


THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY



THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY

THE NEW YORK PUBLIC LIBRARY
ASTOR LENOX TILDEN FOUNDATION
125 WEST 47TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10036

The Salisbury Review

*A quarterly magazine of
conservative thought*

*Editor Roger Scruton
Deputy Editor James de Candole
Literary Editor Ian Crowther*

Editorial address: 7 Lord North St.,
London SW1

Subscriptions: The Claridge Press,
43 Queen's Gardens, London W2

An *intifada* is a 'shaking': but the troubles in the occupied territories have done far less to shake the state of Israel than has the PLO's diplomatic success. 'World opinion' is now captivated by this organisation which, in claiming to be sole representative of the Palestinian people, proves itself representative of no-one. The PLO ought to have been disqualified from all diplomatic possibilities. In fact, however it reaped the rewards of terrorism, in the very act of 'renouncing' them; it acquired, through crime, a legitimacy which it could never have obtained through works of virtue.

It is not only the PLO which has scored a victory; the United Nations has also advanced one of its favourite causes. As Roger Watson shows in this issue, the UN's support for terrorists is a constant and calculating thing, now firmly institutionalised within that grotesque institution. In the case of Israel, other forces, besides the UN and the PLO, are also conspiring for its downfall. Behind the belief that Zionism is a peculiar moral evil, lies the old spectre of anti-semitism. Perhaps Paul Gottfried is right to discern elements of over-reaction in recent Jewish writings on this theme. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to see, in the portrait of Israel now painted by the Western media, a renewal of the ancient suspicion of the seed of Abraham.

In communist countries anti-semitism is openly encouraged, as part of the continuing propaganda war. A partly fictionalized 'novel', recently published in Czechoslovakia, manages not only to identify Czech Jews with Zionism, but also - in passages of absurd political commentary - to blame them for the failure of the post-war economy, for the spread of imperialism, and even for the 'counter-revolutionary activities of 1968-9'. The book, *Zemí Zaslíbené* (In the Promised Land) by J. Sebesta, became the subject of an interesting libel action, brought by a survivor of the concen-

tration camps. The judge was forced to admit libel - a rare verdict in a country where both judges and publications are controlled by the Communist Party. At the same time, no award of damages was made, the PLO was invited to attend the trial and to renew its abuse of 'Zionism', while the book continued to be favourably reviewed in the official press, in terms calculated to spread its message. This is but one instance of the symbiotic relation, which brings Palestinian terrorism, Slavic anti-semitism and communist policy together, in an assault on a people who have the impertinence to believe themselves chosen, not by a party, but by God.

As Christophe Nyíri shows, the old Central Europe - the home of modern Jewish culture - was also rich in conservative thinkers, not all of them anti-semitic. The tradition of social thought that culminated in Hayek is not the least of the achievements of the great multi-national empire of the Habsburgs, and even if it was to become conscious of itself only at the gathering of the dusk, it is to this empire that we should turn in understanding the hopes and fears of Europe. Alas, however, for Albania - the life and death of whose religion is described in these pages - that it never enjoyed the protection of the Austrian crown, and was unable to build for itself the civil institutions that might have mitigated the terrors of communism.

Whatever the strengths of Austrian thinking, it cannot displace the thought of Aristotle, the greatest theorist of constitutional government, who speaks as freshly to us today as he spoke to his contemporaries. A. C. Bradley's brilliant Hegelian interpretation of the *Politics* has long been out of print. We offer a condensed version to our readers, in the hope that they will turn again to the greatest and wisest of philosophers, and the one with the best title to the name 'conservative'.

Contents

Communist 'Reform': Eastern Europe and Freedom <i>G. M. Tamás</i>	4
Aristotle as a Conservative Thinker <i>A. C. Bradley</i>	8
The Real Racism <i>Dennis O'Keefe</i>	18
In Search of Central Europe: Anonymous	19
The Politics of Literature <i>Richard Cronin</i>	22
Toys in a Violent Society <i>P. N. R. Waterman</i>	26
Jews, Christians and Persecution <i>Paul Gottfried</i>	29
United Nations Fund for International Terrorism (UNFIT) <i>Roger Watson</i>	33
Tradition and Freedom: Austrian Conservatism from Eötvös to Musil <i>J. C. Nyíri</i>	38

Editorial	43
Letters	44
Book Reviews <i>Antony Flew, Anthony O'Hear, Dennis O'Keefe, Ian Greig, James de Candole, Stanley Arthur, Mervyn Hiskett, Ian Crowther, Jonathan Ruffer, William Purdue, Nigel Ashford</i>	46
In Short	61

Subscription details

Published quarterly in September, December, March and June, volume commencing with September issue. Annual subscription rates: £14, \$30 surface mail; single issues £4.00, \$8.00, ISSN: 0265-4881.

Copyright © The Claridge Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or other without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Printed in the UK by Biddles Ltd.

Conservative Journals: RES PUBLICA

The emergence in the Soviet bloc of a conservative journal which is published officially is a significant intellectual development. Edited in Warsaw by Marcin Król, *Res Publica* belongs to the liberal-conservative tradition of *Encounter* and *Policy Review*. An activist, and semi-official spokesman for the constitutional wing of the opposition, Król has made his name as editor of underground journals, and as author of scholarly texts, over the last decade. The legalization of *Res Publica* is to a great extent a personal triumph, although one that would hardly have been possible without the achievements of Solidarity, or without the constant and vigilant support offered by the Catholic Church to the tender shoots of civil society. Already, in its second year, *Res Publica* has a print-run of 25,000: the difficulty is not to find purchasers, but to find the paper with which to supply them.

Res Publica defends, as do almost all publications of the opposition, whether official or unofficial, those two precious institutions which

the communists destroyed: the free market and the rule of law. But it ranges more widely, covering culture, philosophy, and sociology, and offering articles on every aspect of contemporary Polish life, together with discussions of matters which are common concern to conservatives everywhere. The next issue will carry a version of John Gray's 'Politics of Cultural Diversity' (See *Salisbury Review*, September 1988), together with a review by Pawel Śpiewak of *Conservative Thinkers* and *Conservative Thoughts - Essays* from the *Salisbury Review*. Discussions of tradition, religion and national identity are common; so too are more daring challenges to the powers that be - including a striking editorial on Patočka, the Czech philosopher who was the first spokesman for Charter 77, and who died as a result of secret police brutality.

Res Publica appears at least six times a year. An annual subscription is £47, from Orbis Books, 66 Kenway Road, London SW5.

Communist 'Reform': Eastern Europe and Freedom

G. M. Tamás

'I am proud of being fettered by antiquated dogmas and enslaved by dead creeds,' wrote Chesterton in his autobiography, 'for I know well that it is the heretical creeds that are dead, and that it is only the reasonable dogma that lives long enough to be called antiquated.'

Our creed is that familiar mixture of principle and habit, critical reasoning and idiosyncratic faith, that can broadly be described as the civic tradition. It is an ideological salmagundi: elements of natural law, classical republicanism, Burkean Whiggism, utilitarian liberalism, and simply memories of a political practice based on decency and dealing with human conflict on the basis of law. In the long fight with modern tyrannies this (essentially Western) civic tradition came to be seen as a long effort to develop a system of liberties. However narrow and polemic, this image is after all accurate enough.

Defending a universe of experience (*Lebenswelt*) is an exacting task, because it obviously cannot be an exclusively moral one. Nor is it an entirely rational exercise. This is why the criticism of communist régimes on the sole ground of human rights is finally unsatisfactory. Theories of rights have the same limitations as other ethical theories. The sheer existence of Western civilization is not only a concatenation of historical facts but a universe of experience and values. The frontiers of the Soviet Union are heavily guarded to prevent people getting *out*, those of the United States are (not so heavily) guarded in order to prevent people getting *in*. This empirical contrast is, I believe, fundamental. This is not to say that whatever people appear to prefer is in any case preferable. Majorities are known to have been foolish. Nevertheless, the amount of suffering imposed on millions by socialist and other totalitarian utopias should silence the most sophisticated and highbrow objections. While defending itself, the West is defending those who are the unwilling subjects of communist dictatorship.

The interest of Eastern European nations in the Russian sphere of influence is not the fulfillment of some abstract idea of peace (and/or *détente*, rapprochement, or appeasement), but the continued strength and self-confidence of the Western powers. It has been said that *détente* is good for reforms in the communist world. Forgetting for a moment that *détente* had the opposite effect under Mr Nixon's and Dr Kissinger's tenure, let us briefly examine this supposition.

A reformed communism would no doubt be nicer than a plain one. Less economic *dirigisme*, less poverty, an increased 'gray area' of free speech, more room for

privacy, and so on, would all be welcome. Nevertheless, what we want is not a better sort of communist regime, but no communism at all. People in Eastern Europe will put up with reforms as a way out of their current predicament. Communist reformers apparently think that reforms will strengthen the system. This is not warranted by history. On the contrary, thorough reforms here have always been followed by revolts (as in Hungary in 1956 and, to a certain extent, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia). This is something Mr Gorbachev seems to be aware of. His version of modernization is possible if the West is willing to bear the costs: it would be dangerous for him to use the scant Soviet resources. So it is indeed his intention to reach some sort of agreement with the West. This agreement and its immediate financial advantages will give him a firmer grip on the reins of the *nomenklatura* and at the same time an incentive for procrastination, for a *sine die* postponement of reforms. It should not be forgotten that in Hungary the huge Japanese and West German loans have actually stopped the so-called 'reform process.' This is likely, alas, to be repeated in the Soviet Union, which obviously would not modify Mr Gorbachev's reform rhetoric. Then those who encouraged this deception abroad will have a vested interest in allowing him to go on with his particular blend of innovative hypocrisy. If *détente* were to encourage real reforms, however, trouble would surely follow. The Soviet counterpart of King Juan Carlos of Spain who could lead that nation peacefully out of totalitarian socialism is not yet born. We do not wish for trouble, but reforms will cause confusion and chaos unless they are fully endorsed by society - and to be so endorsed, they would have to be quite different.

One ought to ask, I think, what is the sense of an agreement between inimical powers in time of peace. One possible answer could be to change an adversary relationship into an alliance. Clearly it would be absurd to speak of a new Russo-American alliance: the ideological chasm is too deep, and there are no common enemies comparable in might to that of the super-powers. The SALT, ABM, and INF treaties sought only to decrease the tension, diminish the apocalyptic fears of the public, and demonstrate that the state of peace is given further guarantees and tokens of good will. In other words, they are *political*, not military, instances of understanding. But then they are only indirectly so: the most important, that is, *political*, consequences of the INF treaty are not spelled out, they can merely be guessed.

Guesswork is hardly a serious undertaking: I shall concentrate instead on those problems of the contemporary world that are inextricably linked to the opposition between communist dictatorships and Western constitutional democracies (I prefer the adjective 'constitutional' to 'liberal' because of the rather blurred meaning of the latter). Treaties meant to alleviate the dangers of this opposition must address these problems; if they fail to do so, this is bound to have its own consequences calling for further analysis.

1. The communist system is in a profound crisis. This crisis is not confined to the Soviet sphere or influence. China, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Moçambique, Ethiopia, and Cuba are facing different, but equally distressing and apparently insoluble, problems. This crisis is affecting roughly half of humankind. For the communist type of modern tyranny, unlike the fascist one, has never yet been beaten (if one discounts Grenada); thus no one is in a position to know what a post-communist society would be like. However much I may desire the end of Bolshevik rule in my country and elsewhere, I cannot dismiss the anxieties concerning this unknown future. It is therefore understandable that Western politicians with impeccable credentials as to their undying hostility to communism are not keen on terminating what they hate most. But should they be acting to save their adversaries? The credibility of Bolshevik leaders nowadays is dependent on their winning their domestic political battles in Washington and London. Without the support of the 'liberal' Western media, neither Señor Ortega nor Gospodin Gorbachev could hope to win their battles at home. The West may be weak and hesitating; however, it is unquestionably the *arbiter* of every major dispute today, and therefore unwittingly responsible for whatever happens next everywhere.

2. The dependence of communist leaders on Western fame and recognition is explicable in view of their inability to gain popular support. After all, if they could consult their 'constituents,' they would not be what they are. But that the popularity of the president of the United States could depend on whether he is or is not able to make a deal with the leader of the Soviet Communist Party should give one pause for thought. It is an essential feature of modern constitutional democracies that there is no agreed set of criteria defining a good society or the indispensable minimum of human dignity. The decisive factor is not some sort of knowledge of a moral or theological nature, but the *will* of the citizen conceived as an abstract entity, a totally free agent who by virtue of his complete freedom and nothing else will make the right choices, that is, the only possible choices. This rather strong presupposition is operative only when popular beliefs support it. When these falter or are on the wane, the defence of that peculiar and parochial universe of experience and values (*Lebenswelt*) becomes increasingly difficult. Intellectuals and other 'opinion leaders' are free to find their beliefs where they like. The principle of toleration and of what is misleadingly dubbed 'pluralism' is a

utilitarian one: the dangers of the predominance of one social dogma are deemed to be greater than the dissemination of various dogmas, however crazy or harmful. So far so good. But John Stuart Mill never thought that this would preclude the search for truth in civic matters, nor that persuasive argument asserting the values of a particular civilization would have to be out of bounds. 'Theories' of 'moral equivalence' might have been considered donnish fads; but being unresisted, they finally carried the day. The old paradox that free societies are the prisoners of their abstract commitment to decency and to liberties is being reaffirmed.

We who live under dictatorial rule are yearning for ideals the West is too shy to say it believes in. There is thus an ironic reciprocity: Western values are cherished in the East, while Eastern dictators are seeking legitimacy in the West. The West is doomed in the long run if it cannot find a dogma, in spite of the stark fact that nobody believes in the socialist utopia where socialism is in control, not even the regimes' beneficiaries.

3. The greatest single problem facing us today is a heritage of the Second World War: the German question. Undeniably, the greatest continental European power, West Germany, because of its legitimate national aspiration, that is, German unity, is politically the hostage of the Soviet Union, the only force that can satisfy that aspiration. West German public opinion's resistance to the deployment of the so-called Euro-missiles tipped the balance toward what is now the INF treaty. An inescapable fact remains the unwillingness of this major democratic nation to be defended against what one would think was its main enemy. On the West German left there was even talk of a new Rapallo. Regardless of its allegiance to the Atlantic alliance, the West German government has a high stake in the political welfare of its communist counterpart in Pankow.¹ And I believe nobody will claim that Herr Honecker's régime has anything to do with 'liberalization' or any such thing. If the West cannot offer something substantial to the German nation to help heal its historical wounds, it will have to be prepared to see the slow erosion of NATO and a recrudescence of Central European nationalism, anti-Americanism, and anti-Semitism, together with a growing sympathy for a streamlined and dynamic Soviet Union. The stupefying reception that the disclosures about Dr Waldheim's past received in Austria shows only too well that this chapter of history is not closed and that the Kremlin does not need to be too skillful to exploit it.

4. Mr Nixon's and Dr Kissinger's détente had the immense although temporary advantage of dividing America's communist enemies in spite of losing a war to them. But the adroit manipulation of the Sino-Soviet split was fraught with danger, especially because it gave legitimacy to the idea that the United States can have communist allies in its conflict with Russia. Now Taiwan and Hong Kong have been let down, British instructors, alongside Cuban and East German ones, are training élite combat units of the communist

Mozambiquan army, and China, while benefiting from Western economic and military aid and diplomatic support, is quietly resuming its links with the Soviet Union, slowing down reforms, and lending a hand to distasteful Third World dictators. This is a development of tremendous importance (stressed further by the appointment of the pro-Russian Li Peng as prime minister). The obsolescence of the idea that world communism is not confined to the Warsaw Pact countries is a frightening example of political folly.

5. The INF treaty was originally devised to satisfy America's European allies under pressure from what were at the time their increasingly pacifist bodies politic. But the change of heart of the same nations (a growing respectability of 'dry' conservatism and such surprising phenomena as the forthright pro-Americanism and tough anti-communism of the entire French political spectrum) has made those misgivings completely superfluous. A 'dovish' United States may soon feel as isolated as the 'hawkish' one felt itself to be during the raid on Libya. British and French newspapers now appear to be shocked by the 'Gorbie fever' in Washington. The emphasis on the reduction of conventional forces and chemical weapons in the post-summit statements of Western European politicians means that the Soviet stratagems aimed at dividing the Atlantic alliance have been on the whole quite successful. The Western European allies would have felt left out anyway, whatever the outcome of the talks. And now they may deem it necessary to reach separate arrangements with the Muscovite leadership, thus further diminishing the influence of the Western alliance on the other half of the European continent.

The pleasant surprise of finding Mr Gorbachev distinctly human, unlike his pathetic, robotlike predecessors, hides the fact that his apparently outstanding personal abilities are used for ruling an unrepentant and unreformed tyranny. He did nothing more than acknowledge his country's difficulties and then try to get a blank cheque from every side in exchange for his promise that he will somehow deal with them in the future in ways kept religiously secret apart from a handful of now familiar clichés. This achievement testifies to a worn-down sense of vigilance. Admiration for a clever dictator's person as divorced from his role and actions is, I am inclined to think, a rather worrying sign.

The crisis in the Soviet bloc precludes any economic 'thaw' being at all profitable for the West. It is, furthermore, doubtful whether the menace of war has become any less. The rifts within NATO continue to exist.

The crucial question is whether arms control agreements can bring about any change in the communist world and especially in Eastern Europe. The room to manoeuvre for the leaders of the small Eastern European nations will not be increased if Soviet prestige and self-confidence become greater. If there are influential social groups wishing to interpret this as an opportunity for change ('reforms'), they might grasp this

opportunity. But the existence and the impact of such groups are never closely connected with international treaties. The future of Soviet-type societies will probably be decided within their boundaries. And their future may possibly determine the fortunes of the world. We in Eastern Europe would like the West to have a say in what that future is going to be like. For the West's good and for our own.

Notes

1. Pankow is a suburb of East Berlin, the seat of the ruling Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) which can also be translated as the Socialist Party of German Unity.

Postscript

The above article was originally published in a semi-official NATO review, *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* (Washington), Vol 26, No 1, Spring 1988 and as it was the first of its kind in such a place, written by one of the spokesmen of an East European opposition movement, it came to be regarded as an unusual expression of commitments, allegiances and sympathies. Since the *Quarterly* has only a very specialized readership, it makes sense perhaps to reprint it in an intellectual journal - with some precisions, especially regarding recent developments and the difficulties in understanding them.

Knowledge about communist countries is supplied to the West by journalists, scholars, civil servants, diplomats and spies, in a word, intellectuals. The findings are necessarily controversial, as is the nature of intellectual work. However, political action needs unified opinion (which the jargon of 'political science' would call a 'doctrine'). This makes the challenging of received wisdom (or, as the case may be, suicidal folly) an arduous and thankless task. My asseverations and strictures aim at orthodoxy - still, controversy appears to be the only way.

I shall offer a précis of the main theses making up the received ('mainstream') opinion about communist dictatorships today, adding brief critical remarks.

Thesis I: The changes in Eastern European countries are brought about by reforms engineered by the ruling Party.

In fact, the ruling Communist Parties are resisting reform everywhere; they are not planning, even less implementing any reforms, except those forced upon them by independent social and political forces. Mainstream Western opinion gives the Communist Party the credit of concessions, granted amidst the gnashing of Party teeth, wrested from the dictators by their unruly subjects.

Thesis II: 'Reforms' are strengthening the appeal of socialism.

On the contrary, socialism has completely lost its credibility. The caution of, say, the Baltic 'popular fronts' (legal or at least tolerated opposition mass movements) on this matter is explained by their wish to avoid major sacrifices and by the tacit understanding that if the illegitimate power crumbles, the old ideas of legitimacy and liberty can be resurrected. People in Eastern Europe know that 'reforms' are points scored *by them, against* the system.

Thesis III: 'Reforms' are bringing stability to the region.

Alas, this is patently untrue. Since 'reforms' are not reforms, but defeats for the weakened régime which is in a long, disorderly retreat, stability is out of the question. Despite warnings in British and American editorials, thundering or not, trouble is ahead and cannot be avoided. The agony of Eastern socialism has begun, and I have not the slightest doubt that the process will prove dangerous, chaotic and sometimes ugly. (See the disgusting outburst of tribal hatred in Yugoslavia, with the emerging Duce, Mr Milosević.) The West, to its own peril, is still ignoring the real forces behind the changes.

Thesis IV: The West should support the 'reformist' communist régimes in the interest of the concerned East Europeans and of world peace.

Western political and economic help often proved counter-productive in the past because it was nothing more than a blank cheque cashed by Bolshevik bureaucrats with no obligations whatsoever. Bribing one's enemy when one is disinclined to fight, is a time-honoured course taken for example by the late Romans and some emperors in Constantinople, both Byzantine and Turkish. But this should not be embellished with a 'moral justification'. Helping the sick men of Europe is little else than prolonging the sufferings of their victims.

Thesis V: Nationalism will weaken the influence of the Soviet Union and increase that of the West.

While the first half of *Thesis V* is at least half-true (although *only* Polish nationalism is anti-Russian, the rest of the small East European nations hate each other more and are oblivious of Russia), the second half is not even that. As Asian examples show us, nations escaping tyranny with Western help (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines) will turn bitterly against the West. East European nationalism was fashioned - in its twentieth-century variants and with the partial exception of Masaryk and Szekfü - to emphasise those aspects which separate us from the West. East European nationalism, unlike its Western counterparts, is revolutionary, full of class resentment, opposed to high culture, to élites of any sort, to religion and to legal authority.

Thesis VI: 'Reforms' and troubles will reduce the pugnacity and hostility of the Soviet bloc.

We should not forget that the Soviet leadership has never been particularly brave or adventurous. The Red Army has never launched an attack unless it had a three-to-one advantage. They have always preferred proxy wars, preferably paid for by others (say, the World Council of Churches - that is *you*, esteemed taxpayer or habitué of the collection box - a nice little item on the revenue side on the Soviet military and subversion budget). But with the increased commercial and other contacts a period of ideological and intelligence offensive is likely to be inaugurated. The immediate successors of the now reigning Politbureaux will be as friendly as Ayatollah Khomeini. Which will not stop them from pocketing your cheques.

Finally, let me dwell upon an entertaining philological and psychological puzzle.

The word '*glasnost*' is usually translated in the West as 'openness' or 'transparence'. Naturally enough, the word does not mean any such thing. Perhaps German 'Glas' or English 'glass' have misled the journalists? 'Glas' is Slavonic for 'voice' ('golos' in modern Russian). '*Glasnost*' is an old legal term meaning approximately 'vocality', that is, the right of the defendant or litigant to speak out on his own behalf in court. In its contemporary Gorbachevite usage it suggests that everybody is justified in representing their own *interests* - but not of course their faith, conviction, moral and political views. It is the ultimate corporatist slogan, diametrically opposed to ideas of Benthamite 'transparence' (not very attractive either) or Popperian 'openness' (a loveable utopia, that). Conspiracy theories (and *agents d'influence*) aside, why should this term be mistranslated by all and sundry? After all, there *are* people who can use a Russian dictionary.

It seems that they myth of the enlightened tyrant is stronger than any linguistic fact. Intellectuals educated in the mock-Enlightenment spirit will think that freedom is something conceded (if they like the rulers) or something won by revolutionary violence (if they dislike them). It is neither. It is experienced in belief, reflection and ordered practice, it is lived and, one should hope, sometimes even played with. I trust that, regardless of the failure of those who should inform the West to do so, sane fundamental political instincts will prevail in these days when, from Estonia and Silesia to Tibet and Burma, the idea of centrally planned human happiness is taking its greatest beating since Waterloo.

This is not to deny that it is hard to imagine how a system of liberties and a rule of law can be created in a situation where people must feel that foreign governments are their allies against their own. Far be it for me to say that the West therefore does have a moral obligation to help us achieve freedom and dignity in disintegrating Communist states. It does not. Still, it is our only possible ally. Let's pray that these simple home truths will not take too long to be rediscovered.

Aristotle as a Conservative Thinker

A. C. Bradley

This essay has been adapted from a little-known, and long out-of-print exposition of Aristotle's political philosophy, by the Shakespearean critic A.C. Bradley, brother of the conservative philosopher, F.H. Bradley. The original, entitled 'Aristotle's Conception of the State' appeared in *Hellenica*, edited by Evelyn Abbott, and published by Rivingstone, London, in 1880.

Aristotle's work on *Politics* has a twofold interest—historical and theoretical. If it does not add very materially to our knowledge of facts and events, it throws more light than any other writing, ancient or modern, on the constitutional forms and struggles of the Greek States. It is the result of the political experience of a people, reflected in the mind of one of its wisest men, and reduced to theory. Aristotle wrote of a life that was going on around him, and the freshness of personal knowledge enlivens his coldest analysis. Thus, in spite of the scientific character of his theory, it is national.

But it is not merely our desire to understand the past which is satisfied by a treatise like the *Politics*. That which is true of the art and literature of the Greeks is scarcely less true of their political creations. Their most intensely national products are at the same time 'purely human.' To apply to modern affairs conclusions drawn from Greek history is indeed hazardous. But in spite of change there are permanent characteristics of social forces and of forms of government, of commerce and agriculture, of wealth and poverty, of true and false aristocracy, of oligarchy and democracy. Not only this: among the subjects of which the *Politics* treats there is something even more permanent and universal, and that is the simple fact of political society. Let a State be the organisation of a nation or a city, it is still a State; and what is true of its nature and objects in one case will, up to a certain point, be true of them in another and in every case. It is in the discovery of these truths and the investigation of such ideas as those of justice and right, that the primary business of philosophy in its application to politics consists; and Aristotle is before all things a philosopher. To Aristotle political science is founded on ethics, and ethics on psychology; and all these rest upon metaphysic and its application to nature. I propose to give a sketch of the views which Aristotle held on a few of these preliminary questions. The differences which exist between Greek political conditions and those of our own time, and between the ideas associated with each, are so marked that, unless they are constantly kept in sight, it is impossible rightly to appreciate Aristotle's views, or to

separate what is essential in them from what is merely temporary. It will be as well to begin, therefore, by recalling some of these points of difference to mind.

First of all, the Greek State was a city, not a nation. In such a community public affairs were as much matters of every day as the municipal politics of an English town, and yet they had all the dignity of national decisions. The citizen, in a State like Athens, took part in politics personally, not through a representative; not once in four or five years, but habitually. His convictions or his catchwords were won not through the dull medium of the press, but from the mouths of practised orators. The statesmen of his time were familiar figures in his daily life. The opposite party to his own was not a vague collective name to him, but he rubbed shoulders with it in the streets. Thus political life was his occupation and acquired the intensity of a personal interest. The country and its welfare had a vivid meaning to him; he felt himself responsible for its action and directly involved in its good or evil fortune. Under these conditions the rise and fall of a State visibly depended on the character of its citizens; its greatness was nothing but the outward sign of their energy and devotion; the failure of virtue in them acted immediately on it. Hence the vital interest taken by the State in the character of its members and their education. Hence also an amount of governmental inspection and control of private affairs which, even if it suited modern ideas, would be scarcely possible in a nation. Such 'interference with liberty' was then not felt to be an interference. In the best days of Greece to participate in this rapid and ennobling public life was enough for the Greek citizen. 'To live as one likes,'¹—this is the idea of liberty which Aristotle connects first with the most primitive barbarism (*Eth.*10.9.13), and then with that degraded ochlocracy which marked the decay of the free governments of Greece (179.20; 185.9; 216.16).

A second fundamental distinction is to be found in the social organisation of the Greek State. The political life of Sparta or Athens rested on the basis of slavery. In both instances the bulk of the necessary work was performed by an unfree population, far outnumbering

the select aristocracy of free citizens. This institution and the contempt even for free labour are the most striking proofs that the Hellenic solution of social problems was inadequate; modern writers find in them the 'dark side' of Greek life, or even the 'blot upon their civilisation'. But the latter expression at least is misleading, since it implies that such defects had no organic connection with the strength and beauty of this civilisation; whereas, in fact, the life of 'leisure', devoted to politics and culture or to war, would have been impossible without them.

On this point Aristotle shares the view common to his countrymen. He recommends that slaves should be kindly treated and that good conduct on their part should be rewarded by their liberation. He does not admit that the slavery of men born to be free is justifiable, since, in his view, it is a violation of nature. But he definitely holds that there are men (apparently as a rule 'barbarians') whose right and natural destination is servitude. These are destitute of reason in the highest sense of the word: 'those men who differ from others as widely as the body does from the soul, or a beast from a man (and men stand in such a relation when the use of their bodies is their function and the best thing that can be got out of them), are by nature slaves' (7.15); and for them servitude is not merely a painful necessity, but their good. The problem is, then, to find men whose nature is of this kind, and who at the same time are capable of obeying and even anticipating orders (5.21), of receiving rational instruction (22.9), and of standing in the relation of friendship to their masters (*Eth.* 8.10.6). And this is a contradiction which cannot exist. The weakness of the position is brought out in the words which Aristotle adds to his assertion that friendship is possible between master and slave - 'not as a slave, but as a man.' In other words, to treat a man as a slave is to treat him as though he were not a man.

Another distinction concerns religion. Greek religion knew no recognised orthodox doctrine and no recognised expositor of that doctrine. A Greek had no church. Consequently one of the most fruitful sources of conflict in modern nations had no existence in Hellas. In Aristotle's list of the cause of *stasis* or civil discord religion is hardly mentioned. A second consequence is this, that the Greek knew little, either for good or evil, of the modern idea that the State is 'profane.' His religious feelings attached themselves to it. It was not merely the guardian of his property, but the source of right and goodness. He might not insult its gods, although within certain limits he was left to think and speak of them as he thought right. Thus, but for the occasional influence of the Delphic oracle, we may say that to the Greek citizen his State was the moral and religious law in one.

It is easy for us to realise the defects of such a relation and the want of truth in the religious ideas connected with it. But it had also a greatness of its own; and this we do not feel so readily. It fostered the social and political virtue of the citizen; and in his

devotion to his State, his perception of its greatness and dignity, and the fusion of his reverence for it with that which he felt for his gods, he possessed a spiritual good which the modern world has known only in the scantiest measure, and that only since the Reformation. It is this spirit which breathes throughout the *Politics*, the spirit which is willing to be guided by the highest authority it knows; which emphasises its duties to the community, and has not even a word to signify its 'rights' against it; which describes the possession of property and the begetting of children not as the private affair of individuals but as services to the State;² and which finds in the law, not a restraint but the supremacy of the divine element in human nature, 'reason without desire.'

It will be already apparent, lastly, that if Aristotle's views represent Greek opinion, we must not expect to find in him our own ideas of the individual. It is natural to us to base our political theories on individual liberty and rights. We look upon man as having a nature of his own and objects of his own, independently of society. When we read Aristotle everything seems to change. The State does not limit private existence; private existence derives its being, its welfare, and its rights from it. The community and even its institutions seem to be regarded as an end in which personal happiness has no necessary place, and to which the existence of any number of individuals is a mere means. We soon discover that the Greek philosophers held no such absurdity as this, that they regarded personal welfare in the highest sense as the sole object of the State, and that they were in far less danger than ourselves of seeking it in conquest or in wealth. But after this has been taken into account, and after we have realised that the modern citizen's patriotism and reverence for law seem to answer more to Greek ideas than to our own theories, there remains a decided difference which appears again and again in political questions.

For a century or more before the *Politics* was written, the traditional Greek view had been called in question, and ideas had been opposed to it which strike us at once by their modern air. These ideas may be summed up in the single inquiry, stated by the Sophists, - Is the State natural or conventional?³ If, with some of them, we hold that it is the latter, that it rests upon custom and enactment, the result seems at first sight to be that the reverence and devotion which it claims from the citizen are misplaced, and that its identification with the moral law is absurd. If then it is still to be regarded as an absolute moral power, and not the product of fear or force, we must find some way of reconciling this absoluteness with a recognition of the action of man's will in law or custom. Thus we shall find that Aristotle's position towards the question practically amounts to a denial of the antithesis between *phusis* and *nomos* and an assertion that the State is at once due to man's will and the necessary or 'natural' expression of his progress. The first question, on which all others depend, is: What does the fact of political

community mean? What is the State?⁴

'Since all communities or associations are formed for the sake of some good, this must be especially true of that community which is the highest and includes all the rest, and it will clearly have for its object the highest and most commanding good. This community is the State.' With some such words the treatise opens. In accordance with this fundamental idea that everything is defined by the end it is destined to attain, they lay it down that there is a definite object for which the State exists; that this object is not something accidental, suggested by the chance desires of individuals; and that it is not the merely relative end of making possible the attainment of other ends; but that the State is the highest of human associations, and, instead of being one among others, includes in itself all other associations; and that, as the good at which it aims includes the subordinate objects of desire arrived at by the subordinate communities, this good is nothing short of the final object of human life, the end which alone gives value to all lesser ends and has no end beyond it.

Whatever this chief good which makes life worth living may be, it is the end of *man* and not of an abstraction such as the State is sometimes thought to be. But many men pursue a false end; they give their lives to objects unworthy of a man, such as mere pleasure, or to objects like wealth, which, though they are really desirable, are so only as means to a good beyond them. In the same way there are States which pursue unworthy aims and opinions, put about in justification of those aims. There are, for example, certain oligarchic and democratic arguments which assume that the possession of wealth and free birth, respectively, forms such a contribution to the purposes of the State as ought in justice to be rewarded by political privileges. But these arguments, as Aristotle points out, really pre-suppose that the end of the State is wealth or free birth, positions which he cannot for a moment admit. Not that these elements or life are without importance for the political community; they may even be means necessary to its welfare, but they do not on that account constitute its essence or end. The same is true of other necessary conditions. The State is not a defensive alliance, concluded by individuals who wish to pursue their various object in security from hostile attacks. Nor is it a device they have adopted for facilitating trade with one another, and insuring themselves against force or fraud. If it were, its object would be (to borrow modern language) merely the protection of person and property; 'the law,' in Aristotle's own language, 'would be a contract and, as Lycophron the Sophist says, a pledge of lawful dealing between man and man;' and two different nations which had formed a defensive alliance, and whose citizens, when their trading led to disputes, could sue and be sued in the courts of either State alike, would only be considered separate States because their territories happened to be distinct. But even if this difficulty were overcome, and to communion in all

these points were added the right of legal intermarriage and the existence of societies for holding common festivals and joining in common amusements, the resulting association would still fall short of being 'political'. For the members of the society would not only lack the single government which is essential to a State, but they would not necessarily have any share in that which alone gives a value to these subordinate bonds of union, the final end of human life.

What, then, is this final end or chief good, the pursuit of which and a common share in which is the essence of the State? What additional bond would make this imaginary society political? Aristotle has answered this question in the concrete in the passage before us. This society is a community in mere 'living'; and a State is a community in 'good living'. These associates do not trouble themselves about each other's moral character or wellbeing; and the State aims at nothing short of that. The law to them is a mere contract, protecting their persons and property; but the real law, the law of the State aims at making the citizens good and just men. 'Good living' (3.9; 72.14), 'noble actions' (74.1), a 'perfect and self-sufficing life', 'well-being' or happiness, - these are all various names for the chief good of man. It is the full and harmonious development of human nature in the citizen, or, in other words, the unimpeded activity of his moral and intellectual 'excellence' or virtue. In the freedom of this activity from hindrances is implied a certain amount of 'prosperity' or of 'external goods'. But the goods of fortune are not goods at all except to the man who can use them aright, and therefore the essence of his wellbeing lies in the activity itself, or in his character, not in what he has, but in what he is. The virtues of excellences in which his true nature is developed are naturally manifold; but in Aristotle's view they fall into two main groups. The soul feels and desires; it thinks and it rules its emotions. In so far as its desires are moulded by reason into harmonious and controlled activities, the soul attains the 'moral' virtues in the narrower sense of the word; in the employment of reason itself it reaches what Aristotle calls the intellectual virtues. In both it feels that pleasure which accompanies the free exercise of a function. A life of such happy moral excellence and active 'contemplation' is what Aristotle calls 'good living'. To attain and further this is the end of the State. This itself, community in this, *is* the State. An inseparable connection of this kind between political society and man's chief good leaves only one possible answer to the question, is the State natural or conventional? It is man's destination, that in which and through which his end is realised. It is therefore 'natural' in Aristotle's use of the word, at least in so far as man is concerned; and if man's end is also an end in the system of the world, the State will be natural in a still further sense. Such an account of the origins of the State (2.1 - 3.9) destroys beforehand the various theories which found society on any explicit or implicit agreement.

The beginnings of the State, the final community,

are to be sought in the most primitive forms of association. Man and woman come together not from any rational resolve, but because in them, as in the other animals and in plants, there is a natural desire to reproduce themselves. Master and slave are united by the desire for security; the master being one whose superior intelligence enables him to foresee the future and fits him for rule, whereas the slave is naturally adapted for simple obedience, because he is only capable of carrying out the orders given to him. Thus, we may say, he is a body of which his master is the soul; and owing to this natural division of functions the relation of slavery is for the interest of both parties. It is of these two associations that the household or *family* consists and the origin of the State is to be looked for in the Family. But there is an intermediate step between them. The *village* consists of several families. Whether it is formed by the aggregation of independent households or by the expansion of a single one, Aristotle does not tell us; but the latter view seems to be favoured. With the union of several villages we have the State.

Thus the individuals who became citizens of a State had already been members of two previous stages of community. Each stage is a preparation for the next; each is produced by the effort of human nature to realise itself; this process, therefore, and most of all its completion, the State, is *natural*. For the realisation of the nature of anything is its end: that which a thing is when its process of growth is complete, is its nature (3.11). It is this that defines a thing, or is its formal cause or essence. It is this also that causes its existence, developing it from a merely potential condition to its full actuality.

Such, in the barest outline, is Aristotle's answer to the Sophistic question. In common with most other metaphysical theories of politics, it is easily misapprehended. Such theories are often accused of annihilating man's will before a spiritual fatality. It is true that Aristotle's ideas lose all their meaning if we suppose that human action is perfectly capricious, or that it is destitute of an 'end', or that this end stands in no relation to the order of things. But they are not inconsistent with any sober notion of freedom.

Putting metaphysical questions aside, we have now to ask, what is Aristotle's *ground* for regarding the State as man's destination and good? There are three ways, he tells us, in which men attain virtue. One of these, our natural endowment, is out of our power. Another, intellectual teaching, has little or no effect on those who live by their feelings, obeying the dictates of pleasure and pain. It is only by the third means, by habituation, that the impulses which lead away from virtue can be trained, and that men can acquire that love of the good without which mere instruction is little. For the purpose of this habituation, we need an authority which must unite two requisites. It must itself be an expression of reason; and it must have the fullest powers to compel and punish. And this union of right and might Aristotle finds only in the State. But it is not only by its direct action, by its compulsory

education and its moral guardianship, that the State contributes to 'good living'. If we examine those virtues in the exercise of which this good living consists, we shall find that they all imply social relations or life in community, and one of the most important, that practical wisdom the possession of which implies the presence of the rest (*Eth.* 6.13.6), has its sphere not only in private life, but also in the ordering of State-affairs; and the *Politics* adds that the virtue of the best man, the perfect virtue, is equivalent to the virtue of the ruler (119.22). Thus we find that the individual who realises his chief good or happiness is necessarily a citizen. And the strongest expression which Aristotle has given to this view is to be found in his statement that the individual is *posterior* to the State, and a part of it.

To say that the State is prior to the individual means primarily no more than that his end is realised in it. By 'prior' Aristotle often means not anterior in time, but prior in idea or, as he sometimes says, in nature. Thus in idea or in nature the end is prior to the means, and the actuality to the potentiality. But in the order of time, or again relatively to our knowledge, the means may, and often do, precede the end, and the potential existence is prior to the actual. In one sense of the word, then, the family may be said to be earlier than the State, and in another sense the opposite is true; and in this latter meaning Aristotle might say that the individual is 'later' than political society. In the present case, however, this dictum has a further meaning. The State is said to precede the individual not merely as the actual precedes the potential, but as a whole precedes its parts. The part is itself only in relation to the whole, has no existence outside it, and is intelligible only in reference to it. It is therefore said to be posterior to it; for, to take the instance of a living body, 'if the whole is destroyed, there will no longer be a foot or a hand, except in name, and as one may call a stone foot a foot; for everything is defined by its function' (4.1), and with the dissolution of the body the functions of its members have disappeared. Such is the relation of the individual to the State.

That the State, in the sense of the political community, is a totality or composition (*sunthesis*), admits of no question. Its unity is formed of a multiplicity of parts; it is a number of citizens (58.31). But there is more than one kind of composition. For example, a heap of cannon-balls is a whole made up of parts. But here the whole is made up by the mere addition of unit to unit: it is a collection. In such a totality the part does not get its existence or character from its relation to the other parts and to the whole; it is the same thing in the pile that it was out of it, and has merely had a relation added to it. If the State were a collection of individuals of this kind it would be absurd to say of it that it was prior to its parts; it would be absurd to compare one of these parts with the hand or foot, which have no existence or function apart from the body to which they belong. A composite body of which this can be said is not formed by the addition of units, and not even the category of whole and parts is in strictness applicable

to it. Its 'parts' are members; it is a unity which expresses itself in diverse members, functions and organs, and the connection between these members is not mechanical but organic.

In other passages the dissimilar parts of the State are regarded as classes of society, not as mere individuals. These classes are formed of groups of men performing separate 'functions', or 'works', in the whole. In the description of the ideal constitution these works are enumerated as the agricultural food-providing function, the technical or mechanical, the military, the religious, the function of property, and that of government in its two main branches, according as the decisions arrived at concern the common interest or the administration of justice (107 and 108). In another passage (150-152) the list is repeated with some enlargements, and it is pointed out that the reason why different species and sub-species of constitution arise is that, though all these functions or social elements are necessary to a State, the particular forms which each of them takes may vary, and, further, the varieties of each may be combined with those of the rest in different ways.

From this differentiation of functions it immediately follows that inequality among the parts of the State is regarded not as an imperfection, still less as an injustice, but as natural and necessary. And not merely inequality, but a relation of government; 'for wherever a single common whole is formed out of a number of elements, a ruler and a ruled is to be found whether these elements are continuous', as in a physical organism, 'or discrete', as in the relation of master to slave, or in a political organism; and an analogue to this relation may be found even in 'compositions' not organic (6.21). But there is a still closer correspondence between the living body and the State in this point. We soon find in reading the *Politics* that all the 'parts' or members of the State are not of equal importance; that some of them, as for example the agricultural and industrial functions, are mere means or necessary conditions to others; and that only those which are ends are properly called 'parts' at all. Such are obviously those which really share in the life of the whole, or realise its end; in other words, those which are organs of 'good living'. Accordingly the real parts of the State are, to Aristotle, the citizens alone, who exercise the functions of government and religion, defend the State and possess its landed property.

The same point of view is apparent where Aristotle is treating of the necessary equilibrium of the various elements of society. It is only within certain bounds that this equilibrium will bear disturbance. The disproportionate development of one social function is hostile to the wellbeing of the whole, and may destroy the constitution (212. 1 ff.; 201.2). The illustration is taken from the living body. 'A body is composed of parts, and they ought to grow proportionally, that is symmetry may be preserved; otherwise it perishes;' as it certainly would, if 'the foot were six feet long and the rest of the body only two spans'. So it is with the State. And as

again a certain kind of disproportionate growth may result in one animal form actually passing into another, so one constitution may from the same cause pass into another, and the whole nature of the State be therefore changed (197.30). The same idea lies at the root of Aristotle's advice to those who wish to preserve either of the two principal 'perverted' forms of government, oligarchy or democracy. It is the essence of these constitutions that they represent the preponderance of one social element in the State, whether it be that of the few rich or the many poor, and that this class rules not for the common good but for its own interest. Even so perverted a State has a vital principle of its own. But this principle will not bear straining too far; and Aristotle points out that the worst friends of such constitutions are those who wish to develop their characteristics to the uttermost. 'Many of those things that are counted democratic destroy democracies;' and the same is true of oligarchies.

We may thus reach an important conclusion. That end of the State which is described as good living or happiness is also described as the common interest or good (*To koinēi sumpheron* 68.9), that noble living (*kalos zen*) in which each shares according to his ability. In any whole that is 'prior' to its parts, in any organism, there is an identity between the general welfare and the particular welfare of each part. It is in the healthy and harmonious development of its organs or functions that the health of the whole body lies, and the interest of the State is nothing but that of its citizens. And conversely, there is no part which really has a separate interest; for its essence and good lie in its function, and this is a function of the whole body. Thus if it appears to have a private interest which is thwarted by its membership in a system and sacrificed to that system, this appearance must be considered a delusion. The disproportionate growth of a single organ, for example, is its real misfortune; for its true nature is not developed, and it injures the whole on which its own health depends. And in the same way we may say that the dependence of one member on the rest is not a sign of bondage but its real liberty, if liberty means 'self-sufficiency;' and the growing independence of the parts is equivalent to the loosening of that bond which is the life of the organism and only disappears in its decay.

The functions of the body politic are moral functions; and the members which exercise these functions are consequently moral agents. It must be remembered, lastly, that the virtue or happiness which is the end of State and citizen alike, is not something distinct from the direct duties of citizenship, but that these duties themselves play a large part in it. A man is not a good citizen in order that he may gain something by it. Happiness is the exercise of 'virtue'. In being brave and self-controlled and liberal a man is attaining happiness, and at the same time showing the virtues of citizenship. But there are excellencies of a more commanding kind than these. As we have already seen, the crowning talent of moral wisdom, with the possession of which

all the virtues are given, has its sphere no less in affairs of the State than in a man's own household. It is the virtue of government, the possession of which makes a 'good citizen' and a 'good man' equivalent terms, while the citizen-virtues of obedience would by themselves not amount to perfect goodness.

From the conception of the State two main results directly follow: first, that citizenship can mean nothing less than the right or duty of exercising political functions; and, secondly, that this exercise is, in the true State, the activity of those higher virtues which make the good citizen identical with the good man. For practical purposes it may be, though it is not always, true to say that a citizen is one whose father and mother were both citizens. But this is a mere external mark, and does not tell us in what citizenship consists. In what does it consist? Not in the mere possession of civil rights. Just as the State is not merely a community in territory or in the legal protection of person and property, so a citizen does not mean one who resides in a certain city and can be sued in its law-courts. These are not functions of the State, and do not involve participation in its end. If the citizen is to be really a part of the State, he must live its life; and that in the concrete means that he must govern. Thus citizenship may be defined as 'ruling and being ruled', and a citizen as one who shares, or has the right to share, in government, deliberative, executive and judicial. In so doing he uses not only the virtues of obedience, not only the common moral virtues, but also the excellencies of moral wisdom and command. His life is pre-eminently one of *arete*.

But the brain cannot think unless the heart beats; and society cannot exert its highest powers when its lowest needs are unsatisfied. The whole must exist before it can exist well; and it cannot exist well if the organs whose office is to think have to attend to mere living. A life of culture and political *arete* implies freedom in him who lives it from the necessity of looking after these lower wants (66.22). It implies what Aristotle calls 'leisure', and this leisure must be supported on some one's labour. The life of labour is a mere means to the higher life. It is not a participation in the State-life, but a condition of it, a *sine qua non*. It does not do what is noble, but provides what is necessary. It might produce a joint-stock company, but not a State. It creates mere material prosperity, and 'no class has a share in the State which is not a producer of virtue' (109.21).

The result of this hard and fast distinction is obvious. So far as is concerned, it makes no great difference whether the labourer is a slave or a free man. 'Those who provide necessaries for an individual are slaves, and those who provide them for society are handicraftsmen and day-labourers' (66.24; cf. 21.32). Aristotle's view is only the reproduction of current Greek ideas. At first sight it is so repulsive to us that we are tempted to condemn it wholesale. But it should be observed that it is due not only to a contempt of labour connected with the institution of slavery, but also to the height of the

ideal with which the labouring life is compared. In this point it contrasts favourably with the modern upper-class sentiment which it seems at first to resemble. And it is worth while to ask where its falsity lies.

If we grant Aristotle's premises, no fault can be found with his exclusion of the labouring classes from political rights: their admission would have been a mere inconsistency.

What is disputable in Aristotle's view is the too exalted idea of citizenship, an idea which, with the increase in the size of States, has ceased to be even plausible. What is psychologically untrue is the pre-eminence given to intellect in the conception of man's end, and the hard and fast line drawn between the virtues of government and those of obedience. What is morally repulsive is the consequent identification of the end and means of life with two separate portions of the community, and the feeling that moral lowness has anything to do with labour, as such, or with a professional occupation. Modern civilisation, in its best aspects, tends to unite what is here separated. The intellectual excellencies themselves have become the basis of professions. Payment for performing the duties of government, in Greek democracy the symptom of decay, is the recognised rule of modern States, so far as administration is concerned. Clergymen, artists, poets, authors, philosophers receive, or may receive, wages for their work, and it is not supposed that they necessarily work with a view to their wages. We anxiously avoid even the semblance of contempt for the labouring classes; not only out of deference to their political power, but from a conviction that there is no shame in labour.

To Aristotle the fundamental problem of politics is one of education. And to him the practical conclusions are inevitable. Education must be *public* and *compulsory*. Aristotle is not blind to the advantages of private instruction, the system followed in most of the Greek States (129.26). It has the same advantages which government by a person possesses over government by a fixed law; it can adapt itself to individual differences. But he cannot admit that the State should give up the training of its citizens. That it attended to it, in however narrow a spirit, at Sparta and Crete, was one of the chief claims of those communities to honour. Not only does the State possess a conception of the end which training is to attain, but it, and it alone, has power to enforce this training on unwilling subjects; and, owing to its impersonal character the compulsion it exercises is comparatively inoffensive (*Eth.* 10.9.12). Nor, even if it were possible, would it be right for the State to leave this duty to that private enterprise which means private opinion. It has an end and a moral character exactly as an individual has, and its responsibility is like his (130.19). If the object it sets before it is not realised in the persons of its citizens, it is not realised at all. And this object is not something indefinite, but a fixed type of character, or *ethos*. The failure to produce it is the failure of the State, and may be its danger; for the *ethos* is that living spirit which

keeps the political body healthy and united. 'The greatest of all securities for the permanence of constitutions is what all men now neglect, an education in accordance with the constitution', and the best laws in the world are of no avail if men are not educated in the spirit of the State (215.27; cf. 78.7; 146.17).

All the citizens of the ideal State have received the same education; they are 'free and equal'. Their education was designed to fit them not only for obedience, but also for government, and for the second by means of the first. Of the virtue implied in this function there is one indispensable condition - freedom from the necessity of providing the means of life. Accordingly the property of the community is in the hands of the citizens; and though they ought to some extent to permit a common use of it, they hold it as their own, and not in common. Under these conditions what distribution of public rights or duties does justice demand? In virtue of the equality of the citizens, it demands that *all* shall share in civic rights. Of these functions there are two main classes, military and political; and accordingly every one has to take part in each. But the equality of the citizens is not identity; they are unlike as well as like; and in the necessary distinction which nature makes between them Aristotle finds the ground for a difference in rights or duties. Various functions demand various capacities, and these capacities belong roughly to separate periods of man's life. Energy or force (*dunamis*) is the gift of youth, and wisdom (*phronesis*) of riper years. In the ideal State, then, the citizen in his earlier manhood will perform the military duties, and will only take part in government when they are completed. The remaining function of citizenship, the care of religious worship, is assigned to those advanced years which relieve men from more active services. In this distribution of work, as in other respects, the ideal State is the image of that perfect justice which in Aristotle goes by a name afterwards applied to a very different conception - natural right.

When Aristotle thus distinguishes between an ideal State and various perversions of it, he is far from supposing that the existence of bad forms of government is avoidable. He does not dream of framing an ideal scheme of government, the adoption of which would turn a misshapen State into the image of his idea. To him the constitution (*politeia*, a word which has a wider sense than its English equivalent) is inseparable from the nature of the people who live under it - as inseparable as any organisation is from the matter organised in it. It is the 'order' of the citizens (*taxis*, 58.28). It is the 'form' of the State, and constitutes its identity (62.22 ff.); and it is often spoken of as the State itself. But it is possible, and even necessary for our purpose, to draw a distinction between the two. To ask why an imperfect State exists is to enter at once on a metaphysical question, and comes at last to the problem of the existence of evil. But there is a more obvious meaning in the inquiry why an imperfect constitution exists, although this inquiry must ulti-

mately merge in the other. It exists because it is the natural outcome of a given social condition. Given a certain material, a population of a certain kind and in a definite degree of civilisation, and there is a form or order naturally fitted for it; and no other order, however superior it would be in better circumstances, is better for *it*. This fact Aristotle clearly recognises. There are populations, he tells us, naturally adapted to monarchy, aristocracy, and a constitutional republic (91.31 ff.); and though he adds that all the perversions are unnatural, he does not mean by this that they do not naturally arise under the appropriate social conditions: on the contrary, this is true not only of oligarchy or democracy, but of the various sub-species of those forms (166.14 ff.; 178.22 ff.). Accordingly, when he is describing his own ideal State, Aristotle does not confine himself to the arrangements of government. He realises that, if his sketch is to have any verisimilitude, he must imagine also the population for which the constitution is intended, and even the physical conditions under which it lives. In other words, he describes an ideal State, and not merely an ideal constitution. In the same way he recognises that the approaches which can be made to the constitution of this ideal are very various in degree, and that it is essential for a political theorist to consider all of them.

Aristotle proposes three tests by which the goodness or badness of a constitution may be tried. The *first* of these criteria is obvious. The very definition of the State places its whole nature in its end. To pursue a false end is to be a bad State, or even (so far) to fail of being a State at all. The true end, as we know, is that noble life which is identical with happiness or the exercise of complete virtue. But there are various subordinate constituents or various necessary conditions of this end, which may be mistaken for it. And just as a man may take as the object of his life not real happiness, but wealth or pleasure, so may a State. Thus the end of the good State is, as we may suppose, the true end. That of the ideal State is this end in its perfection, so that, in the aristocratic form of it which is really Aristotle's ideal, the virtue of the good citizen is, as such, identical with the virtue of the good man. In the same way the fact that the Politeia is counted among the good States, must mean that its end is virtue; but the virtue at which it aims is that imperfect *arete* of which a large number of men is capable, the virtue of the citizen-soldier (70.15). On the other hand, the ends which define the perverted forms are not merely imperfect degrees of *arete*, but something subordinate to it. Thus we shall expect to find the object of oligarchy in wealth, and this is implicitly asserted by Aristotle (e.g. 218.9). That of democracy must be freedom, since the other characteristics of that form, poverty, numbers, and low birth, are obviously incapable of being ends (159.15; 179.7; 180.17). That of tyranny again is not the noble life on which pleasure necessarily follows, but pleasure itself and, with a view to pleasure, wealth (218.4).

In the perversions, then, the government does not

seek the good. But, *secondly*, it does not seek the common good (*to koinēi sumpheron* 68.5). It pursues the end for itself, and not for the whole State. Its rule therefore is not political but despotic; that is, a kind of rule applicable to the relation of master and slave, but not to the relation of citizens to each other. The welfare of the ruled is, like the slave's, only accidentally involved in that of the ruler, in the sense (apparently) that more than a certain amount of ill-treatment destroys the living material or instruments by which the master or tyrant obtains his own objects. Thus the subject, like the slave, is the means to another man's end; whereas it is the essence of political society to be a community of *free* men. In this sense democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny are alike despotic (69.17). In other words, they are so far not States at all; they are insecure; their vital principle is self-destructive; and their safety lies in suppressing the full development of this principle, or in adopting for a bad end measures which, as a matter of fact, tend to the common good.

Each of these two moral characteristics is indispensable. To seek an end which is common to all citizens will not make a government correct, if the end is false; and to seek the true end will not do so either, if this end is not sought for all. And Aristotle combines the two characteristics when he defines the common good as the share of noble life which falls to each citizen (68.10).

We have to ask, *thirdly*, in what way is the State a realisation of justice or right. It is so, first of all, in this general sense, that it produces in its citizens that virtue for which justice is another name. But there is also a more special principle of right in political society. This is what Aristotle calls *distributive* justice; and its law is that public honours, advantages, or rights, are distributed among the citizens, not arbitrarily, but in proportion to their contribution to the end of the State, or, in other words, according to their worth (*axia*). Thus this justice may be defined in modern language as the correspondence of rights and duties. A right given, which does not answer, and answer proportionately, to a duty done, is a violation of justice. A duty done, a contribution to the State, which does not meet with its proportionate return in the shape of a right, is equally a violation of justice. Or, again, this justice may be represented as a geometrical proportion. If A and B are two citizens whose worths differ, the rights a, which go to A, ought to differ in amount from the rights b, which go to B, proportionately to the difference in worth between A and B; or, $A : B :: A + a : B + b$. In the same way Aristotle calls political justice a principle of *equality*. And by this he means not absolute equality, but equality of ratios. Thus if A gets the amount of rights which answer to his worth, and B does the same, they are treated justly; and, although they receive unequal rights, they are treated equally. To give equal rights to unequal worths, or unequal rights to equal worths, is to violate equality. In so far then as a State applies this law of proportion, it realises distributive justice. On the other hand, although it fairly distributes

rights according to worth, it may in reality violate justice by using a false or one-sided standard of worth. Instead of rating the citizen by his capacity of exercising true citizen functions, it may adopt a criterion answering to its own false end. In this case, among others, the justice of the State will, in a high sense, be unjust. And it is only when this positive justice corresponds to, or expresses, *natural* justice, that the State can be said to be a full realisation of right.

This is not the case with the perverted States. Plainly, none of them is likely to produce justice in its citizens. None of them, again, fully satisfies distributive justice. Though all – except, we may suppose, the tyrant – admit that justice means proportionate equality (193.29; 195.14), in no State except the ideal is political right wholly coincident with natural justice (*Eth.* 5.7.5). The departure from natural justice in oligarchy and democracy is represented by Aristotle in two different ways. A partial equality or inequality is taken as absolute, and a false standard of worth is adopted. Thus in the oligarchy an inequality in one respect is considered a just ground for the exclusive possession of power; and political rights are restricted to those who are superior to their fellow-citizens in one particular, viz. wealth. Here is already an injustice; but it is heightened by the fact that the measure of worth is itself a false one. 'What is a man worth?' means in oligarchy not 'What is his *merit*, his contribution to the true end of the State?' but 'How much *money* is he worth?' The injustice of democracy, though it leads to very different outward results, is in principle the same. Grasping the fact that in one point, freedom, all its citizens are on a level, it takes this partial equality for an absolute one, and gives equal right to everybody. In other words, it gives equals to unequals, and thereby violates justice. And again, though according to the standard of worth it has adopted it may apportion fairly, this standard is not merit but the imperfect one of free birth. Hence Aristotle can at one time insist that equality is justice, and at another condemn democracy on account of its passion for equality, since the equality it realises is not proportionate but absolute or numerical.

The result of these principles for Aristotle would seem to be clear; and to a certain extent it is so. That the only true standard of worth for distributive justice is merit, or virtue, or education (*paideia*, 'culture'), is obvious. But in the immediate application of this doctrine uncertainties arise. First of all, there is one limitation on all governments, a limitation which has, fortunately for us, become almost too obvious to be worth mentioning. The rule of those who possess *any* superiority, even that of virtue, is to be considered inferior to the rule of law. It is only because the law is too general to meet all the particular cases that arise, that a government is necessary to supplement as well as execute it; and therefore, with one exception to be noticed later, the rule that all governments ought to be subject to it is absolute (*e.g.* 77.30). Secondly, an element of doubt is introduced by the true perception that, though wealth or free birth are not direct con-

tributions to the end of the State, they yet constitute elements necessary to its existence (79.22). There is consequently a certain amount of justice in the demand that the possession of them should be followed by some share in public rights. But what share this should be, and in what rights it should be a share, are questions which Aristotle does not discuss. Lastly, his view of the claims of individuals to political power receive an important modification in the account of the imperfect States. Aristotle tells us (166.6 ff.) that we have to consider not only quality, but quantity; that is, not only the element or quality on which a claim to rule is based, but also the *number* of those who possess it. It is the comparative power of these factors which settles the constitution of a state. Thus oligarchy means the preponderance of the quality of wealth over the superior quantity of the poor, and democracy the opposite. It is the tendency of either government to push its principle to an extreme. Oligarchy heightens the amount of the 'quality' of wealth necessary for political rights, and thereby increases the numbers opposed to it. Democracy extends the franchise more and more, and with its increase of quantity loses more and more all distinctive quality. The further this development goes, and the further these factors are separated, the worse the State becomes, and the nearer it approaches to an internecine struggle between them. Accordingly, it is the characteristic of the *Politeia*, which is distinguished for its stability, that it combines these elements; and it is in this connection that Aristotle's celebrated eulogium on the middle classes occurs. But it is clear that the application of this idea to the question of political rights will make our previous results uncertain. For those results are based simply on an inquiry into the *quality* which any individual can allege as a claim to power: this doctrine, on the contrary, touches the rights not of an individual, as such, but of a number, or possibly a class, and it expressly admits that their quantity must be considered.

The true State may take various forms; but, whatever form it takes, these two requirements are absolute: it must strive to realise perfect justice by giving power to the natural sovereignty of intelligence and virtue, and it must seek the common good. The Greek constitutions have no more than a historical interest for us now. Our monarchy, our feudal aristocracy, our representative government, were things unknown to them, and the most democratic of their democracies we should call an oligarchy. But these principles remain. The first of them modern States attempt to carry out in various ways. From the very force of circumstances we are even less tempted than the Greeks to translate the truth that reason alone has a 'divine right' to rule, into the dictum that philosophers should be kings; but it is still possible to forget that wealth and numbers have no political value except as symbols, and that political machinery is very far from being an end in itself. The second of these principles may be thought, fortunately for us, to have lost the pressing importance it had to Aristotle. For him the ruin of the Greek States was the

witness of its violation. The organisation of the State, instead of representing the common good and standing above the strife of social parties, had become in many cases the prize for which they fought, and a means which the victorious party used for its own exclusive advantage. Cities were divided into two hostile camps of the rich and poor. In this immediate dependence of the State on society we have one of the most marked characteristics of Greek politics. In modern nations the struggle of classes for political power does not, as a rule, rise prominently to the surface; and, though a change in social conditions—such as the decay of a landed aristocracy, or the rise of the commercial or the labouring classes,—inevitably expresses itself in politics, it commonly does so slowly and, so to speak, unintentionally. The State has a fixity and power such as the Greeks—in spite of the far greater part played by government in their lives—never knew; and, where the opposition of classes begins to pass from the social sphere and to take an openly political form, we recognise a peril to the national welfare and morality which to the Greek, instead of being a rarity, was ever at the doors. But it is impossible to say how far this supremacy of the State is connected with the modern institution of monarchy, and to what extent more popular forms of government, by whatever name they go, may be able to preserve it. That it needs no preservation, that great nations can do without it, and can subsist on nothing but the natural competition of interests modified by public opinion, is a hope which underlines some forms of the democratic faith, and seems to be implicitly adopted by many who have no theoretic convictions on the subject. Yet it seems too probable that, in more than one European country, the irruption of an exasperated social strife into the political arena would follow any weakening of the central power; and it would be a poor change which freed men from the burden of that power only to bring it back to its least beneficent and progressive form, that of military force. Nor is it possible to confine these doubts to the great continental States. In more than one of the English colonies, unless they are maligned, the interest of a class is predominant in politics, and is susceptible of scarcely any check from above. And if representative institutions are not in other cases to be misused for the same 'despotic' purposes, if they are not to produce, instead of the public good and the rule of *arete*, class-government and the supremacy of the demagogue and the wire-puller, it may be that the sluggish action of public opinion will need to be reinforced by some strengthening of the State and some counterpoise to those tendencies which characterised the extreme democracy described by Aristotle, the gradual weakening of the executive and the grasping of all the powers of government by the popular assembly (154.26; 170.12; 174.16; 179.25–180.11).

There is no fear that modern civilisation will abandon the ideas which mark its progress. Unless some gigantic calamity were to overtake it, men who have once conceived of God as identical with the inmost spirit of

humanity and bound by no limits of race or nation, who have realised that the breath of morality is freedom, and that voluntary association may be almost as powerful a force as the State, are never likely to find their ideal in the Greek city. The dangers are still on the other side. The process through which those ideas gained strength involved serious losses, and the false antitheses to which it gave rise have not yet ceased to rule our thoughts. To them the spirit of Aristotle's conception may still serve as a corrective. With every step in the moralising of politics and the socialising of morals, something of Greek excellence is won back. That goodness is not abstinence but action; that egoism, to however future a life it postpones its satisfaction, is still nothing but selfishness; that a man does not belong to himself, but to the State and to mankind; that to be free is not merely to do what one likes, but to like what one ought; and that blindness to the glory of 'the world,' and irreverence towards its spiritual forces, are the worst of passports to any 'church' worthy of the name, - every new conviction of such truths is an advance towards filling up the gulf between religion and reality and restoring, in a higher shape, that unity of life which the Greeks knew.

So far as opinions have weight, there are not many which more retard this advance than the idea that the State is a mere organ of 'secular' force. That it is so seems to be the theoretical, though not the practical, belief of most Englishmen; and Aristotle's fundamental position, that its object is nothing short of 'noble living', seems to separate his view decisively from ours. The partial truths that the law takes no account of moral character, and that Government ought not to enforce morality or interfere with private life, seem to be the main expressions of this apparent separation. But, to say nothing of the fact that legal punishments do in some cases habitually consider a man's guilt as well as his illegal act, it is forgotten that the reason why this is not the rule is itself a moral reason, and that if, by making it the rule, the good life of the community were likely to be furthered, it would be made the rule. And in the same way the reason why the State does not to any large extent aim at a directly moral result, is not that morality is something indifferent to it, but that it believes it will help morality most by not trying to enforce it. If we hold to Aristotle's definition, it does not follow that we are to pass sumptuary laws and force men to say their prayers. Every argument that is brought against the action of Government may (so far as it does not rest on a supposed right of the individual) be applied, with whatever truth it possesses, under that definition; and if, in the pursuit of its final object, the State, with a view to that final object, refrains from directly seeking that final object, that does not show that the immediate ends which it pursues are its ultimate and only end.

But, apart from this, it is not true that in our own day the State has ceased actively to aim at a positive good, and has restricted itself to the duty of protecting men's lives and property. If the theory that its duty should be

so restricted were carried out, it would lead to strange results and would abolish public laws and acts which few would be willing to surrender. We need go for a proof no further than our own country, where the action of Government is certainly not overvalued. A State which, in however slight a degree, supports science, art, learning, and religion; which enforces education, and compels the well-to-do to maintain the helpless; which, for the good of the poor and weak, interferes with the 'natural' relations of employer and employed, and regulates, only too laxly, the traffic which joins gigantic evil to its somewhat scanty good; a State which forbids or punishes suicide, self-maiming, the voluntary dissolution of marriage, cruelty to animals, offences against decency, and sexual crimes which, if any act could be so, are the private affair of the persons who commit them, - a State which does all this and much more in the same kind, cannot, without an unnatural straining of language, be denied to exercise, in the broad sense, a moral function. It still seeks not merely 'life', but 'good life'. It is still, within the sphere appropriate to force, a spiritual power, - not only the guardian of the peace and a security for the free pursuit of private ends, but the armed conscience of the community.

Notes

1. 73.16 Here and throughout this Essay, where mere figures are given, they indicate the pages and lines of Bekker's small edition of the *Politics* (Berlin, 1855).
2. *leitourgein te polei*, 126.21; and 152.10. So also of government, 152.11.
3. *Phusei or nomoi*. It is impossible to render *nomos* by a single word, as it means both enactment and custom. The *Gorgias* and the first two books of the *Republic* contain full illustrations of the Sophistic views referred to.

Sophist's Corner

Logos and Life: Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason

by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning, Belmont, MA, USA.*

'... Tymieniecka lays bare the primogenital ground of all phenomenology, the *poiesis* of life itself.

As she focuses on the differentiation of the logos in the genesis of the specifically human significance of life, she, with true virtuosity, causes the various voice of experience to speak in their own language: the vocation of phenomenology is at last fulfilled. As the virtualities of the human condition unfold themselves, the frames of the intentional system explode, which brings to the fore the *creative orchestration* of human functioning... (Publisher's blurb)

The Real Racism

Dennis O'Keefe

We have heard much talk in recent years in this country of 'racism'. Most of such talk has been vacuous or pernicious or both. The white British have been accused first of all of overt prejudice, a proposition rather at odds with the astonishing ease with which more than three million non-whites have been absorbed by the British nation, mostly in England, in the last three decades. The other attack accuses the British of a parallel malady known as 'institutionalised' racism. In order to make this different from the other kind, its detectors and critics have to argue what amounts to the view that it is accidental e.g. that white teachers 'inadvertently' cause black children to get bad examination results. We end up here with the nonsense of applying a morally pejorative term (racism) to alleged accidents. Could you have accidental murder, theft or adultery? We have usually confined such implacable and nightmarish judgments to the classical Greek theatre, their eerie resonance deriving precisely from the transcended moral universe which produced them. In the limiting case, however, the indignation of anti-racism does, in laws such as 'all white people are racist,' imply a moral helplessness on the part of the transgressors. Like Oedipus they sin all unknowingly. This slight, however, is nothing compared to that directed at black muggers and their like: victims of supposed 'structures', they are denied any moral engagement whatsoever. The oppressors sin in helpless ignorance; the oppressed cannot sin at all.

One little-remarked oddity is that the anti-racists, in their campaigns against the white British, have no way out of conclusions which must necessarily be much the same as those which marginalised the political career of Enoch Powell. If life really is so awful for non-whites in this country, was not their mass-immigration a great error and would not voluntary repatriation accordingly be a humane as well as a prudent policy? But in fact the whole anti-racist case is an economic nonsense. Compared to Jamaica or Pakistan, Britain is not a hell but a paradise, and the gap has widened considerably since the 1950's and 1960's when non-white immigration got going. The problem is not the dreadful fate that awaits non-whites here but the irresistible improvements in their living conditions. Nor in truth is the question really one of race in the main. The unfortunate whites of communist Europe would also flock to places like Britain, in huge numbers, if the governments or ours allowed it. Open-ended immigration simply cannot be tolerated in the world as it is. Countless victims of the world's tyrannies or slums would make for the limited number of attractive economic havens in their unabsorbable millions. Who, indeed, could blame them.

Since most of the debate obstinately avoids these considerations, settling instead for an unhelpful belabouring of the white British for faults more imaginary than real, it is not surprising that the 'racism' debate is insubstantial. This does not mean that there is no such thing as racial prejudice in the world. There is, indeed, and it involves what racial prejudice used to mean before the 'racism' and 'anti-racism' industry appeared, namely the scorning or underrating of people because of their racial type. Such racism, moreover, expresses itself in ways which threaten us all - but which are very rarely discussed.

The same people who denounce the British police as racist are also quite likely to say that it is racist to claim that most mugging in London is done by black people. What can be said is in part governed by the race of those under scrutiny. There are many international examples, too. The Soviet Gulag causes less offence and horror than the Nazi Holocaust, though it has been on a far bigger scale. The reasons for this inconsistency are complex. One of them, however, is simply that the world weighs the Germans and Russians in different judgmental scales. It does not treat them as morally equivalent. The same thing can be seen at work in the Middle East. Far higher standards are expected of Israel than of the Arab peoples.

What explains the tolerance which worthless institutions like the United Nations and the Commonwealth receive year after year? They berate the West as relentlessly as they demand its money. The answer is surely that these organisations are held to express the voice of the non-white world and that the criteria for evaluating them are accordingly reduced in severity.

The worst case of this ethical constipation, however, is that of South Africa. The union of Third World agitators and First World intellectuals cares far more about this regime than about all the other tyrannies in Africa and elsewhere, many of them far more odious than South Africa.

Behind all this inconsistency and contradiction lies the deepest and most condescending racial prejudice and stereo-typing. The worst thing about it is how widespread it is. The intellectual, white or black, who refuses to confront the manifest facts about mugging in places like London, is as racist as a National Front yobbo. Such outlooks reproduce the past in a peculiarly rigid and fatalistic way. And like most dangerous ideas they have a significant kernel of truth. Europe *has* been more inventive and civilised than Africa or Asia. Russia *has* in large measure been a barbarous nation and Germany *did* have a great civilisation before the Nazis ruined it. Israeli economic and political standards *do* far surpass those of the Arab world. The Boers

should *not* have created an abomination like Apartheid.

This moral unevenness in history, however, should not be treated as a 'given' for the indefinite future. The deep but unspoken belief in the unquestionable superiority of the West, is in practice translated by many non-Westerners into a destructive and envious hatred, and by many Western intellectuals into pathological *self-hatred*. This distortion prevents a proper evaluation of many people and institutions, both within and outside the West itself. Race relations in the advanced countries are not to be improved by a refusal to face facts. There is no excusing mugging or rape, whoever does them. We cannot expect the white South Africans to dismantle Apartheid, while the world seems indifferent to the ghastly tale of murder, extortion and famine now being acted out in most of the rest of

Africa. We cannot go on appeasing dictators, however murderous, simply because they are not white. Until we can be persuaded to start seeing the Russians as something other than pre-determined brutes, they will probably continue to see themselves in that deadly light.

The real racism is to see people as morally irredeemable or innocent by virtue of the - supposed - intractable historical conditioning of their race and culture. The real prejudice, as well as the most dangerous kind, is to expect, tolerate and subsidise inferior conduct, out of misplaced guilt and ill-informed condescension. The uniqueness of the human race is that it is the only race whose history is not also a biology, and whose future, therefore, is open. That future depends on our applying the same standards to all people and to all societies.

In Search of Central Europe

The following article smuggled to *The Salisbury Review* from Albania, comes in reply to a question from the editor.

'Religion is the opium of the people': with the knowing smile of the enlightened, the guide to the Museum of Atheism in the town of Shkroda, North Albania, used to point to this quotation from Marx, written in large, dominating letters at the entrance to the museum. Yes, there is a museum of atheism in Albania - one of the wonders of the modern world, though temporarily closed to visitors. Here, through pictures and relics from the churches and mosques of our country, the authorities try to justify their clamorous declaration - made in 1966 - that Albania is the first atheist state in the world.

Albania is also the most secluded and backward country in Europe, closed tightly in its shell, and tortured by paranoid suspicions of things outside. How come that this reactionary world beyond our frontiers, ruled by bourgeois ideology and capitalist exploitation, could boast of so many achievements? In an effort to leap into the future, our government undertook something unprecedented in the history of mankind. The practice of any form of religion was forbidden by law (if law is the right word for the decrees which rain down on us from the heights of power). All religious institutions and shrines were closed and scheduled for demolition. This step towards utopia was also a negation of Albania: of its people, their past, their history and their culture. All churches and mosques were destroyed, with the exception of those few - designated as bearing 'artistic and architectural value' - which were locked up and left to crumble.

The war on religion was the personal initiative of our late ruler, Enver Hoxha, himself born into a Muslim family. Hoxha went further than his two beloved

teachers, Stalin and Mao. He did not only force his 'teachings' on the people; he did away with everything that failed to comply with them, and which stood as a symbol of our ruined life.

Before 1966 the Albanian population comprised 69% Muslim, 21% Orthodox and 10% Roman Catholic. The Muslims lived mainly in the centre of the country, with the Orthodox to the South of them, and the Catholic minority in the North. However, Islamic pockets were to be found everywhere, making the Muslims predominant both numerically and geographically. The spark which ignited God's funeral pyre was started - according to the official press of the day - by students at a middle school in the town of Durres, in central Albania. We all knew, however, that this 'initiative from below' was merely a propaganda ruse. The attack in question was an order, issuing from the upper echelons of the Party, and in conscious imitation of the 'Cultural Revolution' of Chairman Mao. As in China, a 'struggle' was declared, against the 'bourgeois intellectuals'. Every intellectual was a potential threat to Hoxha, whose powers of cogitation were not of the highest order; teachers, engineers, scientists and writers were the first targets of his campaign. Hence, simultaneously with the war against religion, we witnessed a 'revolutionising of the schools'. This was a further blow to the culture and memory of our people: a blow from which, as always, the young were the principal sufferers. All text books were 'reviewed', and those teachers who showed 'academicism', 'intellectualism' or some similar mental disturbance were removed. Schoolbooks, in both humanities and science, had to be rewritten from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, while courses and reading

materials were henceforth based on the teachings of Enver Hoxha. Since the only teaching of this great man was xenophobia, this effectively severed Albanian schools from the outside world and from history.

In such conditions, religion naturally became an obstacle to the Albanian leadership, running counter to 'the great revolutionary transformations' which the 'people' required. How is it possible that Hoxha could succeed where both Stalin and Mao had failed? The reader must understand that it did not happen in a day; nor even in a year. The struggle for men's souls began on the day when the communists took power. Although allowed to practice their calling, the Islamic hierarchy and the Christian clergy were compelled to serve the regime, being forced to make no judgements that would challenge the communists' authority. Evangelism was forbidden, and no efforts were permitted that would serve to communicate religious doctrine to the young. Religion became a shadow among institutions, whose sole effort was its own survival in a climate of terror. After the consolidation of communist power in 1950 young people were seldom to be seen in mosques or churches. Schools and communist officials sharpened their vigilance against parents and grandparents who dared to inculcate the love of God. Fearsome stories were told about religion, and infants were bombarded in the cradle with atheistical propaganda. Fear and aversion towards the act of worship became part of the spiritual condition of the rising generation.

The result was that, when the communists launched their all-out war in 1966, no serious barrier remained to their purposes. Besides, religion had been imposed on the Albanians by foreign invaders. Except for the period between 1912 and 1966, there had been no 'religions of the Albanian people', but only 'religions of the ruling powers'. It is true that these religions had entered the popular spirit, and helped to shape the way of life in both town and country, rescuing the Albanians from their ancient paganism. Clerics had been prominent in Albanian politics and cultural life, making a major contribution, here as elsewhere, to the national revival, and contributing the educated class necessary for political independence. Nevertheless, the fact that religion came from 'abroad' worked in favour of the communists, and sharpened their desire to do away with it. The Albanians, they claimed, were foreigners to religion, which was also foreign to them. Worship and doctrine had helped the invaders, and would help them again. Nor was this a novel theme. During the Albanian Renaissance of the eighteenth century, when scholars spoke out on behalf of national independence, there were those who wrote that 'the religion of the Albanian is Albanianism': only through such radical doctrines, they believed, could the shock of leaving the Turkish orbit after five centuries be made palatable. Many Albanians continued to see themselves as Turks; the advocates of an Albanian renaissance, however, could speak with a clear national conscience, and for such people the dominant religion was an

obstacle to independence, and a chain which bound the Albanians to their former masters.

But the parallel with those times is superficial. The goal of the communists is not to preserve the Albanian nation, but to consolidate their own illegitimate power. The necessary means to this has been the establishing of a new religion, a new belief - if belief is the word for a system of lies and deceptions. Marx is a jealous God, for the very reason that truth is his greatest enemy. In our case God came not only in the form of Marx, but also in that of Hoxha: ruling for forty years, from 1945 to 1985, Hoxha had the time to become, for the ordinary Albanian, all-powerful and sempiternal. He was not a party leader, since there was no party in the proper sense of that word. He was no head of a republic, since there was no republic. He was king of kings, who ruled with an absolutism that has no match, either among the medieval kingdoms, or anywhere else in the record of civilisation.

Hoxha was helped by the existence of three separate faiths. This fact divided the population, making it easy to destroy their resistance. The Muslim clergy were pliable from the beginning, and the Orthodox little better. Only the Catholics tried to resist: but their voice was choked and their efforts were soon neutralized. Some were shot, many were sent to prison or labour camp, and many more were forced to work in the 'cooperatives'. Being evident symbols of dissent, the communists lost no time in making examples of them. As contact between the three communities became more difficult, so did the possibility of a united opposition. This fact too was useful to the communists, since it gave credence to the idea that religion is a source of disunity. Communism, by contrast, could 'unite the country' - and with this slogan the usurpers advanced towards their evil goals, destroying all natural forms of society, emptying the spirit, and returning the people to paganism. The unity which they pretended to have imposed on the country was a unity of impotence, of nothingness: the oneness of a vacuum. It did not come from below but from the threat of arms; it was not the will of the people, nor even their dream, but a nightmare of solitude, hatched in the mind of Satan.

What have been the results for us, the people of Albania? Man needs something to believe in. Unlike the animals, he is capable of good and evil, needs to pursue the good, and requires the belief which justifies the good and strengthens his pursuit of it. The new generation, being ignorant of God, must live according to the choice made on their behalf by Enver Hoxha. Yet the problem of the older generation remains. They were educated at home into a closed society, and although the people of the mountains remained aloof, and only partially obedient to religious laws and duties, those of the valleys and the towns were pious, aware of the wider world, of man's destiny, and of the need for God. They lived by means of religious festivals and ceremonies, and were in constant communication with the transcendental. Such people have preserved in their souls the mark and the memory of their early

years. How to deal with them? That was the major question for the party, and no policy seemed adequate. Year after year the old cry was repeated: 'We must destroy every manifestation of religious ideology', 'nip in the bud every opposition to the party policy towards religion', 'intensify communist propaganda', 'use conviction and, if we do not succeed, use force'. Those were the clumsy slogans which warned us of our fate. 'Thousands of youths, equipped with picks and spades' - those cheerful bands of 'volunteers' summoned to do dirt on their fathers - brought down mosques and churches, destroyed icons and wall-paintings, minarets and belfries. They even disinterred those who had received godly burial, and scattered their remains. Not even the most beautiful churches and icons were spared: only much later was it understood that 'architectural monuments' were compatible with the leading role of the Party. Nor was it Hoxha who saved the few churches that remain, but people whom he later eliminated, and who saw with horror that more was being destroyed than the superstitions of the 'invader'.

Despite everything, however, we never ceased to practise religion, by whatever means we could find, even if only within the security (such as it is) of our own homes. This explains why, year after year, the official press has carried articles critical of the 'weak efforts of certain party organs', and of their 'incapacity to fight the remnants of religion to the end'. In some areas of the country, the press reported, people have been safeguarding their religious rites and customs - worse, they have been practising them. Hence, on major feast days, such as Christmas or Bajram, anti-religious propaganda always intensifies. We hear of whole villages in the Islamic areas, in which men and women are sent to work on feast days. And because Christians still take the risk of painting eggs at Easter, the sale of eggs was for some years stopped during Easter week. Many people have remained reluctant to marry their children to those of other faiths. The peasants pray and worship at home, and reconstruct the rites that they cannot observe in public. This has been especially true of the Islamic population: for although their clergy put up the smallest resistance, Islam is not dependent upon clergy for its survival. Like all Albanians, the Muslims, unable to digest communism, and also unable to offer resistance to it, have maintained their identity through an underground culture. To those who ask where atheism has gripped Albanian society, we can truthfully reply 'Nowhere, save among the youth and the communists'.

And how are things now, three years after the death of Enver Hoxha? As already indicated, he became the God of the country. Having been compelled to believe in him, the Albanian people must still nurture his divine image, and any step towards emancipation must be slow and timid. Little by little, however, they begin to understand that Hoxha was not a god but a tyrant. His image fades, the emptiness returns, and with the death of one God comes the yearning for another. And what was so wrong, after all, with the

God who was stolen from us? Even among intellectuals, the magic of religion is exerting itself. What was your father's name? What religion are you? Such questions begin almost every serious conversation, and even those who have forgotten the meaning of religion look at one another with the curious eye of a half-awakened belief. The new leaders cannot, like Hoxha, become gods; what will happen to them, therefore, if no substitute is found? Marxism-Leninism has no reality, except as the excuse for terror. Another Hoxha is impossible to conceive. Historically, materially and spiritually we have reached the end of the road, so far as communism is concerned. We therefore pray that - in their own desperation - our rulers will restore our birthright to us, and allow us to direct our faith and our hope to the One who truly merits it.

(Translated from the Albanian by Jonathan Cating.)

UNTIMELY TRACTS

by Roger Scruton

Roger Scruton's articles in *The Times* have established his reputation as one of the ablest controversialists of his generation.

Succinctly argued, vividly expressed, and unfailingly reactionary in tone, these articles have scandalised the intellectual establishment and brought comfort to those of old-fashioned views. Ranging from the eating of fish to the maintenance of motorcycles, from nuclear disarmament to the Anglican liturgy, from the music of Pfitzner to the foundations of social thought, these frank expressions of unfashionable prejudice will give food for thought both to those who agree with them and to those who do not.

Whatever your views, you will recognise here in this collection of controversial articles a useful identification of the issues which now confront us, and a challenge to the world in which we live.

Published by Macmillan
hardcover
£13.95 0-333-43862-0

M

Macmillan Publishers
Brunel Road, Houndmills
Basingstoke
Hampshire RG21 2XS, UK
Telephone: (0256) 29242

The Politics of Literature

Richard Cronin

Since the early 1970s Britain has developed its own distinctive school of post-structuralist literary criticism. It is distinguished from continental varieties in much the same way as the term Marxist is used differently in Britain and in France. In France Marxist is an epithet almost synonymous with intellectual, in Britain it is reserved for the description of a narrower and more urgent set of political beliefs. British theorists of this school regularly complain that their French counterparts foster a dangerous detachment from the pressing realities of class struggle. The most successful exponent of this kind of criticism is Terry Eagleton, but it has become increasingly influential in literature departments throughout the United Kingdom. It has its own journal, *Literature Teaching Politics*, and its own press, the New Accents series published by Methuen. The group of critics and theorists who can usefully be thought of as belonging to this school do not all of them think alike. In fact, they contrive fairly often to find grounds for violent disagreement with one another. If in spite of this they can still be thought of as constituting a school it is because the work of each of them takes as its premise an assumption that Peter Widdowson makes explicit in his introduction to a volume of essays entitled *Re-Reading English* (Methuen, 1982), a volume self-consciously designed as a group manifesto. 'What these essays recognize', writes Widdowson 'is that all education is a *political* activity, and that the teaching of English is especially so'.

Critics of this persuasion are not remarkable for the density of their theoretical content. They rely on a very few, easily summarised positions that tend to be wearisomely repeated in essay after essay. Almost always the starting point is the question, *what is literature?* Two answers are permissible, each finding favour with a number of critics, but the majority, even though the two answers are inconsistent, cling to both. One answer runs as follows: literature is the group of writings that articulates the ideology of the dominant class, an ideology described either as liberalism or bourgeois individualism. The second answer denies that literature is a concept that can claim any objective reality. Rather, it is the group of writing that has been subjected to the stratagems of conventional criticism, which work to present these writings as articulating, as if they were natural or universal, truths that are in fact the ideological values of bourgeois liberalism.

In either case, what is crucially true is that literature is a plot, a conspiracy. Successive governments have been willing to invest money in the teaching of literature in schools and in institutes of higher education because

they have grasped that such an investment secures valuable political dividends. In learning to admire literature the student is taught to recognize certain values as possessing a natural or universal truth independent of any particular political or social arrangement. Shakespeare, according to Coleridge, 'is of no age - nor, I may add, of any religion or party or profession'. His plays embody quintessentially human values: not to admire them is simply to reveal oneself as a careless reader or a defective human being. To be taught literature is to undergo a course of political indoctrination designed to persuade the student that the values carefully located in Shakespeare's plays, which are also the values that underpin the existing social structure and sustain the dominant class in its power, are not open to question. Literature courses end with an assessment in which the student's success in assimilating this indoctrination is gauged. Those who have most thoroughly imbibed the secret lessons of the course are rewarded with a certificate that qualifies them to superintend literature courses to which new generations of students can be subjected. Other successful candidates are offered entry to the professions and to government service, thus ensuring that the business of the nation will continue to be conducted by men and women who have been taught to accept that the dominant ideology is not to be questioned, that like Shakespeare it is 'not for an age but for all time'.

The task that these critics undertake is to unearth the ideological premises of the literary text, and of the criticism it has generated, and to expose those premises for inspection. *Henry V* is studied to reveal the ideological self-contradictions inherent in imperialism. A lecture on *The Tempest* given in 1918 by Sir Walter Faleigh, then Merton Professor of English at Oxford, in which he claims that Caliban strikingly resembles the average German, is exposed as a crude and rather nasty piece of wartime propaganda. But the critic shows his true mettle only in his dealings with less promising texts. James Kavanagh valiantly struggles to locate in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* 'the problematic of proto-professional ideological production denied autonomous weight in a society struggling to preserve the hegemony of an aristocratic class-ideology' (in *Alternative Shakespeares*, ed. Drakakis (Methuen, 1985)). Terry Eagleton finds only an incitement to dark political suspicions in the tendency of the American New Critics to celebrate a literary text precisely in so far as it disengages itself from partisan commitment. Some of the New Critics, he warns, were practising Christians, and several of them came from the South.

It may seem odd for a critic to put his interpretative

skills to such a use, but for critics such as these it is the only valid critical task, and a necessary consequence of the premise that they share. All writing is dependent on the political pressures that produced it. Conventional criticism, in seeking to deny or to disguise this, serves only to foster a damaging illusion. 'Shakespeare in Ideology' is a significant title, and not just because of its popularity - it has been used as the title of two quite different articles. It takes the figurehead of conventional criticism, the writer who more than all others has been claimed to offer access to universal human nature, and insists that even he, even Shakespeare, should be understood only as a product of ideological tensions. There is, of course, no possibility of demonstrating that this is wrong. As Kavanagh's essay on *A Midsummer Night's Dream* indicates, it requires only a minimal ingenuity to understand any statement whatsoever as implying ideological assumptions. At this point I ought to confess that I am so far gone in reactionary empiricism as to refuse to accept that unfalsifiable statements are properly regarded as theoretical statements at all. They seem to me to offer not a theory, but a picture of the world, and the crucial question we ought to ask of these critics is what sort of picture of the world they provide us with.

It is not, for one thing, a world that needs to be looked at very closely. What most enrages unsympathetic readers of this kind of criticism is its insistence on travestying the views of its opponents. We are assured, for example, that the conventional critic values Sidney's *Astrophil and Stella* as a transparent medium through which one gains direct access to Sidney's thoughts and feelings. This same conventional critic believes, it seems, that the primary moral responsibility for the rape of Clarissa Harlowe lies with Clarissa herself. He believes that *The Waste Land* is about a girl on a sledge who undergoes a series of sex-change operations and ends up fishing glumly by a canal. But, of course, this is not admissible evidence. All it shows, these critics would claim, is the difference between their marxism and my bourgeois individualism. It is better to confine one's attention to those rare moments when the critic engages with the extra-literary world.

Eagleton, for example, notes uncontroversially that different people speak differently, and that the language even of the same person is modified by its context. An Oxford don and a Glasgow docker speak English differently, he points out, and the Glasgow docker does not use the same language when he is writing a love letter that he uses in conversation with his local vicar. It is not just because I live in Glasgow, and am therefore aware that Glasgow dockers do not have local vicars that I find this particularly infuriating. It is the crude use of the phrase 'Glasgow docker' as a metonym for member of the working classes, the reduction of a human being to a figure of speech, whose life, since it has been deprived of all human reality, need not be attended to, that I find intolerable, and the offence is only compounded by Eagleton's repeated protestations that somehow his critical labours are

devoted to the service of this man whose way of life he so carelessly disregards. Let me offer another example, one that I can view more temperately. Wishing to explain realism to the uninitiated, Eagleton directs our attention to the typical Hollywood film. Notice, we are enjoined, how the camera remains stationary for long periods, so that we are encouraged to look at the film as if it were a view from a window. The effect of realism is achieved by distracting our attention from the techniques that produce the image. Such a passage almost leads one to believe that Eagleton is the only person in the Western world who has never seen a typical Hollywood film, and who remains quite unaware that the typical Hollywood director has several cameras, not to mention tracks, cranes, and so on, prides himself on the scale of his production expenses, and is prone to shifting camera angles with an irritating mechanical frequency. Eagleton must have seen such films, it is just that he has not looked at them. He has a sense that conventional films are like conventional novels, he knows that the conventional novel uses an omniscient narrator, and jumps to the conclusion that the camera in Hollywood films must be used in the way that would best serve his analogy.

Eagleton's inattention to the external world is so ingrained that the habit even extends to his own books. On page 16 of his *Literary Theory: An Introduction* (Basil Blackwell, 1983), he inveighs against a prejudice underlying the popularity of practical criticism, the notion that there is such a thing as a pure literary judgement. The chief culprit in this sorry state of affairs is I.A. Richards, 'who as a young, white, upper middle-class male Cambridge don was unable to objectify a context of interests which he largely shared, and was thus unable to recognize fully that local, "subjective" differences of evaluation work within a particular socially structured way of perceiving the world'. By page 30 Eagleton is in need of a class explanation for the radical reorganization of English studies that took place in Cambridge following the first world war, and he finds it in the entry into the post-war university of representatives from an 'alternative social class':

F.R. Leavis was the son of a musical instruments dealer. Q.D. Roth the daughter of a drapier and hosier. I.A. Richards the son of a works manager in Cheshire. English was to be fashioned not by the patrician dilettantes who occupied the early Chairs of Literature at the ancient universities, but by the offspring of the provincial petty bourgeoisie.

I.A. Richards is demoted from upper to lower middle class in a matter of pages. When Eagleton's argument demands it, even class, that terrible vehicle of historical inevitability, becomes a text to be read in whatever way suits the reader.

In this dimly apprehended world only a very few activities seem to be pursued, almost all of them violent. The metaphors that these critics favour are drawn more often than not from a single metaphorical

field. Reading, writing, talking, living, are represented as episodes in a military campaign. The following examples are all taken from the single volume, *Re-Reading English*. The subject is a 'terrain' or a 'field' on which radical critics 'fight their daily battles'. 'Forces' are 'deployed', 'positions' are 'attacked' and 'defended'. 'Alliances' are sought. Critics develop 'strategies'. They 'challenge' the 'forces' of bourgeois hegemony. They accomplish 'manoeuvres', they 'mobilise' texts and students. 'Onslaughts' are resisted. Those they disapprove of are found to be defective in the martial virtues. Conventional critics 'surrender' to the authority of the text. Lacan, Derrida, and Kristeva conspire to deny 'the possibilities of struggle'. We are repeatedly urged of the 'need to be more combative', of the need to expose in everything 'relations of difference and antagonism'. Quotations cited for our approval are characterized by the use of a rhetoric perhaps best described as psychopathic. My favourite is from Althusser, who is commended for identifying 'humanism' as a word 'exploited by an ideology which uses it to kill another word ... class struggle'. Always we are presented with a world that offers only one acceptable form of exercise, a world where 'men become aware of their struggle and fight it out'. The contributors to *Re-Reading English* do not all achieve the same level of figurative violence. Peter Widdowson and Tony Bennett contrive to manufacture a rhetoric more floridly and continuously militaristic than anything their comrades can rival, but the tendency to describe reading and writing as if they were violent activities is pervasive. Criticism for Peter Widdowson is a 'barrage', its aim 'destruction': it is as if he can only reconcile himself to the sedentary life of the literary critic by imagining that his pen is some piece of artillery. Incidentally, it is a curious fact that almost all these critics allow during their essays a short ceasefire during which they take the opportunity to proclaim their solidarity with feminism. All the same it is a warrior world that we are presented with, a world more likely to remind us of Norse sagas than any more recent fiction.

One subordinate metaphorical group is worth noticing. It recalls Perry Mason novels rather than sagas. Critical works of this kind almost invariably include a group of stock characters, who have an air of 'innocence' or 'purity', and who suffer in the end 'detection' or 'exposure'. These characters may be conventional texts or conventional readings of texts, but in either case the radical critic succeeds in unmasking them, exposing their 'innocent' appearance as the product of artful guile, and 'convicting' them of the crimes they have sought to conceal. This is the critic not as warrior but as master detective or peerless courtroom lawyer, uncannily able to penetrate the misleading appearances that deceive lesser men.

In this strange world that offers only the possibility of fighting, or, in the infrequent intervals between battles, the thrill of detection, there is predictably only one kind of human relationship. The reader either exercises power, or he submits to the power of the text.

The teacher either fights his daily battles with the institution that has employed him, or he surrenders to it. Students seem to be given even less choice. All that they can do is to submit to the power of the teaching establishment, or yield to the attack of their radical liberators. It is a world even narrower in its range of permitted gestures than Noh theatre. Only two postures are possible, subservience or dominance.

It seems a bleak enough picture, but it does have a certain temporal depth. It is a world with a history. All these critics insist on the importance of history, by which they mean both the historical forces that produce the literary text and the historical forces that produce its reader. Nowhere are they more severe in their strictures of conventional criticism than in its failure to subject the text to a properly historical understanding. Conventional critics are apt to be surprised by this, rather believing that the long years of doctoral research they have passed through were specifically designed to instil in them an unshakable, even oppressive, sense of the importance of sound and detailed historical scholarship. But there is no mystery here. It is just that these two kinds of critic attach quite different meanings to the word history.

Take the version of British history since the 18th century that can be culled from Eagleton's *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. 'Eighteenth century England', it seems, had 'emerged, battered but intact from a bloody civil war', concerned only to 'reconsolidate a shaken social order'. The attempt proved a failure, and there followed the Romantic period, an age of 'revolution', of middle-class insurrection'. The 'callous discipline of early industrial capitalism' provokes 'militant protest' by the working class to which the 'English state reacts with a brutal political repressiveness which converts England during part of the Romantic period into what is in effect a police state'. In the nineteenth century there was more of the same: a 'socially turbulent class society' maintained a fragile stability until the outbreak of the first world war. Having reached 1918 Eagleton pauses to offer another of his large scale historical panoramas:

Europe lay in ruins, desolated by the worst war in history. In the wake of the catastrophe, a wave of social revolution rolled across the continent: the years around 1920 were to witness the Berlin Spartacus uprising, the establishment of workers' soviets in Munich and Budapest, and mass factory occupations throughout Italy. All of this insurgency was violently crushed, but the social order of European capitalism had been shaken to its roots by the carnage of the war and its turbulent political aftermath.

And so to our own day, when 'the world contains over 60,000 nuclear warheads, many with a capacity a thousand times greater than the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima', and so on. The past is another country, says L.P. Hartley, and the country that Eagleton's past best resembles is the Lebanon. History is a state of perpetual crisis, an unceasing turbulence that demands

of the historian a breathless, newsreel prose. History is the scene of frenetic energies, but they are sustained so unvaryingly that the effect becomes surprisingly monotonous, rather like a Kung Fu film.

It could be argued, of course, that the picture of the world I have just described is simply the picture of the world offered by Marxism, a world in which the one reality is class struggle. Certainly, that is what most of these critics would claim. They think of themselves as continuing a revolutionary struggle that in 1968 took to the streets, and suffered a glorious defeat. Their criticism is a product of the 60s, or, as Eagleton characteristically puts it, a product of 'the social and academic turmoil of that decade'. Its exponents see themselves as remaining true into the reactionary Thatcherite and Reaganite 80s to a steely political perception of the role of literature and criticism that was born in pitched battle on the streets of Paris, and in scuffles outside the American embassy in London. They think of themselves as resisting the attempt by the ruling class to re-impose its hegemony, and resisting also the temptation to which they believe American theory has yielded, the temptation to transform the theoretical tools designed to expose the vacuousness and self-contradictoriness of conventional liberalism into toys useful only to those who wish to waste their lives in anarchic, politically irresponsible, deconstructive play. It is this self-representation, the frankness of Eagleton and those who share his views, in insisting that the study of literature must now be 'defined as a struggle against the bourgeois state', that alarms their more conventional colleagues, and may yet alarm the government committees who control the funding of British universities, but it is not a self-representation that I am prepared to accept.

The Marxist view of history as impelled along its inevitable course by the conflict between classes has a certain weight, even as epic solidity. These classes are after all the products of large economic forces, the conflict between them is impersonal, inevitable, grand. If we compare the prose of these critics with the prose, say, of the *Communist Manifesto*, then what immediately strikes one is an absence of gravity, at best a shrill exuberance, at worst a thin hysteria. Epic conflict has diminished into cartoon violence, the Greeks and the Trojans into Tom and Jerry. That is why the violent rhetoric that these critics favour is oddly unthreatening. One would not fear to be in the same room as Peter Widdowson. Eagleton speaks of 'the Great War, with its carnage of ruling class rhetoric'. Rhetoric was not the most important thing killed on the Somme, one might think, but his remark remains oddly appropriate, because in these critical texts at any rate the conflicts are less between people than between idioms, the wounds inflicted are on styles, if there is murder it is of one word, class struggle, by another, humanism. It seems, in the end, a comically refined struggle in which we are engaged, not a conflict of classes but a battle of books.

These critics never weary of castigating those who

seek to sever literature and the study of it from the wider life of the nation, and yet they give the impression, even for academics, of being a remarkably bookish lot. Eagleton's curious innocence as to the nature of such phenomena as a Glasgow docker or a Hollywood film is characteristic. It is in the end appropriate that these arch-critics of academic institutions should feel for those institutions a kind of inverted piety. For what other group of critics is Sir Walter Raleigh, that dust-covered inhabitant of second-hand book shops, still a significant critic, his work scrupulously read? What other critics still insist on the contemporary relevance of Sir Henry Newbolt? No critics before them have gone quite so far in replacing the study of literature which was at any rate written outside the universities with the study of literary criticism that was produced within them. But if the picture of the world that this criticism offers us does not derive from Marxism, where does it come from?

Academic institutions have a long-standing and well-merited reputation for vituperative internecine feuding, bitter disputes over precedence, and the use of a violently insulting rhetoric. The more rarefied the area of specialised knowledge, it seems, the fiercer are the passions brought into play: the more sedate the way of life the greater the need to enliven it with quarrels of spectacular virulence. Within academic institutions the savage in-fighting has a certain ritualistic quality secured by the incongruity between the issue in question and the emotions it generates, but it seems real enough to those who are engaged in it. If we ask what is the model for the picture of the world that I have described, we would do better, I think, to find it in English departments up and down the country than in any Marxist view of history. What these critics offer us is an acrimonious faculty meeting construed as a model for the whole of human experience. We are shown the view from a college window of a saturnine don who imagines that the same capacity for verbal violence, the same desperate anxiety to avoid the taint of subservience, the same ability to remain for hours fixed in a lathered state of righteous indignation that he detects in his colleagues and suspects in himself are the qualities that characterize all the rest of mankind.

What is the most to be complained of in this school of criticism is not the threat it poses to ingenuous young people who might reasonably expect to be able to take a course in literature without being informed that this entails their opposition to the bourgeois state. Young people are rarely so gullible as those who seek to protect them from such influences fear. They are much less likely to be indoctrinated than they are to be bored. They are shown a view of the world as a scene of battle, as a terrain for class struggle. It seems exciting enough. But then the struggle between classes reveals itself as no more than a struggle between Dr X's way of teaching a class and Dr Y's, and all we are offered is academic rivalry ludicrously presented as though it were the stuff of which history is made. This criticism is less to be reprehended for peddling marxism than for

trivialising the marxism that it professes, less for taking an academic subject out of the cloister and subjecting it to the vulgar pressures of politics than for immuring literary criticism more completely within the academic system than has ever been achieved before. Revolutionaries, of course, need martyrs, and the revo-

lution in English studies has claimed one or two. But they are of a wholly academic breed. The most celebrated is a man who was not offered the job in Cambridge that he had hoped for, and had to accept a professorship in another university. This is not the stuff from which the legend of Rosa Luxembourg was made.

Toys in a Violent Society*

P. N. R. Waterman

The title of this paper has been carefully chosen. 'Toys in a Violent Society' is offered as an alternative to the expression 'war toys' because it will be a fundamental contention of the paper that toys can only reflect life; that objections to certain toys are therefore objections to certain aspects of life and that the term 'war toys' is only one more of the rhetorical devices used by single interest pressure groups to achieve by propaganda what it may be difficult to achieve by rational persuasion.

The object of this paper is to set out as clearly as possible the real issues relating to this subject, to summarise the extensive answers which are already available to what are undoubtedly genuinely felt concerns and to suggest further action which can be taken by interested parties. In doing so, it is fair to point out that this paper has been prepared for the British Toy and Hobby Manufacturers Association and is a statement of its views and beliefs; nonetheless the Association has attempted to present those views as objectively as possible.

The contention we address is that certain toys, being either facsimilies or representations of weapons or military equipment, have the power to condition human behaviour - with the assumed consequence that children who play with such toys become temporarily or permanently predisposed to violence. It is a further assumption of this general position that at least some violent adult behaviour is traceable to the use of such toys and that by logical deduction the elimination of such toys would reduce the incidence of personal violence in our society. A further extension of the general argument is that the behaviour imprinted by use of these toys leads to a greater disposition to warlike activity, especially among males and hence helps to perpetuate militarism and a conventional resort to war to settle international differences. We believe this to be a fair and objective summary of the concerns held by opponents of toys based on warlike or military themes.

The charge is, however, so grave that we should make clear at the outset that were the Industry or any of its members convinced of its validity, we would instantly stop making the toys in question. The Toy

Industry is made up of men and women who are themselves parents, themselves citizens of our society, who share all of the general concerns of our society about the future of its children. In particular, it is quite clear that if any of us dreamt that ceasing manufacture of certain toys would end war, or even lead to an observable reduction in interpersonal violence, we, together with our Managers, Shareholders and customer, would leap at the opportunity.

It follows, therefore, that having studied this situation with more than average care, we have concluded that toys cannot be credited with the effects which are attributed to them. We are as certain as we can be that toys of any description do not bring about permanent changes in behaviour patterns. We are equally certain that toys are incapable of permanently predisposing children to violence. We are therefore satisfied that toys are not responsible for adult interpersonal violence or for wars.

Why are we able to say this? First, it is important to note that the Industry has been studying this question closely for the past 18 months. During that time, we have funded the full time work of an academic researcher and have commissioned a study of the available evidence from a leading behavioural psychologist, specialising in interpersonal violence. We have entered into detailed discussions with a wide range of interested parties and we have debated the matter at length internally in an effort to develop a proper understanding of such an overwhelmingly important subject. We are now planning to fund further research work, extending over the next 3 years, in an effort to provide the empirical evidence the Industry needs to validate the very convincing case already available - which we will rehearse today.

It will be recalled that public concern about a possible link between toys and violent behaviour rests on a single assumption. That assumption is that toys representing military or violent themes produce changes in the permanent behaviour patterns of the users. Clearly, this assumption should be susceptible to test by experience and indeed, there appear to be at least three such tests potentially available.

First, is there any experimental or scientific obser-

vational evidence of a direct link between toys and permanent changes in behaviour? Second, does our social history provide any evidence of a correlation between recorded levels of human violence and the existence of particular types of toy? Third, is there any correlation between statistically recorded levels of interpersonal violence in different societies and the differential penetration of toys of the kind thought to produce such violence? We have examined all three of these sources of evidence and, in summary, our findings are these.

1. *There is no scientific evidence that we can find of a connection between toys and permanent violent behaviour patterns among humans; indeed, what evidence we have been able to collect points in the opposite direction.* During the past year, the Industry commissioned Professor Goldstein, visiting Professor in Behavioural Sciences at London University, to assemble and summarise all of the extant scientific material on the possible connection between toys and human behaviour - with special reference to indications of causes of violent behaviour. Copies of Professor Goldstein's summary are available and may be read in full but, in essence, the study finds no evidence of the suspected causation. Instead, Professor Goldstein draws attention to an alternative conclusion from the available evidence. By far the most important influence on the development of permanent behaviour patterns is the influence of parents or mentors. This influence far outweighs any conceivable influence which could be imparted by association with artefacts such as toys.

Put another way, the evidence available says that the influence of toys, if any, is so easily overridden by the example and influence of parents, family and teachers that we must look to the guidance of these latter as the primary cause of violent behaviour patterns - not to alternatives such as toys.

Also, during the past year, an academic researcher, Miss Jacqueline Jukes, funded by the Industry, has conducted a well designed experiment to establish whether the television programme element of programme related toys substitutes 'ready-made' phantasy material for the imaginative play which children might otherwise develop for themselves. Her findings, which we are about to publish, are important. The experiment, conducted with toys with military themes, showed that children made little or no use of the TV programme material, after direct exposure to such material, in their subsequent play patterns. This finding is important because it speaks powerfully to the subject under discussion. The TV programme material, related as it was to military themed toys, contained material which many observers describe as 'violent'. Even so, the material appeared to have no immediate effect on children's behaviour when playing with the toys - suggesting that such material is a great deal less influential than many have feared hitherto, even in conjunction with toys which reinforce the possible significance of the programme material.

This finding is, incidentally, in line with the results

of research carried out by the Advertising Association on the influence of TV advertising on children. This research, also about to be published by the Toy Industry, showed that children have much greater powers of judgement and discrimination in exposure to TV advertising than anyone has supposed - even the advertiser!

Again, we must conclude that there are other, much more powerful influences at work on determining children's character and behaviour which override the influences of ephemera such as TV and toys. Professor Goldstein points to the parent or surrogate parent as that enduring influence.

It is probably not a coincidence that this finding is a good deal more embarrassing to our self-esteem than the convenient alternative - that is that the toys and not ourselves are to blame. We will discuss this aspect of the matter in more detail later, noting only in passing that the search for scapegoats is part of our deepest primitive response to unexplained or unexplainable evil.

2. *Social history generally shows a continually de-escalating level of interpersonal violence in Western society and appears to bear no relationship to the availability of particular types of toy.* Starting with a period for which we have good eyewitness accounts, levels of interpersonal violence in 8th and 9th century Frankish Gaul (the forerunner of the territories now known as France, Germany and the Benelux) were exceptional. Setting aside Viking raids and Hungarian incursions, which were themselves of exceptional ferocity and destructiveness, even for the period, interpersonal violence within the community was endemic. These levels of violence generally reflected unpredictable economic conditions, unstable government institutions, highly fragmented legal systems, unsettled land tenure arrangements, all leading to a conventional resort to force to settle economic, political and religious differences.

Even a cursory survey of Western European history since this period confirms a trend of reducing levels of interpersonal violence through to the present time. Historians will point to critical factors such as the gradual institution of stable government, growing recognition of the rule of law, the moral influence of the Christian Church, the institution of democracy and improvement in economic conditions as the key determinants of this trend.

However, there is manifestly no correlation to be found between the ownership and use of toys of whatever kind, and the varying levels of violence which have occurred in history. Toys occur only rarely among the artefacts uncovered by archaeology; scarcely any survive from a period before the 18th century and it is only in the late 19th and 20th century that widespread distribution of mass produced toys was either feasible or supportable. Of the toys produced in this latter period many have been associated with, or based on, weapons and military equipment. Were such toys to be a primary cause of violent behaviour we would therefore expect to see a rising level of inter-

personal violence in the late 19th and 20th centuries. History simply does not support this, either in terms of long or short term trends in violence. Other factors are obviously of overwhelmingly greater importance and a reading of some of the social documents of the Victorian period, including the novels of Dickens, or the revelations of the Pall Mall Gazette in the 1880's, will confirm what these are. To lay growth or development of interpersonal violence at the door of the Toy Industry in the face of our social history therefore seems absurd.

3. *Present day statistical evidence of the incidence of interpersonal violence also indicates an absence of correlation between toys and the propensity to violent behaviour.* For there to be a genuine heightening of the incidence of adult interpersonal violence as a result of childhood exposure to particular toys, logic requires that societies which have experienced varying degrees of exposure to such toys should show varying levels of interpersonal violence. However, a comparison between Dallas and Philadelphia in these respects fails to support this hypothesis. The measured incidence of violent crime in Dallas is sharply higher than in Philadelphia, in fact about 88% higher; the penetration and development of toy products, including those associated with warlike themes, is effectively identical in both cities. A similar comparison can be repeated for other pairings of American cities and regions for which we have accurate information.

We are forced to conclude that the differential incidence of violence is more likely to be traceable to the social and economic differences between the two cities than to the use of particular types of toy.

Based on all of these considerations, including review of all of the scientific evidence we have been able to find, the Toy Industry has concluded that in essence, there is no case to answer in respect of a supposed linkage between toys and violent behaviour. There is no direct observational or experimental evidence of such a linkage; history confirms this absence of scientific evidence; statistics support history. Nevertheless, because the issue is so important, the Industry intends, as indicated, to continue to fund research in an effort to validate experimentally what seems rather obvious from other information.

We now come to the real nub of the problem – the issue of moral and social responsibility in relation to this matter and its relevance to the positions which have thus far been adopted in the debate. For reasons we have summarised, it seems clear to the Toy Industry that the continued production and sale of toys with military associations is a harmless activity, is at worst morally neutral, is economically beneficial and gives substantial pleasure and satisfaction by meeting manifest consumer needs. This last point should be emphasised by recording the fact that around 15% of the entire market for toys – that is around £150MM at retail prices – consists of toys based on weapons or military equipment.

By what right, therefore, do critics of such toys seek to eliminate them from sale? The right we see as one

conferred only by the habitual mind-set of 19th-century liberalism – the presumed right of one group in society to know what is best for another group, regardless of the views or requirements of that other group. But rights are, after all, only the reciprocals of duties and responsibilities; and in the present case it is the duty of critics of toys to prove a benefit before pronouncing an anathema. This, we believe, has not occurred. More seriously, we consider that the attempt to blame toys for violent behaviour in our society is a negative contribution to the resolution of a very serious problem. By diverting attention away from such issues as standards of education, parental responsibility, social and moral leadership, underprivileged minorities, and unfettered media of communication, the nomination of toys as a convenient scapegoat (which appears to absolve practically everyone except the Toy Industry) is morally perverse. It simply helps to ensure that we will never deal successfully with the problem of violence in our society – and the Toy Industry finds that objectionable.

The industry therefore concludes that its best means of discharging its acknowledged duties and responsibilities towards society is to resist forcefully the notion that its products are to blame for a state of affairs which appears to require an altogether different diagnosis. Consequently, we propose what we feel may be a more relevant programme of action.

1) Since parental influences on children appear to be of crucial significance in moulding eventual permanent behaviour patterns, our attention should be turned to the task of improving our understanding of this subject. That understanding might help in removing whatever obstacles, social, economic or otherwise there may be to the universal exercise of morally benign parenthood.

2) We believe that those who advance a view at variance with common opinion have a duty to promote that view – if it is likely to be important. There are few subjects more important than unexplained violence in civilised society and we therefore urge critics of toys to design and finance scientific enquiry into the relationship between toys and children's development. It is an area of insufficient information and we may be missing vital data.

3) In general, we believe that reforming zeal should be focussed on the glaring inadequacies of society – not diverted into exotic byways of ephemera such as toys. Limited energies are more effective when concentrated against major targets.

We hope that these thoughts, together with the overall summary of the Industry's position on this subject, which we have offered, will be of help in clarifying a difficult and potentially emotional subject. It may be helpful in this last respect to close, as we opened, by drawing attention to the relationship between toys and life. We consider that, by definition, toys can be no more than an imitation of life – including, of course, the phantasies which are built with the materials of life. Toys which do not reflect or cannot be made to

reflect intelligible aspects or artefacts of life would be meaningless to children.

It follows, therefore that toys which represent violent or military themes exist only because violence and militarism are well known and, to many, fascinating, aspects of life. Equally, if violence and militarism did not exist in our society, then such toys would have no

meaning, would not sell and therefore would not exist. The inference is obvious. If we wish to eliminate the toys under discussion, then we need to eliminate violence and militarism in our society. Happily we can all agree on that; we suggest, therefore that our attention can be most fruitfully directed towards that most desirable goal.

* A paper prepared for presentation to the Toy Libraries Association.

Jews, Christians and Persecution

Paul Gottfried

The syndicated columnist and *National Review* senior editor Joseph Sobran observed that 'if Christians were hostile to Jews, that worked both ways.' This remark was made in the context of a bitter debate between Sobran and leading Jewish neoconservatives. Sobran had deplored the influence of Jewish lobbyists on American policy in the Middle East. He had also noted the incivility of Jewish intellectuals in dealing with Christian culture. By late spring 1986, it was apparent that Sobran had wandered on to a mine field. His neoconservative critics, most conspicuously Midge Decter and Dorothy Rabinowitz, worked to have his columns dropped from newspapers and pushed his close friend William F. Buckley into openly dissociating himself from Sobran's 'indelicate' comments.

Though Sobran made at least one inaccurate charge about Jews, claiming they had persecuted Christians to a degree comparable to their own victimization (something historically impossible), he nonetheless raised an interesting question about the way American Jews perceive their relationship to Christian society. Paul Johnson, a self-described conservative Catholic, gingerly dodged this question last year in a review of Sidney Hook's autobiographical *Out of Step* and in a subsequent radio interview with John Lofton. In both instances Johnson refused to discuss anti-Christian diatribes coming from explicitly Jewish sources. Though Hook, whom Johnson praises without reservations, describes himself as an atheist, he is also proud of his Jewish identity. Moreover, the only religion Hook chooses to attack (and he does so vehemently) is Christianity. Lofton asked Johnson whether Christians have a duty to be sensitive to anti-Christian rhetoric by Jews as well as to Christian anti-Semitism. Johnson responded by calling attention to European anti-Semitism while ignoring the thrust of Lofton's question.

Yet, as Martin Peretz acknowledges in the *New Republic* (December 1987) 'just as there are Christian texts animated by Jew-hatred, there is no shortage of Jewish texts motivated by goy-hatred.' There may also be something less than evenhanded about the American

Jewish idea of dialogue with Christians, which is supposed to consist of Christians apologizing to Jews. Indeed it has become offensive to the American Jewish community, or at least to its recognized leaders, to suggest that Jews and Christian deal with each other through mutual respect, with the same expectation of tolerance.

In Rabbinic literature abusive references can be found to both the founder of Christianity and his followers. Medieval and later Jewish authorities on biblical and Rabbinic laws made no attempt, unless constrained by Christian political leaders, to hide their contempt for Christians and Christianity. The Church was characteristically depicted in Rabbinic literature as a successor of Rome which had taken over disagreeable religious practices from the pagan world. The fact that Christians savagely persecuted Jews made it easier to dislike them; but Christian anti-Semitism was never the sole source of Jewish religious intolerance. Even the primitive Jewish church in Jerusalem resented the presence of non-Jewish Christians and would only accept Gentiles who had undergone formal ritual conversion to Judaism. Other Jews had considered Jewish Christians the followers of a false Messiah and had turned against them with particular scorn after Jewish Christians had refused to join the last Jewish revolt against the Romans in 132 AD.

Anti-Christian feeling among Jews has not come about in modern America exclusively from Christian anti-Semitism. Jewish expressions of dislike and fear of Christianity are perhaps more widespread today than thirty years ago, though opinion surveys indicate that Christians are less anti-Jewish now than in the past. Significantly the reduction of Christian hostility has made the Jewish community not less anti-Christian but more willing to vent anti-Christian sentiments. The theology of the Holocaust, which has grown popular in American synagogues, is full of animus against the Christian world. Though this theology, as Jacob Neusner points out, has nothing to do with traditional Rabbinic Judaism, its 'spite and suspicion'

reinforce already established patterns of Jewish prejudice.

In an essay for *Commentary*, the historian Jonathan Sarna observes that American Jewish historiography has become increasingly centered on the continuity between European and American Christian anti-Semitism. This trend, Sarna notes, developed ironically in the face of diminishing, not rising, anti-Semitism. In *Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians and the New Left*, Stanley Rothman and R. S. Lichter examine another aspect of Jewish estrangement from American life. Rothman and Lichter trace the predominance of Jews in American radical movements of the sixties to the status anxiety suffered by quasi-assimilated Jews in relation to the surrounding Christian society.

This hypercritical view of Christian America is by no means limited to Jewish leftist or militantly Zionist publications. One finds anti-Christian tirades at least as often in *Commentary* as in *Tikkun* or *Midstream*. All these magazines, for example, publish Cynthia Ozick, who combines venomous anti-Christian statements with a nationalist-based theology of anti-Christian resentment. Between 1982 and 1984, moreover, *Commentary* published several articles tying the Holocaust to essential Christian teachings. One frequent *Commentary* contributor, Hyam Maccoby, presented the Holocaust as the fruit of 'the metaphysical hatred of Jews that is endemic in Christendom.' Christians qua Nazis killed Jews because of the New Testament's account of the crucifixion; that is, because of the 'Pauline misinterpretation influenced by Gnostic dualism of the Jewish story of the Fall.' Another *Commentary* contributor Henry Grynberg (in November 1982) asserts that Christians trivialize the Holocaust because they cannot accept the truth: 'The plain fact that the Holocaust was prepared and caused by Christian anti-Semites, that Christendom in effect made the Jews the chosen people for the Holocaust, was just too difficult to accept.'

One recent tendency in Jewish anti-Christian polemics is to father Arab anti-Jewish prejudice on Christian sources. Thus Bernard Lewis in *Semites and Anti-Semites* and in essays for *Commentary*, traces Arab dislikes for Jews and Judaism exclusively to the inroads of Christian attitudes in the Middle East. Despite the alleged absence of indigenous Moslem prejudice against Jews, Lewis believes Arabs became Jew-haters owing to their exposure to French Catholic and Russian Orthodox anti-Semitism since the mid-nineteenth century. Lewis, who on this point seems to have influenced Daniel Pipes, another *Commentary* contributor, goes so far as to ascribe Moslem theological diatribes against Jews to the presumed Christian ancestry of anti-Jewish Moslems.

Arab Moslems have indeed drawn on *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and on other anti-Jewish slanders that originated in Europe. Moreover, medieval Christian anti-Semitism was, on the whole, more brutal and persistent than its counterpart in Moslem societies. But surely a religious culture whose founder exterminated

Jewish communities (as Mohammed did) did not have to learn to hate Jews from chance contact with foreigners. It is also noteworthy that in recent centuries Moslem countries have imposed on Jews onerous disabilities, while Christian, particularly Protestant, countries have treated them with growing tolerance. Only in Christian countries have Jews been put on an equal legal and political footing with members of the majority religion. And the only Arab country to have treated Jews with any degree of toleration since the creation of the state of Israel has been Christian-dominated Lebanon.

Though Christian anti-Semitism is undoubtedly more scandalous than other forms, given Christianity's Jewish paternity, it is certainly not the only manifestation of that particular prejudice. As Guido Kisch shows in *The Jews in Medieval Germany*, many of the stock charges of medieval anti-Semites went back to Roman pagan sources. Contrary to a still prevalent view of the pagan world's tolerance, Romans were fiercely anti-Jewish, as reading Cicero, Juvenal, and Tacitus makes abundantly clear.

The attempt to blame the Holocaust on Christianity further demonstrates the dangers of half-truths. Christian anti-Semitism, particularly the Scripturally - *unfounded* charges of collective deicide against the Jews, may have eroded the resistance of particular Christian populations to Nazi anti-Semitism. Yet, the Nazis were themselves emphatically anti-Christian: Hitler stated openly his contempt of Christianity as a Jewish invention. Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich, an early opponent of the Nazis, told his parishioners that Teutonic Christians had been redeemed by 'Semitic blood'. What makes Faulhaber's assertion noteworthy is not simply his defiance of Hitler but his earlier avowal of medieval Catholic attitudes toward Christ-denying Jews. Maccoby's brief conveniently omits obvious variables in its blanket condemnation of the New Testament: for example, the Philosemitism of many Bible-reading Christians, such as Ukrainian Adventists who risked their lives protecting Jews from the Nazis; the inverse correlation between Christians who insisted on fidelity to Scripture and those who supported the Nazis; and the Nazis' repeated effort to replace biblical with Teutonic folkish religion.

More important for our discussion than the defects in Jewish anti-Christian polemics of the kind here discussed is what they indicate about those who accept and propagate them. Anyone who believes the charges they contain must live in a state of terror. A religious culture which some Jewish critics of Christianity find despicable - not simply one with which they have respectful differences - is being linked to the mass extermination of European Jewry. That such a culture must be rooted out as a precondition for Jewish survival goes without saying. A reading of *Commentary*, from cover to cover (not merely the essays on foreign policy and social questions), *Midstream*, and other Jewish intellectual publications, underscores the inevitability of this conclusion. Christian civilization has brought forth not only theological error but a continuing threat

to the very existence of Jews. Thus Maccoby scolds a theologian of the Holocaust, Emil Fackenheim, for explaining Christian anti-Semitism as the 'outcome of religious rivalry,' not as something integral to an ugly, polluting creed.

This fear and loathing of the Christian world may help explain the Jewish neoconservatives' efforts to reinvent the West. I emphasize 'help' since the discussion that follows is not intended as a total explanation of the worldview being treated, but as a clarification of a significant contributing cause.

Since the 1970s, and especially during the Reagan presidency, neoconservative journalists and policy-makers have attempted to speak for 'the West'. Their concept of the West has little to do with what historians have usually meant by the same term. Graeco-Roman, Hebrew-Christian, and Germanic components all went into the creation of the real Western civilization, though the proportion of its constituent elements differed, depending on the region, age, or group in which one found oneself. Evangelicals today, for example, make a fuss about the West's Hebrew and Christian heritage, while deprecating its pagan one. Yet, what Evangelicals cherish is recognizably Western, particularly when read in the King James Version. The confrontation of Athens and Jerusalem is a recurrent theme in Western theology and philosophy, and those involved in it, whether St. Jerome, Luther, or modern Evangelicals, affirm one part of the Western heritage to the exclusion of another.

What is peculiar to the neoconservative 'West' is its almost exclusively contemporary character: it arose in the twentieth century and found its fullest actualization in the present American society. It has no medieval or European components and its classical ones are merely vague references to Athenian democracy or to the roots of modern rationalism.

The Enlightenment is important for neoconservatives, but not as a total culture or critical period. They look to the Enlightenment (often through selective reading of sources) for those values and models they find most congenial and most convenient to identify as American: secular materialism, acquisitive individualism and attempts to combine these with public virtue. Like Marxists, neoconservatives view whatever precedes their ideal age - in this case the present minus a few warts - as 'prehistory,' the grim preparation for a later period of happiness. Ben Wattenberg describes the past as the 'bad old times.' Moreover, a neoconservative symposium, 'America since 1945,' in the October 1985 *Commentary* dramatizes the degree to which its participants celebrate the improved America of 1985 as against the racially and religiously bigoted America of 1945. The West that the *Commentary* circle exalts is coextensive with trade union democracy. Its devotees have a model but no historical past, save for figures such as Lincoln, Wilson, Churchill, Martin Luther King, Jr., Truman, and Bayard Rustin who are seen as foreshadowing its own anti-Communist, social-democratic politics.

It is this hastily improvised, fictitious concept that neoconservatives call 'the West.' They naturally rage against any attempt to dissociate 'the West' from their presentist notions. The extent to which at least some of them carry this *idée fixe* is evident from an essay and subsequent response to a question in the *American Spectator* by Chester Finn, an assistant secretary of education and a prominent neoconservative. In November 1986 Finn discussed how public education can contribute to instilling 'cultural conservatism' in American youth. The figure Finn would use to build a public patriotic cult is Martin Luther King, Jr. The fallen civil rights leader illustrated the practice of democracy, the paramount value that schools are intended to 'inculcate'. Finn insisted that humanities studies are to be structured around the teaching of democracy.

In February 1987 the social economist William Hawkins, Jr. in a letter to the *American Spectator*, asked if Western civilization is really reducible to contemporary democratic thinking. Hawkins observed that 'democratic ideology has its (historic) roots in leftist politics' and cannot form the substance of what Finn claimed he wanted to teach, namely cultural conservatism. Moreover, 'the greatest Western thinkers made their contributions without the "benefit" of a democratic culture.' Finn thereupon indignantly replied, 'Anyone who doesn't start with a deep and abiding affirmation for and belief in democracy has no standing, in my view, to participate in the conversations about "cultural conservatism" - or about much else.'

In reading Finn's rejoinder, it should be obvious that his view of public education is generally unrelated to any of the constituent elements of Western civilization. Certainly his prescriptions would have mystified mid-nineteenth century American educators - who believed that America was a constitutionally limited republic (not a democracy) with an explicitly Protestant culture. Like other Jewish neoconservatives, Finn has invented a civilization that he wishes to make coterminous with America and the West. The civilization he proposes to teach has no need for Bach, Dante, and Aeschylus since it originates in the second half of the twentieth century, among secular welfare-state democrats. Finn has no intention of keeping this improvisation to himself and his friends. He seeks public money and civil service intervention in order to *impose* his invented civilization on others. Other neoconservatives meanwhile demand that the rest of the world embrace the same improvised West. Wattenberg bemoans the fact that the 'Western' way of life, individual self-actualization, may soon be in danger of extinction. Wattenberg proposes national day care centres that will enable working and liberated couples to fulfill themselves professionally while adding to the population stock of the Western democracies.

The problem that should concern us is the growing neoconservative attempt to redefine the West. Neoconservatives have emptied that term of its historic meaning and given it one that reflects their own

alienation from pre-twentieth century (largely Christian) Western society.

There is of course a reason why the reinvented West has gained currency on the right. Like the left, self-described conservatives are ashamed of the past, or at least that part of it that cannot be shown to conform to contemporary ideals of political and social equality. In my opinion, Thurgood Marshall's remarks on the obscurantism of the Founding Fathers were a delightfully candid presentation of what most conservatives as well as liberals think about the American founding. The Constitution was the work of sexists and racists which in due course was used to establish a true democracy. The conservative responses to Marshall's disparagement of the Founders published in *National Review* and *Washington Times*, with only one exception, conceded his point, that the Constitution was the creation of a less enlightened generation than our own. Its saving merit was that it turned out to be 'pregnant' with a more democratic future.

Dr Finn and other proponents of curricular reforms now being proposed by Secretary Bennett could respond that they are indeed willing to teach great literature in the classroom - e.g., *The Divine Comedy* and *Hamlet* - though such literature was not produced by democrats. But I remain suspicious of the announced attempt by Finn to fit humanistic education under the rubric of American democracy taken (I assume) in its current form. To whatever extent the pre-modern West will be tolerated in the classroom, it will be a transitional stage to welfare state democracy. As a historian I

believe the past should be appreciated in its own terms; as a member of Western civilization, moreover, I resent the implication that the world was lying in darkness save for a few souls ahead of their times, until the most recent phase of American political development.

To abandon this reinvented West, one collapsed into the most recent present, need not be an act of intolerance. It does not sanction a return to the shameful anti-Semitism that marred Jewish-Christian relations in the past. This point should be made to American Jews, without the customary grovelling, and Christian traditionalists should give proper and justified emphasis to the Judaic heritage of the Christian world. At Seton Hall University, a devout Catholic philosophy professor, Robert Herrera, discusses Maimonides and other Jewish theologians in symposia and programmes devoted to medieval Christian culture. Herrera follows this course not as an act of cultural condescension, but because he correctly understands that Jews and Judaism belong to *his* civilization. It may be equally proper for American Jews to adopt a similar attitude toward the Christian world. Jacob Neusner notes that Rabbinic Judaism treats the Christian Church as Esau, but not an idolatrous nation. By comparing Christians to Jacob's menacing brother, the Rabbis recognized a fraternal if not happy relationship between themselves and the Christian community. In an age when Christians extend their hands in friendship, Jews should build on this fraternal relationship - rather than retreat into sectarian bitterness or into a reinvented Western civilization.

THE CHURCH IN DANGER

The Church in Danger Charity was set up this year by a small group of MPs and peers with the object of 'promoting the Christian faith *in accordance with the traditions and teachings of the Church of England within the United Kingdom*'. In their manifesto they draw attention to the dangers facing the Church of England: the decline in church attendance and the number of communicants; the loss of the common reference point for belief and order once provided by the Book of Common Prayer; the loss of pride and confidence in church tradition; the influence of secular fashions on church morality; the excessive growth and bureaucratisation of Synodical government; the amendment of Bible teachings to fit 'relevant cultural demands'; the indifference and scorn within the church for its duty to the nation under the Establishment; and many more.

The key point in all this is the ascendancy within the Church of England of what the poet

C. H. Sisson called, in his satirical poem *On The Prayer Book*, the 'Empty figures of silken Why and How'.

Our concern is that the role of 'intellectual arguments' has been excessive, that a concept of the Church has prevailed in which it is over-intellectualised, seen as a body of propositions to be ever adjusted in the light of apparent new wisdom, that wisdom itself not part of tradition but a secular, rationalist discipline ... The *wisdom* of the Church is something much more than modern argumentative sophistry.

The Church of England 'is what it has become over history: it is not the property of any one age or clique (even if elected) to change according to current secular fashion'.

A copy of the Church in Danger Manifesto is available from the charity's Director, Rodney Bennet-England at PO Box 132, East Rudham, Norfolk.

United Nations Fund for International Terrorism (UNFIT)

Roger Watson

The latter half of the second millenium has been remarkable for the deification of moral relativism. Alongside this there has been an unprecedented increase in technological innovation and communications and the growth of supra-governmental organisations such as the United Nations (UN). The spin-offs from each of these phenomena are legion but there is one unique consequence which has firm roots in all three, and that is the growth of international terrorism.

In the words of Paul Johnson 'international terrorism should have been the primary concern of the United Nations. But by the 1970's, the UN was a corrupt and demoralised body, and its ill-conceived interventions were more inclined to promote violence than to prevent it.'¹ This situation has been of great service to the forces of subversion and revolution.

If the United States of America (USA) can be taken as representing the forces of anti-communism at the UN then, based on a detailed survey of the 155 countries currently represented at the UN,² only 13% vote with the USA on more than half of the votes taken. Also, 45% of the countries, by their voting patterns, can be classed as avowedly pro-communist since only 16% or less of their votes coincide with those of the USA. It is interesting to note these patterns bearing in mind the fact that substantial aid in US dollars goes to 68% of the countries represented at the UN.

It can be fairly said that pro-Soviet aims and objectives, pursued through international terrorism - which is one of the principal weapons in the fight against freedom - are adequately represented at the UN. This point is borne out by the acceptance of the credentials of Yassir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organisation at the UN and the presentation of a medal, in recognition of his work for peace, to Arafat by the World Federation of United Nations Associations.³

While direct Soviet funding of terrorism has been established⁴ and the interlinking of all major terrorist organisations is widely accepted⁵ it is also possible to demonstrate that the interests of the Soviet Union are uniquely and substantially served through indirect funding of terrorism, via UN agencies, by Western democracies. There follows a case study of how one of these agencies facilitates a convergence of Soviet aims and objectives with one of the UN obsessions, namely that of 'organising the destruction of South Africa'.⁶

A considerable amount of UN rhetoric regarding South Africa is translated into chilling reality via the work of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

This body is a specialised agency of the UN, the existence of which pre-dates the UN since it was set up in 1919 alongside the short-lived League of Nations, both being products of the ill-fated Treaty of Versailles.⁷ The ILO survived, however, and now claims to exist primarily to 'increase employment, raise living standards, share the fruits of progress more equitably, safeguard the health of workers and to promote co-operation between governments, employers and workers (tripartism) in order to improve production and working conditions.'⁸

The lofty principles of the ILO, however, are grounded at the first hurdle, the national composition of the ILO almost exactly mirroring that of the UN, with a few exceptions.⁹ While the concept of tripartism can flourish in the Western democracies where governments, workers and employers are free to represent different interest, in the communist countries, which wield a great deal of power in the ILO, this is a travesty. It is not possible, for example, for employers and trade unions in the Soviet Union to represent interests different from the government since all these are, ultimately, controlled by the Communist Party. As Joseph Godson said 'The communist view, as enunciated by Lenin and his successors, of the natures of trade unions and their relation to the state changes radically once a communist regime comes to power. Prior to take-over, communists inside the trade union movement strive unceasingly and by all means available to generate hostility towards the capitalist state. Once in power, with the state now supposedly on the side of the workers, the relationship is totally changed. This apparently signifies the trade unions almost total surrender of their position as independent institutions to promote and defend the workers interests and welfare.'¹⁰ How this works in practice was described by Hamish Fraser who wrote 'Now the anatomy of the communist party and the army is paralleled in industry where, instead of a military command you have the management and analagous to the political commisar is the trade union movement which no longer seeks to defend the workers but is designed as a transmission belt in the service of the ruling party, checking up on both managers and workers.'¹¹

An abundance of exquisite rhetoric pours forth from the ILO annually, but no agency should be judged by its rhetoric, rather than its actions. Viewed logically, on this basis, it is very difficult to see what the ILO actually achieves. The Western democracies could teach most of the ILO participants a great deal about labour

standards, pay and conditions. On the other hand, in the communist countries, where basic human rights are denied as a matter of course, the ILO can achieve little or nothing since it cannot hope to implement its standards or make adequate checks.

An absurd situation exists, therefore, whereby Western democracies contribute substantial amounts of money to the ILO—money which could be better spent in their own countries in the furtherance of better labour relations. The poorest underdeveloped nations pay very little towards the ILO and, judging from their persistent poverty, unemployment and debt, receive very little in return. The Soviet Union is also a substantial contributor to the ILO, but for standards which it has no intention of implementing.

Naturally, the above leads one to question what it is that the ILO actually does. The answer, at least in part, comes from an examination of the financial affairs of the ILO, as revealed in the annual reports of the Director-General and the annual programmes and budgets. While it is deficient in its proclaimed aims, it appears that the ILO is an effective agency for financing the work of international terrorist groups, particularly in South Africa.

While the Republic of South Africa is not officially represented at the ILO, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) are, and attend in their capacity as Liberation Movements.¹² The profile of the African liberation movements is sufficiently and favourably heightened by the Western free press and since 'sophisticated leaders of terrorist groups know that getting their message across is as important as any of their other activities'¹³ it is not immediately obvious why these groups should be so enthusiastic about the ILO. It is one of the least publicised agencies of the UN. For instance, in the United Kingdom, apart from passing reference in Trades Union Congress documents, the only other organisation which gives coverage to the ILO in its publications is Moral Re-Armament (MRA) with regular reports in its industrial newspaper^{14,15} and, more recently, a highly favourable profile of the ILO Director-General Francis Blanchard in its flagship publication.¹⁶ There is a more concrete reason for the presence of African liberation movements at the ILO and that is funding, which comes in abundance from the UN and from other sources, through the ILO. In fact, funding of the PAC and the ANC by the UN, where these organisations have equal status, is much to the annoyance of the ANC, since it believes that 50 per cent of the aid channelled 'to the liberation movements as a whole is being put to no good use.'¹⁷

A recurrent theme of ILO publications is the situation in South Africa; the 1988 report on Apartheid 'is the 24th Special Report on the subject to be presented by the Director-General since 1964.'¹⁸ A Declaration concerning the Policy of Apartheid in South Africa was adopted by the ILO in 1981.¹⁸ The current Director-General, Francis Blanchard, plays a leading role in highlighting the Apartheid situation within the ILO.

Replying to the discussion of his report to the ILO in 1987 he said that all 'can and should play their part in the struggle against this odious policy of racial discrimination'¹⁹ and proposed 'that the 1981 declaration concerning the policy of Apartheid in South Africa should be updated, that is to say, strengthened as from next year.'¹⁹ For these statements and others he was congratulated by a Soviet government delegate to the ILO, who spoke of 'the fight to eradicate apartheid, the most monstrous anachronism.'²⁰

The ILO proposals to counter apartheid are highly unimaginative. Comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions are called for, in addition to severing of sporting and cultural links.²¹ UN resolution 435 for the independence of Namibia is cited and supported and one of the specific actions of the ILO which is called for is a 'programme of vocation and management training and to encourage small business development programmes for apartheid victims.'²¹ Disinvestment is advocated by the ILO with a full recognition of the potentially damaging consequences. The question has also been raised 'whether the flight of foreign capital, which started as a trickle, will gather sufficient momentum to force Pretoria to abandon apartheid.'²² Every negative aspect of South Africa is expounded upon and no recognition is given to the significant steps which have been taken to achieve a peaceful settlement to the issue of race relations by the South African Government.²³

The most recent special report of the Director-General on apartheid shows a typically unbalanced view of the situation. The report is based on the false premise that it is South Africa which continues 'to threaten and undermine the stability of neighbouring countries in Southern Africa, aggravating the already grave economic and social problems.'²⁴ Paradoxically, the solution proposed by the ILO is to undermine the South African economy; thus 'It is increasingly felt that only concerted and targeted international pressure on the government's area of greatest vulnerability can bring about a reversal of that policy by peaceful means.'²⁵ This is proposed despite the Director-General's own admission that 'Disinvestment has led to reduced social, educational and job training expenditure by companies.'²⁶

The report gives great credibility to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) saying the 'COSATU was not a socialist organisation, although it was now beginning to see internal discussion around the issue of socialism.'²⁷ The politicisation of the trade union movement is seen as being a result of 'the state of emergency, censorship, the occupation of the townships by the military and the continuing oppression.'²⁸ At the same time the report denies that communism has anything whatever to do with the current situation. The politicisation of COSATU is no accident and, as John Pampalas of the ANC explained in 1986, 'COSATU is legal but SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions—Communist) continues to work underground as there is a limit to what a legal trade

union body can do in South Africa.²⁹ The ILO report ridicules that idea that COSATU activities are 'communist inspired and co-ordinated with the South African Communist Party, the ANC and the United Democratic Front.'³⁰ In fact, the ILO has recently been 'Reinforcing the co-operation between the ILO and COSATU'³¹ while concomitantly welcoming the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), a recognised 'Soviet Sponsored Liberation Movement,'³² into the fold.³¹

In the same vein the report does not miss any opportunity to refer to 'extreme right wing white elements'^{33,34,35} and to cast aspersions about Inkatha, describing it as intimidating and violent.^{36,37} This is a standard ANC/Communist line²⁹ since Inkatha tries to resist the tyranny of the ANC and find constructive solutions to the racial problems in South Africa.

Perhaps the most revealing statement in the Director-General's report is that there is 'no reason to expect that Blacks will be able to bring about a peaceful political transition through any influence they may exert within the economy.'³⁸ The Director-General's report does, however, explain that a peaceful solution may be brought about by external action which is, of course, an open invitation to the subversive terrorist forces. Furthermore, they are having a field day and at the expense of the ILO.

Before examining how the ILO finances terrorism in South Africa it is worth dwelling upon the manifest hypocrisy displayed by many member countries in their stance regarding apartheid. Pages of platitudes occupy the section of the Director-General's report on action taken against apartheid³⁹ whereby many countries outline their policies on trade, cultural, sporting and diplomatic links with South Africa. This hypocrisy is exemplified by Israel which 'unequivocally condemns South Africa's policy of apartheid',⁴⁰ saying that it will (effective from March 1987) 'refrain from new undertakings between Israel and South Africa in the realm of defence.' It is, however, known, and this was reported in November 1987, that Israel and South Africa are, together, developing some of the world's most sophisticated electronically controlled weaponry.⁴¹ However, progressing to a subsection on national liberation movements,⁴¹ some of the platitudes begin to take substance in the shape of the 43 countries which claim to give, at least, 'moral and material' aid to the national liberation movements. Among the leading contributors are Australia (A\$ 5 million over 5 years);⁴³ Canada (C\$8.4 million in 1987);⁴⁴ Switzerland (SFr 2 million in 1987)⁴⁵ and the USA (US\$ 20 million in 1987).⁴⁶ The USSR is in good company giving 65 million roubles in 1986-87.⁴⁶ It is worth noting that none of the above funding is channelled through the ILO.

Turning the spotlight on to the specific activities of the ILO, in relation to South Africa, it is possible to see how sloganising in the safety of the Palais des Nations in Geneva is translated into slaughter in Southern Africa through terrorist violence. The mechanism lies

in what the ILO describes as 'technical cooperation', which 'mobilises an annual budget of over US\$ 100 million and constitutes one of the ILO's principal means of action in the world'.⁴⁷ Discussing 'promotion of equality' the Director-General has spoken of 'financial and technical assistance to the victims of apartheid in the Southern African region'.⁴⁸ More specifically, technical cooperation, according to the Director-General, has included 'the strengthening of the planning and administrative capacities of the national liberation movements'.⁴⁹ These include, as already mentioned, the ANC, PAC and SWAPO. In considering the Draft Programme and Budget for 1988-89 the Financial and Administrative Committee of the governing body of the ILO raised a concern about 'providing for general coordination of ILO assistance to the liberation movements recognised by the OAU'⁵⁰ which was 'the scarcity of resources allocated to this sub-programme'.⁵¹ They asked if the Director-General could 'find ways of increasing resources to this important area, possibly from savings elsewhere'.⁵⁰ In reply, Francis Blanchard said that ILO assistance to 'national liberation movements recognised by the OAU will be increased, largely by means of technical cooperation activities'.⁵¹ The Director-General's Programme and Budget proposals for 1988-89 specify that the sub-programme of promotion of equality is aimed at 'the elimination of the policy of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa and Namibia'.⁵² The proposals mention another factor in funding called 'extra-budgetary resources' which will be drawn upon to publicise the apartheid situation through the UN Centre Against Apartheid.⁵³ Regional offices of the ILO, for instance those in Dar as Salaam and Lusaka, will continue their 'activities in support of the national liberation movements in Southern Africa'.⁵⁴ Assistance through 'training' will include 'persons associated with national liberation movements'.⁵⁴ Still outside of the ILO's own budget, it is specified that 'of the total resources for technical cooperation activities under extra-budgetary sources, it is expected that about US\$ 89.8 million will be available for Africa'.⁵⁵ The total volume of technical cooperation financed from extra-budgetary sources in 1988-89 will be around US\$ 172 million.⁵⁶

Concentrating on the ILO budget it is hard to say exactly how much money goes to the terrorist organisations and under precisely what cover it is given; but it is clear that an increasingly large slice of the technical cooperation budget is going to Africa. It has been increased steadily, from 40 per cent in 1977 to 51 per cent in 1986.⁵⁷

From a total ILO budget for 1988-89 of US\$ 342 million, over US\$ 21 million has been allocated to Africa for 'regional service activities'.⁵⁸ Part of this money will be spent on technical cooperation and over US\$ 4 million has been allocated for unspecified 'field programmes'⁵⁹ such as human rights and training, which are obvious channels to the national liberation movements. In the field of human rights apartheid has been described as 'The most persistent and profound

challenge to ILO principles',⁶⁰ in a specialised report which continues to specify how money is spent on human rights. It is spent, for example on 'collaboration with other organisations within the United Nations system'⁶¹ including 'national liberation movements recognised by the Organisation of African Unity'.⁶¹

Looked at from another angle, in 1986 US\$ 54 million went to Africa under the heading of technical co-operation; but only US\$ 45 million was accounted for in the Director-General's Annual report for 1986. There appears to be a ceiling of US\$ 150 thousand below which projects do not have to be described in detail. There were 12 such projects in existence in 1985 which purported to assist the national liberation movements through technical cooperation.⁶² Presumably these projects have been continued, since the most recent Annual Report of the Director-General mentions 'Several technical co-operation projects and other forms of assistance to national liberation movements.'⁶³ In a characteristically vague manner these projects are described as being 'financed from the ILO's regular budget and external sources.'⁶³ With the above conditions applying this could account for up to US\$ 1 million going towards terrorism. This is of more than passing interest since the United Kingdom's contribution towards the technical cooperation budget of the ILO in 1988-89 will be about US\$ 1 million.⁶⁴

Of the countries giving more than 2 per cent towards the financing of the annual ILO budget the USSR gives 10 per cent, which is hardly surprising in view of the ultimate use of some of the money. However, nearly

60 per cent of the ILO budget is financed by Western style democracies which vote in a consistently anti-communist manner at the UN. These countries are the USA, Japan, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Canada. The remaining budget, only 30 per cent of the total, is paid for in negligible contributions by over 100 'underdeveloped' countries. The situation is, simply, as follows: developed Western nations are paying substantially towards the financing of international terrorism which will, if financed on a sufficiently large scale, undermine the very foundations of freedom.

For anyone in any doubt about the communist nature of the African Liberation movements one can hardly do better than reflect on the words of the current ANC President, Oliver Tambo, who is viewed by too many as a 'decent chap.' He wrote in the *World Marxist Review* that the ANC plans 'for the seizure of power in South Africa by the oppressed masses; to take our country through the terrible but cleansing fires of revolutionary war.'⁶⁵ In *The African Communist* he said 'The relationship (of the ANC) with the South African Communist Party is not an accident of history - the South African Communist Party has been an integral part of the struggle of the African people ... Ours is not merely a paper alliance ... it is a living organism that has grown out of the struggle.'⁶⁶

The ultimate question for the leadership of the Western democracies, however, is not 'how much money are we giving?' but, 'How much terrorism can we tolerate?'

Notes

1. Johnson, P. (1983) *A History of the Modern World*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, p. 689.
2. *The New American*, 4 January 1988.
3. Mercer, P. (1986) *Peace of The Dead*, Policy Research Publications, London, p. 92.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
5. Johnson *op cit.*, p. 688.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 690.
7. *The ILO and the World of Work* (1984), ILO, Geneva, p. 7.
8. *The World Employment Programme* (1984), ILO, Geneva, P. 2.
9. *Draft Programme and Budget 1988-89 and Other Financial Questions* (1987), ILO, Geneva, Appendix, P. 3.
10. Godson, J. (1984), in *The Soviet Worker* (Schapiro, L & Godson, J eds), 2nd Edition, Macmillan, London, p. 108.
11. Fraser, H. (1987), in *The Voice of Christian Affirmation*, (Smith, A ed) Christian Heritage Publications, Worthing, p. 46.
12. Supplement to the *Provisional Record of the International Labour Conference*, 1986, ILO, Geneva, p. 182.
13. *The Economist*, 6th February 1988, p. 46.
14. *The Industrial Pioneer*, November 1985.
15. *The Industrial Pioneer*, August-September 1986.
16. *For a Change*, June 1988, pp. 8-9.
17. *The Guardian*, 5 December 1987, p. 21.
18. *Apartheid in South Africa* (1988), ILO, Geneva, p. 1.
19. *ILC Provisional Record 32*, 23 June 1987, ILO, Geneva, P. 10.

20. *Ibid.*, p 22.
21. *ILO Information*, August 1987, ILO, Geneva supplement.
22. *ILO Information*, December 1987, ILO, Geneva supplement.
23. *South Africa Profile* available from South Africa Consulate-General, Stock Exchange House, Glasgow, G2 1BX.
24. *Apartheid in South Africa, op cit.*, p. 3.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
29. *Conway Halls*, 15 March 1986.
30. *Apartheid in South Africa, op cit.*, p. 43.
31. *ILO Information*, August 1988, ILO, Geneva, supplement.
32. *The Book of The World* (1976), Wyndham, London, p. 228.
33. *Apartheid in South Africa, op cit.*, p. 13.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 95-177.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 111.
41. *Foreign Report* (published by the Economist), 26 November 1987, pp. 5-6.
42. *Apartheid in South Africa*, pp. 122-130.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
47. *ILO Press Release 13-87*, Geneva, 30 April 1987.
48. *Report of the Director General*, 1986 (1987), ILO, Geneva, p. 7.
49. *The Role of the ILO in technical co-operation*, (1987), ILO, Geneva, p. 29.
50. *Draft Programme, op cit.*, p. 35.
51. *Programme and Budget, 1988-89* (1987), p. 24.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 55/3.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 55/4.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 250/7.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 250/12.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
57. *Report of the Director General, op cit.*, p. 1 and *The Role of the ILO in Technical Cooperation, op cit.*, p. 32.
58. *Draft Programme, op cit.*, p. 4.
59. *Programme and Budget, op cit.*, p. XV.
60. *Human Rights - A Common Responsibility*, (1988), ILO, Geneva, p. 21.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
62. *The Role of the ILO in Technical Cooperation, op cit.*, p. 34.
63. *Report of the Director-General*, 1987 (1988), ILO, Geneva, p. 7.
64. *Draft Programme, op cit.*, Appendix p. 5.
65. Campbell, K. (1980) *ANC: A Soviet Task Force?* Institute for the Study of Terrorism, London, p. 5.
66. *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1987, p. 74.



EUROPEAN FREEDOM REVIEW

A radical new forum for the discussion of British and European foreign policy options. The European Freedom Review is a quarterly high quality journal being distributed in London and throughout Europe.

The first issue includes:

Mangosuthu Buthelezi sets a new agenda for foreign involvement in a post-apartheid democratic South Africa.

Dr Myles Harris draws upon his experiences as a relief worker in Ethiopia to illustrate the way European aid is misused by the Mengistu regime.

Brian Crozier examines the way in which the Soviet Union is increasingly furthering its true foreign policy goals using surrogate methods.

George Miller places present resistance in the Soviet Union in the useful context of historical opposition to communism.

Write today for a complimentary copy:

International Freedom Foundation, 10 Storey's Gate, Westminster, London, SW1P 3AY

Tradition and Freedom: Austrian Conservatism from Eötvös to Musil

J. C. Nyíri

During the last two centuries of its history Austria has been exposed to almost every major current of modern European thought - English, French and German Enlightenment, to German transcendental philosophy and German Romanticism, and to the various forms of utilitarianism and positivism. However, as is repeatedly pointed out in studies dealing with Austrian intellectual history, on Austrian soil each of these currents has undergone a characteristic transformation. Each took on a characteristically *conservative* perspective, a perspective which the relevant studies more or less regard as *the* basic aspect of the Austrian outlook. Thus William M. Johnston in his *The Austrian Mind*¹ speaks of a permanent nostalgia for organic, *gemeinschaftliche* forms, and locates in the continued existence of certain feudalistic elements the historical and social background of this nostalgia. Carl E. Schorske², too, emphasizes the conservative mood of the Viennese intellect at the turn of the century, the loss of confidence in human rationality, and points, by way of explanation, to the almost *inevitable* political defeat of liberalism in a multinational empire. In like manner Ernst Fischer, in his analyses of Grillparzer and 1848, was of the opinion that it had been precisely in view of the multinational character of the Habsburg Empire that the German-Austrians opposed all revolutionary changes.³ And already Robert A. Kann singled out, in his *Austrian Intellectual History*⁴, published in 1960, the peculiar geo-political and ethnic situation of the Habsburg Monarchy as *one* source of that specific Austrian cultural tradition the *second* essential source of which he discovered in the Catholic heritage, and which tradition he of course characterized as overwhelmingly conservative. Still earlier, Allmayer-Beck wrote of the 'ausgesprochen konservativer Zug im österreichischen Temperament', the roots of which he, too, saw in national heterogeneity on the one hand, and in the historical individuality of the particular Austrian lands on the other.⁵

Perhaps these views can be moved into a broader perspective. It is a truism that Enlightenment and liberalism are linked to the development of a middle class. Conservatism, on the other hand, seems somehow to be bound up with the *disturbances* of that development - with its all too rapid, or much too slow pace; constituting a reaction to it, or an apology for its absence. Clearly, then, Austria - both in the broader sense, encompassing Bohemia and Hungary, and in the narrower sense, as *Deutschösterreich* - had to have a special position with respect to conservatism. After all, Austria belonged to two different world-

historical domains at one and the same time: to the western, *and* to the eastern half of Europe; to the domain of that relatively undisturbed, continuous development, where particular privileges, rights, freedoms gradually merged into a body of unified, homogeneous civil liberties - *and* to the domain where processes of middle-class development were, at best, retarded and incomplete. The dividing line of the two domains was roughly identical with the border between German Austria on the one hand and Bohemia and Hungary on the other; but even *within* German Austria that dividing line made itself felt. Not just a vivid consciousness of national plurality and regional self-containment, tempered by Catholic discipline, but also a *diversified attitude* to middle-class development as such, a certain *distance* to middle-class ideals, seems to form, then, the background of Austrian conservatism, and to give rise, at the same time, to its politically moderate, and philosophically intriguing, nature. Austrian views on freedom, authority, tradition and reason were more balanced, anthropologically and epistemologically more adequate, than, say, those in France, where the development of the middle class became a matter of course, occasioning philosophical illusions, and giving rise, by way of reaction, to an in fact *reactionary* conservatism; or those in Northern and Eastern Germany, where freedom was, so to speak, decreed by authoritarian fiat, a development leading, understandably, to uncritical beliefs about the power of *pure reason*; or those in Russia, where any experience of civil liberties was absent, and where conservatism, by implication, was narrow-minded and high-handed, while the opposition against it could not be but extremist and nihilistic. As far as the historical possibilities of an interesting conservative theory go, of a theory not rejecting middle-class development in its entirety, Austria is rather similar to *England* - a phenomenon not only a number of Austrian authors sensed but even Lord Acton alluded to, in his celebrated essay on nationality.⁶ In Austria, too, just as in England, conservatism developed a markedly philosophical dimension. And it is to this dimension that my present talk is primarily directed. Conservatism interests me here not as a political creed, but as an over-all image of man, as philosophical anthropology, and in particular as epistemology. The analytic questions at the background of the brief historical sketch I am about to present are: What does it mean to view man as a creature bound by traditions? What is the relation of reason to tradition, of subjective thought to intersubjective language, of individual creativity to

handed-down rules, of aesthetic judgment to training and habit?

The conservative image of man can be usefully characterized by contrasting it with the enlightened-liberal view. The latter - to summarize some of its familiar tenets - will take *individual reason* to be the ultimate standard of truth and falsity, of good and evil; will regard, by implication, the freedom of thought, and the freedom to live according to one's own values, as original rights of man; and will strive, in particular, to organize society exclusively along the lines dictated by rational principles. Its political ideal is representative government, its pedagogical ideal is permissive education aiming at a free development of individual talents; its economic ideal is free enterprise, subject however, if necessary, to restrictions in the name of an over-all rationality - of a central will, expressing the sovereignty of the people. By contrast, the conservative view accepts the epistemic and moral authority of the given, of the handed-down; indeed it regards the idea of individual judgment not based on prejudice as absurd, and the idea of a reconstruction of society according to abstract ideals as a dangerous delusion. Its politics are authoritarian; in the domain of economics, however, it does not necessarily reject free enterprise, since the *regulation* of the economy often strikes the conservative sentiment as artificial and rationalistic; it tends therefore, to argue for healthy, natural, i.e. *spontaneous*, economic processes.

Five successive, widely interconnected generations have brought Austrian conservative anthropology to theoretical maturity - 'Austrian' here used in the broad sense, i.e. encompassing Bohemian and Hungarian elements as well. Personages reaching manhood in the 1780s and 1790s formed the first generation: the Redemptorist Klemens Maria Hofbauer, leading figure of the Catholic re-awakening in Vienna at the beginning of the 19th century; and the members of Hofbauer's circle, in particular the politically very influential Count Ferenc Széchenyi, founder of the Hungarian National Museum, author of an unpublished but symptomatic essay 'Vom Zeitgeist'⁷, and the elective Austrians, philosophers of classic stature, Friedrich Schlegel and Adam Müller. Friedrich Gentz, too, Metternich's confidant, the German translator of Burke, belonged to this generation. The two main representatives of the second generation are Franz Grillparzer, born in 1791, and, born a year later, Count István Széchenyi, son of Ferenc Széchenyi. No one has done so much to introduce liberal reforms into *Vormärz* Hungary as the young Count - and no one held such a profoundly conservative view of man at the same time. Between the 40s and the 60s the members of the third generation were active: the Styrian politician Moritz von Kaiserfeld; Viktor von Andrian-Werburg, author of the book *Österreich und seine Zukunft*; and the Hungarians Aurél and Emil Dessewffy, as well as Zsigmond Kemény and József Eötvös. To Eötvös, who had a considerable theoretical influence even in Austria, we will shortly return. The fourth generation

includes, in Hungary, János Asbóth, and, in the other half of the Monarchy, the economist Carl Menger, the German liberal party leader Ernst von Plener, the philosopher Thomas Masaryk - who later of course became a champion of democracy - and finally, but most importantly: Sigmund Freud. Members of the fifth generation are Robert Musil, born in 1880, the Hungarian historian Gyula Szekfü, born in 1883, Ludwig Wittgenstein, born in 1889, and his second cousin once removed, Friedrich August von Hayek.

I had occasion elsewhere - most recently in my book *Am Rande Europas*⁸ - to fill in the details of the above sketch. I have tried, in particular, to draw attention to the significance of Hayek's position in the line of development here recorded. This time I would like to single out two figures whose work seems to be especially pertinent to the leading themes of conservative thinking: Eötvös on the one hand, and Musil on the other.

The novelist, politician, and political theorist Eötvös is of course constantly referred to in Hungary; but he could hardly be said to have a living influence. In a way this is strange, since his central ideas, those of pluralism and of local self-government, have recurrently formed, and today once more form, part of the Hungarian dream.⁹ It is the tension between the directly liberal and the directly conservative elements in his thinking - a fruitful tension, to be sure, but still a tension - which, I maintain, is mainly responsible for this lack of influence.

Nor is Eötvös's reception abroad a straightforward affair. A relatively recent monograph on his work is Paul Bödy's 'Joseph Eötvös and the Modernization of Hungary'¹⁰. Earlier Gerald Stourzh published a perceptive essay under the title 'Die politischen Ideen Joseph von Eötvös' und das österreichische Staatsproblem'¹¹, and in their works on Austrian political history both Robert Kann and Josef Redlich have written at some length on Eötvös¹². It is his views concerning the nationalities question and the reconstruction of the Monarchy after 1848 that mainly interests these authors. But they certainly do acknowledge the importance of Eötvös's general political theory as formulated in his principal work *The Influence of the Ruling Ideas of the 19th Century on the State*¹³. This work, Stourzh writes, 'presents one of the most significant and original achievements of the European liberal theory of the state - if at the same time one which is today forgotten'. Redlich describes Eötvös as a man who, even by Western European standards, 'was able to combine the highest political and literary scholarship of his age with a deeply rooted Magyar patriotism in the single, wholly original and creative personality of a modern political thinker and statesman'. The *Ruling Ideas* made its author 'one of the most respected proponents of European liberalism at its height, and even today it is still to be described as one of the most singular and intellectually richest writings on the modern state'. Bödy characterizes the book as an attempt to explain 'why the Western

European revolutions had failed in their quest to establish individual liberty in modern society'.

Eötvös locates the sources of the European tradition of freedom first of all in the English liberal (as contrasted with the French democratic) tradition - but then ultimately in Christianity. His treatise begins with an explanation of the failure of liberal idealism in 1848. Liberty, equality and nationality he sees as the three 'ruling ideas' on which the revolutions of that year has been based. And they had failed, roughly speaking, because of a contradiction between two interpretations of these political ideas - loosely: the French, and the English. The French interpretation rests on the notion of an absolute sovereignty of the people: equality therefore signifies an equal entitlement to participate in the exercise of sovereignty. The English interpretation sees the possibility of a plurality of sovereign powers - King, parliament, the courts, cabinet, even the church and private associations - each limited by the others in such a way that there is no absolute power within the state and in such a way that the rights of individuals are clearly guaranteed.

There are important affinities between Eötvös on the one hand, and Guizot and Tocqueville on the other. He was greatly influenced by both of them, and after the publication of the *Ruling Ideas* briefly corresponded with the latter. Bödy cites a letter from Tocqueville to Eötvös in which the former expresses his reaction to the *Ruling Ideas*, which he read in the German version through the mediation of Montalembert, the noted French liberal Catholic publicist who also corresponded with Eötvös. Bödy specifically refers to the impact Western European liberal Catholics had on 'Eötvös's distinction between the spiritual and temporal power as a guarantee of civil liberties in the liberal state', and rightly points out that Lord Acton held a position strikingly parallel to that of Eötvös, though no direct contact between them can be established. What Bödy does not emphasize, however, is that these affinities would today be classified as conservative rather than liberal; indeed he seems to ignore all the more directly conservative trends in Eötvös's thought. Thus even at the level of methodological foundations, Eötvös displays a characteristically conservative aversion to abstract theorizing - to philosophy in the sense of vacuous speculation. Pre-conceived ideas, he suggests in the first draft of *The Ruling Ideas*, cannot serve as a basis for sound political action: 'Man can derive pleasure from absolute theories and his poetic inclinations can never be satisfied more than when confronted by poetic ideals under the cover of philosophy.'¹⁵ It will then turn out that the striving for, say, absolute freedom, exists only in philosophical speculation - and in the minds of those who, as Eötvös says, belong in a mental asylum.¹⁸ Society cannot be changed in accordance with abstract ideals.

A society in which - in order to set it up anew in a preconceived form - all the mortar holding together the individual parts has been dissolved

away, in which everything that had seemed too large has been diminished and everything that had seemed too firm and not amenable to every realignment has been broken into pieces, can just as little achieve durability through its form alone, as a heap of gravel - whether heaped up like ninepins or as a pyramid - can withstand the storms and the rains.¹⁷

It is clear, further, that liberal and conservative elements coalesce in Eötvös's main idea, that of regionalism or territorial self-government. Not only individual liberty but also historical continuity are threatened by centralized government. A system of territorial pluralism, of municipalities, on the other hand, will defend the freedom of minorities (and ultimately those of the individual) against centralist absolutism. The 'autonomous township', as Bödy puts it, will replace the lost communal relationships of the feudal system and provide for a sense of community in the modern state. So, too, social and institutional pluralism will defend the organic continuity of historically given institutions against radical-utopian alterations, whether brought about by the central government itself, or by a radical movement against which such a government is, in the long run, defenceless.

There are many who believe that that which exists can only be preserved through the influence of a powerful central political force, and the fact that the system of centralization finds so many defenders amongst statesmen is for the greater part attributable to this belief. Yet it is a point of view which rests on an error. That which exists cannot be protected against changes by the state; it is much rather the immutability of a host of other relationships through which the state itself must be protected against upheavals. Every comfortably appointed house which a citizen erects on the territory of the state is not only a channel through which a whole series of citizens will step up to superior habits. It is at the same time a protective bastion for civil society. Every right whose possession is guaranteed to the individual by the state is a guarantee of civil society. And every securely organized municipality is a stone by means of which the larger structure will be secured. The better one understands how to insert these stones into the building, the more will one understand how to use the particular as an essential part of the whole, the more unshakable will stand the state.¹⁸

Of the various elements whose autonomy and permanence - according to Eötvös - specifically guarantee the organic continuity of the whole, two - the municipalities and an independent church - have already been mentioned. The third element singled out by Eötvös is an Upper House, for which both the English House of Lords, its members naturally linked

to the history of the state by birth and family traditions, and the American Senate, whose natural task is to defend, as a historic right, the autonomy of the individual states, might serve as models: 'The task of the Upper House in the constitutional states is . . . none other than that of defending the right of history in the rough-and-tumble of real and imagined needs of the moment.'¹⁹

Finally, Eötvös mentions the different nationalities of a multinational state or federation. Indeed, his critique of the national idea - as something whose effects may be destructive - very marked in Part I of *The Ruling Ideas*, is almost totally withdrawn in Part II.

Since the principle of self-government is nothing other than the application of the principle of individual freedom to individual legal objects, so also the claims of the individual nationalities - which become moral persons through the consciousness of their peculiarity - can be satisfied only through the application of this principle . . . The fascination of the concept of nationality is nothing other than a celebratory protestation of all peoples, in the name of the Christian principle of individual freedom, against the absolute power of the state.²⁰

Thus the national idea is a conservative element and, Eötvös writes, it is 'quite certainly one of the greatest dangers of our time that the conservative elements in this idea are too weak in comparison with those elements that push forward'²¹. The awakening of this idea is indeed 'a wonderful dispensation of divine foresight', an awakening which might indeed have the power to curb or to reverse 'that sequence of massive upheavals set in train by France, in which not only thrones, but even the concept of law and everything which man had held holy have been made unsteady'. It will be able, moreover, to change those artificial political institutions with which we are familiar, through which 'the rabble of the capital city has been allowed to dispose over the form of government of a great nation'²².

To the picture of Eötvös the conservative liberal I would now like to add the picture of Musil the conservative nonconformist. It is the mature, the later Musil I have in mind here, the author of *The Man Without Qualities*. The later Musil was a nonconformist writer; but I do not share the conviction that he was a nonconformist *thinker* - someone who, rightly or wrongly, was intent on showing the detrimental effects of those social bonds which before 1914 had been real but on the verge of breaking apart, and which after the war were just a sham. The image of Musil the nonconformist is obviously the dominant one in literary circles; but even an Austrian professor of philosophy could, way back in 1960, write a paper called 'Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften und die Tradition' in which Musil is accused of an 'arrogant nonconformism with regard to any tradition'²³, an accusation which of course, amongst other things, implies the thesis that

the novel *Törless* and Musil's later novel should be seen to represent one and the same *Weltanschauung*.

Now I suggest that the later Musil, far from being a nonconformist, in fact held traditionalist views. Writes Musil in chapter 5 of *The Man Without Qualities*: 'In his potentialities, plans, and emotions, man must first of all be hedged in by prejudices, traditions, difficulties and limitations of every kind, like a lunatic in his strait-jacket, and only then will whatever he is capable of bringing forth perhaps have some value, solidity and permanence.'²⁴ Nor is this an isolated idea within the novel, or rather within the plan the wreck of which became the novel. In a draft chapter written in the mid-twenties, this is what the protagonist has to say to his sister: 'Wir sind einem Impuls gegen die Ordnung gefolgt . . . Eine Liebe kann aus Trotz erwachsen, aber sie kann nicht aus Trotz bestehn. Sondern, sie kann nur eingefügt in eine Gesellschaft bestehn. Sie ist kein Lebensinhalt. Sondern eine Verneinung, eine Ausnahme von den Lebensinhalten. Aber eine Ausnahme braucht etwas, wovon sie die Ausnahme ist. Von einer Negation allein kann man nicht leben.'²⁵ But already in the comedy *Die Schwärmer* written in 1921, a tale of utopian-nonconformist revolt, the promise contained in the insight 'einer ist ein Narr, zwei eine neue Menschheit'²⁶ remains unfulfilled; the moral of the story in fact being that without what amounts to unjustified social beliefs, without 'jener helle Tropfen Dummheit'²⁷, man cannot live and cannot create. This point of view is elaborated in quite some detail in the essays of Musil written during the 1920s. Handed-down forms of feeling and thought are, he stresses, the constitutive basis of human existence. As he put it in 1923: 'The very shapelessness of his natural make-up forces man to adapt himself to forms and to assume the characters, customs, morals, styles of life and the whole apparatus of an organisation . . . For one can say that man becomes man only through expression, and this forms itself in the forms of society.'²⁸ Man's development occurs 'under the guidance of tradition and by cautious adjustments of direction'²⁹; reason cannot replace tradition³⁰, and even the spontaneity of an artist is inconceivable without handed-down forms and concepts³¹.

In science in particular, Musil points out, the work of previous generations plays an essential role. Inherited methods are taken over and further developed, so that it is 'in the ratio individual/traditional that there lies the economy of practice'³². Even if Musil is reluctant to follow Spengler in entirely dissolving natural science into cultural forms, he is certainly convinced, by the 1920s, that facts are what they are only in an historical context. And so, too, with norms, values, and indeed the personal self. These are not nonentities, as Musil's early adversary Mach would have it; but neither do they exist independently of specific forms of life, or of the mixed motley of traditions and constraints which constitutes a human culture.

There is a remarkable passage in ch.8 of *The Man Without Qualities*, where Musil, picturing himself as

riding on 'the train of events', goes on to say: 'What is flying past flies past because it can't be otherwise, but for all our resignation we become more and more aware of an unpleasant feeling that we may have overshot our destination or have got on the wrong line. And one day one suddenly has a wild craving: Get out! Jump clear! It is a nostalgic yearning to be brought to a standstill, to cease evolving, to get stuck, to turn back to a point that lies before the wrong fork. And in the good old days when there was still such a place as Imperial Austria, one could leave the train of events, get into an ordinary train on an ordinary railway-line, and travel back home.'³³ Now if, as we have suggested, the later Musil was a traditionalist, then this passage

is neither predominantly ironic, nor indeed without a background on the level of ideas. In fact when Franz Theodor Csokor wrote that for Musil 'with the year 1918 his homeland really vanished. In 'Man Without Qualities' he re-erected it'³⁴, he pointed to a fact of theoretical significance. Far from being a nonconformist in an avantgarde age, Musil was a conservative living on memories of bygone times. His ideas were the theory of a nonexistent practice; as ideas invariably are. 'A tudat a bizonytalanság reakciója', says the Hungarian poet and essayist Mihály Babits³⁵, that is: consciousness is a consequence of uncertainty. To point to some of the more remote sources, aspects, and parallels of that uncertainty has been the purpose of this paper.

Notes

1. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
2. *Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980.
3. *Von Grillparzer zu Kafka: Sechs Essays*. Wien: Globus Verlag, 1962.
4. *A Study in Austrian Intellectual History: From Late Baroque to Romanticism*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1960.
5. Johan Christoph Allmayer-Beck, *Der Konservatismus in Österreich*, Munich: Isar Verlag, 1959, p.12.
6. Cf. his *The History of Freedom and Other Essays*, London: 1907, pp.296ff.
7. Recently analyzed by Moritz Csáky. Cf. his 'Von Josephinismus zur katholischen Romantik: Bemerkungen zu Franz Széchényis unbekannter Abhandlung "Vom Zeitgeist"', *Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Klasse der österr. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 117 (1980) pp.70-86.
8. Vienna: Böhlau, 1988.
9. Gyula Szekfü's essay 'Valahol utat vesztettünk' (1943/44), re-published in his *Forradalom után* (Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1947) merits special reference in this connection.
10. *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, n.s. 62 (1962).
11. *Der Donauraum* 11 (1966).
12. See R. A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918*, 2 vols., New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950, and Josef Redlich, *Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem*, vol. 1, Leipzig: 1920, and vol. 2, Leipzig: 1926.
13. *Der Einfluss der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat*, vol. 1, Vienna: manz, 1851, and vol. 2, Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1854. The German text of *The Ruling Ideas* was not, as is normally suggested, a translation. The book was in fact composed in that language, not in Hungarian.
14. József Eötvös, 'Munich Sketch' (1848), sect.16. In: J. C. Nyíri, ed., *Austrian Philosophy: Studies and Texts*, Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1980.
15. Vol. 2, p.33.
16. *Ibid.*, p.274.
17. Vol. 1, p.244.
18. *The Ruling Ideas*, vol. 2, p.505.
19. *Ibid.*, p.166
20. *Ibid.*, pp.518 and 520.
21. *Ibid.*, p.520.
22. *Ibid.*, p.519.
23. Erich Heintel in *Wissenschaft und Weltbild* 13 (1960), p.194. 'Musil', writes Heintel in the same paper, 'Steht in jenem Traditionsverlust des Abendlandes, der sich etwa von dem Zusammenbruch des Idealismus im vergangenen Jahrhundert über die Linkshagelianer, dann über Schopenhauer und Nietzsche auf unsere Tage erstreckt. Soziologisch handelt es sich dabei um die Auflösung der sittlich-politischen Substanz des Bürgertums.' (*Ibid.*, p.189.)
24. Translation by Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser.
25. Robert Musil, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 1-9, ed. by Adolf Frisé, Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1978 [GW], 5:1673.
26. GW 6:331.
27. GW 6:361.
28. GW 8:1374.
29. GW 8:1369.
30. GW 8:1081f.
31. GW 8:1250, from 'Der Dichter in dieser Zeit' (1934).
32. GW 8:1409, from (Die Krisis des Romans' (1931).
33. Translation by Eithne Wilkins and Ernst Kaiser.
34. Csokor, 'gedenkrede zu Robert Musils 80. Geburtstag', in Karl Dinklage, ed., *Robert Musil: Leben, Werk, Wirkung*, Zürich: Amalthea, 1960, p.354.
35. Babits, (A magyar jellemről'. In: *Ésszék, tanulmányok*, vol. 2, Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1978, p. 631.

Cast in an Antique Mould

The following appeared in *The Times* on 26 January 1989:

"... A stuffed, disarmingly life-like, Alsatian police dog, motionlessly guards this last section of the [Prague Police] museum which is devoted to 'cultural subversion'.

There ... stands that most hated of anti-socialists ... the Western intellectual. Made up to resemble a distinguished Victorian curate, starched collar and black coat, the expression on this figure is one of tight-lipped amazement.

In one hand he carries a copy of a reputable English newspaper. In another [sic], a leather, 1930s suitcase clearly opened by an astute sniffer dog, reveals the dissident's best friend - a portable photocopier. A subscription form to the *Salisbury Review* is rolled up between two shabby black brogues ..."

Richard Bassett

Editorial

A strange transformation has occurred on the left of British politics. Where collectivist thinking recently dominated, we find a rhetoric of liberty and law. Hardly a word about the 'planned economy'; no mention of those 'irreversible' moves towards equality and social justice which have formed the subject-matter of recent manifestoes; little about class or race, and no praise for the Great Soviet Experiment, but only for the new leader who is (according to the prevailing conception) charged with the task of undoing it. In the place of ideology we find a defence of the individual, his freedom and his rights; an advocacy of constitutional government and rule of law; even a claim that the true goal of socialism is a civil society independent of the state - the goal of Burke, Tocqueville and Hegel, and of the 'anti-socialists' of Eastern Europe. Indeed, the British left would like to identify with these 'anti-socialists' - though not under that description. Its latest publication is called *Samizdat* and its roll-call of the just Charter 88. The sufferings of the 'anti-socialists' have been appropriated along with their ideas, to give credibility to the oppressed middle classes under Mrs Thatcher. Of course, unlike the *Salisbury Review*, *Samizdat* has no shortage of backers, and is scarcely likely to attract persecution. Its editor - Ben Pimlott - has, if anything, enhanced his academic standing by this 'daring' gesture. Nor are the signatories of Charter 88 to suffer anything but wearisome congratulations for their decision to speak out against the oppressive structures. Nevertheless, the choice of such labels is of considerable interest, not only in displaying a shift in doctrine, but also in showing a kind of realism - or at least surrealism - about the Soviet bloc.

Charter 88 was signed by members of the establishment: old labourites like Sir Alfred Ayer, New Leftists like Perry Anderson, and posturing Marxolators like G. A. Cohen. It calls for civil liberties, a bill of rights, freedom of association, expression and information. It demands trial by jury, an independent judiciary, an elected second chamber and a written constitution. In short, it seeks to re-build Britain on the American model: a strange ambition, coming as it does from such America-haters as Harold Pinter, Anthony Arblaster, Stuart Hall, Christopher Hitchens and Lord Hutchinson. If a written constitution, a bill of rights and an elected senate have failed to turn the United States from the path of oppression, what hope do they offer to those who groan under Mrs Thatcher?

But wait a moment. Do we not already have an independent judiciary? Isn't trial by jury the norm in criminal cases? Is there not freedom of speech, publication and assembly in Britain, and are we not free to associate without asking permission of the State? Perhaps, in the matter of an elected senate and a

written constitution, we lag behind the high standard set by our transatlantic ally. But neither written constitutions nor elected senates have shown themselves effective in the face of tyranny. In any case, such issues can hardly be the core concerns of British people in their present suffering.

The good men and women of the Left are not convinced. Our freedoms, they believe, are increasingly at risk from executive power: freedom of speech, for example, and freedom of publication. Is this a reference to the persecution by campus radicals of those who speak for the Right? Or to the consequences of publication visited upon Ray Honeyford, Jonathan Savery, and Chris McGovern, the Lewes history teacher? Not a bit of it: the reference is to St Clive Ponting and Peter Wright: people who have published the official secrets entrusted to them. It seems that freedom of association is also threatened. Do our champions of liberty refer to the closed shop, to compulsory membership of the National Union of Students, to the long-standing war on parental choice conducted by socialists in education? Do they refer to the organised disruption of 'right-wing' gatherings, of National Front demonstrations, of fox hunts and shooting parties? Of course not. They refer to GCHQ - i.e. to the lack of 'trade union rights' at an institution essential to our national defence. It is hard to know quite what the other clauses of Charter 88 refer to. But such examples suggest that the freedoms demanded are more likely to be of use to the terrorist and the spy than to the ordinary citizen.

For all its exaggeration, Charter 88 is an interesting document. The previous outburst from the Left occurred during Mrs Thatcher's second term, and was, for the most part, revolutionary in tone. Scargill and the striking miners were the heroes of the day, and the prevailing communist causes - Western disarmament, Nicaragua, 'anti-racism', and 'anti-apartheid' - were the stuff of political demands. The re-election of Mrs Thatcher was a shock: not because it caused the old labourites to believe that she had acquired so much popularity, but because it awoke them to their own lack of it. The language of 'Thatcherism' was therefore appropriated in order to re-frame the ancient purpose. The rights of the individual, the rule of law, constitution and limited government: those old liberal causes, which had provided the bare-bones of Tory doctrine since the war, became the favoured causes of the left. Even if the new language is a Trojan Horse, with an undiminished hatred crouching impatiently within, it cannot become the standard discourse of opposition without real political changes. We might be advancing towards a time when Her Majesty's Government will confront, once again, Her Majesty's Opposition, and find, in the business of Parliament, a pretence of common loyalty to the Crown.

Letters

Sir,
Professor Mishan (*Salisbury Review* June 1988) believes that *per capita* productivity declines as immigrants swell the workforce. This is a new insight - it explains why the USA created 14 million jobs and lost productivity, and why our productivity has soared while keeping well over 2 million on the dole queues!

The case against immigration is strongest in the cultural field, as the traditionalists can see. Professor Mishan has no need to use semi-plausible mercantile economics to bolster his case. Adam Smith, in the most scintillating prose, pointed out two hundred years ago that the free movement of goods and services was an advance. Mishan sees only loss: but if an immigrant is better off by his move, then, providing he is acting on market information and not responding to the distorted welfare inducements of governments, the gain is for all. The golden rule of free enterprise is that my fortune multiplies that of others: the cake of national and global wealth is not of fixed size.

The challenge for conservatives and true liberals alike is to look for what immigrants can offer to strengthen this country, and thus their own peace and sense of place. This is not wishful thinking but a vital imperative. More black and Asian businessmen, professionals and leaders of organizations should be encouraged to look to the duties advocated in this journal - respect for law; loyalty to the Crown; and love of country.

Tom Burroughes
'Cavendish'
Halesworth
Suffolk

Sir,
May I comment on Paul Helm's letter (September 1988). The Romanians form, today, the vast majority of the population of Transylvania and did so for the last hundred years according to contemporary Hungarian census. Since the end of the last war we have witnessed the dismemberment of several empires. Can anyone suggest even that the entire population of any one of these was moved out of the subject country when imperial power was withdrawn? The arrival of the Hungarians in Europe and their subsequent invasion of Transylvania in 1002 are fully documented. The arrival of the Saxons in the 12th, Teutonic Knights in the 13th century, of the Swabians in the 18th is equally fully inscribed in history. How is it then possible that the beginning of an incomparably greater presence - that of the Romanians - is nowhere recorded? For this is the gist of the proposition that the Romanians came to Transylvania from South of the Carpathians.

In 1437 the 'Unio Trium Nationum' was concluded by the Hungarian aristocracy, the Szeklers and Germans (Saxons) to exclude the Romanians from any political recognition, 'wealth and glamour', as Mr. Helm puts it. They were even excluded from settling *in towns*. In 1721 an edict was issued in my home town Turda (Torda in Hungarian), prohibiting any Romanian from settling within the city confines with the exception of '3 cowherds and 3 pigherds' who could be, and were, Romanian.

Of course the Hungarians are responsible for the backwardness of the Romanians. They were deliberately kept in subjection and ignorance by their feudal, Hungarian overlords. Count Tisza said '*the idea of a university education in Romanian is a cultural monstrosity*'.

An objective historical truth is generally accepted by scholars of world renown. *The History of Transylvania*, though beautifully presented, is invalidated by the findings of historians like R. W. Seton-Watson, Emmanuel de Martonne and by the possibly greatest living scholar of the history of Hungary and Romania, specializing in that of Transylvania, Professor Keith Hitchin of the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign USA. The 'History' was written for other reasons, not 'in order to save that part of Hungarian history from final distortion by the Romanians'. They have no such power; nor should they have.

I completely agree with the conclusion of Dr. Helm's letter. When the tyrant Nicolae Ceausescu finally leaves the scene no change is likely to occur unless his family - 'the whole gang' - is removed; nay, unless the communists are removed from power in Bucharest and Budapest, giving democrats a chance to work towards an historic Hungarian-Romanian reconciliation.

Ion Ratiu
The World Union of Free Romanians
54/62 Regent Street
London W1

Sir,
Canon K. E. Wright, in the June 1988 issue of the *Review*, asks for evidence of the involvement of The International Department of The Central Committee of The Soviet Communist Party in the 'peace' propaganda of Western churches.

The best way to peel an onion is to start at the root-end; Canon Wright will perhaps benefit from starting with:

- 1) *Campaign Against Western Defence*, by Clive Rose (Royal United Services Institute).
- 2) *The Security of Western Europe: A Handbook*, by Altling von Geusau.
- 3) *Peace of the Dead*, by Paul Mercer.
- 4) *The New KGB*, by W. R. Corson and R. T. Crowley.

M. H. C. Niklas
'Summerhaze'
12 Roman Road
Broadstone
Dorset

Sir,
In my review of Pacepa's *Red Horizons* (*Salisbury Review*, September 1988) two words were added which completely change the meaning of a sentence: 'Ceausescu . . . smuggles drugs and sells (*them to*) his minority populations . . .'

While I do not believe Ceausescu incapable of selling drugs to his own population, the evidence so far is that he only sells them to the West. After all, his subjects would not be able (and not allowed) to pay in hard currency.

Dieter Kotschick
Wolfson College
Oxford

Sir,
Sometimes the most extraordinary things escape comment because they are so extraordinary. I refer to the exclusion of Mr Enoch Powell, for this is what it amounts to, from the House of Lords.

It is rumoured that Mr Powell would accept only a hereditary peerage. If this were true, the price would be small in exchange for his contribution to public debate and for the renewed interest and distinction that his presence would bring to the Upper Chamber.

It is also rumoured that the Prime Minister fears or resents his own fearless and reasoned opposition to her policies in Europe and Northern Ireland. Those of us who continue to admire and support her government can only hope that this is not true and that this impression will not persist. May I appeal to all those who share these feelings to make them known, if they have not done so already, to the Prime Minister.

Geoffrey Strickland
University of Reading

Sir,
The *Salisbury Review* comes closer than anything I know to the crisis at the heart of our civilization.

There is a nexus of questions behind all the articles in your September issue. Has our civilization become meaningless through becoming secular? No, it has become more honest. We do not need to apologize for that, nor for its alleged materialism.

Mervyn Hiskett starkly described the challenge of Islam. Can we meet it without 'Gott mit uns'? Yes, and we must. The problems of the world are all man-made. It is up to us to use our wits to find answers. Prayers are irrelevant, no matter to whom addressed.

Stewart Deuchar
Dean Farm
Singleborough
Milton Keynes

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY & POLICY

Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul

Launched in 1983, *Social Philosophy and Policy* is now established as a leading forum for discussion of the most important and controversial issues in social and political philosophy today. Each 192-page issue is devoted to a single theme, with specially invited contributions from the world's most distinguished scholars.

Volume 6:1, Autumn 1988 will be entitled **Capitalism**. Among the contributors will be: JOHN CHRISTMAN, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANDREW LEVINE, JOHN GRAY and ANTONY FLEW.

Volume 6:2, Spring 1989 will be entitled **Socialism** and contributors will include: N. SCOTT ARNOLD, JOSHUA COHEN, DANIEL LITTLE, LOREN E. LOMASKY and ALEC NOVE

Published in October and April for the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University, Ohio

Subscription to Volume 6, 1988/9

Individuals: £13.50 (UK), £15.50 (overseas), \$18.50 (N. America)

Please send orders with payment to: Journals Marketing Manager, Basil Blackwell, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, England

Book Reviews

LUKE UNMARKED

Antony Flew

Marxism and Morality, Steven Lukes, OUP, 1985, £4.95, (0-1928-20-745)

When a leading Radical academic prefaces his latest book with a long quotation from a reconstructed ex-Bolshevik, a quotation describing some of the abominations of 'The God that failed', the optimist will dare to hope that the author has embarked upon a course of comprehensive rethinking. But here, as so often in what Wittgenstein called 'the darkness of these times', the optimist will be disappointed. For, even before the end of the Preface, the alert reader will have recognised sure signs that Steven Lukes is resolved not to allow his findings about *Marxism and Morality* or, indeed, anything else - to alter, or even to weaken, any of his previous political commitments or personal associations.

He is careful to assure everyone, and - perhaps especially - his it seems exclusively socialist friends, that 'This book is, emphatically, not just another anti-Marxist tract' (p. xii). So, whatever faults may be found, no one is to be required to reject Marxism root and branch. Again, after first noting the unspecified supposed 'contributions of anti-socialist forces', Lukes does have some words of disapproval 'for Stalin's terror, the purges and trials, the mass deportations and the vast network of labour camps, for the social catastrophe of Mao's Cultural Revolution, for the 'murderous utopia' of Pol Pot's Cambodia, and for the grim, surveillance-minded, demoralized world of contemporary 'actually existing socialism' above all in the USSR and Eastern Europe (p. xiii). But no reference to such now admitted miseries of 'actually existing socialism' is to be allowed to inhibit the drive to impose that same socialist system everywhere; to promote, as Lukes himself puts it, 'the cause of socialism' (p. xii). Nor has Lukes ever even one good word for any who have fought or are still fighting to prevent such catastrophes. For Lukes, even now, all resistance to the Marxist-Leninist drive to total world domination remains nothing but 'the capitalist imperialism and neo-colonialism presently visible behind the moralistic facade of United States foreign policy, especially in South East Asia and now in Central America' (p. xii).

By thus refusing to allow his results to upset any previous political or personal commitments, Lukes betrays himself into a paradoxical position: presenting these findings as practically important; while simultaneously insisting that they must not be allowed to affect practice. For, certainly, he is as right in that presentation as he is wrong in his bigoted refusal to apply any of the lessons. His refusal also constitutes a

paradoxical defection from a Marxist 'unity of theory and practice'. But far more important than any of this is what these resolute refusals reveal about his actual rather than his pretended values.

Lukes sets himself three questions. 'The first concerns Marxism as a theory: what does it have to say about morality, and what answers does it have to such central moral questions as 'What is justice? ... The second concerns Marxism in practice: what can now be said about the record of Marxism as a social movement and as a system of rule ... The third question concerns the relation between the first two' (p. xi).

Any book answering only the first of these questions would be, as one of the author's many Marxist friends remarked, very short. For it is credibly reported that the moment anyone started to talk to Marx about morality, he would roar with laughter (p. 27). Certainly there is an abundance of considered statements from both Marx and Engels to the effect that morality is an illusion, behind which class interests 'lurk in ambush'. Lukes quotes several of these statements, noting that 'Lenin agreed with Sombart that there is in Marxism not a grain of ethics from beginning to end since, theoretically, it subordinates the ethical standpoint to the principle of causality; in practice, it reduces it to the class struggle' (p. 21).

In face of all these considered repudiations Lukes and almost everyone else have seen it as paradoxical that the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin are full of denunciations of the hated class enemy; denunciations unreservedly employing moral terms, and apparently appealing to moral ideas. The Lukes proposal for resolving this paradox is said to depend on 'drawing a distinction ... between ... the morality of *Recht* and the morality of emancipation'. Since he goes on at once to quote Marx and Engels as stressing 'the opposition of communism to *Recht* ... as the rights of man' (p. 27), we should not be surprised when later we discover that the promised emancipation is no more truly an emancipation than People's Democracy is democracy or Liberation Theology is theology.

Nor does Lukes make it clear why he thinks that we have to engage in his elaborate and subtle interpretative exercise. Why are these denunciations not to be construed in the least complicated and most straightforward way: either as sincere but inconsistent moralizings; or as hypocritical appeals to standards which the appellants themselves refuse to recognize? This sort of inconsistency and this sort of hypocrisy, sometimes mixed up almost indistinguishably in the same person and at the same time, are both, after all, perfectly familiar and very common.

Can there, for instance, be any teacher of philosophy who has not had students who, after insisting in a

classroom context that moral talk is nothing but the more or less pretentious and hypocritical expression of the arbitrary likes and dislikes of its users, then proceeded outside, without any apparent logical qualms, to join in what they were eager to dignify as *moral* protests against whatever was the favourite unfavourite group of actual or supposed evil-doers? The litmus test of the morality of all such popular protests is, of course, first to name other and worse offenders against whatever has been proposed as a moral principle; and then to ask whether the misdeeds of these others are to be similarly protested against.

Again, no one who has followed the great conflicts of our century can have failed to notice how frequently spokesmen for both Marxist-Leninism and National Socialism have denounced their opponents for defections from norms which those spokesmen themselves scarcely even pretend to accept. So why do we not simply settle for saying that Marx himself, like so many of his followers, was a hypocrite?

Chapter 4—'Justice and Rights'—starts, as usual, from an hermeneutic question: 'Did Marx think that capitalism, and more particularly the wage-relation between capitalist and worker, was unjust?' Noting—consumed with the sheer joy of scholarship—that 'by now all the logically possible positions on the issue have been ably and convincingly defended', (p. 48) Lukes proceeds to take up another:

What Marx offers is a multi-perspectival analysis in which capitalism's self-justifications are portrayed undermined from within, and criticized from without, then both justification and criticism are in turn criticized from a standpoint that is held to be beyond justice (p. 59).

I hate to interrupt, and so spoil the scholarly fun. But ought not all concerned to consider a simple, collapsing suggestion? Think: had Marx himself been as interested in answering the substantive question as are Lukes and other devotees in discovering what his answer would have been; then, surely, Marx would have taken a little trouble to give that answer in an unequivocal form, pre-empting present disputes?

In the same Chapter 4 Lukes has the effrontery to claim that 'countless Marxists have believed in and fought for human rights' (p. 66). Similar tributes are paid elsewhere (e.g., p. xi). But only here does he have the gall to add, 'especially since the Helsinki accords' (p. 62). As throughout, he must be thinking of himself as addressing solely his fellow self-blinkered socialists. For who else could be relied on not to object that such support stops the moment these 'bourgeois' rights have served their sole purpose of enabling the Marxist-Leninists to establish what is, quite frankly, 'power based directly on force, and unrestricted by any Laws' (Lenin, quoted p. 106)?

Near the beginning of Chapter 5, 'Freedom and Emancipation', Lukes pretends to see and meet a need to explain why (classical) 'liberals are often drawn to

an opportunity rather than an exercise conception of freedom, according to which my freedom is solely a matter of how many doors are open to me' (p. 76). But what is there to explain in the fact that anyone who is sincerely devoted to freedom is 'drawn to' the genuine article rather than to tawdry substitutes meretriciously and deceitfully packaged as '*positive* freedom'?

Lukes himself admits: both that what he calls those 'wider, more complex, or richer views of freedom' (p. 77) mislead people 'to disparage as merely formal the typical bourgeois freedoms (including civic and political freedoms)'; and that from this 'it is a short step to deny them the status of genuine freedoms at all' (p. 79). He even adds that it is 'a step which Marx himself ... occasionally took' (p. 79). Yet none of this stops Lukes speaking in his 'Conclusion' of Marxism's 'rich view of freedom and compelling vision of human liberation' (p. 141). This Marxist view becomes rich only at the cost of ceasing to be a view of *freedom*; whereas the vision all too truly is forcefully compelling, but only and precisely in as much as the promised liberation is a fraud, in which any dissidents are to be, in the notorious words of Rousseau, 'forced to be free'.

In his Preface Lukes maintains that '*pas d'ennemis à gauche* has always been a dubious principle, stifling critical discussion ...' (p. xii). It is, I fear, both significant and characteristic that he refers only to the stifling of critical discussion, and not to the far more formidable practical consequences of obeying his maxim. For it is clear that Lukes has long been, and is in his practice inflexibly determined to remain, obedient to it. How else, for instance, can we interpret his quoting, with obvious approval, as one of the two mottos for his Conclusion, the statements that 'the political leader who sends masses of humanity to their deaths for the sake of a shining distant future is indeed abominable. *Equally abominable* is the complacency of those liberals willing to rain terror from the skies ...' (p. 139: emphasis added).

Unlike the ineffable Chomsky, Lukes does not now in general deny the immeasurable abominations resulting from Marxist-Leninist victories. Yet those who resisted the Vietminh and the Khmer Rouge, and those too who continue to resist the advance of similar Marxist-Leninist movements in Central America and elsewhere, are still, at worst, morally equivalent in Lukes' eyes to such monsters as Pol Pot.

Chapter 6 contains interesting and important material on 'Ends and Means'. But Lukes refuses to draw the proper practical conclusions from it. As always, he is inhibited by a stubborn, incorrigible resolve not to permit any critique to end in outright rejection of, much less a fighting opposition to, Marxism and Marxist-Leninist organizations: *pas d'ennemis à gauche*.

The third section of this chapter consists in a discussion of the reactions of the slimy Sartre and the meandering Merleau-Ponty to Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, and to the facts behind that fiction. Although forced, however reluctantly, to admit these

facts, Merleau-Ponty for many years and Sartre to the end similarly refused actively to oppose. Lukes quotes Sartre's notorious and inelegant words: 'An anti-Communist is a dog, I do not depart from that, I shall never depart from it' (quoted p. 29).

I wish that my sometime colleague Lukes had here expressed emphatic dissent. But, to be as kind as possible, it is at least, and at most, not clear that he is even now prepared to disagree. Certainly, after quoting Koestler's charge that Merleau-Ponty had in *Humanism and Terror* 'published a remarkable book to prove that Gletkin was right', Lukes then concludes this chapter by saying of that book:

It also classically exemplified the point to which a theoretically (if not factually) well-schooled thinker could go when reasoning within the structure of thought that it has been this book's aim to exhibit and analyse (p. 138).

It does indeed. And *Marxism and Morality* itself provides a further classical exemplification. For it too shows the lengths to which a thinker can persist in continuing to go - this time a thinker *both* theoretically and factually well-schooled - when he is resolved that nothing, absolutely nothing, is to be allowed to induce him to break his personal and intellectual commitments to 'the cause of socialism'. If these things do indeed, as it appears, mean so much more to Lukes that any of his belated discoveries about oppression and impoverishment under 'actually existing socialism' - or than all the sufferings of the myriad 'enemies of socialism' already or in the future to be tortured or starved to death, imprisoned or murdered by Marxist-Leninist regimes - then that practical preference cannot but constitute a damning revelation of the present true values and real priorities sustaining the continuing commitment of Lukes to 'the cause of socialism'. Quite certainly this commitment no longer springs from a generous concern *pour la soulèvement de la condition humaine*. For such fundamentally unreconstructed Sartreans as Lukes - to adapt an austere and Roman phrase - evil communications have corrupted good morals.

REASON AND WILL

Anthony O'Hear

Beyond Deduction: Ampliative Aspects of Philosophical Reflection, Frederick L. Will, Routledge, 1988, 260pp., (0-41500-1773).

Professor Will's treatise will be welcome and its message congenial to readers of *The Salisbury Review*. He argues that adherence to a deductive and foundational model of enquiry on the part of many philosophers since the time of Descartes has led to a disastrously curtailed conception of reality. If the only conclusions and arguments which can be rationally defended are

those which follow deductively from premises which are certain in themselves, most of human life and practices are irrational. This was, of course, the conclusion to which much of Hume's thinking pointed. In our own day T. S. Kuhn has pointed to the lack of conclusive justification for adoption of new theory in the physical sciences, and Professor Will takes Kuhn and Hume to exemplify the malaise into which a Cartesian conception of rationality can throw us. It is important to realise that, as the example of Hume suggests, the malaise is not confined to philosophers who would be classified as rationalists. Indeed, in a way, those empiricists who would found knowledge on deductive reasoning backed up by immediate experience are as prey to the conclusion that most of our life is run on irrational lines as *soi-disant* rationalists. Would-be Cartesian rationalists and classical empiricists are actually very close to each other in their search for foundations, in their implicit individualism and, in later times, in their concentration on language and symbols in abstraction from the practices in which they are embedded. And these assumptions do lead to disastrous forms of irrationalism, not only in epistemology and the philosophy of science, but also in politics, morality and law. In the law, for example, if a judicial decision does not follow deductively from established norms, then those seduced by rationalism would conclude that the decision can represent nothing more than an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the judge.

It is this conclusion that Professor Will is determined to resist. By appeal to writers such as Hegel, Wittgenstein and Oakeshott, he adumbrates a wider, more generous conception of rationality. He sees our explicitly held beliefs and norms not simply as sentences to be justified in isolation, but as embedded in practices, in habits and in much that is not fully conscious. We become aware of a norm or belief particularly when it is challenged by some unexpected circumstances, as when a judge has to deal with a sort of situation not explicitly covered by existing statute. (Many of the best parts of the book deal with this aspect of judicial reasoning.) Drawing on Oakeshott's notion of an intimation and on his analysis of the enfranchisement of women, Will tries to demonstrate the manner in which a decision may nevertheless be more or less forced on a judge and appear to us as the right one, and this because of the way other practices and decisions point and because of its wider ramifications in a particular context. This sense of the rationality of a decision or a belief will be forever hidden to those who insist on looking at the matter too narrowly, on the judgment as a sentence to be scrutinized as it is in and for itself and in relation only to what immediately surrounds or grounds it, and who do not consider its wider implications and its effects on the fabric of our lives. Will toys at times with Aristotelian-Hegelian metaphors, speaking of an institution or a concept having its own final causality and telos which may not be fully actualised in its present existence. This is

undoubtedly suggestive, but his tack is really Lamarkian, as he himself admits. What really engages him is the way in which a new context may force quite rationally defensible extensions to, or changes in, existing concepts or institutions.

Will's message may be seen as conservative in a broad sense. He sees norms and institutions as arising unconsciously from particular forms of life; hence it is always dangerous to view norms in abstraction from the particularities which ground them. He also writes suggestively that only someone who understands norms from within will be able effectively, to reform them or even to understand their wider social relevance. That is surely correct. An understanding of the social relevance of an activity is a natural extension of understanding that activity itself; it is not to be gained by a merely external look at it, as much modern education would have it, for someone who just looks at, say, science or the law from outside will not understand the meanings the institution or activity has for those who engage in it. But what Will calls ampliative reflection may be radical, too, as when nineteenth-century collectivists argued in favour of curbing the freedoms of liberal capitalists on the grounds that their exercise of those freedoms amounted to a denial to others of the very freedoms they claimed for themselves.

Nor is Will's conservatism one which downgrades the significance of explicit belief in favour of unconscious habit. He quotes approvingly G. K. Chesterton's dictum that 'the question is not whether one's theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else affects them'; in other words, differences of metaphysical view reach right down to the details of our lives and how we conduct them. In considering the difference between the Aristotelian and Galilean view of cause, Will shows how this is no narrow divergence of view on a technical point of physics, but represents and derives from many other differences of world-view and practice. For the Aristotelian, the notion of cause was one which was located in a view of the universe, man and nature, forming a harmonious whole, inspired by and reaching to the ultimate Good, while the Galilean was concerned much more with the technological manipulation of nature. And these differences not only issue in different types of question and investigation; they are 'in turn reflections of the kinds of activities the questioners are engaged in, the kind of individuals and communities they form, and the kinds of institutions in the communities they represent when they engage in this questioning investigation' (p. 241).

Will's rejection of foundationalist rationalism does not lead him, as it has led Rorty and others, to an assertion of the incapacity of reflection and of philosophy to achieve more than mere persuasion or rhetoric. His notion of the ampliative nature of creative reasoning - in the pointing out of connexions, of institutional parallels between one mode of thought and another, of hidden premises and of looking to the wider fabric of our lives - has, I believe, much of Wittgenstein's later method about it: though without

the relativism one sometimes associates with that, it also has much of Leavis's conception of literary criticism, as a tentative, questioning critical-creative dialogue in which one looks to see how one's suggestions resonate with the responses of others, and how the responses of one person to a text can inform and modify the responses of another. Professor Will's book made me wonder whether the best model of human rationality might not be constructive debate in the humanities rather than the mathematical theorem so beloved of philosophers.

DOWN WITH SOME INTELLECTUALS *Dennis O'Keefe*

Intellectuals, Paul Johnson, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988, £14.95. (0-297-7935-0).

Paul Johnson's new book is written with all the style and energy which we have come to expect from him. It is a set of brutal *argumenta ad hominem*, directed against some of the most influential intellectuals of the last two hundred years. There are twelve chapters devoted to specific individuals, starting with Rousseau and concluding with Lillian Hellman. There is a thirteenth chapter dealing with such mixed luminaries as Kenneth Tynan, Norman Mailer, James Baldwin and Noam Chomsky. I cannot say any of the findings of the book surprised me; and one might say that something of the sort has been long overdue, though a reference book would have to be much longer and more comprehensive.

As one would expect the book has received a predictably hostile response from some quarters. This may be taken as a good sign. The blows are going home. People do not like to be told what their heroes, such as Sartre and Brecht, were really like. Actually it is not really that they did not know and dislike having their illusions smashed - they just do not want it spelled out. The reasons for this reluctance are not entirely clear, though both guilt and defiance are involved. The fact is that there is something of the naughty school-child, at once furtive and obstreperous, in those who admire such demons as Sartre and Brecht. They know they should not have their hands in the antinomian sweet-jar; but they like doing it! It is not just the intellectual output which is admired; the moral corruption and ruthlessness of Rousseau, Shelley and Marx, the cruelty and calculated callousness of Ibsen and Russell, are secretly admired by those who imitate them or would like to. So are the profitable lies of the Hellman type. And imitating James Baldwin is an industry twice-over!

The cast of mind of such fans is one we might call 'refined picaresque'. The proscription on arguments

directed against the person is for them serendipitous, since it allows the real nature of their enthusiasm to remain hidden. The fact remains, however, that we still need to know whether the proscription is in principle valid. Not all Johnson's offenders were great writers - Sartre's philosophical reputation is already gone, if he ever had one, and his artistic standing may also plunge. A fair bet is that Brecht's stock will take a tumble too. But supposing all these writers were unambiguously as distinguished as Tolstoy - 'God's elder brother' as Johnson calls him - would it matter? Are not *War and Peace* and *For Whom the Bell Tolls* what matter and not the unlikeable characters of Tolstoy and Hemingway?

The rule against personal attacks holds in most cases. Things which are true or beautiful will not cease to be so just because they are articulated by scoundrels. There are cases where madness and intellectual output form a seamless web: this is true of Marx and Sartre. And genius can have overwhelmingly bad results, as with Rousseau as well as Marx and Sartre. Surely Johnson's book would have been improved if he had written a separate chapter dealing with these problems.

In fact there are three more problems which indicate the need for a chapter setting out the philosophy of the work. The first is so obvious that Johnson can hardly be surprised that people have raised it. Quite simply: why pick on the so-called radical-progressives? Are not Tories and libertarians sometimes 'intellectuals' and do not they also have their share of moral shortcomings? Predatory sexual promiscuity, drunkenness, parsimony and vindictiveness are manifest among some anti-socialist scholars. So what? Even more damaging to Johnson's case, however, is his failure to see that moral evil is not confined to intellectuals. One would be hard-put to call Hitler or Stalin intellectuals, after all. Finally it is easy to forget as one enjoys the exposée side of this brilliantly executed book, that the political and economic arrangements of which Johnson so much approves, owe much of their genesis to intellectuals. If democracy and the free-enterprise economy endure, intellectuals will surely be involved, just as it was other intellectuals not long ago who nearly succeeded in wiping them out.

CONSPIRACY DOWN UNDER *Ian Greig*

The Petrov Affair, Robert Manne, Pergamon Books Ltd., 1987, 310pp., £8.25, (0-08-034425).

In the spring of 1954 the Western world was startled by the announcement in the Australian House of Representatives by the Prime Minister, Mr Menzies (later Sir

Robert) that a diplomat from the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, who was in fact a senior officer of the Soviet Intelligence Service and acting 'Resident' (i.e. acting officer in charge) of that service's network based upon the USSR's embassy in the Australian capital, had defected. When the same diplomat's wife defected two weeks later and it was revealed that she too was an officer of the NKVD (Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs), the forerunner of the KGB, it seemed that the stage had been set for some really sensational revelations about the extent of Soviet espionage operations in yet another part of the world.

Revelations of considerable importance regarding Soviet intelligence techniques certainly followed. Before long, however, it became clear that Vladimir and Petrova Petrov constituted a 'catch' of somewhat disappointing quality. Although Petrov held the rank of Colonel in the NKVD, making him the most senior officer of that service known to have defected to the West since the 1930s, Australian interrogators soon came to the conclusion that he was 'an exceedingly simple man of peasant stock, who had been promoted far above his capabilities'. In addition almost his entire career had been spent in a desk job in Moscow. When he arrived in Australia his sole experience of work in foreign lands could hardly have been further away from his new posting, consisting of a brief spell in Sweden.

Despite the somewhat pathetic figure Petrov cut as an NKVD 'Resident', among a number of documents of considerable value which he brought with him upon his defection were two which, with an Australian general election fast approaching, could truly be described as 'political dynamite'. Both were in English and according to Petrov were reports which had been prepared for his predecessor as 'Resident'. The first of these reports took the form of details and notes concerning a number of well known Australian journalists, including information about their private lives which could clearly be used for agent recruitment through blackmail by the NKVD. The author of this report, Petrov indicated, was the Press Secretary to Dr Evatt, leader of the Labour Party, then in opposition to the coalition Government led by Mr Menzies. Part of the second document consisted of a report on political trends in Australia, with notes on those involved in them. Some of the latter being of such a scurrilous nature that the report came to be described as having been written 'with malicious foulness', and to constitute a 'farrago of facts, falsities, and filth'.

Petrov identified the author of this second document as a leading member of the Australian Communist Party. Moreover, Australian security officers came to believe from Petrov's evidence that the source for some of the information contained in it was a further two members of Dr Evatt's staff, in one of whom they had been interested for some time.

Mr Menzies had announced that a Royal Commission was to be set up to examine the extent of Soviet espionage in Australia. But with the election due to be

held only a few weeks after Petrov's defection he believed it would be wrong to release the news he had been given about his political rival's staff until after polling day: lest he be accused of attempting to exploit a matter of national security for purely party advantage.

Despite this refusal to seek any such advantage, no sooner had the election been fought and Mr Menzies' government re-elected with a narrow majority over the Labour Party than the worst storm in Australian politics for many years started to break.

Dr Evatt, described by the author of this book as a 'prickly and suspicious character', launched a series of allegations of a most extreme and extravagant nature. He commenced by loudly proclaiming that the timing of the defection of the Petrovs had been deliberately delayed by Mr Menzies and his Ministers, in conjunction with the ASIO, until just before the election in order to produce a 'red scare atmosphere' which would prejudice the Labour Party's chances.

Once the Royal Commission had started its sittings Evatt declared his belief that the allegations concerning members of his staff were all part of a comprehensive conspiracy to discredit him and his followers, in which the government, the ASIO, and even some members of the Labour Party opposed to his leadership were all involved. It was, he opined, 'one of the basest conspiracies in political history' akin to 'the burning of the Reichstag which ushered in the Hitler Regime in 1933'. Australia had become a 'Police State' and the whole affair could almost be described as 'a crime against humanity'.

Much of the Royal Commission's time was taken up with lengthy investigation into his charges, which in the end it found entirely baseless. (A conclusion which Mr Manne also comes to.) Despite this rebuff, Evatt's allegations continued to haunt Australian political life for some time, resulting in the end in a major split in the Labour Party over his leadership and in its further defeat in the general election of 1955. This, in turn, marked the commencement of the lengthy period which Mr Manne dubs 'the Menzies era'.

The idea that conspiracies between right-wing politicians and Western intelligence services are commonplace remains dear to the political left and a certain type of 'investigative journalist' today. The sad story of Dr Evatt's obsession regarding the Petrov Affair should be a warning to all of how much damage such conspiracy theories can ultimately inflict on their originators, and those around them, when based upon little more than the imaginative workings of over suspicious minds.

Although the events described by Mr Manne took place over 30 years ago his book is particularly worth reading in that it is largely based upon research amongst ASIO and Royal Commission files only recently released to the public. The Petrovs may not deserve a high position in the list of Soviet defectors, but anyone interested in the techniques and objectives of the Soviet intelligence services at the height of the Cold War will find much of value in Mr Manne's very thorough study.

BITTER CHARMS

James de Candole

God Bless Karl Marx! C. H. Sisson, Carcanet, 1987. £4.95, pp.64, (0-85635-710-3)

Edmund Burke, in the *Reflections*, compares the construction of the state to that of a poem. He gives us a quotation from Horace - 'It is not enough for poems to be fine; they must charm' and applies this principle to the political realm:

There ought to be a system of manners in every nation which a well-formed mind would be disposed to relish. To make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely.

C. H. Sisson's latest book of poems *God Bless Karl Marx!* is full of unfashionable pieties - Burke's pleasing illusions and 'decent drapery of life' which the modern mind so wilfully scorns. He values the church and the old Prayer Book, he loves his country, he scorns visionary change, he rejects the liberal 'self', and he remains acutely aware of the limitations of reason. But the charm he values so highly in the public realm is sadly lacking in this collection; reading his poems is like raking over a compost of anger and disappointment, albeit a compost 'In which humility may flower'.

In *Thoughts on the Churchyard and the Resting-Places of the Dead*, the mildness of liturgical idiom -

The corpse shows that you must decline
In rottenness and stink to dust,
That nothing in the world's too fine
To go to ashes when it must,

is mixed with a gruesome picture of physical decay. This portrait of a putrefying child is a quite horrible example, made more so by the sickening juxtaposition:

The pretty ringlets fall away,
The plaits begin to come apart,
Where the moist flesh still has its say,
About the temples, movement starts.

Throughout he mocks us with our pitiful insufficiencies. In *What Do You Know?* he scoffs at reason, the curative of modern man;

Reason, ha, ha!
You may be sure, is never sound:
Take a look at the whirling ground.
Ha, ha!

In *Vigil and Ode for St George's Day* he sighs, irritated by 'those for whom perfection / came in a sudden phase' - we are irredeemably flawed and '... crimes / Habitual to mankind'. He scorns those 'cunning men' who with 'All manner of follies weave / Their way past us with if and when'. Above all he asks us to learn that visionary change 'Puts all out of joint':

- Lies, lies and lies.
So, the imaginary
Point recedes and the fact
Formerly exact
Loses reality.

Cotignac Again

Richard Cronin, in his review of Sisson's *Collected*

Poems 1943-1983 (*The Salisbury Review*, July 1985), points out that for Sisson, 'We find our own identity only in recognising that of others,' and that it is this thought which makes him a nationalist and a conservative. This is surely right - Sisson illuminates the problems faced by all of us in a 'progressive', pluralist society. The ever-deepening and variegated blush of multi-culturalism ends up destroying the conditions in which it is possible to achieve an understanding of ourselves and of others. 'In the end', writes Sisson in a poem entitled *The Absence*, a lonely and exhausted murmur of resignation:

... those to whom one cannot speak
Cannot be heard, and that is my condition.

And again, the obsessive pursuit of the mirage of an 'authentic self', a self which must be conjured out of nothing since it rejects all externally imposed values, destroys the possibility of friendship:

When all retire within themselves
Each to declare that what he has found
Is nothing to anybody around,
Then friendship cracks and each one salves
His stupid conscience as he may:
Or so it seems to me today.

The myth of the disengaged self is a miserable fantasy. Man, Sisson believes, is rather less capable and rather more dependent on the external world, which, if he is to live bearably, he must learn to live *with not against*:

Think what you will, nothing will come of that,
What you spin on the lathe of circumstance
You are shaped, it is all the shape you have.

The poem which gives the title to the collection, *God Bless Karl Marx!* sets out to dispel another favourite illusion of the modern age. Here Sisson suggests that that 'great sage Abstraction' - which 'flies like a pterodactyl, with an action / Appropriate for imaginary millenia' and which creates the phantasmagoria of classes, 'Mythological giants strewn by the way / Of history' - is a dangerous 'theoretical gimmick', a 'two-backed beast' (Marxist-Leninism) which feeds upon class-hatred and spits out huge gobs of mankind - those who fail to nourish the ineluctable laws of socialist development.

C.H. Sisson hisses and moans at the idiocies he finds around him but he does so only to rescue the actual and the concrete from the clutches of 'cut-throats claiming to be kind'. Indeed, his poetry is nowhere finer than where he sets his anger aside to remind us of his love for the countryside and for his country:

... You may say
It is the sick dream of an ageing man
Looking out over a past not his own.
But I say this: it is there I belong,
Or here, where the pasture squelches underfoot
and England stirs, forever to hold my bones.

The Hare

There *is* charm - in his satires on 'their Graces' - the Archbishops and their 'conquering empire of light and reason ... destitute of all taste and elegance' (Burke).

The empty bucket, sound, clangs in the well
And draws up nothing, banged against the wall.
Was meaning down there? It is dry now
And all around the well-head chirrup and mow
Empty figures of silken Why and How.

On the Prayer Book

Sisson urges us to cherish what we have, *here and now*: Be sure, he warns, all those gusts of progressive wind will 'swallow up our land'. His poems are both a vigil and an ode for England for finally 'it is her he seeks to please' (*Vigil and Ode for St. George's Day*).

CROWNED JEWELS

Stanley Arthur

Red Calypso, by Geoffrey Wagner, The Claridge Press, 1988, £8.95, (1-870 626-25-7).

Professor Wagner lived in Grenada during the period of the 'Peoples Revolutionary Government' (PRG) headed by Maurice Bishop. In this book he describes the effects of the so-called revolution, and its dramatic end; and seeks to put these events in the perspective of Western and Soviet policy in the region. The story he tells is a grim one, but worth the telling, not only in order to answer left-wing mendacity, but also to sound a note of warning to us all.

On the night of 13 March, 1979, the official Opposition Party, the New Jewel Movement, took advantage of Prime Minister Eric Gairy's absence from the island to stage an almost bloodless coup: one officer was killed when the barracks were attacked. Thus began four and a half years of a *dictatorship of the working people* by a *vanguard party* purporting to lead a revolution of *the masses* (in a tiny agricultural island of less than 100,000, half of them under 15).

The Constitution was abolished: rule was by decree. One apparently curious anomaly was the retention of the Governor-General (the Queen's representative under the abolished Constitution) as Head of State. But, as Wagner points out, this enabled the PRG to retain Grenada's membership of the Commonwealth (unlike Fiji, which recently had to leave the Commonwealth when it became a republic). By a grim irony, however, it also conferred a legitimacy on the Court which tried Bishop's murderers.

From the beginning the PRG followed an Orwellian course. Radio 'Free' Grenada was totally controlled. Myths were created, such as that the PRG were obliged to look to Cuba and the Soviet bloc for help because of the refusal of the West to offer the new government assistance. This was nonsense, and indeed Wagner criticises the Carter administration for being *too* ready to try to come to terms with the PRG, despite the stream of anti-US propaganda which emanated daily

from the island in the media and speeches by Ministers.

Cuba promptly established a substantial Embassy; hundreds of Cubans and heavy equipment were shipped in to work on the largest civil engineering project in the Eastern Caribbean: the construction of an airport large enough to take Boeing 747s, in the interests of tourism. However, Grenada had only a few hundred hotel beds: small wonder that there was suspicion about the real purpose of the airport. Nor was it a free gift: its cost represented a heavy financial burden, and when the Bishop government finally fell, Grenada was deeply in debt.

Meanwhile, the PRG continued to seek help from new friends - Libya, Algeria, North Korea and members of the Eastern European bloc. But all was not well within Grenada. For the biggest myth of all was that there had ever been a 'revolution' in the island: there had been a coup, initially popular as an alternative to Gairy. But with increasing demands on a basically easy-going population, the popularity of the self-proclaimed 'heroes' waned to vanishing point, as the captured documents of the Central Committee subsequently showed.

In 1982 the Russians established an Embassy in Grenada, with an ambassador who was a General in the GRU, the military intelligence branch of the KGB. Why should they do this on a tiny Caribbean island when they already had, in the Cuban ambassador, an extremely influential - if not the most influential person on Grenada? Wagner maintains - rightly - that the Russians had come to pull rank, and to speed up the by now faltering progress of Grenada to a fully Marxist-Leninist State, and a military base for Soviet adventuring in the area. But the speed and violence of the final split in the ruling party came as a surprise, even to well-informed observers such as Wagner.

Shortly after a visit to Eastern Europe, and a final talk with Fidel Castro, Bishop - still to all appearances the charismatic Leader - was put under house arrest in chains, together with his mistress (and Minister of Education) Jacqueline Creft, accused by his hardline colleagues of 'petty bourgeois' tendencies. When a crowd of Bishop supporters released him, the Peoples Revolutionary Army, under orders from the hardliners in the Central Committee, sent three armoured Soviet personnel carriers, which fired into the crowd, killing many. They then cold-bloodedly murdered Bishop, Creft, two other Cabinet colleagues, and a leading Trade Unionist.

This rump of the Central Committee then announced the formation of a 'Revolutionary Military Council' to rule the island, and imposed a shoot-to-kill curfew. Since they had no claim to authority whatsoever, except for the guns that they could command; and since they realised that nemesis might come upon them from outside, they appealed to Castro for help, only to be met with an angry demand for Bishop's killers to be punished. These stern anti-Imperialist revolutionaries then sent a grovelling message to the US Embassy in Barbados, with an assurance that they intended to

form a 'broad-based civilian government' with a 'mixed economy'. The answer they got was the US-Caribbean military intervention on 25 October, 1983. Wagner has no time for those who argue that the intervention was either unnecessary or illegal. He quotes the journalist Hugh O'Shaughnessy: 'It could only have been a matter of time before the Leninist aspirations of Coard and Austin (members of the RMC) were swept away by the Grenadians themselves'. How? asks Wagner. With nutmegs?

He is equally critical of the lawyers, including the American Bar Association, who 'threw up the Rio Treaty, the Vienna Convention, and the UN and OAS Charters as road blocks to the rescue of a people helpless in the face of a murderous gang of thugs'. The only legitimate source of authority on the island was, normally, the Governor-General whom the PRG for their own purposes had left in place. When he asked for help, 'he got it'. A threat perceived not just by the United States, but primarily by Grenada's small Eastern Caribbean neighbours, had been removed, and Grenada returned to the ballot box.

The tragedy of the Bishop episode in Grenada's history is that if he and his colleagues had been pragmatists whose only objective was to offer the people of Grenada efficient and honest government they would have received a good deal of sympathy, despite the concern over their method of taking power, and they might have achieved much. But instead they embraced a harsh and unforgiving ideology with harsh and unforgiving paymasters. They ended up one third dead, and the others on trial for murder.

'Red Calypso' is unlikely to become a 'standard source of reference' as is claimed for it, if only because Professor Wagner is unable to resist the temptation to animadvert at any point in the narrative, on any topic. But the book is entertaining for the general reader, and is of especial interest for anyone who had direct experience of the problems of the region, and its *dramatis personae*.

LOST CONTINENT *Mervyn Hiskett*

West African Interlude, Richard Terrell, Michael Russell, Salisbury, 1988, £10.95, 175pp. (85955 144 X).

The title aptly describes a collection of reminiscences, based on a journal compiled over about two years, during which the author served as an Administrative Officer in Nigeria.

Richard Terrell's style is always enjoyable. His imagery is rich and tangible - so much so that it provokes me to suggest certain additions to his narrative. For all the vividness of his accounts of Nigeria in the

rainy season, and his olfactory sensitivity - the lush, warm scents of Lagos contrasted with the harsher, volcanic ones of Las Palmas - he seems to have missed that most thrilling West African scent of all - the pungency of the first rains pattering down on the hot, dry dust of the last, intolerably scorching day of *bazara* (the hot season immediately before the rains). Also, though he visited Kano, there is not a descriptive word about that ancient, stately 'cathedral' city of the North, but only a comment on its Railway Guest House, now, alas, converted into a garish would-be luxury hotel. However, these are not criticisms, only comments on how what strikes one man for a lifetime, may pass another by. Throughout, the book is a stylistic delight, nostalgic for those who have known Nigeria; provocative for those still young enough to make it part of life's experience.

Two incidents intrigued me. First, his relationship with the winsome Christiana, the lady to whom he was introduced by his steward and who promptly became his mistress. Although these women trading in the market and having occasional sexual relations with men, mainly Europeans, are certainly not prostitutes in the usual connotation of that ugly and ungentlemanly word, they are a West-African institution. Somewhere in my field notes I have a prudish and disapproving circular from the Government of the Gold Coast, c.1930, headed 'Liaisons between Expatriate Government Personnel and Native Women', or something equally distasteful. It deplores the kind of ménage Terrell so tenderly describes, and seeks to put it down. I doubt if it succeeded. The institution is ancient. It much resembles Islamic *mut'ah* (temporary) marriage, which I believe may have been its origin, for there is much more independence on the woman's side than in servile concubinage. If I recall correctly, Ibn Battuta makes lusty mention of it in the Sahelian kingdoms of the 14th century. It was almost certainly formally established on the Coast by Muslim traders, long before the Portuguese caravels made landfall there in that century. The early Europeans and their successors thereupon adopted it. The relationships are implicitly contractual as well as amorous, and no shame attaches to them, as the proudly-borne European surnames of the Coast testify. For non-Muslim Europeans similar liaisons with Muslim women in the 'Holy North' were out of the question, though relationships of the same kind with pagan Fulani girls were at one time common enough. As Terrell makes clear, part of the charm of the Southern liaisons was that of pidgen English, as well as the artistry of Southern West-African womens' dress. Pidgen was lacking in the Northern equivalents. However, they had a simple elegance of their own and sometimes produced accomplished Fulfude speakers. Seldom has original sin had more gracious and useful outcomes!

The other for-me-outstanding incident is that of the peasant who, in the course of grooming for independent Nigerian citizenship, was asked where Nigeria was. He pursed his lips towards the horizon and replied, 'E

dey - far away'. (It is over there - Far away). I feel this sums up the folly of dismantling a humane, paternalist administration and pitch-forking these dignified but defenceless people into a succession of spectacularly corrupt elected governments interspersed with more or less brutal military administration - all in the name of the cruel liberal chimera of independence. What a burden of moral guilt these liberals bear for having torn down a most civilized institution - British colonial government - and handed back chaos to a hapless Third World!

In his evocative way Richard Terrell does indeed do justice to the memory of the British Colonial Office whose impact upon events in recent decades is due for reappraisal. At £10.95 for the hardback, the book is excellent light but cultivated reading.

Political Order

Philosophical Anthropology, Modernity,
and the Challenge of Ideology

David J. Levy

"... this book is extremely important... I hope [it] will be widely read." — *Times Higher Education Supplement*. *Political Order* is a thoughtful, eloquent contribution to the field of political and social theory. It represents a major effort to rethink the problems of politics from an uncompromisingly realist perspective.

ISBN 8-8071-1389-1 cloth, £18.00

In Search of Order

Volume Five of *Order and History*

Eric Voegelin

In Search of Order brings to a conclusion Eric Voegelin's masterwork, *Order and History*, begun more than thirty years ago. Sadly, his death on 19 January 1985, means that *In Search of Order* is briefer than it otherwise would have been. However, the theoretical presentation that Voegelin had set for himself is essentially completed here.

ISBN 0-8071-1414-6 cloth, £11.95

Louisiana State University Press
1 Gower Street LONDON WC1E 6HA

TRADITION HAS ITS REASONS

Ian Crowther

Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Alasdair MacIntyre, Duckworth, 1988, 410pp., £12.95 (0-7156-2199-8).

The Politics of Human Nature, Thomas Fleming, Transaction Books/Clio Distribution Services, Oxford, 241pp., £22.00 (0-88738-189-8).

Alone among the traditions of political life examined by Alasdair MacIntyre in his latest book, liberal individualism rejoices in its independence of all traditions. It is indeed what MacIntyre calls it, an 'antitradition'. Its essence is the familiar Enlightenment notion of a natural (or 'rational') man existing in the first instance apart from, and then in tension with, any particular society of which he finds himself a member. Not that the tension need be very great, provided that through the circumscription of its rulers and rules the society respects every individual's right to pursue his preferences at least to a point consistent with every other individual's right to do the same. And provided also that every effort is made, through progressive education and legislation, to emancipate citizens from the vestigial influences of race, custom and religion. The isolated individual, who is at once the progenitor and the product of this society, is what enlightened moderns take to be a rational person.

Rationality, in this view, is the outcome of a purgative process, as of course it was for Descartes: we are rational to the extent that we become socially disembodied observers. 'Unaccommodated Man', a being to be pitied by Shakespeare as one pities the destitute and the dispossessed, has come now to be widely regarded as Reason personified. Rationality, we have been told for the last two hundred years, requires that we liberate ourselves from the very allegiances and social relationships in terms of which pre-modern man understood his place in the world.

It is easy to see how, given this requirement of disinterestedness, which its advocates equate with the objectivity of the scientist, liberals can plausibly claim to be neutral as between any number of different conceptions of the good life. In fact the neutrality turns out to be a sham, as soon as one notes the fate which invariably overtakes all such conceptions in modern liberal societies. True, people can now live by any private theory of the good they please, as long as they do not attempt, as it were, to 'go public' with it. While liberal individualist regimes will tolerate an infinity of 'life styles' or sects, they will also proscribe their translation into the social and political realm, except in so far as they can be construed there as expressions of attitude and feeling. In this way nonliberal normative judgments (and by definition, most normative judgments of a substantive kind are nonliberal!) are, if not marginalized, then emasculated. And this fact gives the lie to the liberal claim that it has no broad ruling

conception which, in the course of implementing, severely limits 'its toleration of rival conceptions of the good in the public arena.'

What does count (literally) is the weighing and tallying of individual or group preferences and the bargaining that goes on to secure their embodiment in policy. 'Fair bargaining' or rules and procedures to ensure it thus becomes of paramount importance in a liberal individualist society. Conflicts must be resolved not by invoking any overall theory of human good but ultimately by resource to the legal system. As MacIntyre puts it, 'the lawyers, not the philosophers, are the clergy of liberalism.' But it is not only lawyers who have profited from liberal modernity. Modern society is debarred by the sovereignty that it grants to individual wants from admitting any established 'clerisy', who will lay down standards or serve as models of exemplary conduct. Here it must rely instead upon a ruling elite endowed with persuasive, manipulative or therapeutic skills. It matters more and more—as much in the cultural and political spheres as in the economic—how things are presented or packaged. They must be made to appeal to individuals considered not as inheritors and beneficiaries of a rich tradition but as cultural and social orphans: mere sensate beings, alone with their appetites. Such beings furnish the raw material for sophists, spivs and demagogues to work upon.

When one looks at how the individual-as-such has turned out in practice, it is hard to credit him with much rationality. Even harder is it to believe that he occupies some neutral high ground from which he may gain an objective view of other and older traditions. Fact is, this individual, far from being 'above' tradition, is all unknowing, the victim of one particular tradition: liberalism. MacIntyre's case against this tradition's claimed universalism rests not only on the fact that liberal rationality was itself conceived within a tradition, and is inconceivable without it, but on the fact also that all developed conceptions of rationality are likewise the creatures of particular traditions.

MacIntyre's book provides 'an outline narrative history of three traditions of enquiry into what practical rationality is and what justice is' as well as drawing a contrast between these traditions and liberalism. Where the latter, even while being itself a tradition, has nursed the twin illusions of a tradition-free individual and a tradition-free rationality, the older traditions which MacIntyre explores all situated the individual—and his rationality—within a developed, rather than an underdeveloped, idea of the human good. 'In Aristotelian practical reasoning it is the individual *qua* citizen who reasons; in Thomistic practical reasoning it is the individual *qua* enquirer into his or her good and the good of his or her community.' Even in Hume, who in so many respects foreshadows an evaluative scheme and a social order predicated on the satisfaction of individual wants, we still find the assumption that those wants will always be structured by the individual's participation 'in a society of a particular kind of mutuality and reciprocity.' Only 'in the practical

reasoning of liberal modernity (is) it the individual *qua* individual who reasons.'

No review can begin to recapitulate the great detail which has gone into MacIntyre's account of each tradition. I can only say that immersing oneself as a reader in such detail is an enriching experience. Just because to MacIntyre each tradition is *sui generis*, we are taught to see how the virtues which are prized by particular cultures are not arbitrarily chosen but arise from 'participation in the life of one of those groups whose thought and action are informed by some distinctive profession of settled conviction.' But granted all that MacIntyre says about the 'embedded' character of the good human life, about its necessary roots in historically grown traditions, there still remains (at any rate, to this reader) the nagging question of human nature. When, instinctively, we appeal to the concept ('It's not natural'), are we conjuring up a chimera? Is human nature *nothing* but its many different cultural manifestations: in other words, a redundant term? I don't think so, and I don't think MacIntyre's thesis obliges us to think so either, because his very emphasis on the social contexts in which necessarily our moral lives are organised presupposes something necessary and universal about the human being. It does seem to me that what MacIntyre's book points to, beyond the heterogeneity of traditions, is a certain homogeneity in the make-up of *homo sapiens*. There is, in other words, a human nature about which we can at least talk, even if we cannot see or touch it except when it is clothed in culture.

It is a tribute to the power exercised over our minds by the liberal idea of human nature as a bloodless abstraction that ever since Burke many conservatives have shunned the very idea itself, glorying instead in the particularity and even the irrationality of their own traditions. But this is surely to concede far too much to the opposition. MacIntyre is all for the particularity of traditions but convinces us also of their rationality. I see nothing incompatible between MacIntyre's brand of rational historicism and the Aristotelian-Thomist concept of human nature as always concrete and historical. It is the latter view which informs Thomas Fleming's book, *The Politics of Human Nature*. Drawing upon insights from sociobiology, anthropology and ethnography, Fleming sets out to demonstrate 'how unlikely it is that such a species as ours could ever have existed, especially in its natural state, as a set of atomized, self-seeking individualists.'

The mistake made by moderns, to equate our human nature with nature *per se*, issued in the idea that we are most ourselves in a 'state of nature', and that we invent civil government only for our convenience and protection, while jealously guarding our 'natural rights'. Fleming, following Aristotle, argues to the contrary that the fulfilment of our nature lies in civil society or the 'polis'. Against libertarian proponents of the minimal state, like Robert Nozick, Fleming denies that the State has no other function but the protection of individuals from physical harm. Such a view implies an unreal

distinction between the 'regulation of violence and the regulation of morals.'

Fleming is no less attentive than MacIntyre to the fact that 'different societies prize different virtues.' But underlying all the differences which Fleming freely acknowledges and copiously illustrates there seem to persist certain fundamental patterns of behaviour which lend substance to the idea of our social nature as something not chosen but given. 'If, even apart from families, we have a natural tendency to form groups, promote leaders, and develop rules and status systems - then we have to wonder still more about man in the natural state.' If it is in our nature to be something infinitely more complex than go-getting individualists, then we are in possession of a 'natural right' undreamt of in liberal theory, namely, the right to resist all those - egalitarians, progressive educationalists, family reformers, social and genetic engineers, the monstrous regiment of feminists, and countless others - who want to remake us in their own, unnatural images.

FAUSTUS AT LARGE

Jonathan Ruffer

The Alchemy of Finance, George Soros, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987, £18.00, (0-297-793-314)

My father was once asked by an American GI whether sherry was any good. He was interrupted in his reply as to the status of the drink by a second question: 'Hell, man, is it a quick drunk?'. There will be many who read George Soros's book with the spirit embodied by that pre-war soldier. The aspiring plutocrat may hesitate when he reads that 'the shoe-lace theory can be interpreted as a synthesis of Hegel's dialectic of ideas and Marx's dialectical materialism', ('Hell, man, do we go long or short of copper?'), and Soros's integrated model of the Imperial Circle on page 116 is not for those whose digestions are attuned to the financial equivalent of the milk shake.

His basic message is that concepts of proof and absolute assertion are inappropriate in a context of social interaction. Future events cannot be predicted accurately because they involve human decisions, which are driven by inherently flawed perceptions. He therefore regards the idea of a social scientist as a contradiction in terms. For science, 'proof' is the aim of the enquirer; in society, truth is revealed in 'effectiveness'.

George Soros maintains that the key to an effective understanding of social forces is to be found in his concept of reflexivity. He defines reflexivity as a two way connection between flawed perceptions and the

actual course of events, which results in a lack of correspondence between the two. He believes that this concept has given him an 'edge' in investment performance.

The stockmarket is a perfect testing ground for an analysis of the interactions of human society. Effectiveness in the financial markets is easier to define than spiritual or emotional effectiveness (holiness or happiness). It is easily defined, for its participants share the common target of the accumulation of wealth. Moreover, although all human decisions are based in ignorance, the flow of information into the market place is, within those limitations, comprehensive.

The market place is a phenomenon which has been somewhat neglected by serious thinkers. Its participants tend either to folksiness - 'the grizzly grip of a bear market' - or are theorists who variously explain market trends as mere chains of chance (the random walk theory) or a perfect discounting mechanism of the future. There is every point of view between these extremes. The trouble with folksiness is that it offers no insight, and the trouble with the theorists is that their views are unproved and unproveable. Soros has attempted to provide, in the second part of his book, a framework against which his theories can be tested.

He describes this as a 'real-time experiment'. It takes the form of diary notes written (and unexpurgated) for two 6 month periods in 1985 and 1986 respectively. It may not appear very readable, because it presupposes a close knowledge of the way that commodity, currency and stockmarkets operate and inter-relate.

It nevertheless serves the same intellectual purpose as Einstein's squiggles do in relation to the formula $E=MC_2$. It provides the authority for the assertions - authority in this case being defined as effectiveness rather than proof. George Soros's supreme achievement is not, in my view, to have thought of the concept of reflexivity. It is rather that his mastery of stockmarkets have given this concept an authority which no other social thinker could achieve, because no other social thinker could carry the burden of the real time experiments. For one man to understand every twist and cross current distilled into a single market movement is incredible. It provides the technical evidence that George Soros's frenetic purchases and sales made within the period were done with an extraordinary grasp of what was driving the markets on the day, the hour, the minute that he was making his decisions. George Soros literally became the market. His feat was like that of a man who drives six inches behind the bumper of a very fast moving and nimble car, watching a multiplicity of obstacles and opportunities, while responding simultaneously to those conditions in the same manner as the vehicle in front. One can begin to see how extraordinarily difficult and dangerous the attempt to allocate the correct weight to each circumstance is likely to be. Moreover a perfect allocation results in the participant being no better than the market. In practice, of course, most players ignore

many, if not most, of the cross currents, and hope that these will cancel one another out - i.e. they drive some distance behind the vehicle in front and hope to catch it up by weaving rather less. The significance of reflexivity for Soros the Investor is that, having the prodigious talent to perform as one with the market, he needs only one more ingredient to out-perform it. Thus, for him, reflexivity makes the difference between exactly tracking the market for 20 years, and multiplying original investor's money 300 fold.

There will be many who read his book hoping for an insight as to how to be equally successful. The inherent reply to such a reader is the same as Caruso's to an aspirant singer: 'Have a voice as good as mine'. The performance of Soros's Quantum Fund is unparalleled. Yet the value of this book is for the insights of Soros the Thinker: his investment performance gives an authority to his thoughts which no theorist will ever have.

At the moment, the greatest legacy of George Soros seems to lie in the statistics of his performance figures, and the actual wealth which has been consequentially distributed to his stockholders. However, when the spirit of the age moves away from the fixation with scientific proof, this book will be seen as an important authority on the nature of dynamic institutions.

BACK TO MAITLAND

William Purdue

The Culture of Capitalism, Alan Macfarlane, Basil Blackwell, 1987, £19.50, (0-631-13636-6).

The anguish and fury of 'progressive' historians, robbed of their revolutions, knows no bounds. As interpretations of British history which stress its long continuity become steadily more influential, the reaction of the upholders of the recent orthodoxy of history as a series of revolutions and great leaps forward becomes ever more strident. Alan Macfarlane's *The Origins of English Individualism* (1978) has played an important part in the process of dismantling the Marxisant structure of British historical scholarship which was so firmly entrenched by the 1970s. A postscript in *The Culture of Capitalism* analyses the clamour of outraged dissent which greeted the earlier book; and that clamour has not yet abated. David Cannadine has, in a recent and intemperate article, described Macfarlane's work as providing a 'celebration of our country's so called "individualism" which in fact offers a Thatcherite, Little England interpretation of Britain's past, but does so only by ignoring most of the available evidence' ('British History: Past and Present - and Future?' in *Past and Present* No. 116).

Macfarlane had the temerity to argue that England has followed an individual and individualist path from at least the thirteenth century and probably long before then. England was different from other societies because it had no peasantry and possessed a legal system which emphasised individual rights and personal titles to land. It did not, in short, need revolutions to become different; for it was different already. The implications of this interpretation for Marxist, Marxisant and even Whiggish historians, are challenging. Macaulay had early on provided a picture of a rapid and progressive transformation of English society from the seventeenth century, while Marx, Engels and Weber had seen a capitalist revolution triumphing over and emerging from a feudal peasant society within a period of c.1475 to 1700. Other have gone on to locate their revolutions in a variety of centuries: thus, for R. H. Tawney, the sixteenth century was the 'watershed'. For Christopher Hill, the 'bourgeois' revolution came in the seventeenth century; while some have placed the capitalist revolution much later, making it about coterminous with an industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century. Nor have such 'revolutions' been confined to the economic or the political spheres, for Lawrence Stone and Edward Shorter have discovered a revolution in family relationships in the eighteenth century, with the growth of what Stone has called 'affective individualism'. Macfarlane discerns no revolution, whether economic, social or familial, but rather, the development of characteristics already long present in English society by the thirteenth century.

The Origins of English Individualism was followed by *Marriage and Love in England 1300-1840* in which Macfarlane took further one of his themes, the 'modernity' of English attitudes to marriage and the family as early as the fourteenth century. Because England was not a peasant society, he argued, marriage was not an inescapable duty, arranged by kin for the propagation of wealth in the shape of children, where the female partner was usually very young, but, rather a matter of choice with companionship and, often, love for the motives. The views of those who, like Stone and Shorter, had considered companionate marriage and affection for partners and children to be an eighteenth century innovation, were shown to be in error, as was the notion that the nuclear family was in England a recent development.

In *The Culture of Capitalism*, a collection of essays, Alan Macfarlane once more begins with the subject of peasantry and then goes on to explore the implications and ramifications that follow from the absence of anything resembling a model peasant society from England. A table in the first essay lists the characteristics of a model peasant society and the very different characteristics of society in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The peasant society contains such features as: the centrality of the extended household as the unit of both production and consumption; a

strong link with the land which is not seen as a saleable commodity; a low degree of market rationality; and a multi-generational household with a high fertility rate. England presents a very different picture. In English society we find: the basic unit of production is the manor or estate; production is mainly for exchange; ownership resides in the individual rather than the household; and households are usually composed of the nuclear family while the fertility rate is controlled largely through the late age of marriage. This table is the kernel of the book, for it gives us an instant portrait of two entirely different worlds, different in their economic characteristics, their family structure, their attitudes to women and children and their degrees of social and geographic mobility. The features of English society that emerge, Macfarlane sees as, together, composing the culture of capitalism. One might have preferred him to call his book 'The Culture of Individualism', for the word 'capitalism' retains the deterministic implications given to it by Marxists, while Macfarlane stays with the definitions of Marx and Weber, seeing capitalism as a historically specific phenomenon. Yet, whatever the most apposite generic word, the book proceeds to give us a fascinating analysis of demographic trends, of the degree and type of violence in English society, of English attitudes to nature, love and evil and of the concept of revolution.

The picture that emerges is of a society governed by law, in which social relationships were not dominated by extended kinship groups, and in which, by the fourteenth century, more than half the population were working for money wages. It was also a society in which domestic pets were highly prized, in which people lavished great care upon their gardens and in which mastery over nature enabled nature to be appreciated as something apart.

Alan Macfarlane brings to his subject the comparative framework and the knowledge of sociological and anthropological theory that one would expect from a Reader in Historical Anthropology. It is significant, however, that his own doubts as to the tenability of the prevailing academic orthodoxy came from his own detailed researches (on the life of Ralph Josselin, an Essex farmer and vicar of the seventeenth century, and on two specific English villages and their development), and also from a rediscovery of the writings of F. W. Maitland and W. Stubbs. There was in the work of those great historians no hint of a cataclysmic change from a 'medieval' to a 'modern' society but rather a depiction of a long and continuous development.

If *The Culture of Capitalism* is a body blow to Marxist interpretations of history it does not give comfort to all schools of conservative thought. Some conservatives have shared with Marxists a nostalgia for the virtues of a supposedly customary, organic and uncommercial pre-capitalist society, although they have stressed different aspects of it. Mathew Arnold, F. R. Leavis and T. S. Eliot have all detected a fall from grace and a great divide separating the pre-industrial from the modern world. But the mainstream of British

conservatism differs from its continental counterparts in that the national traditions, the continuities and the harmony with the past it seeks to defend contain strong individualist and even liberal elements. This is largely why Burke was so different from De Maistre. Macfarlane, of course, tells us only half the story and, if he is clearly right in seeing an individual and a rational tradition, then J. C. D. Clarke's work provides an instructive balance; Jonathan Clarke is also concerned with continuity (see for instance *Revolution and Rebellion: State and Society in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (1986) which I reviewed in *The Salisbury Review*, July 1987), but he stresses the endurance of religion and the confessional state and the perseverance into the nineteenth century of an ordered and hierarchical society under aristocratic leadership. Perhaps Macfarlane's interpretation of Britain's past is a 'Thatcherite' interpretation, and none the worse for that, and Clarke's a high Tory one. If neither is the whole truth, nor are they necessarily incompatible. Neither are, however, compatible with the view of contemporary society as a recent construct, cut off from past society by its novelty and its rapid and violent formation. The big appeal of revolutions to historians of a socialist persuasion is that, as Macfarlane argues, they suggest 'that our own world has such shallow roots that another revolution could easily shift it'. Alan Macfarlane has demonstrated that the roots of English society go very deep.

WRONGS OF THE RIGHT

Nigel Ashford

The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship,
Desmond S. King, Macmillan, 1987, £8.50, (0-333-420-756)

Desmond King has provided a thoughtful contribution to the debate on the Left on how to respond to the New Right, or more accurately to the liberal economic element within the New Right. He explains some of the main theories together with some of the criticisms normally made of them, examines the behaviour of the Thatcher and Reagan administrations, and suggests that 'post-Thatcherism' must not be a return to the old consensus but should adopt greater use of markets while strengthening the concept of social welfare rights.

His understanding of New Right theorists and ideas is more thorough than that of most critics. He recognises the conflict between the liberal and conservative elements of the New Right; discusses the liberal ideas of freedom, the market and public choice; and explains their critique of the post-war Keynesian welfare state consensus. He examines the economic policies of the British and US governments and recognises that they have failed to achieve New Right goals. However, he believes that the administrations have significantly changed the political agenda and that the Left must

respond in a creative rather than a reactive manner.

While recognising that ideas are not the only factor in determining policy, he correctly notes that they are significant. He provides a good discussion of liberal theories and of the economic policies of the Thatcher and Reagan administrations. What is absent is an explanation of the connection between them, which requires knowledge of the empirical work of the New Right and of how these ideas were transmitted from the intellectuals to the politicians. It is the former which is a particularly serious omission, because of his frequent claims that the theorists and the politicians were either ignorant of, or deliberately unconcerned about, criticisms that were made of their ideas or policies.

On monopolies, King finds it 'striking that those promoting the market model largely neglect this problem' (p. 78). Yet Friedman discusses monopolies in Chapter 8 of *Capitalism and Freedom* where he argues that 'probably the most important source of monopoly power has been government assistance' (p. 129). The theory of 'contestable markets', that anti-trust measures are only necessary when entry into the market is prevented, explains the Reagan administration's policies in this field, which King claims is inconsistent with liberal economic theory (p. 156). He makes several references to the 1930s' depression as evidence of market failure and justification of Keynesianism (p. 5), ignoring those economists who have attributed it to government actions such as the drastic reduction in the money supply, dramatic tax increases and the rise in tariffs.

In King's discussion of the two governments, he implies that they are not interested in whether there is empirical evidence for their policies (pp. 144, 150). He claims that Laffer provides no empirical support for his curve (p. 150). In fact there have been numerous studies of supply-side effects demonstrating that at certain tax levels revenues can be increased through tax cuts and at other levels the loss of tax revenues may be smaller than Keynesian economics would predict. Laffer's friend Jude Wanniski presents empirical evidence to support the Laffer Curve in *The Way the World Works*. King implies a lack of evidence about the effects of welfare dependency (pp. 27, 150), ignoring Charles Murray's *Losing Ground*, the most important and detailed work in this area. My argument is not that New Right writers are necessarily correct, but rather that they did address the empirical issues which King claims they did not.

King notes the different principles of the liberal and conservative strands of the New Right. However, these differences are not so incoherent as he implies. The liberal belief in the free market fits well with traditional Tory scepticism about the capabilities of government, although liberals will tend to have more faith in markets than conservatives. Similarly, the conservative emphasis on defence and law and order fits well with the liberal belief that these are the defining and necessary functions of government, although they will

be more sceptical about a policy of throwing money at them. The usual example by King of conservative 'authoritarianism' is the 'attack' on the trade unions. Giving the voting power to members and reducing coercion on the picket line is portrayed (with no sense of recognition) as a reduction in the rights of workers.

His main attack on the New Right is in the form of a defence of social rights. He presents the development of legal, political and social rights as a continuum of rights. He implies that the New Right wishes to diminish all of these rights (p. 165). Nineteenth-century liberals, about whom he is dismissive, were in the forefront of the promotion of universal legal and political rights. This is a reflection of their belief in the freedom of the individual, his right to procedural justice and the need to check the potentially tyrannical power of government. However, social rights are conceptually very different. Instead of respecting and protecting the freedom of the individual, claims to social rights seek to justify the coercive denial of personal economic freedom to satisfy someone's conception of social justice. Absent is any discussion of the nature, sources and legitimation of rights.

King himself is unclear about his concept of the welfare state. He defines it as 'providing citizens with a minimum income, a basic standard of social services (health, education, for example), and respite against uncertainty' (p. 65) and suggests that the New Right wishes to destroy it. Defined like this, it would be

acceptable to most (though not all) liberals. The first could be provided by the negative income tax, the second by education vouchers and compulsory health insurance with state payment for the poor, and the third by a proper system of unemployment insurance. However, what King wishes to defend is a universal, comprehensive and state-monopoly welfare state, which would be unacceptable to the New Right. He claims that it is the widely held and deeply entrenched belief in the welfare state that has prevented reforms in this area. Liberals, however, claim that the support is for King's more narrowly defined welfare state, while the successful defence of the state monopoly lies with vested interests, of the mind studied by the theory of public choice.

King's proposals amount essentially to a revived Keynesianism with a more active labour market policy. He takes Sweden as his model: would he then uphold the strict workfare provisions that prevail in that country? An incomes policy based on the ideas of James Meade is presented as essential, but does this include Meade's desire for the 'removal of all the special trade union legal immunities and privileges' (p. 184)? King's proposals may have their virtues, but they hardly amount to a coherent economic policy. In fact, they indicate that the left is still obsessed with redistribution and has little to say about production, and thus has failed to come to grips with the problems of the post-war consensus.

Notes on Contributors

Stanley Arthur was British High Commissioner to Barbados (1978-1982) and Grenada (1980-1982).

Nigel Ashford is Senior Lecturer in Politics at North Staffordshire Polytechnic.

A. C. Bradley was a Shakespearean critic and the brother of the conservative philosopher, F. H. Bradley.

James de Candole is our Deputy Editor.

Richard Cronin is Lecturer in English at the University of Glasgow.

Ian Crowther is our Literary Editor.

Antony Flew is Distinguished Research Fellow at Bowling Green State University, Ohio.

Paul Gottfried is Literary Editor of *World and I*, and author of *The Conservative Movement* (1988).

Ian Greig is a specialist on communism and political warfare.

Mervyn Hiskett was vice-principal of a school in northern Nigeria.

J. C. Nyíri is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Budapest.

Anthony O'Hear is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bradford.

Dennis O'Keefe is Senior Lecturer in Education at the Polytechnic of North London.

William Purdue is a teacher in History at the Open University.

Jonathan Ruffer is an investment analyst and author of a book on Edwardian shooting parties.

G. M. Tamás is a philosopher living in Budapest and author of *L'Oeil et La Main*.

P. N. R. Waterman is Managing Director of a toy manufacturer.

Roger Watson is a biochemist, and freelance writer and researcher on religion and ideology.

John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society*, Verso, 253pp, £8.95 paper, (0 86091 917X).

John Keane's book of essays is one of several recent attempts by socialists - P. Q. Hirst's *Law, Socialism and Democracy* is another - to defend the ideal of civil society, as an entity outside the control of the state. Well-written, learned and imaginative, these essays make interesting reading for those who wish to understand the new socialist idea of citizenship. Traditionally, the desire for a separation of state and civil society has been voiced most powerfully by conservatives: by Burke (whose 'little platoons' were to be the source of culture, morality and allegiance); by Tocqueville (for whom the civil associations of America seemed to be the best safeguards against the excesses of democracy); and by Hegel (to whom the distinction between State and Civil Society is owed). Burke and Hegel are largely ignored by Keane, and Tocqueville is criticized for under-estimating 'the democratic potential of workers' resistance to the grip of capitalist manufacturing industry', and also for failing 'to consider the possibility of a *socialist* civil society'.

The call for a civil society has been often made by the captives of Eastern Europe, most of whom repudiate socialism and all that it stands for. Keane has taken very seriously the dire conditions of 'real socialism', has visited and given comfort to those who suffer under it, and has tried to incorporate his experience in the revised socialist idea. What, then, does he now propose, as the civil society of the future? It will be, he writes, 'a type of ultra-modern civil society, no longer dominated by capitalist enterprises, patriarchal households or other undemocratic forms of association.' Robert Owen, he says, was moving in this direction; so too were the more liberal exponents of Marxism; so too are modern feminists, and the constellation of freaks and fantasists who run our inner-cities. Keane's ideal institutions, when finally he lists them, have a decidedly fashionable character: 'the rape crisis centre, the gay and lesbian collective, the housing cooperative', and 'other public spheres of civil society'. To advance towards such ideal institutions, we must 'politicize' civil society, take once more to the streets, and march beside our fellows for a better world.

How the politicization of civil society is to free it from the grip of politics is a question to which Keane does not address himself. Nor does he inquire who will lead these new 'movements of the oppressed', or how the power of such leaders might be limited. Behind his rhetoric one cannot help suspecting the old sentimental dream, of a society 'mobilized to fellowship', and

'unified' by those whose 'leading role' justifies their every action. It was with just such dreams, after all, that the bolsheviks took power.

The conservative ideal is of association *without* a purpose, of institutions which exist as persons in their own right, bound by no *a priori* rules - not even the rule of democratic government. Burke envisaged a depoliticized society, in which the patriarchal family would play a major role. For such thinkers, the State and its offices derive their legitimacy by protecting such 'little platoons' from their natural predators, among which socialists, it seems, are still to be counted. (R.S.)

David Caute, *The Fellow-Travellers: intellectual friends of communism*, Yale University Press, 1988, £10.95, (0 300 03875 5).

For well over four hundred pages, David Caute wades through the case histories of the scores of prominent Western European intellectuals who have striven to dignify the communist cause and, as a result, have become the willing victims of this century's most powerful and long-standing deceit.

Thomas Paine described history as the progress from a government of priests and conquerors to a government of pure reason. Some have been naive enough to hope for this dream's fulfilment and many appear in the book. For what, above all else, characterises the intellectual friend of communism, apologist for Castro's Cuba and Pham Van Dong's Vietnam, Stalin's Russia and Gottwald's Czechoslovakia, is his belief in Progress: the fellow-traveller is the disillusioned child of the Enlightenment, whose faith in mankind's ability to create the perfect world, disappointed by the slow and imperfect achievements of western democracy, has been fired once more in the glowing furnace of communism.

At his best, the fellow-traveller is a well-meaning dupe; at his worst, a conscience-ridden sentimentalist who plays out his utopian fantasies, at no personal cost, through the lives of other people. More often than not, he deals in double standards: the guilty contempt in which he holds his own country will not cause him to abandon it - unless briefly, to take part in Potemkin tours of his illusory New Jerusalem whose cause he so vigorously champions, though *always at a distance*. As Caute writes, "The fellow-traveller does not recommend world revolution: he prefers 'socialism in one country' - but not his own". (P.4).

(J.A. de C.)


We've grown somewhat since 1921.



Taylor Woodrow began life with a handful of team members.

Today we number many thousands worldwide. Which shows phenomenal growth by anyone's measure.

Yet when you consider Taylor Woodrow's diet of free enterprise served with generous helpings of teamwork, it comes as no surprise to find we've grown up over the years.



TEAMWORK IN CONSTRUCTION, PROPERTY AND HOMES WORLDWIDE

