

The Salisbury Review



The Third Marquess of Salisbury
1830-1903

<i>The Price of Revolution</i>	A. L. Rowse
<i>The Politics of Interpretation</i>	David J. Levy
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conservative thought*

The Government's educational reforms have focused largely on the schools, brought to the brink of catastrophe by their socialist agenda. In some areas - notably History, discussed in these pages by Stewart Deuchar - the damage will need more than the existing measures if we are to re-establish a sensible curriculum. And it is not only the schools that need reforming. The confusion at the secondary level would have been less had the universities offered guidance. Instead, they have lapsed entirely from their civilizing pretensions, into a state of self-regarding apathy. The discussions of Humboldt, Newman, Arnold and Leavis have found no worthy successor in our times, and if schools no longer know what to teach in such crucial subjects as English and History, it is partly because the universities have ceased to uphold the aim of cultural guardianship.

In this issue we carry several articles devoted to the state of university education, and to the role of the university in the modern world. As John Carroll argues, the humanistic assumptions upon which the modern university was founded are no longer believable. And yet without them it is hard to understand what could be meant by humane education in a secular age. Perhaps, as Jean Wilson suggests, there is no longer any place for the subject of English in the English university: at any rate, it seems reasonable to question its new and self-justified branches - women's studies, semiotics, discourse studies, and the rest. If there is such a thing as humane education in our times, then it must surely involve the art of interpretation, described in these pages by David Levy. It must teach us how to find meaning in the great gestures of our culture, and how to make that meaning part of our lives. But when, under the influence of Marxism, feminism and deconstruction, the authority, and even the existence, of meaning are denied, what justification remains for the 'subject' which tells us so, and why should public funds be provided to 'scholars' whose sole message to their students is that there is no message, and that nothing makes sense?

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Some of the problem stems from deeper changes in society, which have brought with them, as Gorley Putt argues, a revision in the role of tutor. The tutor is no longer *in loco parentis*, and this change in his standing has been associated with a marked decline in the collegiate order. Oxford and Cambridge provided a useful model to the universities of the nineteenth century - the model of a community of scholars, whose members *in statu pupillari* were free but unequal participants in the life of learning. This model depended, in the last analysis, on the maintenance of collegiality, as a form of domestic life distinct from the matrimonial. We have lost that form of life, and acquired nothing in the place of it. Without it, however, the 'idea of a university' lacks embodiment, and comes to us with no sharper image of the scholarly life than can be obtained from the novels of Malcolm Bradbury and David Lodge. In such circumstances it is almost inevitable that people should lose sight of the conception of learning, and of the community which enshrines it, as ends in themselves.

Behind the old idea of collegiality lay another: that of the separateness of man and woman. To our ancestors the building of a community of scholars seemed to require the segregation of the sexes, and the exclusion of one sex from the precincts of the other. Such practices are barely intelligible to our age, which has so far lost sight of the sanctity of sexual differences, as to contemplate the ideas of monasticism with amazement. The Enlightenment view of man, as a being whose destiny is to liberate himself from every custom, erodes the sense that men and women are destined to different spheres. It is this secular view of man which is pushing the Anglican Church towards its latest blundering reform, and one wonders how many bishops of that church would deliver a sermon on this subject as robust, as biblical and as committed as that of Quinlan Terry? One wonders, too, why it should be left to an architect to refer this question to the authority of scripture?

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Conservative Journals: GLASNOST

Perhaps the most famous, and certainly the most impertinent, of the *samizdat* journals to have emerged under the regime of Mikhail Gorbachev, is the one edited by Sergei Grigoryants, which dares to name itself using the new buzz-word of Soviet propaganda. Subject to continuous harassment by the KGB, and to a campaign of disinformation involving the left-wing *Nation* magazine in America, *Glasnost* is published in an English edition by the Center for Democracy in the USSR, which has its headquarters in New York. To call it a conservative journal is to risk raising the eyebrows of those for whom the label 'conservative' indicates conformity to the surrounding *status quo*. But in the sense made current by *The Salisbury Review*, *Glasnost* is as conservative as any current publication in Russian, upholding legality, the Christian religion, moral order and the vestiges of destroyed institutions, amid the storm of 'socialist reconstruction'. Its articles speak not only for the future of the Russian people, but also for their past, demanding the truth about vanished generations, and urging the authorities to preserve for the unborn the fragments of the Russian heritage that have yet to be destroyed.

Issues 10 and 11 have just appeared in English, and contain hair-raising accounts of the ecological catastrophe which threatens the Soviet provinces. One report, taken from *Raparakainutun* (the Armenian sister of *Glasnost*) tells of 150 serious accidents in ten years at the Metsamorskaya nuclear power plant, and of uncontrolled chemical and biological pollution of the Armenian countryside. Another (by Grigoryants himself) relates the sorry tale of socialist reconstruction in Georgia, where people, villages, and ancient monuments are all swept ingloriously away in the name of progress. Such stories occur together with powerfully argued and often heart-breaking appeals on behalf of law and order, and in defence of those unjustly persecuted by a regime which knows the value of words well enough to advocate free expression, so that those best equipped to make use of it, like the brave Sergei Grigoryants, can be identified and marked down for persecution.

Glasnost is obtainable, price \$7 per double issue, from the Center for Democracy in the USSR, 358 W 30th St., New York, NY 10001.

The Price of Revolution

A. L. Rowse

The French Revolution ushered in the modern world, such as it is, and set the example for the revolutions that succeeded it in France, Europe and the outer world in the 19th century. Our own more murderous century has provided more horrible examples, with genocide and other accompaniments. Sainte Beuve described the French as 'the most horrible modern revolution.' In France it has always been the subject of fierce partisanship: approved by most people on the Left, disapproved by the Right. It has been difficult to get a balanced objective view, estimating the losses as well as the gains.

At last a book has appeared which gives one the *bilan* of the whole affair, *Le Coût de la Révolution française* by René Sédillot (Perrin, 95 francs). It gives one the facts and the figures. We have all been taught that the peasants got the land, and that this was a great benefit. But how much did they get, and what was the result; how far did France profit from it? We shall see.

The author of this original and salutary book takes the whole period of Revolution and Napoleon, 1789-1815, as one. After all, Napoleon was the child of the Revolution, inherited its aggressive, expansionist spirit and carried it to its furthest bounds - to Moscow indeed. From the first the Revolution was aggressive: an early revolutionary urged that 'war is a benefit to the nation, peace a calamity.' Thus the occupation of Belgium and the Scheldt forced the reluctant Pitt into war, against his instincts and his gifts (unlike his father he was not good at waging war; he took after his mother's family, the Grenvilles, and was better as a peace-time administrator).

The upshot of the wars, external and internal, civil war and massacres, was about two million French dead. Something like 400,000 perished in the prolonged civil war in La Vendée and Lower Brittany - the former province was deliberately ravaged and left desolate. The infamous Carrier was responsible for some 1800 deaths at Nantes: 800 by the *noyades*, throwing boatloads into the Loire - a couple tied together formed a '*mariage républicain*' - the rest shot in batches, in regular *battues*. At Angers 800 were massacred, bodies thrown into the Loire. At Lyons the massacres were presided over by the unspeakable Couthon. Then there were the notorious massacres in Paris, which made history, and the continual operation of the guillotine.

All lives are not equally valuable, and among those guillotined were France's greatest scientist, Lavoisier; her best poet at the time, André Chénier; her leading intellectual, Condorcet, fell a victim, though not by guillotine. Lavoisier was the discoverer of oxygen, and in addition to other discoveries, was making important

applications of chemistry to agriculture, of great benefit to France, which the guillotine prevented him from completing. 'The Republic has no need of *savants*' (scientists), proclaimed a revolutionary. One is reminded of the way in which Nazi Germany got rid of indispensable Jewish scientists. As for Condorcet, with his inhuman progress, not even his experience in contradiction of it shook his naive optimism. Nor did it Tom Paine's, who defended the Revolution to the English-speaking world - and escaped the guillotine only by flying from France. She lost other scientists in the wake of Lavoisier, as well as artists and writers who sensibly fled the country, like Châteaubriand. The emigration numbered some 70,000. Not all of these were losses; the Comte d'Artois, for example, who as Charles X showed himself another James II, was no loss. Nor was the abominable duc d'Orléans, Philippe Egalité, who financed revolutionary agitation, voted for the execution of poor Louis XVI, his cousin, then was himself guillotined.

Demographically, M. Sédillot tells us that France in 1789 was overpopulated. It is borne home to an historian that, consciously or unconsciously, excess population is at the bottom of many of the world's troubles, and in this century for the wars of aggression of Germany and Japan: in those cases consciously, with Hitler's demand for *Lebensraum* and Japan's 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' in Asia. The result of France overstraining herself with wars all over the Continent was to reduce her population-growth during the period to 9 per cent, while Great Britain forged ahead to 23 per cent.

In 1789 the nobility were owners of one-fifth of the land - one does not know how much was leased out to others' profit. The Church owned rather less. This leaves perhaps 70 per cent already in the hands of *bourgeois* and peasants. The actual transfer of land amounted to perhaps one-fifth. The result of the expropriations of nobles, the Church and the émigrés, with the division of large estates, was to increase the number of small proprietors. But did this increase agricultural production or the productivity from the soil? Apparently not: we gather that agriculture 'stagnated'; peasants' cultivation was very conservative - they did not take to growing potatoes, for example, or the optimum rotation of crops. Meanwhile in Britain the agricultural revolution - enclosures and widespread crop rotation - immensely increased production from the land to feed the growing population.

M. Sédillot says forthrightly that the agricultural and industrial revolutions were the only ones worth while; Britain had the benefit of both and forged ahead.

War, the blockade and Napoleon's 'Continental System', attempting ineffectively to close the Continent

to British trade, strangled French commerce, impeded France's industrial development and distorted what there was of it. In 1789 France's maritime traffic accounted for some 2000 ships; in 1812 it was down to 179. The principal ports that had prospered before 1789 - Bordeaux, where one sees it visibly reflected in the splendid architecture of Louis XV's reign, Nantes, La Rochelle, Marseilles - all languished. France had been the principal supplier of Spain and through Cadiz of Spanish America. All now cut off: *'tout s'écroule.'*

But revolutionaries *pur sang* were antipathetic to trade and commerce anyway. The intolerable Saint Just declared that 'a nation of tradesmen and merchants was not a nation, but just a fair of dealers and vagabonds.' Behind this was the impulse of the true revolutionary, to reduce everybody to mere equal units *vis-à-vis* the state (as one sees with Lenin and Soviet Russia). Everybody observed that the real mania in France was not for liberty, but for equality: that was the driving force (in other words, the envy of the inferior for the superior). But the depreciation of commerce is continuous with Napoleon's dismissal of Britain as a nation of shopkeepers. And how France paid for it!

We learn that in 1800 - half-way through the experience - industrial production was only 60 per cent of what it had been in 1789. In the next ten years it picked up considerably, though mainly in the fields of armaments for Napoleon's wars, and in textiles for clothing his immense armies. And what did they achieve that was permanent? M. Sédillot calculates that in industrial development thirty years were lost, and in technical progress perhaps forty. Meanwhile Britain went ahead to the age of steam power, foreshadowing the age of railways in which she had a lead for the whole century.

He concludes that Napoleon's reply to the blockade, his 'Continental System', was ineffective, full of loopholes. The Emperor was reduced to allowing licences for imports necessary to keep his armies going. His brother Louis was driven to protest on behalf of Holland and left gaps wide open there for British imports. The author does not enforce the point that it was the Continental System more than anything that aroused popular and national feelings against French revolutionary imperialism all over Europe. It was the vain attempt to force Russia to adhere to it that led Napoleon to the disaster of 1812. He was pursuing a chimera, like Hitler in his onslaught on Russia.

Of all this England was the chief beneficiary. Naval power enabled her to hold out and to hold on throughout the *épopée* 1789-1815, to render all the victories of Revolution and Empire ultimately null. M. Sédillot calculates that eleven-twelfths of the world's shipping were at the disposal of the island power - and how right the British governing class were to stake everything on it, from La Hogue to Trafalgar! French shipbuilding was of a high quality before 1789, but the Revolution decimated the naval officer class. The upshot was that all the French possessions in the outside

world were mopped up, from India to the West Indies, and Napoleon decided to sell Louisiana to the United States as no longer holding any promise for France.

Thus the territorial *bilan* shows a few minimal gains - Papal Avignon, which could have been occupied at any time, and a few places on the north-eastern frontier - but the position in the outer world was irretrievably lost. Napoleon could win battles on land, but he could not win Trafalgar. How in these circumstances did he manage? His armies lived off the conquered countries - as Hitler's did from 1940-5. This ultimately set all the victims of their aggression against them, and enabled Britain to form the coalitions, the grand alliances, that brought them down. Moreover, though M. Sédillot does not make this point, it made Britain's stand morally right - expressed nobly in Pitt's war-speeches (as in Churchill's in our time).

Louis XVI's government had been bankrupted by the American war - it cost some 2 milliards of *livres*. Vergennes should never have gone to the aid of Britain's revolting colonies, but, the disciple of Choiseul, he could not resist the chance of revenge for the loss of Canada. If he had resisted that the American war would have dragged on even longer, exhausting Britain even more than it did.

The bankruptcy of the state started off the Revolution. Throughout most of the 18th century France had enjoyed stability of the currency. The Revolution, with the uncontrolled printing of paper money, the *assignats*, opened the floodgates - uncontrolled inflation, devaluation of the currency, with appalling consequences to social stability and the social fabric, undermining it to the enrichment of some, the impoverishment of many. The dreadful Marat, who was not without common-sense, questioned what was the point of getting rid of the aristocracy of the nobility to replace it by an aristocracy of the rich?

Some people made enormous fortunes, like the financier Ouvrard, or the finagling Talleyrand and Fouché. And of course corruption ran rife throughout such a debased society - as we see now brought into the light of day in Gorbachev's Russia. Talleyrand and Fouché became millionaires out of politics. M. Sédillot concludes that in such a society the rich became richer, the poor poorer. Hence the agitation on the extreme Left for communism with the propaganda and conspiracy of Baboeuf. This was not to the mind of the bourgeoisie for whose benefit the Revolution was made; he was given his come-uppance by the guillotine - to be made a martyr in subsequent communist and Marxist tradition.

The people at large were bemused by the mania for Equality, as the revolutionary refrain had it:

Tout à la même hauteur -

Voilà le vrai bonheur.

In the name of equality specialist corporations were abolished. This had its ridiculous side, when it came to medicine, as Marat, who had been a doctor, saw. What was the point of allowing every unlicensed charlatan to set up as a doctor, he asked - and the Revolution

had to go back on this piece of doctrinaire nonsense, as in some other respects. Before 1789 education was in the hands of the Church, to which many of the intellectuals of the Enlightenment who helped to create the Revolution - Diderot, for instance - owed their education (as Stalin, and Goebbels too, owed theirs). But the Revolution persecuted the church, closed churches, turned them over to secular uses (where have we seen those enlightened measures in our time?), and suppressed the teaching Orders. Result, so far as literacy was concerned: in 1789 some 37 per cent could at least sign their names, by 1830 the proportion had diminished to 33 per cent.

Culturally - and this is what interests most anyone who cares for the arts - the Revolution was disastrous. M. Sédillot says that neither the Terror nor Napoleon was favourable to genius. Sainte Beuve regards the cardinal writers on the Revolution to be Burke (I agree, certainly not Tom Paine), Mme de Stael, Rivarol and Mallet du Pan. I am not a great admirer of Necker's daughter, Mme de Stael, but politically she was a sensible woman, who stood for a moderate constitutional monarchy à l'Anglaise. That would of course have been the best solution, as Mirabeau argued. Mallet du Pan, the Swiss observer whose writings on the Revolution, on its outrageous course, offer the best commentary on it, also held that the English model of constitutional monarchy was the best solution. He was driven into exile; Rivarol and Chateaubriand were émigrés - as of course were right-wingers like de Bonald in Germany and de Maistre in St Petersburg.

As for Mme de Stael, Napoleon would not allow her in the country with her liberal ideas. One can understand his attitude, for had not the Revolution been prepared, society undermined, by a lot of writers, ideologues and doctrinaires? Mallet du Pan applied the word of the philosophic, sceptical Montaigne to them: '*L'écrittaillerie est le symptôme d'un siècle débordé.*' We may translate this as 'Scribbling is the symptom of a century out of hand.' Has not that been the characteristic of the Left intellectuals of our time - the silly Sartres and irresponsible Bertrand Russells - as of the Marxism and Russian intellectualism that culminated in Lenin?

This is not to subscribe to the right wing line of the émigrés. They were a hopeless lot; as Mallet du Pan complained, the Bourbon princes never understood what had hit them, or anything of the case for the Revolution. Of course, political and social changes were necessary; in many ways they were already on the way under Louis XVI, as under Nicholas II in Russia.¹ The sad thing in human history is that desirable reforms, it often seems, cannot be carried out without appalling bloodshed. One cannot but think that France would have been happier without the Revolution; and think of the prodigious progress Russia would have made if it had not been for the war of 1914 and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917! France began to recover only after 1815 - M. Sédillot concludes 35 years lost. Similarly, as Mr Gorbachev is finding, with Russia.

Simply on the constitutional plane, a moderate monarchy, in keeping with popular consensus, would have given France some institutional stability, instead of the continual chops and changes of the 19th century. Lamartine complained that, when only half-way through life, he had lived under ten régimes. Nor has the record in this century been any more stable. It took Louis XVIII the whole experience of 1789-1815 to learn the lesson of compromise, the necessity of consensus; and then his brother Charles X, who had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, forfeited it all by 1830. Perhaps the July Monarchy of Louis Philippe would have been France's best bet: it might have provided at least constitutional continuity.

The artistic destruction wrought by revolutions passes belief, yet historians rarely notice it, for they have little aesthetic or visual sense. The Puritan Revolution in England did untold damage, yet in all the outpouring of books on our Civil War no notice is taken of this aspect of things for, Philistine and uncultivated, they do not care for it.² M. Sédillot has more artistic sense, he has a section on the subject which could well be longer - in fact the French have a whole book devoted to the subject, Louis Réau: *Monuments détruits de l'art français*.

Of cathedrals that of Boulogne was destroyed, and, I add, Avranches. Nôtre Dame in Paris narrowly escaped, with the loss of much of its splendid 13th century sculpture and its spires. The destruction of its famous gallery of kings was specially decreed, as of course royal statues were overthrown throughout the country. At Strasbourg the mayor invited anyone capable of wielding a hammer along; result: 231 statues and sculptures were lost from the cathedral. That kind of thing went on all over France (as indeed it had all over Britain during the Reformation and again with Puritan vandals).

Cluny, the greatest monastic monument of the Middle Ages - during which it had exerted an unequalled influence throughout Europe - was razed to the ground, along with many other abbeys and monastic buildings too numerous to mention. The bells of all the churches were sacrificed to make cannon. Scores, if not hundreds, of châteaux were destroyed or vandalised; among secular buildings Louis XIV's splendored palace of Marly, Francis I's Château de Madrid, Meudon of the Grand Dauphin; the Condés' Chantilly which we see today is a 19th century reconstruction. Though M. Sédillot does not mention them, the villas of the Pompadour and du Barry were destroyed, as was St Cyr of virtuous Mme de Maintenon, her tomb there vandalised, her ashes thrown out.

Too sickening to go through the tale of churches destroyed - we learn succinctly that Paris lost 18, Beauvais 12, Arras 7, Châlons 7, Troyes about 15, and so on, besides indiscriminate damage to attendant buildings, cloisters etc. like those of St Germain-des-Près. Royal palaces were casually sacked until sales of their marvellous contents were organised and went on all through the period. In the whole history of taste

that of the French 18th century has never been surpassed; the spoils of the Revolution went all over Europe. Here too Britain was a great gainer: it was fortunate that the Regent was an aesthete, a man of taste, and that he led the aristocracy in acquiring the marvels of French furniture and *objets d'art* to be seen at Windsor, Buckingham Palace, and our great houses (what is left of them).

There was besides much deliberate destruction. At Fontainebleau Philippe de Champaigne's portrait of Louis XIII - comparable with his splendored Richelieu, which we all know - was burned. It was rather a near thing that the artists themselves were not. David played up to the Revolution, but narrowly escaped the guillotine all the same. Fragonard and Mme Vigée-Lebrun, who had often portrayed Marie Antoinette in happier days, left the country. So too Riesener, greatest of *ébénistes* (cabinet makers), after the confiscation of his goods and the sacking of his workshops. (One thinks of the ending of the Fabergé workshops in St Petersburg.) Other artists and scientists - one or two of whom committed suicide - followed suit. A contemporary term for what happened would be: 'Brain-drain.' M. Sédillot sums it up in the thought that revolution terrorises *élites*.

Impossible to account for all the losses of other works of luxury and beauty - all the tapestries, the exquisite jewels, in particular the Crown jewels, or such objects as Madame du Barry's gold toilet service (buried for safety; to recover it she returned from the security of England to France and the guillotine). Then there were the losses to works catering for luxury, Gobelin tapestries and Sèvres porcelain, the printers of wonderful books, like Oudry's *La Fontaine* - under royal and aristocratic patronage, and where French taste led Europe. For, one must remember that taste, even more than common intelligence, is the real, and rarer, touchstone of culture.

Perhaps what touches the historian more is the destruction of archives and documents from hundreds of châteaux - bonfires were made of them - as well as from the libraries of monasteries, churches, royal palaces, aristocratic houses. (Mme de Pompadour had been a patron of beautiful books as well as everything else, silks, clothes, furniture, painting, and of course painters and writers.)

The author does not analyse the motives for all this destruction. There is, of course, the fundamental Philistinism, the instinct towards vandalism, among the masses, which we see at large in the indisciplined society of today. (Look at the picture made by our schools, now that punishment has ended, with teachers being beaten up by youths out of hand.) In all this there is a large amount of envy. It is curious that historians, in whose profession there is so much of it, do not realise what a force envy is all through history.

What standards are we to apply to this major event, out of which has come so much that is to be deplored in modern society? In so far as over-population was, and is, a propelling force, the humane remedy is birth control, not massacres and war, internal or external. The standard that ultimately applies in history is not a demotic one, least of all an egalitarian one. We do not remember 5th century Athens for the teeming population at the Piraeus, its lack of sanitation and the presence of plague; nor do we remember Renaissance Florence for its internal faction-fighting or Rome for its malaria; we remember them for Leonardo and Lorenzo de Medici, for Raphael and Michelangelo and Palestrina. It is works of art and intellect that redeem man from the slime.

M. Sédillot is not an aesthete among historians, such as Burckhardt. And he sees the period 1789-1815 as essentially a confrontation between France and Britain, overlooking the others who were roused to hostility by the French Revolution. (Prussia in particular took an almighty revenge in 1870-1.) He concludes by saying that the Revolution gave a grand display of pyrotechnics to the world, and left a legacy of 'glory' and 'prestige' to France. But what are they worth?

For France the Revolution was a 'cruel experience', but certainly it was a good thing for Britain.

Notes

1. See for this Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917*, cc. XVII, XVIII.
2. I have done my best to call attention to it in *Reflections on the Puritan Revolution*, (1984) but so far to little effect.

The Politics of Interpretation

David J. Levy

The story is an old one but bears repeating. Two women are standing at a bus stop, and one is telling the other about a recent misfortune. After listening for a while to her companion's catalogue of woe, the second woman looks earnestly at the first and says: 'You have to be philosophical about things like that. If I were you I wouldn't give it another thought.'

Much of contemporary academic philosophy, in both the 'Anglo-Saxon' analytical and the continental traditions, is likely to provoke a similar sort of 'philosophical' reaction in the mind of the layman - particularly if he is old fashioned enough to imagine, as Plato did, that philosophy has anything valuable to tell him about goodness, truth and beauty or, to take a

more practical, Aristotelian, tack, about the conditions in which a humanly satisfying life becomes and remains possible. Like the women waiting for the bus, those outside the ranks of the philosophical profession are, if they think about it at all, inclined to be 'philosophical' about contemporary philosophy. The best that can be done is not to give it another thought. With certain honourable exceptions, some of whom have contributed to this review, philosophers today are, when at all comprehensible to anybody but the initiate, perceived as engaged in an activity of no practical significance or as apostles of a dispiriting message or moral and intellectual despair.

The fate of the term 'hermeneutics' well illustrates the reasons for this. Hermeneutics, which has become something of a buzz-word in contemporary philosophy, originally referred to the art or science required in the interpretation of scripture. Taken in this sense the purpose of hermeneutics was to uncover the truth of the biblical text. During the nineteenth century the use of the term was extended, initially to the wider problem of understanding the meaning of written texts as such and, subsequently, to the question of understanding the meaning and significance of historical events. Human history, it was claimed, cannot be explained, as men like Buckle, Comte and Marx assumed, as the necessary outcome of the operation of 'laws of history' analogous to the natural laws that determine the behaviour of physical objects. History, and the cultural and political institutions, religions and beliefs that emerge in its course, represent forms of creative response to the circumstances of life and are, as such, in some sense analogous to works of art and literature. They cannot be explained as effects of invariable scientific laws but must be interpreted in terms of the meaning they possessed for those who created them.

The next step in the process, associated above all with the name of Martin Heidegger, was to claim that human existence itself was fundamentally interpretive or hermeneutic. While the life-forms of other animals are fixed by their biologically determined instincts and their equally fixed relationship to a given natural environment, what human beings make of their lives depends upon the way they interpret themselves and the actions they subsequently undertake in the light of these interpretations. Such interpretations are not entirely, or even predominantly, a matter of individual choice but form, over time, traditions, habitual forms of behaviour and patterns of belief. Every individual, born at a particular time and place, enters a world already structured not only by the features shared with all the human race but by the distinctive inheritance of his native culture.

So far, so good. The affinities of this view with the fundamental philosophical outlook of conservatism – which stresses both the constancy of human nature and the significant particularity of the cultures in which this nature achieves creative expression – should be obvious enough. It is not therefore surprising that some of the most perceptive consideration of the

positive significance of such Burkean themes as tradition, authority and prejudice should be found in the work of Heidegger's follower Hans-Georg Gadamer. At the same time the extension of the range of hermeneutics to cover the very structure of human life carried with it certain dangers. The title of Gadamer's major work is *Truth and Method*; but if human life is primarily or, still worse, exclusively a matter of interpretation, then is truth not itself merely an interpretation? How are we to judge between different interpretations given that any criteria of truth or scale of values that we advance will only be the result of one interpretation among others?

There are, I think, certain clues to the solution of this problem to be found even in Heidegger – a philosopher often pictured by foes of hermeneutics as the major source of contemporary endarkenment. Potential remedies to an all-embracing interpretive relativism are to be found both in Heidegger's early analysis of human finitude and, though often obscurely expressed in fragmentary form, in his later attempts to elucidate the experience of truth that he finds articulated in the surviving texts of the earliest Greek philosophers. In Gadamer the appeal is more straightforwardly to the authority of tradition and, beyond that, to the possibility of a philosophical analysis of the enduring features of man's place in the cosmos – in other words, to a philosophical anthropology, of the type developed by Max Scheler.

But the problem will not go away. Once one has drunk at the hermeneutic spring and learned of the universality of interpretation, there is a temptation, seemingly irresistible to most contemporary advocates of hermeneutics, to think that there is nothing beyond interpretation. That is to forget that interpretation is always interpretation of a given situation, and that some aspects of man's nature and place in the world seem to feature in every possible interpretation. It is the enthusiastic surrender to this temptation to dissolve the object of interpretation in the act of interpreting which marks the latest phase in the saga of hermeneutic philosophy, the 'deconstructionism' of Jacques Derrida and his all too numerous followers.

Lest we be too complacent about this, dismissing it as the eccentricity of a continental philosophy never subject to the rigorous analytical disciplines of Anglo-American thought, it is worth noting that a parallel development has occurred within the Anglo-Saxon tradition itself. Truth and reality, relativised to the point of extinction by the Parisian prophets of deconstruction, are no less absent from the pragmatism of Richard Rorty or the linguistic absolutism of A. C. Danto, who affirms that: 'The structures of language determine what are the structures of reality for those whose language it is, and ... the deep order of the world, so sought by philosophers of the past, is but the cast shadow of the deep order of their grammar.'¹

Ivory tower excesses? Certainly; but ones that deeply corrode the intellectual confidence of a civilization based on the distinctions between truth and untruth,

reality and illusion.

But this, perhaps, is to take the whole thing too seriously. If certain contemporary philosophers, hooked on what they describe as hermeneutics, choose to tell us that they deal no longer in the hard currency of truth and that, furthermore, their predecessors were fooling themselves when they believe that they did, why bother with them at all? Regardless of philosophy life continues along its course. Philosophy books, especially those that emanate from the ranks of the deconstructionists, are hardly the stuff of popular reading, and so, whatever their theoretical implications, they are without much practical effect. Philosophy, we are constantly assured by the spokesmen of the new relativism, is not a form of knowledge but a species of play. Why not, then, leave such philosophers to their games - taking care only that they do not consume too much of the public purse?

That undoubtedly is the reaction of many practical people, including, perhaps, those who now control, or at least seek to control, the budgets of our universities and colleges. Philosophy is the heart of the humanities and, I believe, nothing so fuels the present financial squeeze on the teaching of the humanities as the avowal, emanating from their heart, that philosophy has nothing significant to say on the great issues of the day. In saying this I am by no means endorsing the popular shibboleth of 'relevance' - the fashionable prejudice that the only subjects worth teaching, or financing, are those whose mastery has immediate practical effect upon our economic or commercial life. Rather my contention is that what Stanley Rosen has called the reduction of theory to interpretation undermines the claims of philosophy to any sort of public attention or concern. The predominant self-images of contemporary philosophy, and the short-sighted, philistine obsession with immediately visible 'results', conspire together to deprive our national culture of its ability to articulate, now and for the future, the principles that have historically made it worthy of defence. This is a matter of the utmost practical and political importance.

It will not do merely to be 'philosophical' about the present state of philosophy. Too much is at stake. Where philosophy disowns its inheritance by denying its unique, though not exclusive, responsibility for the furtherance of man's quest for truth, the legacy is soon appropriated by ideologies which, whatever their intellectual and moral failings, satisfy the human need for meaning. Nor is the answer to be found in a polemical rejection of the whole hermeneutical tradition, as Murray Rothbard seemed to suppose in his recent assault on what he called 'the hermeneutical invasion of philosophy and economics.'¹² The search for the soul of philosophy is not a battle against hermeneutics, but one within it. For just as Molière's *bourgeois gentilhomme* is speaking 'prose' even when he does not realise it, so philosophers, and economists for that matter, are engaged in advancing interpretations of the world even when they suppose themselves simply to be

reflecting the unambiguously given facts of life.

Interpretation is, as hermeneutic philosophers argue, universal. But this is not the same thing as saying that there is nothing of substance to the order of the world beyond our linguistically conditioned interpretations. To accept, with Gadamer, the universality of the scope of hermeneutics does not require, either, that we believe that any given interpretation is ultimately arbitrary or, to cite Danto once more, that 'the deep order of the world . . . is but the cast shadow of the deep order of . . . grammar.' The distinction between the universality of interpretation and what one may call the doctrine of hermeneutic exclusivity may seem somewhat over-subtle but, in this matter at least, everything depends on its being maintained.

Here let us return to what I referred to above as the affinity between hermeneutics and the philosophical outlook of conservatism. A good starting point is provided by the following observation taken from the *Journal of the Historian of Religion*. Mircea Eliade: 'Even if we wanted to, we couldn't give up hermeneutics because we are the result of a millennial hermeneutical effort. Ultimately, we are the result of interpretations and reinterpretations of life, death, consciousness, creativity, etc. elaborated since the pre-Socratics, and even before (since the discovery of agriculture and metallurgy for example).'¹³ One may quarrel with Eliade's use of the term 'ultimately', but the significance of his words is plain enough: the identity of human beings, and the cultures that they form, is not something utterly determined by nature, but rather a creative accomplishment achieved over history through a process of continuous reinterpretation.

As Eliade conceives it, human existence is indeed hermeneutic to its core but here, in contrast to some at least of the positions castigated by Rothbard, interpretation is seen neither as arbitrary nor as tied merely to features of the language in which it happens to be expressed. No doubt it is sometimes easier to articulate a particular intuition of being in one language rather than another, but the truth to be articulated is always in some sense translinguistic. Interpretation is universal, the very stuff of what we mean by culture, but remains bound to features of the human condition which can neither be dreamed, defined nor argued away.

This precisely corresponds to what, in the first issue of *The Salisbury Review*, I sought to identify as the founding insight which unifies all varieties of conservative thought. Namely, that beneath the apparent flux of history there is a level of constancy encompassing the possibilities of human nature and asserting itself in certain unchanging requirements of political order. Within the British tradition this insight finds expression both in Burke's characterisation of historically established legal rights as 'refractions and reflections' of certain universal - Burke calls them 'metaphysic' - human entitlements, and in Hume's view that history's 'chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by

showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour.⁴

What is notable here, as in Eliade's observation, is that assertion of the constancy of the human condition does not rule out recognition of the historical variety of political and cultural achievement but rather provides us with a touchstone that both permits us, in some measure, to understand cultures other than our own, and, implicitly at least, allows us to form judgements about their relative value. For where the works of culture, whether institutions or beliefs, are conceived as creative responses to an ultimately shared human condition there arises the possibility of judging the success of what each does in fact accomplish. Political conservatism, like hermeneutic philosophy, only sinks into relativism when it forgets the enduring realities of human life.

For both conservatism and hermeneutics such forgetfulness, amounting to what might be termed anthropological amnesia, is a recurrent temptation. Nor is this surprising when we consider more deeply the nature of the affinity between the two. Indeed the very notion of an affinity, suggesting as it does a sympathetic relationship between two originally distinct currents of thought, may even understate the case. It is not merely, as Roger Scruton remarked in comment upon Rothbard's polemic, that, 'In some sense of that tricky word . . . the task of conservatism is hermeneutical',⁵ but that in speaking of conservatism, on the one hand, and hermeneutics, on the other, we may in fact be talking about two aspects of a single, unified outlook upon the world.

Historically speaking this would indeed seem to be the case. The development of hermeneutic philosophy over the last two centuries is part of that same reaction against the abstract rationalism of the Enlightenment that finds political expression in the writings of Burke and his successors. The obviously Burkean tone of much of Gadamer's *Truth and Method* is no accident. It reflects an intellectual ancestry that reaches back through the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, to the German historical school of Ranke and Savigny, and thence to the original generation of German readers who encountered and appropriated Burke's *Reflections* as part of their own experience of the impact of the French Revolution.

Hermeneutic philosophy and modern, post-revolutionary, conservative thought share an origin in reaction to what were perceived as the inadequacies of the politics and anthropology of enlightenment and revolution. In both its political and its more strictly philosophical form this reaction was marked by a rejection of ahistorical rationalism and an emphasis on the record of history as the primary source of our knowledge of human affairs. The conservative interpretation of politics and the hermeneutic politics of interpretation embody alike a conception of man as a

finite creature who achieves his potential only through engagement in the living form of an historically distinct culture. The text of history is read not only as the chronicle of what men have in fact accomplished in the past but of the limits to which their achievements are subject by reason of their enduring nature and worldly condition. History is not merely the record of change but a pointer to the ontologically given framework which makes human existence possible and bearable. How bearable life is at any time and place largely depends upon the artifice of cultural creation - on the nature of the institutions which regulate relationships between individuals and groups and on the doctrines, philosophical as well as religious, which permit us to make sense of our lives.

The conservative presumption in favour of established political institutions is precisely matched by the original hermeneutic commitment to uncovering the abiding meaning of culturally significant texts. This is something best illustrated by reference to the study and practice of law, a field of practical judgement in which the hermeneutic and the political dimensions are inextricably fused in the concrete interpretation and realisation of just, and thus meaningful, order. The example of law further illustrates the point that, if it is to be effective, the appropriation and continuing application of tradition can never be mechanistic or uncritical but requires the ability to discriminate that which is of enduring significance from the merely incidental. As anthropological constancy is read from and through the shifting patterns of history, so the principles of justice, at least in the conservative jurisprudence of the common law, are seen to emerge from judgements founded in the pattern of precedent.

The case of law exemplifies the sense in which we may be said to be self-interpreting beings and the order of our lives a hermeneutic achievement. And it does so in a way that, far from leading us into abysmal relativism, directs our attention to the significance both of historical accomplishment and of anthropological constancy - of human history as well as human nature - as necessary limits encountered in the interpretive process itself. Legal hermeneutics does not find itself caught in an endless regress of prior interpretations. It finds immediate guidance in the presumptive authority of previous judgements, but these, in turn, are ultimately anchored either, in the case of statutory law, in the stated intent of the relevant legislation or, in the case of common law, in one of a small number of maxims of justice. Either way, legal interpretation refers, as it were, beyond itself to a conception of what constitutes just order among men. As law refers beyond itself to justice, so the conception of just order refers, in turn, to prior knowledge, intuited or historically acquired, of what is conducive to the good conduct of human affairs.

For this reason, even where most bound by precedent, law is something more than mere habit or custom. Without going too deeply into the intricacies of the relationship between law and justice, it may be said

that, except in the eviscerated jurisprudence of the legal positivist, law is not simply any body of institutionalised rules but one whose intended object is the realisation of justice. Justice, in turn, is a condition of order conducive to the good life – a state of affairs in which the opportunities for the subject to realise his potentialities within the anthropologically necessary framework of the polity are maximised rather than systematically frustrated. If the conservative presumption of the authority of precedent is a prime feature of acceptable legal order it is not only because the element of predictability it affords is an essential precondition for the good life, but that the pattern of precedent embodied in the law reflects generations of careful judgement concerning the exact nature of the rules that make such a life possible. In this conception, the state of justice is not something to be postulated by philosophical or ideological *fiat* but something discovered in the course of historical life.

Where new circumstances arise precedent alone may prove inadequate for the furtherance of justice. The original development of equity and, subsequently, of statute law reflect this fact. But if either is to contribute positively and lastingly to the constitution of order, as both have done, it can only be because their prescriptions arise from the same species of reflection that already informs the evolution of the common law. Such reflection is, at root, anthropological – embodying a quest for justice founded in knowledge of human nature and of the institutional conditions of human well-being.

I have considered the nature of legal hermeneutics at length because, here more than in other fields, the connection between interpretation procedures and maintenance of the order of human existence is readily apparent. But the lessons to be drawn from these considerations are of more general significance. In particular, the reference of legal interpretation beyond itself to an ultimately anthropological conception of justice invites us to consider in what sense an equivalent reference is required for the meaningful conduct of other forms of interpretation. As law tends toward a purely self-referential legalism when divorced from the anthropological intuition of justice, so other species of interpretation, philosophical, political and religious, become mere verbiage when isolated from their respective sources in the fundamental challenges of the human condition.

Consider again the claim of Eliade that ‘we are the result of a millennial hermeneutical effort . . . the result of interpretations and reinterpretations of life, death, consciousness, creativity, etc. elaborated since the pre-Socratics, and even before . . .’ In Eliade’s formulation the universality of interpretation as a formative feature of human existence is admitted without any implication that there is nothing more to the human condition than what interpretation allows there to be. Interpretation, whose results are embodied over time in the multifarious world of human culture, is not free-floating but responsive. And what it responds to is a range of fundamental experiences that man encounters as the ultimate

defining realities of his being. Life and death, consciousness and creativity provoke interpretation at all times and places precisely because, alongside the no less inevitable facts of human physiology, they are not themselves inventions of the interpretive process. Rather, they must be understood, as much as the hermeneutical effort they provoke, to be elementary and inescapable features of man’s being in the world. As such they form in sum a finite anthropological framework whose recognition and acceptance is the measure of interpretive truth.

Contrary to what many of his admirers and detractors alike suppose, this is something well recognised by Gadamer. Indeed, in commenting on the words of Aeschylus that man ‘suffers unto truth’, Gadamer gets to the very heart of the matter. ‘What man has to learn through suffering,’ he writes, ‘is not this or that thing in particular, but knowledge of the absolute barrier that separates him from the divine. It is ultimately a religious insight – the kind of insight that gave birth to Greek tragedy. Thus experience is, in essence, experience of human finitude. The truly experienced man is one who knows that he is master neither of time nor of the future . . . Experience teaches us to recognise reality. What is properly gained from all experience, then, is to know what is. But “what is,” here, is not this thing or that, but what Ranke characterised as “what cannot be done away with.”’⁶

Human existence is fundamentally hermeneutic not in the sense that there is nothing more to the structure of life than interpretation but because our condition is a puzzling one, full of challenges and encompassed by inescapable mysteries of which we perennially try to make sense. What is quite properly called the hermeneutic dimension of existence is the dimension not of pure self-creation but of finite, creative response to the universal and challenging realities of our being. This response encompasses, on the one hand, the efforts of religion and philosophy to identify the meaning of our existence, and, on the other, the political effort to discover, realise and maintain the conditions, spiritual as well as material, of human well-being. Unflinching commitment to such effort is the very essence of what both Eric Voegelin and Václav Havel have evocatively described as ‘living in truth’.

The point is such an obvious one that it is, at first-sight, difficult to understand why it should have been so obscured. Yet the eclipse of what we may call the anthropological reference of hermeneutics, and with it denial of the mutual entailment of interpretation and truth, is a fact of the present philosophical scene. As such, it must be seen not as an exciting new chapter in the history of philosophy, but, if not countered, as a sure sign of approaching extinction.

It might indeed be claimed that philosophy, as it has been understood hitherto in the civilisation of the West, is already extinct in the writings of such influential, contemporary bravoos as Richard Rorty.⁷ There is something undeniable bracing about Rorty’s spirited reaction against the domination of post-Cartesian

philosophy by the epistemological myth of the existentially unconditioned knowing subject. But unfortunately, like so many other recent converts to what they perceive as hermeneutics, Rorty chooses to forget that interpretation, conditioned as it is by the historical and ontological circumstances of its achievement, is, very much more surely than the type of knowledge proposed by the epistemological myth, tied to objectively given features of human existence.

Disowning alike the brittle, empty certainties of Descartes' epistemology and the Hegelian fable of man's historical ascent to an absolute knowledge distinct from mere understanding, the hermeneutic tradition, up to and including Gadamer, fully accepts its philosophical responsibility to recognise and articulate whatever can be discerned of the truth of the human condition. Just as the original hermeneutics of Biblical interpretation taught, as its first principle, the subordination of the interpreter's creative imagination to the admittedly complex self-evidence of the sacred text - faithfulness to the object of interpretation - so even an existential hermeneutics of Heideggerian provenance demands recognition of the facts of life in which it arises.

Like the deconstructionist literary theorists who deny the presence of given meaning in the texts with which they play, Rorty's dissolution of the object of interpretation in the act of interpreting exemplifies a pathology of philosophy equivalent to the denaturing of law which occurs when legal procedures are divorced from all reference to the objectively given, discoverable, conditions of justice. Rightly dismissing the claim that the foundation of philosophical knowledge lies in the activity of a transcendental, and this, in worldly terms, unreal subject, Rorty proceeds to deny that there can be any foundation to our knowledge claims that is not itself merely the creature of interpretation. Philosophy, so conceived, ceases to be a quest for any discoverable ontologically given truth - a notion which is itself 'discovered' to be only another hermeneutic artifact - and becomes, in the quaint phrase, a variety of 'edifying conversation'.

Such is the result of ignoring what I have described as the essentially responsive character of hermeneutics, and with it all reference to the knowable truth of the human condition. Philosophy becomes no more than a self-sustaining linguistic game resembling nothing so much as the activity of a newspaper astrologer who casts daily horoscopes for the amusement of his readers without believing anything of the claim to truth of the 'science' he purports to practice.

Edmund Husserl may have exaggerated when, in the 1930s, he presented the fate of European civilisation as wholly dependent upon the renewal of Western philosophy in the spirit of truth.⁸ Yet, regardless of the adequacy of Husserl's own conception of what this renewal entailed, there is more than a philosopher's conceit in his claim that the political pathologies of modern society reflect disorders of philosophical reason. In the sorry political conditions of the

totalitarian states of Central Europe the pollution of life by the lies of ideology is readily experienced as the result of just such disorders of the soul. Language, when no longer ordered by commitment to the articulation of truth, is seen, not as Rorty would have it, as edifying play, but as the ever renewable instrument of tyrannical power.⁹ And it is notable that the traditions on which Central European intellectuals draw in countering the effects of political and spiritual corruption overlap, to a surprising extent, with what are, in the West, perceived as the hermeneutic sources of fashionable relativism.

The students of Patočka in Czechoslovakia and of Ingarden in Poland can hardly forget the harsh rigidity of the existential framework to which they seek to respond. Nor do they fail to notice that the exceptional nastiness of their situation, conditioned as it is by the demands of fidelity to an ideology which dreams of transforming human nature, is the result, not of Marxism's appreciation of 'what cannot be done away with' but of its denial that any such realm exists. Philosophers in Central Europe share with their Western *confrères* a deep suspicion of the claim to a certain knowledge of human affairs that transcends the limits of interpretation, and a consequent attachment to the hermeneutic approach, but only in the comfort of the West, where philosophy is isolated from the pressures of life, can the hermeneutic of human existence degenerate into the sort of fathomless relativism represented by Rorty and his kind.

The financially and politically secure professional philosopher, embedded in the security of the academy, is subject, at worst, to the pressure to publish new and 'interesting' findings. Reality, whose anthropological outlines are already known, implicitly at least, in the elementary facts of experience, is hardly an interesting or sufficiently 'original' topic and so the interpretive task declines into a narcissistic stream of critical commentaries on other equally disembodied theoretical texts. The object of it all, Rorty tells us, is simply to keep the conversation going. And keep going it does, at least so long as funds are available to keep the whole unreal enterprise afloat.

Not surprisingly philosophy, when so presented, comes to be seen by the wider world as a luxury which we may or may not be able to continue to afford. This is, by any standards, a thoroughly unhealthy situation for philosophy and society alike; and one made worse by the fact that, insofar as they penetrate the non-academic world at all, the implications of a philosophy which relativises the notion of reality and disowns the quest for anthropological truth are rightly seen as undermining the legitimacy of the institutions of a free policy. Of Rorty's own attachment to such institutions there can be no doubt, but since his reasons for attachment are no more than a compound of historical accident and personal preference, the grounds of commitment are scarcely an adequate foundation for a threatened political order.

Regardless of intention, the philosophy of uncon-

strained interpretive freedom tends, like it ethical equivalent, to undermine the foundations on which political freedom ultimately rests. If such a philosophy were true, philosophers at least, imbued as they should be with the *bios theoretikos* - the commitment to pursue truth wherever the pursuit may lead - might even have a duty to persist in their demoralising undertaking. Society, in turn, might equally feel itself duty bound to persecute them in the interests of its own survival. This, of course, is just what Communist regimes do, but our dislike of such regimes should not blind us to the fact that no political entity, however liberal its outlook, can remain indifferent to activities that subvert its own continuing existence. Luckily, in our situation, such a position need never arise - not at least with regard to philosophy. Not only are the institutions of Western political order compatible with anthropological truth, as those of the Communist world are not, but there is nothing in the logic of philosophical development, beyond a certain pseudo-hermeneutical tendency to what Heidegger called forgetfulness of being, that leads us to suppose that philosophy in the future will not be redeemed, by philosophical argument alone, from the wilderness in

which it finds itself today.

Notes

1. A.C. Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980, p. 8.
2. Murray N. Rothbard 'The Hermeneutical Invasion of Philosophy and Economics', *The Salisbury Review*, vol. 6, number 1, Spring 1987, pp. 12-19.
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6. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, translated by William Glen-Doepel, London, Sheed and Ward, 1975, p. 230.
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A Not Very Edifying Spectacle

Stewart Deuchar

As late as 1985 Sir Keith Joseph, then Secretary of State for Education, was making speeches expressing enthusiasm for the teaching of History, especially British History, in our schools. He saw it as a way of enabling pupils 'to understand the development of the shared values which are a distinctive feature of British society and culture...'¹

But in the summer of 1986 he announced the introduction of GCSE in which History, quite explicitly, turns out to have a completely different role. British History, where it is studied at all, tends to be treated in a negative manner, as though it was an object of shame and derision. Not only that, but the whole idea of studying History for the sake of what we can learn from it has largely been abandoned.

The astonishing discrepancy between Sir Keith's words in 1985 and his deeds in 1986 has passed largely unremarked. Yet it is a matter of great importance to the long-term future of this country. The most plausible explanation - echoing 'The Riddle of the Voucher' - is that Sir Keith was overridden by the tide of opinion in the educational establishment, which was, and still is, above all else egalitarian.

History is a sitting duck for anti-elitists, militant feminists, anti-racists and others, so there has been a strong tendency to drop it altogether from the timetable. But dropping History altogether leaves a lot of teachers and lecturers high and dry. What to do? The answer came pat on cue in the form of the New History which stresses the acquisition of 'historical skills and concepts' and downgrades the study of the historical record itself. Having studied the New History to the best of my ability for the past two years I have come to the conclusion that it is largely bogus and worthless. The enthusiasm with which this mickey-mouse subject has been embraced by the History teaching body presents, it must be said, a not very edifying spectacle. I am aware that there are good and sincere teachers who think the New History has merit. I respect their view and their right to propound it, but I cannot see why they should expect the state to back them, still less give them monopoly status. Nor can I see why they should be allowed to call it 'History'.

The fact is that the New History has been foisted onto our children without the barest pretence of public discussion or even the courtesy of a reasoned explanation. The arrogance of the education establishment truly knows no bounds. History does not belong to the teachers, nor yet to the education departments; it belongs to us all, or rather, we belong to it.

The rationale for the New History is embodied in two short books, E.H. Carr's *What is History?*² published in 1961 and Denis Shemilt's *History 13-16 Evaluation Study*³ published in 1980.

E.H. Carr's book is a brilliant series of lectures expressed with much wit and wisdom. On the back of the Pelican edition is a quotation from a review in *The Spectator* saying 'Professor Carr shows that the "facts" of history are simply those which historians have selected for scrutiny.' Carr does actually make this not very startling observation in his Chapter One, and he actually does at one point put the word 'facts' in inverted commas. This has been taken by some proponents of the New History as justification for dismissing the entire historical record as more or less worthless. But if you read the whole book you find that this is not what Carr is saying at all. The essence of his message is that 'The historian is balanced between fact and interpretation, between fact and value... When we seek to know the facts, the questions which we ask and therefore the answers which we obtain, are prompted by our system of values.'

Carr at no point denies the existence of historical facts. He does not deny that there is a core of facts which any historian of whatever persuasion would have to acknowledge. The following quotation from his page 145 is revealing - 'Professional advertisers and campaign managers are not primarily concerned with existing facts. They are interested in what the consumer or elector believes... or can be induced to believe.' This shows that Carr acknowledged the existence of facts independent of the value-system of the observer.

There is nothing in Carr's book which justifies jettisoning our traditional methods of teaching history, nor did he have anything like that in mind when he gave the lectures. He was, however, intoxicated with the idea of revolutionary change. He scorned 'gradualism', which he saw as a kind of 'British Disease'. He preached that Britain was being left behind by Eastern Europe, Russia and China. No doubt the proponents of the New History were attracted by this revolutionary fervour.

The second 'Bible' of the New History, Shemilt's *Evaluation Study*, is on a different intellectual level. The background to it is the setting up of the Schools Council for Curriculum and Examinations in 1964. This Council contained a majority of practising teachers. In 1972 it established the Schools Council Project *History 13-16* 'to examine the role of History in an era of curriculum change'. Change, therefore, was the essence of the Project from the start, and, by implication, the more change the better.

The Schools Council History Project (as it came to be called) was, and still is, embodied in a syllabus which concentrates on skills, concepts, and other innovations (or rather shifts of emphasis: there always have been skills and concepts in the study of History, but they were acquired in *the course* of study, rather than being

the primary *objects* of study). One of the written papers for the GCSE has no set 'content' at all. For a rather fuller description of this syllabus I refer the reader to my pamphlet *History and GCSE History*.⁴

Originally this Project was tried out in a number of schools round Leeds. Shemilt was given the job of Evaluator of the Project from 1974-77, and was its Director from 1978 onwards. In 1980 his Evaluation Study appeared.

Shemilt's *Study* is open to a great many serious criticisms, but the strange thing is that it has never, as far as I am aware, been seriously challenged. This is the more surprising seeing that one of the proud boasts of the New History is that it is supposed to 'teach pupils to think for themselves'. In fact the most striking thing about Shemilt's *Study* is the number of ways in which it breaks its own rules.

One of the few rules of 'Source-evaluation' (which is supposed to be the jewel in the crown of the New History), is that 'one source is never enough' to establish anything historically. Yet Shemilt's *Study* stands on its own and has been accepted uncritically by the entire educational establishment, from the Secretary of State down. The New History is supposed to be about 'evidence'; yet Shemilt offers very little in the way of evidence, and what he does offer is misleading. He took numbers of pupils, some of whom had taken the Project and some of whom had taken traditional courses, and tested them for 'Conceptual Attainment'. Since Conceptual Attainment was one of the Project's major innovations it is hardly surprising that the Project pupils showed up rather better than their counterparts. On the other hand it is hard to imagine fair and reliable measurements of Conceptual Attainment. And is Conceptual Attainment really what the study of History is all about?

'Detecting Bias' is another innovation of which the New History is particularly proud, yet it is hard to imagine anything more biased than Shemilt's *Study*; its language gives it away in every paragraph. Furthermore, the fact that Shemilt himself was the Director of the Project must cast some doubt on his objectivity.

The New History is often called 'the form of knowledge approach' and this is supposed to imply that it places great emphasis on *how reliably* we know anything. Yet it is precisely here that Shemilt is at his weakest. On the one hand he is habitually contemptuous of mere 'facts', which he invariably puts in inverted commas, and on the other hand he is obsessed with the concepts of Causation and Motivation, on which subject he pronounces with the greatest assurance. I offer the following quotation to illustrate this:

For example, because she thought of History as a simple chronicle of events, one girl was disposed to dismiss as irrelevant the question of their authorship. (Page 19.) [By 'authorship' Shemilt here means 'motivation', as will become clear].

Action alone mattered; intention did not:

Girl: History is mostly noted for the happenings rather than the people. (Written statement)

Interrogator: But for the historian wishing to explain the 'happenings' is it important to know why they did things?

Girl: The actions are more important than their reasons for the actions.

Interrogator: Why are they more important?

Girl: Things that happen make history rather than people.

Interrogator: So how does the historian explain *why* things happen?

Girl: He doesn't usually. (Control subject)

None of the experimental (ie 'Project') pupils participating in the evaluation advanced arguments of this sort.

The last sentence shows that Shemilt clearly believed that the girl was made to look foolish and limited. In fact the girl was quite right. She knew perfectly well that motivation can never be anything more than a matter of speculation. We *know* within tolerable limits that Britain declared war on Germany in 1914, but it would be a bold or bogus historian who claimed to *know* just exactly why.

The one piece of 'evidence' which the New History has clearly never looked at critically is its own birth certificate; this is a pity because the basic philosophy of the Schools Council History Project came to be incorporated in all the GCSE History syllabuses. They all concentrate on 'skills' and 'concepts'. They are all much preoccupied with 'source-evaluation', 'empathy', 'detecting bias' and 'the form of knowledge approach' and they all incorporate a sizeable element of coursework. So now a whole multi-million pound industry has been founded on the basis of one highly questionable treatise of less than a hundred pages.

A common excuse put forward for this radical transformation of the teaching of History is that traditional methods had consisted of nothing but rote-learning of dates and the names of battles in which the English always came out victorious. One can only say that this sounds extremely unconvincing. If traditional teaching ever was anything like that, then the fault lay with bad teachers and examiners. History well-taught is the most diverse and challenging subject of all; for it is about life itself.

The New History is also claimed to emphasize understanding rather than the 'mere' accumulation of knowledge. The 1988 examination papers themselves give the lie to this claim. It was the GCSE papers which asked questions like 'What is the address of the Prime Minister?' and 'Name a minister who resigned in 1986.' It was the 'traditional' Scottish papers which asked questions which demanded understanding. I asked one boy how he got on with his GCSE Schools History Project paper and he said, 'I was floored by the long names of the diseases.' So now the History pupils are burdened with rote-learning the names of diseases and famous surgeons! Where is the logic in that?

It is perfectly natural that each generation should want to re-write history in the light of its particular preoccupations. If this was what the New History was all about nobody would object so long as it did not claim to be immune from criticism itself. I personally welcome the movement to give women more credit for their role. History can never stand still. But this sort of thing is only peripheral to the New History, which regards the historical record as of secondary importance, and has gone a long way towards making it so. As an example I would cite a piece of coursework described by Dr Fines in the Spring 1988 number of *The Historian*.⁵ A 'small group' of pupils spent six weeks on the topic of the Brighton bomb.

The Brighton bomb was a threat to our whole civilization. It was a threat to democracy itself. But this significance was lost on the pupils, as their answers to subsequent questioning clearly showed. They were so taken up with the 'evidence' that the underlying meaning escaped them. This is entirely typical of the New History; it misses the point. Yet Dr Fines is clearly very proud of this particular exercise and invites us to share in the applause.

One highly regrettable feature of the New History is the carapace of intolerance with which it surrounds itself. The language used in its defence in the various teaching periodicals is reminiscent of the old-style class war. When Alan Beattie of LSE wrote the booklet

History in Peril Dr Fines savaged it in *Teaching History* in a manner which did him and his cause no possible credit.⁶

Looming up is the Core Curriculum, which will apply to all children throughout their compulsory schooling. The danger is that the New History, with the enormous head of steam which it has managed to build up behind it, will succeed in extending still further its highly undesirable monopoly of the subject. At the very least there should be extensive public debate so that the public is made fully aware of what is at stake. Better still would be to abandon this ill-starred experiment altogether.

Notes

1. Quoted in *Perceptions of History* by V.R. Berghahn & H. Schissler, 1987, Berg Publishers Ltd. pp. 3 and 4.
2. *What is History?* E.H. Carr, Pelican Books, 1961.
3. *History 13-16 Evaluation Study*, Dennis Shemilt, Holmes McDougall, 1980.
4. *History - and GCSE History*, Stewart Deuchar, Centre for Policy Studies, 1987.
5. *The Historian* Number 18, Spring 1988, p. 18.
6. *Teaching History* Number 48, June 1987, p. 40.

The Ordination of Women

Quinlan Terry

I take as my text a few verses out of the second chapter of the first epistle of Timothy.

There are well known chapters in the Bible, which are in the lectionary, known by heart and are popular with preachers. And there are other chapters, often in prominent places in the New Testament, like this one, which are virtually unknown. I would go further; there are a number of paragraphs which the church in this age would like to blot out of the Bible altogether, because they are *completely contrary* to modern worldly trends. And unless we make it our business to study the *whole* Bible, rather than confine ourselves to the parts that we like; we shall only know half the truth - and half-truths are more deceptive than lies.

Let us look again at these unpopular verses:

Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, not to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived, was in the transgression. Notwithstanding she shall be saved in childbearing, if they continue in faith and charity and holiness with sobriety.

(I Timothy 2,11-15).

Before we look at these words let me say that this epistle is one of the three pastoral epistles, I & II Timothy and Titus, and they occupy the next 10 pages of our pew bibles. They are written to direct Timothy and Titus in the first place, and all ministers of the gospel ever since, on how to behave; and they give advice on preaching, public prayer, government, qualifications for leadership and so on. Together they form *the* most perfect direction we have in all scripture on how to govern the church. So, if the church in our day really wants to know how to govern itself, it should not be seeking the majority view of the clergy and laity; it should go straight to the pastoral epistles for guidance. It is all here; the trouble is that we don't like what it says.

As I read these words I try to picture how the early church conducted its meetings. One can only assume that Paul would not have written these words unless there were some women, emboldened by their new-found faith - emboldened by the truth that *in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female* - to take this equality with men before God to mean that women are the same as men in every other respect. Paul has to use similar words to the Corinthians, I Cor 14/34, where he says this: *Let your women keep silence in the churches:*

for it is not permitted unto them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law. And if they will learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home: for it is a shame for women to speak in the church.

Why must women not be in charge? Why is it a disgraceful thing for them to speak in church? The answer is that men and women, according to Christian teaching, have different vocations. They are also separate matter, both in the Creation and in the Fall - which is why St. Paul goes on to talk about Adam and Eve in the next three verses of our text. Such a doctrine is not an embellishment to Christian theology, but a fundamental part of our religion. Paul contends, in effect, that the different tasks for men and women were clearly defined at the beginning. Man is to work and woman to be his help-mate and to bear children.

A man's task and vocation is to work by the sweat of his brow - *he must* provide for his family: it says later in this same epistle (I Tim 5/8) *if a man provide not for his own house, he has denied the faith and is worse than an infidel*. In 2 Thess 3/10 it says *If a man will not work neither should he eat*. A lazy indolent man is a disgrace to his family, and a lazy Christian is a disgrace to his church. But a man's task is not only to provide: he is also to guide and rule his family. And he is to do this because he was and is less easily deceived by Satan.

A woman's calling is entirely different and almost exclusively concerns the family and the bringing up of children. If she goes out to work, like a man, and leaves the children to bring themselves up, she must not be surprised if she cannot influence them when they are older; and she may suffer endless remorse in old age as she wishes she had put her family before her job. If a husband and wife really want to be blessed and happy, they must each live the way God has made them.

You may say - Ah! that is the Apostle Paul and he hated women. So let us leave Paul and turn to our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. What was His teaching on leadership in the church? We all know the list of the Apostles, and that they were every one of them men! If Christ had selected *one woman* the position would be entirely different. As it is, there is surely abundant evidence that Christ, in His own actions, deliberately reserved His priesthood to men.

Some people say that He was a child of His time, and that with the changing times (like today) He would have chosen a woman apostle. But if you say that Jesus spoke to his generation *only*, you might as well say that he died for his generation *only*. For the Christian *He was and is God*. He knew the future - He could foresee the turmoil of the 20th century - when He chose His apostles; and He caused all Holy Scripture to be written for all time. We reduce the Son of God to the level of a timid politician when we say that that is why He did not choose a woman apostle. There is therefore no foundation whatever, in the Bible, for the ordination of women.

I hasten to say at this point that although Our Lord did not choose a woman apostle, He was, in many other ways, much closer to women than men. Not only did He choose to be born of a woman with all the honour and glory that that implies; but women often showed greater discernment towards Him, when men were more ponderous. Who after all were the first gentile converts but the *women* of Samaria, the Syro-Phoenician *women* and later Lydia? It was a woman who perceived that Jesus was going to die and took a pound of precious ointment and anointed His feet and wiped them with her hair. And women have a greater capacity for love: it was the *women* who recklessly followed Jesus to the cross when the men all fled. It was a woman who was at the sepulchre weeping long before Peter and John arrived.

We have seen enough to show the importance of women in the life of the early church, but *never* do we find an example of a woman taking the authority which was given to men. Someone may yet ask: Is there no teaching ministry for women? The answer is, Yes; Titus 2, 3-5 says this:

The older women must teach what is good in order to train the younger women.

To do what?

To love their husbands, to love their children, to be discreet, chaste, keepers at home, good, obedient to their husbands, that the Word of God is not blasphemed.

What does the apostle mean when he says 'that the word of God is not blasphemed?' He is thinking of the example that the early Christians gave to the heathen all around them. The heathen then, as the heathen today, are not fools; they look not only at the individual Christian but at his wife and family. And if they see a husband who works hard and a wife who supports him and brings her family up well they might begin to be attracted to the gospel which such people profess. If the husband is henpecked and the wife is never there or always out at meetings they would say that they would prefer a comfortable and submissive heathen wife to a Christian. We talk a lot about witness but we forget that witness, like charity, begins in the home.

Now I realise that almost everything I have said this morning is unpopular today. We have the Sex Discrimination Act, we have the European Parliament and all that it means by way of impertinent legislation. And your biblical teaching on the glorious differences between men and women is under attack, not from outside the church, but from within. Prominent clergymen and their wives are pushing on relentlessly and nothing seems to be able to stop them. Make no mistake, this is the major issue of our times. And it will split the Church of England, as it has already done in America.

We have the words of the Apostles against it, we have the example of Our Lord against it; we have 2000 years of church history against it. May we be enabled therefore to see these things for what they are, an attack on the authority of the Bible and the Church; and may we have the courage to stand against any

further changes and innovations in our midst. We are continually being told to accept change. But there is little or no support for such an attitude in the Bible. What it does tell us to do (in the Book of Revelation) is to hold on to the things that remain, that are ready to

perish. May we do just that!

A sermon preached at St. Mary's Dedham, Sunday 26th June, 1988.

In Search of Central Europe

Cardinal Tomášek of Czechoslovakia has written many letters to 'the competent authorities' (as they are known in communist Newspeak), seeking the religious freedom that is officially guaranteed by his country's 'constitution'. His latest letter to the Prime Minister was smuggled to *The Salisbury Review*, and is reproduced below. In it the Cardinal refers to the petition, signed by 500,000 citizens - an unprecedented action in a country where a signature can mean the end of all privileges for a lifetime - demanding an end to the persecution of the Roman Catholic Church. The organizer of this petition, a Moravian railway clerk named Augustin Navratil, has been arrested and charged with criminal insanity. His trial has just ended, and, although Navratil is appealing against the verdict, it seems that he will be forcibly incarcerated in a mental hospital, from which he is sure to emerge (if he is ever permitted to emerge) in as disturbed a state as the authorities could wish. Navratil was not allowed, during his trial, to summon any independent witness to his mental health, and - as is normal in Czech political trials - no proper defence was permitted, and the verdict was pre-arranged.

Dear Mr Prime Minister,

I take it as my duty to inform you - and through you other members of your government - about my position concerning the events of the first months of this year which have a bearing upon relations between the Catholic Church and the state. I must express my objections to the manner in which these events were treated by some public servants and by the media. I also intend to explain the real significance of the events in the broader context and to call attention to the necessity to draw logical conclusions from them.

On the 1st January 1988 signatures began to be collected to a petition entitled 'proposals of Catholics for a resolution of the situation of believing citizens'. The Constitution of our state guarantees its citizens the right to present petitions and to get answers to them. Moreover, the Catholic layman who initiated the petition informed the Office of Prosecutor General in advance that this collection of signatures would occur. He did it by a letter dated 7th December 1987. Similarly, by a letter dated 20th December 1987 he informed you, Mr Prime Minister, and other high officials. In the letter he enclosed the text of the petition and appeal to

believers, which contained an explicit statement of the main intention of the petition: '*to bring about a substantial reversal in the state policy towards the Church*'.

This action originated from within the ranks of Catholic people. Among the reasons why I have welcomed and supported it is also the fact that my own efforts over many years to achieve more normal conditions for the Church and for believers, have yielded almost no results. My numerous letters and communications addressed to responsible state officials have remained unanswered.

The petition has not been prohibited by any authority. However, I have learned of many attempts to suppress the collection of signatures by intimidation. Furthermore, the author, signatories and my person have been subjected to a campaign of disinformation. The mass media have not shrunk from using the vocabulary of the fifties. Believers, and not only they, have become indignant over this campaign, and with justice: the petition has indeed gained such support that nowadays I am in possession of more than half a million signatures. Such is the truth about the petition.

Its real significance can be understood only in the historical context. The petition is so far the strongest and most pronounced, but by no means the first, expression of the opinion and the will of our believers. The Catholic people have been expressing their discontent with the policy of the state towards their churches by various means during all the past forty years. The policy was conceived in the once prevailing ideology of Stalinism. So far it has not been substantially revised. Its repressive and unjust character has been experienced by millions of believers and their children in the form of various chicaneries, including discrimination in the allocation of jobs, education, etc. A great number of them, especially members of orders, priests, bishops, but also numerous laymen, paid for their fidelity to the spiritual calling and for their life according to the faith by years of internment in labour camps and prisons. Some paid even with their lives. Many religious practices were excluded from the narrow confines of permitted pastoral work: for example, religious orders, religious literature and many other kinds of activity, - nevertheless these practices continued in hiding and were harshly persecuted, precisely because they represented a silent protest against the systematic liquidation of the Christian faith and the Church. Whenever there occurred a liberalization -

however slight it was – the believers always reacted in the same manner: they manifested their determination not to let the faith die. They ceased to hide their activity in so far as it became tolerated. Finally, the recent years have witnessed a growth in the number of open expressions, in the form of petitions and complaints.

The peaceful demonstration of believers who met in prayer in a square in Bratislava on March 25th (and against whom the Security used drastic violence without any reason), together with the massive support for the petition are nothing else than a continuation of the undying struggle of Czechoslovak believers for freedom of the faith and Church. At the same time these events have made it clear that the policy of the state towards the Church is in crisis. The policy as conducted until now can only be continued at the price of violence. Violence, however, does not resolve the crisis, but only deepens it. *The Catholics are conscious of their rights, they will continue to demand them and they are ready for sacrifices.*

The Catholic people from Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia have in many ways manifested their full trust in me in the past. Today they do it by hundreds of thousands of signatures, through which millions more Catholics are represented. This moral mandate not only authorizes but even binds me to speak out. Therefore I declare in the name of our Catholic believers, of both the Roman and the Greek rite: *We require change in state policy towards the Church. We do not want to take the road of confrontation, but rather that of dialogue!*

I am convinced that to take such a road in the present situation of our society is not only reasonable and just, but highly necessary. Our public is becoming ever more sensitive to wrongs, no matter to whom they are done. World public opinion watches very attentively whether human rights, religious ones included, are observed or trampled upon. These rights can no longer be denied to our believers. It is not possible to dictate from outside the content and scope of Christian life, while ignoring the opinions of the Christians themselves. It is not possible for the state to intervene in the internal affairs of the Church. Nor is it possible to tolerate interventions of various public functionaries into the private spheres of believers.

The situation destabilizes society and benefits nobody. It must be resolved; and there is no time to lose. The solution cannot be achieved by a dictate imposed by one side, but only through a mutual dialogue. By this word I understand a negotiation of two partners who respect each other and have a sincere will to reach an honorable agreement.

In the most important matters the partner representing the Catholic Church is the Holy See. In other matters the partner is our Church. The Church cannot, however, be represented by men who enjoy the trust neither of the Holy See nor of believers. An especially negative role in regard to relations between Church and state is being played by the association *Pacem in terris*.¹ The association has been forbidden by the Church authorities.

The Catholic people have repeatedly made it clear who they consider to be their true spokesman.

On the negotiations proper I say this: The Church does not want privileges. As regards all religious societies and all citizens without regard to their convictions we wish them the same: freedom to develop what they need and freedom to what they are entitled. The Church only needs space for fulfilling her spiritual calling and service of love to all men and the whole of society. Believers should have their place in the society not only as a workforce, but also as citizens with equal rights. This country is their home; they feel responsible for it, and it is most certain that their faith does not lead them away from an honest attitude towards the common good.

We are ready for a true dialogue concerning the fundamental solution concerning the position of the Church in our state. We are willing to forgive past injustices, but we are not willing to become accomplices through our silence in the injustices perpetuated against us, our children and our grandchildren. We certainly welcome every positive step – now above all else to fill the catastrophic vacuum in the hierarchy. But even a complete number of the diocesan and ordaining bishops will not mean that they could perform fully their spiritual tasks, if the present situation should remain unchanged.

The Catholic people rightly expect from me not only words but deeds. Therefore I decided to undertake the first step towards the dialogue. Serious discussions cannot be undertaken without thorough preparations. The state has for that purpose its experts. The Church needs experts of her own. Therefore I have asked some members of the Church who possess relevant qualifications to work out a complete analysis of the given matter.

I hope that I have fulfilled the essential task entrusted to me by the Catholic people of our republic: to voice their desire that the state's relation to the Church should improve. I expect your answer with hope and I shall relay it to our believers.

On the occasion of your new term in such a responsible post, I wish you, Mr Prime Minister, success in your work toward the peaceful coexistence of all citizens in our common state. For this end I and our believers, priests and members of orders, following the teachings of our faith, pray on your behalf to God, Father of all men, so that He might give you peace and all good things.

Prague, St. Adalbert's Day
23rd April 1988

Franciscus, Cardinal Tomášek
Archbishop of Prague

Notes

1. A communist front organisation established within the priesthood, with the aim of manipulating congregations in the direction required by the Party. (Ed.)

The Post-Humanist University: Three Theses

John Carroll

The Western university was founded as a Christian institution. It was predicated on the unquestioned and unifying faith. Within the faith its central task was theological, to explain the works of God to man, and to train minds for that interpretative work. The university was transformed by the Renaissance and later the Enlightenment into a humanist institution. In this, its second phase, Culture replaced God as the transcendental force that welded the unifying vision. We are now well into a third phase, in which the university has no idea of itself, and in as much as it has any direction left it is to be found in odd pockets still under the influence of the vestiges of long-dead ideals.

This history is best clarified by a closer look at the humanist phase. The humanist university drew its life from three related ideals. One was aristocratic, that of the gentleman, a character ideal. The assumption was that the good society depends on a social hierarchy led by a cultivated elite, based on inherited wealth and status, one with a strong sense of civic duty. That elite is defined by its individuals, men of character. In the nineteenth century the conception expanded to include the upper middle class, and the gentleman ethos was consolidated in the Anglo-Celtic world in the English Public Schools. The education of the gentleman culminated in university studies.

The second ideal was that of 'civilization'. Civilization is the pinnacle of human achievement. It depends on the most intellectually and imaginatively gifted, in trained application producing great works. Civilization has created the Gothic cathedral and the steam engine, Hamlet and the Sistine ceiling, graceful town planning, hygiene and codified law. The works of civilization show man at his highest, transcending mundane everyday life, making of himself something immortal and godlike, creating both powerful tools for the conquest of necessity and objects of supreme beauty.

The third ideal was the utilitarian one, that culture and knowledge are useful. In Matthew Arnold's formulation, deriving from Socrates, knowledge will make a man better and happier. Ignorance is the source of misery and evil. A man who has knowledge will find it more difficult - in the extreme version, impossible - to do ill. He will be more rational about his life, and therefore make it more pleasurable and fulfilling. These qualities applied to society will result in it too being reformed and improved.

The humanist ideals were combined in John Henry Newman's 1852 lectures on *The Idea of a University*. Newman focused on what he called 'the culture of the intellect', by which he meant:

the force, the steadiness, the comprehensiveness and the versatility of the intellect, the command

over our own powers, the instinctive just estimate of things as they pass before us, which sometimes indeed is a natural gift, but commonly is not gained without much effort and the exercise of years. This is real cultivation of mind.

Apart from the training of the intellect the main function of the Newman university is to transmit universal knowledge. The goal is a boy with a disciplined mind, who is knowledgeable and who has judgement. This is not directly utilitarian: cultivation of mind is like health, good in itself. The odd thing about reading Newman today is that while his explicit task was to set the rules for a Catholic university the reality is that he expounded the humanist ideal of his own times. Literature is the centre of his university, theology merely one branch of knowledge. Moreover, the tone of *The Idea of a University* lacks gravity, religious or other. Its mood is buoyant with Victorian upper-class optimism. Newman is secure within his class and his institution, Oxford, and in knowing that he addresses a captive audience, one that believes in the cultivated gentleman as the lynch-pin of the social and political elite, that believes in civilization and has a naive confidence about the complementarity of knowledge and progress. The Newman ethos was echoed soon after in Matthew Arnold's highly influential book, *Culture and Anarchy* (1859).

The optimism had gone by 1918, as Max Weber witnessed in his lecture 'Knowledge as a Vocation' (usually misleadingly translated from the German as 'Science as a Vocation'). Weber's question was whether the university is possible in a godless and prophetless time, in a time in which the traditional ultimate values had lapsed and no new ones had appeared. Weber observed that many were looking to the university to provide the meaning that had gone out of a disenchanting world. However, knowledge cannot provide meaning, in the ultimate sense of answering Tolstoy's questions, 'What should we do and how shall we live?' Nor, according to Weber, should it try. Prophecy does not belong in the lecture halls. What then remains? Weber finds three functions for the university: the advancement of knowledge, the teaching of methods of thinking, and the imposing on students of a clarity and consistency of thought within the framework of already given ultimate values. At this point Weber's defence of the university collapses in unacknowledged contradiction. The one function that moves him is the third, but it depends on already given ultimate values, the lack of which is the problem which stimulated his lecture in the first place. Weber concludes with a piece of vintage Calvinism, defending the virtue of intellectual integrity, founded on the individual teacher's own

conscience. The implication is that the rigorously disciplined scholar dedicated to his own branch of knowledge will communicate enough moral authority to his students to fill the metaphysical void. Behind this flattering absurdity Weber has described the post-humanist university: where there is authority it is in individuals obeying their own consciences, usually in isolation, an odd dispersion of one-man sects to be found sprinkled thinly through an aimless and sluggish bureaucracy.

The last serious attempt to revitalize the humanist university was that of F.R. Leavis. Leavis, in his 1943 book, *Education and the University*, argued for the university as the most important social institution, for only it can preserve culture and humanity from the barbarism of the modern world. Culture is the core, and it has its highest representation in literature. Culture is moral, humane and intelligent, the last defence against the material and philistine juggernaut of modernity. Culture is the continuity of a nation, its moral centre, preserved in its literature. The task of the university is to keep it alive. Leavis, echoing Matthew Arnold, goes on to advocate reading and thinking in a disciplined manner. The goal is to stimulate intelligence and sensibility. Leavis and his school did manage to put these principles into practice for a generation. In spite of their success in instilling a real seriousness and discipline, Leavisite English departments at their zenith in the 1960s were notorious for their internal ructions. Far from being centres of humanity and virtue they were typified by self-righteousness, pettiness and malice.

Some of the modern practice of the Western universities, before the 1960s, continued on the assumption of the humanist model. Michael Oakeshott, in his 1961 essay, 'The Study of Politics in a University', theorized this practice, arguing that the functions of the institution were to preserve the intellectual capital of a civilization, to set up a conversation across the disciplines, and to teach. In other words the 'civilization' part of the humanist ideal is accentuated. But Oakeshott in 1961 failed to see what Max Weber had seen in 1918. In the United States there were similar examples of the survival of the old education, especially in the liberal arts colleges, often centring on courses teaching the Great Books of Western culture - Columbia was a notable case.

In the twentieth-century wake of the humanist university there has been one quite different strategy: to create a politically active institution. Leave to Caesar that which is Caesar's applies as much to the university as to the Church. Yet in the ashes of the last 'idea' has grown the university as training camp for political and social reformers. Here the university has again followed the Church, in producing political activism in its death throes. Weber knew the phenomenon in the German universities of the 1890s. It reappeared in the 1930s with the sacking of Jewish professors, the burning of books, and Heidegger's Rectoral Address at Freiburg in which the great philosopher urged commitment to

National Socialism. In the 1930s it also appeared in other countries such as England, where a Marxist socialism became the fashion amongst intellectuals in the Humanities. The political motivation returned in the 1960s, this time pioneered by Leftist students demanding that radical social reform replace learning as the main activity of the university. Typical of the politicized institution was the stigmatizing of Goethe by German students as a reactionary: they refused to read his work and turned to Brecht as the master of their own culture.

No less political has been the recurring utilitarian attempt to turn the university into a polytechnic, or a Technical High School to use the apt German term. The university is then a collection of guild schools for social engineers and applied scientists, devoted to those specialist branches of knowledge which are relevant to the short-run social and economic problems of the day.

The political cell and utilitarian notions of the university have never been theorized. Leaving aside the systems of Bentham and Comte, for their positivist banality, there is no serious treatise defending them. There is, however, a powerful antecedent, one which is never cited by modern radicals. That is Plato's *Republic*. In Plato's totalitarian utopia, designed from scratch by philosopher-kings, the university is the key social institution. The rulers undergo a forty-year education, from ages ten to fifty, before taking over the State. The State arranges marriages, censors literature to the limit of banning all poetry including Homer, and it keeps control over a strict social hierarchy. This formative work of Western philosophy gave authority to political idealism, to the belief that the best human intellects, with appropriate training, could set about designing and building the perfect human society. The pre-Christian university, Plato's Academy, had strong affinities with the post-humanist university, although it must be admitted that the latter has drawn on none of the profundity in Plato's detail, detail uncontaminated by the horrible vision shaping *The Republic*.

The sequence of modern defences of the university, from Newman to Leavis, and the alternative moves to politicization, have occurred not only because of the failure of the humanist ideal. They have also had to contend with a profound attack on the university. That attack was launched by the German philosopher, Nietzsche, in a castigation of intellectuals, and indeed of the entire Western academic tradition. Nietzsche develops an argument that has roots in Romanticism, and deeper ones in the Reformation and further back in the pre-Socratic Greeks, and elaborates it into a general theory of the decline of European culture. Later critics of intellectuals like Sorel, Spengler and Benda have been very much under his influence, and their work is pale stuff by comparison. Weber's 1918 lecture is troubled precisely because it accepts Nietzsche's case, and cannot get around it.

Nietzsche's argument contrasts instinct and knowledge. The history of civilization is the history of

increasing repression, of steadily proliferating checks on the instincts. This development is against Nature. The healthy, strong, admirable human individual is decisive, he sees things clearly and can act on what he sees - his instincts are good and he obeys them. The high level of repression concomitant with civilization produces men, by contrast, whose passions are tepid, who dither, who are ineffectual, and who take to moralizing in compensation for their inability to decide and to act. In their inhibition they turn to thinking, to the pursuit of knowledge as a rationalization for their own weak character. They have lost the instinctive sense of what is good and bad, what worth doing and what not, and are under the delusion that they can reason themselves into action. It follows that the celebration of knowledge, epitomized in the philosopher and the university, is not a mark of progress, not the banner under which human life will be made better and happier. It is rather a neurotic symptom of bad character and decadent culture. For Nietzsche the devils in all of this was Socrates, the man of knowledge who hated instinct: the West has followed Socrates and what he represents.

In effect Nietzsche makes two major points. The first is about the human types who pursue knowledge, the second about the function of knowledge itself. The first point is that it is the worst of men who become intellectuals, slave types who are devious, inhibited and rancorous. Not only is repressed emotion sublimated into thinking, but the overcharged intellectual faculty is then commandeered to manufacture tortuous justifications of bad motives as good ones, of bad acts as reasonable ones. Such people are the last that any community should look to for example. In other words the university draws off the most decadent members of any modern society: it is not a place for the training of character or the development of virtue.

Nietzsche's second point is that knowledge has helped us become more comfortable, not better or happier. The best societies have strong cultures. Culture is rooted in myth not knowledge. Indeed the pursuit of knowledge is a sure sign that the sacred myths have lost their authority. In particular, academic history is an abstract endeavour, and only appears once real ties to the past have withered - family ties, tribal ties, communal ties. It is a futile attempt to replace this loss, to find new roots. The quintessence of strong culture, the tragedy of Aeschylus and Sophocles, posited that wisdom is a crime against nature. That tragedy in its turn was regarded by the messiah of knowledge, Socrates, as barbaric, as a bad influence on children.

Nietzsche here posits a distinction that was to assume great significance in later Western thought, that between 'culture' and 'civilization'. Through civilization the West has developed science and technology, it has become more rational, more refined, more cultivated - beneath it all, more comfortable. It has also become weaker and more mediocre, more frustrated and more resentful. Great culture is not the product of civilization, indeed it is incompatible with it. It appears at rare and

unpredictable moments in human history - fifth century Athens and Renaissance Italy - and is the product of men with strong and wilful characters. Such men are more likely in hard times and harsh environments. Greatness among men, in myth, and through culture is born out of suffering not comfort.

The last part of the argument is that the increasing repression of the active man combined with the canonization of knowledge has killed God. There are no transcendental powers left in a rational world. Where comfort is the highest value, it is the stomach not the sacred that rules. However, without belief in a higher order human life becomes meaningless, without purpose or direction. Hence the modern problem as theorized by its most insightful prophet: nihilism. The pursuit of knowledge, with the philosopher as hero, and the university as Olympus, has emptied the world of meaning.

Nietzsche's work succeeded in undermining the naive confidence about knowledge that had been axiomatic to the humanist tradition. Newman's 1852 lectures on *The Idea of a University* lost their plausibility a mere twenty years later, when Nietzsche published his first book, *The Birth of Tragedy* - although it was to take several decades for his attack to strike home. After 1872 it was no longer possible to assume that knowledge is a good thing, or that the pursuit of knowledge is one of the highest human vocations, or that 'civilization' is pure achievement. Nietzsche turned the philosopher into the intellectual - a term full of perjorative insinuation. Heidegger had good reason to call Nietzsche the last of the philosophers, the culmination point of Western philosophy.

Weber's defence of the university is against modern culture as interpreted by Nietzsche. For Weber the times are nihilistic, the world disenchanted and occupied by 'specialists without spirit, and sensualists without heart'. Civilization has triumphed over culture. The task of the university is not to restore the spirit or revive the heart. In any case Weber is too pessimistic to believe in that possibility. His modest claim is that the university allows specialist disciplines, and that they have a virtue as long as their practitioners obey their ethos, that of intellectual integrity.

Leavis, in effect also accepting Nietzsche, takes a different line. Yes, the task is to restore culture, which is the moral heart of a society. The university has the central role here, for it keeps culture alive by teaching the highest literature of a people. Taught in the right way this literature will make a student not only more sensitive and intelligent, but more moral. Thereby it trains a cultural elite strong enough to counter the profanity of the epoch. Nietzsche would not have been convinced by this optimism, and the history of Leavisite practice would only confirm his scepticism.

There is one further contribution of significance to this university saga. That is Philip Rieff's book, *Fellow Teachers*, published in 1973. What is important in *Fellow Teachers* is not the bitter attack on the modern university for having lost all its traditional authority

and virtue. The same attack has been levelled by a dozen other professors in the light of their experience of the 1960s, although without the caustic wit. What is notable in Rieff's own idea of the university. Unlike the other modern critics he provides a view of what the university ought to be, and it is not a rehash of the humanist ideal.

Rieff would agree with Leavis that the defence and maintenance of culture is the task of the university, and that task is vital for any society's well-being. The difference is in the concept of culture. Culture or theory, for Rieff, is interdictory: it commands, it has authority. It is what stops people doing what they should not do. It is the Thou Shalt Nots charged in such a way that breaking them will hurt. Culture is 'privileged knowledge'. The job of the university is to pass on this privileged knowledge, through the most objective, personal, closest re-cognitions of the great texts and theories. Thereby the related benefits and penalties of inherited culture are conserved. The vocation of teacher is 'to probe the workings of reverence and justice, and by an exemplary presence (that of the teacher himself) preserve both.' Teachers are the policemen of culture, through their interdictory schools. Finally, a university is for Rieff of necessity a 'credal institution'. It is predicated on faith, without which it is nothing, lacking either authority or mission.

This view is that of the old Plato, in his last work, the *Laws*. The task of Platonic education is to teach virtue. Two quotations from *Book II* give the essence of Plato's final vision:

Education is the drawing and leading of children to the rule which has been pronounced right by the voice of the law, and approved as truly right by the concordant experience of the best and oldest men.

Education is the rightly disciplined state of pleasures and pains whereby a man, from his first beginnings on, will abhor what he should abhor and relish what he should relish.

Teachers themselves must be of exemplary virtue, for it is pedagogically crucial to have contact with people better than oneself. The picture is completed in *Book V*: 'We should leave our children rich, not in gold but in reverence.'

In sum, then, for Plato there is an eternally given law, decreeing the rules which govern human life. Education is the teaching of those rules, so that the individual can learn to control his impulses in obedience to them. In another phrase from the *Laws*, a man must know what to fear. 'Right fear' is the key to the virtuous life. Moreover, when a man fears what should be feared he will be modest, he will be courageous, and he will be under the influence of the highest mood, that of reverence. Education is the instilling of right fear before the law.

We are now in a position to turn directly to our question: is the university possible in the post-humanist West? If so, what would it look like? We know in the late twentieth century that Max Weber's uncertain

defence of the university does not work - as a conglomerate of specialist disciplines vaguely unified at the individual level by an ethic of intellectual integrity. Nor is a polytechnic a university, and in any case it only works for the natural sciences, and perhaps such in-between studies as business and the various professions. A university draws its life from the ultimate questions about the human condition, and therefore it centres on the Humanities (including the Social Sciences), as it always has. It requires a unifying vision. Experience in the twentieth century proves that without such a vision it becomes demoralized, and those teachers who are not completely listless in their vocations in the main become rancorous, teaching against the authorities and truths of the inherited culture, in what they themselves often celebrate as a 'critical' or 'radical' manner. In the vicinity of the eternal questions ethical neutrality is not possible: men teach either in obedience or in rancorous hostility. In such a climate even that uncontroversial function of the university, training young minds in a disciplined manner of thought, has degenerated in practice. A good part of the reason that students turned to politics in the 1960s was out of frustration with teachers who had no authority and no mission, teachers in other words who had nothing to teach.

Thesis I: The Law. The task of the university is to teach the Law. This always was, and always will be true. It follows that there will always be a place for the university. We must return to the old Plato. Education at every level, but especially at the highest, is to evoke obedience and reverence in the student, by arousing fear of what is to be rightly feared - the Law underlying the order of things. Awakening the Law in the student in itself creates authority, first the authority of the Law, second the authority of the institution that teaches it, and third of the society that lives within its domain. Where there is authority there is meaning.

Our churches, the equivalents of which in most societies have had the task of transmitting the Law, are in ruins. Only the university is left. For this reason the Platonic model of the university is more appropriate than the medieval Christian one, although the two are congruent. The Christian God has lost virtually all authority in the West. The Law has not, for it never does, wherever humans are gathered together.

There is one difference with Plato: a university cannot teach virtue. Virtue in an individual is a part of character, which is largely inborn. A football coach or an army sergeant-major can reinforce character. That is not the job of the teacher. All humans are born knowing the Law, but their knowledge is unconscious. Education awakens the Law, leading the student into touch with his deeper knowledge, and in the process it arouses fear. This is not teaching virtue, although virtue may be an indirect consequence. For example, a student who is properly taught *The Iliad* will find himself awed before the laws that check the universal temptations of power. He will tremble in the shoes of

Achilles, who knew those laws but still chose to break them. Homer shows the consequences in retribution and penance for us all.

A great parable of education is *Oedipus the King*. Sophocles' universal tragedy is the story of Oedipus coming to know the Law, through having broken it. He finds himself outwardly and inwardly driven to finding out who has committed the crime of murdering the past king. As he gradually becomes conscious of the truth his fear mounts - fear before the Law, manifest in his case in the inexorable prohibitions on father-murder and mother-son incest. What he learns is that it was he who violated these two of the most serious instances of the Law. That he acted unwittingly, that he did his utmost not to commit precisely these two great universal crimes, for they had been prophesied, makes no difference to his guilt. That he was blameless according to the god of knowledge is trivial. What counts is that his instincts were unsound; they led him into the most transgressive of acts. Oedipus is cursed with a terrible fate, in that he is educated into the Law by breaking it in such a profound way that his life is ruined. His education is a tragic one. He learns fear, he is shamed into reverence, and therefore there is redemption - but no comfort. The timeless lesson here is the inviolability of eternal law: break it and you shall be punished, whether you are good man or bad, whether you acted consciously or unconsciously. The twentieth century has responded to this drama just as enthusiastically as did fifth-century Athens. It has striven to learn from it.

Teaching the Law has consequences not only for the individual, for each one of us as Oedipus. It has social consequences. Oedipus as king is an example to all; moreover, the king has great communal responsibilities. A part of teaching the Law is to stimulate the sense of duty, above all the obligation of the most gifted to renew the elites that keep a society in order, doing what it should. The Law commands the individual to use his talents to the full, and to contribute as best, as justly as he can to the good of his community.

(My unequivocal assertion of the Law here, of its existence and its imperative, is, I know, unsatisfactorily brief, given the pervasively sceptical and fragmented beliefs of our times. I have completed a book devoted to expounding the Law, under the title *Wrestlings with the Angel*.)

Thesis 2: The Three Functions of the university. Within the university the Law can no longer be assumed, it has to be taught. Only within the encompassing process of that teaching, only within the awakening faith, so to speak, within the unifying authoritative vision which is that faith, may the university's three separate functions be fulfilled. They are in a sense secondary. Nevertheless they are all necessary:

a) To develop intellectual discipline. Newman was right that a trained mind is as important for most who enter the political and social elites of a society as a healthy body. A trained mind means both analytical and deductive clarity, and judgement. The training of

the mind takes place in one or more of the disciplines.

b) To teach a specialist knowledge of at least one of the following disciplines:

history, including art history, important for the mindful continuity of the nation and the civilization;

politics and economics, as the laws of government, diplomacy and administration;

sociology, including anthropology, as the laws of society; philosophy, including theology, its history and its major controversies, and as a divining fork for locating the Law;

literature, important in Leavis's terms as the sensibility of the nation and its culture, and as a repository of the Law;

(natural science, medicine, engineering, architecture and law, disciplines not inherent to a university, but the last two in particular benefit from being taught within the wider compass of a university conscience).

Without the assumed framework of the Law the specialist disciplines become futile. A student can see no point in learning about the Putney theological debates of the seventeenth-century English Revolution unless that knowledge is part of a greater and more timeless whole. Knowledge for knowledge's sake has as much sense as sharpening a pencil which will never be used. In the post-humanist university the scholar-teachers themselves have difficulty keeping up their morale, for the same reason, although they will usually blame their students and their bad schooling or lack of cultural background (they know no history, have not read the classics, and their language is clumsy). The problem is not that the students have been poorly prepared in technique at school, but that in passing through the gates of the university they have entered a metaphysical vacuum, one moreover that has steadily contaminated the wider cultural environment, in schools, in the media, and in the fashionable books and other works of culture. The scholars who do not blame the students usually blame the university administrators, the Deans and Vice-Chancellors, for being mere bureaucrats and having no idea of the institution, of its standards and its tradition. This again is a misplaced accusation, for no one has any idea of the university. If anything, it is more the job of the active teachers than the administrators to rebuild an intellectual defence of their institution.

c) To teach High Culture. This is the most important of the three functions, for High Culture is the highest story of the Law. In our case there are two levels. There is the High Culture of Western civilization and that of the particular nation. Western Culture has its source in two sacred sites, each with its myth-forging literature and tradition. That literature is the foundation of a university education: Homer and Greek tragedy on the one hand, the Gospels of Christ on the other. Of second importance are the great reworkings of that literature, starting with the Renaissance and Reformation. In particular the classical works of European art between 1450 and 1850 belong here.

Anyone who has taught the classic texts, ones

written in contemplation of the sacred deities of our culture, knows that students irrespective of schooling and background are immediately alert. Once they are brought into contact with the eternal questions, which means the Law, a seriousness and dedication suddenly appear as if from nowhere. For the first time the university makes sense to them: it is speaking to a deep human need. A mood of reverence enters the lecture room.

Our universities are so run down that it has become necessary to teach High Culture first, when students enter the institution. Apart from literature and philosophy, the specialist disciplines should be delayed, until the students have taken in the true university ethos.

Then there is the High Culture of the particular society. All students should be taught the seminal texts and events of their literature and history. In the case of derivative British societies like the United States and Australia both English history and the local history are necessary, as are English literature, and the local literature if it has achieved its own greatness - which in the American case it has. The Leavis view of the university is cogent here.

Thesis 3: The Cautions. We have to be far more modest in our expectations than either the enthusiasts for the university like Plato and Newman, or even the modern reformers like Leavis and Rieff. Were the ideal university to be established there would remain grave reasons for caution.

Nietzsche was right, the university is inherently decadent, and will tend to relapse into its natural state. We must accept this. A university will always be close to the edge of doing more harm than good, attracting as it does, in both its teachers and its students, the members of society with their instincts most under strain, the most wrought, tense, inhibited and intelligent individuals. It doesn't take much to turn such people to malice, with a fervent bitter drive to destroy whatever is good. In such a climate only the most vigilant maintenance of the authority and direction of the institution will check the potential for rancour and grandiose pedantry breaking out. The best that may be found will be a small, elite institution with prodigious self-discipline and no expectation of a long life-tradition is not enough to save a university from itself. Its achievement will be the formidable one of awakening in such difficult natures a fear of the Law, and thus assisting them to become its servants and not its enemies.

We must also accept Nietzsche's other point, that knowledge in itself is against culture. Teaching specialist knowledge, particularly in areas with no direct relationship to the Law, is fraught with danger. Such knowledge has no depth; it touches nothing of importance. The sense of vocation has to be strong enough in the student - his own Law awakened - for him to be willing to subject himself to the long and often tedious business of learning a discipline. Vocation

here means sense of duty, and what Max Weber called intellectual integrity. Otherwise the student will be bored, or he will take to the old humanist delusion of idealizing knowledge as a virtue in itself.

In this context history needs a special word. Most of what is written by historians is profane and has no relationship to the Law - some of it may be useful for the disciplines of politics or sociology. There is another type of history, one of vital importance to a nation and its own ties to the Law. This is history that nurtures myth, the true myth of a nation. For instance there is Simone Weil's spiritual history of France in *The Need for Roots*, Henry Kyd Douglas's memoirs of riding at Gallipoli, and Churchill's volumes on the Second World War. In between profane history and mythic history is a third type, the story of the people's past, its high points and low points, written truthfully, with gravity and with judgement.

Knowledge is against culture. Furthermore, Reason is vain and assumes a superiority in human affairs which it does not merit. This links with the fact, neglected by Plato, that the Law is taught in many ways. High Culture, the mode of the university, is but one of many pathways to the Law. Popular Culture teaches the Law too, and usually more reliably. It does so through its moral tales told in such forms as television soap opera. It does so through sport, impressing on keen young boys the virtues of courage, honour, selflessness, fair-play and excellence. It does so through the popular newspapers and their morally charged coverage of everyday drama and crime. The Law is taught above all by the example of obedient and reverent individuals, whoever they may be, in whichever walk of life. As Nietzsche observed, the intellectual elites seem to be short on such individuals.

High Culture itself has organs other than the universities. The great imaginings of our culture hang on art gallery walls, while others may be witnessed at the opera, ballet, concert and cinema, and others again quietly read at home. However, it remains the case that much, but not all, of this needs teaching, if a person is going to approach a true reading of one of the great works of the Law.

The humanist university has failed. Today we know it, and we know why. The Christian university, founded in medieval form, is too culturally alien to the late twentieth-century West to be revived. At the same time the one institution which could replace the university, as the master teacher of the Law, the Church, is in a state of even more hopeless disrepair. A bureaucratically organized society will of its nature maintain an educational hierarchy, with the universities at the pinnacle. It will do so for the wrong reasons, and thereby continue to reproduce teaching bodies which are working against the society's best interests, unless the true university is restored. In spite of Nietzsche's scepticism, the revitalization of culture, of myth-charged culture, depends on the renewing of the bonds of the social and cultural elites to the Law. Today, this is the job of the university.

Lice in the Locks of Literature

J. L. Wilson

Amid the acrimony and argument which surrounds the future of British Universities, one major opportunity for retrenchment has not been faced - a reorganisation of the Faculties of English. The teaching of English in British Universities is founded on a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of the subject, its utility, and what it offers to those who read it; the amount of money invested in it represents a misuse of national educational resources.

Historically, English is a victim of its own success, and of changing educational fashion. Until the nineteen-twenties, perhaps until the Second World War, a young person wishing to acquire a University education, but with no vocation to a particular subject, would probably choose to study Classics. Changes in educational background, with more students coming from schools whose curricula did not include Classics, has meant that other subjects have had to absorb the mass of directionless undergraduates. The principal one of these is English.

The nature of Classics ensures that it provides an intellectual training. The alien language, the logic and organization of its grammar, impose perforce an intellectual rigour on those who study it. Translation, with the analysis and precision of thought which it demands, fosters valuable habits in those who practice it. If a delight is discovered in the literature, that is a bonus, not an expectation: Classics is studied for the sake of the subject, not as a means of self-fulfilment. Classics in fact provides exactly what the undirected student needs - an intellectual training which will provide a valuable foundation in whatever profession the student chooses to adopt.

English, as it is at the moment presented to undergraduates, does not. Most of those who choose to read English do so because they have no alternative, they enjoy reading, English is their best subject at school, and they want to go to University. Often they have not read extensively - sometimes no more than their set texts. They have no picture of the broad sweep of English literature, no sympathy for cultures other than their own, and no intellectual equipment with which to deal with them. The adolescent who has enjoyed *The Road to Wigan Pier* is bewildered and indignant when faced with *Piers Plowman*. Since he has come up with every intention of continuing the recreational reading to which he has been used, this reaction is inevitable. The modern school curriculum provides little of the grounding in classical and biblical legend that is necessary to understand all literature written at least until the nineteen-thirties, the ability to scan that is fundamental to the appreciation of verse, or the rules of grammar without which it is impossible to write or read the language.

These shortcomings are deprecated and mourned by many University teachers of English. They mean that students only imperfectly understand courses which assume such knowledge; those who had most influence on the development of English as a University course came out of the classical tradition. Some English dons even recognise their own responsibility for the inadequate preparation of their students, for the schools cannot teach what the teachers do not know, and those teachers were themselves inadequately taught by the very dons who are lamenting their inadequacy. But there is very little will on the part of university teachers to remedy the ills in which they are themselves implicated - to return to the schools a generation of teachers better educated than their predecessors.

To do so would, it is true, involve more than a re-definition of the curriculum. That would, in itself, be simple, since there is a consensus of what is needed - an intensive course of basic instruction in the classical and philosophical background, (together with instruction in grammar and scansion which could be undertaken along with other faculties, such as modern languages and history) an historical outline of English Literature and an introduction to the various *genres*. The students would not particularly like it, but it is the faculty in whom the resistance to change is endemic. It is charitable not to ascribe it to a fear of exposing their own ignorance (fifteen years ago a colleague at Edinburgh was unable to recognise a Biblical allusion in D.H. Lawrence) but rather to a reluctance to invest time and effort in basic and necessarily repetitive pedagogy.

The English Literature industry is a self-inflating Leviathan. What would seem to be its primary functions - the instruction of students and the increase of knowledge - have been largely forgotten. As the number of vocationless students applying to read English and being accepted has increased, so the size of English departments has increased in order to accommodate them. As the size of English departments has increased, so has the number of those wishing to pursue as a career the teaching of English at University level. As the number of candidates for teaching posts at Universities has increased, so has the pressure to publish in order to obtain posts or promotion. Those who win in this paper chase are left with a vested interest in maintaining the subject as it is and the number of students admitted to read it in order to justify their own existence and the expense to which the country is put in maintaining their comfortable lives.

All University departments, when threatened with the need for retrenchment, cry academic freedom and the value of knowledge for its own sake. These are strong arguments, but against them those who pay for

those departments may reply that these rights impose responsibilities – service to the public and contribution to the general good. English is vulnerable on both counts. The poor teaching of English in school is a result of poor courses in English at the Universities, and it is difficult to claim that the writer of abstruse articles in obscure journals makes as much contribution to the general good as the writer of short fiction in popular magazines. Historically English as a university subject is of comparatively recent origin, and the role of the academic critic, in particular, is not one that would have been recognised until this century. The study and the practice of literature have traditionally been seen as indivisible, the profession ‘man of letters’ embracing both. Classic works of literary criticism were either written by creators (T.S. Eliot), or by those who, while primarily students of literature, were yet distinguished writers of literature (Samuel Johnson). They were either practitioners writing about their art, or critics writing about an art which they were capable of exercising. In either case they had personal experience of the process of creation. The more distinguished critics of our own era – Empson, Trilling, Wilson, Lewis (the list is exemplary, not exhaustive) – also practised the art about which they wrote. Such versatility is becoming rarer. With obvious exceptions, practitioners of literature who teach in Universities tend to do so in creative writing programmes, and the role of the critic is seen as essentially separate from that of the writer. The increasingly esoteric and speculative nature of much literary criticism is surely related to the fact that few modern critics have any experience of original writing. This divorce from any practical engagement with their own subject argues a lack of real commitment to literature (for those who care about literature write it, rather than trying to impose their own interpretations on the writings of others) and leads to the sort of thematic truffle-hunting which any experience of the process of creation would have let them know was nonsense. In the world of literature, he who can does, and he who cannot writes criticism.

There is, in fact, an increasing divergence of the literati and the literate. There exists in the English-speaking world a large body of readers prepared to tackle serious writing, taking pleasure in it, and able to understand it. The book pages of quality newspapers are addressed to them. On the whole, those who write for such pages, who are usually themselves practitioners of the genres they review, serve their readers well. But few of these reviewers come from the body of professional critics. It is not seen as the business of the university practitioner of English Literature to address their words to the generally literate public. They address themselves to the colleagues who control their careers, and this produces a progressive retreat from the subjects and issues which should – if they are serious in their devotion to literature – engage their attention. Instead, in a desperate search for novelty, or at least for a ground about which so little is known that

they cannot be challenged on it, the literati discover ever more abstruse aspects of literary culture, ever more obscure authors, ever more startling reinterpretations to give ancient works contemporary relevance. What is never faced, what is indeed, avoided to the point of denying that it can or should exist, is the question of quality – of merit. To suggest that the aspect of literary culture is abstruse because it is unimportant, the author obscure because a minor talent, if not untalented, the reinterpretation startling because unjustified, is to be labelled (dirty word) ‘elitist’. If one questions the quality of an author under discussion, one receives the reply that they are ‘interesting’, which leaves the question unanswered.

The relationship between author and reader is at once direct, intense, personal and nebulous. No intervening consciousness mediates between them, as is the case with drama or music. The reader is his own interpreter; each relationship will be different, because the reader is different. Every reading of a book is, in one sense, ‘right’; the author presents their work for acceptance or rejection by the reader, to do with as they will. If a reader interprets *Persuasion* as an attack on British policy in the Napoleonic War, he is wrong, but Jane Austen has no grounds for complaint. If that reader attempts to persuade others of the rightness of his interpretation, buttressed by the imprimatur of a University post, he may well succeed in achieving a Bunthorneian impressiveness, but he is at best a false prophet, and at worst a fraud, with no true respect for the author whose works he purports to interpret. Yet the massive promulgation of such interpretations with growing intensity over the past four decades has produced a situation in which the confidence of the literate is being undermined by the literati, who are convincing the world outside the English Department (where at least the promulgation of the bizarre can be recognized as a ploy for career advancement) that it is necessary to be a scholar of English Literature in order to read it. By making English Literature the province of the few, English departments take it away from the literate. Supposedly devotees of the art they purport to interpret, they remove it from those for whom it is intended and hoard it to themselves. All that is needed to read literature in English is a knowledge of the language, but this fact is incompatible with the continuation of English departments in their present form. Unless the canon may be seen to be constantly in flux, the knowledge needed to appreciate truly the riches of the past seen as becoming ever more esoteric, the naked Emperor seen as lavishly clad, then the justification for the existence of most of the members of Faculties of English on both sides of the Atlantic ceases to exist.

What use is a degree in English? For what professions may it be seen as a direct qualification? Few. Teaching, publishing, and advertising are the only ones which spring to mind (government service will be dealt with later). Of these it is teaching that is of the greatest concern to those who pay the salaries of those who

teach the teachers. The main aim of any school course in English should be the production of literate children, with a thorough knowledge of their own language, which enables them to express themselves correctly and clearly. This would eradicate one curse of recent years - the coinages of the semi-educated (known in the USA as 'Hagspeak'). The second aim must be to instil a knowledge of how to read a book, and an awareness of the general outlines of English Literature. The hope must be that the teacher may also communicate a love of reading and a delight in literature, but these are not essential for a successful course. At the moment neither the rules of language nor a knowledge of the literature are being communicated, because the teachers themselves are not adequately instructed in them. The Universities must make the production of adequately trained teachers a priority, by means of a more rigorous curriculum, of which language forms a compulsory part.

The introduction of a rigorous curriculum would itself contribute to a reduction in the numbers of those seeking to read English. For too long English has, justifiably, been regarded as a soft option. At one Cambridge college the Director of Music was notorious for admitting young men on Choral Scholarships and then refusing to let them read music on the grounds of their stupidity. They invariably ended up reading English. The Socratic method of teaching Literature, whether by supervision or in seminar, can all too easily degenerate into a relaxed discussion of literature among friends - a tendency exacerbated by the attachment of some university teachers to the guru-relationship with their students which became fashionable in the nineteen-sixties. A discussion of a book or poem which one has enjoyed reading in the previous week encourages neither hard work nor intellectual rigour. When it becomes less easy to obtain a degree in English on the basis of reading one book a week backed up by watching television adaptations of the classics its popularity as a subject will diminish.

Greater content in the curriculum would discourage not only the lazy and the dim, but also those who 'enjoy reading'. These are in some ways the students who suffer most from the present state of English at British Universities. If they do come across a teacher who is rigorous they find that the approach demanded of them - which has nothing to do with enjoyment - may destroy their delight in literature; for them 'we murder to dissect' has real meaning. Without true intellectual curiosity something that could have been a resource for them is taken away, perhaps for ever. If they are allowed (as too often they are) to get away with a superficial approach, then they may coast through their University career, and enjoy themselves, but they will receive little that will help them in their subsequent careers, which will in all probability have nothing to do with literature. Such students might well be directed away from English to subjects which will be of more use to them and to the country.

Many of the directionless students will enter government service or industrial management. Is it really for

the good of the country, for the health of the industrial base of the nation, that a large number of those who run them come to the job with no better educational background than a partial knowledge of our national literature? Should we not demand a more useful grounding for them? Apart from the sciences, mathematics, economics, computer studies, geography, history and modern languages (in which we are, as a nation, so woefully deficient) would offer more to our future administrative class. For them, English, as well as representing a missed opportunity, is a luxury which may well turn into a handicap.

This handicap is not necessarily one which will be overcome by making the study of English more intellectually rigorous. Other subjects are still more necessary to the future prosperity of the nation: we need the numerate, the linguists, far more than those whose knowledge extends only to the literature of their own country. English departments should concentrate on those who have a vocational reason for reading the subject, and on those areas of research and scholarship which are of benefit to the literate.

The areas which are of the greatest benefit - the provision of well-edited, reliable texts, the establishment of facts about literary history, and the lives of writers - are those which are least highly-regarded among the literati. The sort of painstaking scholarship which is exercised by responsible editors and biographers is dismissed as mere mechanical antiquarianism unless it is surmounted by an airy castle of interpretation. The scholar is devalued at the expense of the speculative chancer. Great Literary scholarship is rare compared with the mass of pseudo-scholarship posing as reinterpretation. Great criticism has, in its accessibility, more in common with great reviewing than with the esoteric maunderings that often pass as literary criticism. Criticism at its best is an aid to the literate, but it ranks well behind the provision of reliable texts. Most of the literate would, rightly, far rather read books than books about books.

If English courses are made more rigorous, with a consequent diminution of their popularity among students, then smaller Faculties will be needed to deal with those who remain. This is as it should be. English may at last be put in its proper place, as a minority, a luxury subject, like Art History or Archaeology, rather than an expansive empire for the ambitionless. The number of departments should be substantially reduced, and those that remain should offer adequate and scholarly courses for students who are genuinely attracted to the subject. Even with a considerably smaller establishment there should be room enough to accommodate the true scholars and critics who provide the heart of literary scholarship and the value of whose own work is degraded by the company in which they find themselves. It is time that British Universities face up to the fact that they provide courses in a subject a large number of whose students are unmotivated, whose eventual degree may be worth little, and many of whose teachers practise, not scholarship, but self-promotion.

'Rebel Cambridge' in 1968: A Tutorial Retrospect

S. Gorley Putt

So much has been written of late about the Cambridge intelleftuals of the 1930s that I feel almost ashamed to admit that during the four years 1930 to 1934 I was never once invited to betray my country. A recent book by Andrew Sinclair, *The Red and the Blue: Intelligence, Treason and the Universities*, puts the whole business in reasonable perspective, much like Alistair Cooke's *A Generation on Trail* of 1950. The one mystery emerging from such a survey is how the 'squalid arrogance' (to borrow a splendid oxymoron from Eric Heaton, Dean of Christ Church) of the Apostles and their ilk could ever have been attractive to bright young men. Hugh Trevor-Roper (Lord Dacre) has called it 'the egregious secret society of self-perpetuating, self-admiring narcissi.' The magnetic word must have been 'secret.' Sinclair adds a sidelight: 'Theatrical success... encouraged a love of disguise, of playing many parts other than one's own true self. It enhanced a feeling of cleverness, increased if asked by a George Rylands or an Anthony Blunt to join a secret society...'

Here, for once, Sinclair goes too far. The Marlowe Society in which Dadie Rylands loomed so benevolently was certainly a pretty select group, but there was nothing secret about its activities. I myself had merely attended play-readings in the rooms of Rylands or of Donald Beves at King's, and the only streak of falsity my own priggish antennae could detect was a false confidence born not of treachery but simple visible snobbery. I recall one evening when, reading *Richard II*, a gilded youth (I think his name was David Hedley?), no doubt proud of his knowledge that 'Hertford' was pronounced 'Hartford,' misread Bolingbroke's title, Duke of Hereford, and such was his confidence in his mistake that a roomful of less assured readers followed his lead and went on idiotically pronouncing Hereford as Harford. A modest scholarly temperament could be some sort of prophylactic against this kind of imitative foolery. The major foolery of the real sellers-out was another matter. A dislike of all *they* stood for was, oddly enough, one of the few things C.P. Snow and F.R. Leavis had in common.

When, later in life, I briefly shared a BBC office with Guy Burgess (he was a snob and a slob) and was host to the supercilious Anthony Blunt at a Harkness House party, I could not for one moment believe that these intelleftuals had ever been actuated by a love for 'the masses'. Their zeal to run things for themselves as quickly as possible made them impatient of the slow upward tread of the Establishment ladder. It would be better to rule quickly in Hell than to take place in the queue for promotion in Heaven. The young American

Whitney Straight, who also flitted through a few of the parties I attended, probably shared their impatience. As in the days of the French Revolution, it was the renegade aristos and pseudo-aristos, rather than the bourgeoisie, who dipped their hands deepest in the blood of those ahead of them in the race. It was they who wished to change the rules for grabbing the same glittering prizes.

From this particular form of self-deception I was saved by a lingering realistic suspicion of -isms which also guarded me from such other groups as the sober-sides with a taste for homespun and an urban yearning after wheelwrights; or the young ordinands who in the bell-battered air of Cambridge were already trying to select their position in that spiritually semi-circular assembly which gives the Anglican Church the Left-Centre-Right shape of a Continental Chamber of Deputies rather than the Yes-No division of the British House of Commons.

* * * *

When I returned to my college as a Fellow in 1968, blinking like Rip Van Winkle at new goings-on, the young intelleftuals were quite different. There was nothing secret about their doings: campus politics and world affairs were all mixed up together. Gate hours, admission of women to men's colleges, concern for Afro-Asian economic welfare, were all discussed with equal and overt self-righteousness.

Small changes loomed more startlingly than the large ones. It was easy to accept as a new factor of life that in the evening hours as many young women as young men would be flitting bat-like through the courts; more difficult to grasp the new balance of the sexes as exemplified by sad little convoys of the same young women, clicketing unescorted at midnight towards the Great Gate. They seemed to be admitting, those resolute damsels damp in the winter drizzle, that their their emancipation had but made more absolute the sway of their slave-traders. True, I did on one occasion notice a female guest being seen off the murky premises by her hosts; but they were courteous Indians and she, booted and riding-caped and quite possibly spurred as well, was a Belimperia escorting *them*.

This change in manners struck me more forcibly than the rule of permissiveness itself. In the same way, occasional outbreaks of student 'vandalism' were much less notable than the new habit of first parading them and then disowning them. There is nothing new about undergraduate mayhem. It had long ago been expected

that on Rag Days and Bump Supper nights some policemen would lose their helmets and some boats be burned. It has also been expected that on the following day those responsible would 'own up' and pay society, or the College, the appropriate fine. The new vandalism was not worse than the old; but it was undertaken by public-spirited campus politicians in protest against the state of the world, yet resolutely denied by barefaced lying. *This* was the new flavour.

Already, books are being published (though none has yet come my way) on the various student uprisings of 1968 and thereafter, so swiftly do yesterday's goings-on become -ism and -ology fodder for social theorists. It so happened that I had given earlier warning of student revolt in another country before the fashion had reached us from Berkeley, California, via the Sorbonne. It was in comfortable Berkeley itself that it became clear to me that the local eruption of student discontent was being stoked not so much by guilty outrage against the Vietnam War, which students shared with millions of other Americans, but by the unbridged gap between teachers and the would-be taught. Every young radical generation grows up in its own We-versus-Them reaction against the behaviour of its own national government. In my own student days it was the Spanish Civil War and Britain's shameful 'non-intervention' policy. Earlier generations of students had felt much the same about the Boer War; many in America and other parts of the world were feeling the same about Vietnam. The difference was that my Cambridge friends and I had not blamed our university for Spanish policies. At the Berkeley I visited not long before that campus 'blew up', it was the hampering We-versus-Them frustrations of students against faculty which sharpened the bitterness of students against their government. Absentee or invisible professors had next to no personal contact with their own students - who in their academic life felt as ignored and unregarded as their political views seemed to be in Washington. I reported that trouble was brewing at Berkeley, some time before it became violent and therefore national news. It was the general lack of interest by professors even in the identities, let alone the opinions, of their undergraduates that had, for me, sounded the alarm bell.

It struck me as highly significant, when our own 1968-72 brand of demonstrations broke out, that it was ex-students from foreign countries where the great divide between teachers and taught was deepest who were courted as hero-leaders: Danny the Red or the even less likely Tariq Ali - 'Whose own country,' I used to tell my own rebels, 'hasn't yet got around to chasing Charles I off his throne, let alone teaching *us* how to run a democracy!' No; the coming together of political and campus discontents at the same time could not be explained, in our own case, by the indifference of teachers to the taught. On the contrary, our local protests - side by side with anti-government enmity - were caused by too *much* interest and interference by the old in the affairs of the young. Unopposed

College traditions had cherished a We-versus-Them alignment altogether different: it was We academics (young and old alike) against the Them of the world outside our walls. It took some time for elders loyal to this concept to grasp that our new young versions of We wanted to let Them *in*, not keep them out.

Our quite innocent efforts to go on shouldering the burden of '*in loco parentis*' became obsolete overnight as soon as the law changed and young men and women became officially responsible citizens and voters at the age of 18 instead of 21. (Strange, by the way, that they still go on celebrating their 21st rather than their 18th birthdays - proving that they, too, can take as long as the rest of us to adapt their inherited instincts to a new formula.) Fining undergraduates for coming back too often into College or lodgings late at night - this had once been a routine protection of our working academic We group against the non-academic lure of the outside-College Them. Gingerly, these 'gate hours' were first liberalised and then abolished. Similarly, it took time to grasp that female guests could no longer be extruded at midnight: their We hosts were still undergraduates but also legally responsible adults, who could let in Them of any kind, without consent of dons no longer '*in loco parentis*' - as their own parents had also discovered, some with puritanical anguish but far more with 'nothing to do with me any longer' sighs of relief. The transitional few Terms when old College habits were merging into the new legal realities were marked by quite farcical efforts to apply the brakes: hours of free access grew longer, female guests stayed inside longer. By the end of 1968, females were allowed in until 2 a.m. One morning I had to visit a tutorial pupil and found a young lady sitting up in his bed enjoying her breakfast. It was explained that she had, of course, left College at 2 a.m. and then come back to visit him after the College gates had been officially re-opened at 6 a.m. It was certainly a relief when these fantasies were shelved.

Co-incident with this acceptance of technical adulthood was a very natural demand to shelve the 'all men' or 'all women' nature of Cambridge colleges. Very early in the campaign my own College declared its intention to 'go mixed.' But it was not that easy. The university hoped that male colleges would become mixed a few at a time, forming a queue over some years. This made some sort of sense, simply because girls' schools and mixed schools could hardly act overnight on the knowledge that the drawbridges had been let down: the admission process is a lengthy affair anyway. There was for us, too, a curious obstacle embedded in our College Statutes which certainly could not be removed by the application of an india-rubber. Our royal foundation (Henry VI) had been refounded in 1506 by the Lady Margaret Tudor (mother of Henry VII) and her own princely statutes laid down that 'no woman shall be a member of this College.' She had refounded and rebuilt the place and spent much time in College privately in the upper floor of the Master's Lodge, largely in a room with one window

looking peep-hole-wise into the Chapel and another into the dining hall. The imperious lady wished to be sure that the boys were behaving properly in both places - but by her own decree she was herself debarred from entering such forbidden territory. It took quite a time for our own Queen in Council to sanction a change in the statutes, which also lay available to her Houses of Parliament for lengthy scrutiny.

The junior members I inherited had been hastily selected by teaching Fellows who could spare little time for the extra chore of admissions procedure. Not for another three years could I claim to know all our undergraduates from their first appearances as school-boy candidates. During those years, the reactions of many of them to Cambridge life were tinged by a complex mixture of public, political, professional and private feelings of guilt, often allied to quite admirable philanthropic urges. Those who busied themselves most in campus politics were feeling uneasy about the distant political Establishment of which they mistakenly considered their new parochial academic Establishment to be a part; they felt uneasy about the Western world as a whole when measured against the miseries of Biafra or Bangladesh; most of all they felt uneasy because by brains and hard work they had won a place in a privileged community, unlike Frankie who had gone straight from school to the factory or the dole. They were not prepared to swap the self-pitying comfort of pretending to be under-privileged ('Out, out, out!!') for their hard-won new obligations belonging to the giving rather than the receiving end ('In, in, in!!').

A few examples from those stirring years may illustrate how strangely public and local problems were mingled in the minds of 'activist' students (always, of course, a rather bleak minority). Decisions affecting daily life within College could be absurdly couched in party-political language; or major political demonstrations could have unexpected side-effects on our domestic life.

My first example is black farce. In our concrete Lasdun building which I think of as the Milton Hilton, a large room in the cellars had been set aside for ranks of washing machines for use by students. Very soon their Committee, following upon one of the usual Open Meetings attended by a score or so of our 400-odd youngsters, denounced us as bourgeois fascist hyenas and reported a demand by the usual 'overwhelming majority' that these machines be removed and the room used as a general rumpus room. Sensitive to democratic opinions, the Governing Body conceded. Hardly had that particular Committee cropped its hair and turned themselves into merchant bank trainees before their successors denounced us as unfeeling fascist hyenas for failing to supply washing-machines for the toiling masses. Even now, we are short of space for these amenities, thanks to the now forgotten militant Left.

The second example shows how the College could support We against Them, even when other tutorial pupils were implicated, in the year of grace 1970, in

what is still mentioned in bated breath - by retired Senior Tutors of many Colleges who now walk about with broad smirks indicating 'Nothing to do with me any longer - ask *him!*' - as The Garden House Riot. It was an occasion when yet another foreign régime abhorrent to right-thinking democrats, this time the régime of the odious Greek Colonels, provided background excuse for public self-righteousness and private enjoyment of vandalism. A group of travel agents had organized at the Garden House Hotel a weekly series of 'national' dinners, hoping that those who enjoyed a particular cuisine new to them would be lured into buying package tours to that country. A Greek dinner found a place in the series. Somehow, an amazingly well orchestrated army of indignant youth, cheered on by some trendy (but absentee) dons, stormed the hotel, smashed windows, upset tables, terrified elderly and politically innocent diners, and in general constituted a full-blown riot, the consequences of which included several arrests and a major legal enquiry in which city and university were involved.

Of all this I knew nothing until in the middle of the night I was roused by a College porter asking for permission for a police officer to call at the room of a certain undergraduate (whose name, providentially, escapes me). In dressing-gown, I preceded our visitor and knocked politely on the door of Mr. X. No reply. By this time I had learnt that he had been a 'ringleader' and was needed for 'questioning.' It seemed unlikely, I devoutly hoped, that Mr. X would have returned from his nocturnal labours. With tutorial authority I entered the room. No sign of an inhabitant. The walls were covered by posters of an obscenity which (we later confessed) neither the policeman nor I had ever seen matched. But far more striking was the evidence, on a large coffee-table crowded with debris of an indoor picnic, that Mr. X and his friends had refreshed themselves, before setting out for the impious hotel, with copious draughts of Greek wine! The empty bottles proclaimed the Greek origin of the word hypocrisy.

One of my own tutorial pupils was less lucky. He had been caught red-handed in active riotous behaviour that same night and in due course was tried and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. As Senior Tutor I visited him at Wormwood Scrubs as soon as possible (raising the eyebrow of an Athenaeum porter when I asked him where it was and which bus or Tube would get me there) and obtained permission for him to have his text-books (in, predictably, one of the Social Sciences) sent to him. When later he was transferred to more relaxed confinement elsewhere, the College arranged for his supervisor to pay him weekly visits at our expense, and it is on record that he gained in his next examination a higher class than he had won before submitting to the less permissive regime of prison fare (no Greek wine) and prison sleeping-hours.

It was a matter of high principle that this Mr. Y, having 'paid his debt to society', should not be subject to any extra form of discipline by either university or college. On his return to us (with full remission for good

behaviour while reading and being taught in what had become for him an alternative place of higher learning), he found his new room ready for him and his name painted up on staircase and door, plus an invitation from me to my wine party that same evening. The Master, Lord Todd, was one of my guests, and when Mr. Y entered my candle-lit room I placed him next to the Master and surreptitiously showed him the label on the bottle of quite unaccustomed champagne I had saved to toast his return to his College.

'Oh, *merveilleux!*' said Mr. Y - I forgot to add that he had been born in one foreign country, travelled under the passport of another, and had acquired revolutionary techniques whilst at the Sorbonne - 'Lovely stuff! But don't tell my friends, will you!'

A thoroughly likeable chap. He has not yet revisited his old tutor, but I still hope he will turn up, one of these evenings. He will be more welcome than another pupil whose Wykhamist face I unexpectedly descried through a hole in the Senate House window caused when a stone, hurled from outside, landed among the audience for a rather boring (to a non-economist), technically neutral academic lecture by the Cambridge-bred Prime Minister of Singapore, Li Quan Yew. This particular protester also happened to attend my wine party the same evening. I said I had seen him through a hole in a window that afternoon, and asked what particular item in the lecture had upset him and his outraged colleagues. He could not say, having heard nothing outside that quite substantial building. Did the *title* of the talk annoy him? He did not know it. Then, what did he have against the speaker, who had himself been a pretty revolutionary figure at one time? He did not know: he had not discovered the name of the speaker. The man, whoever he was, was speaking to dons in The Senate House, it seemed: surely that was enough?

Thus far, my samples have illustrated the unwitting abrasions between over-anxious guardians of the academic We and their new pro-Them juniors. My last sample, a striking example of lay pastoral activity, must serve to illustrate the role of tutors acting out the now discredited '*in loco parentis*' role on behalf of pupils who had either rejected, or been denied, old-fashioned advice from Mum and Dad. Obeying my own general rule that every undergraduate should get to know at least two dons - his Tutor and his Director of Studies - I had many tutorial pupils whose subjects of study were way outside my own sphere of comprehension. One of my mathematicians (whose name also providentially escaped me) had disappeared from the lists of those attending my wine parties and was rarely seen by me around the courts. His long hair had been trained over his face so that only his nose was clearly visible, and the curtains of his room were always closely drawn by day as well as at night. Well, we all have our little ways. At Cambridge, eccentricity is a badge of normality. Perhaps mathematicians become unaware of the presence of other human beings in their locality? Who knows?

One night, at about midnight, he walked in unex-

pectedly. My pupils knew that I did not have 'visiting hours' but was usually available without notice up to 2 a.m.

'You are my tutor.'

I acknowledged the correctness of his solution.

'You should know that I have nothing left to live for. I have decided to end it all tonight. I thought you should know.'

I sensed that he was telling the truth.

'Thank you. This calls for a drink, I think.'

It was some time before he could be persuaded to sit down: our earlier talk (correction: my earlier monologue) was conducted as he stood erect while I replenished glasses or walked about the room fussing very busily with ashtrays or the like. My own hair was quite long, but did not cover my eyes, which were not off him for one instant. I was fairly voluble in my complete agreement with his point of view. He was right, Life did seem pointless. And don't imagine that it becomes any less so. In fact, so far as silly old sadness went, I must be much sadder than himself, having lived longer and collected much more to be sad about. His girlfriend had left him, had she? Humph. What about people who did not even *have* girlfriends to leave them? How can we miss what we don't have? We managed to find other things of interest. Didn't *he*?

An hour or so passed while, as last seated, we played an increasingly bizarre game. I ticked off various things that I myself had found, and some of which I still did find, useful, calming or worth occasional notice. He was beginning, I thought, to feel quite sorry for me in my relentless quest for *raisons d'être*.

'By the way, the very last thing I'd advise you to do is to try to "Cheer up". There's nothing boring about being wretchedly miserable. I often am. When I feel in the dumps I just sit in my puddle and wallow: it isn't pleasant, but it certainly isn't boring.

'I'm sad at this moment. For me as well as for you. But this is a good claret, isn't it? Oh! Do you know what your friend X asked me the other night, when he was leaving the wine party you missed? He said: "I've been meaning to ask you for some time, sir: What is the difference between claret and wine?" Do you know what I said? "The difference between Players and cigarettes".'

My visitor gave a half-hiccup in lieu of a half-laugh.

It seemed the moment to ask him about College food: did he eat in Hall? Not much. His girlfriend cooked stuff on his electric heater.

'I always breakfast alone, here in my room. Did you have to make your own breakfast this morning?'

'Yes.'

'Did you have an egg?'

'Yes.'

'A *boiled* egg?' I was beginning to feel like a witch-doctor.

'Yes.'

'Did you enjoy it?'

'Yes.'

'Then for heaven's sake enjoy another one tomorrow.'

And now, be off. Time for bed. Goodnight. Correction: Good morning!

What does a Tutor do, daddy? I learnt several years later when a young man opened the door in response to my 'Come!' and ushered in a pleasant looking young lady.

'You probably don't remember me', he said. He turned to his wife. 'My dear, I wanted you to meet the man who once saved my life with a boiled egg.'

* * * *

It is pleasant to be able to close these samples from a muddled period of transition with a firm affirmation that the admission of women undergraduates, once the various technical obstructions had been cleared away, was effected (like Dr Leavis's dislodgement of Milton) with remarkably little fuss. They came, they saw, they conquered - and *were* conquered, not so much by their male colleagues as by the place itself. They joined. They improved us without altering us very much.

(There were soon Women's Boats on the river.) They were immensely superior to the draggletails who had previously been admitted to College by private enterprise rather than via UCCA and the Admissions Tutor. Draggletails? As editor of the College Magazine I had one difficult task: justifying the new policy against the entrenched if innocent male chauvinism of old members. I reminded them that just as to the tutorial eye the three-year cycle of males saw them change from freshmen to stalemen and on, sometimes, to rottenmen, so their visiting girl-friends had been observed to pass through a three-year cycle of Lolita, draggletail and Earth-Mother. I suggested that the new arrangements would attract better types of Lolitas, draggletails and Earth-Mothers. Very soon I was able to assure them that, so far as one resident don was concerned, the newly fashionable sex-war would continue only so long as, in rainy weather, women continued to twirl the spikes of their umbrellas at precisely the level of men's eyes.

The Myth of Academic Freedom

William Bains

The laurels of public debate seldom go to those with the most persuasive case or the largest battery of statistics. As debates on the NHS and the role of the market in economics demonstrate, it is those who set the topics, the 'agenda', who can constrict what is said on both sides and thus assure their side victory. It is interesting to view those sections of the Education Reform Bill which pertain to Tertiary Education in this light. The Universities and most of the serious press have set the topic of academic freedom as the ground for debate of the bill, and so pre-empted the discussion of the abuse of academic tenure at which the Bill is aimed. So persistent has the clamour that the Bill damages or destroys academic freedom been, and that the 'tenure' system is that freedom's only protection, that the government has felt compelled to introduce a clause protecting this freedom even though it admits to being unable to define it. In this the friends of the 1960s-style Universities have proven themselves superior strategists, for two reasons. They have pre-empted the evocative word 'freedom' from its more usual home in the Right, and used it to set an agenda. And they have used the word to create a largely fictitious 'freedom' which can take on whatever properties the exigencies of debate require.

The government has followed the intellectual lead of the *Guardian* and the *THES* in arguing about whether tenure is essential for academic freedom, and whether its abolition is essential for the long-term survival of the Universities as innovative research and teaching centres. That some of this academic freedom is a myth created purely by academics to justify tenure seems to have occurred to noone.

Academic freedom is said to be the freedom to pursue the truth, no matter what political or social consequences, no matter the winds of fashion. You can say unpopular things on any subject and at least not suffer for it, even if, as inevitably happens, noone listens. But in practice academics' record of tolerance towards different views in learning or in politics is dismal, and shows how little 'tenure' has to do with free speech, and how little free speech has to do with academia.

On technical matters, your conditions of employment have almost no bearing at all on what you can say. In the sciences, where a shaky consensus exists on most technical questions, anyone who breaks ranks is effectively ostracised by his colleagues. Research grants dry up, students (who do the backbone of University research) are advised to go elsewhere. The iconoclast is shuffled into damp, cramped laboratories in the basement and denied access to equipment and secretarial help. He will not be fired, even if he could be, because someone has to mark all those exam papers. He will just be denied the means to pursue his research, for the sake of his career or (in the case of the few altruists) for the benefit of others. Intellectually, he will have been erased.

So different is this from the Universities' image of complete freedom on technical matters that, did this sort of thing not happen from time to time, it would be hard to believe that it could. But it does. Dr Harold Hillman of Sussex University is the most obvious example in the biological sciences - others exist, and yet more in other subjects. Hillman has had all this done to him for daring to say, loudly and in public, that a large amount of what his colleagues are doing is

wrong. His arguments are technical, but he has been silenced anyway, and many others intimidated by the example.

Of course, everyone *knows* that Hillman is wrong. That is why he gets no more research grants. The idea that Universities exist to further enquiry, even when it is likely to lead to nothing, does not apply to *him*, because the man is so clearly a nutcase.

The humanities fare no better, requiring grants for assistants, computer time or travel, and students to do the work. The distribution of those grants comes under ferocious pressure from colleagues, and none of that would be affected by abolishing 'tenure'. For those few bits of research that can be done without grants, they can be done as a tenured academic or as a clerk in the patent office (Einstein was the latter for his early career); whether the researcher is a University lecturer or not should be irrelevant.

Political controversy is even less healthy. Lecturers who express left-liberal ideas, ritually spitting at a picture of the Prime Minister while doing it, receive only praise for their outspoken political courage. But outside the University consensus the air gets very cold. I walked into a University SCR wearing a blue sticker during the last election campaign - so testing free speech to its limits - but could have got more sensible discussion in the local RSPCA. Again, no one bothered to argue, because they *knew* they were right. For some, such pressure goes beyond muttered abuse behind the back and sneering condemnation. Every now and again academics claim they have been forced to retire because of political antagonism - every time it is their own colleagues who have made their life intolerable. It is not all that uncommon: David Selbourne (in 1986) hit the headlines because he was outspoken, was 'Oxford establishment' and was tied in with the popular press. He is only one of the dozen or so that have tried to fight such pressure from their colleagues this decade.

The majority, of course, do not fight. The self-image which the Universities project would give no hint as to why at one University about 30% of the far left lecturers in the institution are in the Maths department, why half the most vociferous Marxist biologists in the UK are at the Open University, why so many scientists at Salford are enthusiastic free enterprisers while most elsewhere are noticeably underwhelmed by the idea of industrial support, and so on. Such local concentrations of political opinion only make sense if there is substantial pressure to conform, and severe penalties for non-conformists, at least in some departments and some Universities. Faced with 'squeezing out' or 'knuckling under', most knuckle, or at least abandon opposition to the line of the organised majority. The pressure comes from within: the idea that Kenneth Baker should listen to what every lecturer in the country is saying and repress them accordingly is absurd, and one of the sillier examples of the left setting a ludicrous topic for debate in order to hide their own record of political intolerance. It is the political activists within the Universities, not the government

or University administration who make such decisions. Tenure is no barrier to them, and its modification will not affect them at all.

How about the freedom to pursue a line of research, despite the winds of fashion? This is the argument from 'curiosity-driven' research, that brave wandering into unknown areas which lays the foundation for the technology of the 21st century. Universities are uniquely suited to imaginative ventures into unknown terrain, and many of the great breakthroughs in science in the 20th century have come from just such excursions. To be effective, researchers pursuing this sort of 'pure' research must be free to innovate as they think best and, once started on a promising line of research, to remain constant in its pursuit. Such a combination has won several Nobel Prizes for some of those willing and able to use it effectively.

This would be a convincing argument for academic freedom if such research actually happened. In practice, however, those lecturers who do significant amounts of research usually follow programs which cannot be described as innovative even by their supporters. They are described, rather, as 'solid' or 'fundamental', code-words for repetitive and uninteresting. Research frequently involves the recycling of whatever is fashionable at the moment, so as to please the Research Councils and (in these days of greater appeal to reality) Industry. Far from battling for their chosen line of enquiry in the face of fashion, many, maybe most, University researchers are the vanguard of those fashions.

This is not to say that Universities never produce truly innovative research. Frequently they do. But most University research is merely the clamour of the also-rans.

Only about half of University lecturers spend significant time on research, but all give lectures. Continuity in teaching is the only continuity really supported by 'tenure'. This means that the graduates of tomorrow sometimes receive lectures written ten years ago, because there is no reason for their teachers to update them. *They* of all people need to know the latest hot topic, and of all people they are denied such knowledge.

So if academic freedom is mostly myth, should we abolish the 'tenure' whose justification is that freedom's support? On those grounds we should not. Tenure serves a useful role in attracting researchers into jobs that pay no better than comparable ones in industry, and offer no hope of promotion into positions of real responsibility. Universities are run by bureaucrats, not workers. (The suggestion that this is a good thing, and that they are well off being so run, originates from the Jarrett report: why Sir Alex Jarrett, whose IPC newspaper group was infamous for its inefficiency in its pre-Wapping days, should be a suitable judge of University efficiency remains obscure.) If the lure of lifelong job security were not held out, who would apply? The real argument for abolition is that tenure protects a substantial number of negligent and incompetent academics

from the rigours of doing a job. Only 'tenure' keeps them in their posts: tenure, together with a sudden access of tolerance in their colleagues, who ask whether assessing effectiveness is such a good idea when it could be applied to *anyone*. This perhaps is the only true academic freedom in the Universities, the freedom to be mediocre, to be negligent, and to regard this as the normal way that life should be conducted. Govern-

ments have been trying to correct this interpretation for three decades (Shirley Williams was the last to try before 1979). This government is trying harder than most, but it will need considerable luck to achieve its ends, for the opposition will be fierce. Academics have more time than anyone other than MPs to publish their opinions. And, unlike MPs, they only need to stand for election once in a lifetime.

The Left Establishment

Roger Scruton

During the run-up to the last election, a survey of university and polytechnic teachers, conducted by the *Times Higher Education Supplement*, concluded that only 16% of academics would vote conservative; of the remainder, the majority would vote for the Labour Party, notwithstanding its move to the left, and its espousal of the fashionable causes of disaffection: unilateral disarmament, feminism, anti-racism, and the rights of sexual minorities. Some time previously Mrs Thatcher had been proposed for an honorary doctorate at the University of Oxford, from which she had graduated some three decades before. The dons decided to make use of their vote and, mobilized by well-known leftists like Peter Pultzer and Steven Lukes, stampeded to the Court House to manifest their displeasure. Despite her historical importance as the first woman Prime Minister of our country, Mrs Thatcher was denied an honorary degree by her own *alma mater*. This fact should be set beside the ease with which honorary degrees are earned by left-wing politicians and heads of state. Robert Mugabe was recently honoured in this way by the University of Glasgow, and Mrs Ceausescu not only holds an honorary doctorate from the Polytechnic of Central London, but has also been granted - on the strength of her self-bestowed reputation as a chemist - an honorary fellowship of the Royal Institute of Chemists.

During the period in question, it became difficult for speakers judged to be 'right wing' to address university gatherings. Conservative politicians - especially those who could be characterised, on the usual makeshift evidence, as 'racists' - would be sometimes assaulted, usually denied a hearing, and always in need of police protection. An Oxford academic, David Selbourne, was ostracized by his students and colleagues, on account of having written for the *Times* (whose dispute with a trade union had been exalted into a 'noble struggle' for workers' rights). Selbourne was forced to resign; while commission appointed to review the safeguards of academic freedom at his college made no censure of those who had provoked his resignation, and spoke of the need for lecturers to abide by the 'traditions' and 'sensibilities' of their institution, and to curb their tongues and their pens accordingly.

Other academics have been similarly abused: Professor Vincent was assaulted during his own lecture at the University of Bristol, on account of writing for the *Sun* newspaper (well known to students as the mouthpiece of the gutter Right); the author of this article has been threatened and shouted down - even when attempting to give a public lecture on the theme of 'Toleration' at the University of York - on account of the unsatisfactory ideological dossier which always precedes his arrival at a British University. Mr Honeyford was lucky to escape from Liverpool University with his life, while anyone who offers to defend South Africa, the Nicaraguan Contras, or even Israel stands a serious risk of intimidation.

Of course the intolerance of the ultra-left does not meet with the approval of the majority of academics. Although the donnish classes lean to the left, they are relatively tolerant towards those who lean in another direction, looking on them as an endangered species, which ought to be preserved in captivity in numbers just large enough to breed. On the other hand, when someone is persecuted for views judged obnoxious by the left, the academic establishment will not put itself out to defend him. Left-liberals like Sir Isaiah Berlin, Bernard Williams, A.H. Halsey, Ronald Dworkin, and H.L.A. Hart spoke out, during the days when universities tried to discipline their revolutionary members, in order to justify the right of the individual to speak his mind, however offensively, assuming that this right was being curtailed by crusty old reactionaries for whom the dustheap of history lay prepared. On the other hand, those noble figures fall instantly silent, when the threat to freedom of speech and opinion comes from the left: either they do not perceive the threat, or else they regard it as a legitimate bridling of views which are too dangerous to be aired in public. We have even witnessed the strange spectacle of an amendment to a Parliamentary Bill, designed to guarantee freedom of speech on campus, being actually opposed by all those members of the House of Lords who are also Vice-Chancellors - on the recommendation, as a rule, of the impeccably liberal bodies over which they preside.

The incidents to which I have alluded are not

isolated occurrences: they are quite normal and run-of-the-mill. Nor are they confined to universities. Ideological conformity has been rigorously enforced in British schools, with local authorities and their advisers often ensuring that promotion will not be offered to those judged to be out of tune with the spirit of progress. Readers of this *Review* will be familiar with the 'anti-racist' show-trial, as a weapon in the 'class struggle'. But it is only the extreme point on a graduated scale of sanctions, which will ensure, as a rule, that those who rise to the top in the educational world are either on the left, or else liberal in the 'useful idiot' manner.

A parallel development has taken place in the Church of England, once described as 'the Tory Party at prayer', and still counting far more Tories than socialists or social democrats among its congregation. At their recent council, the Anglican bishops made use of a standard piece of communist newspeak, in order to express their sympathy for those engaged in 'armed struggle' against oppressive regimes: meaning, of course, not the peoples of Romania, Czechoslovakia or Poland (in whom Christianity has largely cancelled the desire for violence), but those of South Africa and Palestine. All reports issuing from the Church of England (and especially those from its Board of Social Responsibility) have been of socialist persuasion, involving an attitude of repudiation towards the history and institutions of England, and a secular morality of 'social justice'.

I do not think that the case of Britain is in any way exceptional. It would not be safe to defend the Contras, for example, in the average American University, and the career of an academic would be put seriously at risk if he were to become an outspoken critic of homosexuality or feminism. The University of Stanford - which offers degree courses in 'feminist studies', for which ideological conformity is the *sine qua non* of success - is now jettisoning its course in 'Western Civilization', not on the grounds that the reading required for it is beyond the intellectual capacity of many students (though this would be true) but on the ground that such 'cultural imperialism' is unacceptable in a university which has set its face against racism, elitism, and the Eurocentric worldview. The formerly conservative Dartmouth College has suspended right-wing students who have published the low academic standards and political bias of certain courses; and once again the statistics - collected in this case by the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipsett - indicate a preponderance among American faculty members of left-liberal opinions.

Naturally labels like 'left' and 'right' are not very precise and always depend upon context for their interpretation. It is particularly difficult to see what they mean in the United States, where the person whom we in Britain should describe as 'on the left' is more normally designated as 'liberal'. Nevertheless, it is possible to give a rough sketch of what I mean by 'left' opinions that will be sufficient to identify the

state of mind expressed in them:

The fundamental belief in human equality, accompanied by a hostility to all distinction, whether of class, race or gender.

The suspicion of 'power'; and the absence of any lively sense that the surrounding power might be legitimate, despite being in other hands than one's own.

The hostility to all that confers power: and especially to enterprise, business, and the market.

The 'critical' approach to society, in which 'power' and 'conflict' are everywhere perceived and unmasked.

The paradoxical identification with the external enemies of power: especially with those states which pose a threat to the security of Western nations.

The willingness to believe the *bona fides* of those who speak the language of 'liberation' and 'struggle'.

Guilt towards one's country and its past - the attitude described in America as the 'liberal cringe': a form of embarrassment at one's ancestors, for having believed in their own superiority and having, through that belief, made themselves superior.

Anti-patriotism; usually accompanied by mockery towards patriotic sentiments in one's own nation - or an open war upon them as forms of 'militarism'.

Those opinions and attitudes form a coherent nexus, and ask for a single explanation: an explanation of how it is that the 'thinking intellectual' tends to repudiate the very social order which grants him the leisure to think, to teach and to agitate for change. It is not necessary to take sides in the underlying ideological conflict, in order to perceive that such an explanation ought to be forthcoming. In the days of McArthyism, it was hardly puzzling that universities, schools and publications tended to manifest the same fears and bigotries as the surrounding world: such a fact does not cry out for special explanation. But when a seemingly immovable left-wing consensus emerges in the intellectual world at the very moment when the people as a whole are turning their backs on left-wing ways of thinking, we are faced with an interesting and in some ways surprising occurrence. We discover, for the first time in our history, a full-scale left-establishment, at the very moment when the much sought-after constituency of the left - the industrial proletariat - has finally disappeared, not only from the real world, but also from the popular imagination.

Moreover, not only is the tide of popular opinion retreating from socialist ideas - at least from those which seem to legitimize the control of society by the state - these ideas are no longer put forward in a spirit of conviction even by those who claim to believe them. The only *strength* that attaches to them, is that of opposition to their enemy, whose evil, however, is so great as to endow them with a constantly renewable motivating power.

The case provides, I believe, a novel challenge to theories of ideology. How is this growth of a 'left establishment' to be explained, and what does it indicate about the social conditions of the 'capitalist' world?

The first thing that will strike the student of Marx is that this ideology, which dominates churches, schools and academies, as well as much of the press and television, is not the ideology of a 'ruling class'. The case should be contrasted with the situation in the 'socialist countries', where ideology is expressly purveyed and maintained by the *nomenklatura*, even though neither the members of that (ruling) class, nor those who are subject to them, have the slightest tendency to believe in it. In the Western world, the 'ruling class' could mean one of two things: those who control the 'means of production', and those who control the instruments of political power. In Britain neither of those groups leans to the left, and both are scorned and ridiculed by the left establishment. So far as this aspect of the Marxian theory goes, therefore, it provides us with no explanation of the ruling ideology.

Before returning to Marx, I shall consider two alternatives. First, the 'indoctrination' theory. It might be said that an intellectual establishment owes its ideas primarily to what is taught in the schools and academies, and that this provides an opportunity for 'control from above' which no self-respecting activist of the left would fail to take. Anyone can conduct a 'movement of ideas' provided that there is no resistance, or that resistance comes only when it is too late. Once the crucial chairs are filled, the crucial bureaucrats installed, and the crucial textbooks written and made compulsory, the re-education of the intelligentsia follows as a matter of course.

David Marsland¹ has shown that this process has occurred in the discipline of British sociology, analyzing all the major school textbooks in this subject, and demonstrating that they are so manifestly biased to the left, and so dismissive of the few 'right-wing' arguments that they consider, as to constitute little more than a sustained exercise in indoctrination. I shall illustrate with an example of my own, taken from the principal textbook currently used to teach school sociology:

Inequality of power and advantage has been an extremely common, if not universal, feature of human societies, even if the degree of inequality has varied very greatly. It has almost always been the case that some group or groups have controlled or exploited other groups. At some points in the history of a given society people have rebelled and challenged this inequality; at other points they have meekly accepted their subordination.

The passage introduces the discussion of inequality, in a book that openly professes the value of sociology as a catalyst of social change. Three conclusions are foregone in this paragraph, and throughout the ensuing discussion, and they are foregone in the interests of a political agenda: that inequality is tantamount to the existence of 'controlling' or 'exploiting' groups; that when people have rebelled against such groups it is in order to challenge 'inequality'; and that when they do not rebel it is because they 'meekly' accept 'subor-

dination'. Now it is true that certain theories argue for those conclusions - the most important being Marxism. But Marxism is a theory with a political agenda, and people who neither accept the theory nor approve of the agenda will naturally not wish to see its conclusions being assumed throughout a discussion that ought to question them.

The political dispute concerning equality is wide-ranging. Nevertheless, there is a right-wing position which argues as follows: first that it is not inequality but equality that requires 'controlling groups' for its achievement; secondly, that exploitation occurs not in the social distribution of goods and advantages (however unequal that distribution might be) but in coercive relations between people - and hence that there may be exploitation even where there is equality; thirdly, that inequality is not what is resented or rebelled against, but tyranny - including the tyranny which has 'social equality' as its goal; finally that subordination occurs only where there is coercion, and not where economic relations are based - as in a market - on consent. That position is by no means uncommon or academically disreputable - unless you think Hayek and Nozick (both of whom have defended it) are academically disreputable. Yet it is not mentioned by the authors of the passage quoted, nor, so far as I have discovered, by any other author of a school sociology textbook. Nor is any attention paid to the thinker who has questioned egalitarian values most thoroughly - Nietzsche - whose account of the 'slave morality' (the morality typical of the left-establishment), quaint though it may appear to a philosopher, is a piece of genuine sociology. I do not say that those 'right-wing' ideas are correct: but they provide a case to answer, and the very language of the paragraph quoted shows a determination neither to answer, nor even to raise, the question that they pose.

I give the example in order to illustrate a process which can be witnessed not only in sociology, but in almost all subjects in the humanities (and especially those which touch on the concerns of those for whom the intellectual life is continuous with political action). A new kind of academic discourse has emerged, which is only superficially a discourse of enquiry, and which has the more urgent purpose of closing the mind around certain unexamined premises, and mobilizing the resources of the academy in the task of their legitimation. The practice is combined with another: that of ideological criticism, in which the texts and the assumptions of traditional subjects are exposed to a kind of third degree interrogation, in order to reveal the hidden premises in *them*. The very language of traditional literature is repudiated, on account of its 'patriarchal' or 'authoritarian' assumptions, and the texts themselves are examined less for what they say than for what is implied in the fact of saying it. Understanding and sympathy give way to what Paul Ricoeur has called a 'hermeneutics of suspicion': an obsessive hunt for the 'power' and 'oppression' which lie concealed in traditional discourse. As a result of

these two practices, the humanities are open to total politicisation, with the establishment left controlling the curriculum, the method, and the ideology of study.

Despite those practices, however, I do not think that we can accept the 'indoctrination theory'. To accept it is to commit one of the naiveties against which the history of Marxism should caution us. It is to attribute too great an influence to conscious planning, and not enough to the 'invisible hand'. What explains the growth of sociology in the first place, and the penetration of the schools by a subject that has no agreed discipline and which lends itself so easily to a political agenda? What explains the easy acceptance of such transparent indoctrination as I have described, or the widespread and simultaneous rise of 'ideological' criticism? And what explains the silence of academics themselves, faced with the flood of semi-literate and transparently political material which flows around them?

It is true that there is a penalty to be paid for criticizing the left establishment, and this provides a strong pressure to conformity. But this penalty is part of what needs to be explained. It may be useful at this point to consider an example and I hope I may be forgiven for describing experiences of my own. I recently published a series of essays, entitled *Thinkers of the New Left*, which originally appeared in this *Review*. These essays argued, among other things, that the major authorities adopted in the teaching of humanities and social sciences are of no great intellectual significance, and owe their appeal to their ideological 'correctness'. The book was subjected to fierce abuse in the British press, and had the complement paid to it of appearing in *samizdat* editions in Czech and Polish. The response was typified by a letter to the publisher from Dr Michael Shortland, who teaches philosophy in the Department of External Studies at the University of Oxford. (Shortland is also review editor of *Radical Philosophy*, a journal devoted to the dissemination of socialist ideas.) 'I may say,' Dr Shortland wrote, 'that I have considered deeply the question [i.e. whether to review *Thinkers of the New Left*] with many colleagues in the Philosophy Faculty here [i.e. in Oxford]. Without exception, the feeling has been that this shabby, shoddy book deserves as little publicity as possible. You will by now have gauged the extremely unfavourable reviews generated by the book. But I may tell you with dismay that many colleagues here feel that the Longman imprint - a respected one - has been tarnished by association with Scruton's work.' The slightly menacing is tone more emphatically later: 'I do hope that the negative reactions generated by this particular publishing venture may make Longman think more carefully about its policy in the future.'

At about the same time, I had been proposed for a personal chair at my own university, which honour can be conferred only on the recommendation of certain standing external advisers. The adviser first consulted (who is professor at a British university) responded with an interesting letter. He would have had no difficulty in recommending me, he wrote, before my

articles began to appear in the *Times*, and on the strength of my academic work; but those articles were the real proof of my intellectual powers, and showed conclusively that I was unworthy of promotion. In other words, the adviser inferred intellectual incompetence from ideological unacceptability; and saw nothing strange in ignoring a candidate's academic work, and concentrating on his opinionated journalism, when assessing his fitness for an academic post.

I do not think my experiences are untypical; they have persuaded me that the penalty for outspoken criticism of the prevailing ideology - especially if it is criticism levelled from *within* the university - is more or less automatic, and spontaneously understood, by those who administer it, as a just retribution for intellectual error. This is how the idea of the conservative party as the 'stupid party' first arose: not because those who support it are actually stupid, but because their opponents are people who have *identified* their own position with the intellectual life.

When the pressure towards ideological conformity has acquired such an automatic character, we should not try to explain it as the outcome of a plan. We should look instead for an 'invisible hand' explanation, of the kind offered by the theorists of the market. This leads me to my second theory of the left establishment: the theory of 'public choice', as expounded by James Buchanan and the economists of the 'Virginia School'. According to this school of thought, the tendency of modern societies is to generate areas of advantage which are liberated from the constraints of the economic market, by the market in political power. For example, the services offered by the state are invariably secured from the possibility of bankruptcy, and their occupants made immune to economic competition. To secure a position in a state-controlled service industry is to acquire a life-interest in the social product, and a perpetual guarantee against disaster. A new opportunity is provided for what Buchanan calls 'rent-seeking': i.e., the process whereby an individual can claim a rent upon economic activities the risks of which he does not bear. People who have secured such rents form a natural 'interest group', whose principal concern will be to maximize the resources directed to their activity, and to ensure security of tenure for each of their members. Hence the law of bureaucratic expansion, discovered by Parkinson, and since universally confirmed.

Ideology performs two useful services to the rent-seeker. First, it maintains group coherence in the face of external threat. Ideological beliefs tend to declare a separation between 'us' and 'them': they offer a criterion of membership, which reinforces the unity of the group, while providing a barrier to intruders. An interest group united by an ideology has a much better chance of gaining control of a rent, for the reason that its members will be less likely to compete with each other in the pursuit of it, and more likely to lend support to each other against outside rivals.

Furthermore, the ideological test of membership has

the effect of destroying rival criteria, in particular those which might re-introduce effective competition into the areas where rents can be obtained. For example, it would be normal to assume that offices in a public service - whether it be education, social work or medicine - should be 'open to the talents', and gained and lost on grounds of competence alone. In the sphere of education, this means that intellect and culture should be the principal qualifications for office. Now an ideology can *masquerade* as the sign of intellect and culture. It can provide an easily intelligible model of those virtues, and show exactly how to acquire them. Hence it permits the educational profession to erect a charade of competition, and to maintain a charade of standards, while in fact offering 'jobs for the boys'.

Left-wing ideology is particularly effective in this respect. For its ruling idea is that of equality. In its heart, it is a sustained attack on the idea of merit; while pretending to uphold standards it will, therefore always end by undermining them. By its very nature, it tends to the gratifying conclusion that no criteria really matter, that all people are equal, and that discrimination is arbitrary and unjust. The only qualification that can be reconciled with conscience, is that of ideology. The one who recognizes the injustice of privilege, therefore, is the one entitled to receive it.

In the context of rent-seeking, the interest group united by the ideology of the left has a great Darwinian advantage. It can put itself forward as qualified by the very criteria which determine the accepted framework of competition, while at the same time destroying that framework, in order to sit securely on the throne. It neutralizes all competition among its members, while effectively excluding its rivals, on the very ground which they purport to respect.

This explains two very important facts: the vehemence with which the internal critic is condemned, and the language used to condemn him. The internal critic is an existential danger: unlike the one who has been successfully excluded, he is not a business rival, but a potential traitor to the cause of group cohesion. He needs to be exposed, denounced, and expelled from the fold. Usually he is condemned as an *elitist*: that is, someone who believes too seriously in the virtues of competition, in the scarcity of real achievement, and in the inequality of men. When the critic becomes too threatening, he must be cast out, perhaps with a show-trial, by wounded colleagues who protest at the 'atmosphere of intimidation' which he had created. (This atmosphere of intimidation was discerned by the critics of Mr Honeyford and Mr Savery; it was also noticed recently by the staff of the Open University, following an anonymous document prepared by students, criticizing the left-wing bias of certain courses. It was noticed too by the staff of Dartmouth College, who, in suspending the students responsible, rejoiced at the return of the 'academic freedoms' which the presence of those right-wing vigilantes had served to curtail.)

The 'public choice' theory of the left establishment

has its merits, and can be interestingly compared with the classical Marxist theory of ideology. Like classical Marxism, the theory offers a *functional* explanation of ideology. But it rejects the distinctively Marxian claim that the beneficiary is a ruling class. The beneficiary, according to the 'public choice' explanation, is the believer himself, and the interest group of which he is a member.

Perhaps the most important merit of the theory, is that it can explain the otherwise rather puzzling posture of academic liberals. On the whole these too are maintained by rents derived from the welfare system. Their tolerance and open-mindedness are the virtues of people freed from the threat of disaster, eager to offer benefits which they can offer at no cost to themselves. Their position is safe, however, only so long as they can gain the favour of the new rent-seekers, whose advance they protected by their very preparedness to speak for every viewpoint, and for the rights of every group. Once installed, the left establishment poses a potential threat to the liberal who helped it into power. He must take care not to be identified with those criteria of intellectual competence and rooted culture which the new barbarians fear. He is useful to the left, as the protector of the moral space in which ideology can flourish and fortify its positions. But let him step out of line - let him reveal his sympathy for the elitist, racist, sexist, or in any other way anti-egalitarian ideas which threaten the rights of conquest - and he too must take the consequences of enmity. Liberals are always at pains, therefore, to distance themselves from their right-wing colleagues and will tacitly cooperate with the left in excluding them from the rents available.

The 'public choice' theory explains the emergence of a left establishment within the state welfare system, or some other area of guaranteed rent. But does it explain the emergence of the very same establishment among the priesthood, membership of which involves a sacrifice and not a material gain? Or in the media, where fierce competition will always fragment any interest group sustained by ideological ties? In effect we are dealing with a 'clerisy' - a class of people who identify themselves in relation to their fellow men as instructors, counsellors and guides. And it seems that there is something about this very role, in a world of declining faith, which turns its adherent in a left-wing direction.

The role of a clerk - whether priest or teacher - is to mediate. He transcribes and interprets for others the message of a higher authority. Such a role is dignified and ennobling, since it confers on the clerk some of the effulgence of authority. The traditions of learning, the body of knowledge, and the revelations of faith all make a distinction between those who possess them, and those who do not. The mediating role of the institute bestows authority on the clerk; in such circumstances, he will be sensible of merit and privilege, and endowed with a lively sense of the legitimacy of the powers which uphold his office.

Take away the belief in the higher authority - in God, civilization, or the given tradition of learning -

and the role of mediator collapses. The clerk becomes foolish in his own eyes, as the interpreter of an authority in which he no longer believes. He is no longer elevated above the level of his pupil, and endeavours to negate all suggestion that his privilege and position are the sign of real inequality. The 'left establishment' attitude which I described emerges spontaneously among people subjected to this emotionally strenuous position.

If that is correct, however, it raises an interesting question concerning the idea of a university. To what extent is a 'liberal education', as it used to be called, really available in the modern world? When von Humboldt and Matthew Arnold mounted their defence of culture, and Cardinal Newman his vindication of the university, all took it for granted that freedom of thought could be as much a part of humane education as it was a necessary ingredient in scientific progress. None supposed that the results of this freedom could be known in advance: such a supposition is as much a contradiction in the humanities as it is in the natural sciences. And each imagined that a unifying culture could persist and be enriched through the process of enquiry, and passed on undiminished to future generations.

This manifestly has not happened. By the standards set by nineteenth-century academics, we have witnessed a decline, not only in the intellectual ability of academics, but also in their cultural standing and spiritual authority. Moreover, the genuinely liberal teaching is everywhere in retreat.

Liberal education flourished only when it was possible to assume a belief in human excellence. It relied upon a long tradition of universalist thinking, with its roots in

Greek philosophy, Christian religion and Roman law. Yet, as Alain Finkelkraut has mordantly demonstrated,³ this universalist tradition has now been put in question, as the source of the very 'chauvinism' and 'racism' which liberalism has striven to eradicate. The liberal frame of mind is egalitarian, in that it offers equal respect to all persons. But it cannot survive the attempt to engineer some 'equality of outcome', or even 'equality of opportunity', which ignores the most fundamental differences between us: including the difference between those who are good at something, and those who are not. It is predicated on faith: faith in the civilizing process, in universal values, and - ultimately - in the God who is their guarantee. The priestly office is possible only so long as the clerk believes in the *authority* of his teachings, and in himself as the mediator between authority and ignorance.

The effect of the left establishment is therefore to endanger the liberal education which made it possible. Egalitarian ideology has a tendency to spread and settle. It is mild, and reassuring; it also serves, as I have argued, to neutralize the threat posed by talent. It is vindictive only towards its internal traitors, and occupies the seat of privilege quite benignly, so long as it is questioned from a point of view outside its chosen territory. It will continue to turn all education in its favoured direction, manufacturing 'subjects', 'authorities' and 'methods' which have nothing to recommend them besides their egalitarian assumptions. Gradually, however, as students perceive the futility of their studies, the universities will lose their following, just as the churches are losing theirs. Only the voice of authority can awaken the desire to learn, and a clerk without authority has nothing serious to teach.

Notes

1. D. Marsland, *Seeds of Bankruptcy*, London, Claridge Press, 1988.
2. Tony Bilton, et al., *Introducing Sociology*, London, Macmillan, 1981.
3. Alain Finkelkraut, *The Undoing of Thought*, tr. Dennis O'Keeffe, London, Claridge Press, 1988.

The UK and Immigration

J. Enoch Powell

The story which I have to unfold is unique, and that perhaps is the potential interest of it for nations other than the inhabitants of the United Kingdom, because it exhibits the peculiarity both of British law and of the British character. The uniqueness of my story is also a caution against the vulgar error of supposing that when we apply the same word (or its relevant equivalent in translation) to the affairs of different countries we

are talking about the same thing or even about different things which have any significant commonality.

Every society has a definition to identify those who belong to it - I shall resolutely refuse to define the word 'belong' itself, regarding it as sufficiently understood for my purpose without definition - and to distinguish them from the rest of mankind who do not belong to it. In the case of a club that definition is to be

found in the rules. In the case of a state it is to be found in its law of nationality or citizenship. (The two terms, nationality and citizenship, are not exactly interchangeable, but the course of my narrative may cast light upon their difference.)

Until recent times the nationality law of the United Kingdom was essentially feudal. It was based on the conception according to which, between whoever is born in a territory and the lord of that territory, there exists a nexus of reciprocal rights. Those who were born in England were consequently subjects of the Crown, and to be born with that allegiance was to be a British subject. The law of the United Kingdom thus divided mankind into two classes: British subjects, and the rest. (Strictly speaking, there was a third category, namely, 'British protected persons'; but it was of no importance generally and I mention it only to defend myself against anyone complaining that I have overlooked it.)

Of course a person not born within the allegiance could become a British subject by being allowed to undertake that allegiance. This might be a formal legal act of naturalization, or it might follow as a consequence of some other event. A woman, for example, became a British subject by marrying one, because it was inconceivable in that relationship that she did not share the allegiance which might require her husband to fight and die for his sovereign.

This law of nationality was a *ius soli*, 'right of the soil', as distinguished from *ius sanguinis*, 'right of blood'. There were, it is true, circumstances in which children born to British subjects but born outside the allegiance were recognized as British subjects; but this anomaly - for such it was - was jealously limited and did not normally extend beyond one such generation. The idea, familiar to the nationality law of other nations, of an inherited status transmissible from generation to generation was, and indeed still is, foreign to the law of the United Kingdom.

To the status of British subject attached the bundle of rights and liberties of the sort which we ordinarily describe by the term citizenship. They included the right to enter or leave the realm at will and to be domiciled in it, as well as political rights, like holding office or exercising the electoral franchise, as the law attached to the status of British subject, with or without other qualifications.

From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards, notwithstanding the loss of the American Colonies, there occurred a striking expansion outside the United Kingdom of the dominions of the Crown, until those born within a quarter of the land surface of the globe were born within the allegiance, and were consequently British subjects indistinguishable from one another in the law of the United Kingdom. Britain, be it noted, did not, in that alleged fit of absentmindedness in which it acquired an empire, create in its metropolitan law any new status to accommodate the denizens of the empire. It simply allowed the consequences of the doctrine of allegiance to operate automatically wherever the

sovereign of the territory of birth was the sovereign of the United Kingdom. Consequently by the end of the Second World War there were in the world some eight hundred million persons born outside the United Kingdom but endowed in the United Kingdom with all the rights of British subjects.

Every state claims and exercises as a natural aspect of its statehood the right to admit or exclude at discretion those who do not belong to it. In exercising that discretion it may have regard to the present or future interests of its inhabitants or to other considerations, which may include considerations of an altruistic nature. The policy involved in exercising that discretion is commonly and conveniently described as its immigration policy. The United Kingdom had, of course, always exercised this discretion in respect of aliens, as for example when it admitted to the United Kingdom some 200,000 European Jews in the last decade of the 19th century and the first decade of this century and a further 50,000 in the 1930s. In respect of British subjects, however - those eight hundred millions to whom I just referred - there neither was nor could be an immigration policy. All possessed under United Kingdom law the same unqualified right of entry and domicile.

This consequence of United Kingdom law applied of course in the United Kingdom only. By a curious irony, entry, including entry by other British subjects, into the territories composing the remainder of the British dominions was controlled by the relevant local government whosoever government that was. There was always and everywhere an immigration policy in the rest of the empire. Acts of discretion underlay Asian immigration into East Africa or, for that matter, into Fiji. Responsibility for immigration policy, as for every other discretion, devolved as part and parcel of self-government.

The populations which eventually amounted to the eight hundred millions I have mentioned made a quantitatively negligible use of their rights of entry and domicile in the United Kingdom until after the Second World War, when economic conditions in Britain, coupled with the enormous capability of air transport for shifting large numbers of persons, opened up the imminent prospect that a movement hitherto negligible would become so massive as to alter substantially the composition of the population of Britain. If this was not to happen, it would be necessary so to alter the law of nationality of the United Kingdom as to detach the right of entry and abode from the status of British subject and attach it to a narrower category, however defined, of those who belonged to the United Kingdom itself.

I have brought my account down to the point where the inevitability of that alteration of British nationality law was fatefully fended off between 1949 and 1961. Before I proceed to describe and explain that drama there is a tale within a tale that must be told first. It is surpassingly bizarre.

When British rule in India came to an end in 1947, it

was evident that the principal successor state, the Indian Union, and probably also the other successor state, 'Pakistan', would wish not to recognize the British monarch as their sovereign. In consequence they and their populations would automatically, being outside the allegiance, become foreign states whose citizens were aliens, as had been the case with Burma in 1946. For a Britain which was engaged in telling itself that the Empire was in process of evolving into a worldwide Commonwealth of Nations on which the sun would never set, this was an appalling prospect, and they applied to themselves - nobody else wanted it - a hallucinatory drug. They abolished allegiance as the basis of British nationality. Instead they declared that British subjects would in future be those who were the citizens of a list of self-governing countries which grew longer and longer as colonies became independent. That left the United Kingdom itself and the colonies that were still dependent unaccounted for. To accommodate them the British invented a new category called Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. The whole lot were to be called Commonwealth citizens and equated for the purposes of UK law with British subjects. Thus did the British bravely hold reality at bay, and ensure incidentally that the overhanging entry rights of eight hundred millions would remain intact, however many of their countries became, like India, republics.

This passionate attachment of post-war Britain to the myth of a continuing Commonwealth has to be grasped in all its fullness if the disaster of the 1950s is to be understood. By the time Churchill ceased to be Prime Minister in 1955, a Bill to restrict in the United Kingdom the right of entry and domicile, as every other country on the face of the earth restricts it, to belongers was in draft and awaiting introduction into Parliament. There is no reason for supposing that it would have been particularly controversial there or elsewhere. That the old law was obsolete in modern circumstances was generally recognized at the time. Instead, however, after a year spent searching for alternative wheezes, such as making admission conditional on housing or employment, Macmillan shelved the whole matter for the duration of the 1955 parliament. Quite suddenly, in the middle and later 1950s, not only did the reform come to be perceived as a threat to the multi-racial Commonwealth, but the idea grew up that there would be actual merit in the presence in Britain of those whom the reform would have excluded if it had been in force already.

It was thus in a different atmosphere and only after the Conservative Government had won a majority of 100 in the General Election of 1959, that the original Bill was at last put before Parliament in 1961 and came into force in 1962. That Act created for the first time two classes of British subject - now alias 'Commonwealth citizen' - those who did and those who did not possess in UK law the right of entry and abode. However fate played a malign trick.

There was a flaw in the drafting, which was to have

serious and continuing consequences. The category of British subjects who were to retain the right of entry and domicile was basically defined as those 'born in the United Kingdom'; but for convenience and to avoid verification of birth at the point of entry, an alternative definition was provided, namely, those 'who hold a UK passport or a passport issued by the government of the United Kingdom'. Now, when a Commonwealth country became independent and created its own citizenship, persons belonging to that country who did not obtain that citizenship but remained therefore Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies would look to obtain their passports from the local High Commissioner (who else?), who, unlike the former Governor or Governor-General, represented 'the government of the United Kingdom'. Thus quite unintentionally the right of entry and abode was conferred upon large numbers of persons, notably Asians in East Africa, who did not become citizens of the newly independent states. When substantial numbers availed themselves of this facility it was obvious by 1968 that an amending Act had become unavoidable. By then however the whole subject was surrounded by great excitement and the allegation was being widely made, for which no evidence has ever been produced, that the provision was in fact intended in the first place and had even been promised. As a result, the Government were forced to purchase the passage of the amending Bill by promising that, although the right of entry was withdrawn, all such persons would eventually be admitted by discretion.

An important consequence of the absence - indeed, the legal impossibility - of what in other countries would be an immigration policy was the dearth of reliable information as to what had been happening: statistics and a policy of control go hand in hand. Huge numbers of Commonwealth citizens enter and leave the United Kingdom all the time. Theoretically, if you subtract the number who leave from the number who enter, you arrive at the number who stay - whether legally entitled to do so or not. The scope for error, however, when the gross totals were so large, was great and, in the absence of any device for matching individual departures against individual entries, the method was hopelessly inadequate. Moreover after 1972 documentation was to be further impeded when freedom of internal movement within the European Economic Community came into force. In the middle 1960s it would not be unfair to say that no British government really knew in quantitative terms what had happened.

It was natural, in retrospect, that for a long time attention continued to be concentrated upon the crude numbers of New Commonwealth citizens who had entered before the Act of 1962 (necessarily an unofficial figure) and of those who were admitted afterwards. Only in the later 1960s did information become available on the proportion of births within the United Kingdom which were attributable to parents who had themselves been born outside it. This information, at first collected locally by the health authorities, was given a statutory basis in 1969, when the place of birth

of parents was required to be notified at the registration of all births. The figures thus obtained cast some light upon the prospective future make-up of the population, both locally and for Great Britain as a whole; but these implications were confused by the debate over the likely future pattern of fertility. Moreover, with every year that passed, more and more parents of New Commonwealth origin would themselves have been born in the United Kingdom, so that births to parents born outside would trend downwards even while New Commonwealth births were increasing.

The focus of interest has shifted in recent years, as the central importance of population profile, or the age structure of the population, has begun to be appreciated. It is the profile of one element in a country's population, compared with that of the rest, which determines future relative magnitudes. This is subject of course to any assumptions that may be made as to differential fertility; but it still holds good and produces a reliable minimal model if that differential is taken at zero. The current official projection of a Great Britain in 2000 AD with a minimum 7 per cent ethnic minority population derives from population profiles which have been increasingly based upon direct surveys of the population initially undertaken for other purposes - for employment policy, for example. The existing age profile is, of course, the product of what took place before 1962 combined with the manner in which the policy governing control thereafter was exercised and notably the principle, successively refined but remaining broadly in force, of admitting the children, spouses and dependents of previous arrivals.

These surveys, on which population statistics in Britain are now based, rely upon the visual self-identification of those surveyed in terms essentially of colour. The replacement of more objective classification, such as place of birth, by ethnicity, and the supersession of older terminology such as 'New Commonwealth origin' by the now almost standard term 'ethnic minority' are the end product of a process that has extended over thirty years. It was, you will recall, in 1962 by a fundamental change in its law of nationality that the United Kingdom acquired the possibility and therefore the obligation of an immigration policy - something which every other nation, under different systems of law, had possessed. Immigration policies take account inter alia of the prospective consequences of a change in the population of the receiving countries and in particular, in the case of long established and densely populated countries, of acceptability to the existing population and of governability under the existing constitutional modes. When the United Kingdom enabled itself lawfully to control the entry of British subjects not defined as belonging to it, the measure was inherently neutral: the UK differentiated itself thereby for nationality purposes from the whole of the rest of the Commonwealth indiscriminately.

However, the motive which compelled the change was alarm at the consequences anticipated from unlimited entry from the New Commonwealth such as

took place between 1948 and 1962 and the implications of further growth of that element in Britain's population. Any attempt therefore to measure and to observe had to be in terms of an element defined not by status but by another criterion. This was an ethnic criterion; and it is significant that in official publications the term 'ethnic minority', which no longer distinguishes at all between those who are Commonwealth citizens and those who are not - it would for example include mainland Chinese and Philipinos - has replaced the older terminologies, 'New Commonwealth', 'New Commonwealth and Pakistan', or even 'New Commonwealth ethnic', which retained a basis in status and embraced, for example, Maltese and Cypriots.

The term 'race' first made its way into the law of the United Kingdom in 1965 in a measure which referred, without further definition, to 'colour, race or ethnic or national origin', and has been pronounced by the courts to differentiate the Scots and the Welsh from the English. Indeed, the introduction of that term borrowed from biology was intended to abort specification of the apprehensions which underlay the decision to legislate in 1962. The 1965 Bill was in fact the earliest essay in the attempt, by the creation of offences and a new distinction at law between one citizen and another, to avert those consequences of which the apprehension had led to the abandonment of the old United Kingdom law of nationality. Thus it came about that the delay between 1954 and 1961 in moving to bring United Kingdom nationality law into consonance with contemporary realities has entailed upon Britain what the modern world understands as the politics of race. A government decision, albeit a decision by default, in the middle 1950s wears in retrospect all the dignity and significance of tragedy.

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Václav Havel as a Conservative Thinker

James de Candole

The 'first real-life moneybags I ever met' wrote Ludvik Vaculik of his friend, the Czech playwright and political essayist Václav Havel, born into a wealthy Prague family in 1936. For the prosperity of the father the son was made to suffer. Since the age of fifteen Havel's every endeavour has been liable to frustration in a country in which so much depends upon class origins; in his twenties Havel's hopes of going to university and to the Performing Arts Academy of Prague were repeatedly dashed; in his thirties he joined the official blacklist of banned writers, became an internationally renowned playwright and a brewery worker; in his forties he was perhaps better known as a leading spokesman of Charter 77 and an intermittent political prisoner; now in his fifties, Havel is much admired as the author of political essays. Recently he has become something of a hero amongst young Czechs who, as the 10,000 strong demonstration in the Old Town Square in Prague this August showed, have developed a political consciousness largely due to the encouragement and leadership of the Chartists. With such a biography it is not surprising that Havel is made nervous by attempts to press upon him the lines of still another part. And yet Havel's plays and in particular his theoretical essays upon which we shall concentrate here, are redolent of a deeply conservative disposition.¹

Havel has noticed how traditional he must appear to foreign visitors and Western journalists who, he realises, have found his ideas 'stuffy, moralistic and old-fashioned' (*Times Literary Supplement*, 23 January 1987). In a review of his *Letters to Olga*, a collection of 145 letters written to his wife from prison, Heinrich Böll remarked upon the conservative nature of Havel's attachments:

Again and yet again the values and authorities which are proposed and are considered are the very ones which are falling increasingly into discredit in the free and 'free' world; consciousness, conscience, order and responsibility. These are juxtaposed with surprising concepts such as 'recollection of being', 'spiritual order' and 'absolute horizons'. (*Courtesy Towards God* p 206)

And Böll asks, 'Does this make the penitent who is searching for an authority a "God-seeker"?' The answer is 'Yes': Havel's thoughts are suffused with a spirit of piety and a sense of the *Grenzen der Menschheit*. Throughout his writing we are reminded of the fragility of human goodness, of the limitations of human reason, of the complexity of human affairs and of our dependence upon a sustaining and transcendent moral order. Humility and responsibility, qualities which Havel himself enjoys in large measure, are the unfashionable consolations he offers to an irreverent and careless world.

Havel summarizes the path which we should follow in the essay '*Politics and Conscience*', (first published in English in the *Salisbury Review* vol.3 no.2 1985). The world he finds around him is being dragged along under the 'irrational momentum of anonymous, impersonal and inhuman power' - the power of ideologies, systems, *apparat*, bureaucracy, artificial languages and political slogans. To challenge this 'huge snout of nothingness' (as the Polish poet, Zbigniew Herbert put it so well), we must re-learn, 'with the humility of the wise the bounds of that natural world ... admitting that there is something in the order of being which evidently exceeds all our competence.' And we must set free from their private exile those personal qualities of friendship, solidarity, sympathy and tolerance and accept them once again as the 'only genuine starting point of meaningful human community'. (*Politics and Conscience* p.154). The crisis, in other words, is a spiritual and moral one and should be addressed in a spiritual and moral language, not in the terminology of systems and technique. Russell Kirk wrote in *The Conservative Mind* that 'The twentieth century conservative is concerned first of all, for the regeneration of spirit and character - with the perennial problem of the inner core of the soul, the restoration of ethical understanding and the religious sanction upon which any life worth living is founded.' This is conservatism 'at its highest' and goes to the heart of Havel's beliefs.

Havel's collection of political essays are perhaps best understood as an examination of civic virtue, a twentieth century *De Officiis*. He believes the key to decent political conduct is to be found in the private realm; good politics is first and foremost an exercise in personal morality; it is grounded in personal responsibility and experience. Havel believes that the human heart and not any political system is, finally, the source of our afflictions and therefore, to change society for the better, it is not sufficient simply to adopt some alternative political organization. The only reform of which Havel speaks is reform of our own characters; what is required is a 'moral reconstitution of society' (*The Power of the Powerless*, p.117), a change in the heart of each individual and his personal morality; '...the issue is the rehabilitation of values like trust, openness, responsibility...' (*ibid.* p.118). Public happiness emerges out of the private realm and good politics out of practical morality:

A genuine, profound and lasting change for the better can no longer result from the victory ... of any particular traditional political conception, which can ultimately be only external, that is, a structural or systematic conception. More than ever before, such a change will have to derive from a fundamental reconstitution of the position of people

in the world, their relationships to themselves and to each other, and to the universe (*ibid.* p.70).

Havel gives as an example of human reason set free from the natural world of human beings and their personal experience, the trauma of 'collectivisation'. On the back of an arrogant and treacherous abstraction, the basic component of European agriculture, the family farm, had been carried off in the interests of 'universal welfare' and 'social justice'. This foundation of rural life, rooted as Havel says, 'in the nature of its place, appropriate, harmonious, personally tested by generations of farmers and certified by the results of their husbandry...' (*Politics and Conscience* p.139) was invaded in the 1950s by an army of bureaucrats '...in the service of the "scientific world view".' Disregarding all limits and drained of all humility, they devastated once and for all and without trace 'that humbly respected boundary of the natural world with its tradition of scrupulous personal acknowledgement.' (*ibid.* p.141).

In Havel's most recent play, *Asanace* (which means slum clearance/decontamination), a group of architects discuss the elimination of the Old Town from their office, a mediaeval castle, overlooking the slum. The frightening experiment which Nicolae Ceausescu is performing on Bucharest has many precedents, and the subject of Havel's play is a thinly disguised attack on the destruction of a large section of old Bratislava, the capital of Slovakia, in the 1970s and its replacement with a compound of high-rise flats. While experts and their bosses relish the virtues of planned progress, bulldozers clear the world of all which made us loyal to it. In an earlier play, *The Memorandum*, a scientific language is dreamt up; its purpose is to rid language of all its habitual subtleties and ambiguities. Nature, architecture and language are all pillaged by the sanitary mind, a mind so exquisitely satirised by Jonathan Swift in *Gulliver's Travels*: in the Academy of Projectors in Lagado 'professors contrive new rules and methods of agriculture and building ... and in the meantime the whole country lies miserably waste, the houses in ruins, and the people without food and clothes' (Part III ch.4). Centuries of religious and cultural history, the proper ground of a people's hopes and fears, are as nothing before the cloying fantasy of 'Progress'. Living historical traditions are stripped of contemporary meaning; the Romanian Projector, Ceausescu, insists that the churches of Bucharest which have not yet been 'systematized', i.e. demolished, be referred to as 'architectural monuments'. The official guidebooks to Czechoslovakia ring with praise for the beauty of her churches whilst the officials do their utmost to discourage her people from using them.

This plundering in pursuit of abstract principles is an impiety that goes to the roots of a system which remains, in the short term at least, unanswerable to those whose lives it dominates and ignorant of the responsibility it has to both the past and the future. The modern state, Havel believes, has 'set apart the actual human being as the subject of the lived experience

of the world' (*Politics and Conscience* p.143) and in his place substituted 'a bloated, anonymously bureaucratic power...' The state has lost its *personality* in both a legal and a moral sense. The legal personality of the state is founded in a law of collective agency which endows the state with rights and imposes upon it duties; as Roger Scruton has written, 'Collectives may act rightly or wrongly. Without a law that can hold them to account ... we can have no protection from their power.'² The legal impersonality of the one-party state, in which the 'leading' role of the Party is a synonym for its almost total lack of answerability, means that the state has no legal collective identity; it can never legally be held to account for its activities and in such a situation the rule of law is destroyed. The enormity of impersonal government is difficult to appreciate for those who have always enjoyed a rule of law. A state which no longer acknowledges agency and responsibility for its deeds leaves everything helpless before it. In the lawless city, wrote Cicero in *De Officiis*, 'nothing is left - only the lifeless walls of houses. And even they look afraid that some further terrifying attack may be imminent.'

Havel believes it is the myriad particular loyalties and attachments that nourish community life and endow it with affection and legitimacy. The varied institutional life of society - trade unions, the Church, poetry societies, the family, academic journals and The Women's Institute - is '...at once the condition and the result, at once the glory and the cause, of a free society...' as Lord Hailsham put it in *The Case for Conservatism*. The rational, goal-directed technology of totalitarian power refuses to recognize the rights of these autonomous associations and in destroying their independence and demanding of them an unnatural purposefulness, it destroys the very foundations of a flourishing society. All those loyalties which have grown gradually and are sustained in reverence are trampled on by the jealous and inclusive interest of the State; filial, marital and sacral duties are forcibly subordinated to the one overriding imperative to achieve the Party's purpose. That which was always an object of piety - the obligations owed to a parent or a spouse, to the land or institution which has supported and will certainly survive us - is compromised by some meaningless, empty abstraction to which all must now pay their unwilling due. The totalitarian state insinuates itself into every such established relationship so that in honouring our father we honour People's Socialism and in loving our spouse we love the Socialist Motherland. Every institution must allow itself to be absorbed into the state and there have foisted upon it a wholly extraneous purpose before which the sufficient ends which institutions generate so naturally for themselves in the course of their activity, and which constitute the reason for their existence, must wither. In short, associations become *movements*.

A fundamental tenet of the conservative attitude to life is a profound awareness of how unhappily it

responds to systematic treatment. To 'radiant tomorrows' dreamt up by the rational intellect, Havel prefers life as it is lived in all its untidy complexity:

...what happens when intellectuals lose all respect for life's richness and heterogeneity, for its immanence, for its own particular laws, when they choose to give arrogant credence to their own reason and their own ideas, which are supposed to be superior, more important and better than life itself...? The outcome in Pol Pot's case was that a third of the nation was murdered. (TLS)

Havel shows how the rationalist reduces history to boredom; history is levelled out and the multifarious and the unique replaced with pseudo-history, 'a calendar of rhythmically recurring anniversaries, congresses, celebrations and mass gymnastic events.' In the Polish city of Wrocław there exists a group of young people who call themselves the *Orange Alternative*; last year, on General Jaruzelski's birthday, fifty or so of them appeared on the streets, at the busiest time of the day, all wearing sunglasses. They were joined by the people of the city in a spontaneous public gathering which had no special purpose except for the delight the spectacle gave those who happened to be walking by. And the pleasure in this and other similar happenings consists above all in the enjoyment of the uniqueness and unpredictability of these occasions. Havel explains: 'This is the moment when once more something visibly begins to *happen* ... something unscheduled in the official calendar of "happenings", something that makes us no longer indifferent to what occurs ...' (*Letter to Gustav Husák* p. 28).

In a short essay entitled '*Thriller*' Havel examines how the rationalist hopes to rid the world of not only a sense of historical time but also of wonder and awe. Under the destructive glare of his reason, nothing remains obscure to modern man; he pours scorn on the mythical and succumbs to the dangerous illusion that 'no higher and darker powers - which these myths in some ways touched, bore witness to, and whose relative "control" they guaranteed - ever existed... ' (*Thriller* 159). Old myths 'exercised something like a "check" or "supervisory power" over those forces of the human unconscious' and by expelling the mythical and the awesome, we throw out order, limit and control and end by degrading that which we wish too much to exalt - ourselves. In the place of religious and mythical meaning we have substituted our own heedless superstitions - the myth of mankind's limitless progress and perfectibility.

If Havel has a political programme, it is the reintroduction into the public realm of personal experience and responsibility and of an acknowledgement of an absolute, transcendent order. In an interview recently he aligned himself with the first President of Czechoslovakia, T.G. Masaryk:

While... I disagree with his positivist belief in progress, I do profoundly share the feelings behind his constant references to transcendence,

and his insistence that democracy as a political system... must have some sort of transcendental basis or horizon. (TLS)

This Havel prefers to call 'anti-political politics' because it involves, as we have seen, a revolution in the realm of consciousness rather than institutions: 'Truth and morality can provide a new starting point for politics and can have undeniable political power.' (*Politics and Conscience* p. 156). The Power of Charter 77, a document signed by a group of politically impotent individuals calling for the authorities to abide by their own laws, was of a moral nature; it stood out as a gesture of civic courage and responsibility in a society more used to public displays of fear, fatigue and personal aggrandizement. In the words of its intellectual mentor, the philosopher Jan Patočka:

We have to report that people are again aware that there are things for which it is worthwhile to suffer. That the things for which one may have to suffer are often those that make life worth living... All this we know today, and to a large extent this knowledge is due to Charter 77.³

Charter 77 'is not an act that is political in the narrow sense, ... it is not a matter of competing or interfering in the sphere of political power. Nor is Charter 77 an association or an organization, but it is based on personal morality... [It] is aimed exclusively at cleansing and reinforcing the awareness that a *higher authority does exist*, to which we are obligated.'⁴ And its demands could not be more conservative. Far from appealing to abstract moral principles, it defies the state by invoking the state's own written law. The Charter places as much emphasis on the duty we all have to uphold the law of the state as on the rights we might claim against it. But in a system in which the authorities more than anyone else fail to fulfill this duty, this deeply conservative appeal to concrete laws is vastly more penetrating and more embarrassing than a liberal appeal to abstract principles could ever be. As Milan Kundera wrote of Charter 77 in a tribute to Havel: 'They do not seek to demonstrate that the authorities' ideology is a bad thing, but their candid regard systematically reveals the gigantic sham for what it is,' (*Candide had to be Destroyed* p.261). A demand that the regime reconstitute the moral and legal personality of the state and begin again to obey its own law assumes that over and above the political order there stands an independent legal order before which the regime must bow. And this would destroy the very foundations of the regime's power. Havel has played an important part in this call for a legal order by his promotion of VONS (The Committee in Defence of The Unjustly Prosecuted) which aims to establish a most basic condition of the rule of law; the making of law known to those who are subject to it, by compiling a detailed record of legal cases and the judicial reasoning which lay behind them. The Czech state, it seems, does not like it when citizens know their law too well - Havel was jailed for several years as a result of his work for VONS.

In an essay called '*An Anatomy of Reticence*' Havel

seeks to explain why he is unenthusiastic about the peace movement in Western Europe. The reconstitution of personal responsibility and practical morality means ridding ourselves, once and for all, of the illusion that 'the weight of personal responsibility and timeless sorrow' can be miraculously dissolved in 'the clarity of a pamphlet' (*Anatomy of Reticence* p. 174). The mental short circuit from which the Western peace movement suffers is the result of such a dangerous suspension of responsibility and imprudent trust in man's ability to produce a perfect world. Jonathan Swift once ventured the idea that 'if the Words *Whoring, Drinking, Cheating, Lying, Stealing*, were, by Act of Parliament, ejected out of the *English Tongue and Dictionaries*; we should all awake next Morning chaste and temperate, honest and just, and Lovers of Truth.' The peace movement, Havel suggests, is based on the similarly naive presumption that because peace is so obviously in all our interests all men will therefore pursue it. Mankind, thought Walter Scott, will forever 'live and die in the heresy that the world is ruled by little pamphlets and speeches and that if you can sufficiently demonstrate that a line of conduct is most consistent with men's interest, you have therefore and thereby demonstrated that they will, after a few speeches, adopt it at once.'⁵

A belief in a transcendent order before which the public realm must kneel in an attitude of reverence; a careful enjoyment of the diversity and wonder of human affairs which distrusts the parsimonious

abstractions of the political planner; a prudent understanding of human shortcoming; an attachment to history, to the rule of law, to a limited style of politics and to that which has been prescribed by custom; a nurturing of the qualities of humility, responsibility and submission. These are the marks of a conservative mind and of the mind of Václav Havel.

Notes

1. The essays are gathered together in *Václav Havel or Living in Truth*, edited by Jan Vladislav and published by Faber and Faber in 1987. The titles and pages references which appear above are from this book.
2. Roger Scruton, 'Rechtsgefühl and the Rule of Law', in J.C. Nyiri and Barry Smith, *Practical Knowledge: Outline of a Theory of Traditions and Skills*, Croom Helm, 1988.
3. Jan Patočka, *Political Testament* published in Telos, 31, 1977.
4. Jan Patočka, *What Charter 77 Is and What It Is Not* published in Gordon Skilling, *Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia*, George Allen and Unwin, 1981.
5. An observation of Walter Scott's taken out of Russell Kirk's *The Conservative Mind* page 107, Gateway Ed. Sixth Revised Ed. 1978.

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Thoughts from the Organ Lofts of Paris

Andrew Thomson

In recent years, my researches into the great French composer-organists Charles-Marie Widor and Charles Tournemire have taken me to various churches in Paris, some well away from the ordinary tourist trail. The result was an extraordinary *mélange* of experiences, ranging from feelings of religious and aesthetic exultation to those of deep cultural pessimism.

As an Anglican of High Church leanings, I admit to deploring the new liturgies and the fashionable trivialisation - as opposed to popularisation - of services, in which the clergy openly boast of their ignorance of theology and history, and even the majestic voice of the organ is drowned by chattering adults, undisciplined children and crying babies, suffered in the name of Fellowship. However, witnessing the life of some of the Paris churches, I am forced to admit that a considerable amount of Anglican tradition still survives in this country, particularly in the Cathedrals with their choral foundations and daily Evensongs, albeit under constant threat.

In these Catholic churches, however - with two notable exceptions with which I will deal later - the Masses were dismal and frigid, even at Saint-Sulpice and Sainte-Clotilde which in the past have boasted outstanding ecclesiastical and musical traditions. As a result of the Vatican II reforms, the liturgy has become a pale shadow of itself and can only be described in negative terms. The Protestant influence displays itself in an excess of talking and interminable homilies; the present day's *horror vacui* must fill the previous deep silences and meditative calm with constant amplified babble. No longer do clouds of incense fill the air, and Gregorian chant, if not formally abolished, has effectively disappeared from use as being deemed unsuitable for congregational singing - an illogical position surely, in view of the contemporary cult of the early Christian church. The singing of more banal material is led by priests or lay people bawling through microphones, and the contribution of the choirs - never good but now thoroughly demoralized - is pitiful to hear.

The organists alone maintain their time-honoured and immensely distinguished tradition of liturgical performance, happily isolated from these deplorable developments in their west end galleries. The great Oliver Messiaen still plays at the Trinité in his 80th year. (Unfortunately, he has always happened to be absent from his post during my visits to Paris.) Daniel

Roth - the successor to the line of Widor and Dupré at Saint-Sulpice - and Jacques Taddei together with Pierre Cogen - following Franck, Tournemire and Langlais at Sainte-Clotilde - improvise on the Gregorian chants of the day during the Offertoire, Elévation and Communion, with superb style and invention on their famous Cavaillé-Coll instruments.

My interest in Charles Tournemire led me to Saint-Nicholas du Chardonnet where, as a young man, he had been organist. This Jesuit style church on the Left Bank at the top of the rue Monge is a smaller version of Saint-Sulpice, and, like its big sister, used to be part of a seminary. Today, however, Saint-Nicholas has gained notoriety by becoming the Parisian fortress of the followers of Archbishop Lefèbvre, who has defied the Pope in opposing the reforms of the Second Vatican Council and maintaining the Tridentine Mass. Without entering into the vexed question of the legitimacy of the Archbishop's position, I have to say that I was struck by a different atmosphere, a human warmth, a spiritual commitment. There was incense and the singing of Gregorian Chant. At last I was in the presence of an authentic Catholic spirituality. Moreover, the church has a fine organist in Patrice Holiner, whose playing in the classical French manner perfectly matches the 18th century Clicquot organ.

Lastly, a pilgrimage to Saint-Fervais (near the Hotel de Ville) is a necessity for every serious church musician. There the Couperin family had been organists in the age of Louis XIV, and later, at the end of the 19th century, Charles Bordes founded *Les Chanteurs de Saint-Gervais* which initiated the revival of Gregorian chant and 16th century polyphony in the Catholic liturgy, now swept away. However, a revelation of a somewhat different but entirely appropriate nature was in store. On entering the church one weekday evening, I was surprised to find the chancel filled with nuns and monks lying prostrate on the floor in total silence, and I learned that Saint-Gervais has become the centre of the monastic order *La Communion de Jérusalem*, founded in 1975. Their literature tells us that 'In this desert of solitude, anxiety, searching, indifference and anonymity, and in solidarity with contemporary man whatever or wherever he is, the brothers and sisters of Jerusalem . . . want to dig out an oasis, to bring alive an area of silence and prayer which is at the same time a place of welcome and sharing.'

Half an hour later, the community rose to its feet to sing Vespers followed by Mass. The actual performance and repertoire is admittedly undistinguished - it is not, after all, a primarily musical foundation. Nevertheless, an incomparable sense of liturgical worship prevails, in an atmosphere of utter peace, intense stillness and concentration, enhanced by the magnificent Gothic building. At the Elevation of the Host, the great bell tolled and time itself seemed to dissolve.

If this can be said to contradict the spirit of the present day by being 'medieval', 'escapist', 'irrelevant' etc., the fact remains that the *Communio de Jérusalem's* daily offices attract a very considerable following, and the church is well filled with people of all ages, many of whom appear to come directly from their offices and workplaces. Here they are, as it were, released from the trivia of everyday life; the community's services absorb them into its contemplative aura, meaningful ritual, and utter faith in the efficacy of the Sacraments.

The moral seems obvious - the community provides for the genuine spiritual needs of people today with its essentially medieval ethos. And this despite the fact that the modern mind tends to conceive the Middle Ages as a period of barbarism, torture, ignorance and superstition. But such a distorted perspective completely ignores the towering intellectual and cultural achievements of the 13th century, above all the synthesizing philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, whose development of the Graeco-Roman concept of Natural Law - valid for all men in all times and places - is the basis of modern International Law and of much else in modern morality and jurisprudence.

Likewise, a fascination with ritual is commonly seen as evidence of a backward-looking mind, imprisoned in a circular non-developing philosophical outlook, as opposed to the purposeful linear thrust of the scientific post-Enlightenment. Yet ritual is of the essence of some of the most representative works of the 20th century: the poetry of T. S. Eliot, the anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss; and particularly the music of Stravinsky (*Les Noces*, *Symphonie des Psaumes*, *Mass*), Tournemire (*l'Orgue mystique*), Messiaen and even Boulez (*Rituel in memoriam Bruno Maderna*). And on a lower level of artistic achievement, that of the American minimalists, Cage, Feldman and Glass, who seek in their repetitive pattern-making and deliberate non-events to evoke a state of timeless stasis and contemplation.

The Catholic liberal establishment, however, appears to take a much less sophisticated view of contemporary civilization, in its anxiety to keep in step with what it perceives to be the culture of mass society. It may be useful to attempt a very brief sketch of the historical reasons for this *volte-face* against eternal verities in favour of the ephemeral. By its constant attacks on Modernism, the Catholic Church excluded itself from the great advances of 19th century theology and biblical criticism taking place in the liberal atmosphere

of Protestant Northern Europe. Ernest Renan, in his *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse* (1883), has left his account of how he abandoned his training for the priesthood at Saint-Sulpice, being unable to reconcile his intellectual respect for the integrity of the closed system of scholastic theology with his compelling interest in the new ideas coming out of Germany. Recently, Anthony Kenny in *A Path from Rome* (1985) has described the ossification of much of the teaching at the Gregorian University in Rome. Particularly revealing is the information that the lectures on modern scientific ideas were delivered *in Latin!* This throws much light on the general revulsion against the Latin-based culture in recent times.

Obviously such an attempt to grapple with modern ideas and problems using archaic language is a gross solecism and absurdly affected (also manifest in the titles of certain Anglican writings, e.g. *Putting asunder* and *Naught for your comfort*). This language finds its proper place in the context of the liturgy. A not dissimilar phenomenon in the fields of architecture and engineering in the 19th century was the tendency to conceal functional and mechanical elements within archaic decorative forms, Egyptian, Greek or Gothic.

Conversely, the present age has seemingly taken its revenge on the past by seizing every opportunity to obtrude modern jargon and technology into traditional forms of life and ritual, regardless of suitability, function or taste. At the church of Saint-Merri - in close proximity to the Beaubourg Centre - any possibility of quiet meditation was destroyed by a badly amplified recording of harpsichord music emanating from the souvenir shop at the back of the nave. The Protestant love of 'demythologization' can be found at Saint-Sulpice and Saint-Eustache in the replacement of the old confession boxes by large plateglass cubes; thus light and open-planning is cast on the secrets of the confessional! Such empty gestures towards contemporary values should impress nobody. Likewise, the installation of television sets in the Metro, and the pyramid built in the forecourt of the Louvre signally fail to demonstrate that Paris is still the cultural capital of the world.

To the profound and complex question whether science has an authentic part to play in the life of the church, the field of music provides one encouraging answer. In the 19th century, the organ builder Cavallé-Coll had the vision to reconcile science and religion in the creation of his great instruments for the service of the church, thus making the modern tradition of French organ music, stemming from Franck and Widor, possible. Indeed, both this and the *Communio de Jérusalem* at Saint-Gervais provide some degree of optimism for a future revival of Catholic civilization, one, moreover, devoid of the accretions of triumphalism, obscurantism and authoritarianism; a truly universal culture rather than a Counter-Reformation.

Rethinking History: New Trends in Soviet Historiography

Wladimir Berelowitch

Since the summer of 1986 Soviet leaders and media have repeatedly claimed that some explosive matters must be reconsidered, and some 'blank spots' in Soviet history be filled. Such a rethinking (which is not yet a rewriting) of the Soviet past is no doubt more important than an ordinary adjustment in response to a change in Soviet leadership. In the Soviet Union history plays a prominent part in the legitimation of communist power and it is difficult to change anything in the official version of Soviet (and even Russian) history without shaking the whole building. So the present ten thousand Soviet historians are in a difficult situation, which one could compare with that of a tight rope walker whose hands and feet are bound but who must nevertheless seem entirely at ease. I would like to give here a summary description of this 'new thinking' and try to explain it.

First let us recall in a few words the state of Soviet historiography until the recent period. Soviet historians are pressed in a kind of institutional and ideological iron collar which has remained unchanged since the sixties. Orders are given by the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, led by chairmen who, as a rule, are specialists in the Soviet period of history. This means of course a very strong control by the communist party and an almost complete lack of freedom in their research (if one can speak of research when, for instance, the books of Khromov, director of the Institute of History of the USSR, are merely apologetical monographs on Dzerzhinsky). The two main reviews - *Voprosy istorii* (Questions in history) and *Istoriia SSSR* (History of USSR) - are rarely audacious, not to mention *Istoriia KPSS* (History of CPSU) which is under the direct control of the Central Committee.

From the ideological point of view, one could say that the official version of Soviet history was elaborated in successive strata since the twenties and above all the thirties. Its main features are a total immutability and exhaustiveness: all the facts and figures find a complete explanation, as if there were no kind of mystery or unresolved question. Since the whole history of the world is supposed to have been a preparation for the present state of Soviet socialism, it is logical, for instance, that the programs in history for the entrance examinations in universities should always include the last Plenum or Congress of the Communist Party.

The Soviet version of history is therefore a raw mixture of three constituents:

- a very primitive Marxism, according to which every society (including the Russian) follows an ineluctable evolution in five stages, from primitive communism, through slavery, feudalism and capitalism, to socialism;

- a vindication of the October 17 revolution and of the whole evolution of the Bolshevik party, with the help of 'historical laws' and a division of all facts and people into progressive and reactionary tendencies;

- Russian nationalism, introduced by Stalin in the thirties, which misappropriated the old Tsarist nationalism in the purposes of the communist party.

Now Soviet scholars are torn between divergent trends. There have been few changes from the institutional point of view. The last elections in The Academy of Sciences in December 1987 promoted orthodox scholars like Kukushkin or Shishkin and some specialists of Soviet-American or Soviet-Chinese relations (Sevostianov, Bolkhovitinov, Kapitsa). The only significant change occurred in the editorial board of *Voprosy istorii*, which was almost completely renewed (one can notice the departure of conformists like Khromov, Sakharov, Kim and the arrivals of some 'new-thinking' historians, such as Volobuev, Danilov, Pavlenko and so on). This review published in its last issue (March 1988) a debate about *perestroika* in historical sciences, composed in quite a 'new-thinking' manner - as did *Istoriia SSSR* in January 88.

As usual in the USSR one could hardly know in each case whether scholars are speaking in their own voice or whether they are, so to speak, 'on detached service', or both. Obviously chairmen and academicians still hold the power, even when they feel somehow threatened. As under Khrushchev's rule, they proclaim *perestroika* and *glasnost* in a high-flown style. Isaac Mints, the 'boss' of all studies about revolution, who has adapted himself to every political change since Stalin, has recently, quite shamelessly invited historians to fill in the 'blank spots' which he himself had played a great part in creating. Khromov writes articles about *perestroika* and 'acceleration' in the Soviet past. Academician Tikhvinsky, who leads the whole world of historical research, wrote recently that 'in the field of historical sciences, *perestroika* has to develop deep and wide, it has to keep pace.'

In another category we can find 'young Turks' (even if they are not so very young), who call for open debates about the critical points, publication of secret documents, and a new and free approach in historical thought. One can mention Afanasyev, director of the Historical-Archives Institute, Smirnov, director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism; and academicians Volobuev, Polyakov, Samsonov. All appeal to *perestroika* as the justification of their academic claims.

Of course many historians (academician Kovalchenko, Danilov etc.) remain cautious and take a middle course. Finally some historians appear as more independent,

calling for improvements in the conditions of their work (access to archives, etc.). Some of them claim openly that Soviet historians should draw their inspiration from their ancestors of the Old regime, who, as academician Shmidt recently said, 'tied their research to the great issues of the public debate'. Historians like Gurevich or Shatsillo (both set their names to an open letter to Marchuk, chairman of the Academy of Sciences, in July 1987) deplore the present state of historical research in the Soviet Union, the lack of historical thought ('we don't know what it is' Gurevich wrote in *Iunost* January 1988', and compare) themselves to 'slaves'.

Despite these touches of courage, the general atmosphere remains one of conformism, even if it seems freer than before. In most cases historians are waiting for signals from above, and do not depart from their permanent habit of justifying their results in terms of the Communist Party's decisions and political course. Recently historians have opened a debate about the periodization of Soviet history. They disagree about the division between its two first periods: according to some of them it was the last war (when 'socialism' was achieved); according to others it was the thirties (the great purge in 1937 or even collectivization) when 'socialism' started to 'deviate'. But they are all unanimous in defining the 'third' period: of course it has started in 1985, and involves the reconstruction of socialism and the rectification of past mistakes. To quote Iskenderov, the new chief-editor of *Voprosy istorii*, 'historical science remains party-minded (*partijnaja*)'.

Let us survey now the historical points which are revisited in the present period. The main focus of the new trends is Stalinism, as it was in the Khrushchev period. The difference is that now people are not content with criticizing the 'excesses' or even 'crimes' of the dictator; they have to explain them 'scientifically' and they implicate *structural* features of the Stalin period, supposed to be the roots of the 'stagnation' and 'backwardness' in the construction of socialism.

It has naturally also been stated that Stalin was wrong in liquidating 'honest communists', skilled generals and valuable patriotically-minded scientists (such as Vavilov). All of them perished in the 'Great Purge' in 1937 and it will be noticed that in focusing on such people the present debate criticizes Stalin for having endangered the security of the Soviet state, while 'forgetting' the millions of victims of the whole period. But recently some historians have started to examine earlier events and to rehabilitate scientists like Chayanov (victim of the collectivization) or historians like Platonov who disappeared in the 'Cultural revolution' of the early thirties. These attempts remain very cautious, and we can say the same thing about the 'moral' rehabilitation of the old Bolsheviks. Bukharin is gradually restored to favour (see *Pravda* April 3rd in which Bukharin was honoured with the title 'Nikolay Ivanovich' and it was recalled that Lenin died in his arms), but Trotsky remains a demonic figure, even if it is conceded that he 'contributed to

creating the Red Army'.

The problem of the collectivization in 1928-31 and, as a correlative, the industrialization of Soviet Union, remains very ticklish and dangerous. Some journalists and writers attack it openly, but the middle course consists in deploring its 'excesses' and methods, but in approving its basic principle. Such is, roughly described, Danilov's point of view, despite the fact that he appeared as a non-orthodox historian of this period. But, on the 'extreme left' of historiography (to use the language of Soviet intellectuals), some people criticize the collectivization as a whole, and idealize the NEP as a perfect harmony between state and private economy.

The same can be said about discussions of the Second World War. It is not too difficult, as academician Samsonov does, to expose Stalin's misdeeds and mistakes in the beginning of war. It is much harder to speak (as the same Samsonov did cautiously last month) about Vlasov's case, about the whole statistics of loss or, as other historians did, about American and English help, which has been 'forgotten' for 40 years. These topics don't simply focus attention on some 'isolated aspects' (*otdel'nye aspekty*) of war, in order to preserve the main dogmatic approach, as was the case before. They may induce people to reconsider the whole matter, which is dangerous because it includes such annoying items as the Soviet-German pact or the conquest of Baltic states and Poland. No doubt the vindication of this pact in the Soviet media in autumn 1987 (as in Gorbachev's speech on November 2nd) can be easily explained by the troubles in the Baltic area in the summer.

Obviously the Soviet leadership and historians are hesitating whether they will use an old and well-tried tactic, which consists in drawing out some black points in Soviet history in order to clear the rest, or whether they will question 'Stalinism' as a whole. During the last months an undertone debate rose in the Soviet press about the human cost of the Soviet regime. Danilov wrote an article in which he argued from the works of American or English historians, in order to give a low estimate of the victims of collectivization and starvation. But Polyakov speaks of 5 million dead, and other writers of 10 millions. Polyakov estimated that the whole demographic gap amounted to 46 millions and described it as an annihilation 'of a whole nation' (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, September 30th 1987). But as soon as historians raise the question of the 'whole cost' they are almost unavoidably led to include in their estimations the history of the Soviet regime since its beginning.

Therefore the idealization of Lenin plays a prominent part in this reconsidering of history. As playwright Shatrov wrote, 'one should not throw out the baby with the bathwater'. For him as for Afanasyev or Volobuev, or the journalist Burlatsky, this flash-back to Lenin is not simply a reactivation of Leninist tradition, but a call to come back to 1921 (the NEP) and to 1922, because, according to them, Lenin was on the point of dismissing Stalin, or at least of bringing him to reason.

The publication of Lenin's so-called 'Testament' means as a matter of fact that there were no successors worthy of him, that Lenin was always the only leader who was right in any circumstance, and that he was right against almost his whole staff. It was so in 1917 (when he called for insurrection), in 1918 (when he settled the Brest-Litovsk peace-treaty), in 1921 (when he stopped the so-called 'war-communism') and in 1922 (against Stalin). Even the civil war (people tactfully omit mention of the Cheka) becomes an unfortunate peripetia which unduly inspired Stalin in his own methods of government.

Shaken in such a fashion, the old teleological historical outline becomes out of date. One can observe indeed a double trend which takes the exact opposite course to both the voluntaristic and deterministic approaches in the Soviet official historiography. First some historians try to explain the tragic Stalinist period by some original features of the Russian past. Contrary to the 'Marxist' orthodox view they separate Russia from European history: capitalism came very late in Russia, the despotic character of autocracy strongly influenced the communist regime, and in 1917 revolution was not only proletarian but peasant too. On its extreme limit this trend seems like the mensheviks' (mainly Plekhanov's) point of view. On the other hand, historians assert that events were in no means pre-determined and that Lenin was really a genius because he always took the right decision at the right moment and could shepherd masses of people and events in the right direction. As Volobuev, a pioneer of this new philosophy, wrote in the journal *Nauka i zhizn* (Science and Life in January 1988, Lenin knew that 'in Russia there was only one force, the bolsheviks, which was able to master primitive forces and then to open, when peace came, a wide field for creativity...'. In short Lenin is the coup of October *plus* the NEP.

To conclude this part I'll say that despite the new trends one can observe very few products of this reconsidering. Some newspapers or magazines publish documents or debate more or less openly about some events, such as Kirov's assassination, or Beria's arrest, or the life and death of Stalin's victims. Promised books (a biography of Stalin by general Volkogonov, rather orthodox, a history of collectivization in two volumes, biographies of Kuybyshev and Rudzutak...) seem to be colourless considering the expectations of Soviet opinion.

Now what are the reasons for this little storm in historical waters? First it must be recalled that the signal for it came from above but that it came late. In June 1986 Gorbachev was still exhorting writers not to tackle the past. But on July 10th he declared to journalists that one 'never should forget or vindicate' the year 1937. Then in January 1987 he stated that the 'roots of the present situation' were to be sought in the past and put his formula ('blank spots') into circulation in February, even if his speech on November 2nd was very cautious and disappointing for the anti-Stalinists. So why did he change his mind in summer 1986? One

can propose several assumptions.

First: We can assume that the Soviet leadership is acting under the pressure of public opinion and tries to adapt itself to the new climate. This explanation is not very convincing: it is hard to imagine that Soviet leaders start to shake their ideology and legitimacy only in order to please intellectuals.

Second: They are attempting, in a more cynical way, to improve their image, both within the country and abroad, by developing an anti-Stalinist rhetoric without touching anything. Obviously indeed the 'young Turks' want to clear their flesh of the most unpleasant thorns and to be considered by Westerners as more civilized and credible scholars than their predecessors. On the other hand Soviet historians are adopting a more flexible policy towards their Western colleagues. In January 1988 *Istoriia SSSR* published a round-table conference about 'non-Marxist historiography' in which everyone advocated a 'constructive dialogue' with those Western sovietologists and historians who are 'objective', 'realistic' and not 'anti-Soviet'. So the new policy consists in isolating 'our adversaries' and not in treating 'non-Marxist historiography' (they don't say any more 'bourgeois falsifications') as a whole. 'Adversaries' are defined as those who endorse the whole Soviet period with the same totalitarian features, 'colleagues' are mainly Western 'revisionists'. Soviet historians have also the duty to keep a close eye on the manner in which Soviet history is taught in Western countries. Some international committees (with American, Finnish, German and Austrian historians) are expected to banish from the textbooks the 'look of the enemy' and the totalitarian view of Soviet history. But however important this aspect may be (as always in Soviet policy) I don't think that it explains fully the whole phenomenon.

Third: In their attempts to reform the Soviet system and to make it more effective, Gorbachev and his team may have inferred, like Zaslavskaya and others before them, that the source of Soviet ineffectiveness lies in the Stalinist past, which in the first stage of their rule they did not want to move. More deeply they would like to steep themselves in the pure Fountain of Youth of Leninism, which was polluted by Stalin. The active voluntaristic policy, which they want to be led by a strong man with a regenerated party and using the 'creativity' of the masses, needs a philosophy of history which, without destroying Leninist ideology, would emphasize will and spontaneity rather than determinism and linear progress. In Volobuev's view, history is made with 'zigzags', not with straight lines. Gorbachev's pattern is a leader who can see urgency, read the events and make his choice. In his play 'Farther, farther, farther...' Shatrov develops the same view: bolsheviks have to lead the way, if not 'people would go on without us' and also: 'the events are guiding the party'.

One could easily imagine that some people inside the party and among the historians have no taste for this new destalinization. The famous 'letter' published in

Sovetskaya Rossiia on March 13th did not only defend the memory of Stalin, the collectivization and the Soviet role in the last war, it made a strong stress upon what it called the 'objective laws' of history. In other words the defence of Stalin was also the defence of the 'linear' approach in Soviet history. As it seems now, the 'new thinking' is in a fair way to win among the Soviet establishment.

But this attempt, maybe more audacious than Khrushchev's one, might imperil the communist legitimacy. No doubt the historians and particularly those who champion *perestroika*, remain generally faithful to the regime.

Nevertheless deviations might come from three different sides.

First, Russian nationalism, usually well mixed with communist ideology, sometimes becomes inconvenient. Quite significantly a letter published in *Sovetskaya Rossiia* emphasized the great power in the USSR, referred openly to the Jews as 'descendants of Dan, Martov, Trotsky' and as 'cosmopolitans' and sang in a lyrical tone of the 'slavic' peoples in their fight against fascism. In 1986 the Soviet military press (*Voenizdat*) published a popular book, written by Sergey Semanov which, describing General Brusilov's life, explained

Russia's misfortunes by reference to Jewish and Masonic plot. The foreword, very laudatory, was written by Marshal Moskalkenko. Such trends are anything but 'civilized' nor are they convenient for the new course.

Second, since if historians begin to say even half a truth about Stalin it would be difficult for them to keep Lenin (and therefore Soviet legitimacy) undamaged. Hence the ambiguity and the hesitations so typical of the whole movement. Despite some audacious ideas and projects, the most interesting papers or documents, (testimonies) were published in the media, but we cannot mention any historical study which would strongly contrast with the usual production.

Third, as I already mentioned, the nationalistic trends in Baltic countries, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia, might use the Russian 'rethinking' of history and claim finally the truth about their own past. This would be probably the most dangerous evolution. But anyway history is a dangerous tool and Soviet leaders know that they have to use it cautiously. If Soviet historians win back from the communist party the inner and outer freedom which they need so strongly, it could be the end of communist ideology. But we haven't come to that point yet.

Editorial

Next year sees the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution, and, in anticipation of the hypocritical festivities which will be staged in all the territories of Europe, we carry an article by A. L. Rowse, deliberating on the findings of René Sedillot - findings which would be common knowledge were it not for two hundred years of historiographical mendacity. The fact is that the Revolution was a disaster as great as any in the history of our civilization, and one that provided the model, and the inspiration, for the disasters that were to come. In 1789, as in 1917 and 1933, a diabolical force took possession of men's souls, sweeping all before it, and mobilizing the religious passions of its victims towards the end of their own destruction. The Revolution placed its gods upon earth, and described them in 'the language of man': liberty, equality and fraternity. And these idols thenceforth remained upon their papier-mâché thrones. Yet what do they amount to? The pursuit of them was to destroy every imperfect human value - freedom, justice and fellowship - which they might otherwise have sanctified. Moreover, they were to threaten, not only the religious and moral, but also the aesthetic values of our civilization, conscripting people behind one of the greatest acts of

organised vandalism in the history of mankind. These abstractions stepped down into the world of men from the sphere of metaphysics and laid waste the patient work of centuries, finding nothing in the merely empirical world that could match their own geometrical perfection. At the same time, the Revolutionaries began to adore their idols, not in spite of, but because of the fact that they filled the world with terror. 'Liberty', since it denoted no achievable goal, came to refer to the purely *negative* principle, that all powers on earth are powers of usurpation, and could therefore be destroyed. Likewise, 'equality' referred to no achievable order: it meant neither justice, nor law, nor that 'respect for persons' which was set before us by Kant. It too had a negative application: it was a weapon against privilege, a denial of distinction, and an inspiration to the eye and hand of envy.

Worst of the idols, however, was the third: fraternity. This most potent of abstractions has been the source of socialist dreams from the Revolution to the present day. The General Will of Rousseau, the People of Robespierre, the 'phalanstery' of Fourier, the commune of Marx, the *fascio* of the Italian anarchists, the *groupe en fusion* of Sartre: all express the same contradictory

idea, of a free society without institutions, in which people spontaneously group together in life-affirming globules, and from which the dead shell of law, procedure, custom and authority has fallen away. The aim is for a 'society without obedience', indeed, for a 'unity in disobedience', where conflict, competition, domination and subservience are all unknown. Each version of the dream is as unreal as the last, and none more unreal than that which has dominated radical socialism in our time - the dream of the great alliance, the 'historic bloc', as Gramsci described it, which brings worker and intellectual together in defiance of established power. Contemplating, Pygmalion-like, the worker of his fantasy, our modern revolutionary is stirred by a passionate love: love for himself, as the architect of this noble vision. The heroic worker combines in his protean personality the contradictory attributes of self-affirming liberty and class solidarity; he is at once the proud individual, answerable to himself alone, and the submissive unit, joined to his companions in the universal sympathy of the 'mass'. As with Robespierre's *peuple*, which cannot be the object of compassion, and at the same time sovereign, and without the need for a condescending love, so too with the industrial worker. The proletarian of the Leninist must mirror the striving

individualism of the alienated intellectual; but at the same time he must display the complete social immersion, the 'class solidarity', from which the intellectual feels himself so tragically sundered. The worker of the future, like the 'People' of Robespierre, must be completely free, and at the same time bound by the consoling solidarity of the oppressed. The contradictory nature of the idol is the immediate result of its having stepped from the transcendental into the empirical realm. And yet the idol is worshipped as such, in full consciousness of its impossibility. As with the Revolutionists, the *real* reference to the transcendental, which is there in the humble forms of ordinary love, is cancelled, on behalf of an earthly idol whose sole reality is to destroy human relations, by measuring them against a standard which they cannot attain.

We are confronted by an astonishing fact - one that we should treat with all due solemnity since it touches on the meaning of our lives. Liberty, equality and fraternity become the objects of religious zeal only to destroy freedom, justice and fellowship. Their earthly reality is precisely Nothing, and the spirit of nihilism blows through them with a force that is all the more mysterious in that we the worshippers provide it.

Letters

Sir,
I read with much interest the article by E. J. Mishan 'What Future for a Multi-Racial Britain?' (*The Salisbury Review*, June 1988), which poses some questions that I have not previously seen or read in any British journal. The problem of coloured immigration, far from being typically British, is nowadays paneuropean. West Germany has many difficulties with her immigrants (to a large extent from Turkey). The Netherlands has (like Belgium) a population consisting of 10% from immigrants (primarily Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese). There is no need to mention France with her large Arab immigrant population. Even Spain and Greece, traditionally countries of emigration rather than immigration, have their fair share of immigrants.

E. J. Mishan rightly points out that the predominant culture of traditional European societies is that of Western civilization. It is difficult to see how this traditional Western culture will be transformed into a 'multi-ethnic' cultural mix. In the worst case the culture of the newcomers will be marginal to the aspirations of the white majority, in the best case the dominant white culture will be nicely 'embroidered' with some immigrant habits. It is not, however, only the old societies which feel rather uncomfortable with the rising tide of immigration. American society,

far younger and admittedly more open than the older European ones, finds it also difficult to adjust to the influx of the Asian and Hispanic immigrants of the eighties. 'The immigrants', says David Simcox, executive director of the Centre for Immigration Studies, 'are leading us toward a less standardized society and making us make adjustments in our cultural and language practices' (*International Herald Tribune*, 'U.S. Immigration Nears 80 Year High', 25/7/88).

E. J. Mishan, in his excellent article, mentions briefly the problem of the immense increase of the African, Asian and Latin American populations. The population of Europe is in a horrible demographic decline and with a continuous influx of immigrants from other continents we are bound to have demographic changes in the future. How critical these changes for the future of Western civilization might be, remains to be seen . . . To recall what Enoch Powell once wrote in *The Salisbury Review* (September 1987), this is not a picture that ought to leave us agnostically content.

Michael Danikas
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Sir,

Official History of S.O.E. in Yugoslavia

I have read with great interest and scepticism *A Correspondence Concerning Yugoslavia*, in *The Salisbury Review*, March 1988. In their exchange of letters both Miss Nora Beloff and Mr Michael Lee, expressed their profound concern at the government's choice of historian, to write an official history of the SOE in wartime Yugoslavia. Of course they should be concerned, when we know now - even without access to SOE files, which are still classified - that during the war there occurred a classic example of misleading and - as both Miss Beloff and Mr Lees put it - hoodwinking of the Prime Minister by the well planned and highly sophisticated Cominform, through the infiltration of British Intelligence Services.

During the last fourteen years, I have been researching and writing on Anglo-Yugoslav relations during the War period, and I, too, am disappointed at the government's choice of historian for this task. My doubt issues from the fact that, hitherto, the proposed historian, in his writings on this period, has not only followed the safe, official version as expounded by politicians and Civil Servants (who, on four consecutive occasions, have misled the House of Commons concerning the forcible handover of anti-Tito Yugoslavs), but has omitted factors which seemed to point in a direction contrary to his conclusions. In Yugoslavia, Professor Veselin Djuretic of the Balkan Institute of the The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences has destroyed the Titoite Myth, and explained in some detail how the Comintern, under Stalin's guidance, outsmarted both the President of the USA and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Some of this was revealed by Tito on 27th December 1947, on the occasion of his election as an honorary member of the Yugoslav Academy in Zagreb, when he told the assembled academics: '... I have outsmarted and deceived that old fox Churchill ...' (F.O. 371-72578).

A few more examples will illustrate the clandestine work of communists within the Intelligence Services:

(i) No historian either in Britain or Yugoslavia - apart from Dr Djuretic - has undertaken to explain why SOE started - as early as December 1941 - to recruit communists in Canada, to be trained at Camp 'X' near Toronto. Upon completing their training, these communists were flown to Cairo, to SOE Yugoslav Section, where their training was completed under Major James Klugman, a well-known communist. The selection of communists in Canada was conducted under the scrutiny of the Comintern and its agent Tito in Yugoslavia. The SOE officers involved in this enterprise were at the beginning: Captain Bill Deakin and Colonel W.S. Bailey, both at the time attached to the BSC New York. After Bailey and Deakin left in the Summer of 1942 for Cairo, they were succeeded by Captain Lethbridge, who according to Tito's biographer V. Dedijer, was a communist of long standing and known to the Comintern.

(ii) In August 1943, Flt. Lieutenant Kenneth Syers replaced MI6 Captain William Stuart (who had been killed in action) in Yugoslavia as the new Intelligence Officer working with Yugoslav communists. As far as is known, he was an MI6 officer; he was also a well-known member of the British Communist Party. When on 20th September 1943 Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean arrived at Tito's H.Q. in Yugoslavia, he relied for information very much on the Intelligence Officer, Kenneth Syers, since MacLean did not speak Serbo-Croat and had only vague knowledge of the country's history and culture.

No historian up to now, Professor M. Wheeler included, has queried how MacLean managed to produce his Report for the Prime Minister in less than five weeks, without knowledge of the language, history, literature and culture of Yugoslavia, and without going anywhere from Tito's

H.Q. to meet people, or to talk to those who opposed Tito. It goes without saying that Brigadier MacLean relied on Syers, who misled MacLean who in turn misled the Prime Minister. The Report was completed before 28th October, flown to Italy, and then to London, was published at record speed and landed on the Prime Minister's desk on the morning of 6th November 1943. It spelt doom to all those Yugoslavs who were not communist; that is, to the majority, who were against the communists at the time, as they are against them today.

(iii) Branko Radojevic, alias British Captain Charles Robertson was recruited by W. F. Deakin in mid December, 1941 in New York as a telegraphist, with full agreement of Mr Vane Ivanovic, the Yugoslav shipowner of the Yugoslav Merchant Navy. Radojevic, a Yugoslav communist (with Trotskyite leanings) was sent to Camp 'X' near Toronto, and in February 1942 emerged at the other end, as British Captain Charles Robertson. He was flown to Cairo and passed on to James Klugman to be polished in Dialectics and 'paradoxes of history', Klugman's favourite theme. Robertson was parachuted to General Mihailovic's H.Q. on 29th/30th August 1942. One could write at great length about this subject, which most historians shy away from.

Stanisa R. Vlahovic

Sir,

I read with great interest Ray Honeyford's article 'The End of Anti-Racism' (*The Salisbury Review*, March 1988). The data presented in his article seemed to refute the myth of 'racist schools'. In the light of this evidence (supplied by ILEA), the 'anti-racialist' policies of the ILEA appear to be highly questionable. I would like, however, to comment on a certain point of the said article. Its author writes: 'Could the poor West Indian showing have something to do with IQ and race, as various psychologists, notably Eysenck and Jensen were suggesting up to twenty years ago?' It is quite wrong to claim that Professor A. Jensen ever suggested such things for the West Indians. Professor Jensen in his research, about twenty years ago, which caused so much controversy and debate, used data obtained from groups of white Americans, black Americans and occasionally Hispanics. His conclusions referred to the above mentioned groups. He never suggested or claimed that poor West Indian academic performance 'had something to do with IQ and race', because he performed his research with other racial groups.

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Sir,

I read with interest the four representative contributions from school teachers who are in the 'front line' of the educational process and upon whom its success depends, well recognising the picture presented, especially by Marcelle Papworth, in private conversations with friends in what ought to be a profession, only to turn with a sinking heart to Professor Flew's article which, while welcome in its summary of ideological corruption of the secondary curriculum, seems so remote from classroom practicalities that it asserts, in effect, that the greater the number of pupils a teacher has to control, teach, and help or correct (other factors being equal), the *greater* the educational outcome. Personal tuition of minds, of course, is *not* comparable to the mass-production of consumer goods by automated industry; and it is curious that a philosopher of Professor Flew's acuity should share this philistine assumption of the most reality-remote back-bench teacher-baiters of the 'stupid party'.

My teacher acquaintances, who share the grumbles of their union papers about low pay, low status, low morale, along with excessive paperwork from extra Baker time and GCSE 'monitoring', privately share the grumbles of the Hillgate camp about low standards, low morals, low politics, along with mounting misbehaviour arising from official policy and broken homes. However, the limited promotion prospects that remain mostly within the gift of a still unbroken 'progressive' establishment (DES officials, HMIs, LEA 'advisers', socialist Heads and ultra-left departmental chieftains) counsel discreet silence. Those who have opted in increasing numbers for premature retirement, or have successfully moved to more rewarding employment, are free to tell the same tale: once-dedicated teachers are sick of it all, but their situation - which is crucial to any authentic improvement in 'standards' - is the last to be considered or confronted. Behind the dissatisfaction over the relative salary decline and the 'days off' (the usual practice in city comprehensives consists of imaginary 'flu' or 'migraine' as an excuse to recuperate from, or to avoid, the gruelling ordeal of trying to discipline outrageously unruly and unpleasant classes) is the general disappearance of job satisfaction, a factor that happens to be important to 'pedagogic effectiveness'. Teacher magazines have printed disturbing accounts of graduate poverty and other journals have published horror stories from ex-teachers; but the majority who labour on the 'timetable treadmill' have to hold their tongue about official philosophy, instructions and changes. Like Vladimir Tchernavin, one of the first to escape from an early Soviet prison camp, I wish to 'speak for the silent'.

Consider the story of a middle-aged teacher known to me and whom I shall call Jack Robinson; I shall alter only names, not the substantial facts. Leaving an Oxbridge college with an exemplary postgraduate education certificate in the 'swinging' sixties, he anticipated a productive career teaching History in a grammar school. Faced with the prospect of unavoidable and botched-up 'comprehensivisation' which, like the majority of secondary school-masters involved, he then opposed for reasons subsequently fully justified by events, he left teaching - at a time when the 'progressive promotion' racket was in full swing - to set up a business, one of whose purposes was to publish research reports on social trends and to warn against the creation of problems. The consequences of this venture are now subject to the proposals of remedies from pundits as diverse as Digby Anderson and Alfred Sherman. But as wisdom before the event is not profitable (to say the least) in Britain, Jack was induced by irregular income to return, if he could, to any school that would have him, and to try to begin again from the old Scale 1.

For a while he did well, moving to a responsible post. But he soon found, along with many others, a resistance to

repeated applications for promotion not only in his own city but elsewhere in the country; his academic qualifications and classroom competence could not outweigh either his honesty in interview or his 'conservative' reputation that had perhaps gone before. He was trapped in his comprehensive, since an injury ruled out application to public schools with their additional sports commitment. Jack gradually found the 'conditions' of work declining as rapidly as his real income prospects, for reasons which originate with politicians rather than class teachers themselves: comprehensive ideology led to compulsory mixed-ability groups; the cane was abolished, without alternative sanctions being provided; social problems resulted in the metastasis of 'pastoral care'; egalitarianism, the pop-'culture' and moral decadence damaged curriculum content on the one hand and pupil behaviour on the other; multi-lingual immigration presented new problems, with the NUT eventually telling its members on Friday that it was 'racist' to distinguish between ethnic members in the classroom and on the Monday that it was 'racist' not to do so. Into this situation came the brainwashed probationers from the 'anti-sexist' and 'anti-heterosexual' colleges to replace staff who could not 'get out' quickly enough; and then, soon after Sir Keith Joseph had told teachers that their poor earnings were offset by the 'security', Jack's job vanished in yet another wave of 're-organisation' - this time the result of 'falling rolls' which, nationally, apply only to children of Anglo-Saxon descent, not to the Bengalis, Jamaicans, Nigerians and Irish settling in Jack's part of town.

Faced with the invitation to 'teach' against his conscience, and his principles, as the prices of further employment, Jack sold his house and escaped to 'Tory shire' in the hope that he might find work, perhaps as a supply teacher on the new reduced scale, and support his family, at any rate without a mortgage, in a low-rates district. At his first school, he told me, the 'anti-racist' and 'anti-sexist' requirements of his department (LEAG syllabuses for History and English) were more voluminous than, and as crazy as, anything he had seen in Inner or Outer London; and his temporary contract there was not renewed. I understand, at the time of writing, that he is out of work, despite his established efficiency as a class teacher - at a period when an improvement in pupil/teacher ratios (*pace* Professor Flew) is particularly necessary to contain the appalling indiscipline that now extends to rural backwaters. His only consolation, understandably not shared by his wife and dependent children, is that he is not obliged to 'teach' LEAG material on white 'racism' in North America and South Africa, and British 'racism' in Ireland, while Kenneth Baker beams and boasts of the 'improvement' that the GCSE has made to our national destiny!

The story of this gifted academic, who enters his fifties poor and without prospects, symbolises the fate of his country; for he has been a victim not of events of his own making but of political actions that he has rightly opposed throughout. With a sensible curriculum and a practical approach to classroom dynamics, the education 'system' could utilise competent citizens like Jack Robinson, properly paid and strategically located, to regenerate a sick society. Give *them* the tools and they would gladly attempt that job.

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ONE SIDE OF THE TRIANGLE

Michael Stephen

The Cyprus Triangle, Rauf R. Denktas, Revised edition (1988), K. Rustem & Bro., London, 1988, 419pp., £12.50, (0-04-327066-2).

At Zurich and London in 1959 the representatives of Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots gathered to decide the terms on which Cyprus would be decolonised. The result was the 1960 Constitution of the 'Republic of Cyprus', underwritten by a Treaty of Guarantee, which prohibited the annexation of Cyprus to Greece or any other State. At the conclusion of the negotiations the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios said: 'Sending cordial good wishes to all the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus, I greet with joy the agreement reached and proclaim with confidence that this day will be the beginning of a new period of progress and prosperity for our country.'

However, by November 1963 Makarios had demanded the abolition of the entrenched clauses of the Constitution which had been offered to the Turkish Cypriots as their safeguard from domination, and accepted by them as an essential pre-requisite to their joining the new Republic. The Turkish Cypriots refused to abandon the clauses, and on 28th December 1963 the *Daily Express* carried the following report: 'We went tonight into the sealed-off Turkish Cypriot Quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people have been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen sights too frightful to be described in print. Horror so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears.'

On 2nd January 1964 the *Daily Telegraph* wrote, 'The Greek Cypriot community should not assume that the British military presence can or should secure them against Turkish intervention if they persecute the Turkish Cypriots. We must not be a shelter for double-crossers.'

Such were the beginnings of the post-independence phase of the Cyprus question.

In its report on Cyprus dated 2nd July 1987 the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs reported unanimously as follows:

Although the 'Cyprus Government' now claims to have been merely seeking to 'operate the 1960 Constitution modified to the extent dictated by the necessities of the situation' this claim ignores the fact that both before and after the events of December 1963 the Makarios Government continued to advocate the cause of ENOSIS (annexation to Greece), and actively pursued the amendment of the Constitution and the related treaties to facilitate this ultimate

objective... Moreover in June 1967 the Greek Cypriot legislature unanimously passed a resolution in favour of ENOSIS, in blatant contravention of the 1960 Treaties and Constitution.

Further, the Committee found that 'There is little doubt that much of the violence which the Turkish Cypriots claim led to the total or partial destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the displacement of about a quarter of the total Turkish Cypriot population, was either directly inspired by, or certainly connived at, by the Greek Cypriot leadership.'

Turkey did not intervene under the Treaty at that stage; but when Greece invaded in 1974, Bulent Ecevit, then Social Democrat Prime Minister of Turkey decided to act, after consultations with Britain. The Commons Select Committee on Cyprus formed the view in 1976 that during these consultations he had proposed joint Anglo-Turkish action under the Treaty of Guarantee, but the Wilson Government in Britain refused to take any effective action, even though they had troops and aircraft in the Sovereign Bases in Cyprus. They were criticised by the Committee for this refusal.

Since 1974 Turkish and Greek Cypriots have lived apart.

Following the defeat at the polls in 1988 of Spiros Kyprianou, and the election by the Greek Cypriots of George Vassiliou as their new President, the world spotlight is again focussing on the question of Cyprus, which still concerns Britain as a guarantor power and owner of the Sovereign Bases, as well as Turkey, Greece, the United States, and of course the Turkish and Greek Cypriots themselves. The Cyprus question is also an intriguing case study in constitutional, political, and diplomatic efforts to accommodate the needs and aspirations of two fundamentally different peoples in one small, but strategically important, island.

This book is a timely addition to the literature of world affairs and is, uniquely, written by one of the leading participants, President Rauf Denktas himself. Having been personally and directly involved for the past forty years, leading the Turkish Cypriots through their darkest hours, negotiating with Makarios, Clerides, Kyprianou, and now Vassiliou, the author is pre-eminently qualified to explain and comment upon the question of Cyprus.

In this revised edition, containing 200 pages of new text, the author guides the reader clearly and concisely through the complex events which led to the establishment of the 'Republic of Cyprus' in 1960; its destruction by the Greek Cypriots in 1963; the attempt by Greece to annexe the island in 1974, and Turkey's response. He explains why the Turkish Cypriots now live in the North and Greek Cypriots in the South, and why the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established

in 1983. He then deals with his negotiations with the Greek Cypriots under UN auspices leading to the UN plan of 1986.

The Secretary-General had made it clear when he presented the plan that it 'suggested solutions to the remaining divergencies in a manner that in judgement protected the interests of both communities, and proposed procedures for negotiation of the outstanding issues which remained to be tackled, including withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, guarantees, and freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, and the right to property.'

On 23rd October 1987 in the House of Commons the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs said 'We continue to believe that the proposals form a good basis for a settlement and we urge their acceptance even now.'

The plan has been accepted by the Turkish Cypriots, but still not by the Greek Cypriots, and there are fears on the Turkish Cypriot side that the Greek Cypriots wish to 'go back to the drawing board' and so prolong the matter indefinitely. It remains to be seen whether Denktas and Vassiliou can go forward together, or whether the time has come to call a halt and accept the reality of two States in Cyprus.

The author's narrative is well documented by source-materials, which are collected as appendices. *The Cyprus Triangle* is essential reading for students of world affairs and all who wish to understand Cyprus today.

MULTI-CULTURAL MADNESS

David Dale

Anti-Racism: A Mania Exposed, Russel Lewis, with an introduction by Enoch Powell, Quartet Books, 1988, £12.95 (0-7043-0070-2).

That anti-racism is a form of mania (and its activists, by implication, maniacs) is an accurate enough diagnosis. Some recent examples of the disease: the school governor accused by the maniacs of Brent of 'racist body language' for looking at her watch while a black candidate was being interviewed; the housing official found guilty of racial harrassment by Islington maniacs and sent on a 'racism awareness course' for failing to invite a black colleague to the office Christmas party; the same verdict, this time pronounced by a group of maniacs in Haringey, against a clerk who used 'a banana-shaped pen' (a bizarre one this, even by anti-racist standards. Banana boats? Harry Belafonte?); most manic of all, the attempt by the maniacs of Hackney to impose on the residents of Britannia Street the name of Shaheed-e-Azam Bhegot Singh Avenue.

These and other bits of multi-cultural madness are cited in Russel Lewis' effective assault on one of the left's currently more virulent disorders. His targets

include most of the myths which sustain anti-racism - that the relative failure of black school children is caused by racial prejudice, that Britain's colonial past is a matter for national guilt, that inner-city riots are caused by police brutality and/or deprivation, that black activism produces black advancement, and so on - as well as the 'quango kingdom' within which anti-racism has been institutionalised. And while most of Britain's more established maniacs make brief appearances - loony Linda, barmy Bernie, the former Director of the Race Relations Unit of Britain's largest teacher-training college Professor Chris Mullard (whose thoughtful contribution to racial harmony was the statement 'Watch out Whitey, nigger goin' to get you'), Red Ken MP - it is the leading figures of the liberal establishment against whom he directs most of his attack. These include Lord Scarman for his report on the Brixton riots, the Archbishop of Canterbury for his 1985 report 'Faith in the City' and Roy Jenkins who, as former Labour Home Secretary, took the view 'that immigration was good for Britain and that the majority should be engineered into accepting it'.

But if Mr Lewis' exposure of the fallacies, dangers and simple lunacy of anti-racism is an accurate and convincing one, it falls to Enoch Powell, in his introduction to the book, to question an important assumption made throughout. Anti-racists, argues Lewis, by falsely interpreting Britain's imperial past and by playing on the memory of Nazism, are fostering the very racial antagonism they claim to be eradicating. In some cases this is deliberate, more usually the harm done is a consequence of the liberal belief that unequal outcomes between the races must be due to racial discrimination and, the corollary of this, that equality can (and ought to) be achieved by means of discrimination in reverse. On the contrary, argues Lewis; get rid of the anti-racist paraphernalia, which is a positive hindrance to black advancement, and 'a very real social problem should gradually fade through normal human contact'. 'Would that were so' forebodes Mr Powell. Once, perhaps even as late as the early sixties, the problem might have been contained. Now, the demography of the ethnic minorities is certain to secure for them effective political control of many parts of England, a process which will be accompanied by 'civil strife of a degree that makes it indistinguishable from civil war. That outcome will be hastened, but will not have been caused, by the anti-racist mania'.

But back to Mr Lewis. Chief among his villains are those liberal politicians who refused to recognise the dangers of large scale immigration and who then spawned a grotesque race relations industry to compound them. Especially culpable, argues Lewis, is Roy Jenkins who, with 'self-righteous zeal ... blazed the coercive trail to racial harmony'. Thus was born what was to become the 'quango kingdom' of institutionalised anti-racism, the Race Relations Board, the 'advisors' and 'specialists', the race relations 'units' and, most fatuous of all, the Commission for Racial Equality. The CRE receives a welcome drubbing from Mr Lewis, not

just for its persistent idiocy (it once sent a copy of *The Official Irish Joke Book Number 3 - Number 2 to Follow* to the Attorney General on the grounds that it was likely to stir up racial hatred) but also, and more importantly, for its unbridled ambition to extend its own power at the expense of traditional freedoms. (In an attempt to justify its £10 million pound a year existence by increasing its pathetically low conviction rate, the CRE recently proposed that the law be amended so that to be found guilty of racial discrimination a racial motive would not have to be proved!)

As a counter to all this Lewis points to the lessons of America, particularly as taught by economists such as Thomas Sowell and Charles Murray. The evidence from this quarter is that 'affirmative action' (a weasel term for reverse discrimination) has hindered rather than advanced the position of ethnic minorities in every field. Nor has political activism on the basis of ethnic alignment produced positive results. What is required, argued Lewis, is the repeal of virtually all of the race relations legislation, the dismantling of its industry and the turfing out of its state-funded personnel. With them must go the anti-racist ideology which says that blacks are underdogs and that capitalism is against them.

Mr Lewis is quite hopeful for the future. Not so Mr Powell. The explanation for the difference, it seems to me, lies in their wider political philosophy. Lewis is a libertarian who finds in the capitalist system the fullest expression of his individualist ideals. 'Blacks have a future full of promise' he concludes, 'if they recognise one thing: precisely because it is colour-blind, the free market is their friend.' Powell is a conservative for whom cultural identity exerts a stronger pull on human action and allegiance than mere economic individualism. Which of them has the greater understanding of his people remains to be seen. Either way, Lewis' lucid exposure of the anti-racist mania is entirely welcome.

RADIO AS A WEAPON

Ian Greig

Truth Betrayed, W. J. West, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1987, 262pp., £12.95 (0-7516-2182-3).

... 'I think the BBC will need a lot of guiding, and I do not think they will really take the guidance, anyhow not kindly. There is a very widespread impression that the BBC is biased towards the left and there seems to be good grounds for the belief. If the BBC is to be really fit to do what it evidently thinks itself capable of doing - personally I doubt it - it will have to divest itself of all bias of any kind and get the best people for the job and exclude some of its former lecturers.'

The above words were not written, as perhaps some might think, by a member of the present British Government concerning the BBC's attitude over some present day issue. They were in fact penned some 50 years ago by Lord Vansittard, then Permanent Head of The Foreign Office. The cause of his remarks was the anxiety of Foreign Office officials to try to persuade the BBC to moderate its strong anti-Franco line in its reporting of the Spanish Civil War; their anxiety arising from the belief that the exhibition of such apparent bias would help to push the Spanish nationalist leader, obviously increasingly likely to be the winner in the Civil War, even more into the arms of his German and Italian allies than he was already.

That there were some good grounds for the belief that left-wing influences were at work in the BBC at this time is well illustrated by W. J. West's interesting account of the activities of the notorious Guy Burgess. The latter joined the BBC shortly after leaving Cambridge. Before long he had obtained a position of considerable importance in that organisation's radio talks department. In view of later events it comes as no surprise to find the BBC archives, amongst which Mr West has done much delving, showing Burgess diligently putting forward the name of his close friend Anthony Blunt to give a talk on modern art which much enhanced the latter's reputation. In more sinister fashion Burgess is also seen suggesting the names of a number of persons, who were later to become leading figures on the British ultra-left, as participants in a series of talks on Russia and other aspects of current affairs.

Burgess was a member of the BBC's staff from 1936 to early 1939, Mr West suggests that during at least part of this vital pre-war period Burgess was able to influence the choice of subjects for the BBC's only regular talk on current affairs.

Apart from such intriguing glimpses of possible extreme-left intrigue in the pre-war BBC, the general theme of this book, which is very much one for the specialist, is the role of broadcasting as an instrument of information and propaganda during the Second World War and immediate pre-war years. Students of methods of psychological warfare will find much of interest in the account of the use of what is usually known as 'black radio' stations during this period. The use of 'black radio' consists of the establishment of special broadcasting stations beaming propaganda programmes to a selected audience by a government or political organization on a non-attributable basis. Often the pretence may be made that the station is operated inside enemy territory by a dissident group when in fact it operates from the sender's own or neutral territory.

During the war Nazi Germany made considerable use, the author records, of such stations in efforts to undermine British morale. Three main stations were in operation, all claiming to be operating from inside Britain and each aimed at a special type of audience. Although claiming to be operated by British anti-war

dissidents each in fact launched its message from German-held territory. One station using the name of 'The Workers Challenge' aimed to arouse discontent amongst industrial workers. Its broadcasts were supposed to be the work of a group of dedicated Socialist revolutionaries. Another station tried to encourage pacifist sentiment and used to come on the air to the strains of 'O God our help in ages past'. A third, styled 'The New British Broadcasting Station', sought to arouse coordinated action between all elements who opposed the war; showing considerable skill in making use of any information that came into German hands about conditions in Britain and the activities of its leaders.

Whereas the British authorities encouraged the public to look on the overt broadcasts of 'Lord Haw-Haw' (William Joyce) as little more than a bad joke, they apparently showed considerable nervousness about the possible influence of these three clandestine stations, and all public mention of them was banned.

On the British side the use of clandestine broadcast propaganda started shortly after the Munich Crisis when a special organization known as the Joint Broadcasting Committee (in which Guy Burgess seems to have been at one time involved) was set up. Somewhat romantically it seems at first to have received its funds in the form of gold coin from a mysterious source, quite possibly MI6. One of its first operations consisted of making secret use of the popular commercial radio station of those days known as Radio Luxembourg to broadcast 'anti-Hitler' propaganda to German audiences.

A 'black station' ostensibly operating from inside Germany was also established. This broadcast not only propaganda but also tried to attract an audience by including variety items and the latest German hit tunes in its programmes. Later in the war much use of both overt and 'black' propaganda broadcasting was made by the Political Warfare Executive (PWE).

Although Mr West does not take his study beyond 1945, it would be a serious mistake to believe that such psychological warfare techniques as the use of 'black radio' ended with the cessation of hostilities in the Second World War. Over the last 40 years or so the Soviet Union has made much use of clandestine radio broadcasting. By the end of the 1960's such stations, operating from within the Soviet Bloc but claiming to be broadcasting from within the countries to which their broadcasts were beamed, were addressing listeners in France, West Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and the Middle East.

Today the practice of the use of 'black radio' broadcasting has given rise to the existence of an increasing number of clandestine stations engaged in propaganda war between rival states or political organizations in the Third World particularly in the Middle East and Gulf areas. A study of the extent of clandestine broadcasting by all participants during the last four decades and its possible effect upon target audiences would certainly make a worthwhile companion study to Mr West's interesting account of its origins.

THE ENCRUSTED CROWN C. H. Sisson

The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its Monarchy, Tom Nairn, Radius, £8.95; **The Civil Service Today**, Gavin Drewery and Tony Butcher Basil Blackwell, £29.95 hardback, £9.50 paperback.

Tom Nairn has strong views about the Monarchy: he does not like it. His vision, which pursues him relentlessly, is of modernity, that somewhat subjective goddess which some see as the rehabilitation of capitalism and some, Nairn included, as the final triumph of a 'civilisation from below'. It may be that these two ideas are not as much at odds as is commonly supposed, on either side. However that may be, there is a sense in which, as Nairn says (quoting Gareth Stedman Jones), 'class is a life sentence,' which must mean that, for good or ill, none of us will live to see a truly classless society. There are of course other life-sentences, which run concurrently, and the idea of the world changing over-night is simply a fantasy. It is not a fantasy that Nairn indulges in, and what he recommends, in the end, is 'a quiet republicanism' as the best way of ridding ourselves of the intolerable burden of the past which - again, with varying ideas of what it consists in - we all occupy ourselves with trying to shift.

Nairn is a critic of an unusual kind, and one of unusual abilities. He has read widely and miscellaneously, and pours over the reader pell-mell, quotations from scores of writers who may be supposed to have advanced the cause of modernisation and from some who have walked in darkness. He is an obsessional and insistent moralist - a Scottish trait, perhaps - and if the undoubted liveliness of his writing palls rather quickly, it is because he is more intent on illustrating his prejudices than on advancing an argument or accounting for facts. In some ways he is strangely old-fashioned. Like the princes of Mass-Observation in 1936-7, when the matter was brought to the attention of 'intellectuals' by the Abdication crisis, he is scandalised by 'the extraordinary hold which the Monarchy [has] over the British popular imagination'.

There is no lack of silly things said about members of the Royal Family, and Nairn gets some grim fun out of this. Where he is more subtle - and, I would say, very useful - is in pointing to 'the absence of intellectual concern about the Monarchy', and to the sort of defence which implies that it is not important enough to matter. He sees clearly that it does matter, though for him this is because of the aid and comfort he sees it as giving to what he calls 'the glamour of backwardness'.

It is a weakness of his approach that he is less concerned with the functions of government than with *mentalité*, with the alleged general responses which, in

real life, are made up of no more than a small element of individual minds of widely different degrees of vigour and which, one and all, are overwhelmingly filled with quite different matter. Anyone who knows anything about France will have observed the tenacity of the class system in that classic republic; in the face of such evidence, it is hard to believe that Nairn's picture of the harm done by the Monarchy is not askew somewhere.

Where Nairn is undoubtedly right is in assuming, 'throughout this book, that the Crown's "closeness to the hearts of the people" means something, as distinct from the deplorable nothing of idiot-theory'. It is a question of orientation how one sees that meaning. If Nairn's view is coloured somewhat by his Scottish perspective, my own is certainly no less affected by an English bias. But it is a more fundamental difference that he dreams endlessly of a state mysteriously run from below and without reference to the past - a state of which there is no example (consider not only France but the Czarist-infected government of the USSR) - while I have been more concerned, in *The Spirit of British Administration* and elsewhere, with the tiresome mechanisms of actual government, past and present, here and abroad. His book is anyhow valuable in drawing attention to the almost entirely unexplored constitutional implications of entry into the Common Market, which successive British governments have either found it prudent not to be frank about, or have simply not understood.

It was under the confusing rule of the late Lord Armstrong that the notion was promulgated that civil servants were to be regarded as servants of the government of the day rather than of the Crown. Yet of course, for the population at large, the continuity of the administration is of more importance than its political colour. For senior civil servants with their eyes on their careers, however, the temptation is not to insist enough on facts which should be taken account of, and to be obsequious when they should stand up. *The Civil Service Today*, a workmanlike introduction to the recent history and contemporary structure and problems of the service, is by two academics in the fields of government and social administration. It is at all times difficult to see the civil service from outside, and to distinguish between changes which are really internal and those which are due to changes in government policy; epochs of diseconomy are times in which ministers are not interested in economy. The fundamental question about the service is, is there a role for a permanent executive? - to which the answer, however qualified, must be in the affirmative. And the pinnacle of this executive, as of the armed forces, is not the Prime Minister but the Crown. This does not mean independent action by the civil service, any more than by the armed forces, but the coherence of successive administrations. Ministers in Her Majesty's government, of whatever colour, share this duty of responsibility beyond their own brief moment, and civil servants are the Queen's Remembrancers.

ON HIDDEN AGENDAS *Beverly Halstead*

Science and Beyond, Steven Rose and Lisa Appignanesi (editors), Blackwell, 1986, £14.95. (0-631-14483-8).

I was delighted to have been asked to review *Science and Beyond*, and when the book came into my hands my first impression was that here was a really exciting and important book. Here within single covers were some of the leading figures in some of the most important scientific debates relating to science and society. I dipped into some of my favourite authors: here was John Maynard Smith exuding as always common sense and Richard Dawkins expounding on the furore over sociobiology and its misrepresentation by the radical science movement. Great. Then I set to and read the book and a general feeling of unease and dissatisfaction began to come over me. I put the book aside and returned to it several months later - something was wrong but I could not put my finger on it. Hardly anyone seemed to be addressing the issues discussed by the other authors. One set of authors addressed the topics under discussion in a straightforward way and as clearly and honestly as possible. The other set was making points in reference to an unstated hidden agenda. Herein lies the difficulty. If one tries to point out that a scientist is actually presenting work as part of an ideological campaign as an avowed Marxist, one is laughed out of court as suffering from some kind of right-wing paranoia. No one is prepared to take this seriously even when it is carefully documented, nor even when the leading figures continually proclaim their Marxism. . . .

The trouble is that we are not dealing with a bunch of ignorant ranting demagogues but with some of the most articulate and intelligent scientists of our time. They are well aware of what they are trying to achieve and the only way to halt them is to tackle them on the ground of their own choosing. Not an enviable task, but nevertheless one that has to be attempted for the sake of the integrity of science.

The tone of *Science and Beyond* is set by the Introduction of Steven Rose: 'No longer part of the progressive inevitable march towards socialism, science has become part of the instrumental rationality of capitalism, to use the insight of Habermas.' Sociobiology which implies that certain traits in human society may have been fixed into human makeup over millions of years of evolution, really disturbs Rose because 'political theorists of the Right - from libertarian monetarists to neo-fascists - have seized upon their pronouncements as providing "scientific" justification for their political philosophies.' Rose and his supporters rail against sociobiology because it is 'reductionist and biological determinist'. Mike Howgate (Stephen Jay Gould - chance without necessity, 1985, *Modern Geology*, vol.9, pp.309-313) has pointed out that what the radical science movement is all about 'is

reading back into nature a caricature of what they would like to see in society - an eclectic assortment of cooperation, peace, love, radical change, anti-sexism and even gay rights ... to see their own preferred set of social relations directly mirrored in nature - a socio-biology of the utopian left rather than that of the reactionary right.'

The real trouble is that they do not actually come out with this openly. It is all smothered in obfuscation and parading of slogans. The cry 'reductionist' is often all that is required to set the hounds of radical science baying. Rose spells it out: 'reductionist philosophy [is] more than "bad science", but ... reactionary and anti-human as well.' 'Far from being timeless, universalist and value-free, scientific methods and knowledge, like the institutions of science themselves, are seen as having embedded within them the values and ideologies of those who are the makers of science - that is, science is seen as overwhelmingly bourgeois, male and white.' So what is to be done? The answer is feminist science. Yes, I will repeat that the answer is feminist science. Hilary Rose (Steven's wife) in her article which concludes the book 'Nothing less than half the labs,' sees, according to Steven, the 'choice both for science and humankind as between transcending male values and moving towards a feminist epistemology or destruction'.

Steven Rose encapsulates it: 'The new social movements, of feminism, ecology and peace, actively seek a new relationship with nature, a relationship which transcends the dichotomy of objectivity and subjectivity and looks to holistic rather than reductionist, harmonious rather than dominatory, ways of living with and understanding the world.'

This is the flavour of the book. Is there anything of nutritional value to be had from this collection of essays? There is indeed. J.D. Watson (of Watson and Crick DNA fame) presents an inspiring case for science summed up in his title: 'Biology: a necessarily limitless vista'. This is followed by a depressing narrow diatribe from Steven Rose hammering the evil consequences of reductionism. But this chapter, 'Limits to science', has one very vital piece in it, of which George Orwell would have been proud. In my earlier article 'The New Left's assault on science' (*Salisbury Review*, 1987, vol.5 (2) 37-39) I implied that the radical science movement, and Steven Rose and his collaborators in particular, wished to eliminate ideas of racial superiority by 'not researching on genetic differences among humans' and that they wished to suppress 'uncomfortable facts'. Steven Rose wrote to me stating 'I categorically deny ever expressing such a view ... it is not that research on race differences in intelligence should be suppressed, but that this is not a scientifically meaningful question.' On page 35 in replying to the rhetorical question whether he is opposed to research on 'the genetics of average race differences in IQ', he states 'I am opposed to it on the same grounds that I am opposed to research on whether the backside of the moon is made of gorgonzola or of stilton. That is, it is a silly question,

incapable of scientific answer and actually, *sensu strictu*, meaningless. The question makes grammatical, but not scientific sense, because "IQ" is not a phenotype susceptible to genetic measurements and heritable estimates cannot be applied to average differences in phenotypes between groups.' It all sounds very reasonable but what he is saying in effect is that he is defining what is an appropriate subject for scientific investigation. No, he would not suppress research in any area of science but by his definition certain areas are automatically excluded from consideration. This paragraph can be considered as my having put the record straight vis-a-vis the stand of Rose. Whether this is read as 'a clear apology and retraction' as demanded of me. I leave the reader to decide.

The second part of the book is for me far and away the most exciting, covering as it does evolution. John Maynard Smith provides a magisterial over-view dealing with structuralism versus selection. The next chapter is by Brian Goodwin with the seemingly innocuous title 'Is biology an historical science?' Goodwin, who has now joined Rose's university department, is part of 'a rebirth of a sort of Hegelian structuralist dialectics by radical Piagetians, and some other developmental and cognitive schools in Europe' (Hilary and Steven Rose 'On oppositions to reductionism' in *Against Biological Determinism* published by the Dialectics of Biology Group edited by Steven Rose). Goodwin rejects the historical and contingent aspects of evolution and seeks fundamental laws of structure that are not time dependent. This is part of the attack on the concept of adaptation, which is one of the consequences of selection but Goodwin's essay is not in the class of the brilliant essay by Steven Gould and Richard Lewontin in 1979 (The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm. *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London*, series B. vol.205, pp.581-598). Goodwin is on record as proclaiming the necessity 'to abandon the system of concepts which we call the evolutionary paradigm ... confusion is a consequence of the exclusively functionalist preoccupations of Darwinism.' If the structures of organisms can be seen as the consequences of laws of form then there becomes no need to invoke selection to account for adaptation. Sudden shifts in developmental pathways will do the trick. Competition and selection of individuals can be excluded from the equation of the major stages of evolution. Natural selection and adaptation cannot be denied, but can be relegated simply to the category of 'fine tuning'.

After the heavy dense prose of Goodwin, suddenly we are refreshed by the clarity of language of Richard Dawkins on the topic of sociobiology. This is a biting condemnation of the techniques of gross misrepresentation exercised by Steven Rose on the questions of reductionism and biological determinism. As Dawkins has been described as 'the most reductionist of sociobiologists' it is fitting that he should be the one to demolish Rose and his cronies on this issue. In fact it is worth buying the book for Richard Dawkins' chapter alone. As he points out 'It seems then that, for all that

reductionism is one of their favourite words of abuse, Rose *et al.* have not thought very carefully about what they mean by it... The important thing about "reductionsim", it would seem, is to be against it - like Sin - whether or not you have a clear idea of what you mean by it.' Dawkins concludes 'But "The Sociology Debate" is a trumped-up, ideologically inspired, time-wasting storm in a teacup.'

Patrick Bateson in his chapter notes in passing that Richard Dawkins' 1982 book 'contains the best rebuttal of genetic determinism that I have come across.' He does with much reasonableness draw attention to Kropotkin and the importance of mutualism in the scheme of things. Here is a reasoned discussion of the role of cooperation in both the animal world and human society - and Bateson takes the line 'that "natural" by no means always means "nasty and selfish" and, in as much as biological arguments are brought into political debates, it is appropriate that the biological value of cooperation should be fully appreciated.'

Collectivism implies the conscious cooperation of individuals for common goals. In theory this does not necessarily involve the domination of the individual by the group, but in practice it seems inevitably to produce the imposition of a crude authoritarianism. In a sense this is epitomised by Steven Rose's genuine conviction that he knows what can be properly identified *as* a subject for scientific study. This is almost a definition of a radical - they always know what is best for other people.

The book ends with a couple of chapters on feminism and science. After all Steven had already warned us right at the beginning that this is where the volume was intended to lead us. So what do we get? Janet Sayers discusses the subsidiary roles that are relegated to women in both science and society and makes a plea for a feminist science to counter the male dominated profession. Hilary Rose unites radical and socialist feminists in their recognition that science 'is actively hostile to the interests of women'. One of the headings in the chapter reads 'science and technology under capitalist patriarchy', this says much of Hilary's perceived perspective. But to be fair she is equally disparaging of the 'equally masculine traditional socialist view of the purposes, prospects and methods of science and technology.' At the end of the day she and the book concludes '*Nothing less than half the labs makes a good starting slogan*'.

For most of the book there has been some sense of discussion or even confrontation between authors holding differing viewpoints. This is not the case with the final pair of chapters - both ladies are expressing an identical stance. Implicit in both contributions is that feminism is a phenomenon of the Left. Indeed this is part of the current received wisdom of both the Left and the Right. Researches by the psychologist Helen Haste have demonstrated the existence of a powerful right wing element in modern feminism ('The values and aspirations of English women undergraduates' in S. Acker & D.W. Piper (eds.) *Is higher education fair to*

women? 1984, Nelson). The traditional feminist is seen as a socialist with a fervent belief in the social provision of welfare, an egalitarian society but also in being able to pursue her own career. In contrast is the traditional right wing conservative lady with her uncompromising traditional family values, exactly mirroring the stereotypical dominant and masterful male. Yet the traditional female of the Left, 'bedmate and teamaker for the revolution' (BMTM), held the identical value regarding the relative roles of the sexes as their uppercrust counterparts. The novelty comprised the dungaree and T-shirt socialist feminist bridge. Feminism became almost synonymous with the more strident manifestations of socialism. And all the while nobody seemed to notice the emergence of yet another potent factor in society - the non-socialist feminist. These were to be found in their most prominent among engineers and scientists. They were essentially individualistic and imbued with a powerful sense of the self-reliance model of conservatism. As Haste has stressed, traditional sex role stereotyping is common to the working class and trade union movement and to the Tory shires. Feminism thought to be the monopoly of the socialist left is now also a powerful component of the new conservatism.

None of all this is hinted at in *Science and Beyond*. This is what makes this book so disappointing. There is a ferment of ideas at the present time. The radical science movement seems to be singularly devoid of anything new to say; its members appear to be frozen in the slogans of yesteryear. Many of the passionate and vehemently argued controversies have been resolved and matters have moved onward. It is not without significance that the Spring Address to the Centre of Policy Studies in 1988 was entitled *Natural Partners - cooperation and competition* and the audience was encouraged to go and read Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid*. Nor should it go unnoticed that it is now becoming recognised that in evolution selection favours individuals with a propensity for cooperation. At the end of the day the agitation of the Radical Left no longer poses a threat, it has become irrelevant. More and more the future seems to lie with Haste's individualistic entrepreneurs tempered with Kropotkin's mutual aid.

TEACHING IGNORANCE

James de Candole

Schools For Barbarians, Isabelle Stal and Françoise Thom, Claridge Press, 1988, pp.110, £6.50 (1-870626-50-8).

Milles Stal and Thom are cultural pessimists and for good reason; they are secondary school teachers. They

teach in France but this is of no real importance; their welcome exposé of *la pédagogie* and *les pédagogues* who oil its apparatus travels remarkably well.

Pedagogy is the theory of education. Its ascendancy, so Stal and Thom argue, has meant that no longer is it a requirement that a teacher show an intellectual mastery of the subject being taught; pedagogy itself becomes the essential teaching qualification. But far from constituting a separate branch of knowledge, the history of the French pedagogical establishment has shown pedagogy to be no more than a 'miserable series of unhappy obsessions' of which the two most popular are the fashionable twins of *equality* and *relevance*. This incisive little book reveals how a specious and puffed-up 'discipline' is capable of debauching the minds of those it is meant to serve and the professional morality of those through whom it is perpetrated.

Pedagogy trumpets, in its own uncommonly arrogant way, the belief that each of us is like Rousseau's statue of Glaucus, disfigured by layer upon layer of hideous encrustations - society's rites of passage. The pedagogue is set the task of 'sandblasting' the individual clean to reveal a liberated and perfectly equal creature beneath.

Language, of course, is an important repository of inequality and prejudice, and as such must be challenged in the interests of spontaneous self-expression; Patrick, for example, who makes 'ill-mannered interventions and behaves aggressively' in class is searching after a truth which eludes those of us who must suffer the alienating strictures of common courtesy:

All that remains is for the College of Secondary Education to accept the true picture of itself which Patrick paints through his vulgar, scatological, pornographic, aggressive speech. We must all learn the truth that Patrick is uttering when he tells us we are all shits . . .

'It is clear' write Stal and Thom, 'that language, sense and meaning are the real barriers to the perfecting of pedagogy.' The rules of grammar, logic and syntax are instruments of oppression; 'alphabetic behaviour is irrelevant'; literacy perpetuates inequality; pupils are encouraged to become 'sensitive to sound' in order to avoid the tyranny of the written word:

The ultimate medium of communication between teachers and pupils would be an inarticulate kind of grunting . . . sounds are held to be infinitely more meaningful than any organised discourse.

Lest you suspect Mlles Stal and Thom of writing for effect (or from reactionary spite), they provide the reader with a fund of documentary evidence to support their interpretation.

Pedagogy aims not only at abolishing the differences between pupils but also at developing a 'critical awareness' amongst them. This involves a contempt for any form of abstract thinking, in favour of an examination of 'real life' issues - like disarmament. Pedagogy hopes to 'open up' the classroom to 'life' - to sexism, institutionalised racism, imperialism and so on: 'in the eyes of the pedagogue, the only justification

for the discipline of learning is that it supplies a critique of those ills'. The various subjects are nothing more than perspectives from which to examine the evils of society, hence traditional subjects are 'shredded' into 'relevant' themes.

Stal and Thom also examine *les pédagogues* themselves; how calls for equality serve as a cloak for personal envy, resentment and mediocrity; how the teacher's unions are dominated by socialists and communists; how moderate unions are labelled 'fascist' and how a depressingly low educational standard is used to vindicate the need for the *pedagogie* which created it in the first place.

Teaching was always a modest profession; yet in all this one is impressed most of all by the overweening arrogance of the contemporary pedagogue - his attempt to transform society, and to turn schools into nurseries for the 'new man'. When the teacher believes the world can be saved by his teaching, it is perhaps little wonder that he loses sight of the more prosaic skills of the classroom.

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In Search of Order

Volume Five of *Order and History*

Eric Voegelin

In Search of Order brings to a conclusion Eric Voegelin's masterwork, *Order and History*, begun more than thirty years ago. Sadly, his death on 19 January 1985, means that *In Search of Order* is briefer than it otherwise would have been. However, the theoretical presentation that Voegelin had set for himself is essentially completed here.

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RUSSIAN GUIDE

David J. Levy

State and Society in Soviet Thought, Ernest Gellner, Blackwell, 1988, 193pp., (0-631-15787-5).

Ernest Gellner is not only a formidably intelligent man but a very, some might say intimidatingly, clever one as well. Both qualities are much in evidence in this collection which brings together eight of his recent studies of developments in Soviet academic thought. In their combination of hard-headed intellectual perceptiveness and glittering, but scarcely ever dismissive, irony these essays are vintage Gellner. They are at once informative and entertaining, consistently scholarly and, at the same time, recurrently and irrepressibly playful. Even in a Russian forest Gellner preserves his capacity to see the wood for the trees: identifying with his customary acumen the crucial philosophical and political issues that provide, as often as not, the formative subtext of Soviet academic debate.

The subject matter of Gellner's essays is, at first sight, rather narrower than the title of his book might suggest. There is nothing here on the way the relationship between state and society is presented in Soviet political science, still mortgaged up to the hilt by the crippling demands of conformity to communist ideology, nor on the well worn theme of the treatment of politics in Soviet literature. Instead Gellner focuses on the work of Soviet anthropologists, or 'ethnographers' at they describe themselves, and, to a lesser extent, on the writings of a number of historians and philosophers whom he considers particularly significant. The result is a fascinating series of studies of work little known in the West, on ethnicity for example, that is not only interesting in itself but also illustrates the tensions that continue to exist between the responsibilities of scholarship and the still far from negligible requirements of ideological conformity.

Soviet scholars are, of course, expected to be Marxists, and there is something inherently problematic about the notion of distinctively Marxist scholarship. Scholarship, at least in the human sciences, is, after all, a matter of continuing to ask questions about aspects of the world - history, society and culture - to which Marxism already claims, at least in principle, to have found the answers. At least in the West the self-styled Marxist scholar is, more often than not, a man who asks questions whose answers he knows in advance from his perusal of the canonical texts, and who fills his time and the pages of his books with evidence selected precisely in order to confirm his initial suppositions. If the Western Marxist deigns to answer those who challenge his theoretical premises, he does so either by casting doubt on the political motives of his critics, or by so recasting the meaning of his Marxism that it becomes, where comprehensible at all, vague and slippery enough to be virtually irrefutable.

In contrast to the obscurantist, (Gellner calls it 'long haired') Marxism of the West, Soviet Marxism is 'short haired', committed to certain definite and in principle testable propositions concerning the course and ultimate destiny of human history. These propositions provide a sort of grid against which the findings of scholarship can be measured. The grid is a source of questions for Soviet scholars and the challenge they face is how to couch the answers thrown up by research in a form that does not openly disrupt the informing framework.

While profoundly sceptical of the claims of Marxism to provide an overall theory of history - one inseparably tied, as he continually reminds us, to the unreal promise of worldly salvation from the imperfections of life - Gellner shows how Soviet anthropology is able to raise important questions concerning the nature of man's historical development which have, all too often, been ignored in the more narrowly focused scholarship of the West. The very tension between ideologically engendered expectations and the awkward historical realities brought to light by honest research, as well as by the political experience of a multi-ethnic empire in which the state resolutely refuses to fade away, provides a rich source of anthropological insight. In particular, Gellner shows how the apparent irreducibility of political to economic power, evidenced in Soviet studies of nomad societies and in the dispute over what Marx called the 'Asiatic mode of production', implicitly calls into question not only the fundamental Marxist assumptions to which lip service must still be paid, but also raises potentially subversive questions about the nature of the Soviet state itself.

Perhaps most interesting of all is Gellner's extensive discussion of Yuri Semenov's theories concerning the origins of the distinctively human form of life. While there is undoubtedly an apologetic, ideologically motivated element in Semenov's writings, which aim to provide a sophisticated argument for the compatibility of the Marxist hypothesis of man's original condition of 'primitive communism' with Darwin's theory of natural selection, the sort of questions he raises and the range of evidence he brings into play are fundamental to our understanding of man's nature and place in the world. In its apparent combination of ideological motivation and broad scholarly range Semenov's work testifies to both the present limits and future promise of Soviet scholarship in the human sciences.

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43 Queen's Gardens,
London W2

Antony Flew, *Education Tax Credits*, IEA Education Unit, Warlington Park School, Chelsham Common, Surrey, 13pp., £2.50.

In the latest of its occasional pamphlets, the IEA (in the person of Antony Flew) argues for the introduction of a tax credit system, enabling more parents to take advantage of the Education Reform Act 1988, and to opt out of the system of state education altogether. Flew neatly rehearses the arguments for the views that (1) the state monopoly (or near monopoly) over educational provision is the root cause of declining standards; (2) that this monopoly leads automatically to a socially minded 'equality machine', hostile to any kind of intellectual or educational distinction; (3) that the real sufferers from this process are the children of poorer parents; and (4) that, in this field as in any other, the remedy for state monopoly is private ownership. It is the private school, Flew persuasively argues, which is the school of the future, and it would be a simple fiscal device that placed such schools within the reach even of the poorest parents.

Let us hope that this pamphlet is read in government circles, and that more of the good sense issuing from the IEA's education unit gains the recognition and the readership that it deserves.

(R.S.)

Angelo Codevilla, *The Cure that May Kill: unintended consequences of the INF treaty*, IEDSS, 13/14 Golden Sq., W1, 57pp., £4.50.

Anyone who retains illusions about the INF treaty and its likely strategic impact should read this chilling and powerfully argued pamphlet. We all have the strongest motive to turn away from the facts and the arguments that it contains, and there is every evidence that, in diplomatic, political and even military circles, that motive has been allowed to prevail. But if Dr Codevilla's case is right - and there is little reason to question it - then the main consequences of the treaty will prove far more alarming than the situation which it was designed to remedy. First, a conventional war (with the certainty of Soviet victory) is now more likely; secondly, American troops, vastly outnumbered and without the needed flexible cover of nuclear defence, will not for long remain in Europe. Yet where is the European leader who is alerting us to the danger that

this implies, or who is trying to unite the nations of Europe around something more serious than their blind pursuit of wealth?

(R.S.)

A. P. Galkin and P. I. Rachshmir, *Konservatizm v proshlom i nastoyashem*, Moscow, Nauka, 1987, 188pp.; Oskar Krejci, *Americký konservatismus*, Prague, Svoboda, 1987, 258pp.

The appearance of two academic studies of modern conservative thought, issued by the official press in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, deserves a mention in our pages - even if that by Krejci, in a series entitled 'The Critique of Bourgeois Ideology and Revisionism', is little more than a mechanical application, to recent American conservative and neo-conservative thinkers, of the clapped-out categories of Marxism-Leninism. What is most surprising about both volumes is the recognition of conservatism as a distinct social force, with an international following, and a rapidly crystallizing political programme. Galkin and Rachshmir are more neutral in their appraisal than the morbidly party-minded Krejci; but both volumes acknowledge the inexplicable popularity of conservatism in the West, and even give some statistics which cannot fail to awaken their readers to the surpassing good fortune, by communist standards, of the poorest citizens in the 'imperialist' enclave.

Despite Krejci's concluding judgement, that American conservatism is but 'one step in the vain attempt of the American bourgeoisie to break the law-like progress of the people from capitalism to communism', his obsessive delving into texts whose self-confidence contrasts so vividly with his own depressed and regimented new-speak, is some evidence of a deep and gratifying mental disturbance. Galkin and Rachshmir are more synoptic, finding space to notice even *The Salisbury Review*; they too see conservatism as a ploy of capitalist imperialism; but they remain puzzled by those conservatives who speak of other and more elusive matters than the 'bourgeois' economy.

Precisely why these books should appear at this time is anyone's guess: but the thorough grounding of their authors, in texts which they profess to loathe, suggests many hours spent in forbidden reading, and perhaps in forbidden thinking too.

(R.S.)

