanic, I rather enjoyed the prospect of looking after the two of us and 'Pinafore'. It would be a distinctly agreeable experience, I thought, for me to give instructions to the Professor for a change.

The Professor insisted on preparing breakfast unaided on that first morning, and it made a bad start to the day. The sausages were cold and flabby, tea leaves floated on top of a grey, tepid liquid which I tactfully consumed with feigned relish. But the Professor was not deceived and went about shaking his head muttering 'Bloody inefficient! Bloody inefficient!' too angry to eat. If he had a failing it was an overbearing intolerance of stupidity and inefficiency. People less acute and less energetic than himself, that is, practically every other human being with whom he came in contact, were very liable to incite his wrath. I myself had of course already been the cause of many outbursts, and I had witnessed more than one explosive scene when the offenders had been very senior officers indeed and had not taken kindly to his blunt exposure of their brainlessness. But this was something new. I had never before seen the Professor really angry with himself, because I had never before seen him make a fool of himself. While I had been working with him I had often almost exasperated him, but he had been very patient with me and had taught me a great deal. I wondered just how far our rôles were now to be reversed.

By half-past seven we were ready to start, and the Professor decided to take his first spell at the wheel. He already knew the lay-out of the controls and became piqued when I insisted on pointing out which was the accelerator and which was the brake. In fact, as I was about to learn, his difficulties were much more complex than being unable to distinguish one pedal from another: they involved problems which would not even have occurred to a normal beginner. I did not realise this at the time, and do not remember feeling particularly apprehensive as we jerked and jolted off towards the main road. I had taught other people to drive and was quite confident in my ability to teach him.

The main difficulty, according to the Professor, lay in the steering. His diagnosis was at least partly correct, as I discovered when we had to turn back on to the main road. Instead of slowing down he suddenly accelerated, at the same time swaying about in his seat as though wrestling for possession of the wheel. We turned neither to right nor left, but shot straight on towards a stone wall on the far side. We stopped with a lurch a few inches short of the wall and I found that I had subconsciously pulled the handbrake hard on.

'You see what I mean?' asked the Professor, quite unperturbed.

'Yes, I see,' I replied, wiping the sweat off my hands, determined to be equally composed. 'Now, to turn her it's no good just shifting your weight about in the seat; you must take a grip of the steering wheel and turn it like this.'

'Of course, of course, I quite understand. I must remember I am not on that motor-bicycle,' he said.

'Take it easy, don't be in a hurry, reverse her and try again.' He reversed without much difficulty, but in two seconds we had shot back across the road and were again facing the wall.

'Never mind,' I said, wiping my hands again, 'just take it steady - try again.'

'I'll manage it,' muttered the Professor with the most ferocious look of resolution. Next time he certainly did manage it. We turned a good deal more than the necessary right-angle and narrowly missed the ditch on the wrong side of the road. 'Done it!' beamed the Professor as we swerved back into the centre of the road. I was too unnerved to make any comment.

The road to Bougie forks short of Tizi Ouzou, and at the fork was a large notice stating that the coast road was 'closed to W.D. transport'. The Professor chose it accordingly. We soon realised the reason for the notice. The road was narrow and began to mount and wind in tortuous convolutions through the hills. 'Good practice for steering,' he said, crashing his gears as he negotiated a steep hairpin from which we looked down into the plain, hundreds of feet below. As a matter of fact his steering improved remarkably rapidly, and I had just told him how pleased I was with his progress when quite suddenly and unexpectedly 'Pinafore' slewed hard to port and was only prevented from slipping over the edge of a precipice by hitting the end of a stone bridge. 'How did that happen?' asked the Professor innocently as we inspected the damage. We were relieved to find that we had only stove in an iron bracket and crumpled the oil and water cans held in place by it. They were now oozing their contents into the dust. The Professor seemed to take the accident very much as a matter of course, but for fear that he should lose confidence I screwed up my courage and suggested that he should continue to the top of the pass.

'All you need is practice,' I said reassuringly when at last I climbed thankfully into the driver's seat. 'You need more experience in synchronisation and timing, and you must remember to keep on your own side of the road. You can learn a lot just by watching me.' My spirits improved as we began the descent. On our right the red rock rose sheer for twenty or thirty feet before climbing more gradually to the summits; on our left the slope dropped several hundred feet into the valley, and great vistas of red and bluish rock yielding to scrub and pasture lay stretched out below us in the sunshine. I had not driven far and we were just rounding a blind corner when a British army lorry suddenly swung into view, speeding towards us. There was a rending noise, a splintering of glass and we were through. I pulled up. 'Confounded bad driving,' I snapped, and jumped out to take the driver's name, but he had already disappeared behind a wall of white dust. 'Keep on your own side of the road,' observed the Professor as he picked pieces of the left-hand driving mirror out of his hair and tunic. Apart from the smashed mirror there was a large rent in the canopy, and several bolts holding the canopy stays had been sheared off. I walked a few yards back along the road to regain my temper, but only lost it further when I noticed that our wheel marks certainly did tend to ride the crown of the road. 'A good thing that other vehicle didn't stop,' I retorted, walking back to 'Pinafore'; 'we won't have to explain why we are on this road at all.' Of course the accident had not been my fault, but the whole incident - and particularly the Professor's remark about keeping on my side of the road - nettled me. Fate, I decided, was temporarily against us; we would have to go very carefully and just hope that the third accident, which must surely follow, would not be serious. I was quite relieved therefore when a few miles further on the engine faltered, refused to respond to the accelerator, and finally died away. The Professor cocked an inquiring eye at me. 'Petrol stoppage,' I said with the decision of the expert, 'leave it to me.' The Professor left it to me and I began tinkering about inside the bonnet. After a few minutes he came and looked over my shoulder and asked a few questions; then he seemed to lose interest and got back into the cab. I was just wiping the sweat out of my eyes before blowing down the feed-pipe, which appeared to be as dry as a bone, when the petrol came gushing out of its own accord. 'She'll start now,' I said confidently. 'I thought she would,' replied the Professor. He had the instruction book on his knees: 'You had only one petrol tank turned on; I presumed that had run dry, so I turned on the other one.' 'Oh,' I said.

For most of the way between Bougie and Djidjelli the road is a narrow step cut into the red sea-cliff. The cliff-face does not always rise perpendicular from the road, but in many places hangs out over it, and here and there forms a tunnel through which the road runs. It was very hot. All along the coast were tented camps full of British troops resting. Many were bathing their parti-coloured bronze and white bodies, in a sea so smooth and vividly blue that it looked like highly coloured metal. In the distance, a reminder of things to come, several landing-craft were cruising on exercise. I found myself wondering with unwonted melancholy how many of those healthy tanned bodies would in a short few weeks be rotting in shallow graves. I woke up just in time to avoid our own immediate translation as the result of the recklessness of one of our compatriots who was trying to run us down with a gun-tractor. 'Pinafore's' canopy hit the projecting cliff-face, with more sounds of rending and shearing of bolts. This was too much! Evidently our petrol stoppage had not counted, but we had had three accidents now - and two of them while I, the instructor, had been driving. 'We must both remember,' I said in a shaky voice, 'that

'Pinafore' is broader in the beam and altogether larger than an ordinary car.' 'That, I should have thought, was pretty obvious,' answered the Professor drily.

On the morrow the Professor insisted on the driving-time being scrupulously split between us, but the whole day, despite my apprehensions, was free from mishap. In the afternoon we crossed the Tunisian border and were soon in the late battle area. The night we encamped in a former enemy gun position near the western shore of Lake Achkel.

We soon worked out a satisfactory routine which we maintained throughout the journey. We halted each night about half-past seven. The Professor was responsible for converting the back of the truck successively into dining-room and bedroom and back into store-room in the morning. As soon as we stopped in the evening I made a fire from old ration and ammunition boxes of which we kept a stock in the back of the truck, replenished as opportunity offered. On the fire I heated tins selected and opened by the Professor, and brewed the tea. After a little practice it only took us half an hour to prepare supper, and by ten o'clock we were under mosquito-nets. We brewed enough tea at supper to satisfy our immoderate thirsts and to fill a thermos flask for breakfast in the morning. The Professor was habitually an early riser and I always awoke to find him offering me a mug of tea while still polishing away at what he called his 'collection of brass'. I, like other normal people, wore a shirt and shorts and nothing much else. The Professor, who spent most of the war in Egypt and Africa or places even hotter, invariably wore a shirt with collar and tie, long drill trousers and boots, a tailored drill jacket with brass buttons and regimental badges, and a Sam Browne. As he said, wearing his full uniform 'kept up his morale', and it certainly did not seem to make him feel the heat any more than other people. So each morning I would awake to hot tea and the smell of metal polish and would drowsily watch him concentrate furiously on his 'collection of brass'. We did not cook at breakfast-time and were generally on the road by half-past seven. We stopped for lunch at one and brewed a gallon of tea, part of which went into the thermos for a brief halt in the afternoon.

Perhaps it was because of the loneliness of our journey, and because our exterior surroundings were strange and constantly changing, that many of the familiar inanimate objects encompassed by the little world aboard 'Pinafore' assumed almost human characteristics and were nicknamed accordingly. There was 'Auntie', the Professor's filing cabinet, filled with few people knew what dangerous documents; a rather frail and troublesome creature who had to be humoured, coddled and nursed all the way, and whose presence prevented us from ever once letting the truck out of our sight during the whole journey. Then there was 'What's-his-name', the spare wheel, a great, unwieldy, boorish brute, who always took up too much room and had to be heaved out of the back each night and laboriously hoisted in again each morning. 'Fritz', the thermos, so called because his previous owner had been on the other side, fell in action shortly before the end of the journey, and we grieved for the passing of a trusty friend. The canopy which shielded our belongings from the sun by day and our bodies from the evening dews was named 'Horace'. This was the Professor's contribution and had some obscure reference to Mark Twain which I never properly understood.

It often happened that we would not speak to another soul for two or three days at a time, and in this sense the journey was lonely. We soon found our flow of random conversation was running dry, and might sit for two or three hours in dead silence. This was boring and could be dangerous; in the heat of the driving-cab, lulled by the desolate monotony of the road and the steady note of the engine, it was all too easy for the driver to fall asleep.

Some weeks previously I had implied in the course of conversation with the Professor that Xerxes had been the opponent of Alexander. The Professor had started as though jabbed deeply by a needle and had glared at me as if I had caused him some personal injury. I now proposed that the long hours of driving should be employed in his remedying my ignorance. The Professor consented on condition that when I was not driving I in turn should improve his knowledge. This was an awkward proviso. In the first place, I found that I simply could not relax while the Professor was driving. Indeed it was considerably more tiring to have to watch him than to drive myself, and I did not feel that I should be able to divert much of my attention to this parallel course of instruction. My second and even greater difficulty was to choose a subject on which I was better informed than he was. The Professor's range of knowledge was mortifyingly wide, as I discovered when I made a blundering attempt with French painting. But with his usual obstinacy he made it quite plain that unless I talked he would not. I cast about desperately for a subject, until the narrow scope of my own experience, and the discovery that the Professor had never ridden horseback, resulted in agreement to my talking discursively on horses and hunting.

I was treated to a course of brilliant impromptu lectures on Greek and Roman history, art and literature. We anticipated the chronological sequence of events so that the Punic Wars could be described as we passed through the territory of Carthage. Cato died as we traversed the battlefield of Utica, and as we bowled along the Via Balbia I received a truly peripatetic introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle. It seemed ludicrous at first to intersperse the story of the Odyssey with episodes from 'Mr Sponge's Sporting Tours', or to follow the Professor's discourse on Roman military strategy with a description of what I knew about the art of working a pack of foxhounds. But my diffidence at trying to deliver a 'sporting lecture' was soon dispelled by the Professor's unexpectedly eager interest. We each became so engrossed in the other's subject that in the evenings after supper the Professor would illustrate verse forms and teach me the Greek

alphabet, while I would draw for him bits of harness, the points of a horse, and other intricacies which would have necessitated his taking his eyes off the road if I had tried to explain them while he was driving. Of the various characters I introduced into my talks Squire Mytton was one of his favourites. I wondered why this should be so, and it occurred to me that perhaps the Professor recognised in Mytton's mentality a kindred streak of what the euphemists call eccentricity. I knew Nimrod's biography of the man almost as well as I knew 'Handley Cross' and 'Market Harborough' and was able to repeat most of the stories with fair accuracy. An anecdote which particularly amused him was that of Mytton driving an acquaintance home in a gig. The acquaintance nervously suggested that they should slacken speed lest they should overturn, an unpleasant experience which he had so far been spared. 'What!' cried Mytton, 'never upset in a gig?' and drove straight into the ditch. Hitherto my story-telling had been mainly confined to children, and with them you can rely on ringing the changes with two or three well-tried favourites. But if the Professor was more exacting because he never wanted to hear the same tale twice, I could not possibly have desired a more attentive or enthusiastic listener. 'By Jove!' he exclaimed one day when I had finished the more or less true account of an eventful day's hunting, 'what I've been missing! – the image of war without its guilt and only five-and-twenty per cent of the danger! I believe that fellow Jorrocks knew what he was talking about.' Then quite solemnly he said, 'I've made up my mind. I shall hunt.' I never took him seriously, of course. The idea of the Professor hunting was diverting – but quite preposterous.

We took a brief look at the appalling destruction and desolation of Bizerta and Ferryville and set off on the road to Tunis with the Professor at the wheel. It was a good road and the Professor was taking advantage of it. I remarked rather acidly that the speedometer needle was wavering at over forty m.p.h. 'Just repeat the ingredients of the bran mash again – I must get all this quite clear,' replied the Professor with his foot hard down on the accelerator. At that moment I saw two hundred yards ahead a barrier across the road and a military policeman waving us down a diversion to the right. Forty yards from the barrier the Professor had still not slackened speed. I yelled. The policeman began to run. The Professor suddenly wrenched the wheel over and we careered down the side road straight into a three-foot ditch. There was a moment's silence while we sprawled at an angle of forty-five degrees and collected our wits. Then the Professor began to roar with laughter; 'Ha-ha-ha!' he gasped, 'never been upset in a gig?' Neither of us was hurt, but this exhibition of wanton recklessness by my pupil had frightened me badly, and my reaction took the form of extreme annoyance. 'For heaven's sake don't be a damned fool,' I said. 'We've certainly broken a spring if not an axle – and what about "Auntie"?'

'My dear fellow, what are you so put out about? I knew this would happen – it had to. You can't ride till you've had a dozen falls – you said so yourself.'

'That doesn't apply to driving,' I retorted. 'Anyway, you must have had at least a dozen smashes by now, and if you think you begin to know how to drive you're wrong.' We climbed into the back and beheld a scene of dreadful confusion. 'Auntie' had received a nasty shock and was prostrated across 'What's-his-name,' having disgorged some of her contents into pools of marmalade and tinned tomato.

'"Believe me,"' quoted the Professor, '"there is no colour like red, no sport like 'unting."' We had opened the large tin of tomatoes that morning. For the rest of the journey tomato appeared in every corner of the truck, in the butter and tea and biscuits, and even in our clothes and bedding.

We were towed into Tunis and spent the night in the workshops, where, under the influence of the Professor's rank, they worked so well that much to our surprise we were able to leave at the usual hour next morning. The Professor now proclaimed that he had 'got "Pinafore's" goat', from which I gathered he meant that he had at last gained full control of her and that she would never again bang herself against bridges or throw herself into ditches. I could not quite grasp how he had come to this conclusion, and suspected it might be a ruse to persuade me to allow him to continue driving. Common-sense told me that for the sake of 'Auntie' and our own skins I should drive the whole of the rest of the way myself; but the Professor cunningly touched my pride by pointing out that I had undertaken to teach him to drive and that to give up now would be a weak admission of failure. There was a long argument, but in the end I gave way with an ill grace and some gloomy forebodings.

The main deviation we had decided to make was a tour of Cape Bon, where resistance in Africa had finally ceased. By about four in the afternoon we had reached the northern extremity of the peninsula and turned left off the coast road down a track leading to Sidi Daoud. This we knew to be the place through which the Germans had planned to supply the best part of a quarter of a million troops who, with the fall of Tunis, had been pressed back into the rocky peninsula, where it was hoped that they would continue resistance for several weeks. Sidi Daoud turned out to be a small group of buildings on an island about four hundred yards square, separated by salt-marsh and quicksand from the mainland, and reached by a causeway two hundred yards long. We crossed over and stopped 'Pinafore' in a grass-grown courtyard. The silent, eerie atmosphere struck us both immediately. The whole place was entirely deserted, yet we found ourselves involuntarily talking in subdued voices, as though fearful lest someone present but unseen should be disturbed by our intrusion. A crucifix at the head of the causeway and a chapel wrecked by bomb or shell indicated the habitation of some monastic order. In a large barn we found half a dozen black barge-like boats. Nearly all the buildings had been stripped of their tiles and timber; heaps of the tiles lay about and

some of the wooden beams still stood on trestles in the courtyard. The explanation was to be found on the seaward side of the island. Here, two jetties some twenty yards long had been constructed by dropping great timber crates into the water and packing them with tiles. It was hasty, shoddy, and unfinished work. Even had the enemy had time to complete the jetties an infinitessimal amount of cargo from little boats and lighters could have been landed, and a couple of bombs would have blown the whole thing to pieces. In this grotesque disproportion of means to ends was writ large the desperation of defeat. Incredible as it seemed among these surroundings of hushed and haunted desolation, the surrender had taken place a bare three weeks previously. Sidi Daoud was altogether weird, as though events of the immediate past had suddenly become remote, legendary, and improbable. Yet of all the traces of the enemy's defeat that we saw on our journey, Sidi Daoud left the most vivid impression.

Next day we passed through the mine-sown battlefield of Enfidaville to Sousse, when we struck inland to El Djem, which lies at the meeting-point of seven roads in the centre of a naked plain. It is now a squalid Arab village, but of its ancient glory as a township there remains a Colosseum second in size only to the Colosseum in Rome. From ten miles away across the plain the mirage made it appear like a second Tower of Babel rearing uncertainly into the sky. We strained our eyes to define its true proportions, but the image jigged and wavered in the heat haze, so that we gave it up and concentrated on the road ahead, which was itself dancing and shimmering like a ribbon of flowing water.

We pulled up outside the gigantic shell of the building and went in. 'Perhaps this is an opportunity for me to give my version of a sporting lector,' said the Professor. We examined the tiers of marble seats, which had been partly restored, then walked across to a trench, twenty feet deep, running the length of the arena. 'This of course was roofed over; down below you can see the caves where they kept the wild animals and the gladiators entered by those doors - but hang it!' he said with a smile, 'I'll not waste time describing brutish pastimes. Retiarius and the rest of them may sometimes have had some fun, but for the onlookers it wasn't sport but sadistic indulgence. No, give me the sport of kings. That *is* the image of war without its guilt!'

Judging by the swarm of Arabs, young and old, who pestered us to buy coins, pieces of statuary, and other remains of doubtful origin and value, El Djem was the antique hunter's dream. Mere vocal refusals were quite ineffective in dissuading our would-be benefactors from attempting to strike a bargain with us. Eventually the Professor turned on them in a fury, clipped one on the head, and scattered the rest by charging at them with flailing arms. The North African Arab is fearful of violence but has a strong sense of humour; we drove away amid a volley of imprecations, jibes, and laughter - delivered from a respectful distance.

Throughout the journey our commercial dealings were restricted to the exchange of tea for eggs. The lone Arab crouching by the roadside holding up an egg between finger and thumb, or sometimes dangling a ready-plucked live chicken, was a familiar sight along our route. We felt sorry for the wretched chickens, thus cruelly made to proclaim their freshness, but we jibbed at the trouble of cooking them. Eggs, however, proved a very welcome variation to our diet. I had been responsible for provisioning 'Pinafore' before we started and had drawn from the ration depot a large case marked '14 men 2 days'. In theory these rations should have lasted two men for fourteen days, but all the delicacies, including a certain tin of tomatoes, were in large cans which had either been finished up or had distributed their contents about the truck in the first few days. Thereafter we found ourselves reduced to an almost constant and all too sustaining diet of bully and biscuit. We decided one morning, after trying to break the monotony by toying with a cold, tinned suet pudding for breakfast, that we must visit the very next depot we passed.

At the depot we obtained not only more palatable food, but some ammunition for our rifle, which had pricked our consciences as it stood dusty and useless in it's rack in the driver's cab. Before leaving Algiers we had with some difficulty persuaded a sinister gentleman wearing dark spectacles to discuss the matter of a self-destructive device to be attached to 'Auntie' for use in emergency. The sinister gentleman inquired whether we wanted instantaneous or delayed action; he promised that we would not be content with fire alone; indeed he strongly recommended fire followed by explosion as the only 'safe' method.

'How instantaneous is your - er - instantaneous device?' I asked a little uneasily.

'Well, instantaneous of course.'

'Oh,' I said, feeling foolish, 'but that surely means we go up too?'

'If it's explosive, yes. Lots of our men are really good types, you know; they prefer to blow themselves up and kill everyone within thirty yards of them.' He further explained that whatever form of destruction we chose he could give no guarantee against the apparatus being set off by the heat of the sun or by jolting over bad roads. I appealed to the Professor for a final decision and was greatly relieved when he said that, much as we should like to be regarded as really good types, he had decided in the circumstances to take the lesser risk. So we dispensed with self-destructive devices and took the rifle as a gesture instead.

We now headed along the coast through Gabes towards the Tripolitanian frontier. Here the road ran dead straight for miles at a stretch, with sandy treeless wastes to landward and salt-marsh glaring and glistening white to seaward. We passed through the minefields and pill-boxes of the Marsh Line and began navigating the treacherous ruts and potholes of the last ten miles to the frontier. The road here had never been properly surfaced, doubtless as a measure of

defence, and now after the passage of the armies it was just passable, with some risk to springs and axles. The Professor was persuaded to continue his discourse on Plato and to postpone his usual spell of driving while I steered a cautious zigzag course at five miles per hour.

Our first impressions of Tripolitania were good. The Via Balbia, which runs for over 1200 miles to Capuzzo on the Egyptian frontier, still had an excellent surface, and meagre, sordid hovels gave way to modern white concrete buildings. Looking out towards the coast we saw a town of these white buildings surrounded by palm trees which seemed to rise from the sea itself. Yet this town was not marked on our map. When we got nearer we found the palms growing on a long sandy spit, but the buildings were simply an illusion caused by the sun blazing on the dunes. We had already learnt that in the heat of the day things were not always what they seemed, but had been relieved to find that most hallucinations were common to both of us. For instance, the road surface in front of us would appear like a glistening lake stretching to the horizon. Out of the lake would emerge a little rounded hump; the hump would elongate itself into a chimney, then rapidly subside and resolve itself into an ordinary army lorry which would lumber past us in a cloud of white dust. A more intimate phenomenon, which the Professor insisted was a private hallucination of my own invention, took the form of a terrible attack of itching on my legs and stomach.

'Look here,' I protested, exhibiting my leg, 'those are flea-bites, and they itch. If I itch I must scratch.'

'Very well,' replied the Professor, determining to be obstinately unjust, 'if you scratch I shan't talk.' This was tyranny, and I maliciously hoped in vain that some of my guests would transfer their attentions to him. There were intermittent gaps in our lectures and relations remained strained until the itching mirage disappeared. This happened on the day that I obtained a tin of insecticide.

By the end of the seventh day we had covered 1200 miles, and that evening we stopped at Sabrata, originally (according to the Professor) a Tyrian settlement which had grown to prosperity under Roman rule in the second century A.D. The theatre was in an excellent state of preservation, and an inscription informed us that in 1935 King Victor Emmanuel and the Duce had there attended a performance of the 'Iphigenia.' It had been a long day and the Professor's driving had been rather more than usually erratic. I found that my desire for supper and bed was diminishing my interest in what the Professor had to say about Euripides's use of a *deus ex machina*. He of course was still full of energy as usual, but he must have sensed my listlessness; for his lecture was exceptionally detailed, and as we walked back past the museum he insisted on conning every fragmentary inscription affixed to its walls and expatiating on its probable date and full significance. But I got my own back, when my next turn came to talk, by describing at maximum length the complexities of riding side-saddle, which I was gratified to see he found extremely tedious.

In Tripolitania the Italian colonial settlements were still occupied and displayed a thriving appearance, in contrast to those we were to see in Cyrenaica. Between the two groups of settlements lies the Gulf of Sirte, and we made good speed along the coast road, which was flat, deserted, and uninteresting, but nevertheless had the advantage that is was difficult to come to any harm, even with the Professor pushing 'Pinafore' along at a good forty miles per hour. Our continued freedom from further mishaps almost deceived me into thinking that the Professor really had 'got "Pinafore's" goat' and that he could now be considered safe. But the lapses that occurred when he drove in more frequented areas renewed my qualms in an all too lively manner. In Tripoli a patriarchal Arab, bent and sluggish with years, had stared destruction suddenly in the face and skipped like a young ram. In Benghazi another Arab disappeared with his bicycle into the jaws of death beneath 'Pinafore's' bonnet, yet miraculously reappeared unharmed. What particularly disturbed me was that the Professor seemed to have no sense of guilt or of danger. If only I could have made him angry with himself as he had been angry when he made a mess of the cooking, there might, I felt, have been some chance of teaching him to be more careful. My advice was listened to, but completely disregarded, my threats were scorned, my prayers derided. What a pupil!

Progress in my secondary course of instruction was much more satisfactory, and, short of practical application, I had taught him almost everything I knew. An hour or so from Cyrene I concluded a talk on the care and cleaning of boots and saddlery. 'By the way,' I warned the Professor as I climbed into the driver's seat, 'don't take everything Surtees says as gospel. He recommends champagne and apricot jam for top-boots, but I've never met anyone who has actually tried it, and it certainly sounds very messy and rather expensive.' I let in the clutch; in a few moments we had slipped back twenty-five centuries or so, and the Professor was quoting Herodotus and relating how the Delphic Oracle had described to the founder the sweet spring water of the future Cyrene before he had set sail from Greece. On arrival in Cyrene we took a supply of that selfsame water, which was indeed delicious, and obtained half a dozen fresh loaves, the first we had tasted for ten days. We inspected the ruins of the great temple to Apollo and then drove down to Apollonia, once the port of Cyrene. During the previous three years it had been used successively by Italians, Germans, and British as a rest-centre for troops; now it was again deserted. We found that the coast road had been destroyed, so there was nothing for it but to climb the hill again and strike inland from Cyrene. The Professor took over the driving and forthwith did his best to bring disaster upon us. I think I was never more frightened during the whole journey than when he swung round the first hairpin on the wrong side of the road within a few inches of the precipice and then missed his gear change so that 'Pinafore' began to slip back over the edge. I will not

dwell on those agonising moments; they were really too unpleasant to be funny.

We now began the most dreary part of our journey. On the twelfth day we encamped beneath the lowering heights of the Gazala ridge and next morning drove into Tobruk. A Sunday silence brooded over the place and infected us both with an oppressive melancholy. Even a strong brew now failed to cheer us; the Tobruk water was so full of salts and chemicals that it curdled the tea. We pitied the many thousands who had had to drink it for weeks and months on end. All the places through which we were now passing were so well known to us by name and description that we had subconsciously formed our own mental picture of them and were surprised at the difference between reality and imagination. Bardia, perched on the edge of its cliff, looked like a quaintly displaced Italian hill village, and Halfaya was not a pass as we had imagined, but a zigzag road up a salient. One hundred and twenty-two kilometres from Alexandria a modest notice marked the forward German minefield in front of El Alemein. We supposed that one day a more imposing monument might mark this place where the German tide had begun to ebb, and that no doubt the Egyptians would make a good thing out of it by arranging excursions in luxury coaches for winter tourists.

'Well, will you pass me as fit to drive?' asked the Professor as we made supper on our last night.

'I should very much like to - you're my pupil and my reputation as a teacher is at stake, but what do you think yourself? For hours on end you seem quite safe, and then suddenly for no good reason you give me the fright of my life.'

'Oh, that's just "Pinafore's" goat,' smiled the Professor. 'She's a very provoking animal, but I've got her now for good and all. Remember, I've never had another accident - not a proper one - since Bizerta.'

I was tempted to say something scathing about luck rather than judgement, but instead I made a proposal.

'Look here, tomorrow we have to drive into the centre of Cairo - that's a far stiffer test than anything you've had to deal with so far. If you can drive "Pinafore" from the Pyramids to G.H.Q. without hitting anything - and without turning my hair grey - I will certify that you can drive.' The astounding thing was that he did it. Snail-paced, meandering native carts, devil-may-care taxis, crazily unpredictable pedestrians, gesticulating policemen, roundabouts and traffic lights, all the hazards and navigational uncertainties of the teeming streets were as nothing to him. His handling of 'Pinafore' during that final hour could only be described as masterly.

Within a few hours of our arrival the Professor had done the round of the bookshops and purchased three Surtees and a Whyte-Melville. He was bursting with energy as usual and insisted on taking me that same afternoon to tea at Gezireh. A first visit to Gezireh with its luxurious club-house, squash courts, polo ground, golf course, green tennis lawns, and smart comfortable members is astonishing at any time, but then the contrast was well-nigh overwhelming. During the previous fortnight we had travelled nearly three thousand miles through lands thronged with ghosts and saturated with blood. Now we sat on the shaded terrace of the club-house, watched the white-flannelled cricketers, and sipped our tea. A girl's laughter and the sound of splashing came from the swimming-pool; behind us in the lounge three well-rouged and powdered matrons, and an immaculate bearded gentleman with a monocle, were settling down to a rubber of bridge. 'Come along to the polo ground,' suggested the Professor. 'You must explain to me all about the game.'

'Presently,' I murmured. 'Presently,' and dropped off to sleep in my chair.

Soon afterwards our ways parted. I did not see the Professor again until the other day. It was a December evening and I boarded a London-bound train on the outskirts. I could not have missed that pale face and those arresting eyes. I would in any case have taken a second look at him because of his clothes. He was wearing a bowler hat with a mud-smeared dent in it, a black cutaway coat with a muddied shoulder, a stock with a fox-head pin, and mud-spattered breeches and boots.

'Ever been upset in a gig?' he grinned, digging me in the ribs with his hunting-crop.

'It looks as though you have,' I replied. 'Quite recently.'

'Yes, I took four tosses today - but the last two were at jumps.'

'You don't mean to say you've been hunting?'

'Of course I've been hunting. I told you I was going to hunt, and hunt I do. It's all your fault, you know; ever since I last saw you I've been taking riding lessons when I could, and now I hunt regularly every Saturday. Judging by the number of bowlers I've smashed I'm inclined to think that "five-and-twenty per cent of the danger" is an underestimate, but my luck holds and "all time is lost wot is not spent in 'unting." '

'Well done!' I said, 'but what are you doing in the train?'

'Well, I live in London and have to get to and from the meets somehow - train, bus, horse-box, or pony-trap. The other day I walked the last six miles in my boots in just under the hour and got there before they moved off.'

'This petrol rationing is the devil,' I sympathised.

'Oh, I wouldn't *drive*,' he replied, 'even if I could get all the petrol I needed - I haven't got the nerve.'

The Salisbury Review - the ideal gift for birthday or anniversary. See page 56 for details of how to subscribe.

Announcement

From the September issue (Vol. 7 No. 1) *The Salisbury Review* will be published by The Claridge Press. Our editorial address for correspondence and contributions will remain the same: 7 Lord North Street, London SW1. Subscription enquiries and administration will be dealt with at the offices of The Claridge Press at 43 Queen's Gardens, London W2.

Regrettably, production and postal costs continue to rise. We have felt it necessary to increase the cost of a year's subscription to £14 (overseas $30). Single issues will cost £3.50 (Back issues: £4). These price changes will take effect from the September 1988 issue (Vol. 7 No. 1). Those subscriptions which have already been renewed or which run on past that date will not be affected until due for renewal.

We take this opportunity to thank our readers, whose interest and support have enabled us to present the case for intellectual conservatism over the last six years. We hope that they will continue to read the *Review* for many years to come.

NEW FROM THE CLARIDGE PRESS

Conservative Thinkers and Conservative Thoughts

These two volumes contain essays which appeared originally in the pages of *The Salisbury Review*. *Conservative Thinkers* summarises writers of the conservative tradition, including Shakespeare, Edmund Burke, Hegel, Jane Austen, Hayek and Oakeshott. The companion volume, *Conservative Thoughts*, provides an irreplaceable synopsis of the conservative outlook, and examines such topics as sex, gender, language, education and race, crime, death, economics and culture. Both collections are indispensable to all students of political science, as well as to those thinking people who are curious as to the nature and impact of conservative theory.

Conservative Thinkers and *Conservative Thoughts* are available from The Claridge Press, 43 Queen's Gardens, London W2, price £14.95 each (hardcover only).

Editorial

Following the recent missile agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, the European powers must re-assess their position. Otherwise they will go the way of other states in the modern world who, having relied on the United States, found themselves abandoned in their hour of need.

That the Soviet Union will not keep its side of the bargain goes without saying: a state without legal opposition, rule of law, a free press, is without the mechanism whereby political honour is established and upheld. All previous treaties have been broken, either secretly or openly, with the result that the Western powers, which entered the process of 'arms control' with overwhelming military superiority, now confront an enemy whose strategic position is unassailable. Even if the Soviet Union adheres to the agreement, it is clear that NATO's position vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact has significantly worsened. The Warsaw Pact is not an alliance, but a conscripted army of subject states, whose main use until now has been to invade the territory of its own members. Its strength, disposition, battle plans and exercises all testify to an aggressive intention. So do the soldiers or commanders who have served in the Warsaw Pact army, and who have escaped to conditions of freedom. Being situated outside the Soviet Union, this vast army could fight tomorrow without exposing the motherland to danger. Until the recent agreement, NATO, faced by Warsaw Pact superiority in all conventional forces, together with a formidable battery of chemical, biological and tactical nuclear weapons, had relied on a strategy of 'flexible response', threatening precise nuclear attacks on strategic targets within Soviet territory. Removal of the intermediate range nuclear weapons destroys this strategy, and puts nothing in the place of it. As everybody knows, or would have known, but for the resolute turning away from the truth which has always characterised Western policy towards the Soviet Union, NATO is no longer able to mount a conventional defence of its positions. Soviet tanks, immeasurably more numerous than those ranged against them, are now coated with an outward-exploding armour which renders them invulnerable to anti-tank defences. Thousands of these tanks stand poised in Eastern Europe, and the knowledge of their existence is one cause of West Germany's increasing reluctance to make even the most conditional threatening gesture.

More importantly, the INF agreement has diminished European faith in the United States. The isolationist temper of the American people will inevitably grow, as they awaken to the fact that American troops in Europe have been deprived of the means of their own defence. Moreover, Gorbachev's propaganda has worked wonders on the world's most gullible electorate: faced with a Soviet leader who is able to smile and wave like Hitler, and who has such additional trappings of human normality as a wife and a Visa card, the Americans have lapsed into a condition of false security, preparing the way for a new era of liberal and appeasing leadership.

Strategic planning means planning for the worst case. It is precisely this which Western governments have ceased to do, basing their defence policies on the absurd hope that the Soviet Union has renounced the aim of world domination, despite having no other source of legitimacy. It is not only common-sense that suggests the unchangeable nature of Soviet foreign policy. Military exercises and publications, the perceived disposition of forces, the constant and unaltered war-propaganda to which the subject peoples are exposed, and the unanimous testimony of fugitives, all bear witness to the single and terrible truth. Only a massive stream of disinformation, aimed at the Western media, at its leadership, and at the left establishment, enables people to escape this truth, in which they have in any case so strong a motive to disbelieve.

Despite the fact that Western Europe is incomparably more prosperous than the Soviet Union, the will does not exist to spend money on defence. Our need for leadership is greater than ever; but our leaders, far from warning us of the dangers and marshalling our collective will, have made only confused and feeble gestures, and shown neither the courage nor the desire to pull us back from the brink. The time has come to prepare the British and the French electorates for a sacrifice; expenditure on defence must be raised as soon as possible, to a level comparable with that of the Soviet Union. We must follow the French in deploying the neutron bomb - our sole remaining weapon against Soviet tanks - and we must accelerate research into anti-missile devices, something made urgent by the real possibility that the Soviet Union might be the first to develop a full system of strategic defence.

Many will doubt the need for such measures, and scoff at our warnings. But let them reflect on the actual condition of the Soviet Communist Party, ruling illegitimately over people rendered restive by the proximity of freedom, and by the economic collapse of the communist system. Debt to the Western powers has risen to the point where the very suggestion that it might be repaid is laughable. When a desperately needy, but immensely strong debtor stands next to the rich and defended property of his feeble creditor, the time has come for plunder. Only supreme moral virtue would, in such circumstances, cause the debtor to withstay his hand. And whatever the qualities the Soviet Union has miraculously acquired along with Mr Gorbachev's smile, supreme moral virtue is not one of them.

Letters

Sir,
I read the article in your September issue entitled 'Subversive Theology' by Roger Watson, with its bitter personal attack on me with a growing mixture of amusement, amazement and annoyance.

The amusement was caused by the fact that I had seen it before. Some six months ago I received through the post a totally anonymous typescript which was almost identical with the article. As with all anonymous attacks, I confined it (mentally at least) to the waste paper basket - but it is a different thing when it appears in a reputable journal such as yours, and when the lies and half truths it contains may well be believed by a responsible readership.

The amazement was caused by the incredible amount of research which must have gone into this. Clearly the author has spent many hours searching through documents and minutes and reports - but it is equally clear that he has done so not in order to find independent truths, but to find any scrap of possible evidence for a position already prejudged and arrived at on irrational grounds.

Above all my annoyance was caused by the dreadful combination of downright untruths, statements taken out of context, and 'conspiracy theories' based on a complete lack of rational evidence or thinking. Since I have been subjected to such an irrational and unfounded attack, I have I think a moral right to ask for the courtesy of your columns to show this article up for what it is.

Some examples of downright untruths! Much is made of the fact that 'a name appearing regularly in the SCC minutes is that of Canon Paul Oestreicher'. In fact his name appears no more than once or twice and only in connection with a visit he made as one of the secretaries of the BCC to one of our Council meetings. In fact all secretaries of the BCC came in sequence and in turn to our meetings and others considerably more often than he. The Archbishop of Canterbury visited us twice in the same period, and his name appears considerably more frequently in our minutes than Canon Paul Oestreicher's name. This by the twisted argument of the article, would make him a conspirator in subversion! Another example of untruth is the odd statement made about the Conference of European Churches Assembly held in Stirling University in September 1986, that 'it is quite clear from the available documentation that this meeting was the immediate fulfilment of the above deliberations' (referring to various meetings I have had in Eastern and Western Europe). This has caused great hilarity among my friends in the Conference of European Churches, who had at the invitation of the Church of Scotland been planning the Stirling meeting for at least 6 years before. Throughout the article however, statements like 'it is quite clear that ...' are followed by statements that cannot be verified from any documentation and are usually complete nonsense. Another such untruth, even more strange, is the accusation that the Scottish leaflet I wrote in 1986 for the Lent Study, which sold many thousands of copies, is 'a very concise advertisement for liberation theology'. This is simply ridiculous since it was a straightforward booklet on the subject 'What is the Church?' and was orthodox Christian teaching. Even the one quotation taken out of context in the article says nothing more than that we have to listen to one another and especially to the Third World. What is especially radical about that? Anyone who makes such an accusation of that booklet proves only that he knows nothing at all about liberation theology and probably very little about theology! Fortunately I have plenty of copies of the booklet left and I am willing to send it free of charge to any of your readers who wish to assess for themselves how ridiculous is Mr Watson's accusation, and how orthodox is my theology.

I believe myself to be an evangelical Christian, holding fast to the the Gospel and to the Biblical Faith. With the majority of the world's Christians, I also believe that the Gospel has implications for our life in the world and for how society is ordered. The prophetic task of the Church is to be critical of all societies - East and West. The statements in the article that I am 'a tireless traveller to Eastern Europe' is an example of the misleading half truths sometimes used. As Secretary of the Council I travel frequently throughout Europe, East and West and in the United States and occasionally on other continents. My visits to Eastern Europe are in no way out of proportion! Another half truth is the odd statement that while I was at Coventry Cathedral, 'Metropolitan Paulus Gregorios of the World Council of Churches Central Council was invited to a Conference on the Theme of Disarmament and Hunger'.

This is of course true - but he was only one of a host of people from all over the world and of a whole spectrum of political and religious opinions, invited to a whole series of Conferences at Coventry. They included Edward Heath, the American Ambassador and Willy Brandt. A good example this of the kind of selective reporting of facts in an attempt to prove a conspiracy!

The article is so hysterical in its final conclusions - 'the evidence on the Scottish situation is of a highly complex and intricately planned operation, executed by exponents of materialism within the churches, but controlled and initiated by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party' What evidence? Anyone who will believe that statement will believe anything! My surprise is that a responsible journal should print this kind of stuff, based on this kind of so called 'evidence'.

On the contrary there is plenty of evidence that our Council is deeply involved in the proclaiming of the Gospel in Scotland - through the Christian Enquiry Agency, through the Year of the Bible of which we are cosponsors and a whole variety of other ways. True we have also with all the main stream churches who are our members been at times critical of policies which seem to us to need Christian examination and judgement. If we are to obey the Bible in our proclaiming of the gospel for personal response, we must also obey the Bible in our prophetic task to apply the gospel to human society.

One last word - I am surprised that Mr Watson should launch an attack of this kind without even having the courtesy to speak to me about it. Many of his untruths and misunderstandings could have been set right in five minutes. Even now perhaps it is not too late - and I would invite him to meet me. We would, no doubt, have very different views on many things - but I think I could easily disabuse him of conspiracy theories and accusation of evil which seem to come perilously close to near-paranoia.

Canon Kenyon E. Wright
General Secretary
Scottish Churches Council
Scottish Churches House
Dunblane
FK15 0AJ

Roger Watson replies:
Canon Wright has, unfortunately, fallen into the same trap which he considers myself to have fallen, namely, that of selective quotation. Nevertheless, I was grateful to learn two points:

1. That the Conference of European Churches was more extensively planned than originally suspected.
2. That the Archbishop of Canterbury is a frequent visitor to Scottish Churches House. His involvement there would certainly explain his equivocal stance on many fundamental issues.

Only history will prove if Edward Heath, Willy Brandt and, indeed, the Archbishop of Canterbury, are conspirators (a term which does not appear in my article, and the use of which suggests a certain paranoia in the Canon). It is, however, heartening to see that the Canon tries to distance himself from Canon Oestreicher. This can only be to his advantage.

I would entirely agree that the 'prophetic task of the Church is to be critical of all societies - East and West' but, while the Canon's visits to Eastern Europe may not be 'out of proportion', his criticism of the West and apparent blindness to the true nature of Marxist communism most certainly are.

Dr Roger Watson
BM Box 1849
London WC1N 3XX

Sir,
May I comment on your article from last September's edition by Roger Watson called 'Subversive Theology', showing the subversive influence of the Soviet Front organisation 'The Christian Peace Conference' within the ecumenical movement in this country?

The British Council of Churches, when asked what happened to all the papers from the individual groups that were sent in to the BBC's 'Not Strangers but Pilgrims' Lent 86 programme (a million people took part), replied that the papers from the English groups and individuals went to Nottingham University and those from Scotland went into safe keeping at Scottish Churches House.

In the light of Dr Watson's showing that Scottish Churches House is in effect the HQ of the CPC in Scotland, is it not a matter of the most serious concern that this mass of information from Scotland should be given to a organisation closely connected with a Soviet Front? And should there not be an immediate enquiry to find out how this act of betrayal took place and who was responsible?

John Hubbard
London SE11

Sir,
Your publication (March, 1988) of the correspondence between Miss Nora Beloff and Mr Michael Lees, on the one hand, and the former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Armstrong, on the other, about my recent appointment to write the official history of the Special Operations Executive in wartime Yugoslavia has put me in an invidious position. No doubt this was the intention. It is impossible to defend a book which has not yet been written; and it is unseemly to protest one's innocence of bias and/or professional incompetence against accusers who know already what such a book should say and that I am not going to say it.

Self-defence has in this case been rendered more difficult by the decision to disregard Lord Armstrong's stipulation that the correspondence should appear in its entirety. Not only have some particularly choice bits of personal abuse been excised from Miss Beloff's first letter (of 14th April 1987), but her very silly appeal to Lord Annan to join her campaign on 9th September 1987 (copied to Lord Armstrong on 10th September) has been omitted completely.

Had the whole correspondence been published I should have been spared the need to reply. As it is, I must point out that such tampering with the 'evidence' comes ill from those who would presume to fear for the objectivity of my work. I only hope that other former British liaison officers, whether with the Četniks or the Partisans, will not be influenced by Miss Beloff's obvious effort to poison the wellsprings of their cooperation. Given the nature both of the war in which they fought and of the surviving SOE archive, their help will be essential if a fair and comprehensive account is eventually to be produced.

M.C. Wheeler
School of Slavonic and East
European Studies
University of London

Sir,
I read with much interest the piece by Lord Harris entitled 'The Politics of Compassion' in *The Salisbury Review*, March 1988. As the Conservative opposition spokesman for finance on Lambeth Council, I have been witness to this *politicisation* of compassion and the appalling consequences to which it leads. The antics of the left in Lambeth show just how false the notion of 'socialist care' really is, and how wasteful socialism can be in practice.

The London Borough of Lambeth is a depressed part of London where public funds from the tax and ratepayer are squandered in large amounts (in the forthcoming financial year, the Council will enjoy a revenue budget of £152.3 million), with little or no effect on the poor. Due to the continual mismanagement of successive Labour administrations, the borough currently has in excess of £30 million outstanding in uncollected rent and rates. As a result, the housing repairs budget is starved of funds and our houses fall into an increasing state of disrepair. To add to this, we have more than 2000 squatted properties and a further 1,750 standing empty.

The problems of Lambeth do not end here. The lack of basic financial accounting systems by the Council has led to serious qualifications of the Council's annual accounts by the District Auditor, and scope for corrupt practices to grow up. The Council's accounts for 1984-1985 contain £1.1 million unaccounted for in missing stores and equipment in the Directorate of Construction Services. The lack of financial discipline has meant that Council tenants have been overcharged by 300% on average for repairs by the Council's Direct Labour Organisation, according to a recent report. Attempts by Council officers to crack down on malpractice are thwarted by the direct intervention of Labour councillors on the side of the trade unions. This has resulted in a mass exodus of senior town hall staff leaving the Council's employ over the past 12 months, including the Directors of Town Planning, Finance, Social Services, Management Services and Construction Services.

Lord Harris refers to the politics of compassion as 'the indiscriminate buying of votes with other people's money' and Lambeth Council is proof of this. The experience of neighbouring Wandsworth shows there is another ideology on offer which must be pursued if there is to be hope for our inner cities and their ultimate revival.

Councillor Michael Keegan
London Borough of Lambeth
Town Hall
Brixton Hill SW2 1RW

Book Reviews

HOW NOT TO PROGRESS

Ray Honeyford

Out of Order: Affirmative Action and the Crisis of Doctrinaire Liberalism, Nicholas Capaldi, Prometheus Books, New York, 1985, 201pp. (0-87975-279-3).
Living Powers: the Arts in Education, Peter Abbs (Ed.), The Falmer Press, 1987, 227pp. (1-85000-168-5).
The GCSE: an Examination, Joanna North (Ed.), The Claridge Press, 1987, 276pp. £6.50, (1-870626-10-9).
The Reform of British Education, The Hillgate Group, The Claridge Press, 1987, £2.95, (1-8780626-20-6).
Power to the Parents: Reversing Educational Decline, Anthony Flew, Sherwood Press, 1987, 171pp. £6.95, (0-907671-32-2).

These books explore three themes: the destructive effect of doctrinaire liberalism in politics, the futility of modernism in the Arts, and the failure of progressivism in education. They each, in their different ways, insist we have lost our way. They condemn the 'society as a machine' model insistently propagated by 'social scientists', and expose as flawed that simple minded dragon of historicism which we all thought, wrongly, that Karl Popper had finally slain. Each suggests that a basic failure in the progressive, liberal outlook is the belief that the present and future are all, and that we have liberated ourselves from the past, tradition is dead, and we have come of age in a new world divested of the dead wood of history. Only a tiny, but immensely influential group of Western intellectuals has ever believed this. The vast majority of people throughout the ages have understood time as a continuous process, with present and future indissolubly linked to the past. By killing tradition, and sneering at the dead, progressive thinkers have created despair, alienation and confusion. And they may well have sown the seeds of totalitarianism. Each of the books under review is grounded in a phenomenon progressives and authoritarian liberals have taken as their battleground - education. If the established is to be destroyed, what better place to start than with those to whom the guardians are bound to transmit our ancient truths, the young? What better way to break the link in the chain?

Nicholas Capaldi takes a highly critical look at the effects of doctrinaire liberalism, and its commitment to affirmative action as the desired 'solution' to racial inequalities, on universities in the USA. He is unequivocal in his judgement, '... affirmative action very nearly destroyed the university as a viable, independent institution.' By imposing the alien doctrine of racial statistical equality in student admissions on an institution committed to the pursuit of individual excellence, the anti-racist bureaucracy from without, and the 'social scientists' from within the university, embroiled American higher education in a bitter and sustained conflict. Far from improving things, affirmative action worsened the problems of providing racial equality, '... it has created a new moral dilemma in the form of reverse discrimination. The problems remain unsolved, and we have less of a consensus now than we used to on how even to define those problems.'

The insidious and all-pervasive influence on American life of doctrinaire liberalism is shown to be the seed-bed of affirmative action, whose operations have not only failed in their ostensible purposes, but have also seriously distorted key relationships in the American political process. By creating a huge public bureaucracy, the liberal establishment - not least Presidents Johnson and Carter, and Vice President Humphrey - have given birth to an executive which not only dictates to the legislature, but systematically perverts the judicial process, '... affirmative action is a total bureaucratic distortion of the original legislative act (Civil Rights Act, 1964) and subsequent court decisions.' Professor Capaldi, a philosopher, documents this charge in formidable, and wholly convincing, detail. A crucial factor in this processs has been the willingness of 'social scientists' to generate dubious theories about oppression, equality and social structure. It is they, with their bogus scholarship and university status, who have sanctified unquestioning liberalism, and handed opportunist politicians the means of justifying policies deeply at variance with the American experience. For the ideas of individual rights and of the need to achieve success through hard work and merit have been substituted the outlandish and unworkable doctrines of 'group entitlement' and statistical equality of results.

The links between the bureaucratic-academic complex and the Federal executive have been strengthened by the outcome of a dispute in the field of jurisprudence. This dispute may be summarised in the question: Is law what judges say it is, or is it what the law-makers in the legislature say it is? In the battle between the legal positivists, Austin and Hart, and the so-called American realists, Holmes, Cardozo and Pound, it is the latter, with their commitment to the supremacy of the judiciary, who have won the day. This shift in the tradition of common law is revolutionary, according to Professor Capaldi, in its implications for social policy. It encourages the judges to consider the consequences of their decisions as proposed by the 'social scientists'.

In this new dispensation law becomes an instrument not so much for settling disputes in relation to due process as for social engineering. The author calls this 'the hidden teleology of liberalism'. Judges are thereby inescapably vulnerable to ideological pressure from the media and the university. Affirmative action is one result of this development.

It is difficult to know whether our own problems in the law regarding ethnic minorities are the outcome of this sort of thing, or whether we are in our present confused state owing to the appallingly slack wording of the 1976 Race Relations Act, with its deeply ambivalent definitions of the term 'race', and its capacity, as the Commission for Racial Equality has gleefully discovered, for endless interpretation and proliferation. Certainly the dispute between the Court of Appeal and the Law Lords regarding the schoolboy who wore a turban in defiance of school rules was a clear indication of the need for clearer thinking by Parliament.

But of the influence of American liberalism on the direct dealings of the House of Commons with our racial minorities there can be no doubt. The notion of contract compliance has been accepted, and the Secretary of State for Employment recently urged local authorities to make greater use of clauses 35 and 36 of the Act, which permit favoured treatment of minorities in the field of training and 'welfare'. Moreover we have developed the same publicly-funded race relations lobby as the Americans, and we have precisely the same academic establishment with its theorising about 'racial justice.' Expenditure under section 11 of the Local Government Act, 1966, which makes grants available to any local authority with 2% or more ethnic minority citizens, is now running at the rate of £102 million per annum. And the multicultural and anti-racist doctrines of the Swann Committee are now being relentlessly implemented in the state education service - despite devastating criticisms both of the Committee's proceedings and of its recommendations. The expansion of the anti-racist bureaucracy now seems as assured in this country as in the States.

If only our legislators were to listen to the likes of Professor Capaldi! They would then understand the deeply flawed and intellectually dishonest explanation of ethnic minority progress proposed by the anti-racist lobby. Professor Capaldi is brave enough to insist that the key factor in determining a minority group's progress in free societies is not 'historic oppression', but current cultural values, particularly in relation to the family. He quotes work produced in the 60s and 70s which showed decisive links between black problems and illegitimacy, female domination, increased welfare dependency - which undermines the work ethic, and the self-chosen unwillingness to plan for the future. He insists on self help as the only viable solution, '... there does not seem to be a really oppressed group who cannot either individually or collectively negotiate on their own behalf.' Anyone who has had lengthy contact with the ethnic minorities here knows that is undoubtedly the case in this country. And the author is wise enough to point to the only solution to problems created by doctrinaire liberalism: a reinstatement of traditional ways of looking at the structure of society, the nature of man, and the problem of values. We must reject the dominant, modernist concept of social ideals based on a mythical blueprint, or as being deducible from first principles. Our values are implicit in our history - not least in the notion of precedent, and in the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence which has been built on it.

The key question raised by a book like this is: Can we learn from the American experience? That we ought to - and fast - is made clear by Professor Capaldi's sombre conclusion. By replacing our traditional concern for the individual with client group politics we are forced to classify groups by race, as the Nazis did, and so to plant the seeds of racial conflict, and to establish a corporative state as arbiter of that conflict and purveyor of 'solutions'; hence '... the politics of affirmative action bears a distinct analogy to the politics of fascism.' We would do well to heed the author's warning. He is not the first brave American to teach us such lessons.

The importance of respecting the past is also apparent in Peter Abbs's book. This is a collection of essays commenting on the state of play in the teaching of English, Music, Film, Dance, Drama and the visual arts. The general message is that the twin forces of modernism and progressivism have combined, to disastrous effect. Ezra Pound's, 'Make it new', and Rousseau's romantic view of childhood and the need for permissive education, summed up in his, 'Reading is the greatest plague of childhood... the chief cause of unhappiness' - these conceptions have been pernicious both in art and education.

In art Mr Abbs maintains that, though the early modernists such as Picasso, Matisse, Derain, Rouault and Chagall were genuine innovators, the post-1940s generation (Warhol, Oldenburg, Lichenstein in painting, John Cage in music, Robbe-Grillet and William Burroughs in the novel) was a generation of charlatans exploiting a market. The rejection of culture as a continuous process linking all aspects of time caused the modernists to assert the end of tradition. All that mattered was iconoclasm and perpetual experimentation. Art came to justify itself, not in its own proper terms, i.e. aesthetically, but simply as a reflection of some supposed historical inevitability. People were encouraged to judge art, not in qualitative terms at all. All that mattered was: 'Is it contemporary?' Modern art was superior to all previous art simply because it was modern.

This temporal provincialism created acute cultural isolation. Art became, not a means of giving expression to our deepest feelings and aspirations, of creating meaning out of the chaos, of sharing an individual vision, but a weird, alien mish-mash created by those who inhabited a closed, esoteric world from which real people were excluded. Or it sought to express collectivist ideology. The author quotes John Berger's revealing

remark about the viewing of paintings, 'How do these works help men and women to know, and to claim their social rights?' Mr Abbs suggests this phase in the history of art is now over. I beg to differ. A visitor to last year's Royal Academy exhibition, 'British Art in the Twentieth Century,' could not fail to deduce that modernist fakes are still being produced, and are still being honoured by space in our most distinguished galleries.

In education, not least in the teaching of English, the rejection of form, of convention, and of the disciplined acquisition of the means of written expression - this has had equally deleterious consequences.

The teacher has been miscast in the role of psychological observer, rather than that of custodian and effective transmitter of an established culture. One result has been outpourings of semi-literate rubbish in the name of 'creative writing'. Rousseau and his acolytes - Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel, Montessori, A. S. Neil - have much to answer for. By projecting their own lack of understanding of history and tradition; by adopting a romantic and sentimental view of the child as the harbinger of the 'natural man'; and by insisting on the entirely fallacious distinction between feelings and intellect - these influential progressives have wrought havoc. They provide a perfect example of the way in which those with impeccable intentions are misled by a lack of understanding of their real motives, to quite deadly effect.

However, the remedy proposed by Mr Abbs and his contributors, sounds almost as repugnant as the disease. The way forward, it seems, is to link all the arts subjects together in some sort of 'aesthetic field'. There are to be 'complex dynamic movements' between the various processes involved in the making and revealing of creative artefacts. Is this not precisely that empty theorising which has made the teacher's job so problematic? I, and certainly the vast majority of parents, would be happy if the teacher conveyed his subject effectively to his pupils. The gap between the authors' convincing analysis of causes and the proposed solution might be explained by the editor's current position. He is a self-confessed progressivist manqué, and now realises his former position cannot be defended. But he has not quite taken the decisive step. Whilst he owns that he is a 'conservationist', he vigorously rejects any suggestion that he could be that dreaded thing, a 'conservative', even less a despised 'elitist'. His analysis, however, suggests that he is almost certainly both. Perhaps disillusioned modernists and progressives need to get together with homosexuals to discover how best to 'come out'.

There is no such equivocation about the contributors to Joanna North's book. They have considered both the philosophy and the practical implications of the new GCSE examination, and they have no hesitation in condemning it. They detect a lack of rigour, and a levelling down. They also point tellingly to great confusion about how specific subjects should be conceptualised amongst those who have drawn up the new syllabuses. And they suspect the dead hand of egalitarianism, with its desperate attempts to deny the blindingly obvious fact that some children are cleverer than others. Gisela M'Caw, who teaches modern languages, hits the nail firmly on the head. The new examination, she says, is, '... at best inadequate, and at worst utterly destructive of adequate language teaching ... for little, if any, account is taken of variants in the level of pupils' intelligence.'

I believe the GCSE suffers from two obvious and disabling contradictions. First it proclaims itself to be the same test for all, whilst implicitly accepting, in some subjects at least, intellectual variations by supplying different examination papers. By their dishonest trick the GCSE reproduces the differences between the old GCE and CSE, whilst endeavouring to conceal the fact. Alternatively, it sets the same paper for all candidates, whilst making the questions progressively harder - which will encourage mediocrity, since teacher and examiner (often the same person) will aim at the average candidate to make sure there is something for everyone. Moreover, the massive emphasis on course work and 'projects' will tend to undermine the integrity of the subject. Instead of respecting the established definition of what constitutes history, for instance, teachers will be able to invent virtually any definition they wish. Just as bad, since huge proportions of the marks will be awarded for non-examination work assessed by the teacher, the principle of independent judgement of candidates will be violated. The teacher will become judge and jury in his own case. How standards can be maintained under these circumstances, and how public respect can be created, no one appears to have considered.

All this, of course, leaves every opportunity for politicising of education. Since, as Professor O'Hear avers, the GCSE is, '... a more of less wholesale abandonment of the idea of education as an initiaition into existing forms of worthwhile knowledge and understanding', and the new emphasis is on goals, relevance and skills, the way is now open for systematic ideological opportunism. The one hopeful possibility is that the whole misguided experiment will grind to a halt owing to the massive work load being foisted on to teachers in assessing course work and 'projects'. The last thing teachers will have time for will be teaching. In the meantime the existing O-level examination should be retained for those who believe education is about the pursuit of excellence, and in order to act as a standard against which the GCSE can be measured. (If overseas candidates can continue with GCE, why not home-grown entrants?)

The really frightening thing about this latest exercise in folly is the threat it inevitably poses to the integrity and standard of A-level - as Fred Naylor has already clearly pointed out. The Committee of Vice Chancellors has acknowledged this, and there is talk of the need for remedial work in the universities and a four year degree course. If the gadarene rush of the egalitarians who dominate the state education service is to be

halted, there is an urgent need to educate both government and public. The authors of this book have made a valuable start.

And who better to join them in the enterprise than The Hillgate Group? This group, who for many years have been crying in the wilderness, are beginning to see some of their ideas come to fruition. Caroline Cox, John Marks, Roger Scruton, Laurie Norcross and Jessica Douglas-Home have consistently argued that the only way to stop the rot is to make all schools genuinely independent. The huge state machine consisting of the interlocking vested interests of the teacher unions, the politicians and bureaucrats of the local education authorities, and the civil servants at the Department of Education and Science must be challenged and overcome. The decision to abolish the Inner London Education Authority at a stroke is some evidence that, at long last, the politicians are acquiring the necessary courage. The next and vital step is to devolve the management and financing of schools to the local level. Education must become, not a supply-based, but a consumer-oriented service. The opting-out clause in the Education Reform Bill now before Parliament is a step in the right direction. By giving schools and parents the real power, the slide to mediocrity in the name of 'relevance' can be halted, and replaced by the pursuit of ideals and achievement and the rewarding of merit.

The authors believe, correctly in my view, that the twin slogans of 'relevance' and 'multiculturalism' must be exposed as the enemies of real education. The first is based on the fallacious assumption that those who have not yet mastered a subject are fit and proper people to assess its value. The second bids fair to creating a society divided by factionalism, and depriving children, whatever their background, of access to this country's rich cultural heritage. The Group advises great scepticism about the deeply flawed Swann Report on the education of ethnic minority children, and stress the need, in our increasingly multifarious society, for integration and the forging of a common political loyalty.

This publication is valuable, not only for its concise analysis of our educational woes, and constructive suggestions for improving things; it is valuable, too, for the way in which it extends the debate surrounding Mr Baker's reforms. It predictably condemns the GCSE, but also indicates a possible escape route - the withdrawal of the clause in the educational bill which gives the minister the power to dictate to schools the examinations they may take. Though the authors approve in principle the idea of a national curriculum, they acknowledge its centralising tendency and possibly narrowing effect, and suggest that genuine innovation should be given statutory support. (Clause 9 goes some way towards this.) They also make the valid point that, providing there is concentration on attainment, assessment and the publication of results, the actual programmes of study for the national curriculum can be developed slowly and in the light of experience. The authors roundly condemn one of the great sustaining fallacies of the educational progressives - that the teacher cannot work imaginatively and prepare pupils for examinations. The good teacher, of course, has always been able to do both. (Conservatives need urgently to debunk Wackford Squeers, whose commitment to excessive and mindless rote learning has supplied progressives with their most powerful myth.) In addition to the provisions regarding opting-out and financial devolution to the schools, there should also be provision for independent schools to opt in. Why should schools of proven worth worth be denied government assistance just because they have been brave enough to go it alone - often in the face of great difficulty? And why should the parents concerned go on paying twice for their children's education, in the form of fees *and* taxes?

And why, indeed, should the power to opt out be reserved to schools with a minimum of three hundred pupils? Cannot a school with 299, or 199, or 20, or 10 children be successful? With the kind of flexibility possible with school-based finance, the problems of providing a range of subjects can be overcome - not least, as the authors point out, by exploiting the new provision regarding the employment of competent, but unqualified teachers. Ultimately the authors would like to see pupil entitlement, e.g. the voucher, so that the parent would have the real power, and the distinction between rich and poor in the matter of their children's education abolished - a move towards greater flexibility which, inexplicably, socialists fiercely oppose.

There is currently a massive disinformation campaign aimed at rubbishing the Education Reform Bill. The vested interests, fearful of the loss of their hitherto unquestioned hegemony, are predictably marshalling their forces and seeking to persuade the public, particularly parents, that the reforms are not a great opportunity for improvement, but a threat to both teachers and children. I know of two schools where children have been required to take home anti-government propaganda. One of these has transmitted material produced by perhaps the best known state education pressure group, CASE. This characterises Mr Baker's aims as, ... 'dangerous and ill-conceived... dictatorial, divisive and racially inflammatory'. One wonders if the school concerned would be as willing to send home anti-defence propaganda produced by CND. It is little wonder that The Hillgate Group recommend that there should be vigorous campaign informing parents how to opt out. If only The Hillgate Group had the sort of resources enjoyed by the National Union of Teachers!

'*Power to the Parents*' is Antony Flew at his pugnacious best. He castigates Peace Studies as the attempt to instil in children the virtues of 'policies for impotent defencelessness', rounds upon the 'bureaucratic-education complex', particularly the NUT, which has created the current malaise, demolishes those whose 'complacent effrontery' challenges the need for objective assessment of pupil progress, and mercilessly mocks

those muddle-headed egalitarians whose desperate attempts to deny the obvious has so damaged the chances of those who need sound education most. The social and political aims of the comprehensive school are exposed as a sham: there were fewer working class students in our universities in 1985 than in 1935. And Anthony Crosland's notorious Circular 10/65, which effectively compelled LEAs to go comprehensive, and which reflected a high-sounding resolution of a Labour-dominated House of Commons calling for a national effort to 'raise standards' - is revealed as the expression of an obsessive hatred of academic excellence. Professor Flew exposes Crosland's real aim with a chilling quotation from his widow's biography, 'If it's the last thing I do, I'm going to destroy every f...... grammar school in England and Wales. And Northern Ireland.'

The author is particularly revealing about how the educational establishment seeks to suppress views or data which challenge received opinion. Beverly Shaw, a university don and author of the best book on comprehensive schooling (*Comprehensive Schools: The Impossible Dream*? Blackwell, 1983) was warned that he could damage his career by publishing a work which showed conclusively that the comprehensive notion was a failure in both theory and practice. Even more shocking was the concerted campaign of vilification aimed at the authors (John Marks and Caroline Cox) of *Standards in English Schools*. This had shown, on the basis of the best sample of schools and LEAs ever investigated, that selection was as closely associated with academic results as social class. This was not to the liking of the pro-comprehensive power structure. A reaction of extraordinary venom ensued, including erroneous, and subsequently retracted, criticisms from high level civil servants at the DES. Antony Flew documents this campaign in convincing and chilling detail. There is surely nowhere a more telling indictment of the folly of basing a state education service on supply-grounded monopoly powers subserving vested interests.

Professor Flew's solution is the same as that of The Hillgate Group - a shift to consumer-led demand based on variation in provision, and management and finance established at school level. Ultimately, parents must be relieved of the constraining effect of lack of purchasing power on their right to choose the education they feel best for their children. The voucher system would achieve this.

It is worth saying that the author, a philosopher, not only presents his arguments with compelling clarity (there is no better exposure of the conceptual inadequacies of Peace Studies in print), he also happens to write in scintillating English prose. His periodic sentences are at times positively Johnsonian. And in the vigorous and exquisite scouring of his opponents he can be extremely funny. This book is not only a closely argued critique of received opinion. It is a great pleasure to read.

Collectively, these publications provide the ground for educational hope and improvement. Let us hope the politicians now have the courage to do what is necessary.

THE GRAND OLD MAN
S. J. D. Green

Salisbury: The Man and his Policies, Edited by Lord Blake and Hugh Cecil, Macmillan, 298pp, £29.50, (0-333-36876-2).

There is no modern scholarly biography of Robert Cecil, Third Marquess of Salisbury. It is customary to lament this striking gap in historical literature. Yet one wonders if the ritual vexation which often accompanies that observation is not misplaced. Lady Gwendolen Cecil's life, though incomplete, remains an acknowledged masterpiece, a tribute to familial piety, literary grace and historical wisdom. The manner of its composition and the style of its presentation ensure that it will never be superseded by any academic tome. Nor has modern scholarship either neglected or belittled Salisbury's life, thought and career. On the contrary: there is a penetrating study of his political philosophy in Paul Smith's introduction to *Lord Salisbury on Politics: A Selection from his Articles in the Quarterly Review 1860–1883*; an illuminating consideration of his Christianity in Maurice Cowling's *Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England, Volume 1*; and a masterly account of his imperial policy in Robinson and Gallagher's *Africa and the Victorians*. Numerous monographs detail other specific aspects of his career well enough. It is not clear that a new biography, however well researched and considered, would necessarily facilitate a fuller understanding of those aspects of his influence and significance - particularly upon the organization of the Conservative Party as an electoral machine in province and suburb between 1880 and 1900 - where knowledge remains sketchy and inadequate. It is even less certain that a chronolgical narrative could relate the clarities of Salisbury's philosophical doctrine to the complexities of his political actions in any way as to render either other then merely leaden.

In attempting a modern evaluation of Salisbury's thought and career, there is much, therefore, to be said for specific studies presented in discrete essay form. *Salisbury: The Man and his Policies*, edited by Lord Blake and Hugh Cecil, is a collection of ten new studies by various authors which presents new research and offers fresh insights on a number of previously neglected or minimally understood aspects of his life without pretending either to a worthless comprehension or a bogus unity. The book benefits greatly from the modesty of its professed ambition. Every essay is worth reading. None is a dud. A few are gems, repaying careful consideration and reflection. Chapter Three, 'Lord Salisbury in Private Life', a previously unpublished essay by Lady Gwendolen Cecil firmly establishes the full range of his reading in history and his grasp both of contemporary theology and science. E. D. Steele in Chapter Eight, 'Salisbury and the Church' demonstrates just how that scientific knowledge made him

more, not less, hostile to atheism, and gave spiritual sustenance to his sociological insight that only the influence of religion would alleviate the tensions of an industrial and urban society. The priority he accorded to, and moderation he proceeded with, his ecclesiastical policies, bore witness to the seriousness with which he allied a pessimistic conservatism to the hope of other-worldly renewal. There is also an excellent chapter on 'Salisbury and the Unionist Alliance' (Chapter Nine) by Dr John France which reverses many scholarly orthodoxies about the relationship between the Tory party and the Unionists in the crucial years of fusion and offers empirical substance to Salisbury's own reluctant admission that 'Compromise is the very essence of English politics', a banal observation he would not have advanced in abstract agrument, but also a mundane truth which he exploited with much élan in the years of his pre-eminence.

The whole of the book adds up to something more than its parts. It is a fascinating and provocative volume which will stimulate intelligent thought about a figure whom all (or almost all) self-consciously conservative intellectuals claim to admire and yet whom few would emulate, and with whom fewer still, perhaps, can now seriously empathise, much as they might wish to do so. The tone of most of the essays emphasises his ability to compromise, to change tack, even simply to wait. Perhaps this is simply no more than to offer proof that this form of political wisdom is not the sole preserve of the self-proclaimed guardians of pompous moderation. It can be the tactic of the intelligently principled. Principle ruled Salisbury even in the depths of intrigue. As an aristocrat, a conservative and a pessimist, he opposed much of the modern world, certainly its predatory egalitarianism, its flatulent progressivism and its vacuous optimism. Despite his scepticism about the effects of political action, he was able, to a remarkable degree, to resist its dreaded inertia with its own tools. His achievement was very considerable, conceived even as a mere series of political manoeuvres. As Dr France remarks, he presided over 'the transformation of the Conservative Party into a party of government'. But there was a price to pay for this success of which he was all too aware. The politics of democracy, even when steered away from the chimera of equality, did something more merely than to ensure that 'Power is more and more leaving Parliament and going to the platform'. They ensured that political power would be transferred to electoral machines, those cold monsters which eventually destroyed not only the mid-nineteenth century liberal ideal of an educated and informed laity capable of informed judgement on important issues, but also the conservative image of a landed, gentlemanly class, ruling in the interests of all. 'Tory Democracy', a slogan which Salisbury despised as a half-baked idea unworthy of the respect of an honest man, had, in fact, become as much of a reality as the 'welfare state'. It has also achieved much of its purpose. Since 1884, the 'party of privilege' has won more than fifty per cent of *all* seats contested in Great Britain. That electoral success, more than any other single factor, has ensured the preservation of an unequal distribution of property, power and prestige in the polity. The rhetoric of resistance to socialism has changed since Salisbury's time. 'Christian civilisation' has given way to a civilising empire, a united nation, now even an opportunity society. But the object remains the same. Salisbury realized this. Because he perceived the central problem of modern society to be the threat posed to a social structure of unequal property by secular liberal radicalism and working-class enfranchisement, he never mouthed the cant of 'democracy' which ignores, or affects to ignore, its own class basis. Because he understood the threat in analytical class terms he conceived of resistance to socialism in terms of a stake in the nation. That stake was private property, be it ever so small. The point of conservatism was, and is, to defend it. However distant the modern Conservative Party may be from his mentality, however embarrassed it might be to spell out the sociological implications of its existence and purpose which he identified so clearly and so unambiguously, and for which he compromised not one whit in his political posturing, it ignores the truth at its peril.

TOO ACADEMIC BY HALF

Alun Chalfont

Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution, Noel O'Sullivan (Ed.) Wheatsheaf Books, 1986, 232pp, (0-7450-0057-6).

The appearance of a volume on terrorism edited by a lecturer in Politics at Hull University and consisting entirely of contributions from other lecturers at provincial centres of learning is unlikely, it might be thought, to be the signal for unruly assaults upon the bookshops. This collection of essays exhibits many of the depressing characteristics of the academic approach to contemporary phenomena of violence. It appears to proceed from a collective assumption by the writers that no problem has been seriously analysed until the pedagogic intellect has been brought to bear upon it.

One of the contributors informs us reassuringly that, although terrorism has come to be regarded as a major menace by governments, help is at hand, for 'among the academic community of social scientists and others, it has come to be regarded as a subject meriting serious study'. The first step in this process is, inevitably, to define terrorism. Five of the ten contributors to this work offer their own definitions, all substantially different, much as though a man being sent into the jungle to shoot a tiger were given several alternative descriptions of what the animal might look like.

There is, too, a suggestion that all this pursuit of semantic precision, much embellished by words like 'normative' and 'catalytic', is uniquely illuminating. The opening sentence of the first chapter, written by

the Editor, prepares the reader for the enlightenment to come. 'The contemporary study of terrorism,' he writes, 'is marked principally by continuing confusion about its general significance for modern political life, and in particular about its relationship to the democratic state;' and later Charles Townshend remarks severely that 'there has been some very loose thinking about "terrorism as theatre"'.

If this formidable array of academics had swept away the confusion which they deplore and brought the era of loose thinking to an end, they would have earned the profound gratitude of those whose task it is to come to grips with the problems of political violence. There are, it is true, some valuable insights, especially into the historical roots of terrorism; there are also some extremely dubious assumptions and one or two quite bizarre conclusions.

In his opening essay Noel O'Sullivan refers somewhat surprisingly to 'the long history of tyrannicide upon which the Western world has prided itself since at least the time when Brutus murdered Julius Caesar'; and goes on to advance the proposition, evidently derived from 'thinkers like Sanguinetti', that the modern state is actually *strengthened* by terrorism; but that any growth of state power brought about in this way is likely to undermine the rule of law and the security of civil liberties. 'It means in particular', Mr O'Sullivan believes 'the appearance of "emergency laws" and "emergency powers" whose dangerous implications rapidly became evident in West Germany, for example, in the aftermath of the Baader-Meinhof trials'.

The unspoken implication that it was the emergency powers - encased in the eloquent quotation marks of the sceptical academic - and not the Baader-Meinhof terrorists who posed the danger to society, sets out the agenda for this collection of essays, the tone of which is foreshadowed by the magisterial dismissal in the preface of the theory that international terrorism might actually be a conspiracy against liberal democracy. A leader in *The Times* modestly suggesting that Moscow might be the moving force behind the terror network is condemned as journalistic oversimplification. 'Scholars', it is asserted, 'rightly dismiss such purported explanations with a smile'.

Mr O'Sullivan will, one hopes, not be too downcast to learn that some of the theories advanced in this book by these same scholars are likely to be greeted by those with practical experience of terrorism not merely with a smile but with an occasional outburst of incredulous laughter. Are we really expected to take entirely seriously the definition of terrorism (yet another) advanced by Peter Calvert in his essay on 'Terror in the Theory of Revolution'. 'Terror,' he asks us to believe 'is the systematic use of fear in revolutionary circumstances to aid the establishment of a new government'. Is that really what the violence of Islamic fundamentalism means? Or the activities of the exiled Italian *brigatisti* in Paris?

What is to be made of Charles Townshend's assertion that it is 'an important fact that "terrorist" is now an epithet used by governments to illegitimise their opponents'? Or his bald assertion that 'the facile assumption that modern mass media increase the impact of terrorism certainly does not bear scrutiny'? Mr Townshend, it seems, believes that the 'reassuring banality' of the mass media might actually reduce rather than heighten public alarm. Mrs Thatcher's description of media treatment of terrorism as the oxygen of publicity is disdainfully rejected as 'a showy phrase'.

Much of this collection of essays seems to be concerned to cast doubts upon many of the commonsense ideas about the phenomenon of terrorism which have been developed over the years by a broad spectrum of professionals closely involved in formulating methods of defeating the practitioners of political violence. If the test of a serious analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism is that it should provide a basis upon which the terrorist can be contained or defeated, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that these essays fall some way short of success.

There is, however, one redeeming feature. The final contribution, by Professor Paul Wilkinson, is a refreshingly cool assessment, combining some penetrating intellectual insights with an admirably practical approach. Although he cannot resist yet another definition of terrorism, his is at least logical and serviceable. He identifies some of the reasons why the international community has so far had little success in dealing with what he robustly describes as 'the problem of international terrorism'. One of these, he believes, is the obstructive attitude of the 'terror states'. The Soviet Union and its communist allies, says Professor Wilkinson, regard international terrorism as a vital tool of their foreign policy. Asking the Russians to join in collective action against international terrorism would be, he concludes, like inviting a Mafia chief to take control of the police force.

THE ANARCHY OF INTERPRETATIONS

David J. Levy

Hermeneutics as Politics, Stanley Rosen, Oxford University Press, pp.213, £22.50 (0-19-504908-X).

In a characteristically vigorous, if undiscriminating polemic published in these pages (*The Salisbury Review*, September 1987), Murray Rothbard attacked what he called 'the hermeneutical invasion of philosophy and economics'; blaming hermeneutics for the nihilistic destruction of all possible grounds for making a justifiable claim to knowledge. Gadamer and Derrida were lumped together in a general assault on the tradition I have described above. Given the nature of the present Derrida cult in the United States and the sort of self-confirming nonsense that its devotees have committed in the name of 'literary theory', as well as

the one-sided way in which Gadamer has been appropriated by enthusiastic trans-Atlantic 'disciples' who lack both his knowledge of classical philosophy and his Platonic devotion to the pursuit of truth, I can only suppose that Rothbard's characterisation of self-styled 'hermenutical' economists is near enough the mark. But, as the editor pointed out in the same issue, though a libertarian like Professor Rothbard may seem to bypass the complexities of the hermeneutic problem by appealing to the self-interested choices of his imagined rational and atomistic individual, the conservative with his respect for tradition and his hope 'for a meaning that is not self-created and yet fit to be obeyed' can hardly do the same. 'In some sense of that tricky word', Roger Scruton wrote, 'the task of conservatism is hermeneutical.' Stanley Rosen's *Hermeneutics as Politics* goes some way toward answering the question of what sense that may be.

Professor Rosen's book stands in direct line of succession to his remarkable study *Nihilism* (Yale U.P., 1969). One of the virtues of that volume was the way in which Rosen, a philosopher formed in the classically oriented school of Leo Strauss, was able to show that the traditions of linguistically-oriented analytical philosophy and of Heideggerian existentialism tend to lead to the same nihilistic conclusions. In both, the work of reason is divorced from the quest for the good, and the sphere of language, in which, perforce, philosophy lives and moves and has its being, tends to be seen as self-sufficient, rather than, as in Greek thought, the articulation of a pre-linguistic experience of being.

Nearly twenty years on, the foundation of Rosen's opposition to the latest convoluton of the modern philosophical mind - a 'post-modernist' philosophy which deludedly believes itself to be something other than yet another variation on Enlightenment themes - lies in his unshakable attachment to the Platonic and Aristotelian position, already rejected by Kant, that philosophical discourse, if it is not to be empty talk, must articulate a truth which is originally and ultimately intuited or seen. Even Leo Strauss' philosophical classicism and his related political conservatism are seen by Rosen as compromised by his acceptence of the Platonic position as an assumption or hypothesis and thus as something chosen or willed. Strauss' conception of political philosophy, so influential on American intellectual conservatives, may seem to be classical but, as Rosen contends, the grounds on which he adopts his premise are thoroughly modern and even, as resulting from a choice of his own will, Nietzschean. Strauss speaks eloquently of philosophy as 'awareness of the fundamental problems and therewith, of the fundamental alternatives regarding their solution that are coeval with human thought.' But whereas for Plato such a position flows compellingly from intuition of the eternal, divine order of the cosmos, in Strauss' case it is a congenial hypothesis adopted in conscious opposition to what he sees as the politically disastrous effects of modern historicism.

'The popularity of hermeneutics in our own time' Rosen writes, 'is ... a mark of singular political as well as theoretical importance. It is a sign not of our greater understanding but of the fact that we have lost our way, that we understand nothing, except to the extent that we adopt rules and principles, which, however, must themselves be supported by an interpretation that hangs in the void.' Similarly he remarks provocatively that 'modern liberal democracies are the result of the *failure*, not the success, of the Enlightenment.' Liberalism is intellectually possible, and even politically necessary, because, in the absence of the compelling intuition of divine truth, the constitutional sanctification of debate is preferable to an alternative which could only entail the pretence, essential to modern ideological states, that one or another human interpretation embodies absolute truth. The problem is ultimately theological. As such it may be mitigated but not, by human hands, resolved.

In politics debate is endless. In philosophy too what Paul Ricoeur calls the 'conflict of interpretations' will and should continue. What needs to be overcome is not hermeneutics as such but the obsession with language which leads to the superstition that we can never penetrate beyond the linguistic framework and that therefore our pretended understanding of the world is nothing but 'the dance of signifiers in the ballroom of our semantical imagination'. As Rosen shows, different theories of interpretation reflect different political preferences and strategies. Strauss' postulated, and therefore inauthentic, Platonism provides the intellectual legitimation for his conservative opposition to modern ideological politics, just as Rorty's interpretive pluralism, which rules out only the claim to have established truth, reflects the liberal ideal of a political conversation untroubled by awkward claims to know anything except in the most provisional way. Rosen, in affirming the primacy of our admittedly limited knowledge of the world over its linguistic expressions, reintroduces the inescapable evidence of reality as the measure of interpretation. There is more to experience than language and, once this is admitted, the interpretive dimensions of politics and philosophy alike may be redeemed from the anarchy that threatens to engulf them.

CONSERVING THE FAITH

Roger Watson

The Voice of Christian Affirmation, Avril Smith (ed.), Christian Heritage Publications, 1987, £3.00 (0-9512438-0-2).

As an ecumenial venture, the Christian Affirmation

Campaign departs radically from the trend which has been set by the majority of contemporary interdenominational movements. When studied in any depth, bodies such as the British Council of Churches and its 'big brother' the World Council of Churches, can be clearly seen to be engaged in destroying the Christian faith and subverting the temporal order. The significance of the Christian Affirmation Campaign can be measured against this backdrop and also by the fact that the British Council of Churches has found it necessary to send representation 'incognito' to monitor its activities (page 35). An equally valid gauge of its significance is the stature of many of the contributors, from seven mainstream Christian churches, to meetings of the Christian Affirmation Campaign since 1974. Thirteen of these contributions form the bulk of the material in *The Voice of Christian Affirmation.*

It has always been a strength of the leftward leaning liberal elements in the Christian churches that they could rely for support on kindred spirits in the political sphere, since their aims have increasingly become unashamedly political. Conversely, the sentimental 'Christian socialists' (if this is not a contradiction in terms!) have been masterfully exploited by the ideological left. On the other hand, relations at the conservative ends of the political and theological spectra have always been tentative. For example, the last truly conservative Pope, Saint Pius X, sympathised with the aims of the atheistic and nationalist *Action Française* but still signed a decree condemning the books of its leading exponent Charles Maurras. The Christian Affirmation Campaign is not a conservative politico-theological alliance and neither does it call for one, but it believes 'that in attempting to defend Christian civilisation it is necessary to reject those philosophies which are destroying it and this takes one into the political as well as the spiritual realm' (page 2).

Many well-meaning groups expound endlessly on the symptoms of the decline in Christian values and moral standards. The Christian Affirmation Campaign deals decisively with the root causes of decline and traces them historically, as in the contribution by the eminent Catholic writer Michael Davies; it also turns the spotlight on some of the current manifestations, such as the World Council of Churches.

It has been said of the ecumenical movement that it gets together, spiritually speaking, to believe 'precisely nothing'. Such is the compromise which is expected of participants. This tactic is deliberate on the part of the 'apparatchiks' of ecumenism, since they are prepared and ever willing to fill the void with Liberation Theology. 'Unity in Truth' (page 7) could be the motto of the Christian Affirmation Campaign and, as expressed recently in a traditional Catholic review, it is an outstanding example of an ecumenical movement of 'faithful Christians in defence of a common core of faith, morals and social teaching'. For anyone in any doubt about 'the truth' it is elucidated repeatedly in *The Voice of Christian Affirmation* from fascinating angles.

The fear of dogmatic expression of Christian truth is evident today. For instance, Professor Maurice Wiles, Chairman of the Church of England Archbishops' Doctrinal Commission, is quoted as saying 'There are no fixed criteria for the determination of theological truth and error' (page 5). The danger inherent in this thinking is explained by Maurice Cartledge: 'Just at this time, when the Church is suffering from ideological weakness, we are up against those who have a very definite belief structure' (page 16). Hamish Fraser, a convert from Communism to the Roman Catholic Church and vetern Secret Police officer in the Spanish Civil War, points out that 'wherever you get an ideology in conflict with faith you get this social modernism, and eventually the faith must give way or the anti-Christian ideology must give way; the two can't coexist for very long, one or other must give' (page 47). This should be ample warning to any Christian who is tempted by the wooing of the Marxists into cooperation. Their aim is clear. Likewise, in the words of Peter Beyerhaus: 'The pacemakers of the ecumenical movement are fascinated by a visionary concept which has taken possession of their thinking, their feeling and their action' (page 25). Of course, there are Christians who naively believe that Marxists have a role to play in creating Heaven on Earth. It is an unfortunate truth, however, that when you invite a Communist aboard to help out at the oars he has a remarkable ability for ending up at the tiller. This is exemplified by the great materialistic revolutions of history; the direction of the tiller is thereafter towards tyranny.

The considerations of the Christian Affirmation Campaign are wider than just the ecumenical movement. There is an excellent contribution on 'Sex, Secularism and the Christian Vision', which argues that 'Modesty is not the denial of sexuality but the refinement of it' (page 8). Ray Honeyford, no stranger to the pages of *The Salisbury Review*, tells movingly of the story behind his being hounded out of teaching by the activists of the Campaign for Racial Equality. He explains his genuine concern for pupils, of whatever racial origin, while unashamedly emphasising Western Christian values and the right and duty of educationists to promote them. By way of a summary the editor, Avril Smith, pays a sound tribute to the traditional teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. The demise, and indeed ignorance, of the authentic Social Teaching of the Church is much lamented by conservative Catholics. It may take an ecumenical venture such as the Christian Affirmation Campaign to draw the Roman Catholic Church to its senses on this issue. Smith comes to the conclusion that 'it is Socialism itself which is the great heresy of our time' (page 98).

The Christian Affirmation Campaign is a welcome beacon in the midst of 'ecumania'. Its sober, prophetic approach and lack of concern for worldly success should put this compilation into the armoury of every concerned Christian.

RE-INSTITUTIONALISING SOCIETY
Ian Crowther

Political Order, David J. Levy, Louisiana State University Press, 1988, pp.204, £21.40 (8071-1389-1).
In Search of Order, Eric Voegelin, Louisiana State University Press, 1987, pp.120, £14.20 (8071-1414-6).
Political Religions, Eric Voegelin, The Edwin Mellen Press (P.O. Box 450, Lewiston, New York 14092), 1986, $49.95 (0-88946-767-6).
The Political Theory of Eric Voegelin, Barry Cooper, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1986, pp.250, $49.95 (0-88946-771-4).

There is today no shortage of books to which conservatives can turn to buttress their case for a free market economy. Indeed it is ultimately thanks to such books, and the converts they have made, that credence may be given to the claim that 'we are all capitalists now'. But unless one belongs to what Ralph Harris has dubbed the 'full-frontal libertarian tendency', which Mrs Thatcher most assuredly does not, one cannot treat conservatism and uninhibited capitalism as though they were simply synonymous; the extent to which they are compatible will vary with the social and moral circumstances of the time. Freedom, including economic freedom, is always conditional upon its opposite. And the words of Edmund Burke apply as much to our economic as to any other type of behaviour: 'Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere, and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.' Businessmen need to take Burke's lesson to heart, if their particular freedoms are to be valued and respected. They need, in other words, to bring to the marketplace qualities from outside it; qualities moreover that have nothing essentially to do with it. The problem is, that in an atomistic, contractarian society, such qualities tend to be in short supply, principally because they lack institutional support and embodiment.

The whole emphasis of our culture is upon the 'self-made' man, as though we were somehow born into a social and moral vacuum. And this attitude is by no means confined to economic libertarians. If some 'Thatcherite' conservatives are dismissive of institutional constraints the better to provide elbow-room for thrusting entrepreneurs, the Left has its own reasons for celebrating the unfettered self. From Rousseau in the 18th century to Sartre and numberless others in our own, the dream of 'de-institutionalising society' has been central to revolutionary ideology. Indeed, it is sometimes forgotten that the Marxian 'dictatorship of the proletariat' is intended only as a prelude to the 'withering away' of the state and the establishment of 'the true realm of freedom'. The appeal of communism resides not in its oppressive practice but in its promise of an emancipatory future. While there are of course real distinctions between the economic individualism of the Right and the radical individualism of the Left, both attitudes have their origin in the same Enlightenment idea that men are best left to their natural devices, or vices.

David Levy's book is timely in offering a root and branch challenge to this idea. Political order, Levy asserts, cannot 'be transcended in a future without institutional support or constraint'. The assertion is powerfully underpinned with insights drawn from philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of history. How, then, does Levy conceive of 'political order'? First, as something which, though *freely* constituted by man, is also *necessarily* constituted by him. Human freedom has institutional order as its unavoidable correlate. And this is because man is the 'deficient being', as Arnold Gehlen called him. Lacking the sureties of instinct, man must nevertheless find some way of maintaining a balance between himself and his world. Displaced from nature by his nature, man is compelled to create authoritative institutions in order to endow his world with a constancy it would otherwise lack. 'Culture is the only nature in which man can survive', is how Levy succinctly puts it. No vitalistic utopia of raw nature, no Rousseauistic de-institutionalised society will answer our human requirements.

However, Levy is not content to explain political order as nothing but a 'substitute for the instinctual guidance that our species lacks'.

It is not that man cannot live in a 'state of nature': he cannot live *well* in such a state. Man is concerned with the preservation equally of his life and the good life, testimony to which is the fact that on occasions he will sacrifice the former for the sake of the latter. Whether man measures himself by the mundane rhythms of the cosmos or by a world-transcendent God, in both he recognises 'his dependence on an order of being beyond his control .... In contrast to the typical self-understanding of man today, the purpose of existence is not seen as the pursuit of the satisfaction of unmeasured material and emotional desires but as the effort to approximate the form of one's life as closely as possible to the demands of a given and unalterable state of being. Human life is conceived in terms less of expression than of response.'

Levy's book may be read as a re-interpretation for our times of Burke's 'eternal constitution of things'. That we need to be reminded of the existence of such an 'eternal constitution' goes a long way towards explaining our resistance to its mandates. Technology has so transformed non-human nature that we no longer feel dependent upon it in the way our ancestors did; rather, we think of nature as dependent upon us, which in a sense of course it now is: we moderns are capable alike of conserving or destroying the natural conditions of life on this planet. But ideologues and technophiles go further in believing that we can transcend these conditions altogether. It is an illusion which, as Levy

says, 'thrives in an environment insulated by technological advance from the evidence of dependence and finitude .... The illusion of unconditioned autonomy is, as it were, ingrained in the reality of modern life.'

The hubris of modernity consists 'not in the quest for human mastery as such, but in the fact that the progress of technology has encouraged the belief that mastery can be total'. Secure in this belief, modern man is 'impatient with the irremovable facts of life, including the need for the authoritative regulation of life by political institutions'. The legitimacy of our traditional institutions is constantly being called into question by individuals or groups of individuals who view them as at best instrumental to their own self-willed ends. A deracinated individualism of the kind which admits no bounds, no objective measure and no orientation larger than the self will typically find relief for its solitariness either in a frenzied pursuit of material gratifications or in the warmth of totalitarian ideology. But there are countless other distractions in between beckoning the free spirits of our age. It is not exactly fashionable to uphold the legitimacy of institutions as Levy does, let alone on the grounds that their proper role is to curb rather than serve private aspirations. But a little thought may persuade more of us in the years ahead of the necessity of institutional guidance and restraint. David Levy's book may be a work of theory, but its lessons are severely practical.

A major influence on Levy's thinking has been the work of Eric Voegelin, the last volume of whose masterwork, *Order and History*, has now received its posthumous publication. *In Search of Order* concludes an enquiry which the author first embarked upon thirty years ago. An abiding concern throughout that enquiry, evident again finally here, was with the ways in which men, in various historical milieux, approach near to or depart from the truth of their humanity and the order proper to it. Reality, for Voegelin, does not consist simply of things 'out there' to be categorised in positivistic terms; rather, it is something in which man himself participates by virtue of his human consciousness: he 'imagines' reality through languages, symbols, images and institutions. But herein lies what Voegelin calls 'the potential of deformation' when 'the imaginative expansion of participatory into sole power makes possible the dream of gaining ultimate power over reality ... (this dream) has been discerned, ever since antiquity, as a human vice under such symbols as hybris, pleonexia, *alazoneia tou biou, superbia vitae*, pride of life, *lidibo dominandi*, and will to power. ... The image of the world becomes the world itself' which has become opaque to the modern consciousness, as has the accompanying awareness of the 'tension of existence': 'the tension of the metaxy'. The temptation to dissolve that tension by (in Voegelin's famous words) 'immanentising the eschaton' has proved irresistible in modern times. 'The motivations of my work are simple; they arise from the political situation,' Voegelin stated in 1973.

But of course Voegelin's work is far from simple. To appreciate fully the intellectual impulses that gave birth to it, we have to go back fifty years to a treatise first published in Vienna in 1938 and thankfully now available once again in an English translation, *Political Religions*. Written in response to the disorder of the times, it interprets the totalitarian ideologies of nazism and communism as ultimately rooted in the Enlightenment rejection of the transcendental sources of social order. This interpretation presumably still has power to shock the secular intelligentsia, for whom nazism is better described as a regression to the Dark Ages than an outgrowth of Enlightenment. But Voegelin would have none of it: ' ... the world finds itself in a process of decay that has its origin in the secularisation of the spirit and in the separation of a therefore merely worldly spirit from its roots in religious experience ... the secularisation of life, which the concept of humanism brought with it, is precisely the soil in which anti-Christian religious movements such as National Socialism could grow.'

From the same publisher of *Political Religions* comes a useful collection of essays by Barry Cooper 'probing', as he puts it, various aspects of Voegelin's political philosophy. Cooper is one of a growing number of scholars around the world who, under the influence of Voegelin, and in opposition to historicist and relativist modes of thinking, take seriously the truth claims of past philosophers, and do so precisely because these philosophers were speaking not to some transitory state of affairs but to the permanent features of man's nature.

Anyone who takes the trouble to read these books with the same care that they were written will gain immeasurably in his understanding of what would, in Cooper's words, 'under contemporary conditions ... be a good society wherein one might lead a good life'.

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In Short

The Conservative Movement, Paul Gottfried and Thomas Fleming, Twayne Publishers, Boston, 1988, $7.95, pp. 140, (0-8057-9724-6).

America has what Britain needs but seems unable to acquire: a conservative movement, with its spokesmen in the media, in Congress, and even in the universities.

In this excellent brisk survey, Paul Gottfried and Thomas Fleming introduce us to the main currents within the movement, and describe both its intellectual and its political motivation. The reader will find a clear explanation of those otherwise rather bewildering labels which American conservatism appropriates: New Right versus Old; the conservatives versus the 'neo-conservatives', the constitutionalists and the populists, the 'public choice' democrats, the 'moral majority', and the 'cultural conservatives'. The leading figures of each strand are identified, their thinking and influence summarised, and the principal criticisms (including those from the Left) given a brief airing. If the main impression is one of disintegration and disarray, this may be because that is precisely what the political process *is* in America: a steady disintegration of a great society, under the impact of the modern world. On the other hand, it may also be because, as Gottfried and Fleming do not conceal, the rise of the neo-conservatives seems to them to spell the end of an era, and the loss of that distinctive self-identity which Jefferson and Madison gave to the people of America. For them, conservatism is a calm determination to defend a national patrimony, against the corruptions of fashion and the belligerence of egalitarian politics. The question is: can it be done? It is a question on which the future of America - and therefore of the world - now hangs.
(R.S.)

The Burning Forest: Modern Polish Poetry, Translated and Edited by Adam Czerniawski, Bloodaxe Books, 1988, $7.95, pp. 186, (1-85224-009-1).

There is 'No time to mourn roses, when forests burn' (Juliusz Slowacki). This anthology of modern Polish poetry confronts the 'terrible dream' that is modern Poland; a nightmare which 'caused the poet / to jump out of his sleep / like a stag from a burning forest' (Karpowicz, (1921-) *Dream*).

Throughout these poems there is shown a loyalty to the common things of life or as Milosz found in Leopold Staff's (1878-1957) poems, a belief in a 'notion of life as wiser than any intellectual constructs ...' This anthology includes seventeen poets in all, with Norwid, Różewicz, Szymborska and Herbert the most generously represented. There is a valuable introduction by Czerniawski, and each poet is introduced separately with a photograph or drawing, biographical information and a selection of critical observations from various Polish writers. There is a useful bibliography and an exceptionally well-chosen cover photograph - a detail from *Forest Fire* by Piero di Cosimo.

Perhaps the guiding sentiment of the collection is best expressed by Norwid: 'It is better that you should lose your life beneath a shattered tree which you had once plant - than that you should wander in the desert, regarding mirages as your own orchard.'
(J. deC.)

Survey, Vol. 30, No. 1/2 (128/129), March 1988, £10, (ISSN 0039-6192).

It is unthinkable to study the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe or Communism in general without reading *Survey*, a quarterly journal of East-West studies. It is furthermore, unthinkable to imagine *Survey* without its editor, Leo Labedz.

This last issue of *Survey* consists of Labedz's own writings: some general philosophical discussions of the modern world; some on more specific topics. Labedz's style is often complicated - a Central European style. But anyone interested in the serious issues of the twentieth century ought to read them. They deal with important matters: history and memory, freedom and totalitarianism, truth and lies, above all with self-deception. Labedz's achievement is not to condemn Hitler, Stalin or Ho Chi Minh. They are condemned by their own deeds. He condemns instead such dishonest apologists as Isaac Deutscher, E. H. Carr, Noam Chomsky and others. All those, writing in freedom, who support or praise tyranny - Fascist or Communist, though these days more often Communist - help to kill and torture its victims, help to demolish their freedom and ours. Labedz takes them all on with great panache and fights them with his intelligent, witty, often nasty, but always informative and, in the truest and best sense, intellectual writings.
(H.Z.)

ACADEMIC QUESTIONS



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