


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The Salisbury Review

A quarterly magazine of conservative thought



The Third Marquess of Salisbury
1830-1903

<i>Boconoc and the Pitts</i>	A. L. Rowse
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<i>Reform in the Soviet Union: The Future of an Illusion</i>	David Satter
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<i>The Monstrous Regiment of 'Anti-Racism'</i>	Antony Flew
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<i>Punishment in the Community?</i>	Paul Helm
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<i>A Point of Protest</i>	Thomas Szasz
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<i>Mrs Thatcher and the European Community</i>	Arthur Aughey
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<i>Leo XIII as a Conservative Thinker</i>	James McNamara
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<i>In Search of Central Europe</i>	Ján Čarnogurský
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<i>The Decline and Fall of a Literary Myth</i>	Philip Thody
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<i>The Politics of Disinformation</i>	Françoise Thom
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<i>Changing the World</i>	David Stove
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The Claridge Press

The Salisbury Review

A quarterly magazine of conservative thought

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One of the more interesting features of the European Parliament is its propensity, as it strives for an authority equal to its insolence, to establish committees of enquiry into the private lives of the European nations. One such – the ‘Committee of Enquiry into the Rise of Fascism and Racism in Europe’ – has now published its report, calculated to perpetuate the myth that ‘fascism’ is the unique threat to European stability. As usual, ‘fascism’ is interpreted to mean racism, anti-semitism, extremism (of the ‘right’) and even – according to p. 138 of the report – the nationalisms of Enoch Powell, of the ‘Peterhouse group’ and of the *Salisbury Review*, all of which ‘provoked comment from a number of experts’. Who these experts are, and what credentials they enjoy, we are not told – maybe they were recruited from that absurd quango, the Commission for Racial Equality, lampooned in these pages by Antony Flew. Nevertheless, that their ignorant sneers should be endorsed in a document from the European Parliament, is yet further evidence of the foolishness of that institution, and the wrongheadedness of our decision to sign the ‘Single European Act’ which confers legitimacy upon it.

Mrs Thatcher’s speech at Bruges was a welcome relief from Eurospeak: but it was by no means a radical repudiation of the European ‘idea’. As Arthur Aughey argues, it was a reassertion of the conservative view of the European Community, as bound by contract rather than solidarity. The non-contractual bonds of membership are and ought to be internal to the nation: external relations, for a conservative, are a matter of alliance and agreement, rather than submission to another allegiance or surrender to a sovereign power – whether or not that power dismisses the root ideas of conservatism as ‘racist’.

The truth is by now apparent, that the ‘anti-racist’ campaign, into which so much bewildered liberal sentiment has been conscripted, was an exercise in disin-

formation. We shall never know the extent of communist involvement, in this or in the associated movement of ‘third worldism’. Yet all the features of communist disinformation – analyzed in this issue by Françoise Thom – were accurately reproduced by the campaign, whose main effect was to question the legitimacy of democratic institutions and the moral worthiness of the Western powers. Many people find it hard to believe that a country should devote so much of its resources to the manufacture of lies; nevertheless, such is the nature of communism and, as David Satter argues, there is no sign that the mendacity of the Communist Party has abated under Gorbachev, or that its monopoly of power will be called in question. Pressure for reform there certainly is; but until reform comes from below, and is met by genuine capitulation, the prospects for the victims of communism remain far from reassuring. In the Soviet Union every legal association – including the Orthodox Church – remains a foe of the Party; and although there are equivalents of the underground church of Slovakia (described here by Ján Čarnogurský), a person runs an enormous risk in belonging to them.

More than ever is it necessary for us to emphasize the decencies of Western constitutional government, against the campaign of disinformation which would represent the police states of communism as legal and legitimate persons, on a par with us. For all the optimism expressed in these pages by Philip Thody, natural pride continues to be scorned in a climate of opinion for which irony is the mark of political sophistication. It was such a climate of opinion that was foreseen by Leo XIII – our current conservative thinker – in his warnings to the liberal reformers of his day. Hard though it may be in a world beset by material interests, it remains necessary to speak up for the virtues of our culture: after all, we have no other.

Contents

Boconnoc and the Pitts	4
<i>A. L. Rowse</i>	
Reform in the Soviet Union:	
The Future of an Illusion	10
<i>David Satter</i>	
The Monstrous Regiment of 'Anti-Racism'	16
<i>Antony Flew</i>	
Punishment in the Community?	19
<i>Paul Helm</i>	
A Point of Protest	22
<i>Thomas Szasz</i>	
Mrs Thatcher and the European Community	23
<i>Arthur Aughey</i>	
Leo XIII as a Conservative Thinker	28
<i>James McNamara</i>	
In Search of Central Europe:	34
<i>Ján Čarnogurský</i>	
The Decline and Fall of a Literary Myth	37
<i>Philip Thody</i>	

The Politics of Disinformation	44
<i>Françoise Thom</i>	
Changing the World	48
<i>David Stove</i>	
Editorial	51
Letters	52
Book Reviews	54
<i>A. W. Purdue, Barbara Day, Stanislaw Andreski,</i>	
<i>David Dale, Edward Levy, Roger Watson,</i>	
Notes on Contributors	62
In Short	63

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Conservative Journals: FAITH AND WORSHIP

The journal of the Prayer Book Society - that still small voice of the true English church - continues to defend our religious heritage against the corporate folly of the Anglican bishops. Founded in 1975, the Prayer Book Society has devoted itself first to the defence of the Book of Common Prayer, and secondly to the reaffirmation of the Christian doctrines that are enshrined in it, and which are increasingly repudiated in favour of the 'social gospel'. Written with exemplary moderation, and in a style that well illustrates the civilizing influence of the book to the defence of which it is dedicated, *Faith and Worship* continues to reflect on the meaning of the liturgy and its place in the life of a modern person. Its authors include Peter Mullen, A. C. Capey, Anthony Kilminster, Enoch Powell, and several others whose names will be familiar to our readers. Its articles range from discussions of the language, literature and history of our country, to the fine points of theology and doctrine which - precisely because of their finesse - are both increasingly important to, and increasingly neglected by, the agitated church of modern England.

The issue for Autumn 1988 contains a powerful study by Roger Homan of the Kingman Report on the teaching of English, arguing that the illiteracy of our society is not unconnected with the wilful severance of children from the language of the King James Bible. Dr Homan suggests a remedy: the use of that text in school - though whether this will suffice to acquaint children once again with the gravity of words, and their central place in our emotions, may perhaps be doubted.

Faith and Worship is currently edited by A. C. Capey, whose contributions convey a lively sense of the importance of the Prayer Book and of the literature, sacred and secular, which has stemmed from it. Pertinent editorials, and admirably succinct books reviews, further qualify the journal for the wide readership which (perhaps because it appears only twice a year) it has yet to achieve.

Faith and Worship is obtainable from the Prayer Book Society, St. James Garlickhythe, Garlick Hill, EC4; annual subscription for members of the Society, £1.50.

Boconnoc and the Pitts

A. L. Rowse

Boconnoc lay on the ultimate horizon of my boyhood. When I breasted the hill on my walks to our uplands there on the skyline to the east were the woods of Boconnoc, on the other side of the River Fowey – the countryside of the Civil War that so appealed to my imagination. Here in the campaign of 1644 the Parliamentarian general Essex had led his army to be cooped up and surrender to Charles I. *There* it had all happened; my head in the clouds, I used to think I saw the figure of the king on horseback spanning the horizon to the east.

Somewhat later, for me it was about the limit of a whole-day tramp. The park is the finest in Cornwall, with a right-of-way through it to Boconnoc church and out at the other end to Bradock church. Down the slope to the little Lerryn river – and up above was the big house with the long rows of southward-looking windows, a small church perched on the shoulder.

The little church gives the impression of a family chapel, with large pew behind its screen: Charles I attended his devotions there in that faraway summer of 1644. I looked over the wall into the fore-court of the house below: nobody about in those days, for the owner, John Bevil Fortescue, lived mostly at Dropmore in Buckinghamshire. Meanwhile Boconnoc, in my imagination, was occupied by earlier memories, the Civil War and the Mohuns who lived here then. Tramping up the long drive one came to the obelisk, tall and tapering, which dominates a whole mile of drive from within a Civil War emplacement or redoubt.

Not far away is Bradock Down, scene of the first skirmish of the Civil War in Cornwall in 1643. Until this action the Cornish foot – who were to achieve an heroic record on other battlefields – were untried. Of their leaders Sir Bevil Grenville fell at Lansdown; Sidney Godolphin at Chagford; Nicholas Slanning and John Trevanion at the siege of Bristol. Lord Mohun was luckier, and survived to the Restoration.

The last Mohun to live at Boconnoc – though there still are people of the name, Moon, in the neighbouring parishes – was Charles, fifth Lord, a notorious duellist. Duelling was an aristocratic mania in the later 16th and 17th centuries. Mohun was a spirited young soldier, who fought his first duel at the age of eighteen, and was involved in several others before he settled into a promising career as a Whig politician. Then he involved himself in an ulcerated quarrel, over the inheritance of an estate, with the Duke of Hamilton. The duel that ensued is famous in literature for the scene described in Thackeray's *Esmond*. A more factual account is that of Swift, in a letter to Stella. The event happened in Hyde

Park, 15 November 1712. 'This morning at eight my man brought me word that Duke Hamilton had fought with Lord Mohun and killed him... They fought at seven this morning; the dog Mohun was killed on the spot, and while the Duke was over him Mohun shortened his sword, stabbed him in at the shoulder to the heart.' Mohun left his estates to his second wife.

When Governor Pitt returned from India with a fortune and the famous Pitt diamond he was looking for an estate to buy, with some borough interest. One of the boroughs he purchased, Old Sarum, provided a seat for his genius of a grandson, William Pitt: never can a rotten borough have so well justified its existence. Cornwall was another field, so full of promise with all its available little boroughs. So Governor Pitt closed with Lord Mohun's widow for Boconnoc and his other Cornish estates for £53,000, and 'was held to have got a bargain.' (Little did anyone know that an outlying estate, St Stephen's near St Austell was solid china-clay, in time to come worth a million!)

The Governor himself did not consider that he had made a good bargain: Boconnoc was too far away in remote Cornwall. 'I have often repented that I meddled with that estate, and wish that those who come after me don't so too.' It needed the residence of his son Robert to look after it. Robert had been apprenticed to the East Indian trade, and in fact made some £6,000 for himself out of trading with China.

The Pitts were of a good Dorset family going back to a Clerk of the Exchequer in Elizabeth I's time. Governor Pitt was the son of the Rector of Blandford, with his own way to make in the world. For this he was well-equipped with courage and resource, a strong constitution with the capacity for hard work, above all a determined will – the outstanding family characteristic, which led some of them on to great achievements, others to eccentricity bordering on insanity. Never was the saying 'Great wit to madness near allied', more exemplified in a family.

As a young man on his way up he was described as 'a fellow of haughty, huffing, daring temper' – which might equally describe his grandson, the Earl of Chatham. In the end Pitt's ability was recognised by his appointment as Governor of Madras. Its proximity to Golconda meant that diamonds formed a regular item of trade, but it was highly speculative. One needed to develop a good eye for gems, judging their quality, in addition to knowing the men dealing in the trade.

The trade in diamonds was specially subject to the dangers of fraud, theft, and loss on the way home. In fact the second largest purchase the Governor made

was lost when the *Bedford* went down with all on board. His greatest purchase of all, the Pitt Diamond, came through many vicissitudes. The Governor hesitated long before buying it; but he could not resist it: the most splendid diamond he had ever seen, he thought it bigger and finer than the Great Mogul diamond of the Emperors at Delhi. In its rough state it weighed 426 carats; he hoped that it would not lose more than one-fourth in the cutting, and there would still be the 'shavings'. But who would buy such a gem?

After prolonged negotiations, in 1717 the Regent Orleans acquired the Diamond for the Crown of France. The terms were not extravagant, 2 million livres, or some £125,000. The Pitt Diamond, henceforth known as the '*Régent*', made its first public appearance in the crown made for the coronation of Louis XV in 1722. When the monarchy came to an end, the Diamond became a museum-piece in the Louvre, where one may see it behind glass.

While the Diamond was in the Governor's possession the family quarrels which became endemic with the Pitts began. He himself wrote to Robert: 'What hellish planet is it that influences you all, and causes such unaccountable distraction? . . . You say my great concern [the Diamond] is the wonder of the world. So is the confusion in my family.'

The Governor came down to Boconnoc from time to time to attend to its affairs, but he made Swallowfield his residence, not far from the senior line of the family at Stratfieldsaye. The bulk of his estates he had settled upon Robert who made not much of a career, but he had married into the Villiers clan, and this brought an electric touch of the blood that ran in half the aristocracy and had already vivified the Churchills. The promise was already evident in Robert's younger boy, William, his grandfather's favourite, now at Eton. 'He is a hopeful lad,' the Governor had written, 'and doubt not but he will answer yours and all his friends' expectation.' It was at Eton that the friendship was formed among the Pitts, the Grenvilles and George Lyttelton, which led to their forming a group acting together in Parliament, and also to the marriages that connected them in the next generation. This group of Eton boys, of whom George Lyttelton and William Pitt were regarded as the two 'prodigies', were to make history. No-one had much expectation of the elder son, Thomas; in the event his career was worse. None of the Pitts was an ordinary being or at all conventional; everything was extreme or extravagant. Tom Pitt of Boconnoc, the first of the family to make it his residence, was a bit of a brute. Handsome and overbearing, he married a charming sister of the Lytteltons, and then treated her badly.

For some years the couple jogged along unhappily together, the wife left alone for long periods at Boconnoc, while the husband was politicising and wasting his money for the worthless Frederick, Prince of Wales. To the collapse of his married life was added the ruin of his political hopes. He was as ambitious as all the rest of the Pitts and as much of a gambler. He

put all his money on Frederick - poor Fred, whom George II and Queen Caroline detested - and, when he died, Tom Pitt was virtually bankrupt. He had over-spent himself on Parliamentary elections and Cornwall, with its numerous boroughs up for sale, offered a tempting field for conspicuous waste. There was notorious Grampound: 'I think we can carry it, but it must cost damnably dear . . . The dirty rascals despise 20 guineas as much as a King's Serjeant does a half-guinea fee.'

Tom Pitt sat for the family boroughs, first of Okehampton, then of Old Sarum; he had got it from the Prince, who was chiefly supported by the revenues of the Duchy of Cornwall, the offices of Steward, and Lord Warden of the Stannaries. But in 1751 the Prince died, leaving his followers to sink or swim. All that Tom Pitt had to show for his fidelity or party spirit was a vast portrait of Frederick by Van Loo for the gallery at Boconnoc, and a mass of debts that drove him frantic for the rest of his life. On his wife's death he brought the children back to Boconnoc. 'My children I have taken from school, and my son I shall get instructed in his Latin by Mr Leech, parson of Boconnoc. My hounds I am obliged to part with and shall let this house as soon as a tenant offers for it. My sisters will be separated when I go into Cornwall. I wish to God some way may be thought of to provide for them, for either of them living with me is extremely disagreeable.'

Actually a younger sister, Ann, was for years a favourite of her brother William, who did not marry until forty-eight: his letters to her are most affectionate - more so than his stilted missives to his intended wife, Lady Hester Grenville. His nephew, Lord Camelford, thought that Ann equalled the great man 'in quickness of parts, and exceeded him in wit and in all those nameless graces and attentions by which conversation is livened and endeared.' She went to live in France with the Bolingbrokes; this connection with the exiled Tory leader was awkward for her brother's political career and marks the beginning of a breach between them. On her return she was made Keeper of the Privy Purse to the widowed Princess of Wales; but it was not long before she lost the appointment and went abroad again. She was, for a time, a friend of Horace Walpole who, when asked if she resembled her famous brother, replied '*comme deux gouttes de feu*.'

Life at Boconnoc was not without its agreeable side - for the daughters (although they had to be careful of their father's suspicious temper). Their uncle, Dean Lyttelton of Exeter, kept an eye on them: an excellent man, of scholarly tastes, who did good work in repairing the cathedral. He maintained a correspondence with the antiquaries in Cornwall and encouraged Dr Borlase to publish his *Antiquities of Cornwall*. The Pitts do not seem to have been fond of Boconnoc, 'the worst and the gloomiest habitation of any gentleman in England', one of them wrote.

As boy and young man William was there from time to time - once at New Year 1730, when he was twenty-

one. 'We are to have a ball this week at Mr Hawkey's child-feast - a heathenish name for the Christian institution of baptism, where the ladies intend to shine most irresistibly.' In the south aisle of the church we find this man beneath our feet, Reynold Hawkey.

That autumn William was again down at Boconnoc, teasing his sister about Dr Ayscough, the clergyman who lifted up his eyes to Ann Pitt. 'Such a lover is the ridiculous Skue, who instead of whispering his soft tale to the woods and lonely rocks, proclaims to all the world he loves Miss Nanny.' He was rejected by the haughty Ann, who in the event never married.

By November William was 'more and more out of temper with the remoteness of this cursed hiding-place.' It was the distance from the centre of things that made him deplore 'the execrable journey to Cornwall.' This did not dissuade him from offering to purchase Boconnoc later from his brother, to help him out of his difficulties - and put himself at the head of the line. A useful legacy of £10,000 from old Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, simply for opposing Walpole, could have helped to this end. Later on in life he revised his opinion and paid tribute to those leafy walks, the valley with its sunny streams.

Meanwhile a Lyttelton legacy to the girls brought a thunderbolt from their father. He had himself specified that the legacy should take the form of lace, not jewels. There had been 'a constant run of company' that summer, when Amelia wrote to the Dean: 'We are very much obliged to you for the care you take for the safe conveyance of our lace, but I do assure you it will come very safe by the carrier's horses from Exeter to Boconnoc; and the quickest way from London to Exeter will be by Fry's Flying Waggon. All our clothes come to Boconnoc by that means, and even the stores - when there is not enough to make it worth while to send it by sea - come that way.' The sea-passage would bring heavier stuff conveniently to Fowey. Despite this legacy, Tom Pitt could neither retrench sufficiently, nor avoid his creditors; he decided to retire abroad to economise. His son, as intelligent as he was sensitive and talented, wrote later: 'under these circumstances we took leave of poor Boconnoc, where I had passed the pleasing hours of childhood, to neglect and the mercy of creditors. Methinks I still hear the last cheer of the poor labourers assembled on the green before the house when the coach drove from the door.'

One seems to hear those long-vanished voices, as one looks down the rocky declivity from the church to the greel below.

Young Tom Pitt, though the estate was entailed upon him, had other things to think about, for his impossible father intended to carry him abroad with him. When he arrived in London, talks with his uncles, William Pitt and Sir Richard Lyttelton, convinced him that his best course was to go forward with his education: they promised to help him. To circumvent his father he had to 'elope' from his lodgings in London and 'make the best of my way to Cambridge.' A letter to his tutor at Clare followed, and the boy was summoned back to

confront his tempestuous parent: 'he almost broke my heart, but could not bend me from my purpose.' He later attributed the epileptic fits from which he suffered to the nervous strain of living with such a father. He stuck to his guns and stayed at Cambridge for six years, to emerge as one of the best educated and the most polished of the Pitts.

This he owed in part to his uncle William, who kept his eye on the course of his nephew's education and largely dictated it. He began by paying the boy's expenses but, when he lost his place as Paymaster of the Forces, 'he gave poverty as his excuse for no longer supporting me, except with advice and books, which he occasionally sent me.' This seems reasonable enough, for Pitt was not rich and had a family of his own to provide for. Sir Richard Lyttelton, his mother's brother, on the other hand had no children and was married to a rich dowager. 'Sir Richard was from that hour to all intents and purposes my father; and a more affectionate, liberal and indulgent father no man ever had.' Meanwhile, his own father went on his travels abroad, abusing his brother the more his fame grew - 'while the brother did much the same by him', and with more reason.

The direction the statesman gave to his nephew's education rivalled the liberal indulgence he received from his maternal uncle, Sir Richard. When William Pitt's Letters were published by his great-nephew Lord Grenville, they became celebrated not only as coming from the great man, but for their intrinsic value. They offer exceptional glimpses into the inner mind of that reserved, haughty, and often sick, man. With his genius he was also an actor, forever playing a part - to Parliament, the country, Europe, the Empire he so dangerously enlarged. These Letters are the nearest we get to the great orator in undress. One reads them with a warmer feeling for William Pitt: they show the inner man beneath the histrionics; they reveal his religious sense and show that, in an easy-going and relaxed age, its most conspicuous and challenging personality was a respectable, good man.

It was very good of a busy politician up all hours in the House of Commons - he mentions one such 'debauch' going on until six in the morning - to correct the Latin verses and translations of a schoolboy. A good classical scholar himself, he did much more than a university tutor would have done: he opened the boy's mind to contemporary literature, not only English but French. One sees that his superiority in Parliament was not merely oratorical but intellectual. The boy is directed to Pope and Dryden as much as to Virgil and Horace and Terence. 'Your cousin has read them all. Go on, my dear, and you will at least equal him.' This cousin was the clever younger William, who owed so much to his father's coaching. Step by step, whenever he had any leisure - usually from Bath, where he went to assuage the torments of the gout - the great man wrote his instructions. Now it is Homer, from whom young Tom will imbibe 'lessons of honour, courage, disinterestedness, love of truth, command of temper [particularly

necessary for a Pitt], gentleness of behaviour, humanity and, in one word, virtue in its true signification.'

From classical literature the eminent mentor goes on to recommend Addison and Molière - 'when I get to London I will send you the best French dictionary' - from literature on to history, Paolo Sarpi for the Reformation, Clarendon for the Civil War, though Pitt with his Whiggish background mistrusts Clarendon's judgments. Burnet and Locke are more to his taste: from history to the principles of the constitution, not omitting some geography and mathematics. And so to ethics, as the youth attains maturity and is to encounter the danger of society. 'As to the use of the sword, it is well to know it; but remember, my dearest nephew, it is a science of defence, and that a sword can never be employed by the hand of a man of virtue in any other cause.' The possessors of Boconnoc, both past and to come, had reason to heed that warning. Sound advice is given not only as to conduct and one's bearing in the world but, no less to the point in that formal age, deportment. In the end, 'the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom and an upright heart, that is understanding. Cherish true religion as you will fly with abhorrence and contempt superstition and enthusiasm.' There is the essence of the 18th century Church of England.

One morning early in 1758 when Tom was nearing his majority - he had been born and baptised at Boconnoc in 1737 - he was astonished by the unannounced return of his father, in secrecy for fear of arrest for debt. The outrageous parent swore his son to keep his return secret even from Sir Richard, in whose house he was living. This occasioned a temporary estrangement, aggravated by the quarrel between William Pitt and his sister Ann, in which Lyttelton took William's side, and his brother Tom took Ann's. William was next in the Boconnoc entail; this meant complicated negotiations for young Tom with other members of this prickly family.

Taking the bull by the horns, he decided to sacrifice himself and cut off the entail. 'I bound myself to pay my father's debts, gave £5000 apiece to my sisters, settled the claim of Mrs Mary [a clamorous aunt], calculated principal and interest with Mr W. Pitt; in short I left not one person or claim unsatisfied. Then I made my appeal to Sir Richard Lyttelton. "These are my deeds; in what have I offended?" He embraced me with transport and restored me to his friendship.' Young Tom gained much credit by his conduct - Uncle William's precepts were bearing fruit. But there remained his father. The old man decided to end his days in Cornwall, where the Dower House was prepared for him. This would be the large, ramshackle house at Camelford above the river, a bit withdrawn from the street. To equip himself for domestic felicity he took a wife privately, upon whom he settled a jointure of £600 to encumber the estate.

Young Tom was now free to go abroad on the Grand Tour. The year was 1760, the height of Britain's power and triumph in the Seven Years' War under the

guiding star of William Pitt. From now on we are able to observe the family through the telescope of Horace Walpole, who wrote to recommend the young man to Horace Mann at Florence. Thomas was developing into a man of taste, educating himself in connoisseurship in Florence, when his father suddenly died and was buried at Boconnoc. The son had to come home. Horace Walpole's crisp comment was that, 'to make amends for giving away a jointure of £600 a year', the old man was just dead, 'very happily for his family.' Some years later the son was able to recoup himself by marrying a Norfolk heiress, a Miss Wilkinson, according to Horace 'a great fortune'.

During the 1760's, when William Pitt's reputation was at its height throughout the world, his nephew Tom became a favourite with Horace. In March 1762 he took 'a sweet little house just by me at Twickenham, which will be a comfortable addition to my *villeggiatura*.' They called it the Palazzo Pitti. Next year Horace was consulting young Mr Pitt, 'my present architect', about a design Walpole's cousin, Conway, was in need of. So the two connoisseurs, old Horace and young Tom, became artistic cronies, Thomas promoted to the committee of taste that advised Walpole about the embellishments at Strawberry Hill, and himself an amateur architect. We need look no further for the designer of the long gallery at Boconnoc, with Venetian windows at either end, that formed the southern front of the house looking sunnily down the Lerryn Valley - now demolished.

Next year politics came between them: Walpole's cousin Conway, whom he adored, had been dismissed from his post for a single vote against George Grenville's government, with whom Tom Pitt was allied politically as well as by their family ties. Fourteen years later, in 1778, Tom set out for Italy to recuperate from some weakness in his legs that crippled him. 'Let me give you a caution', wrote the aged Horace to Mann: 'he and I have never been on more than civil terms since Mr Grenville's reign. He now swears by the ghost of his uncle Chatham, whom in those days he detested.'

Walpole had more justice of mind now as an old man: 'Lord Chatham was a meteor, and a glorious one. Why not allow his magnificent enterprises and good fortune, and confess his defects? A minister that inspires great actions must be a great minister; and Lord Chatham will always appear so, by comparison with his predecessors and successors. He retrieved our affairs when ruined by a most incapable administration; and we are fallen into a worse state since he was removed.' The American colonies were being lost, the Empire everywhere in danger.

Tom Pitt had not been able to see it then: he always resented that his statesman-uncle - absorbed in political struggle or racked by gout or winning a war - had not done more for him than he had. His love and devotion went to his maternal uncle, Sir Richard Lyttelton, who had been a father to him. In 1770 Sir Richard died, rather suddenly: Tom Pitt heard the news down at Boconnoc, and left in the middle of the night for

London. Lyttelton was only fifty-two, but he had long been in a deplorable way with the loss of use of his limbs. The great Lord Chatham had gone to condole with Tom Pitt. There had been a breach between the grandee and his old schoolfriends, Lord Lyttelton and George Grenville. At a time when it had rained gold snuff-boxes upon Chatham from cities all over the country, and statues were put up to him all over the Empire – like that at Charleston, South Carolina, subsequently damaged by British gunfire during the American Revolution (one sees it in the park there still) – Tom Pitt proposed to commemorate his other uncle in a manner more magnificent still.

Was there not something of reproach in the splendid obelisk he raised in the park at Boconnoc – over 120 feet high, of silvery Cornish granite? On the plinth one reads

'In gratitude and affection to the memory of Sir Richard Lyttelton, and to perpetuate the remembrance of that peculiar character of benevolence, which rendered him the delight of his own age, and worthy the veneration of posterity. 1771.'

Not many a good fellow has had a monument raised to him worthy of an emperor – or, for that matter, of Lord Chatham!

Thomas Pitt was more of a Lyttelton than a Pitt, perhaps that entered into his decided preference for his mother's brother, as against his father's. His portrait at Boconnoc shows a refined face, with luminous eyes; something delicate about him, the natural distinction of a connoisseur. He was not an effective politician, he had none of the force of the Pitts, and he only briefly achieved office – as a Commissioner of the Board of Admiralty under George Grenville, to Chatham's displeasure. His aim was really a peerage, as the head of the Boconnoc branch of the family. He spoke now and again in the Commons, but connoisseurship was nearer his heart, his contacts with the *cognoscenti* in Italy, with artists like Reynolds, who painted his portrait, with Haydon, and Madame Vigée le Brun whom I would suggest as the 'unknown artist' who painted the charming portrait of his wife. Like his uncle Dean Lyttelton, he became a Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries. Much attached to Italy, he spent a couple of years there from 1787 to 1789, as also the last two years of his life, 1791 to 1793, when he died in Florence.

Of the life at Boconnoc we occasionally hear from charming old Mrs Delany, a link with the remote past, for she was the great-granddaughter of Sir Bevil Grenville, who had exercised his troops in the park in the days of the Civil War. In 1778 Tom Pitt presented her with 'my great-grandfather's portrait, his lady's, and his father's, Sir Bernard Grenville, but I am to leave them back to him. However, I am very well pleased with the company of these ancient gentry.' She passes on the news of Mrs Pitt being brought to bed of a daughter, in 1772: this was Anne, who lived on to be an immensely old lady plumb into the Victorian age,

dying in 1864: the ultimate heiress, last of the line. In 1775 the news was, 'Mrs T. Pitt is brought to bed of a son, and very well at Boconnoc.' This was the son they had been hoping for, a strong healthy child abounding with energy, whom Lady Chatham dubbed 'the Cornish Hercules' – quite obviously a Pitt.

In politics the long administration of Lord North and the alienation of the American colonies brought the Pitts together. In 1780 Tom Pitt made the best speech of his career in support of Dunning's famous motion to the effect that the power of the Crown had increased and ought to be diminished. On Lord North's overthrow, followed by Rockingham's death, Chatham's disciple Shelburne took office to carry through peace with America. Young William Pitt was made Chancellor of the Exchequer at twenty-three. He refused to continue in office when Fox and North formed their notorious coalition. Tom Pitt again attacked Lord North, claiming that he himself had always been against using force in America – this the Pitts regarded as a legacy from Lord Chatham to defend. Walpole thought that Tom Pitt had 'been jealous of and offended at the preference given to his young cousin, William Pitt, who was a younger son of the younger branch.' But on this young man becoming Prime Minister, Tom Pitt received his reward: elevated to the peerage, he took his title from the family borough of Camelford – which made a better title than Old Sarum.

Meanwhile, the young 'Cornish Hercules' was growing up into a big bully of a boy, in whom the Pitt characteristics – energy, the impulse to action, aggression – went beyond all bounds. Though born at Boconnoc, the place saw little of him after his early childhood. At school at Berne and then Charterhouse, he insisted on going to sea, where his career was full of adventures. At fifteen his ship was spitted on an iceberg in the South Atlantic and given up for lost; by a marvel of seamanship the damaged vessel managed to make the Cape of Good Hope. On his next journey, round the world with Vancouver, the youth was three times flogged and finally left ashore on Hawaii. When he returned to London he sent a challenge to the Captain, and on his refusal attempted to beat him up in Bond Street.

On his next voyage, and having succeeded as Lord Camelford, there was a confrontation of authority at Antigua between himself and another captain, each backed by his own armed officers. On a deliberate refusal to obey him, Camelford seized a pistol and shot his opponent dead. He then surrendered himself, and at the ensuing court-martial was exonerated – he had a case, but it was probably his peerage and exalted connections that saved him. In 1799 he thought up a mad enterprise: having procured an introduction to Barras, one of the Directory in France, with which England was at war, Camelford set out to cross over to Calais with a hare-brained scheme of inducing him to surrender French war-plans. It was a capital offence to make for France; William Pitt and Lord Grenville, now married to Camelford's sister, had to get the King's

pardon for the culprit.

After various other adventures, such as assaulting a man in Drury Lane Theatre and beating up the watch in Cavendish Square, his last was to quarrel, over a woman, with an acquaintance who had shared her 'favours', a Captain Best. Best was known to be the most unerring shot in England and tried to reason Camelford out of his challenge. With characteristic Pitt obstinacy he insisted on a duel - and then added a codicil to his will exonerating Best from blame and declaring himself the aggressor. The duel took place, on 6 March 1804, in the grounds of Holland House, where he received his death-wound: 'Best, I am a dead man, but I freely forgive you.' (Boconnoc has the silver-encased pistols he carried that day; heavy and practical they look and feel deadly to handle). He lingered four days, long enough to express a wish to be buried at Berne, where he had spent his happiest days, as a child - indeed he had never grown up. While the war was on, his body could not be taken there, and apparently there is a mystery, like so much about him, as to where it reposes. It was the subject of one of Charles Reade's stories, 'What has become of Lord Camelford's body?'

It is strange to think that both lines at Boconnoc - so withdrawn, so sequestered a place - should have come to an end with a duel, both the last Lord Mohun and the last Lord Camelford.

And so the inheritance came to his sister Anne,

happily married to Lord Grenville, who for ten years was Foreign Secretary in his cousin Pitt's administration. When Pitt left office in 1801 his cousin went with him, but would not come back with him in 1804 without Fox, whom George III would not have. For a brief spell Grenville headed a ministry in 1806-7, but after that never resumed office, though he lived on till 1834. He remained an influential, somewhat lofty figure, Chancellor of the university of Oxford, and looking after his estates with the pleasures of gardening at Dropmore. As a boy at Eton he used to sit at a favourite place on the common at Burnham where there was a view of Windsor Castle in the distance; here, he resolved, he would build a house when fortune enabled him to.

Anne Pitt, Lady Grenville, had no children, so she adopted her husband's nephew as her heir: this lucky young man, George Matthew Fortescue, was a younger son of the senior line, Earl Fortescue of Castle Hill in Devon, an immensely older line than the Pitts. Having no Pitt blood at all, perhaps this ended the extraordinary run of fate that attended the Pitt Diamond. The young man took over at Boconnoc and in time succeeded to Dropmore too, so that the remarkable historic possessions of both Pitts and Grenvilles came to the Fortescues, and remained quietly in their hands for the past century, until the upheaval of our time necessitated parting with Dropmore.



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Reform in the Soviet Union: The Future of an Illusion

David Satter

There is an odd sensation in the Soviet Union of events taking place in a time crystal, acted out in an abstract dimension and motivated, like the fertility rites of the Trobriand Islanders, by a guilty need to propitiate the gods rather than by any realistic hope of achieving a concrete objective.

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union is changing. A lull in political arrests has made possible the proliferation of independent social organizations in scores of Soviet cities. The regime has legalized private enterprise, in the form of 'cooperatives,' and there are plans to reform the economy by giving decision making authority to the heads of factories.

Despite these developments, however, it is hard to escape the impression of a fatal uncertainty in the country, even on the part of those who depict themselves as 'reformers.' The elliptical nature of conversations, the half truths and inconsistencies in official publications are, in some ways, more striking now than during the period of 'stagnation' when the leadership was content to defend the existing system.

The problem is that discussion remains encased in ideology. The participants in the reform battles are free to describe society's problems and even to suggest superficial causes but they cannot identify their ultimate source in the nature of the communist system, a lacunae which forces them to fall back on wishful thinking. No matter how severely they criticize existing conditions, they must pretend that it is possible to engender economic dynamism while preserving the Soviet totalitarian system.

The impetus for reform in the Soviet Union came from the decline of the Soviet economy. For many years, the Soviet economy could survive under conditions of spectacular wastefulness resulting from total centralization because it drew on unlimited numbers of men and materials but by the mid-1970's, it began to be faced with an exhaustion of inputs. What was perhaps even more serious, the West entered a new phase of the scientific technological revolution which emphasized not production in bulk but access to information and precise technology.

The Soviet Union today is degrading steadily under the weight of the communist system. Food is rationed outside the major cities. The Soviet Union is the only industrial country in the world where life expectancy is falling, infant mortality is 4 to 5 times the rate in the West and 16 per cent of the children now being born

have mental or physical disabilities. Yet, none of this would have been enough to motivate the present Soviet reform effort.

What mattered was that economic inefficiency began to threaten the effectiveness of the Soviet military. The danger was first described by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the former Soviet chief of staff, in 1985, in a book entitled *History Teaches Vigilance*, and is now generally acknowledged by Soviet military and political leaders. 'We should understand clearly,' wrote Alexander Bovin, a commentator for *Izvestiya*, July 11, 1987, 'that if restructuring does not succeed . . . if not socialism but capitalism succeeds in mastering the new wave of the scientific technical revolution then the balance of forces in the world can change in favor of capitalism.'

Two Russian words, *glasnost* (publicity not openness) and *perestroika* (reconstruction) have become associated with the two aspects of the present Soviet reform program. *Glasnost*, in the broadest sense, applies to political reforms, in particular, the lifting of various restrictions on information, speech and social organization. *Perestroika* is the program of changes in the economic and political mechanism which is less advanced because it bears directly on the structure of power.

In response to the potential military political crisis, Gorbachev has called for 'revolutionary transformations' in the Soviet economy but, so far, structural changes have been hesitant. The party owes its ability to monopolize power to the fact that it concentrates in its hands both economic and political power and, under these circumstances, any adjustment to the economic system in the interest of decentralization and individual initiative weakens the party's control even as it improves the economy.

For the moment, the authorities have concentrated on *glasnost*, which is expected to create an air of change in the Soviet Union and the impression that, at long last, Soviet society is going to deal with its unacknowledged problems. It is also a way of making citizens aware that more is expected of them. It consists of a striking liberalization in culture and in the press and an important widening of the limits on allowable political activity. In fact, it has involved so much exposure to new information and political impressions for Soviet citizens that it would have posed a risk to the legitimacy of the Soviet system had it not been prepared for by a rewriting of the Soviet ideology that dis-

associates Gorbachev from past repression and explains to the population why, after 70 years of communism, they now have to work hard to save the Soviet system.

The new, 'correct' version of the Soviet ideology which will soon be taught dutifully in every Soviet school divides Soviet history into two parts, the periods of 'genuine socialism' under Lenin until 1924 and now under Gorbachev, and the 'distortions of socialism' during the intervening 61 year period. With this ideological preparation, the faults of the Soviet system can now be acknowledged and attributed to any one of five past leaders.

In terms of its impact on the population, the most important aspect of *glasnost* has been the change in the press, which, in 18 short months, has probably published more critical articles than in the entire previous 60 years, stunning Soviet public opinion.

The exposure of the crimes of the Stalin era goes far beyond the exposure of Stalin by Khrushchev. With a few exceptions - such as the Katyn massacre and the fate of Raoul Wallenberg - there seems to be no hesitation about publishing truthful assessments of Stalin's period in power, including his personal role in the crimes of the era. The literary monthly *Novy Mir* published an estimate that ten million peasants died in the forced collectivization of agriculture and the Soviet weekly *Nedelya* has indicated that 50 million Soviet citizens died as a result of the policies of the Stalin period.

Where historical truthfulness ends, however, is in the discussion to show that the one party dictatorship, system of concentration camps, and subordination of justice to police terror were the creation of Lenin. Lenin and Stalin now must be depicted as polar opposites to preserve the legitimacy of the system itself.

Reducing dissimulation to the bare minimum necessary to protect the legitimacy of the system is now the policy of the Soviet press and this limits coverage both in range and in depth.

There now are relatively few forbidden topics but the coverage of every topic must avoid any attempt to analyze underlying causes.

A good example of what Soviet citizens can now read was a recent story in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* entitled 'Zone of Silence,' which described how Akhmadjan Adilov, the director of a collective farm in Uzbekistan and a hero of socialist labor, as well as one of the most powerful men in the republic, turned his collective farm into a slave colony with a guarded perimeter, his own private army, palace, courts, and underground prison. Adilov was able to do this because he was protected by his ties to the top party leaders in Uzbekistan and, in the Soviet Union, the organs of law enforcement are always under the party's control. In analyzing the Adilov case, therefore, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* could ask how it was possible for Adilov to have committed such crimes with impunity but the newspaper was not free to give the obvious response.

Another example of the self-limiting nature of press

coverage under conditions of *glasnost* was a report in *Moscow News* about the attempted hijacking of a Soviet airliner by eleven members of the Ovechkin family, from Irkutsk, which ended with the storming of the plane and the deaths of five hijackers, a stewardess and five passengers. The hijackers had asked to be flown to Finland but the pilot landed the plane at an airport near Leningrad where it was stormed by an anti-terror squad. *Moscow News* asked in its article whether the decision to land the plane on Soviet territory had not been a costly one but it failed to ask the much more obvious question which was whether a family like the Ovechkins would have resorted to hijacking if they had been able freely to leave the country.

The liberalization in the press has been accompanied by a dramatic opening in the field of culture, which also takes place within a Leninist framework. With the exception of the works of Solzhenitsyn and works, such as Vassily Grossman's novella, *Forever Flowing*, which touch directly on Lenin, almost all of the suppressed classics of Soviet literature are now being published, including the works of Platonov, Zamyatin, Pasternak and Bulgakov: the minute political censorship which weighed so heavily on Soviet literature has essentially been lifted. Nevertheless, political writing remains controlled according to the same principles as journalism, and, in this way, imaginative literature is deprived of its intellectual context. Artistic works are also often the subject of deliberately misleading criticism. Novels and memoirs of the Stalin period are said to indict Stalin not Socialism and the introduction to excerpts from Orwell's *1984*, which were recently published, explained that the novel is about Fascism.

In culture, as in the press, *glasnost* has undeniably exposed millions of Soviet citizens to new impressions but Soviet society's delusionary mental framework has been preserved non the less.

In an effort to inspire citizen activism, the Gorbachev leadership has now also granted the possibility for limited political self-expression.

The authorities have released hundreds of political prisoners and, in general, they are not making new political arrests. If it once was enough to write an article and show it to a friend or to criticize the regime in the compartment of a train in order to be arrested, the regime has now decided to grant the population some freedom of expression and if previously the authorities acted quickly to suppress any type of independent organization no matter how insignificant, they now appear ready to accept a limited form of freedom of association. For the moment, the only persons who are singled out for persecution are those who undertake independent political action, such as Pairur Arikyan, an Armenian nationalist, who played an important role in demonstrations in Armenia or members of the *Democracy and Humanism* seminar who are trying to organize an independent political party.

To some extent, this tentative political tolerance is

useful to the authorities. If, in the past, any independent group and, even more so, any independent publication was regarded immediately as a focal point of opposition, today, when the Gorbachev leadership is anxious to put pressure on uncooperative local authorities to implement its policies, independent organizations have suddenly become useful, especially if they lack political sophistication and can be put to work fighting against local 'enemies of *perestroika*.'

The diminution of political persecution has changed the atmosphere in Moscow and created the odd situation of a wave which is always just about to break. The repressive machinery is in place and every Soviet citizen is instinctively aware that once political 'activism' no longer serves the authorities' interests, their tolerance may evaporate. The two political articles in the Russian criminal code, articles 70 and 190-1, anti-Soviet agitation and anti-Soviet slander, are still on the books and at least 250 political prisoners and perhaps many more are still being held in the labour camps and psychiatric hospitals, either for refusing to ask to be 'pardoned' or because they are little known.

The authorities, however, now apparently feel that they can contain political dissent with a minimum of repression and, for the time being, they may be correct. What is important about the present tolerance is that it has no guarantee. It also affects only the public realm and not the realm of the individual working collective which, for the average Soviet citizen, is actually more important.

The wide publicity under *glasnost* being given to abuses of workers' rights has inspired Soviet citizens who have been unfairly denied an apartment or fired from their jobs to come to Moscow to seek justice in the reception halls of government organizations. These petitioners, or 'truth seekers' as they are called are arriving in the thousands only to find that the indignation of the press does not affect the cases of individuals and, just as during the period of 'stagnation,' no one is interested in their complaints.

Reflecting the strange spirit of the times, Abulfazfizza Aliskerov, an Azerbaijani woman who said she had been cheated out of her home by local officials, set herself on fire, on February 12, in the reception hall of the Supreme Soviet, the fictional Soviet parliament. 'I've been coming here for ten years,' she shouted, 'for ten years they refuse to receive me. There is no soviet power in the Soviet Union!'

The policy of *glasnost*, with its Leninist version of freedom, has had mixed results, inspiring hope, principally among the intellectuals, and fear, among the workers who have little faith that anything good can come out of what they call 'the latest campaign.' But it is clear that a psychological change of some kind is necessary if the country is not to be thrown into chaos as the leadership begins to move to implement *perestroika*, the second phase of its reform plan which is, in essence, an attempt to force Soviet citizens to work harder in a system which is inefficient because it remains under the party's complete control.

Perestroika consists of two parts - the organization of independent business in the form of cooperatives or private *ateliers* and the reorganizing of the state sector so that each enterprise will be responsible for making a 'profit' on the basis of prices assigned by the state. To a certain extent, the two aspects of *perestroika* are expected to be complementary: the private businesses improving the quality of services and the plan for 'self-financing' improving the quality of the production of the state. In both cases, what is at stake is an attempt to induce Soviet citizens to show economic initiative in a party controlled economic structure.

The first aspect of the new economic program is the development of an embryonic private sector, which the authorities hope will help to stimulate the state sector. To work in a private business, an individual must be willing to hold a full time job in the state sector and to work in the business in his spare time. This means that the state is able to squeeze extra work out of each energetic *cooperator* or *individualchik* and they, in turn, are encouraged to recruit wives and children to fill in for them in the private business, that way making it possible for the economy to exploit unutilized 'labour resources.'

Despite these conditions, however, Soviet citizens are slowly beginning to form private businesses because in an economy where the services are uniformly shoddy, the rewards for independent enterprise can be high. There are now about 300,000 persons engaged in individual labour activity and an estimated 150,000 persons working in about 14,000 cooperatives.

The appearance in the Soviet Union of private businesses which have official status and pay taxes, does not represent structural change. In the past, many of the services involved were provided by the black market and so the private enterprises are only a means to bring part of the parallel economy back under the control of the state. The main importance of the independent enterprises is in helping to define an environment in which Soviet citizens are expected to show initiative if they want rewards, with the same principle to be applied on a much larger scale in the state sector in the plan for self-financing or *khozratchet*.

In fact, the plan for self-financing is the keystone of the entire economic reform and, with it, probably the Gorbachev program as a whole. It gives to the management of Soviet enterprises what, in the past, they have always lacked: a measure of autonomy. Under the new law on state enterprises, the enterprise has the right to make decisions about the disposition of resources and to take the initiative to find suppliers and to dispose of part of its production either directly or through a new wholesale trade network with prices set by agreement under the supervision of state price formation bodies.

For the moment, the reform has had virtually no effect on the economy because the place of plan indicators has been taken by 'state orders,' making the system even more cumbersome than it was to begin with.

The economic reform is not expected to go into

operation fully until the next five year plan, which begins in 1991. At that time, however, it will be full of ominous possibilities because, although it does not correct any of the structural defects in the Soviet economy, it offers abundant opportunities to reduce the already thoroughly exploited Soviet worker to a new level of poverty while depriving him of the one thing which made his poverty bearable, the confidence that his pay was assured and he could not be fired from his job.

The most important aspect of the new system from the point of view of the individual Soviet worker is that it threatens his wages because the wage fund will no longer be handed down to the enterprise from above but will depend on the enterprise's own income. This would be reasonable in the context of a free market but it is menacing under Soviet conditions where the ability of the enterprise to earn an income depends only marginally on the enterprise but, in the main, on the economic conditions created by the state.

For all of Gorbachev's talk of increasing efficiency and economic independence, there is no indication that he plans to eliminate the factors which account for the inefficiency of Soviet industry, even under conditions of reform. This means that self-financing is actually unrealizable.

Under the new system, an enterprise's production must fully accord first with the economic plan, second with state orders and only then with orders from customers. If the share of state orders is significant, as it appears it will be, the new reform will carry within itself the seeds of the Soviet economy's existing irrationality - the omissions of *gosplan*, the planning agency, the inefficiency of *gosnab*, the supply agency, the interference of *gospriemka*, the quality control agency and the inflexibility of ministries and unreliability of the chaotic Soviet railways.

This will be all the more true if, as seems likely, there is no change in the system of giving absolute priority to military production because the organization of the country as a military machine both impoverishes the civilian economy and subjects it to constant disruption.

Under these circumstances, Soviet workers may find that their salaries are subject to sharp reductions because of the enterprise's failure to make a profit when that failure was, in fact, the result of factors completely outside of the enterprise's control. Such a situation has already led to strikes and will in the future. In addition, they may find that their traditional security will be destroyed by dangerously rapid inflation as enterprises, in order to become 'profitable' without any improvement in efficiency, simply raise prices, shifting the cost of economic reform to the consumer.

It is significant, in this regard, that there are no signs that the authorities are thinking in terms of positive incentives to work harder beside the vague possibility of higher pay for workers in enterprises which, according to the authorities' calculations, make a 'profit,' a possibility which means very little in the

Soviet context unless the stores are well stocked and workers who earn rubles have something to buy with them. As matters stand, however, meat and dairy products are being rationed all over the Soviet Union and the food supply situation is actually getting worse because of cuts in imported meat and grain. Even bread has fallen in quality. Light industry, which produces consumer goods, continues to be neglected. It receives only 8 per cent of all capital investment and 40 per cent of its equipment is obsolescent, some of it dating back to before the revolution.

The overwhelming impression is that if self-financing is to work at all it will depend not on positive incentives to work better but on fear of losing what little the workers already earn - and of unemployment. Soviet factories have already begun experimenting with eliminating positions and distributing some of the savings to the other workers. The Soviet Union has always prided itself on giving workers complete job security but the plans for self-financing call for the closing of inefficient enterprises and there is talk of eliminating 16 million jobs by the year 2000.

The Soviet Union has now entered a transitional period in its history. Faced with an urgent need to inspire initiative but unwilling to give up power, *glasnost* and *perestroika* are the authorities' response. They have decided to try to rewrite to their advantage the long standing social contract between the party and the Soviet people according to which the population trades obedience for security and freedom from any obligation to work. What the authorities now want is for Soviet citizens not only to work but also to accept an unprecedented level of insecurity as part of *perestroika* in return for which they are willing to give them more *glasnost*, the appearance, although not the substance of rights.

It is already clear what institutionalized *glasnost* will consist of - exposures of corruption in the press but no system of justice for individuals, the right to criticize 'in the spirit of the party,' but no public hearing for independent ideas, the right to demonstrate, in the interests of the party, and even to vote in elections for factory directors as long as the director remains subordinated to the local bureau of the party.

Can the authorities succeed in persuading Soviet workers to accept economic risks in return for conditional or illusory freedoms? The answer is probably not.

The fate of *perestroika* and, probably, of the reform movement as a whole will depend on the reaction of workers and all reports suggest that the workers are convinced that *perestroika* is a sham and that Gorbachev is the latest *baltoon* (blabbermouth) who 'promises everything and delivers nothing' and is just trying to exploit them further. They are angry about the anti-alcohol campaign which forced them to wait in humiliating lines and deprived them of their only escape and are panic stricken about the possibility of price increases, since they have barely enough to make ends meet as it is.

For all of the undeniable liberalization of Soviet society which has followed the advent to power of Gorbachev, the essence of his plan to revive the Soviet economy is a program to squeeze more effort out of Soviet workers under threat of unemployment and lower pay, an administrative approach which is, in fact, extremely unpromising.

It is reasonable to predict that if Gorbachev seeks the funds that he needs for investment from higher prices and lower wages, under conditions in which there is at the same time a slackening of centralized control, the result will be a nationwide revolt consisting of cheating, theft, disobedience and petty sabotage which still worsen conditions instead of improving them until the central authorities are forced to give in.

In this respect, it is well to consider the example of the anti-alcoholism campaign, the first reform measure adopted by Gorbachev after his accession to power and the only one for which there are some preliminary results.

The campaign began almost immediately after Gorbachev took office and, in this case too, there was an attempt to solve a social problem with administrative means. The price of vodka was increased, the production of vodka was cut. At the same time, police began picking up anyone who was drunk in public and factory directors were warned not to tolerate any drinking at work. As a result of the restrictions on sales, long lines began to form outside vodka stores every afternoon.

At first, the campaign against alcoholism produced some successes. The consumption of alcohol was reduced and there was a decline in work related accidents and in crimes committed while drunk. Gradually, however, the Soviet population reacted by beginning to produce moonshine vodka and this clandestine production has now reached the point where it can no longer be controlled.

Nikolai Shmelev, an economist writing in the monthly, *Novy Mir*, estimated that if, in the early 1980's, two thirds of the income from the sale of alcoholic beverages went to the government and one third to moonshiners, today those percentages are reversed without any permanent drop in the level of consumption. The loss of revenue to the government, in the meantime, has had to have been made up by printing money. The core of the problem is that Gorbachev is trying to induce workers to show initiative by giving them rights within a Leninist framework whereas initiative is a characteristic of a free man and presupposes the existence of genuine human rights.

Domination in the Soviet Union has traditionally been mental domination and based on the forcible imposition of a delusionary idea. The Soviet ideology has now been stripped to a bare minimum in order to allow civil society a chance to develop and provide a higher quality of work for the regime but it nonetheless remains in place and, even in its reduced form, dictates a mentality which is incompatible with the spirit of initiative and tolerance for risk which the Soviet

leaders now want to develop.

The dilemma of persons educated in Soviet society in the face of an attempt to displace them psychologically was expressed by a thirty three year old mother of three in a letter to *Pravda*, January 18.

Like many others our generation was brought up under socialism and without belief in God. One might say that socialism and its ideals were our God... As a result of the policy of *glasnost* and unrestrained criticism... the idea of socialism under which we lived for seventy years and which determines our aims and the purpose of our existence has, to some extent, been discredited. I cannot speak for everyone, but my own faith has been shaken.

If the reform of the economy continues and *glasnost* accompanies it, the faith of many others will be shaken too because the only way really to introduce truth into an ideological fabric is to reject the fabric and give people rights or see it progressively denuded until there is no alternative but to dominate people through naked force.

The Soviet Union has shown an interest in Western credits to finance *perestroika* and one figure that has been mentioned is \$50 billion. It is not surprising under these circumstances, that the Soviets have moderated the tone of their hostile propaganda and are devoting considerable efforts in persuading us to discard the 'image of the enemy' when we think of them, an image which might make us reluctant to repeat the error of the 1970's in providing the credits and technology they needed to build up their military potential.

In considering the proposals for 'cooperation' and 'mutual help,' however, we might bear in mind that the Soviet Union actually has the means to solve its economic crisis quite independently if the party is ready to renounce expansion and share power. It would be enough to decollectivize agriculture, abandon a few expensive overseas clients and reduce the size of the Soviet armed forces to a level sufficient for security but not for intimidation in order to have the resources to help awaken the productive capacities of the population.

In the absence of such steps, there is no alternative, as Gorbachev has said, to *glasnost* and *perestroika* but it is the Soviet Union's Leninist framework which these measures seek to perpetuate and it is that framework which makes the Soviet Union aggressive and militaristic. There is no conceivable reason why the cost of maintaining it should be shared by the West.

* A shorter version of this article was published by *New Republic*.

The Monstrous Regiment of 'Anti-Racism'

Antony Flew

The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), as it likes to tell us in its advertisements, 'was set up by the Race Relations Act 1976 with the duties of working towards the elimination of discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity and good relations between different racial groups generally.' These are indeed admirable objectives which no person of goodwill could fail to share. Certainly racism is an outrage; if, that is, the word 'racism' is construed, as it should be but nowadays too often is not, as meaning the advantaging or disadvantaging of individuals for no other or better reason than that they happen to be members of this particular racial set and not that. (By Cantor's Axiom for Sets the sole essential feature of a set is that its members share at least one common characteristic. It is well to use this word, since such favoured alternatives as 'class' or 'community' all suggest that racial sets will and should have more in common than the merely racial characteristics by which they are defined.)

It is not as one opposed to these original objectives that I urge that this Commission should be, if not outright abolished, then at the very least radically trimmed and transformed. On the contrary: my own principled repudiation of racism, as just now defined, dates back to when, as a schoolboy visiting National Socialist Germany with my parents, I was first confronted by signs saying that this or that town or village was, and proposed to remain 'free of Jews'. Nor am I prepared to abandon those authentically anti-racist principles now that racism of another kind is being widely recommended; and that in the name of a pseudo anti-racism which employs such slimy euphemisms as 'positive discrimination' or 'affirmative action' surreptitiously to commend its own preferred substitute.

My two main objections to the CRE, and to the whole Race Relations Industry of which it is the chief executive, are quite different. The first of these objections is indeed itself paradigmatically anti-racist. For it is that, by demanding and encouraging all sorts of grouping and counting by race, the CRE is progressively and pervasively institutionalizing racism; and this in a country where previously - whatever the lapses of individuals - all our institutions were, as of course they ought to have been, effectively colour-blind.

The second objection is that the Race Relations Industry, encouraged and sustained by the Commission is, under the banner of 'anti-racist' and 'multi-cultural' education, engaged in a massive assault upon Britain and Britishness. While the cultures and traditions of the countries from which our most recent immigrants have chosen to remove themselves are actively supported

and promoted, both in the state-schools and by special grants, the children of the indigenous majority are in those same tax-maintained schools being taught to be ashamed of our country, as well as of the ancestors who made it what it was then and is now.

It is one thing, and entirely proper, to present the history of our own people, and indeed of all peoples 'warts and all'. But it is quite another, and an altogether unacceptable thing, to misrepresent the history of the people which invented parliamentary democracy, which effected the first industrial revolution, which in so doing opened up the possibility of self-sustaining economic growth, and which - incidentally - harboured the first popular movement for the abolition of slavery, as if that history were nothing but a scandalous and shameful record of enslavement and exploitation.

How then has it come about that what started as a fairly small and modestly funded outfit, with a remit to pursue wholly worthy objectives, is now devoting vastly increased resources of money and manpower to purposes which are both entirely different and egregiously obnoxious? In the first place, this has happened and, unless effective counter-measures are taken, things will go on as they have been going, simply because the CRE is a quango; and, as such, subject both to Parkinson's Law and to Hastie's Law. The former is already familiar. But let us here introduce the label 'Hastie's Law' for what its formulator too modestly christened Newsam's. Reformulated it reads: 'Racism, or what will be accepted as a substitute, will be produced in proportion to the numbers of those well-paid and prestigiously positioned to discover racism.'¹ Never ask the barber whether you need a haircut! The second source of trouble is two clauses in different Acts of Parliament. The main aim here should, I think, be the repeal of these two clauses. Both Acts were passed under Labour administrations. Nevertheless there seems not to have been any principled Conservative opposition to either clause.

The first is Section 11 of the 1966 Local Government Act:

Subject to the provisions of this section the Secretary of State may pay to local authorities who in his opinion are required to make special provision in the exercise of any of their functions in consequence of the presence within their areas of substantial numbers of immigrants from the Commonwealth whose languages or customs differ from those of the community, grants of such amounts as he may with the consent of the

Treasury determine on account of expenditure of such descriptions (being expenditure in respect of the employment of staff) as he may so determine.

In view of the date of this legislation it is obvious that it was both expected and intended that the beneficiaries would be exclusively non-Caucasian.² But, since they are not in it directly defined as such, this clause cannot be condemned as explicitly racist. It is not, that is to say, prescribing that any individual people or any specific sets of people are to be advantaged or disadvantaged for no other or better reason than that they belong to this particular racial set and not that.

The objection which does bear, however, is, though different, still weighty. It is that there is absolutely no good reason why these recent immigrants and their children should be accorded such unprecedented privileged treatment. For nothing of this sort was ever provided by the native majority for any previous immigration: not for the Huguenots; not for the Jews coming in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century; and not for the Poles and others from Eastern Europe after 1945. Yet all these were refugees fleeing religious or political persecution. As such they all had some call upon our charity. They were not just people coming here of their own freewill in pursuit of what they perceived as a better living. Already too the New Commonwealth and Pakistani immigrants of the fifties and sixties were, we must presume, on average benefitting from, more than they were contributing to, the British welfare state.

It is, therefore, hard to see such peculiarly privileged treatment of 'immigrants from the Commonwealth whose languages or customs differ from those of the community' as grounded upon anything other than their non-membership of the Caucasian racial set. If so it constitutes a paradigm case of precisely that 'institutionalized racism' nowadays so commonly denounced in places where it is not in fact to be found. There is an urgent need for persistent parliamentary probing to discover both exactly how much is being poured out every year as 'Clause 11 funding'; and exactly how many appointments this effusion is helping to fund.³ But it is already certain that it is a sum which, if spent for British cultural purposes, could, for instance, rejuvenate our public libraries and national museums; and that, thanks to this torrent of Clause 11 funds, the Race Relations Industry is massively overmanned.

The second clause which cries out for repeal is Section 35 of the 1976 Race Relations Act:

Nothing in parts II and IV should render unlawful any act done in affording persons of a particular group access to facilities and services to meet the special needs of that group in regard to their education, training or welfare, or any ancillary benefits.

This clause is explicitly and blatantly racist. For with deliberate intent it licenses the provision of 'education,

training or welfare . . . facilities and services' to 'persons of a particular racial group', precisely and only on the ground that they are members of that particular racial group and not another. If only the (quite disproportionately non-Caucasian) members of the Commission were themselves clearheadedly and consistently opposed to *all* forms of racism, then they would *themselves* be campaigning for a withdrawal of their powers to endorse and otherwise to encourage such racially discriminating awards.⁴ But of course they are not, and they never would. Instead they are forever campaigning for extra resources and further powers - including, most outrageously, powers to treat employers who do not hire the CRE approved proportion of ethnic minority employees as guilty until and unless they can prove themselves innocent of racial discrimination. (So much for a great fundamental principle of Common Law when that conflicts with the objectively 'racist' ambitions of our 'anti-racist' social engineers!)

It is presumably to this Section 35 that the Commission for Racial Equality would appeal if it ever felt any need to respond to the 'mere English' who criticize the making of grants to Association of Asian This and Conferences of Black That. The Commission would itself, and rightly, raise a hullabaloo about, and try to set the law on, any set of whites who dared to establish similarly exclusive organizations. So now, in the name of precisely those virtuously colourblind principles which they profess but conspicuously do not practice, why should this ever-proliferating quango continue to be allowed to encourage in our racial minorities what is - quite rightly - not to be tolerated in the Caucasian majority?

A failure to distinguish race from culture, combined with the introduction of a new definition of 'racism', has opened the way for a massive anti-national offensive in our state schools. About race and culture there are two essentials: that the two concepts are totally different, race being genetically determined but not culture; and consequently, that a multiracial society need not be multicultural (consider the later Roman Empire) nor a multicultural country multiracial (consider Canada or Switzerland); and, third, and again consequently, that a commitment to racial equality does not by any means entail a commitment to the absurd yet fashionable falsism that all cultures are equally good - not only intrinsically but also instrumentally.

In what Tom Lehrer has taught us to call Edbiz the false equation of race with culture misleads most trendsetters and policy-makers into making the invalid inference that, if a society *is* multiracial then its education *ought* to be multicultural. Confusion is then worse confounded when these illegitimate inferers refuse to accept a traditional 'elitist' education in British history, the Jewish Bible and the Greco-Roman classics as being, what it manifestly is, multicultural - presumably because they are once again muddling race up with the culture. Typically such people sympathize with the teacher who complained that it

was impossible to teach British history to a class which was n% black. But, surely, the most relevant history is always that of the country into which immigrants immigrate, and of which they should therefore aspire to become equal citizens – not that of the countries which they left? The right and truly anti-racist slogan was that of the election poster: ‘Labour calls you black, but Conservatives say you are British.’⁵ It seems that our history teacher saw these as exclusive alternatives.

The vicious new definition of ‘racism’ was, it seems, developed by the Marxist journal *Race and Class*, a journal sponsored by the now fiercely Marxist Institute of Race Relations and the World Council of Churches. Among other remarkable implications this new definition implies that only whites are to be condemned as racists. Apart from trivial verbal differences, this is the definition offered to justify the professedly anti-racist policies of The Inner London Education Authority and of all the other Benno-Bolshevik local authorities. In commending ILEA’s policies the Swann Report found no fault with this misguiding definition. Nor, so far as I know, has the Commission for Racial Equality ever expressed the slightest reserve or disapproval either of it or of any of its implications. In the ILEA wording it ran:

There are certain routine practices, customs and procedures in our society whose consequence is that black people have poorer jobs, health, housing and life-chances than do the white majority... These practices and customs are maintained by relations and structures of power, and are justified by centuries-old beliefs and attitudes which hold that black people are essentially inferior to white people – biologically, or culturally, or both. ‘Racism’ is a shorthand term for this combination of discriminatory practices; unequal relations and structures of power, and negative beliefs and attitudes.

It is this which is supposed to justify, and which is in turn supposedly justified by, misrepresentation of Britain as a country rotted by centuries of all-pervasive and institutionalized racism.

In order to show what a grotesque misrepresentation this is, and how scandalous it is that it should be being widely and persistently pushed and propagated in schools financed by our taxes, let us now end by savouring two passages of nineteenth century history. The first comes from *Freedom and Organization 1814-1914* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1934) by Bertrand Russell – a man always willing to notice whatever warts were there. At the Congress of Vienna the subject of the slave trade was, Russell writes,

brought up by England, and was viewed with complete cynicism by all other Powers. In England the sentiment for the abolition of the slave trade was overwhelming, and Castlereagh, whatever he may have privately thought, was obliged to listen with respect to Wilberforce and

Clarkson, the champions of abolition. The British had abolished their own slave trade, and endeavoured to induce other Powers to undertake that they would abolish theirs within five years. To the amazement of such men as Talleyrand, it was found that for such an undertaking the British Government was willing to give a solid *quid pro quo* in territory or cash, while a refusal was likely to lead to unfriendly commercial discrimination. The following letter, from Castlereagh to the British Ambassador at Madrid, is typical of many:

St James’s Square, August 1, 1814

My dear Sir,

... You must really press the Spanish Government to give us some more facilities on the subject of the Slave Trade, else we can do nothing for them, however well inclined: the nation is bent upon this object. I believe there is hardly a village that has not met and petitioned upon it; both Houses of Parliament are pledged to press it; and the Ministers must make it the basis of their policy... (p.41).

The second reading is taken from Chapter 13 of Volume II of Carl Sandburg’s biography of Abraham Lincoln. It begins with a quotation from a letter to the President from the US Ambassador in London:

The Emancipation Proclamation has done more for us here than all our former victories and all our diplomacy. It is creating an almost convulsive reaction in our favour all over this country... public reaction is very deeply stirred here and finds expression in meetings, addresses to President Lincoln, deputations to us, standing committees to agitate the subject and to affect opinion, and all the other symptoms of a great popular movement...

It was at that time that President Lincoln took the unprecedented step of writing two public letters, one

addressed ‘To the Workingmen of Manchester’, the other ‘To the Workingmen of London’. It was not a custom for the ruling heads of nations to address letters to ‘workingmen’ in other countries. Lincoln, however, had received addresses from bodies of workingmen in those cities giving him the hand of fellowship, and he replied: ‘I know and deeply deplore the sufferings which the workingmen at Manchester and in all Europe are called to endure in this crisis... Under these circumstances, I cannot but regard your decisive utterance upon the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country.’

Notes

1. See Tom Hastie ‘History, Race and Propaganda’, in F. Palmer (Ed.) *Anti-Racism: An Assault on Education and Value* (London: Sherwood, 1986). The whole book is

indispensable. Its strongest recommendation is the ferocious mendacity of the reviews in *The Guardian*, *New Socialist*, *New Statesman*, and the like.

2. Throughout the Race Relations Industry, the preferred alternative to the expression 'non-Caucasian' is 'black'. We have to recognize the malign purposes of thus confounding together as black all who are not white. The first is to recruit all non-Caucasians into a permanently aggrieved and alienated force of those perceiving themselves as victims, ever ready to march to the beat of hard left drummers. The second, by concealing the often very various track records of immigrants from different cultures, is to license the militants of the Industry to put down every failure and every misfortune of non-whites as resulting from (necessarily white) racism.

See, for instance, my *Education, Race and Revolution* (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1984) or 'Education against Racism' in Dennis O'Keeffe (Ed.) *The Wayward Curriculum* (London: Social Affairs Unit, 1986)

Compare also, in the same volume, John Marks 'Educational Policies on Race: A Case Study'.

3. For information about some of these appointments - as 'race trainers', 'racial awareness officers', etc. etc. - and for much else about the various and widespread misdoings of the Race Relations Industry, see Russell Lewis *Anti-Racism: A Mania Exposed* (London: Quartet, 1988).
4. A Commission which had once graduated into that degree of genuinely anti-racist enlightenment might proceed next to postgraduate work - asking what but anti-white racism leads to the present universal condemnation of White South Africa for treating South African blacks much less abominably than blacks are being treated by other blacks in so many other countries in that Dark Continent. Why no proposals for sanctions or other action against Amin or Mengistu or a dozen other black tyrants?
5. On these and all other matters concerning race in the educational system see Ray Honeyford *Integration or Disintegration?* (London: Claridge, 1988).

Punishment in the Community

Paul Helm

'Punishment, Custody and the Community', the latest Government Green Paper on penal policy (H.M.S.O. Cm. 424, July 1988) is a depressing document. Against a background of a rising prison population, and a corresponding increase in the cost of the prison service, it sets out a case for the further development of 'community service orders' as a form of punishment to replace prison for those convicted of serious but non-violent offences. A community service order is an order of the court requiring an offender to make recompense for his crime by money earned in periods of service in the community. Such orders would restrict a person's liberty, but not by imprisoning him; he would do community service, for example, or be under house arrest, or curfew; or his whereabouts would be tracked, or he would be required to stay away from particular places such as football grounds and pubs.

In the formal requirements of the order there would inevitably be an emphasis on restrictions and on compulsory activity, but there would be room for positive and voluntary elements as well. The programme for the individual offender might include encouraging regular attendance at work, education or training and treatment for substance abuse. (3.27)

Such community service orders would in fact build upon the existing policy of community service orders, compensation orders (as provided for in the Criminal Justice Bill), and probation orders applicable to young adult offenders.

The case for this change is as follows. It is maintained that prison is unsatisfactory as a form of punishment in those cases where it is not strictly necessary to deprive an offender of his liberty. 'Even a short period of custody is quite likely to confirm them as criminals,

particularly as they acquire new criminal skills from more sophisticated offenders. They are themselves labelled as criminals and behave accordingly' (2.15). Furthermore, imprisonment reduces offenders' responsibility; 'they are not required to face up to what they have done and to the effect on their victim or to make any recompense to the victim or the public' (1.1).

Recompense to the victims of crime, or reparation, is the second strand to this anti-prison argument. Recompense includes not only reparation to the victim of the crime, but also general reparation to 'the public' through community service (3.13). Reparation to particular victims would only occur if they wished it; no pressure for reparation should be created, nor should the victim's willingness or otherwise to insist on reparation affect the severity of the sentence. 'It would be unjust if the severity of a sentence depended on the victim's willingness to take part in reparation and it would place undue pressure on some victims' (3.12).

The third element in the argument concerns cost. The governing factor here is that the cost of keeping an offender in prison is about £250 per week (3.37). Given that there are at present 50,000 people in prison in England and Wales, with an estimated total of 65,000 by the end of the century, the total cost of the prison services can fairly easily be calculated. The Government is currently committed to a prison building programme of about one billion pounds, and to recruiting more prison officers.

So imprisonment for non-violent offences is to be reduced, and punishment in the community is to take its place. Such punishment

would place a range of requirements on the offender, which include making some recompense for the crime. The arrangements could include

many features of the present disposals, community services, compensation, going to a day centre or an attendance centre. The restrictive elements might include close supervision of the offender's whereabouts, residing at a particular place, or confining the offender to his home during specified hours. Other restrictions might be forbidding particular activities, or staying away from particular places. Legislation might be introduced which would enable any or all of these elements to be combined in a single supervisory order. (3.9)

Such proposals are not wanting in ingenuity; yet I shall now argue that they are ill thought out at a basic level, and that what is novel about them simply perpetuates those undesirable features of penal policy which have long disfigured our penal system. The proposals mark a first step in attempting to bolt a free market philosophy onto the older liberalism; the result is an instrument capable of inflicting pain but not of administering justice.

I shall develop three criticisms: that there is a preoccupation with technique at the expense of a basic understanding of what punishment is and does; that there are important ambiguities and inconsistencies in the proposals as they stand; and that the attempt being made to apply a free market philosophy to punishment is fundamentally incoherent.

Bringing an offender face to face with the victim of his crime, making him serve the community, and requiring him to make reparation to his victim and recompense to society, may all seem, at first glance, to strengthen the retributive aspect of punishment. This would be a significant improvement, for retribution is the most important single feature of punishment, that which makes it fundamentally intelligible and justifiable as a human activity; it is also almost completely lost sight of in current penal policy.

Whether or not such techniques do strengthen the retributive essence of punishment is not a matter of the ingenuity of the techniques themselves, nor even of how suitable they may appear to be in the eyes of a disinterested or even a concerned bystander. It is a matter of how the court and the offender himself *understands* what he is being required to do. For punishment is not a matter of technique, but of the administration of justice. And some effort must be made to create the appropriate setting in which punishment is to be administered if those effects which modern penologists are obsessed with - deterrence and reform, and now, alas, cost-effectiveness - have any hope of being achieved.

The Green Paper refers to the need for an individual to understand the consequences of his actions (1.3). But there is a world of difference between someone understanding what the consequences of his actions are by being brought face to face with what he has done, and appreciating that actions with such consequences are *wrong* actions. Offenders are intelligent; they know that wrecking a house in the course of a burglary will

leave the house wrecked and its owner distressed. What they need to be made to see is that there is an objective sense in which that action is wrong. On the evidence of this Green Paper there is little sign that the Home Office recognises the need for imparting understanding in this sense, for there is little sign that such a view of punishment is held in that Office.

When the Green Paper states that a major objective of the criminal justice system is to reduce crime as well as to punish offenders (1.2) it lays in parallel what should be placed in series. There are not two objectives of punishment side by side, the reduction in crime and the punishing of offenders; there is a fundamental objective - to administer justice. Where justice is administered, where it is just, and where it is believed to be just by all parties, then there is some hope that the offender will not offend again.

So a key question is, does the offender understand that he has *done wrong*? Doing wrong is not the same thing as being caught; it is having done something which is worthy of punishment because it is the deed that it is. All that the Green Paper says about punishment in general is that for something to be acceptable as a punishment it must be 'rigorous and demanding' (2.5); the deprivation of liberty is the most severe penalty available to the courts, and such sentences are imposed to show how seriously the public views criminal behaviour (3.1,3.3).

But is the public right to view acts of criminal violence seriously? The fact that the victim believes that what the criminal has done is wrong cannot be expected to cut much ice with the criminal himself: his victims *would* think that, wouldn't they? The central question is whether criminal violence *is* wrong. Moral questions of wrongness and rightness cannot be transformed into sociological questions about what the community thinks is right and wrong or mechanical questions about whether or not the punishment makes a 'sharp initial impact' (3.28); not, at least, without completely changing the moral context in which punishment is administered, and so transforming it into something else.

So the new proposals are presented not as an attempt to put justice back into punishment, but as a tough on the tiller. The boat is still in safe waters, heading in more or less the correct direction; what is needed is more 'flexibility' (3.33). This is borne out by the way in which the Paper has been written, for while the Paper sets out 'major changes in the way we deal with offenders' (4.9) there is no attempt to take the opportunity to examine fundamental principles of punishment. The Green Paper begins with the assumption that what is already being done through community service orders is basically satisfactory, and then sets out to develop and refine these techniques further.

So making ingenious proposals about curfewing, discussing whether a community service order of 200 hours is 'useful' (3.14), advocating a 'sharp initial impact' (3.28) but with some 'flexible tailoring' (3.33) are fundamentally irrelevant to a discussion of comm-

unity service orders as *punishment*.

Besides the fact that the Green Paper is fundamentally disorientated in the way that I have tried to indicate, it also contains serious intellectual flaws; at crucial points it relies on ambiguous language, and for most of its claims about the effectiveness of regimes of punishment presently being used no evidence is provided.

The ambiguities mainly concern the language of responsibility. It is said, for example, as a reason for reducing the types of offence for which a custodial sentence is appropriate, that prison is likely 'to diminish the offender's sense of responsibility and self-reliance' (3.5). There is a sense in which this may be true, but also a sense in which, if other things in the Green Paper are true, it *cannot* be true. Perhaps imprisonment will blunt a person's moral sense, and so diminish any residual awareness that he is responsible for others than himself. Prison may, in this sense, make a person 'irresponsible' in the way in which a child or teenager may sometimes be said to 'behave irresponsibly'. But prison cannot make a typical prisoner less aware of the consequences of his actions and less blameworthy for what he does; not, at least, if it is a fact, as the Green Paper claims, that two-thirds of the prison population have six or more previous convictions (3.7) and that prison can help prisoners to acquire new criminal skills.

There are other important inconsistencies, revealing a lack of thoroughness; the community service orders are to be both rigorous, and undertaken only with the consent of the offender (3.5). One aspect of this rigour is that by a community service order punctual attendance at inconvenient times may be required (3.14); and yet it is supposedly a virtue of such orders that they can be organised around an offender's other responsibilities (2.5, 3.18).

The paper is intellectually deficient in another respect: it offers a large number of unsupported factual claims about prison and about the efficacy of the policy of punishment in the community. While the many claims made for the efficacy of community orders are qualified and hedged, they leave the reader with the impression that these proposals are based upon solid research. Thus it is asserted that 'punishment in the community would encourage offenders to grow out of crime and to develop into responsible and law-abiding citizens' (1.1). And 'if an offender is made to discuss regularly with the supervisor how to plan the day's activities, this may encourage greater self-discipline' (2.11).

Not only is the empirical support for such claims flimsy; obvious problems are not even mentioned. Is it not likely that a convicted burglar or thief who remains in the neighbourhood while fulfilling the conditions of his community service order will invite private revenge from the victim, who will be presented with an extended opportunity to take the law into his own hands? Furthermore, the system is not clean and clear-cut. What if an offender only partly complies with his order? There is no clear point of terminus to the process of punishment, which could drag on for months and

years, with much scope for conflict between the numerous organisations, from the probation service or a new national organisation to be funded by the Exchequer (4.6) to private security organisations, which are to have a hand in the administering of the orders. This is a recipe for persistent, finicky interference in other people's lives.

The final criticism of the Green Paper which I wish to highlight is its preoccupation with costs and cost-effectiveness. This is, I think, a fairly new factor in the development of penal policy. While the high cost of imprisonment has been recognised for some time, it is now becoming a central issue in determining whether prison is appropriate or not. This is clear in the following remarkable sentences

It costs about £1,000 to keep an offender in prison for four weeks. The cost of punishment in the community should not exceed the cost of imprisonment, which is a more severe sentence... while the suitability of a penalty cannot be measured solely in terms of cost, the total cost of the requirements for an individual offender could be a useful check on whether the penalty is proportionate to the offence. (3.37).

Later on the Paper's particular concern is expressed that new orders, if they come into force, should not take the place of the existing probation arrangements, which are likely to remain cheaper (4.8). So much for savings on costs. What about increases in revenue? The Green Paper begins with the claim that if they are not imprisoned it is more likely that offenders will be able to pay compensation and to make reparation (1.1). Later on there is stress on unpaid work which has value (2.4), or on the direct payment of compensation or payment through instalments (2.7).

The emphasis on money, whether it is saving on expenditure or increasing revenue, at first sight appears to be a howling *non sequitur*. For what has the cost of punishment to do with the seriousness of the offence punished and with the justice of the punishment? May there not be cheap way of justly punishing serious offences, and expensive ways of justly punishing what is less serious? Of course there may. So there appears to be a serious confusion here between the cost of punishment and its justice.

No doubt one simple explanation for this confusion is the assumption that the prison service is too expensive and that anything that can be done to reduce its costs must be welcome. And yet there may be a more complex but more serious explanation, namely that what we are witnessing in the quoted paragraph, and also in those on compensation and reparation (3.10-3.12) are the first attempts in the United Kingdom to apply a free market philosophy to the nature of punishment and its regulation. The first stage is the recognition that prison is expensive and unproductive; the second stage is the view that community service orders are cost-effective and useful. Both stages are clearly represented in this Green Paper. The third stage, which is

just beginning to appear in the Paper, is the belief that an effective penal system is one that pays its way.

Quite apart from the fact that such an approach is developed in a context in which punishment is severed from morality, one in which scant attention is paid to ensuring that the offender recognises the justice of his punishment – the point insisted upon earlier – there is an incoherence of a more fundamental kind. It is a cornerstone of free market economics that there are no just prices and just wages; wages and prices are each determined by the coming together of buyer and seller in a free market, by the interplay of the respective forces of supply and demand. The market is thus anonymous, and amoral. The money value of a good or service tells us nothing whatsoever about its moral value.

If this is so then it is futile to attempt to develop a free market approach to punishment. To suppose that an offender can literally pay for his crime is to suppose that an action which is unjust – as opposed say, to a technical breach of a parking or speeding regulation – can be costed just as a good or service is costed. But the costing of a good or service, according to the free market philosophy, is entirely a matter of the markets. How then, for a free marketeer, could the costing of a

crime be made on any other basis; and how, on that basis, is one going to get the offender to recognise the *justice* of the ‘charge’ that he is being made to bear?

Scant attention seems to have been paid to the fact that a tariff of compensation will quickly come to be, in the eyes of the offenders, what the various offences are *worth*, nor to the attitude that a person may do whatever he wishes provided he compensates the victim for any loss. Wickedness takes on the character of a service which one pays the state, or one’s victim, for permitting. Such an approach continues the already established tendency of estimating criminal injuries in terms of a scale of cash compensation, from £50 for a minor graze to £2,500 for a limb fracture (See *The Guardian*, 20th September 1988).

A penal system which is recognisable as such cannot be adapted to a free market philosophy. What this reveals is not the essential wrongness of the market – for many areas of human life there is nothing superior to it – but its limitations. To try to make the market all-pervading is to dehumanise society just as surely as socialism dehumanises it. For this reason, if for no other, it is fervently to be hoped that this attempt to introduce market economics into penal policy is an isolated aberration.

A Point of Protest

Thomas Szasz

In an Editorial Note appended to Ryszkard Legutko’s essay ‘Do liberals love liberty?’, Roger Scruton writes:

It is worth pointing out that the thinking represented by Szasz has been so successful that US law has been revised so as to forbid compulsory hospitalisation of the insane. The chaotic and disturbing result of this change can be witnessed in every major American city.¹

The assertion that ‘US law has been revised so as to forbid compulsory hospitalisation of the insane’ is news, indeed. Does Scruton actually believe that John Hinckley, Jr. is staying at St. Elizabeths Hospital, the nation’s premier madhouse, because he likes it there, and because the Government likes him so much that it houses and feeds him at taxpayer’s expense? I go to the trouble of refuting Scruton’s absurd misstatement because it reflects the widespread perception, carefully cultivated by psychiatric propagandists, that involuntary mental hospitalization has become so rare in America as to be irrelevant. This is not so. As I write these lines there comes to my hand the February 1989 issue of *The American Journal of Psychiatry* featuring a ‘Special Section’ containing four articles collectively titled ‘Dangerousness and the Civil Commitment Process.’² An Editorial introducing these studies states:

The most recent national data (1980) show that of 1,176,558 in-patient admissions, 26% were involuntary noncriminal commitments. More than 51% of admissions to state and county mental hospitals are, however, involuntary (noncriminal).³

Moreover, these figures do not even begin to reflect the escalating ugliness of the American psychiatric scene, noted in an essay in *The Sunday Times Magazine* (London):

Thousands of [New York] homeless are former inmates of mental hospitals which [Mayor] Koch emptied, largely on economic grounds; on the other hand, he has decreed that a ‘sidewalk dweller’ should be carted off to a mental hospital, on the grounds that anyone sleeping rough and pestering passers-by must be mentally disturbed. New Yorkers see no method in what some of them call the mayor’s madness.⁴

In the past, thousands of individuals were forcibly incarcerated in mental hospitals, often for life; that was bad enough, but at least many of these unfortunate persons could make the asylum their home. Now the situation is even worse, thousands of persons being not only forcibly incarcerated in mental hospitals, but also

forcibly evicted from them as soon as they show any sign of adapting to their new environment. Then the cycle of forcible hospitalization and dehospitalization is repeated over and over again, depriving the 'mental patient' of a predictable and stable environment both within and without the insane asylum.

Thus, what Scruton observed 'in every major American city' is not the triumph of my ideas as social policy but only a singularly unattractive feature of the American national character (if one can so generalize), otherwise often good and generous. Perhaps precisely because Americans strive so hard to be good and generous, they don't like to be told that they have done wrong. Dickens' observation on just this point is unerring:

I believe [he wrote in 1842] there is no country, on the face of the earth, where there is less freedom of opinion on any subject in reference to which there is a broad difference of opinion than in this [the United States]. . . I write the words with reluctance, disappointment, and sorrow; but I believe it from the bottom of my soul. . . The wonder is that a breathing man can be found with temerity enough to suggest to the Americans the possibility of their having done wrong.⁵

Dickens was right. Instead of simply acknowledging their wrongdoing, Americans prefer to deny it with a dramatic gesture of undoing. Indians on reservations, blacks on plantations, epileptics in colonies, the mentally ill in snake pits - all these embarrassing wrongs must be quickly righted and forgotten: the Indians are treated like citizens of fictitious independent nations; the blacks get reverse discrimination; epileptic colonies are written out of medical and psychiatric history; the men and women imprisoned in mental hospitals for years and decades are suddenly and forcibly evicted.

The result, pretentiously called 'deinstitutionalization,' proves not only how very respectful psychiatrists really are of the civil rights of mental patients, but also how very right psychiatrists have been all along in stigmatizing and segregating mental patients as dangerous deviants. The failure of the quick cure then justifies the re-repression of the mad: Mental illness exists and the mentally ill are dangerous; ergo, mental patients, lacking free will and responsibility have a right to be hospitalized against their will, treated against their will, lawyered against their will, even acquitted of crimes against their will; and if they commit mayhem and murder, then, suffering as they do from mental illness, they cannot be held responsible for their actions, need to be hospitalised against their will, treated against their will, and so on . . . *ad nauseam* and *in infinitum*.

In short, I interpret Scruton's howler (and its making it into the pages of so prestigious a publication) as evidence that psychiatry is a religion and that Voltaire was right: if mental illness did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.

Notes

1. Roger Scruton, Editorial note, in Ryszard Legutko, Do liberals love liberty? *The Salisbury Review*, September 1988, p. 30.
2. Special Section: Dangerousness and the Civil Commitment Process, *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 146:170-193 (February), 1989.
3. Loren H. Roth, Four studies of mental health commitments (Editorial), *ibid.*, pp. 135-137; p. 135.
4. Cal McCrystal, The Big Apple turns sour, *The Sunday Times Magazine* (London), February 12, 1989, pp. 24-37; p. 32.
5. Charles Dickens, quoted in John Forster, *The Life of Charles Dickens* (2 Vols.; London: Dent/Everyman's Library, 1966), Vol. 1, p. 194.

Mrs Thatcher and the European Community

Arthur Aughey

For most citizens of the United Kingdom, the European Community has appeared (hitherto at any rate) peripheral to their concerns. It has been something 'out there' which has imposed certain obligations or provided certain opportunities. It has not been generally understood as a new and wider framework within which former social and economic expectations would be re-cast. The main exception to this rule has been the farmer. The Common Agricultural Policy and the determination of its price regime through political bargaining in Brussels transformed the political economy of the farming interest in the 1970s and 1980s. Beyond the farm gate however the European Community has never engaged the imagination of the public and only desultorily engaged its attention.

British attitudes have always been the despair of committed 'Europeans'.

Since the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 and the commitment made by the member states to complete the internal market by December 1992 there has been a noticeable revival of interest in the workings and doings of the Community and in the possible consequences of those strategic developments currently taking place. What seems to be significant is the change in the popular perception of those developments. It appears to have dawned on the average citizen that the European Community is no longer simply something 'out there'. There is a much greater recognition than ever before that by 1992 the Community will provide that framework within which crucial

decisions affecting the life of every citizen will be taken. To argue thus is not to suggest that public opinion has become rapidly and dramatically 'pro-European' (whatever that term may mean today). It is to argue that there is a new awareness of the pervasiveness of the Community enterprise. In other words popular perception of the nature of Britain's relationship with the Community appears to be moving from one phase to another. This may be defined very crudely as a movement from 'externalisation' to 'internalisation' of the Community effect.

There is some vague popular understanding that by 1992 things are going to be different, though to what extent no one (and least of all the so-called experts) is very certain. In such circumstances it is both the duty and the opportunity of politicians to provide the public with a vision and to establish clear principles upon which action will be grounded. It is a duty because it is in the very nature of political argument to give ideological coherence and clarity to complexity and uncertainty. It is an opportunity because it allows politicians to seize the initiative, to fashion a policy which appeals to the sentiments and addresses the concerns of their electorate. That particular process is now under way in Britain and it reflects another change in the political environment.

After 15 years of membership of the European Community the argument about whether the United Kingdom should stay in or come out is now dead. The Labour Party, which in the 1983 General Election was in favour of withdrawal, has adopted a position of sullen acceptance of the realities of Community membership. Even the Trades Union Congress has discovered the value of using Commission preferences as a stick with which to beat the British Government, as was shown by the appearance at its conference in 1988 of Commission President Delors. Partly, of course, these developments are tactical. The more positive (albeit selective) interpretation of the Community expressed by Labour opponents of the Conservative Government reflects the frustrations of 10 years exclusion from power. There is a great desire in such circumstances to take succour wherever one may find it. However the strategic implications are clear enough. The European Community is now the generally accepted framework within which British economic, social, trade and (increasingly) foreign and security policy will be structured. This particular development may once again be understood as a political internalisation of the Community effect. It can be nothing other than a good thing to extend the discussion of Community affairs and to wrest it from those curious political animals the 'fervent anti-Marketeer' and the 'committed European'. For too long argument about the nature of the Community enterprise has been doomed, like the fate of Stendhal's Lucien Leuwan, to an existence 'between mad, selfish, and polite legitimists in love with the past, and mad, generous, and boring republicans in love with the future.' It can do nothing but good to see the Community debate fixed within what George

Santayana called the 'fertile principles' of the life of the state.

These popular and political developments are to be welcomed because they help restore balance to what was an insidiously one-sided debate. Since the anti-Market position lacked credibility, however well-argued the case, it was quite easy for European federalists to advance their cause on the dubious principle that 'there is no alternative'. A false antithesis between splendid isolation and political interdependence was erected, and these became the poles around which one could locate the epithets nostalgia, reaction, nationalist and imagination, progress, European. On that sort of ideological spectrum it was very easy to argue that reason, history and virtue could only point in favour of the 'deepening and broadening of the process of integration' (ie a European federal union). That deepening and broadening could proceed with little let or hindrance in piecemeal fashion simply because there was no effective or respectable alternative idea. Nor was there a 'myth' of sufficient emotional content to counter that of European enthusiasts.

Their myth paints the glorious dawn of a Community suffused with supranational enthusiasm and following the wise and benign vision of the Founding Fathers. The difficulties attending the 'making of Europe' were recognised, but the Rome Treaty had begun a process, created a dynamic of integration which had its own logic and inevitability. This process was interrupted temporarily by reactionary nationalism in the person of General de Gaulle. The struggle continues however, according to the myth, amongst all right-thinking Europeans finally to eradicate such atavism and create a true economic and political union. That is a myth of inordinate influence and one which has dominated the teaching of 'European Studies'; its dominance leads to the arrogance and intolerance of so much academic writing in the United Kingdom on the European Community. Indeed much of that writing has turned out to be nothing other than a public relations exercise for the European ideal.

Yet this approach to the understanding of the Community is narrow and distorted. It is narrow because it tries to confine all the varied currents of European political and economic relationship within the confines of one neat and restricted channel of the Community 'method'. It is distorted because at heart it is not an attempt to understand. It is an attempt to moralise. What characterises this genre of writing is its impatience to see the Community become something other than what it presently is. As such it expresses the same assumptions and the same purposes as those assiduous Eurocrats in Brussels. The great danger has been the development of an intellectual community of interest which would smother out the consideration of dissenting views.

It was important, therefore, for Mrs Thatcher to set out a conservative vision of the European Community, as she did in Bruges in September 1988. Its significance lay in an intellectual challenge to the idea that there is

no alternative to a centralised European Union, that the task of the institutions of the Community is progressively to absorb those functions now carried out by the member states. And it was done without in any way questioning the utility of the Community in a world of political and economic interdependence. That did not prevent Mrs Thatcher being pilloried for her insensitivity to the ideals of our partners nor for treating the institutions like a Brussels metropolitan county council. Put simply, she was being irresponsibly nationalistic. This is far from the truth. The Bruges speech merely interpreted the ambiguous character of the Community in a fashion adequate to a conservative understanding of the enterprise. That was legitimate, not only in terms of conservative argument, but also in terms of Community experience.

Community Ideals

The European Community is an ambiguous enterprise. There are two important notions involved. One may be called Community 'solidarity'; the other Community 'contract'. Each may be expressed in a reasonably coherent language of political discourse. Community solidarity supposes a shared European identity, an identity founded in equality. It therefore argues that an equal degree of welfare and opportunity should be the lot of all citizens as part of the good European life. Community is not just a convenient label. It presupposes a definite common good which is not just the product of formal arrangements between states. The Community has an inner, spiritual meaning and the language of solidarity is the language of Europe's moral conscience, the echo of the Founding Fathers. And insofar as rhetoric is indispensable to moralising, the language of Community solidarity is rhetorical. However the key political thrust of such rhetoric is to strengthen the claims of the institutions of the European Community to provide for the social and economic welfare of the citizens of one Europe. The European 'good' is the absolute index against which all policy and all practice must be measured. As with all such absolute indices the mind of solidarity is the mind of uniformity.

Community contract supposes an engagement of limited extent. The commitments entered into by member states are specific and precise. It is legality and not morality which constitutes the appropriate relationship between the partners. So long as the general rules are equally applied to all and so long as the states subscribe to their authority then there is wide scope for diversity and distinctiveness. The language of Community contract is the language of interest and calculation and insofar as common sense is indispensable to effective action, the language of contract is prosaic. The key political thrust of this prosaic understanding is to retain the primacy of the member state and to retain its distinctive sovereign character. There is no acceptance of some universally applicable ideal of the European interest. The reality is still the substantial inner life of

the 'nation' state and the limited accommodations it may make with others within the Community form.

The political character of the European Community is the ideological engagement of these two ideals just as the character of a state is the ideological engagement of the 'inner vision' of conservatism and the 'transcendent vision' of radicalism. Each of them has its own consistency and integrity but yet neither has an existence without the other. The truth of the European Community is the balance of their relationship. If, to adapt from Croce, we understand the 'nation' state to be the earthly element and European Union as the heavenly element then 'it must be said that heaven cannot exist without the earth.' Both, in their interaction, represent 'Life which is elevated into morality and morality which is transformed into life.' These considerations enable us to recognise the strength and the weakness of Mrs Thatcher's vision.

Conservatism and Europe

Mrs Thatcher's outline of a conservative view of Europe in Belgium last year was fully within the tradition of Community contract. In two key areas it expresses a limited interpretation of the purposes of the Community. First, she understands the creation of the Single Market as a process of liberalisation which will allow market forces to work. The task of Community institutions is to sweep away the remaining barriers to free trade and fully to establish a framework of common standards and practices. Although it is admitted that this will entail adopting a substantial volume of new EC legislation, the form of integration envisaged is essentially *negative*. The wish is to see a 'bonfire of controls' throughout Western Europe. It is not thought necessary to erect on top of the free market substantial new policies of *positive* European scope. It is not really thought to be the relevant task of the institutions of the Community to attempt to direct the collective resources of the member states. Neither does the experience of the one major and central policy of such integration to date give any support to that ambition. The Common Agricultural Policy has represented a monstrous waste of public resources. Having achieved some degree of restraint on agricultural expenditure at the Brussels Summit of February 1988, the British Government has no wish to set a precedent for other forms of open-ended and centrally-determined Community spending. Hence the rather dramatic statement of the Prime Minister that: 'We have not rolled back the frontiers of the state only to see them reimposed at a European level.' The main benefits to come from the Single Market will best be spread according to the practical judgments in the market and not through ambitious schemes of European solidarity.

Second, there is a defence of the national diversity of the member states which remain resistant to the blandishments of a bloodless Europeanism. While the Prime Minister spoke in terms of national identity and tradition (and it comes naturally to a Conservative

politician to do so) this is not the real concern. 'Talk of national identity has always been, in the context of Euro-politics, a red herring. It is true, as European advocates argue, that membership of the Community has not made the French any less French or the Germans any less German. But that is not the point. Mrs Thatcher was concerned with the authority of the state and the scope of its sovereignty. Ever since Britain joined the Community in 1973 those who wish to see a full-blown European Union have attempted to redefine sovereign authority in terms of the *capacity* to do things - the collective 'pooling' of state sovereignty (the language of solidarity in this case) enables the British state to achieve more of its political objectives. This is really an article of faith and not a reasoned argument. But as a proposition it can indicate no theoretical limit to the scope of Community power. It is the sort of thinking which has produced that symbolic monstrosity, the European passport. Mrs Thatcher's idea of sovereignty is founded upon the distinctiveness of the political traditions and institutions of a political community and the direct *accountability* of government to the people. The capacity of the Community to advance or to defend the interests of the British people is not taken on trust and there are clear theoretical limits to the ceding of authority of Brussels. The sovereign state is no outmoded concept but the reality of power and the basis of legitimacy. It will only accept what it has bargained for and Europe is only one of its engagements.

Those who reacted with horror to Mrs Thatcher's speech, like Edward Heath, and believed her to have damaged the Community by her views do so by giving the impression that they have some insight into the inevitable course of European history. That is only the prejudice of those who think in terms of solidarity. Mrs Thatcher's views are perfectly legitimate and justified by European experience and have injected a necessary spirit of intellectual dissent into the deliberations of the Twelve. That is their strength, for they are rooted in the sentiments and preferences of the average person for the accumulated achievements of the state in which he or she lives. At the same time, Mrs Thatcher's critics are right to suggest that her vision is not all-comprehending. That is indeed its weakness. The political clarity of her vision stems precisely from its narrowness of focus. She fails to recognise the equally legitimate arguments of others, most notably within the Commission, who do not share her limited view of the tasks of Community institutions. For them the conservative vision is too contractual, too bound up with outworn thinking about national sovereignty. The completion of the internal market can only point to creating more effective instruments of European

redistribution to complement, and in some cases to counteract, the growing interdependence and integration of European business. To complement 'market Europe' there is a need to build a 'social Europe'. This term is one more way of expressing a commitment to a Community constructed on the basis of European solidarity. The whole debate has simply shifted ground and will not be conjured away.

The Conservative Purpose

There need be no cause for despair. Those who subscribe to that conservative view of Europe outlined by the Prime Minister (a view which owes very little to party loyalties) need not believe that theirs is a lost cause. As T.S. Eliot once said, there is no such thing as a lost cause for there is no such thing as a gained cause. Conservatism, confronted by the dramatic inspiration of European optimism means more than a timid appeal to caution. Nor is it merely a restraint upon and limitation to the progressive thrust towards European Union. It is correct to see the spirit of conservatism expressed in terms of caution and limitation. It would be incorrect to assume that conservatism is a mere break on developments, the course of which it cannot influence. That is to understand political argument in a mechanical fashion which does not effectively capture its influence on, nor its contribution to, practice. Moreover, conservatism does not just engage in a forlorn delaying operation, making concessions only when absolutely required. Conservative values will positively and materially affect the political culture of the Community and contribute to its character. Ideas really do have consequences.

The consequences of Mrs Thatcher's statements should be to clarify some of the choices and options, and to concentrate the mind of citizens, in Britain and elsewhere, upon the sort of Europe in which they wish to live. They should provide the grounds upon which other can develop a strong and purposeful case, and thereby materially affect the way in which the Europe of the 1990s and of the next century develops. This can only be done on a pan-European basis. On the other hand one consequence should be the reconsideration of the way in which Westminster addresses European affairs. For if Britain is to contribute positively to the 'common European endeavour' from the inner life of its political tradition, then Westminster ought to be fully engaged in the task. Let us hope that the elections to the European Parliament this year provide us with some further exploration of the Bruges themes. Let us hope that they are not lost in the bland pieties of Euro-speak.

MAJORITY RIGHTS

A nation has a right, indeed a duty, to protect its culture and traditions; only by so doing can it continue to make a contribution to global civilization. Britain is no exception, yet our institutions, cultural heritage, and even language are questioned, and attacked on behalf of minority cultures. Our state education system is being subjected to wide-ranging and often obligatory "multi-cultural" and "anti-racist" policies. These tend to teach not a well informed and critical understanding of the minority cultures now represented in Britain but rather the neglect, undermining and denigration of the British national heritage. Disastrous consequences are bound to follow for community relations, and for the children of the ethnic minorities deprived of a proper knowledge of the culture in which they will be living. We would ourselves in no way wish to undertake similarly hostile activities against the cultural background and traditions of any ethnic minority. We fully recognise the right of minority groups to transmit their own cultures, but the place where they can be preserved without antagonising the majority or handicapping children is the home and not the educational system which should seek to unite rather than divide. This is what has been done by previous immigrants, for instance the Jews and the Poles, who have never demanded that their language and culture should be taught in British schools.

Majority Rights has been formed to speak for all citizens, whatever their origin, creed or colour, who believe in the value of the distinctly British form of European civilization and in the right of the British people to safeguard it.

Our aims are:

- 1. To preserve and transmit Britain's cultural heritage.**
- 2. To challenge the validity of the concept of multi-cultural education.**
- 3. To expose the hollowness of the claims made by the anti-racist lobby.**
- 4. To work towards the elimination of the Race Relations legislation, which is supposedly in the interests of the ethnic minorities but is in reality divisive and as much against their interests as those of the majority.**
- 5. To urge the abolition of the Commission for Racial Equality.**

We welcome support from anyone who shares these values and concerns.

Ray Honeyford

Professor Antony Flew

Tim Janman M.P.

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Leo XIII as a Conservative Thinker

James McNamara

History rarely offers us a corpus of entirely chaste political doctrine – doctrine free from self-aggrandisement or the deformations of ideology. Marxists believe such an idea to be a theoretical impossibility. The worldly conservative would think it necessary to visit heaven, like Dante, to experience it fully as angelic discourse. Even so, earthly models exist. We might have to go back some way to find them, possibly to Graeco-Jewish sources; but the most obvious text is surely the nostrums for rulers in the deuterocanonical books of the Bible, where good government is given its true celestial significance. In Europe, both East and West, the patristic period provides us with examples, and so, thanks to Aquinas, does the later scholastic age. The writings of Burke seemed to constitute a last fading European echo.

All the more welcome therefore ought it be to hear such a voice in the modern world, and one moreover, speaking not from the periphery but from the ancient centre of our civilisation. It is to be found in what is now known as the Leonine Corpus. This is a collection of twelve *Litterae Encyclicae* taken from a total of 86 letters, composed between 1878–1903 by Joachim Pecci, or Leo XIII as he is known to history. The particular twelve owe their integrity to a combination of factors: each deals with a specific crisis of the public realm; they are all addressed to recently founded Nation-States in Europe; they are concerned with the public interest which is foreseen as endangered by the policies of new aggressive democratic regimes; and finally, they are a masterly summa of Christian social doctrine, both as theory and practice. In retrospect, Pecci's choice of Leo as his Papal name appears singularly apt. Although by all accounts a mild-mannered man he does indeed now sound like a lion. Standing in time between *Das Kapital* and *Mein Kampf* the Leonine Corpus has the deep resonance of real authority raised amidst the howlings of radical hyenas.

If we now hear a note of sovereignty in the encyclicals it is a deeply afflicted one. Their universality must be weighed against a particular background. During the 19th century the Catholic Church had suffered more than in any other epoch since the Diocletian persecutions. On the very morning of his election, 20 February 1878, Leo XIII literally became a prisoner. Under his predecessor, Pius IX, the Vatican had become a hostage of the Italian government and thus to every revolutionary movement in Europe. There is ample evidence that influential secret societies, using a form of liberal insinuation later copied by the Bolsheviks, had determined upon the utter destruction of the Chair of St Peter. Loyal Catholics everywhere looked into the

future with dread. One year before Cardinal Manning had surveyed the view as it must have looked to the new Pope at the moment of his coronation – a prospect of Europe, as it were, *sub specie aeternitatis*:

Few centuries since the Christian era have seen events of greater Magnitude, or more far reaching consequence, than the age in which we live. It has seen the extinction in 1806 of the Holy Roman Empire, the heir and representative of the Caesars; the overthrow of more dynasties and the abdication of more Kings, than any former age. It is characteristically the century of revolution. It has seen great wars which shook the whole of Europe from Madrid to Moscow; and lately two great Empires overthrown in a few weeks. Once it has seen the head of the Christian Church carried away prisoner into France, once driven by bloodshed out of Rome, and now we see him stripped of all the world can clutch; twice it has seen Rome seized and held. These are not common events.¹

These momentous changes set the Leonine agenda. At stake was the intellectual integrity of Catholicism and the restoration of social harmony. Providentially for both Church and State they had found in the mind of Joachim Pecci a combination of philosopher and diplomat equal to the task. The former *ponente del buon governo* at the Vatican had already grasped that Europe's political cacophony arose from daring attempts to re-define the nature of government and society outside the Christian tradition. Leo XIII entered the muddy water of democratic theory with the aim of restoring its clear Christian sources.

He did not come unprepared. Following his first Vatican appointment in 1837, he was made civil governor to papal-states in southern and central Italy. He had then been introduced to the unpredictable ways of constitutional monarchy as Papal Nuncio to Belgium until 1846; and for the past three decades as Bishop and Cardinal of Umbria he had steered the Church through the worst excesses of the Risorgimento with prudence. Those experiences had made him an expert on the machinations of the liberal mind, and he had made a special study of the forms of Government in England and France. In the reign of Pius IX he was a constant adviser to the beleaguered Pope and his Department of State; his was the hand behind many of the propositions in the 'Syllabus of Errors' – that superbly comprehensive enumeration of modern non-Christian philosophies. In 1865 he was chosen to guide research into the most controversial section of the

agenda for *The First Vatican Council*, the part which dealt with the nature and authority of the Church and her relations with the State. All this helped to form a philosophical intelligence capable of reformulating the idea of good government for a rebellious world. The prophecies of St Malachy characterise this pontificate under the title of 'Light in the Heavens'.

The two great encyclicals on which the Leonine doctrine of government stands are *Diuturnum Illud*, 29 June 1881, (on the origin and nature of civil government) and, *Immortale Dei*, 1 November 1885, (on the Christian Constitution of States).² The vexed 'Roman question', concerning the rival spheres of influence between the Italian State and the Vatican, rambled on until 1929, but in these documents the subject attains universality. The Pontiff, following his usual method of exposition, distilled the essence of the principle to be adhered to if the tension between Church and State is to be satisfactorily resolved. Then he showed how the principle arose naturally from the origins of the subject, and how it had been hammered out in history. And finally he formulated a programme to rectify present abuses. The principle was stated clearly:

The Almighty has given charge of the human race to two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, one being set over divine, and the other over human things. Each in its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits within which it is contained.

Diuturnum explained that difficulties would always arise since both powers commanded the same subject; only by understanding the proper sphere of each was any resolution possible. *Immortale* goes further, warning that when a State does not recognise God, or rejects the source of its own authority in the sovereignty of God, it can easily come to reject the title of the Church to be a perfect society with its own special rights. 'A perfect society' in this context means one which possesses in itself the means necessary to attain its own special end - which is, in the case of civil society, the temporal well-being of the community. The Church is supreme in Her own domain, in possessing the means necessary for the eternal salvation of mankind. This title of a supernatural order was superior to any other conferred in the natural order. It could not be usurped even by a newly secularised State.

The theory of the two powers goes all the way back to Gelasius I (492-496) who wrote when Italy was undergoing barbarian invasions, and when a Byzantine Emperor, Anastasius I, was trying to interfere in Church affairs. It has ever since been known as the Gelasian Theory:

There are two, O august Emperor, who share between them in chief the rule of the world; the sacred authority of the Popes and the Royal Power. And of these two the burden of the sacerdots is the heavier, for they must render account for Kings themselves in the day of judgement.

Leo XIII brilliantly adapted this argument to altered modern circumstances. In *Diuturnum* he is telling the secular powers of Europe that any war waged against the Church's authority would end in undermining civil authority as well. As supreme Pontiff, responsible even for the actions of rulers, he felt forced to speak out against the elimination of God from public affairs, and against the inevitable destruction of the foundations of society which stems from that. The ultimate victim of these policies is of course the State itself. He explained the particular advantages which flowed from Catholic doctrine, the dignity and security it bestowed upon rulers, and the benefits of protection and defence which the religious authority received in return. Such co-operation ensured the rule of justice. This lofty conception of Petrine responsibility can also be traced back to the Pope's namesake Leo I (440-461), who set it forth as a mode of authority conferred by the divine imperative - 'Go ye and teach all nations'. He writes, 'For it was most fitting to the divine disposition that many kingdoms should be joined in one Empire in order that a general preaching should reach an accessible people, whom the rule of one city should retain'.

St Augustine's *City of God* offers the same perspective, in which the *civitas terrena* has been prepared for Christus Victor. At the fall of Pagan Rome, the providential city of God entered the sphere of time in order to spread the reign of Christ throughout the world. Latin theological thought crystallized this into a recognition of the primacy of the See of Peter amongst other Patriarchates. It also stabilized the relationship of that See to the secular order. The Magisterium of the Church had to be free from interference, so as to carry out its divinely appointed role as teacher of mankind. As late as the medieval period this same appeal to a 'non-political' form of authority can be heard in the words of Gregory VII, exiled in Salerno:

Since the day when the Church placed me on its apostolic throne my whole desire and end of all my striving has been that the Holy Church, the Bride of God, our mistress and our Mother, should recover her honour and remain free and chaste and Catholic.³

Freedom there means freedom from dependence on the feudal State and Imperial power alike.

At the latter end of the 19th Century, Leo XIII had to settle this relationship to the secular power during a much worse crisis; one unforeseen by the Gelasian theory. This time it was not that the State wished the Church to occupy a more modest position: it did not want it to have any position at all, except possibly as a vague benevolent influence of an Anglican/Protestant-type. After the watershed date of 1870 the various countries of Europe seriously curtailed the liberty of the Church according to the methods laid down by Napoleon: confiscations of property; expulsions of religious orders, especially of teaching orders; punitive taxation of revenues, in particular alms-giving; the

secularization of ecclesiastical institutions; the laicization of everything to do with marriage and education of children; and the spread of heterodox religious teaching under the aegis of bogus Christian publications. Each European democracy had the choice of a selection from these options. And all of them represented the Catholic Church as the arch-enemy of liberty and therefore of the State.

The Papacy had to face the three main forms of this hostility aside from petty local variations in Switzerland and the Iberian peninsula; the Risorgimento in Italy, the Kulturkampf in Germany, and the secular absolutism of the Third French Republic. Leo XIII's answer to it all was humble and definitive. In the same spirit as De Tocqueville earlier in the century he accepted the development of democratic ideals, while asserting, in the spirit of Gelasius, the sacred right of the Church to Christianise democracy, just as the early Church had Christianised gothic Barbarianism. He demanded this right in the interest of future civilisation.

To make his argument convincing - that the Church was a perfect society entitled to liberty of action within ordained limits - other parts of the Leonine Corpus demonstrated the other side of the Two Powers theory of Government. The modern State was displayed as a legitimate custodian of the sovereign power required to perfect the civil order. In other words, the Catholic emphasis on a supernatural order of Truth and Justice does not threaten but rather sustains the temporal authority. In the atmosphere of mutual hate and suspicion between rulers and ruled, the persuasive force of this argument encountered both political and philosophical resistance. It was difficult to reconcile Catholics, suffering under new legal disabilities for the practice of their Faith, to the very liberal codes which had imposed them. In France the Catholic and the Royalist causes were thought to be synonymous, and Leo XIII's chaste argument for integration in an unavoidably liberal world, was considered inscrutable. As a result, the kind of separation of Church and State which he consistently condemned came into being in that country in 1905 and has acted as a model for the modern world ever since. This triumphant view asserts that the Church is not a true, perfect and wholly independent society; its rights and limits are determined by a civil power. The State is the origin of all rights and is itself endowed with a right that is unlimited. The Church properly belongs on the moral sidelines; liberty must therefore be given to every opinion and idea which encourages religious indifference. In two encyclicals, *Nobilissima Gallorum gens*, 8 February 1884, and *Au milieu des sollicitudes*, 16 February 1892, the Pope had already warned the French of the possibility that this perversion of the Gelasian theory might be enacted as Law.

The strain of conservative thought represented by Leo XIII should now be apparent. It is an integral conservatism, not the pragmatic variety at all. It belongs to the nobler type which adheres strictly to

first principles as given by tradition and logic and which then combines them in a comprehensive blueprint, including but not destroying, the contingencies of historical change. Leo XIII describes this method as a search for 'the germ of the good in all modern ideas'. Once this was discovered, he believed the rest would be blown away by time as so much chaff. It takes a very generous and erudite mind to maintain this poise with any elegance, and of course liberals like to believe that they possess its qualities in abundance. Conservatives are not supposed to have blueprints; Leo XIII, however, clearly believed he had inherited one large enough to contain the smaller pre-occupations of European Liberalism. Enough has already been said to establish that he believed Catholicism had to learn to live in a liberal world without forsaking a single principle. This generosity earned him much criticism equally from Catholics who wished to become liberals, and from those who did not. In his own period this was understandable. Less forgivable has been the consistent 20th Century mis-representation of him - amongst modernist Catholics as well as amongst orthodox liberal democrats - as a sort of crypto-progressive who had covertly absorbed a new revolutionary view of politics.⁴

What Leo XIII actually believed, the germ of the good he had discovered in the new ideas, was simply the truth that Man is saved by the social action of mankind, as well as by the sacramental action of a divinely appointed Church.⁵ He did not make this into a Dogma necessary for salvation, as political enthusiasts have since the Second Vatican Council; nevertheless he included it as a fact of historical contingency. If philosophers have come to believe anything else about him, it is because they have neglected to read what he actually wrote about Liberalism, particularly in the companion encyclicals to those I have mentioned (*Libertas* (Human Liberty) 20 June, 1888, *Inscrutabili De* (Social evils) 21 April, 1878, *Quod Apostolici muneris*, 28 December, 1878 (On Socialism)), and in the many *Epistolae* addressed to specific Bishops around the world. These blow away the philosophical chaff that clings to this once successful political theory.

A true conservative will always place marriage, property and education at the heart of his political and social ideas. Leo XIII was no exception. Nor is this surprising: for marriage, property and education safeguard the Family, and the rule of family life is an imperative that must always reach high on the Christian social agenda. In traditional Catholic doctrine the family is also a society, with priority of nature, and therefore of rights, over civil society. Nevertheless the family finds its place between Church and State since it requires them both for its proper development. The status of marriage was the first fundamental area of conflict between Leo XIII and Liberalism. In the early days of his pontificate he tried to avoid this conflict: His encyclical *Arcanum* 1880 appealed to the secular powers not to make marriage subject only to civil law,

not to alienate it completely from Church law, since this would, he thought, only increase divorces. If Church and State might co-operate in this crucial area it would only be to the advantage of the civil order. The contract between partners in a marriage was as sacred as that between rulers and ruled; if the State proceeded, therefore to 'civilise' marriage the force of both contracts - the private and the public - would be weakened. The argument is of a piece with Leo's other writings, but particularly with *Inscrutabili*, which concerns the evils that afflict modern society. It was simply not prudent, he argued, to abrogate the moral authority of the Church, and he gave examples of the evil which would result.

It follows that when the dignity of Christian marriage is violated, men adopt legal concubinage instead of marriage, husbands neglect their natural duties of fidelity, children refuse obedience to and respect for their parents, the bonds of domestic love are loosened, and - what sets a deplorable example and brings ruin to public morals - pernicious and fatal separations often follow extravagant love.

To bring this picture up to date all he would need to add is that some 20th Century women now demand legal concubinage as a right and that the breakdown of marriage also leads to the breakdown of educational discipline. But he also foresaw the latter malaise, believing that it followed from the liberal attacks on Church schools and from the attempt to banish Christ from the curriculum.

In *Sapientiae Christianae* 1890, he made the family and its relations to the State a central theme. The argument of this encyclical is impeccably conservative and aroused intense hostility amongst liberals. Its purpose was to show them that Catholics make the best citizens since they understand God and authority, and accept the second through believing in the first. 'The family is the cradle of civil society, and it is for most part in the surroundings of the home that the destinies of States are prepared'. Catholic citizens learn from this original society how any society is regulated and governed, and as a result acquire the concept of Divine legitimacy. Those who sought to tear society away from Christianity were determined to corrupt this first school of Christian virtue. The divided allegiance to Catholics originated from the conflict over secular education, a conflict which made loyal citizenship most difficult precisely for those prepared to accept it. Leo XIII saw quite clearly that the troubles in France could not all be put down to Royalist reaction against Republican government. Underneath was a genuine crisis of conscience. It was one thing to accept new forms of government, quite another to acquiesce in the wholesale destruction of Catholic education. By pressing too hard up against the limits of good government, the State was violating justice. Leo's writings on the family therefore repeat as hard example the

warning first heard a decade earlier in *Diuturnum illud*: that war against the Church will end by undermining the power that wages it.

It was the nature of civil authority which occupied Leo in *Libertas*, one of the finest of his encyclicals: seldom has so much liberal chaff been winnowed so convincingly. It begins by proving that liberty, the endowment of the reasonable being, confers a sublime dignity on man by making him master of his own acts. The potential for self-mastery is the inner principle allowing us to choose by the practice of virtue, a life in obedience to eternal destiny, or voluntarily to cast ourselves to utter destruction by rebelling against the lawful order of our nature. The will is free to follow either course. The moral and political order arise naturally from these ontological conditions. But what the liberals had done, inspired by a philosophy of Naturalism formulated during the 18th Century, was to subvert these conditions, by introducing into the moral order a new and false concept of liberty. They had identified liberty with a form of political rebelliousness: liberty became, for them, a wholly autonomous province of action not subject to God or his Laws. Liberty was thus newly identified with 'the excesses of unbridled intellect', and to the Pope this was a truly Luciferan conception.

By a fresh impiety, unheard of even among the Pagans, governments have been organised without any regard for God or the order established by Him, and further, everything that has been wisely decreed by Divine and Human Law for the protection and improvement of life, they attack.

Leo's objection was not to the liberal form of Government itself, but to the theories it used to justify attacks on religion; the encyclical therefore addresses not large abstract entities but 'the Men who style themselves Liberal' - in other words those who crusade for general licence:

For when once a man is firmly persuaded that he is subject to no one it follows that the efficient cause of unity in civil society is not to be sought in any principle external to man, or superior to him, but simply in the free will of individuals; that the authority in the government comes from the people only; and that just as every man's individual reason is his only rule of life, so the collective reason of the community should be the supreme guide in the management of public affairs.

He challenges the authors of the social contract theory, who attribute the origins of society to some voluntary agreement. The contractarians sought the basis of law in the multitude of the people, who, believing themselves free from all divine sanction, are not then willing to submit to any laws but those which they are pleased to impose upon themselves. Any

natural desire for happiness was transferred to this world; but since it can never be properly satisfied in this world, disorders of the public realm inevitably follow. Here the Pope achieves a prophetic note: 'It is not to be wondered at then, that tranquillity has ceased to exist in public life, or for that matter in private life, and that in consequence almost total ruin has come upon the world.' The consequences he most deplored were the spread of violence and the thirst for seizing other people's property, both of which are now common diseases in all democracies.

Many books and articles have been written about Leo XIII and property.⁶ As an integral conservative theorist he ranked the defence of property at the top of his thought, alongside the family and education. This ought to have earned him high marks from liberals; alas, however, by a curious sleight of hand, it was the democratic socialists who claimed him as their fountainhead. In the light of what he actually wrote about socialism - a creed he thought even more dangerous to the European order than atheistic liberalism - it is astonishing that many modernist catholic writers have conscripted him to their cause, seeing him as a bulwark against conservative reaction. In fact he stated explicitly throughout the Leonine corpus that socialism could never be yoked to democracy since it did not respect the integrity of private property. Much of the mis-reading occurred at the beginning of this century, when every kind of political movement wished to underwrite their particular ideological programmes with the Papal signature. But Leo XIII's voice rises chastely above party politics. His second encyclical dealt explicitly with socialism; not only did he trace its corrupt intellectual genealogy; he found it to contain in one extreme form all the worst errors of liberalism without the mitigating arguments. *Quod Apostolici muneris* 28 December 1878, confounds those who describe this Pope as a sort of crypto-Progressive, sprinkling holy water on statist programmes before anyone else had thought of them. It is true that, as civil governor of Perugia and Benvenuto, and as a Cardinal in the Papal States, he had embraced modern technology with great enthusiasm, and inaugurated successful programmes of public works. It is also true that he embraced the modern world in ways that his predecessor Pius IX did not. Nevertheless, that does not entitle us to describe him as 'the first progressive Pope in history'.

All that can be shown is that Leo was a social 'meliorist', who supposed he had found in technological discoveries a means of spreading wealth to his beloved poor. The only part of the liberal canon which he seemed genuinely to admire was its sound grasp of economics. But this makes him no friend of socialism; on the contrary he considered socialism to be the working man's worst enemy. A single quotation from the above encyclical makes this point succinctly; 'By preaching the doctrine of perfect equality of men, the supporters of socialist doctrine refuse obedience to the

powers which St Paul says are derived from God. Suppressing the Law of Property, they wish to seize and make common all that has been acquired by lawful inheritance, by the work of the mind, by hands, or by the economy.' Towards the end of his life, in the encyclical, *Graves de communi*, 18 January 1901, he reiterated his condemnation of socialist democracy and explained what he meant by Christian democracy. If a democracy uses the name Christian it must base itself *and act upon* principles laid down by divine faith and obedience to lawful superiors. Nothing is more sacred to Christian democracy than justice. It must prescribe the full right of property and of possession, and safeguard the indisposible distinctions and degrees found in every orderly commonwealth, so as to bestow on the community a form and a character in conformity with those established by God. Leo went on to warn that Christian democracy must never become an all-involved 'politics', in the sense of that term understood by activist socialists. If it followed its own nature, however, its future would be glorious, not in spite of, but because of, its self-denying ordinance.

The subject of Justice brings us to that crown of the Leonine Corpus, *Rerum Novarum*, 15 May 1891 (The condition of the working classes) - a recognised political masterpiece. It was the last great attempt to turn the course of history, before the spirit of revolution led mankind into the folly and destruction of our century: a true 'light in the heavens'. This encyclical has been called the foundation document of Christian social democracy; but that does not seem to go far enough. The argument proceeds from immutable Natural Law and the infallible teachings of Christ; it is addressed to *any* government conformable in its institutions to right reason and nature; and it offers a God's eye-view of earthly power, a view *sub specie aeternitatis*. This is the Church's definitive answer to the visionary materialism of *Das Kapital*, or, indeed, to any other form of materialism that seeks to translate itself into social and political doctrine.

The encyclical starts where Marx started: with the plight of the working poor, the shadow side of rapid economic change in the 19th Century. But unlike the German philosopher, who turned low-wage status into alienation and thence into the motor of social revolution, Leo XIII looked for a solution through reform. Many of his constructive proposals are so familiar a part of modern democratic states that they need no further discussion. It is enough to say that his teachings on the just wage, on the integrity of workers organisations, and on the mediating role of the State in the relief of extreme poverty; his solemn warnings to rapacious employers, and even graver ones about State-centralisation - that all these have played a distinctive part in civilising the economic systems of the West.

Important and innovative as they were, however, those teachings were not the central theme of the encyclical. More urgently offered (though less sensibly taken) were the sections defining the limited role of the

State, and those which argue for the Divine origin of civil Authority. As a result the encyclical's most original contribution to the problem of poverty – a brilliant re-working of the scholastic concept of Distributive Justice – has not been recognised. Perhaps because of the collectivist spirit which descended on the world after Leo's pontificate, 20th Century thinkers interpreted his doctrine of justice in a corporatist light; yet nothing could be further from its message:

We have seen that this great labour question cannot be solved save by assuming as a principle that private ownership must be held sacred and inviolable. The Law therefore should favour ownership, and its policy should be to induce as many as possible of the humbler class to become owners. Many excellent results will follow from this; and first of all, property will certainly become more equitably divided. For the result of civil change and revolution has been to divide society into two widely differing castes... If working people can be encouraged to look forward to obtaining a share in the (land) the consequence will be that the gulf between vast wealth and sheer poverty will be bridged over, and the respective classes brought nearer to one another... That such a spirit would add to the wealth of the community is self-evident.⁷

Distributism, with its emphasis upon the inviolable right of property, was the method by which Leo XIII proposed to break the connection between poverty and class-conflict, and to raise the working man from abject status and feelings of alienation. As a philosophy entirely coherent with his conception of the State it contrasts favourably with both liberal and socialist thinking. He saw all revolutionary programmes exactly for what they were, the working man's worst enemy. Such programmes, he argued, 'can only increase contentiousness in the community, rob lawful property-owners, overstep the boundaries of State-competence, and increase confusion in the community'.

Distributism, then, is the economic blue print which, taken together with the stress on Family and Education, and formulated within the political theory of the Two Powers, composes what I have called Leo XIII's integral conservatism. Other characteristics of the Leonine conception have emerged from my argument. First, Leo was more of a traditionalist than a progressive, taking the strictest interpretation of Papal Authority from the earliest days of the Church. Doubtless he would have sternly disciplined those members of the Episcopate who went so wild after Vatican II. Secondly, in his defence of property, and of associations lesser than the perfect civil society he was far more a Burkean than a liberal individualist. This Burkean side is revealed, too, in his emphasis upon the common good rather than the 'hidden hand' of classical liberalism. Thirdly, Leo advocated social change through the continuities of institutional development,

rigorously excluding the vast transformation programmes associated with communism, socialism, nationalism, anarchism and the machinations of Freemasonry. And lastly, he took the modern conservative view, that justice does not emerge from an abstract will of the people or the party, but through the rule of law, the right of association, elected parliaments, and a secure and peaceful commonwealth. Above all, he stressed that these were the patrimony of the Christian Church, which had never been the enemy of liberty, as its enemies maintained, but the preserver and custodian of genuine liberty against the advocates of licence.

One question, however, remains: what forms of conservative thought can the Leonine corpus be taken to exclude? Clearly it does not fit into that English tradition which descends from Hume through Bradley to the baroque scepticism of Oakeshot. If all you need to be a conservative is 'a disposition', then it would certainly have to be a 'moral disposition'. Then again Leonine conservatism could not be any merely reactionary royalism, since it accepts the legitimacy of differing forms of government. Nor does its adherence to principles as sacred leave any room for the conservative pragmatism which admits the possibility of adopting for the sake of a peaceful life all your antagonist's principles. In the end the conservatism of Leo XIII is almost *sui generis*: realistic, tempered by a knowledge of the modern world, but rooted in the transcendental. It was the sort of political philosophy that everyone would secretly like to write, but which few without his faith and authority would be able to enunciate. In *Rerum Novarum* Leo left us a statement which summarises the frame of mind that he obtained, and which the integral conservative must strive to imitate:

Nothing is more useful than to look upon the world as it really is – and at the same time to seek elsewhere for the solution to its troubles.

Notes

1. Cardinal Manning: *The True Story of the Vatican Council*, King & Co, 1877. Chapter 1.
2. References to Encyclicals is to Anne Fremantle: *The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical Context*, Mentor Books.
3. For Gelasian Theory as it operated in pre-modern period see Christopher Dawson: *The Historical Reality of Christian Culture*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960.
4. See for example Bernanos: *Diary of a Country Priest*, Boriswood, London 1937.
5. Actually this is the message of the Epistle of St James.
6. The most definitive is that of Etienne Gilson: *The Church Speaks to the Modern World*, New York, Double Day (Image Books) 1954.
7. The corporatist theme is much more obvious in Pius XI, writing forty years after.

In Search of Central Europe

Ján Čarnogurský

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The Underground Church and Pilgrimages in Slovakia

Religion and the church have traditionally played an important social role in Slovakia (the eastern third of Czechoslovakia). It was here in the 9th century that Saint Cyril and Saint Methodios began their mission to the Slavs. In the centuries following, Slovakia was a part of the Hungarian kingdom. Unending warfare shook the power and authority of the state, and in many regions the priests became the only organisers of communal life. In the 18th and 19th centuries both catholic and evangelical priests played a decisive part in the movement towards national revival. In the last democratic elections in Czechoslovakia in 1946, the Democratic Party, which had a Christian orientation, gained an absolute majority in Slovakia and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Slovak Communist Party – an offshoot of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. But in February 1948 the Communists seized absolute power and in the course of the few days liquidated political parties and organisations and the free press. The Catholic Church remained almost the only force capable of taking a stand against the Communists. The Communists chose their tactics towards it as they did towards other 'organisers' – bishops were imprisoned or isolated, monasteries broken up, active priests and laity imprisoned. In 1949 they passed a law – still enforceable – which made permission from the state a condition of every ecclesiastical activity. According to the experience of other 'organisations' which were liquidated, the church should have first become a tool of the Communist regime, and then gradually die away. But it did neither.

The Catholic Church responded by building an underground church structure and by making secret some of the pastoral activities which had until then taken place openly. In 1951, a year when a number of Catholic bishops were sentenced in show trials, the first secret bishops were consecrated. They had the right to consecrate further bishops and priests under the wider discretionary powers given to bishops in Communist lands by the popes, most recently by Pope Pius XII.

Active priests and laity spent the fifties and the beginning of the sixties in prison. They were freed during the period of democratisation which culminated in 1968 with Alexander Dubcek becoming First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. With the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the forces of the Warsaw Pact in August 1968 a new wave of repression began. This time the main drive of the regime was against those intellectuals identified with Dubcek's policies, but the measures were not as harsh as in the fifties. The complete destruction of the reform movement both within and without the Communist Party was sufficient. The reform intellectuals joined with other opponents of the regime, Christians among them, and anchored themselves in Charter 77 or among its sympathisers.

Husák's regime, which succeeded that of Dubcek, operated neo-Stalinist politics in its relationship towards the church and believers. In the Catholic Church, where it could not completely influence the appointment of bishops, it could at least fight the Pope's appointments. An independent religious press was forbidden, as was the church's participation in radio and television programmes. The regime set limits to the freedom of worship. People were allowed to attend church services, but if they were teachers or worked in the cultural field, they lost their jobs for doing so. In 1974 Rudolf Fiby, a 28-year-old junior lecturer in mathematics was thrown out of Bratislava University because he asked for one sentence to be changed in his political evaluation. The original text read: 'he holds a marxist-leninist outlook on life' and Mr Fiby asked for it to be changed to: 'he holds a scientific outlook on life.' The most recent person known to have been sacked for attending a church service was a teacher, who lost her job in 1987. Christians who are employed in management have no possibility of promotion.

In the recent past, active priests have lost their state licence for pastoral work and in these cases they have had to leave the ministry and take up manual employment. Religious meetings outside the church are forbidden and in the churches only services of worship are permitted. The regime does not allow religious

orders and forbids any activity by the priest outside their own church (a priest can receive permission for such activity only in exceptional cases). The laity are forbidden to teach religion, nor are they allowed to assist the priest in any way. In September 1988 Mr Juraj Dubec in Kezmarok (in northern Slovakia) received a warning from the local authorities that he was committing a criminal action by assisting the priest at mass. In 1982 the 65-year-old Jesuit Gabriel Povala was sentenced to eight months imprisonment because he was visiting the sick who were confined to bed at home and praying with them. Povala served the full sentence without remission. In 1986 the 62-year-old Silesian Stefan Javorský also received an eight-month sentence, because he celebrated mass in a private flat for a group of young people.

In the seventies the Catholic Church showed its defiance of the state more and more through the upsurge of the underground church and through its encouragement of clandestine pastoral work. Activists of an underground pastoral ministry reject the label 'secret church', however, emphasising that the church is one and performs a single mission; it is simply that in present conditions it must perform part of this mission secretly. The underground church is not a distinct part of the Catholic Church; the label is simply a convenient term for such religious activity as the regime forbids, and for those people who take part in it.

Personal contacts are the chief method used by the secret church. It is not a method thought up by a Catholic 'brains trust' but one that originated gradually and spontaneously in response to existing conditions. For the most part, personal contacts have always remained beyond the grasp of the regime and its secret police. Religious activists saw such opportunities as the only way out; in particular, they recruited, through personal contacts, young people into groups of believers who apply their Christian ethics in daily life. These groups usually meet once a week in flats in strict secrecy. They have a programme of prayer, readings from religious texts, meditation and discussion, usually religious, but often covering social topics. The groups are mostly made up of students and the young intelligentsia, but workers and apprentices are not unusual. They have developed more rapidly in the larger towns, especially in Bratislava; however, as members finished their studies and went to live and work elsewhere in Slovakia groups were gradually started in rural areas. Wherever members were living and working, they would found new fellowships of believers. In the seventies growth in the number of these was manifest; nor has it ceased today.

The method of gaining followers by the help of personal contacts is not new and is not used only by Catholic activists. The Catholic activists explain their success by the fact that they have approached only those known to them, who have had a Catholic education at home, who attend church services more or less regularly, and who themselves show interest in a more vigorous religious life.

The Christian fellowships have used every opportunity for public ministry. Their members attend church services and many priests, practising a public ministry, join them later in the evening as their leaders. The passage between public and non-public pastoral ministry is fluid.

The origin and growth of these religious circles was neither planned in advance nor centrally directed, even though at the outset - back in the forties - a Croatian Jesuit working in Slovakia, Tomislav Kolakovic-Polajen, had the idea and worked actively towards its realization. The fellowships arose as a defensive action against a political regime which had deprived them of every other possibility of free association. Other movements tried to form circles, but only the religious groups succeeded on a mass scale. The explanation of this lies in the elementary truth of Christianity. Only Christianity has been capable of surviving forty years of Communist oppression.

The Christian fellowships have demonstrated their ability for independent existence and development without central leadership. In the course of the last ten years, there have emerged, in the various districts of Slovakia, personalities of a high moral integrity, who enjoy a natural authority. These individuals have begun to make contact with each other and to exchange ideas about the direction of activities within the groups. Their position does not rely on election and the members, while respecting their opinion, are not formally bound by them. By means of these individuals the Catholic movement has gained a high level of mutual co-ordination.

The groups are no secret army, waiting for D-Day. Nor are they a political movement in opposition to the Communist regime. They are a network of people who, in a society which has for forty years been built on Communist foundations, have maintained the living ethical precepts of Christianity. And that is all.

Only a minority of believers is involved in the activities of the secret church and, obviously, only a minority of society. But participants in these activities are very animated, disciplined, and prepared if necessary to make sacrifices. It is for these qualities that the social significance of the religious groups greatly outweighs the number of their members. No other social movement in Slovakia has such enthusiastic followers, least of all the Communists. The growth of the religious groups is counterbalanced in other areas of society by a reverse trend - a retreat into passivity, lethargy and privacy. The Communist Party - with foreign military assistance - completely controls the state, and in the face of it society hides in the only place it can, in passivity, through political collaboration and economic self-sufficiency. With this entropic background the activity of the religious groups has a terrifying effect on the regime. Although the religious groups do not have any political aims, the regime sees in them a dangerous political opponent for the very reason that they are islands of action in an ocean of docility.

The tendency of the groups is towards the spiritual

growth of their members, but in the last ten years there has been the increasingly important public manifestation of the pilgrimages.

Pilgrimages have a long tradition in Slovakia. The biggest pilgrimage, to Levoca, originates from the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries. It has been held annually, without interruption, to this day. Other pilgrimages began more recently, but even those have lasted for centuries. From spring to autumn scarcely a week passes without a pilgrimage taking place somewhere. Most of them have a more or less local character; five or six have a significance for the whole of Czechoslovakia.

People go on pilgrimages to pray. At the times of worst oppression during the fifties pilgrims were able to see how many of them there were assembled, and realise that it was not in the power of the regime to prevent them. So a feeling began to grow amongst those on the pilgrimage, which is now stronger than ever – a feeling of safety. Whilst they last, pilgrimages solve a basic problem of our society – the problem of being outnumbered by the police. There are so many people at the place of pilgrimage that if the police wanted to intervene, they would have to bring in a bigger force. The police are unable even to act against individuals on pilgrimages, because they are protected in the solidarity of numbers. In 1986 a police patrol tried to threaten pilgrims in Sastín (western Slovakia) by arbitrarily asking certain young pilgrims for their identity cards. The patrol was immediately surrounded by 300–500 young people, all of them offering their identity cards for checking. The situation became embarrassing for the police patrol and it had to get away.

Communists fail to understand the religious phenomenon. No obviously defined opponent of the regime steps forward on a pilgrimage; nothing is expressed which would threaten the regime with extinction. If the police did take action against the pilgrimages it would cause an outcry at home and abroad, and the following year the pilgrimage would take place just the same. In 1986 they tried to put a stop to individual gatherings, in one case by setting dogs on a group of pilgrims journeying to Gaboltovo (eastern Slovakia). But when the group arrived at Gaboltovo, the attack aroused the wrath of 50,000 fellow pilgrims.

The feeling of safety gives the pilgrims another feeling – that of freedom. On a pilgrimage they can act according to their convictions and openly display their religious faith. They do not have to utter official lies and they experience the fellowship of other worshippers. These qualities are recognised by the religious groups, who since the seventies have taken part in pilgrimages. They have brought with them a youthful enthusiasm and sometimes new ways of doing things, changing the content of the pilgrimages. Old traditions were adapted with the result that pilgrimages became more attractive to other believers, and the number of followers began to grow. One of Hegel's dialectical laws was thus fulfilled in reverse – quality was trans-

formed into quantity. At the present time, therefore, the secret church is capable of significantly influencing the number of participants, according to whether it does or does not recommend individual groups to take part in the pilgrimage.

The central concern of the Christian fellowship is to further the inward spiritual formation of their members. Nevertheless, they take part in pilgrimages only two or three times a year. Most of the groups follow a programme – music, song, meditation, information on the eve of the visit to the shrine. The programme also contains requests for the release of religious and political prisoners, for the abolition of laws against the church, for information about Christian prisoners in the past. It is a small step from purely religious themes to criticism of existing relations with the state. The criticism is immeasurably less sharp than, for example, *samizdat* texts by dissident authors; nevertheless, it is given significance by the number of listeners, and because it is spoken openly. The groups do not want to provoke open confrontation with the authorities. Recent experience confirms that when the totalitarian state controls the whole of society, the church is the last island of freedom; on its fringe can exist not only the dead leaves of the past but also the new shoots of civil society. The secret police are aware of the programme, but they cannot act against the great majority of pilgrims. Nor, in the current international situation, can they allow those responsible for the programme to be punished, not even after the pilgrimage has ended. They are protected not only by the moderate nature of the programme but also by Western solidarity.

The turning point for these nocturnal programmes was the pilgrimage to Velehrad (Moravia) in July 1985. It took place on the occasion of the 1100th anniversary of the death of Saint Methodios, who was bishop in the Great Moravian Empire. The night from Saturday to Sunday was taken up by a programme from the youth groups. On Sunday about 15,000 pilgrims whistled at the Minister of Culture when he tried to put an official gloss on the events.

Thousands of people go on pilgrimages every year. In Levoca on Sunday morning there have been about 100–150,000 people, on Saturday and Sunday together about 250,000; in Gaboltovo 100,000, in Sastín 50,000, in Nitra 100,000, in Lutin 50,000; smaller local pilgrimages have attracted 3–10,000 people. For many of them participation in a pilgrimage provides the spark to a whole year's spiritual development. And although the pilgrimage is above all a religious occasion, the spiritual formation of the pilgrim gains a social dimension as well. The mutual interest of the pilgrims is linked through the pilgrimage town and through generations of their forebears; this helps them to withstand the new and powerfully entrenched pressure of ideology. Moreover, the authorities are unable to defend themselves in front of them, whilst they themselves are defended by their convictions. It is these convictions which form the basis of the secret church and which grant to the pilgrims their brief experience

of freedom. And it is the experience which they take away with them into their daily lives, so receiving

through the gift of faith the gift of hope. It is a way of surviving the long night of communism.

(Translated from the Slovak by Barbara Day)

The Decline and Fall of a Literary Myth

Philip Thody

Since the mid twentieth century, there has been something strange about the authors most admired by Western society. Almost without exception, they have written books which are either totally indifferent to the ideas on which our society is based or violently opposed to them.

The phenomenon first became apparent in France, with Baudelaire and Flaubert. Both were political reactionaries and philosophical pessimists. The first was intensely hostile to science and industrialisation. The second looked down on them with scorn. At a time when France was painfully beginning to develop some concept of what parliamentary democracy might mean and how it might work, its two most influential writers saw politics as the province of the lazy, the dishonest and the petty-minded. The ending of *Madam Bovary* is ironic. When the local chemist, Monsieur Homais, receives the *Croix d'honneur*, the reader is clearly expected to see this as a sign of how French society behaves. It rewards the stupid and intolerant after driving the sensitive and honest – Emma Bovary and her husband – to suicide and despair. Yet as Renan observed, 'we must not despise Monseieur Homais. Without him, we should all be burned'. Without the vigour with which this stubborn apostle of the Enlightenment opposes the attempt by the Catholic Church to regain the power it had lost in the Revolution of 1789, we should all, Renan reminds us, risk the return of the Inquisition. There would then be no more hope of seeing the development of a pluralist society tolerant of all opinions that were reasonably argued and based on the best evidence available. Anyone looking nowadays either to Baudelaire or to Flaubert for support in their struggle against the newer Inquisitions of the Left would be as disappointed as any nineteenth-century liberal would have been in his quest for allies in his struggle against more old-fashioned tyrannies.

Both *Les Fleurs du Mal* and *Madame Bovary* were, it is true, prosecuted as immoral books. In 1857, French society of the Second Empire was not keen to encourage authors whom it saw – quite wrongly, as it happened – as likely to promote sexual immorality. But although *Les Fleurs du Mal* was condemned as an immoral book while *Madame Bovary* was acquitted, neither author

ever developed the kind of philosophy of free expression which is the essential hall-mark of the pluralist society. Although *Les Fleurs du Mal* can be read as the apology for a kind of neo-Pascalian Jansenism, and *Madam Bovary* as the gospel of the religion of the artist, both men were moral nihilists. The book by Flaubert most admired in advanced literary circles, in England as in France, is *Bouvard et Pécuchet*. What it says, in effect, is that any attempt at self-improvement or at a rational understanding of the world is pointless and pretentious. The only course of action is blindly to copy out what somebody else has written.

Had European literature developed differently, Baudelaire and Flaubert might be seen as brilliant imaginative writers who happened, by a curious accident of personal development, to be moral and political dwarfs. But it didn't. *Les Fleurs du Mal* remains the Bible of contemporary poetry, in France if not in England, and neither Pound, Eliot nor Dylan Thomas would have written as they did without Baudelaire's influence. The idea that Zola, with his faith in science and his passion for social improvement, is a disciple of Flaubert is totally mistaken. The true heirs of Flaubert, as they never ceased telling us at the time, were the French 'New Novelists' of the fifties and sixties, whose ambition was to exclude from fiction anything except the minute description of trivial physical objects. In the opinion of Robbe-Grillet and his disciples, as in that of their principal theoretician, Roland Barthes, there is no point in expecting novels to tell exciting stories, present interesting characters or express challenging ideas. The view of the writer as somebody who, like Burke or de Tocqueville, defends a society which has at one and the same time an organic unity and the capacity for ordered change, is totally alien to the French 'New Novelists'. As, indeed, it has been for many years to the whole literary establishment, whether in France, England or North America.

For Baudelaire's and Flaubert's literary progeny are more numerous than any untutored observer of our political society might expect. Such an observer, considering the basis of our prosperity and the origin of our personal and political freedoms, might well expect us to admire books which celebrated the achievements of applied science and the efficient organisation

of our industry. This observer might think that our most sensitive minds would admire that capacity to distinguish between opposition and treachery which is the hall-mark of the liberal as opposed to the totalitarian society. Such an observer would be disappointed. On seeing the admiration still bestowed on D.H. Lawrence, on James Joyce, on William Faulkner, on Samuel Beckett, on Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, on Pound and Eliot, on Borges and Nabokov, he might well say to himself: 'Ah. Here is a society which sets the greatest store on emotionalism, on irrationalism, on a call to primitive instincts, on the rejection of all attempts at social reform, on the destruction of the inquiring intellect, and on all attempts to encourage people to think of themselves as responsible moral beings.'

Were such an observer also to look at the major *guru* of the murderously revolutionary Left, Jean-Paul Sartre, and at his most admired prophet, Jean Genet, he would have a comparable reaction. Here, he would say, is a society which bestows its dearest honours on those who set out most persistently to destroy it. The writers whom it admired are those whose books and behaviour constitute the most deliberate insults to its way of life.

Such an observer might also, of course, feel considerable if slightly baffled admiration for a society which, like our own, is capable not only of withstanding the attacks made on it by its leading writers but also of becoming stronger as a result of their opposition. He might go beyond the slight bafflement created by the spectacle of accountants, administrators, businessmen, doctors, scientists and civil servants paying large amounts of the money which they themselves have earned in order to buy books in which their attitudes are held up to ridicule. He might cease to be amazed at their going to see plays in which their attempts to live a normally decent life are presented as a hilarious exercise in hypocrisy. He might even admire the vigour of a society able not only to allow its licenced jesters such liberty but also prepared to pay them so generously and to emerge so strengthened from their attacks. He might also, if he dived a little deeper into one of the literary establishment's most treasured myths, emerge with a feeling of quiet satisfaction. For he would have then seen this myth effectively destroyed by the effort and initiative of two scholars for whom Gustave Flaubert would have had only contempt and scorn.

The book capable of providing this satisfaction is not likely to become a best-seller. Indeed, the circumstances of its publication effectively inhibit this. For *Jean Genet. Essai de chronologie 1910-1944* is a volume in a series entitled the *Bibliothèque de Littérature française contemporaine*, published by the press of the *Université de Paris 7*. It has appeared in a limited edition of only 800 copies. It nevertheless deserves a wider audience. It is most elegantly written. It establishes some valuable if not always flattering facts about an author whose books are best-sellers but whose popularity and reputation were based upon a series of misunderstandings and mistakes.

Jean Genet first became known in 1943, when copies of his homosexual novel *Notre-Dame-des-Fleurs* were clandestinely circulated in German occupied France. *Jean Genet. Essai de chronologie 1910-1944* does not mention the legend that the novel was originally written in Fresnes prison on sheets of brown paper stolen from the workshops in which Genet was supposed to make them into paper bags. It suggests, more convincingly, that Genet had been writing since the mid nineteen thirties. This would be certainly more in keeping with his highly sophisticated use of language. Neither do Dichy and Fouché tell us how any of the manuscripts written in prison were smuggled out, or how Genet's first publisher, Marc Barbézat, managed to obtain the beautiful paper on which both *Notre-Dame-des-Fleurs* and Genet's second novel, *Le Miracle de la rose*, were originally printed. At a time when the rest of France was living in the total penury created by the German occupation and the ending of the Second World War, the aesthetico-homosexual community was able to obtain thick vellum paper and use an ostentatiously simple hand press to print novels exalting crime and homosexuality.

Jean Genet. Essai de chronologie 1910-1944 does nevertheless tell us how much Genet received for the autobiographical novel *Le Miracle de la rose*, in which he described the horrors of life at the Reformatory of Mettray and in the prison at Fontevault: 120,000 francs, the equivalent in modern English currency of £30,000. A recent collection of previously unpublished letters from Genet to his publishers, Marc and Olga Barbézat, show him to have been an author capable of driving a very hard financial bargain, and in a way one can scarcely blame him. If you have lived, as he had done until the age of thirty, as a petty thief, a homosexual prostitute, an army deserter, a drug smuggler and a beggar, the discovery that a whole section of middle-class society is ready to applaud and reward you for writing about your experiences must have come as a divine surprise. Genet never became rich as a result of his substantial advances and even more substantial royalties. Until his death in 1986, he continued to move from hotel room to hotel room, living out of the same suitcase. The adoration bestowed upon him by his middle-class admirers never changed his hostility towards their society, and he ended up as a supporter of the Black Panthers. The two central myths about him are nevertheless important. They illustrate the dichotomy already mentioned between the official values of our society and the kinds of authors it admires; at the same time, they are quite easily dispelled. These are, first of all, that middle-class society treats its weaker and more unfortunate members with quite unusual cruelty; and, secondly, that the works of authors such as Genet undermine our values to the point of making them ready for instant destruction.

Until the publication of Dichy's and Fouché's scholarly

detective work, the 'received version' of the events in Genet's early life was based on a long book published in 1952 by Jean-Paul Sartre and called *Saint Genet, comédien et martyr*. The English translation, *Saint Genet, Actor and Martyr*, published in 1983 has 625 pages. Together with Jean Cocteau, who was the first to discover Genet, Sartre had been instrumental in securing a free pardon for him in 1948 from the President of the Fourth Republic, Vincent Auriol. Sartre had, earlier, published a number of Genet's works in serial form in *Les Temps Modernes*, and was to continue to do so. He knew him well, and the account of his life in *Saint Genet, comédien et martyr* was seen as gospel truth. It told how Genet was an illegitimate child of no known father; of how he was born, in December 1910, to a Paris prostitute; of how she abandoned him to the welfare authorities when he was still a baby; and suggested that Genet, after spending the first seven years of his life in institutions, was entrusted at the age of seven to a peasant family in the somewhat harsh agricultural region of Le Morvan, to the South East of Paris. There, Sartre maintained, Genet was the only person, in a society of small peasant proprietors, who possessed nothing. In order to compensate for this, he began to steal small objects and small sums of money. He was caught. He persisted. A general assembly was held of everyone in the village. Genet was placed, a quivering child, in the centre of a circle of accusing fingers. 'You', he was publicly told, 'are a thief.' In a splendid onset of existentialist authenticity, Genet behaved as Sartre recommended the Jew and the Negro to behave. He took on to his own shoulders this malediction which society had imposed upon him. He then defiantly used it as the basis for a new and different identity. The whole of his subsequent life as a criminal, vagrant and imaginative writer was, in Sartre's view, based on the choice which society had so cruelly forced him to make. He had, courageously, accepted the consequences of his own criminality. He was now receiving the reward.

It was a splendid story, admirably adapted to one of the basic tenets of existentialist psycho-analysis. This attempt to understand human behaviour is based on the view that our personality is not the result of heredity and environment. It is, rather, the result of the free choice that we make of ourselves, generally at about the age of six or seven. This, according to Sartre, was the age at which Charles Baudelaire chose the exile and unhappiness which were to provide the leitmotif for his poetry. Later in his career, Sartre was to make the same assumption when talking both about himself and about Gustave Flaubert. It is not an unattractive idea. Most of us would prefer to be the result of a decision that we ourselves have made rather than the product of forces we cannot control. In the case of Genet, the idea that he was placed in a position where he had to make his choice also had another very considerable advantage as far as Sartre was concerned. It offered a splendid illustration of how cruelly bourgeois society treated its unhappy children. The only trouble,

for the Sartrean, is that the account of Genet's early life provided by *Saint Genet, comédien et martyr*, is very largely untrue.

Genet was illegitimate all right, and he was abandoned by his mother. On 28 July 1911, when her son was only six months old, she realised that she could not provide for him herself, and placed him with the *Hospice des Enfants Assistés* in Paris. But he was not, as a misleading sentence in Sartre's essay invited readers to believe, then kept in institutions until the age of seven. It was at the age of seven months that he was entrusted to a foster family in the village of Alligny-en-Morvan – barely two weeks after having been abandoned by his mother. Neither was his foster father, Charles Regnier, the harsh peasant farmer of *Saint Genet, comédien et martyr*. He was a skilled artisan, a joiner/cabinet maker. He and his wife were in their fifties. They were very fond of children, and had had two of their own. These were now grown up. But the Regniers so enjoyed having children around that they had already welcomed one foster child into their home, a girl called Lucie Wirtz. In 1913 she was almost eleven and had been with them since the age of two and a half. Like Eugénie Regnier, she adored the new baby, and made much of him. Genet acknowledged on a number of occasions that his early childhood had been very happy. The Regniers certainly did everything possible to make it so. They also lived next to the village school. Genet was encouraged to go and talk to the teachers out of school hours. He was an intelligent child. They enjoyed his visits and lent him books. He was not, as Sartre alleges, the only child in the village not able to look forward to inheriting property from his parents. Before 1914, the *Assistance Publique* placed in the Morvan area one in every three of the children which it put out for fostering. The region was underpopulated and needed more future workers. The money paid to the foster families provided a kind of state subsidy to an underdeveloped region. Far from illustrating how wicked bourgeois society was, the background and immediate circumstances of Genet's work show it to have been working rather well.

One of the many admirable features of *Jean Genet. Essai de chronologie 1910-1944* lies in the reproduction of a large number of interviews with people who knew Genet as a child. These include Lucie Wirtz, who was Genet's godmother when he took his first communion in 1922, and who still refuses to believe that he was a thief. She is somewhat alone in this view, since everybody else says that it was a matter of common knowledge that Genet stole small sums of money. He never took anything important and he often shared his booty with the other children. His behaviour, in this respect, was not unlike that of a number of children who feel themselves, for some reason or other, starved of affection or suffering from an unusual situation. What is more important is that this mildly delinquent behaviour was treated as such. The police were never called in. There is no record of Genet being prosecuted or punished. What is even more important, the

ceremony in which he was, according to Sartre, publicly labelled a thief, never took place.

Neither is this the only assiduously cultivated myth about Jean Genet which the researches of Dichy and Fouché have effectively dispelled. For all his intellectual vigour, Sartre was anything but a consistent and systematic thinker. A second theme runs through *Saint Genet, comédien et martyr*, contradicting rather than complementing his early insistence on the role of free choice. It is that Genet was the victim of what he calls 'notre abjecte société'. This, being based on the principle of private ownership, is naturally criminogenic. It secretes offenders because it needs to use them as scapegoats for its own failings. 'He only had to go to the trouble of being born', writes Sartre. 'The gentle, inexorable hands of the Law will conduct him from the National Foundling Society to the penal colony.' This idea occurs in Genet's own work. In one of the more amusing passages in *Le Miracle de la rose*, Genet describes how the boys in the reformatory at Mettray look longingly across the fields at the neighbouring prison of Fontevrault. They know, he says, that they are destined to figure among its future inmates, and the tone in which Genet writes evokes the more fortunate social conditions which makes the boys at Winchester automatically think in terms of New College, or those at Manchester Grammar School of Balliol or Queen's. The trouble with this second strand in Sartre's myth is that it too is contradicted by what actually happened. It is not a question, as it was for Genet's ceremony of condemnation and choice, of there being no evidence to support what Sartre says. What he alleges to have been the case flies directly against the facts.

For in spite of his reputation as a thief, Genet was not sent away from Alligny-en-Morvan in disgrace. Although the death in 1922 of his foster mother, Eugénie Regnier, provided a perfect excuse to get him out of the house, he stayed with Charles Regnier until he was fourteen. This was the normal age at which all foster children left their foster homes. Once again, there was nothing unusual in the way society treated Genet. Sartre alleges that his reputation as a thief was so well established that he was sent straight to the Reformatory. This is simply not true. He was sent to the *Ecole d'Alembert*, the Apprentice Centre for foundlings. This was not the French equivalent of Winchester or Manchester Grammar School. Genet did not receive the secondary education to which his talents and industry entitled him. Such, in the 1920s, was the situation of hundreds of thousands of gifted children. What he did receive, unlike many of his coevals, was the chance to learn a trade: that of printer/compositor.

Then, as now, printers in France still constitute very much a guild. They are among the highest paid French industrial workers. Even nowadays, the members of their trade union, the *Syndicate du Livre*, form one of only two groups to be exempted from the French legislation barring the closed shop. The other group

consists of the dockers at Marseilles who are members of the Communist dominated *Confédération Générale du Travail*. But on 3 November 1924, Genet ran away from the *Ecole d'Alembert*. He does not seem to have been bullied or ill-treated there. When, a week later, he was picked up in Marseilles, he was not punished. Instead, in April 1925, he was placed as a companion with a blind composer, René de Buxeuil. Two months later, he stole a postal order from him. Again, the authorities took no legal action. It was not until Genet had been caught for a second time travelling without a ticket on a train that he was sent to the Reformatory at Mettray.

By modern standards, the punishment was excessive. The law at the time in France was so framed as to make the sending of a boy to Mettray a virtually unlimited sentence. Genet was not released from what was a cruel and criminogenic institution until he was twenty-one. That part at least of the myth is true. The boys at Mettray were bullied, humiliated and financially exploited. The 'Colonie Agricole', first established in 1839, made a handsome profit. The boys didn't. The factual side of *Le Miracle de la rose* is accurate. But it would still be wrong to see official twentieth-century French society as pursuing Genet with a peculiar vindictiveness. Institutionalised children often find a second home in the armed services. On three occasions, Genet enlisted in the French army. In 1937, with one year of his third three-year engagement still to run, he deserted. In 1938, he was caught and brought to trial. Because he had, earlier, served another prison sentence, he was immediately released. The army, with what would strike most British ex-servicemen as uncharacteristic generosity, also paid him an enlistment bonus of 9,000 francs.

By 1942, Genet had committed so many offences that he had become liable, under French law, to be sent to prison for life. Such a practice cannot be commended. It is neither a humane nor an economical way of dealing with an habitual offender. One does nevertheless feel the occasional twinge of sympathy with a legal system that does also have the responsibility of protecting the more law-abiding citizens. As at the time when Genet was sent to Mettray, one wonders what else the authorities could have done. But in 1942, Jean Cocteau made his first intervention on Genet's behalf, supported by Marc Barbézat. Both poet and publisher said that Genet was a gifted writer, assured the authorities that he did now have visible means of support other than crime, and got him off. The *Letters à Marc et Olga Barbézat* show Genet as impatient and ungrateful during the whole proceedings. But in July 1943, a judge had refused to invoke all the severity of the law when passing sentence on Jean Genet. He did not, Cocteau said, want to have 'l'air bête de la bourgeoisie française'. He did not need to worry. Never in history can a class have been more afraid of those most anxious to destroy it than the French bourgeoisie. In 1948 Genet got another free pardon, just as he had avoided being sent to prison for life in 1942. In 1950,

however, French justice finally caught up with him. It made him pay a fine originally imposed in 1943. He was most indignant.

III

It is useful to distinguish, when looking at literary rebels, between the books they write and the attitudes they strike. It is also instructive to separate what they say from what their admirers say they say. If you look at Genet's novels and plays, you see the same recurring patterns of defeat and despair. His criminals are stupid and spend most of their time in prison. Most of them, moreover, are there because they have been betrayed to the police by their associates. The first idea to disappear when you read a novel by Genet is that of honour among thieves. I once had the experience of giving a talk about Genet to the long-stay prisoners at Wakefield gaol. It confirmed everything the criminologists say: they look just like us. Had I not known, I should never have suspected that the men I met were guilty of the horrors for which they had been imprisoned. The two hours I spent with them also provided me with the best comment I have ever heard on Genet's work. I had chosen to talk about him because I could think of no other topic likely to interest men who were going to spend the next ten to fifteen years behind bars. I was nervous, because I had been warned that I was likely to be interrupted after the first ten minutes. In fact, I was listened to for fifty minutes of total silence. At the end, after I had finished describing Genet's portrayal of criminals as cowardly, stupid, treacherous, dirty and inadequate, my request for comments or questions was greeted with: 'He'd done time. You can tell. He knew what he was talking about'.

It was not a view that any of Genet's critics had ever expressed. When, in a book I published on Genet in 1968, I ventured to suggest that his work constituted one of the most eloquent pleas in favour of going straight, I was roundly told to keep middle-class morality out of literary criticism. The standard view, from which academics in British universities depart at their peril, remains the one expressed by Sartre in 1952 in *Saint Genet, comédien et martyr*. This was that the act of reading Genet's book totally destroys the moral convictions of the 'honest reader' who dares to open them. We bring a book to life, argues Sartre, by lending the characters our own ability to think and to feel. When we give life to the characters in Genet's book, this power of recreation makes us realise that we are, as it were, sisters under the skin to the thief's murderers, drug runners and homosexual prostitutes whom Genet describes. His book becomes, in this context, like the sleeping serpent that the peasant put into his bosom. When he had warmed it into life, it stung him.

This ingenious theory has one great disadvantage: it is not true. Genet himself prevents it from being true by telling you all the time how totally different from you all his characters are. But this insistence has had no impact on his admirers, any more than his totally disillusioned view of homosexuality has prevented him

from becoming one of the heroes of the Gay Liberation movement. The enthusiasm lavished on him in this context is even more surprising than the view that his work constitutes a kind of Nietzschean 'transvaluation of all values' in the moral field. Like Proust, Genet maintains that the homosexual is doomed to permanent frustration by the very nature of his desires. For what he wants, argues Genet, is to be loved by a real, genuinely virile man. But is it a characteristic of virile men that they are strongly attracted to women. Once they become sexually interested in another man, they are like a vegetarian who eats meat: a contradiction in terms. The homosexual is consequently condemned to pursue a will o'the wisp of an especially elusive kind. Once he catches it, the act of capture makes it uninteresting and undesirable.

Unlike Muslims, homosexuals rarely burn books. If they were to make an *auto-da-fé* of *The Thief's Journal*, *Querelle of Brest* or *Our Lady of the Flowers*, they could nevertheless expect sympathy. For Genet's condemnation of the sexual activity in which he so frequently describes himself as indulging is not limited to the observation of its emotional and logical contradictions. Again like Proust, and like André Gide, he notes another feature of homosexuals: their inability to be faithful. Betrayal is a key concept throughout Genet's work. Not only do his criminals constantly betray one another to the police. Any homosexual trusting the emotional or physical fidelity of his partner is heading straight to heartbreak.

Throughout his early work, Sartre insists on the idea of freedom. Not only, he argues, are we intellectually free and ought we to be politically free. We are also emotionally and sexually free. In his view, Genet chose homosexuality, as he chose theft, in order to make sense of his own experiences. The desire to be dominated and taken from behind is an essential part of his project. This is how he wants to be. In Sartre's view, he consciously endorsed the sentence passed upon him by society. He willed himself, if such a paradox be allowed, to be the passive victim. Like most of Sartre's ideas, this is interesting and even convincing until you start to look at the evidence. The one recollection common to all the witnesses who talk about Genet in *Jean Genet. Essai de Chronologie 1910-1944* is the memory of how effeminate he was as a child. It is true that reformatories and prisons offer little encouragement to heterosexuality. In Genet's case, however, they seem to have reinforced a hereditary tendency whose existence would have been recognised - and deplored - by Marcel Proust. He too depicted homosexuality as an inescapable hereditary curse.

It is unfortunate for the homosexual literary lobby that the two authors most admired for their depiction of homosexuality should have given so hostile an account of it. Indeed, the more you read Genet, the greater your amazement becomes at the admiration lavished on him by the left. If anyone ever deserved damnation as a right-wing deviant, it is he. An insistence on genetic determinism, on the indefensibility of

sexual deviations and on the self-defeating nature of criminality would ensure a total ban from literary lunches as well as from student unions. Genet nevertheless remains the darling of the left-wing establishment.

And this in spite of the content of his plays. Like his novels, they are remarkable works of art. Just as *Miracle of the Rose* is one of the best books about prison life, the *Notre-Dame-des-Fleurs* is in the same class as Gore Vidal's *Myra Breckenridge* as a novel about bi-sexuality and transvestism, *Le Balcon* is far and away the best play ever written about prostitution. What it says is that virtually nobody goes to a prostitute, and even less to a brothel, for straight sex. The frequenters of Madame Irma's splendidly equipped establishment are looking for something rather different: the opportunity to live in a dream world. Monsieur de Charlus does the same when he visits Jupien's house of illusions in *Le Temps retrouvé*, and the truth of Genet's perception can be seen in any tobacconist's window in Soho or South Kensington. But the play also contains a more general, political truth, which it is rather surprising to find in the work of a man adopted by the left. For *Le Balcon* not only describes the failure of a revolution. It also links this failure to the way the revolutionary leader behaves when he realises that his revolt has failed. He goes off to the brothel, where he unwillingly fulfils the dearest wish of the Chief of Police.

Until then, the only authority figures whose roles are in demand by the various clients of the brothel have been traditional ones. Madame Irma has received her money from men who wanted to dress up as bishops, judges and generals. The fact that nobody wanted to come and dress up as the Chief of Police has been a consistent disappointment to him, especially after his organisation had proved itself to be the only one resilient enough to withstand the rebellion which had swept away the Church, the Army and the Judiciary. Now, however, he is satisfied. His mythical status has finally coincided with his actual power. The defeated revolutionary leader wants to be him. In all the revolutions that have taken place in the twentieth century, in Russia and in Germany as well as in China, Cuba or Vietnam, the one body to have gained in power has been the police.

It would be tedious to rehearse in detail the way in which Genet's other plays present a view of society which totally contradicts all the most fervent tenets of the left. His best play, *Les Bonnes* (*The Maids*), depicts two maidservants indulging in complicated rituals which aim at destroying the authority of their mistress. What actually happens, however, is that one of them poisons the other and then commits suicide. Rebellion could scarcely be more self-defeating. Genet's 1960 play, *Les Nègres* (*The Blacks*) is a hymn to racial hatred. If, Genet tells us in the stage directions, a white spectator should happen to come and watch the play, he should be isolated with a spot light on him all the time. The concept of 'negritude', the play tells us, can become a political reality only through the iron rule of the black revolutionaries. The 'real action' of the play

takes place off-stage: it is the punishment of a traitor. At least Genet has the artistic honesty as well as the understanding of politics to forecast as well as to herald with apparent enthusiasm what has actually happened in newly developed countries: the establishment of the one-party state as a form of government imposed and perpetuated by legalised terrorism. His last major play, *Les Paravents* (*The Screens*) tells the story of the Algerian war. The Arab cause triumphed, in Genet's view, because it was prepared to make a more consistent use of evil than the French. It is not exactly how the people who took over in Algeria after 1962 liked to think of themselves.

The Screens nevertheless has a curious history, and one which throws light on the question inevitably raised by all Genet's work. Here is a man whose creative writings are unremittently hostile to everything that his left-wing and liberal-minded admirers stood for. How is it that he has come to be seen as so useful a weapon with which to try to destroy the pluralist democracies for the West? For in 1966, only four years after de Gaulle had compelled the French to leave Algeria, *Les Paravents* was produced at the state subsidised National French theatre. On a personal level, the situation was rich in irony. Here was an ex-convict, a petty thief who had spent most of his adolescence and early manhood in prison, and who had written books that were originally regarded as too obscene to be publicly circulated. He was now not only being given the opportunity of seeing his play produced at the tax-payer's expense. He was being allowed to watch the French police holding back the angry representatives of the ex-servicemen's associations which were protesting against the glorification of the terrorists who had killed their comrades. Politically, of course, Genet was being exploited. De Gaulle wanted to drive home the nail of Algerian independence, a solution he had achieved only in face of the most determined opposition from the French army and the right. This aim could not have been better achieved than by the production of a play in which the army and the right-wing were defeated and held up to ridicule. One of the great arguments against literary censorship is that the lifting of a ban can enable a government to make an indirect political point. *The Screen* had earlier been banned because it offended public decency. This was still, for many who saw the play, not a wholly empty argument. It was now allowed to be performed because it showed the French army being as ridiculous in defeat as it had been cruel in victory. Genet was being used. It was not the first time.

Read in isolation from the commentaries that have grown up around it, Genet's work is intellectually fascinating and linguistically inexhaustible. He is a highly original stylist, the master of a peculiarly sumptuous tongue. His works are held together by a dialectical tension between his romantic desire to exalt the power of evil and his realistic awareness of its totally self-defeating nature. Just as his life, shorn of its Sartrian accretions, throws a fascinating light on

the problems society has when dealing with its criminals, so his novels and plays isolate and define the nature of deviant activity with peculiar and irreplaceable intensity. What neither his life nor his works do, however, is fit the Procrustean bed on which the ideologically motivated criticism of the left has tried to fit them. The attempt by Sartre and others to do so stems from two sources: the feeling that the tradition of Baudelaire and Flaubert must be kept alive, and that any writer worth his salt must offer a stick with which to beat the bourgeoisie; the awareness of a shortage of genuinely original writers who offer the right kind of anti-bourgeois ammunition. 'Men do their broken weapons rather use/Then their bare hands', as the Duke observes to Desdemona's father in the first act of *Othello*. But Brabantio, wisely, decides to call off the fight. Sartre could not bring himself to do this. Perhaps it is time for other literary men to look more objectively at the facts.

It is often tempting to read literary history in Marxist terms. However murderous his inadequacies as a prophet, Marx did offer an interesting tool to historians. This is especially true when he suggested that we look at the literature of the past in terms of unresolved and perhaps unacknowledged social conflicts. The romantic movement, in this context, is a symptom of the immense adjustment which European civilisation had to make as it passed from an agricultural to an industrial mode of production. The gloom of twentieth-century writing, like its perpetuation of the Romantic myth of the inevitable conflict between the artist and society, is equally eloquent as a symptom of the two crises which have afflicted the West since the rise of industrialism: the rise of Prussian militarism and disasters of the First World War; the conflict between totalitarianism and parliamentary democracy which reached a double climax in the war against Hitler and in the Cold War which accompanied and immediately followed it.

By 1952, the first crisis was over and the second was beginning to resolve itself to the West's advantage. When, in 1951, Albert Camus said that he 'wagered for the Renaissance' he meant that he was placing his bet on the survival and triumph of what Karl Popper called the Open Society against the forces of Stalinist totalitarianism which were confronting and trying to overthrow it. Camus was, at the time, being violently attacked by the left-wing establishment in France for making in his 1951 political essay on revolutionary

totalitarianism, *L'Homme révolté*, exactly the same criticisms of Stalinism which have since become commonplace under Gorbachev. The coincidence between Camus's quarrel with Sartre and the publication of *Jean Genet, comédien et martyr* is significant. Camus was of impeccably proletarian origin. His father was an agricultural labourer and his mother an illiterate charwoman. At a time when he was completing his conversion to liberal politics, the writer born with the most indubitably bourgeois spoon in his mouth - Jean-Paul Sartre - was fighting himself even further into the corner of his sterile and hysterical opposition to society which was giving him and his recent *protégé* such generous and indulgent treatment and support.

Had the crisis which began to move into its acute phase with the Russian revolution of 1917 not finally resolved itself to the West's advantage, the contradictions both in Genet's own work and in the attitude of his admirers might be legitimately seen as the product of a society still unable to solve its internal and external problems. Now that the West seems definitely to have won the Cold War, those contradictions in the attitude of Genet's admirers can clearly be seen for what they are: the perpetuation of an attitude whose time has passed. The triumph of the West in the Cold War has meant that the discrepancy between the values by which we live and the hostility towards these values in the authors we most admire is beginning to come to an end. It is often in small events that major social changes show themselves most clearly. The destruction of the Genet myth through the patient scholarship and clear prose of *Jean Genet. Essai de chronologie 1910-1944* is not just an accident. It is a sign of the times. It accompanies, in its modest way, the collapse both in Russia and the West of the view that there is something inherently wrong with what used to be dismissed as 'bourgeois values'. After fighting totalitarianism physically to a halt in Korea between 1950 and 1953, after risking New York, Paris and London to protect West Berlin between 1958 and 1962, after having survived the oil crisis so ingeniously engineered by the unholy alliance between militant Islam and Russian imperialism, after having stuck out for the right to defend itself against the SS20s, liberal democracy has won back its spurs. There are fewer and fewer writers whose work can be described as the appropriate expression of a decadent culture.

The Politics of Disinformation

Françoise Thom

'Disinformation' of the enemy has long been practised in wartime: victory often comes from an error of judgement on the part of one of the adversaries rather than from the military skill of the victor. The Communist State, however, is the first State to have appreciated the enormous advantage to be derived from exploiting, deliberately, persistently and with full understanding, the limitless proclivity of the human mind for error and illusion. Only the Communist State maintains an organisation with the sole function of implanting falsehood inside and outside its borders and only the Communist State makes systematic use of the naiveté, gullibility and short memory of its opponents in planning its diplomacy. Soviet propaganda techniques have succeeded in enlisting stupidity, idealism, naiveté, conformism, vanity, good intentions, snobbery and even simple good sense in the service of the Soviet war-machine.

Every society of course has known self-deception: the thing to remember is that since 1917 there has been a State which cleverly manipulates our capacity for deluding ourselves and relies on it as a means of achieving supremacy in the battle for the 'balance of power'. That State is at war with the rest of the world. My intention here is not to analyse the classic Machiavellian techniques of Soviet policy nor the status of deceit in a State founded on ideology, but to consider disinformation as a unique, strategic device.

The organization-chart of disinformation has been described many times¹ and I do not mean to go over it again. It is necessary however, to understand the importance of a body which employs, in Moscow and in all the KGB 'houses' in foreign countries, thousands of people, together with their active fellow-travellers. This great machine is completely centralized: every directive from the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emanates from the organs of propaganda, from mass organizations and from Department 'A', which has responsibility for active measures. Each of the three sources is supported and reinforced by the other two.

The nature of the machine - hierarchical, militaristic - is sufficient in itself to show that disinformation is a part of the Soviet Union's war resources and a very important part. According to Lenin, war takes only incidentally the form of armed conflict, and Communist strategists lose no opportunity of pointing out that economic, diplomatic and psychological conflict can be just as decisive. At present, in the age of Gorbachev, Soviet military writers particularly stress the last two. Disinformation is valued more than other sorts of weapon for several reasons, including the lack of risk

and relative cheapness. (As Sun Tsu said: 'One must take advantage of the situation, just as when one rolls a ball down a steep slope. The initial force required is minimal: the result is great.') Disinformation can be used anywhere and fits well into the four kinds of war that Lenin enunciated.

V. Volkoff has given us a definition of disinformation: 'making the enemy believe the very thing that inevitably brings about his downfall.' This definition should be kept in mind whenever one considers the subject of disinformation: it has the benefit of being almost a complete antidote. To refute disinformation, however, one has to do more than recognize it: it is just as important to know the areas where it is deployed and the ways in which it operates. By analyzing the objectives of disinformation we can establish a classification of its types.

I: A typology of disinformation

1. *Disinformation designed to increase dislike between peoples.*

Where there is unity, cause division. Drive a wedge between a ruler and his ministers, then separate him from his allies. Arouse mutual suspicion between them so that mutual distrust becomes their predominant sentiment. Then you can make your plans against them.

Sun Tsu.

The principle is simple - create division wherever possible, with the prime objective of disrupting the Atlantic alliance. To this end, the Soviets try to convince Europeans and the rest of the world that the United States operates an aggressive policy of intolerable interference. In this connection Department D (the predecessor of Department A) and Department A itself have shown inexhaustible inventiveness. T. Wolton's book contains a list of lies concocted by the KGB with the aim of either 'demonstrating' Washington's 'policy of force' or otherwise striking fear in European hearts. For example, in November 1981, there appeared in the Spanish Press what was alleged to be a letter from President Reagan to King Juan Carlos, putting him on his guard against certain members of his entourage described as being opposed to Spain's entry to NATO. In January 1982 two documents, supposedly from the American Department of State, surfaced, describing the possibility of a military *coup* against Papandreou if he did not renew his agreement with the Americans concerning their bases in the Aegean. In April 1982, another 'letter' appeared, this time from General Haig, dated 29 June 1979 and addressed to Joseph Luns, the Secretary-General of NATO. It referred to the possible

first use of nuclear weapons by the Western Powers.

Since then – and especially since ‘Irangate’ – the disinformers have quietly been telling the Europeans that the United States cannot be trusted as an ally, that it is unreliable, that you can never know when to believe its word, etc. The anniversary of the Suez affair provided an opportunity for reiterating these points. At the same time, the Soviets try to induce mistrust of Europeans in the United States. This is the essential role of pacifist movements in Europe: one can imagine the effect on the average American television watcher of the sight of the American flag being burnt in Berlin by demonstrators for peace (September 1981).

The International Department meantime continues to stir up ill-feeling between the Western Europeans themselves, with the main aim of isolating the Federal German Republic. That country’s attachment to the West is, in the eyes of the Soviets, the chief obstacle to the neutralization of Europe. Great efforts are therefore made to raise the ghost of neo-Nazism, in order to show that the Fascist disease is still ripe in West Germany. There is evidence from a number of defectors, who agree on the importance of the KGB’s role in manipulating small extreme-Right groups. The Tremeaud affair is an outstanding example.

More than ever before, the principal tactic is to undermine the Paris-Bonn axis. Recently, certain stories have appeared with the primary purpose of increasing French fears about German neutrality and implanting the idea that it is impossible to know whether the Germans can be trusted. In West Germany, it is easy to play simultaneously on the alleged chauvinism of the French, their lack of understanding of German problems and their latent hostility to German reunification. The present division of Germany is depicted by the disinformers as the result of a second Treaty of Versailles and not as the outcome of Communist hegemony in Central Europe.

A recent article in *Stern* (no. 24, 3 June 1987) shows the success which the ‘hate-raisers’ have had in some sections of the West German Press. The article was devoted to French foreign policy and comprises a vigorous indictment of the French ambitions to be a Great Power, of its interference throughout the world, of its obsession with its nuclear force and its reservations about disarmament. The Soviet Press would not have changed a word.

Disinformation designed to create mutual distrust includes a number of themes aimed at discrediting democratic institutions and corrupting the politics of democracy. In pursuit of this, it aims to set against the rule of law human entitlements, that is to say, the right to work, the right of life etc. – notions intended to cloud the nature of the rule of law. In France, the Communists have cleverly used the concept of ‘the left’ in such a way as to keep the Socialists at their mercy. The dichotomy of Left and Right, of which the Communist Party is so fond, causes people to forget the much more profound split between democratic and non-democratic, which marginalizes Communism. In

addition, the International Department has organized ‘hate-campaigns’ against some Western politicians whom it judges to be particularly dangerous to Soviet interests. The outstanding example is Franz-Joseph Strauss. Two defectors from the East, J. Sejna and I. Djirkvelov, heard Ponomarev, the head of the International Department, exhort all its sections to do everything possible to discredit the leader of the Christian Democrats. The police, the armed forces and the intelligence services are well-known to be constant targets of the disinformers. Now the KGB’s imagination has run to sheer fantasy – one recalls the Soviet version of the origin of AIDS, which was that this evil sprang from the malevolent brain of the CIA, anxious to devise an effective bacteriological weapon. It affects mainly homosexuals and drug addicts because the CIA, everlastingly faithful to bourgeois ideology, tested its new weapon on the dregs of society.

2. *Disinformation to distract*

This very up-to-date mode of disinformation consists in attributing to the enemy things which actually relate to the disinformers. So the United States is rife with terrorists, the CIA master-minded the attack on the Pope, psychiatry is presently being used to control political prisoners in Canada, and so on. In November 1982 the Swedish journal *The Worker* announced that American tanks had passed through Göteborg, violating Swedish neutrality: the true purpose of the item was to divert attention from the comings and goings of Soviet submarines in Swedish territorial waters.

On 23 April 1987 *Humanité* carried another splendid example in the form of an article entitled ‘Butchers of Children’. This denounced the ‘scandal’ of the raising and fattening-up of South American children to provide organs for organ-banks in the United States. The international Communist movement needed this horrifying story to make people forget about the fate of children sent from Mozambique and Angola to Cuba and that of the Afghan children sent to Tashkent to be turned into specimens of the New Man.

3. *‘Pre-emptive’ disinformation*

This mode is used every time the USSR wants to prevent the free world from adapting some measure it judges unfavourable to the development of the balance of power. Public opinion is worked on by a well-orchestrated campaign in which mass organizations play a vital role. The blocking of the European Defence Community and America’s abandonment of the neutron bomb are examples of the effectiveness of these tactics – so effective that the Soviets were amazed when they lost the argument about Euromissiles. The latter, however, did not prevent their re-entering with renewed energy into the campaign against the Strategic Defence Initiative (‘Star Wars’). The same messages emerge each time – the United States is working for military supremacy in order to impose its will on the whole world (a good example also of ‘distracting’ disinform-

mation): it does not care if it compromises the security of Europe, etc.

4. *Mirror-image disinformation*

I manage things so that the enemy takes my strong points for weak ones and my weak points for strong, while I am turning any weakness into strength.

Sun Tsu

This technique brings together all the means by which the Soviets are able to blind the rest of the world to the nature of Communism. Here the difference between propaganda and disinformation is most clearly shown. Propaganda asserts that the USSR is a paradise: disinformation asserts that it is a country like other countries. The latter is then related to the former in order to reaffirm it by implication: the Communists must have made great progress towards the truth, for are they not admitting that they have problems just as we have? The fact is that the new picture is as untrue as the old one and even more deceptive. In this case the point of the mirror-image disinformation consists in encouraging Western countries to project their own social structures onto the USSR. Wishing to draw the maximum advantage from the USSR's entry into the war against Japan, Stalin used to tell Roosevelt of the unfortunate stubborn opposition to the war on the part of the Politbureau, and of his own endless patience in overcoming it. Similarly, there is the well-known division between 'hawks' and 'doves' which lasts forever and which has recently been given new impetus. Then there is the manner in which General Secretaries - and now their wives - are presented to the public as being similar to legally elected statesmen; the implication is that, inside every General Secretary, there beats a liberal heart rendered powerless by a cruel system and by the fear of ending up like Khrushchev. Westerners are encouraged to read their own political experiences into the Soviet situation until they come to see in it the ever-present imminence of a liberating revolution. This is the origin of that classic of disinformation, the 'weakness and evolution' scenario so well described by Golitsyn² according to which the USSR, in a state of complete crisis, will one day renounce ideology and return to capitalism - with the special help of Western loans. This scenario has been brought out with every new economic plan since the 1920's. It surfaced in Khrushchev's time and it has done so now: it appears every time the Soviet regime needs Western aid to survive.

We should look now at how the themes of mirror-image disinformation are deployed under Gorbachev. The general outline is the classic one of 'weakness and evolution'; but the team of Yakovlev and Dobrynin has added some subtle and refined touches:

- the USSR is entering a post-Leninist phase: Gorbachev's interest in the social sciences shows his disaffection with Marxism (it actually shows how abiding is the interest in social engineering which is at the root of Bolshevism);

- as a consequence, the Communist movement does not exist any longer - witness the replacement of Ponomarev by Dobrynin: the International Department has been absorbed by the MID and the USSR is renouncing subversion in favour of classical diplomacy;
- The USSR is far too busy with its economic reforms to continue to be active in the international arena (in fact, historical precedents show that Soviet expansion is pursued with renewed energy during every new 5-year Plan);
- free public opinion is appearing in the USSR and different social groups are freely expressing themselves. The Party takes account of public opinion, as is shown by the abandonment under public pressure of its proposal to change the courses of the Siberian rivers. (The truth is that the project had been abandoned for lack of funds before it was ever submitted to public discussion). On 24 March 1987, *Le Monde* cited a case which well illustrates the new Soviet technique: M. Timerbaev, a diplomat accredited to the United Nations, declared: 'We accept that the invasion of Afghanistan was mistaken... and we now wish to withdraw our troops.' He hastened to add that he was expressing a purely personal point of view. His words had a double purpose - to make people believe (a) that something was happening in Afghanistan and (b) that a Soviet diplomat had the right to hold personal opinions and to express them. Such an economy of means would have been impossible in Brezhnev's day;
- Gorbachev's position is precarious: he risks dismissal at any time. (This theme was particularly apt when President Reagan was in difficulties over 'Irangate': it served to reassure the Americans by showing them that there was an exact parallel between the weakened power of the two leaders.)

Mirror-image disinformation emanates also from the Soviet allies: a good example is the referendum which was held in Romania in November 1986 on the question of a reduction in the military budget. Here obviously was a message to the countries of Western Europe, inviting them to show the same 'independence' towards the United States.

Sometimes it is not enough to conceal the true nature of Communism: the Communists themselves have to be hidden. In this case, the preferred technique is to disguise them as nationalists, a method which Mao, Fidel Castro, the Sandanistas and the Vietnamese Communists have used successfully. In France, anti-American and pro-Soviet propaganda has often been advanced under the cover of Gaullism and patriotism. As Sun Tsu put it: 'When you are close, pretend to be far away...'

That brings us to the second aspect of mirror-image disinformation. Not only does the USSR contrive to deceive us about herself by persuading us to project our own situation onto her; she also persuades us to betray ourselves by accepting and applying her interpretations of situations and countries. Entire countries, such as

South Africa and Israel, are badly understood in the West, so thick is the layer of disinformation which now lies over them.

5. Strategic disinformation

This sort of disinformation should be distinguished from the pacifist propaganda to which USSR has always had recourse since the star of Marxism-Leninism began to shine less brightly. Nuclear disarmament by the Western powers is indeed the primary objective of Soviet policy, because of what the nuclear arm represents from the Leninist perspective. It is the ultimate weapon, something totally unacceptable to a Marxist, for its existence denies supremacy to either side. Nuclear weapons have stopped the Soviets from advancing into Europe and have forced the USSR to adopt an indirect approach, to advance into the Third World, to have greater recourse to subversion and terrorism and to step up disinformation. Department 'D' was set up in January 1959, when the Soviets realized how wide the implications of nuclear warfare were; since Western Europe remains the prime target of the Soviets they must neutralize its nuclear weapons. So they sustain an enormous campaign for disarmament which has been a staple of Moscow's policies for many years and which Gorbachev has continued with renewed energy. Although nuclear weapons have given Europe the longest period of peace in its history, they are represented by the disinformers as likely to cause war. Negotiations about the control of arms have to be seen as part of the Soviet's long term active measures to support their policy objectives. It is part of Soviet disinformation to affirm that their diplomatic proposals are based on security considerations: in fact they are tactics in 'the war of diplomacy'. The installation of SS-20 missiles had a political objective - to frighten Europe; the INF treaty has exactly the same purpose - to frighten Europeans by implying that America is abandoning them.

Some recent examples of strategic disinformation implanted in the United States are:

- we must negotiate now, while we have superior power, because Congress may later put obstacles in the way of completing the SDI ('Star Wars') project and our position then will be less favourable. (The truth is that the Soviets are afraid that SDI will be realized and that they will lose their bargaining power in the negotiations);
- if the United States cannot reach agreement, it will lose the support of its European allies;
- we must not let Gorbachev have a monopoly of disarmament initiatives: in fact, we must outbid him;
- what is at stake in the competition between the super powers is no longer Europe, but control of space. (In fact, the Soviets think more than ever in geopolitical terms, but they try to hide this from the Western powers: this is the point of their new slogan of 'interdependence', which they use so extensively).

II: Glasnost - a new technique

In Brezhnev's time, disinformation had no more than one comparatively modest aim, that of leading the non-Communist world into error. This objective, as we have seen above, remains fundamental, but the Gorbachev administration has much wider ambitions and seeks to regain complete control of opinion at home and in the whole Eastern bloc. The administration has realized that to do so its propaganda must be disseminated not by the discredited Soviet media but by Western radio stations transmitting to the Communist world. The problem was how to get the Western media, without understanding what they were doing, to accept the slogans of *perestroika* and to pass on to the captive listeners behind the iron curtain whatever the Soviet regime wanted them to hear. The propagandists in the Kremlin found a cunning solution - transmit propaganda under the guise of reporting events. This was the dawn of *glasnost*. The West, accustomed to boring news recitals under Brezhnev, is suddenly treated to a torrent of sensational items, each more astounding than the previous one: Gorbachev is threatening to resign, he is thinking of meeting Dubcek, he is offering to remove the Berlin wall, he is looking forward to withdrawing Soviet troops from Afghanistan: he is working to democratize the USSR by allowing multiple candidates in elections. In the world of culture, new rumours rain down even more heavily: the authorities are thinking of publishing Solzhenitsyn - even of inviting him to return to the USSR. Pasternak was rehabilitated with great publicity and there is the possibility of a Pasternak museum: Bukharin's name has reappeared in official publications.

All this effervescence serves two purposes. The first is to exploit the West's own wishes (one has only to remember the facility with which rumours about the reunification of Germany were spread at the very moment that Kohl was due to make a statement on the double-zero option). The second is to cause the Western media (whose function is to disseminate news) to spread Soviet propaganda throughout the Eastern bloc. By doing this, they strengthen the disinformation which they conscientiously reproduce. The propagandists in the Kremlin arrange for 'leaks' when they wish to spread some slogan that they regard as particularly important. This is the notorious 'State samizdat', of which there are some outstanding examples: the Novosibirsk conference on alcoholism, the statement of the prosecutor Tchistiakov on the corruption of the Party organizations, the speech of Yeltsin to the propagandists and Gorbachev's discussion with the writers. All these were widely diffused by the Western media and show the degree to which the Western system of information is now skilfully used by the Soviet machine. The results of this policy were soon apparent: the peoples of Eastern Europe hailed Gorbachev as a liberator. The West is on its way to losing its natural allies by reason of failing to defuse the trap of *glasnost* and not knowing how to present,

and comment on, the real news to the peoples of Eastern Europe. The real news would show clearly that the aims of Soviet policy remain as they were under Stalin, by holding up to the light the new *gosagroprom* in agriculture, the introduction of quality control commissions in industry, the decree against unlawful sources of income and the introduction of tighter integration within Comecon which heralds greater exploitation than ever of its member States.

How can the free world protect itself against disinformation? A good knowledge of the history of the Bolsheviks and a clear understanding of Soviet objectives are the necessary pre-conditions for neutralizing the work of the disinformers. It is often said that the West deludes itself and that Department A has no more to do than exploit that condition. There is some truth in that, but it must not be exaggerated. There are other tendencies that the disinformers can make use of.

The first and most important, to my mind, is intellectual snobbery, which explains the success of mirror-image disinformation. It is considered intellectually not 'smart' to come to clear-cut judgements. The 'in' thing, on the contrary, is to flaunt our elegant impartiality, to state for example, as some American Sovietologists do, that the apparent increase in infant mortality in the USSR is actually due to an improvement in its statistics; or to state that Western societies

have many totalitarian aspects, that Reagan is more ideological than Gorbachev and so on... This intellectual snobbery often exaggerates grievances about 'bourgeois society' - grievances which are stirred up and exploited through the 'disinformation of hate'. National vanity is also often turned against the real national interest. It is the origin of anti-Americanism, a powerful feeling in England and West Germany and an ideal field of action for disinformation. And one must not forget intellectual sloth, particularly formidable in an age when everybody feels obliged to have an opinion on all manner of subjects. Instead of acknowledging honestly that one really knows nothing of the situation in this or that country one prefers to adopt some ready-made opinion peddled by the Communist propaganda machine. When we gain the courage to admit our ignorance and either live with it or take serious steps to overcome it, disinformation will have lost the match.

Notes

1. See for example: *R.H. Schultz and R. Godson Désinformatsia Antropos*, 1985.
2. *A. Golytsin New Lies for Old*, London 1984.

Changing the World

David Stove

'The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it'. This famous saying was one of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*. It has been repeated with approval thousands, probably millions, of times. Even some philosophers - I blush for my profession - have been heard to endorse it in pulpit tones. As for criticism of it, I have never seen one word, despite having looked in all the likely places I could think of.

Yet it is talk at its cheapest. An Epicurean, or even a mere reader of *Playboy*, might say, 'Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is to enjoy it'. Why is that not as good, or as bad, as Marx's *dictum*? A Buddhist, or a Christian, might say, 'Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the point is to escape from it'. What is Marx's next move then?

In fact anyone at all can play this game. You simply announce to the world that 'the point is' - to do whatever it is that *you* would have people do. For example, if the only thing that interests you is tennis, you might say: 'Golfers have only tried to land the ball in the cup, and footballers have only tried to score goals with it; the point is to hit it over the net into the opponent's court'.

Of course, some people might react by saying. 'Why

should I accede to your fantastic impertinence?', or something less polite. But then again, they might not. Marx has never met, to this day, with any such impoliteness over his announcement that 'the point is' to change the world.

Marx was exasperated with philosophers, of course, because of their absorption in intellectual work which had little or no tendency to advance the cause of the working-class. That cause was his only interest, and he thought no one should have any other. For the same reason, he was almost equally exasperated with the learned class in general: philosophers were only the extreme case. Absorption in mathematics, philosophy, physics, or the like, seemed to him not only frivolous but indecent, while the condition of the working-class was what it was. His *dictum* was really addressed to the learned in general, and meant, 'Stop all this *studying* of a disgusting reality, and *change it*'

This injunction to the learned, to change what they had previously only studied, was impertinent in any case; but in the case of mathematicians or physicists, for example, it was meaningless as well. It does not make sense to say: 'Mathematicians have only studied the prime numbers; the point is to change them'. Nor does it make sense to say: 'Physicists have only

uncovered the laws of matter; the point is to change them'. Whether God himself could change the prime numbers, or even the laws of matter, has been doubted, and with reason. But it is entirely out of the question for human beings to change them.

Marx's injunction makes little better sense even when addressed to philosophers: what did he expect *them* to change? (*Ex officio*, I mean, and as distinct from the things which he wanted everyone to join in changing.) Did he expect philosophers to change the nature of identity, for example, or of causality (to name just two of their favourite subjects)? That would, again, be expecting people to do something entirely beyond all human powers. Were philosophers supposed to change classical logic into 'dialectical' logic? Some Marxists said so; but the more learned ones said that that couldn't be right, because the bourgeois philosopher Hegel had (most unsportingly) done that *already*. Was it the existence of God? But the divine existence could not possibly be changed, unless there *were* such a thing; while if there were, presumably not even God could change it. The possibility of suicide, as Seneca remarked long ago, is one advantage which men have over gods. But I simply cannot answer the question, and I therefore leave it in the obscurity to which Marxists have prudently consigned it.

Perhaps it is unfair to apply Marx's saying to branches of learning as abstract as mathematics, or physics, or philosophy. So let us apply it to disciplines which have material things, and time, and change, built-in to the very fabric of their subject-matter: branches of learning such as geography and astronomy. How well will Marx's injunction work out here?

No better than elsewhere. 'Astronomers have only studied the evolution and constitution of stars; the point is to change them'. That will clearly never do. 'Geographers have only studied the distribution, the kinds, and the effects, of land, water, wind, coal, (etc.); the point is to change them'. That will not do either. Astronomers cannot change stellar evolution, so it is idle to tell them to. Nor can a geographer re-arrange land-masses, for example. Well, all right, he *can* do so, thought only on an insignificant scale: for example, he can dig his garden. But that can hardly have been the kind of thing that Marx had in mind: his injunction was something very different from Voltaire's advice.

A day may come, of course, when geographers *can* steer continents, and astronomers can interfere in the evolution of stars. There will be nothing new in principle about that, if it does happen. We can steer satellites now, and we have been interfering for a long time in *organic* evolution. Scientists have in fact been changing the world ever since there *were* scientists. So have philosophers, though in less tangible ways, ever since there were philosophers. If Socrates, for example, or Augustine, or Bacon, or Rousseau, did not change the world, then no one ever did. There is nothing in the least *novel*, then, about thought changing the world: on the contrary, it is one of the most familiar common-places of human history.

But there is nothing in the least metaphysically exciting about it, either. Thought is an extremely local affair; after 2500 years of theology and science, we still do not know of a single extra-terrestrial intelligence. And thought's sphere of influence is very small. It will probably never extend even as far as the sun; what price its ever being able to change our galaxy? Yet our galaxy itself is only a drop in the ocean of 'cosmic weather' (as Chauncey Wright called the universe). Even where thought does operate, it is only one of a thousand causal agencies which are constantly changing the world. It is far from being one of the most powerful of these, while it is easily the most fragile. A comet of the right mass, a virus of the right chemistry, or any one of a million other contingencies, would extinguish thought in no time; but gravity and light, wind and water, and many other old-reliables, would still be on the job.

Thought can change the world, then, in the sense that, in some few and local respects, it can make things different from what they would otherwise have been. *So can wind and water*, and countless other things which no one would get philosophically airborne about. All these changes, past or future, actual or possible, are only changes *in* the world, after all. That our thought can change the world, would be metaphysically interesting only if it meant that we can change the *world* in the sense in which we can change our shirts or our jobs: namely, *get another one instead*. But that is obviously mere lunacy.

Yet Marx's famous saying implies that thought never *had* changed the world until he spoke! And this saying has been received with so much reverence by Marxists as to suggest that it had opened man's minds to a dimension of thought never before conceived: the dimension (as they like to say) of *praxis*. You might as well suppose that no one knew that people have thickness, as well as height and width, until Marx told us so.

This is simply a case of ignorant or frightened worshippers flattering their deity. But Marx is not one of the gods of thought, or even one of its giants. He belongs in the same rank as, for example, Bentham, to whom, indeed, he bore a remarkable resemblance. Both had a strong vein of common sense, and the satirist's gift of detecting low realities concealed under high ideas. Neither man had any philosophical ability worth mentioning, or even any philosophical interests. In fact, neither had any intellectual interests at all, except ones connected with the hobby-horse which they shared. This was, a passion for the future happiness of humanity, so all-consuming that it could easily be seen to promise, as in fact it produced, more misery than could have been brought about in any other way. The only major difference between the two is, the unvarying savagery of Marx's mind. The child was father to the man: in high school he was nick-named 'Destroy', from the frequency of this word on his lips.

There was, indeed, only one thing which really interested Marx. This was the fact that in the second

half of the 19th century A.D., in western Europe, or at least in its industrialised parts, the poor were poorer than, in his opinion, they ought to have been. Now this opinion may have been true; or it may not. But it is hardly entitled to rank as one which opened up a new dimension of thought, or marked a new era in the history of humanity.

To criticise this hasty jotting of Marx – for that is all it was – is breaking a butterfly on the wheel. It is only the absurd respect with which it has been generally received, which entitles it to the flattery of criticism.

This ‘thesis on Feuerbach’ was, quite obviously, not a thesis at all, but a mere expression of will: as when a petulant child says, in whatever words or without words, ‘Everyone drop what you’re doing, and see to it that what *I* want done gets done!’ Marx’s injunction to the learned – ‘Stop it, and join the workers’ struggle!’ – was exactly like the tennis-fanatic’s injunction to the sporting: ‘Stop it, and play tennis!’. Why the learned ought to heed the former injunction, any more than golfers or footballers ought to heed the latter, was never explained. It could not be: there *was* no explanation.

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Editorial

In the next issue we shall mark the tenth anniversary of Mrs. Thatcher's office, and the seventh of this Review, with a series of articles discussing the Tory record. Our contributors will subject the philosophy of the market - against the unthinking extension of which we have often sounded a warning - to further critical analysis. The unanswerable arguments of Hayek, which persuade us that comprehensive economic planning is irrational, and that civil society can be neither managed nor created by the state, have, we believe, offered too ready a paradigm of intellectual triumph, and one which, applied too widely, threatens the authority of the state. For many of Mrs. Thatcher's advisors, it seems, the answer to every social problem is 'privatise'. Even if this answer is sometimes the right one - as, for instance, in education, where the state monopoly has been the opportunity for organised subversion - it is also sometimes the wrong one. It is particularly wrong when the 'problem' is merely a creation of the solution that is proposed for it.

The government's growing tendency to hunt for problems where none have been perceived is nowhere more in evidence than in the Green Paper proposing extensive reform of the law. The legal profession contains monopolies - and in particular the Bar's monopoly of advocacy - which must inevitably excite criticism from those who engage with it. But does it follow that the Bar constitutes another 'vested interest' which must be threatened with competition? To think in this way is to take too activist a view of the role of government, and one whose long-term effect will be to sow discord among the professions. The hunting down of 'vested interests' is certainly no natural goal for the Conservative Party, which triumphs precisely because it has the professions behind it, and because it represents in the popular imagination that balance of powerful interests to which the nation's future can be confidently entrusted. A vested interest should be challenged only if it is notoriously injurious to the common good. In other circumstances, the correct approach to an interest, however 'vested', is either to conciliate or leave alone.

We should remember, too, Burke's great defence of those with a 'vested interest' in the nation and its continuity. In aristocracy Burke discerned a monopoly of honour - which was also a major public good. The destruction of the hereditary estates, and the ensuing social and ecological catastrophe, enables us to perceive the truth of Burke's conception - too late to save the

aristocracy, but not so late that we cannot apply the lesson elsewhere. The Bar too has a vested interest in continuity, in the preservation of law and justice, and in the survival of authority and honour. Not to see this as a public good is to have lost the conservative vision of society.

It is a long-standing principle of British justice that pleading before a judge is through a representative, and that this representative is answerable not merely to his client (as a solicitor is) but also to the law itself, in the forum of which he struts like an actor. The first duties of the barrister are to interpret the law, to do the best for his client within the framework of the law, and to uphold those standards of truth and justice which his client may have an interest in perverting. Duties are reliably honoured, however, only where there is a benefit attached to them. In the case of the Bar the benefit (or 'vested interest') consists in the fact that the barrister's career is in the court, and advanced through the court. He earns his reputation as an exponent of the law; and it is from the ranks of barristers that judges are chosen. The intricate and long-standing relation between the Bar and the Bench is one of the delicate constitutional artifacts whereby the objectivity of the law is upheld. It is through this relation that a class of people comes into being with a collective interest in justice.

The government's proposals involve a radical step in the American direction. Litigation will no longer be the solemn and occasional thing that it now is, but will become a commodity among others, offered on tempting terms to all-comers. The law will lose its status as a corrective, and become instead an active participant in all transactions, a busy ancillary to every business and a cancer upon the social organism.

We shall become as litigious as our transatlantic cousins and our legal system as corrupt as theirs. The Roman virtues which are still embodied in our legal system reside there precisely because it plays so little part in the market place, and is invoked only *in extremis*. At the same time, for all their perceived remoteness, Roman virtues are an economic asset. It is in *English* courts that international contractors choose to litigate, and our law, known for its justice, is for that very reason our greatest invisible export. To destroy the delicate balance upon which that law depends is not only unconservative: it is to threaten the very source of authority and continuity which conservatism is devoted to defending.

Letters

Sir,

Since a British government first sought to introduce the nation into the mysteries of metrication without offering any good reason, it is not surprising that the government feels no urge to explain to the public why it proposes effectively to complete the process. The predictable result of the first instalment of bureaucratic folly is a prevailing and persistent fog of confusion in the minds of ordinary folk about English equivalents of metric units and vice versa. Weather forecasters now give temperatures either in Fahrenheit or in Centigrade ('Celsius!!'), or sometimes in both. Estate agents' particulars indicate areas either in yards or in metres, or in acres or hectares, or both. This emergent eclecticism is accompanied by a sort of muddled truce between the rival metric systems on grocers' shelves, litre bottles standing reluctantly next to pint bottles, pound packages propped promiscuously against half-kilo ones. Soft drinks come mainly in litres. Beer and milk remain adamantly on the pint standard. Eggs are still sold by the dozen. Dried fruit have started to flirt with grammes; spices have all but surrendered to them. On the other hand, fruit and vegetables, meat and fish, continue blithely to be sold by the pound.

Engaging though this benign chaos has been, it can become wearisome. The question that should exercise us is whether we should press on regardless with another instalment of metrication or, instead, return to our native measures. Does adoption of the metric system, assuming it is eventually successful, confer any social or economic advantage on the nation?

A moment's reflection should suffice to convince us that the attempt made to compel the British public to don this bit of Continental attire cannot be vindicated by appeal to any rational consideration - a product only of bureaucratic presumption.

More than 20 years ago my father was an exporter in a modest way of Manchester textiles. His only clerk, using a book of conversion tables, took less than a minute to translate yards into metres, pounds into francs and pesos, and so on. It was, of course, much the same a century earlier when Britain was 'the workshop of the world.' And today, the highly efficient economy of Japan has no plans whatever to discard its unique and complex script in a vain endeavour to expand its commerce.

Clearly, in the absence of any argument of substance to vindicate its surrender to the inertia of current political momenta to 'go metric', the government has chosen to issue a diktat. A parliamentary debate might reveal the issue to be one of constitutional import. As things stand, however, the sad fact is that MPs and cabinet ministers are still mesmerised by the 'European mystique.' They are borne along by these spurious visions of 'harmonisation' - the official buzz-word that is bandied about in order to conjure up the idea of peaceful co-existence, cooperation, and prosperity. The term is, of course, no more than a transparent euphemism for indiscriminate standardisation, productive only of 'monotonisation'; a part of the trend toward (or flight into) a uni-sex, uni-race, uni-culture, unit-class, and now uni-metric civilisation.

Yet while the new technology, the mass media, and the world's 'forward-lookers' seek to standardise, to replicate, and generally to level out all remaining differences in the institutions and the character of different countries and regions, resistance is everywhere growing. Separatist movements since World War II have erupted in almost every large country, including Britain. Evidently the creation of a universal brotherhood via 'harmonisation' is being increasingly challenged and hindered by a wide variety of movements with

their impassioned appeals to national, ethnic, and cultural identity.

This form of national resistance to foreign intrusion should have spread to Britain. Alas, having been conned into and force-fed with one dose of metrication - albeit one that has been imperfectly digested - the public, instead of reacting indignantly, has apparently resigned itself to having to ingest another in the belief, perhaps, that there is no choice in this instance but to comply with the decree of a government guided (as it must imagine) by the manifest beckoning of destiny.

But let the British public reconsider. This is no trifling matter. Words like shillings, florins, crowns, and guineas; words like gills, pints, quarts, and gallons; pecks, bushels, pounds, hundredweights, tons; inches, feet, yards, furlongs, miles, leagues; acres, fathoms, and so on can be regarded merely as expendable terms of denomination only by philistines and purblind Eurocrats. Such words are an integral part of the English language, resonant with history, rich in literary association, at once distinctive and familiar. They form an organic part of our Anglo-Saxon inheritance; an essential feature of the national persona.

Only overworked ministers who have come to equate 'the national interest' with the performance of financial indicators, only those who habitually perceive the country primarily as an economic entity, a vast commercial enterprise, Great Britain Incorporated, can continue to contemplate with equanimity the projected liquidation of an elemental and living part of the Mother tongue. And for what? For nothing better than a mess of metricated porridge!

E. J. Mishan
22 Gainsborough Gardens
Golders Green
London NW11

Sir,

J. Enoch Powell's article, 'By Our Consent', (March 1988), the Comprehensive Collapse contributions, (June 1983), and Roger Scruton's own article in the most recent edition were of particular interest to me as a college lecturer who teaches the philosophy of education and British history.

The concern expressed in the most recent 'Review' about the lack of British history being taught in our schools is something that I share.

At the age of 35, I can still remember when this was a compulsory subject on the school curriculum. Some of my students, both black and white British citizens, complain that if their history lessons, (received at various London comprehensive schools), had not been almost exclusively devoted to 'The History of the West Indies' and 'European Imperialism and the Slave Trade', then I would not have to spend time in presenting them with a condensed history of the Wars of the Roses, so that we can discuss passages from Shakespeare's 'Richard III' in class.

Peter Ransom
Sanelan Court
1, Mapesbury Road
London NW2

Sir,
I am sorry that Mr Mills (S.R. December 1988) allowed himself to be distracted from concerns which we share to take a sideswipe at me for supposedly saying, 'in effect, that the greater the number of pupils a teacher has to control, teach and help or correct (other factors being equal), the *greater* the educational outcome.'

For what I actually denied, both in 'Corruptions among the Clerks' (S.R. June 1988) and, much more extensively, in *Power to the Parents!* was the widely accepted assumption that (when, as in the last 30 years, other things have most manifestly not been equal) increases in the teacher/pupil ratio guaranteed proportionate, or indeed any, educational improvement.

Suppose, for instance - as was the case in Britain in the seventies - that you have, in order to 'improve' these ratios, admitted for teacher training large numbers of candidates without so much as a miserable O-level bare pass in Mathematics, and that then many of your training institutions, instead of labouring to make good such deficiencies, have preferred to stuff their trainees up with a malign and mendacious stew of socialist trendiness. Suppose now that you split a class of 40 formerly taught by a teacher of the calibre of Mr Miles' Jack Robinson into two, giving the other half to one of these new recruits. What should we expect the effect on *average* pupils performance to be? Even if all other things really were to be held equal what, surely, we ought to expect is that a big expansion of any profession will result in some decline in its average quality; thus making it less of a dedicated elite either deserving or obtaining commensurate rewards. That is very hard both on the Jack Robinsons, and on all those pupils who do not have him or his like to teach them. In our seemingly uncommon common concern both for him and for them, Mr Miles and I are not to be divided.

Antony Flew

Sir,
Patricia Stoll (S.R. Sept. 1988), like so many others, sees the root cause of our education troubles in senior schools. That is why they remain uncured.

When children are turned into reading failure (some of them for life) by top-down infant teaching, instead of the time-honoured, bottom-up c-a-t-cat, there is no way this can be cured by post-primary meddling. The Centre for Policy Studies and (so far) Policy Search have closed their ears to all urging to pay attention to the first year of school. When we revert to the simple, safe and fast-working intensive phonics, we shall remove almost all of today's remedial needs, and resources will suddenly be lavish, not scarce.

The top-down teaching has taken a step further into the quicksands with 'real books', encouraged by Jeff Hynds. Bromley council and I.e.a. have banned Mr Hynds from their patch after his teaching proved catastrophic in Raglan School. Has your I.e.a. banned Mr Hynds? If not, why not? He is booked up with lecturing engagements to Easter 1990! So long as teachers believe him, things will get even worse.

The recent Tizard study of infants 1982-5 found that the average reading quotient for ILEA was 89 (Young' test). This is spine-chilling, when you know that Norfolk's 103 means a good 10% of pupils are needing remedial after First School. Does 89 mean hardly any children are learning to read at all? Yet, incredibly, 77% of parents were satisfied after 2 school years!

Mrs Mona McNee
2 The Crescent
Tottwood
Norfolk

Sir,
Two of the wisest observations ever made about schoolmasters appear in Dr Adam Fox's biography of Dean Inge. Teachers, he wrote, 'need to work, but not too hard, for it is important that they should be fresh, and teaching freshly in class is exhausting.' And if they are unable to make pupils 'fear them a little,' they cannot keep order and, therefore, 'can never teach in class effectively'. Such perceptive remarks highlight the important sketch by Mr Mills (S.R. December 1988) of the real crisis smouldering beneath the hectic 'reforms' of secondary education.

Teachers feel trapped between the cumulative burdens of new 'initiatives' and the growing problems of indiscipline. There are limits to the number of pupils a teacher can help or evaluate during a lesson; to the homework assignments which can be constructively marked during his 'free' periods, evenings and weekends; and to the syllabus study and In-Service Training that can be fitted into so-called 'long holidays'. The time-and-motion of curriculum delivery seems to be ignored throughout the educational debate, whereas it should have been the first consideration in any rational programme of improvement during the past three decades. It is not a matter of 'making lazy teachers do some real work for a change' but rather of enabling teachers to *teach* - in the most productive manner. Many recently imposed measures, some of which *originate* in the 'philosophies' of 'equality', 'community' and 'playway', actually frustrate the efficient delivery of an appropriate curriculum.

D. L. W. Ashton
Loggia House
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Sheringham
Norfolk

Sir,
The letter from Mr Mills about the fate of a good teacher in British 'education' could no doubt be multiplied a thousandfold. Since the beginning of the 1960s there has been endless upheaval, but I cannot think of one single change, from the raising of the school-leaving age to the current drive to eliminate single-sex schools, that has brought any benefit whatever to anyone, apart from the recent introduction of information technology into the curriculum. *All* that was ever needed during the past thirty years was an improvement in the 'selection' process, both between primary and secondary stages, and between and within the secondary schools themselves, together with a steady improvement of the pupil/teacher ratios, particularly at the primary stage where children should have been taught the basics early and learned to enjoy work as much as to 'learn' through 'play'. Many 'innovations' have been disasters, and the greatest tragedy of all is that the present 'reform programme' is not reversing but compounding them. It merely adds red tape and clerical bumb to the 'progressive' subversion that is pulling A-Level and University Entrance into the swamp, while at the same time refusing to allow non-academic adolescents the chance to leave school and obtain the placements or jobs they want before 16.

A. Munden

A LATE DEVELOPER

A. W. Purdue

Macmillan 1894-1956: Volume 1 of the Official Biography, Alistair Horne, Macmillan, 1988, £16.95 (0-333-27691-4).

It is difficult to see the older in the younger man. How did this rather awkward and diffident figure with a goofy grin, unstylish clothes and gold-rimmed spectacles grow into the unflappable and urbane prime minister with an air of good humoured cynicism and the hint of Edwardian dandyism? The older Macmillan looked like a man who had enjoyed a good youth but, as Alistair Horne's biography makes plain, the young Macmillan had a pretty terrible time of it; he looked like a man who had early and purposefully set himself on the path to political power – but Macmillan was by his mid-forties a political outsider, poised uneasily on the leftish fringes of the Conservative Party.

Harold Macmillan was, in old age, one of the last Edwardians, for his childhood and early youth had been over when the Great War began. But an upper-class Edwardian upbringing could encompass very different attitudes and experiences. For a Duff Cooper and other members of the faster set it could mean an easy hedonism chafing at decaying social restrictions, while for the earnest Macmillan it retained a high Victorian flavour as he went through his religious crisis and, under the influence of his tutor, Ronald Know, agonised over whether to leave the Church for Rome or, as he put it, 'to Pope'. A rather lonely adolescence was dominated by his mother, a formidable American matriarch, who invested great expectations in him. Oxford provided a golden interlude with friendships, success in the Union and a First in 'Mods'; but then, abruptly, came the war.

His mother pulled strings, first to get him into action with the Grenadier Guards and then to rescue him from the consequences, by getting the badly wounded soldier removed to a private hospital when he lay near to death. A further deft tug by Mrs Macmillan took her son to Canada as A.D.C. to the Duke of Devonshire, who was then Governor-General. An advantageous marriage to Lady Dorothy Cavendish followed ('Well, books is better than beer' the Duke, who already had a brewer as a son-in-law, is supposed to have said) and, with the family publishing business providing wealth and a ready-made career, the young Macmillan could look forward with confidence to the post-war world.

The 'twenties and 'thirties were not, however, to be a happy period for Macmillan. Indeed, if this first volume of biography had ended in 1939 it would have largely been a tale of failure and frustration. Entering parliament as M.P. for Stockton-on-Tees in 1924 he had done little before the outbreak of World War II to suggest

that he would be a prime minister. He had made a political mark, but it was as a maverick, at odds with his party leadership on both domestic and foreign policy; it was not Hitler, Stalin or even Clement Attlee who was burnt in effigy on the Guy Fawkes's Day bonfire of the Macmillan family in 1939 but Neville Chamberlain.

Nor could domestic felicity console him for lack of political advancement. That Lady Dorothy and Robert Boothby were lovers had long been known; but Alistair Horne gives us the facts which constitute an essential part of Macmillan's biography on account of the effect this long-lasting affair had upon him. In any period the marriage of a young man with a low sex drive to a normally sensual female would have been likely to have been a failure. In our time there would have been a divorce, but in the inter-war period a divorce would have been a handicap to a political career and the vicariously ambitious Lady Dorothy put her influence against it. The compromise arrived at after 'the crash' of 1929, when the affair became known to Macmillan, resulted in the marriage continuing as a public charade while Lady Dorothy remained 'faithful to Bob'. It was a facsimile of those pre-1914 adjustments to unsatisfactory upper-class marriages by which affairs and unusual domestic arrangements were accepted provided public face was upheld; but somehow it fitted imperfectly into the hinterland of social and sexual mores that was the 'thirties and it caused Macmillan embarrassment and humiliation. The retention of the public marriage did, no doubt, help his political career, and Lady Dorothy, perhaps because she had given up so much for it, became as ruthless a proponent of Macmillan's political advancement as her mother-in-law. But it cannot be pretended that the arrangement was a domestic success and none of the Macmillan children, whether born of the marriage or, as in the daughter Sarah's case to Lady Dorothy and Robert Boothby, seems to have led a very happy life.

What was he, this younger Macmillan: a paternalistic Tory, a Whig or a near Socialist with his mania for planning and corporatism? The image assiduously propagated by himself is of a paternalist and a member of the lost generation, seared by his experience of the Great War and impressed by the post-war sufferings of his Stockton constituents; he who sought a middle way, a Keynesian way, betwixt capitalism and socialism, in which planning would boost employment and resolve class antagonism. There is no need to doubt the impact of the war, in which he fought so bravely and saw so many friends and comrades die; nor should we doubt his admiration for the working-class soldiers he commanded. The attachment to 'dear old Stockton' has probably been exaggerated. He was readier than he admitted in his autobiography to desert the North East constituency for a safer political haven; and it was his aristocratic wife rather than he

who enjoyed a real empathy with his constituents. His political views were the commonplace of a contemporary progressivism which doubted the efficiency of market forces and classical economics. The secular pessimism of a Tory was modified and perhaps contradicted by a confidence in the nostrums of planning which verged on the socialistic, while the search for the middle ground revealed the Whig opportunist.

We can now appreciate the relative success of the National Government leaders who presided over Britain during the 'thirties: the British economy weathered the Depression well and society proved remarkably cohesive. It is perhaps less easy for us to appreciate the impatience of those who were convinced that there were better, easier and more dynamic ways. Macmillan was, after all, an admirer of Lloyd George and of Winston Churchill, the very dynamic forces which had been replaced by the cautious conservatism of Baldwin and Chamberlain.

Alistair Horne does not, however, leave us with Macmillan the errant backbencher far from political power, but takes us on to 1956 and the early days of premiership. The greater part of the book describes the extraordinary transformation in his fortunes that came after Churchill replaced Chamberlain as prime minister. The events of 1940 made for spectacular changes of fortunes within the Conservative Party. Macmillan had supported Churchill's critique of foreign policy and opposition to Appeasement. He was not among the 'Guilty Men' and was to gain from the post-war re-writing of the history of the 'thirties, by which the social and economic policies of the previous leadership were discredited along with its foreign policy. He was to rise on the coat-tails of Churchill as the great outsider brought in other outsiders.

Macmillan was never close to Churchill, who seems to have regarded him as reliable but a bit of a bore. But it was Churchill who gave him the two appointments which brought him close enough to the centre of power to be in a position to succeed Sir Anthony Eden in the aftermath of Suez. Neither of these appointments, that of Minister Resident in Algiers in 1942 and that of Minister of Housing in 1951, seemed glittering prizes at the time; but they turned out to be the significant stages in his advancement. The former gave him 'a good war', with the role of expatriate minister moving forward with the allied armies in the Mediterranean sector. The unusual post took him to the centre of inter-allied diplomacy and strategy, enabled him to demonstrate his skill and tact in dealing with such heavy-weights as Eisenhower and De Gaulle, and retained for him a personal line to Churchill with the corollary of the enduring enmity of Eden. By the end of the war Macmillan was within the inner circle of the Conservative leadership and in line for a major cabinet post when the party returned to power in 1951. His appointment as Minister for Housing was not welcome to him, but it turned out to be a magnificent gift. Happy the minister who is given a clear and straightforward task, to which the cabinet is prepared to allocate the

necessary resources. The Government had committed itself to solving the housing crisis by building 300,000 houses. The resources were provided and, with the aid of his non-commissioned officer Ernest Marples, Macmillan saw that they were built. Whether this was a wise use of limited resources, considering the demands of industry and defence, may be doubted; but all those houses were to loom large in Conservative propaganda at the 1955 election and the minister responsible gained considerable kudos. By 1956 Macmillan had been, in quick succession, Minister of Defence, Foreign Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had the requisite experience to challenge and defeat Eden's 'natural' successor R. A. Butler, as a confused and demoralised party sought a new prime minister after Eden's resignation.

Alistair Horne concludes this volume with his subject transformed not merely in fortune but apparently in personality. The mannerisms and affectations of the elder statesman are already there. Age becomes him well; indeed he cultivates the air of one older than he is: the detachment of the man who has seen it all, the Edwardian wit with the throw-away lines and the hooded eyes, the old Greek who can still teach the Romans a thing or two. How did he do it? How did he overtake contemporaries who a few years before seemed better placed? More dogged application than he would have cared to admit and quite a lot of luck; but then there's always luck.

There are usually a few skeletons in the cupboard as well. Alistair Horne does his best to put one back and succeeds to some degree. It is clear from his account that Macmillan's personal responsibility for the forcible repatriation of Cossacks and other members of Axis military units to the Soviet Union and the Yugoslavian Titoists has been exaggerated. The whole question of the repatriation of foreign nationals who had been fighting on Germany's side has to be seen in the context of the confusion of the closing stages of a bitter war, the misguided enthusiasm for the Soviet ally and fears for the fate of British POWs in Soviet hands. The Yalta agreement itself and its interpretation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were more responsible than one minion. Yet the repatriation remains a barbaric act, and, if Macmillan played a part in a ghastly muddle rather than a conspiracy, his interpretation of his orders and his definition of citizenship were calculated to satisfy the demands of the Russians and Titoists. He knew that, 'to hand them over to the Russians is condemning them to slavery, torture and probably death'.

But if Horne does something to rebutt the wilder charges against Macmillan over the Cossack repatriation, he exposes his performance during the Suez crises as a combination of bad advice with loss of nerve. The man who was supposed to understand the Americans failed to comprehend the paralysis that falls over American foreign policy in the year of a presidential election. The Greek failed to understand the mores of the Romans and gave Eden the impression

that he could count on American support. He who had been prominent among those who favoured military action became foremost among those who wanted it called off when American support was not forthcoming - 'first in, first out'. Butler, who had at least been consistent in his opposition, had, as Eden's deputy, to endure the obloquy of the party as he stood in for the ill and absent Eden in the aftermath of the crisis. It was therefore Macmillan who became prime minister. He had flapped but he contrived to look unflappable. He destroyed his diaries for the period 4 October 1956 to 3 February 1957.

Horne's is an official biography, and he is sympathetic to the subject by whom he was chosen for his task and with whom he spent many hours of conversation. The book is, however, far from hagiographic and, if future writers may deal more harshly with Macmillan and ask different questions about his motivations, they will be indebted to Horne's considerable achievement.

ETHICAL NATIONALISM

Barbara Day

Intellectuals and the Future in the Habsburg Monarchy 1890-1914, edited by László Péter and Robert B. Pynsent, Macmillan Press, 1988, 196pp., £29.50 (ISBN 0-333-444129-X).

Whose future? Although never explicitly answered, the question is relevant to the Introduction by László Péter and Robert Pynsent, with its references to '...the present... when a "decadent" liberal education is forced by narrow fiscal utilitarian attitudes to fight against microchip technology'. The intellectuals of the title were of course primarily concerned with their own present - with a society where traditional structures were disintegrating, where money and the ability to make and spend it had superseded ethical values. 'A writer who strives to express his awareness of the decay surrounding him is necessarily a critic of contemporary life...', the editors write. 'Only on criticism could any future be based. ... [the intellectuals'] rejection of the social order was based on a moral and aesthetic idealism.'

At that time, one way of rejecting the materialist society was to blame the decay on Vienna, and to see the preservation of the native culture as a moral lodestone. After 1918, it seemed to the politicians of the states with a non-German majority that the future now belonged to those who had fought for a national identity and a national state. It was they who were to shape twentieth-century Europe.

The view taken by Péter and Pynsent is that the ambitions of the Nationalists were illusory and unhistorical. The artists and intellectuals of the essays in this collection are largely those who suspected Nationalism of belonging to old, unthought-out, easily-held beliefs, and whose ideas really were instrumental in shaping the patterns of thought in post-war Europe. The future for them lay in questioning, in probing the established order, and in seeking a 'new perception of the self'. Influenced by Nietzsche - but also by the atmosphere of thought of which Nietzsche was a part - they rebelled against 'institutionalised mediocrity', and by striving 'to understand individual human identity' they rejected 'the levelling inherent in a society guided by technological success'. Although they were all subjects of the Habsburgs, their origins were various. The editors observe that whereas 'Vienna 1990' has become as much of an area for scholarly publication in Anglophone countries as the Italian Renaissance - '...Contemporaneous cultural activity in Budapest, Cracow and Prague has been largely neglected.' The names of Klimt, Schnitzler and Freud have international resonances absent from those of Karásek, Schikaneder or Justh. By juxtaposing the well-known Austrians and the lesser-known Hungarians, Poles and Czechs, the editors demonstrate that the intellectual response to a society of lost values and principles was European and not solely 'Viennese'.

There are nine contributors to the book, their subjects ranging from Freud and Klimt to the Hungarian writer Zsigmond Justh (an aristocratic landowner who revered the vigour of the Magyar peasant) and the tormented Polish 'prophet' and 'meteor' Stanislaw Przybyszewski. Probably the most accessible contribution - at least for the *Salisbury Review* reader with an interest in Central Europe - is Karel Brušák's essay on 'The Meaning of Czech History: Pekař versus Masaryk'.

Masaryk is remembered by Anglo-Saxons as the venerable first President of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the upholder of democracy and, following the Communist victory of 1948, the icon of resistance to Marxist ideology. With the virtual extinction of communist idealism in the seventies and eighties, the democratic opposition has devoted more weight and critical analysis to Masaryk's ideas. Simultaneously, samizdat historiography has called its readers' attention to the work of the historian Josef Pekař, unpublished in contemporary Czechoslovakia (where some at least of Masaryk's writings are still available).

Pekař's writings may be difficult to obtain in Czechoslovakia; in the West they are virtually unknown, and there are no English translations. (Some of his writings have been translated into German and French.) Karel Brušák's essay is both an introduction to Pekař's work and an examination of the conflict between the two schools of thought. Pekař (1870-1937) was made lecturer in history at the Charles University in Prague at the turn of the century, when the Czechs were newly confident in their technological and cultural achievements. The school of history in which Pekař was

trained gave him an empirical basis from which to challenge the romanticization of Bohemian history propagated during the National Revival. He was conservative in his approach towards both politics and culture, believing that the right place for Bohemia was within a federalised Austria. His writings, at first little known outside academic circles, amounted to a re-evaluation of much of Bohemian history.

The differences of opinion between Pekař and Masaryk first unfolded in 1912, with the publication of Pekař's analysis of Masaryk's views on Czech history. Masaryk's belief, originally expounded in *The Czech Question* (1895), was that the Czech nineteenth-century National Revival was linked with the Czech Reformation through the common ideal of 'humanitism' (*humanitismus*), and that this 'humanitism' must become the guideline for all future thought and action. The debate, interrupted by the 1914-18 war and the establishment of the First Republic, was resumed in the late twenties. In *Masaryk's Czech Philosophy* (1927), which Brušák summarises, Pekař refuted the assumptions of Masaryk's vague 'humanitism', criticising it for its confusion of the medieval ideals of Hussitism and of the Czech Brethren with Herder's eighteenth-century rationalism. He denied that the Hussite movement and the Unity of Czech Brethren were specifically 'Czech' in spirit, or that they represented a moral struggle for social and political equality.

In Pekař's eyes Masaryk's greatest error was to concentrate on the Reformation and the National Revival without considering the span of Czech history. Pekař, by methodical study, had noted that from the tenth century the characteristic feature of Czech history had been the awareness of belonging to one nation. He maintained Masaryk to be wrong in contending that national consciousness arose out of 'humanitism'; in reality, it was Czech nationalism that over the centuries had become more cultured - more 'humane'; except for periods of isolation, when it had relapsed into barbarism.

Brušák notes that Pekař overlooked one relevant observation: Masaryk's very ambition to provide the Czech nation with a meaningful interpretation of history was an example of that same nationalism which Pekař recognised as the driving force in Czech history. It could be said that in the end Pekař was in agreement with Masaryk, in that the question was ethical - one that concerned above all the truth. In his lecture *The Meaning of Czech History* (1929) Pekař distinguished between two types of nationalism: one which is a manifestation of the best qualities of the nation, and through which it can achieve humanity; and a second, which leads to hatred and barbarism, even when initially inspired by ethical precepts.

Pekař's contemporaries, the Czech Decadent writers Arnost Procházka and Jirí Karásek ze Lvovic, are Robert Pynsent's chosen subjects. They too rejected pseudo-patriotism and the romanticization of history, which they saw as ensuing from a sense of national inferiority.

In Prague today, young people, in many cases scarcely knowing what they are calling for, are chanting 'Masaryk', 'democracy', 'freedom' and taunting the police with shouts of 'You're not Czechs'. Nationalism has been adopted by a new generation. With wagers being laid there on how long the Communists will stay in power, history is felt to be on the move in a way that in this country we rarely experience (perhaps because here it is on the move continuously). Among the few who have access to Pekař's work, there are those who recognise that his scrupulous attention to truth and accuracy in the study of Czech history is a matter not only of academic scholarship but of immediate ethical concern, for both the individual and the nation.

NEW FOLLIES FOR OLD

Stanislav Andreski

The Undoing of Thought, (La Defaite de la Pensée) Alain Finkielkraut - translated by Dennis O'Keeffe, The Claridge Press, London and Lexington, 1988, 132pp., £6.95.

To appreciate the merits of this well written and translated book one must disregard the discrepancy between its reasonably limited scope and its title - *La défaite de la pensée* - which might lead one to expect a survey of the general trend of intellectual history during the last two hundred years. This would be a gigantic task, and the conclusion implied by the title would be manifestly false because it was during this time that human thought achieved unprecedented triumphs. Even in the study of society - where progress is far less obvious than in the natural sciences and technology - it would be absurd to maintain that nothing has been added to our knowledge since Montesquieu. Perhaps even more preposterous is the title of Part One - The Roots of Human Mind - which deals only with certain views of a few political thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries.

The author discusses the intellectual antecedents of nationalism in the writings of Herder, Goethe, Joseph de Maistre, Renan and Fustel de Coulanges. With considerable perspicacity he shows the illogicalities and tacit implications of their ideas and how they often twisted the arguments to suit their preferences or passions. This part falls within the usual boundaries of intellectual history, as it deals with figures of real intellectual substance. We meet no such figures in the rest of the book, which exposes fashionable follies promoted by international bureaucrats and politicking pseudo-intellectuals.

Under a more appropriate heading 'Generous Betrayal' the author shows how UNESCO has abandoned its original objective of 'assuring to all, full and equal access to education, the free pursuit of objective truth and the free exchange of ideas and knowledge.'

What had begun as a critique of fanaticism turned into a critique of Enlightenment-style thinking... It meant taking care that no timeless or universalising critique must be allowed to disturb the cult of time-honoured prejudices. In sum, the spirit of the herd must prevail over all other spirits.

Part Three shows the inconsistencies of multiculturalism for internal consumption.

It is contradictory to preach, simultaneously, the virtues of universal communication and the unique, inexplicable character of particular cultures. It is not reasonable, having attached the French to their country by the sole bonds of an affective memory, to people France with men and women who have no access to that national memory, and who, indeed, have nothing much in common except that they are excluded from it. There is an insurmountable contradiction in seeking to found hospitality on the attachment to cultural roots...

The multi-culturalists, in their anxiety to make the Old World hospitable to outsiders, quite consciously broke its spirit; and as a result, Europe has no attractions save its prosperity.

We are afraid of offending the immigrants, so we identify them entirely with their historical and cultural provenance. In order that they be free to live as it suits them, they are refused protection against the malpractice or contingent abuses of the traditions to which they belong.

Relativism was a product of the anti-colonial struggle; but it ends up as a hymn to servitude.

Agreeing with the author's judgement of 'multiculturalism', I can add a few illustrations of its absurdity. The most obvious point is that the principle of equal value of all cultures is applied one-sidedly to suit the multiculturalists. They tell us that we must not object to the subjection of women in Islamic countries or female circumcision in tropical Africa but we must condemn apartheid, which is a part of the culture of white South Africans. The multiculturalists tell us that immigrants into Britain must be allowed to keep their cultures but that the indigenous Britons must modify theirs to accommodate them. Why?

The most absurd of all is the combination of feminism with multiculturalism, since the idea of equal rights for men and women is an invention of modern Western Civilisation. Even when they still had neither the vote nor equal rights in the disposal of property or divorce (not to speak of an access to better paid occupations) women had a much higher status in Europe than anywhere else in the world. Nowhere else did men let them pass through the door first, give them their seats or bow to them. A disapproval of the subjection of

women has spread to other cultures only to the extent to which they have been westernized.

The same jet-setters, who talk about the equal value of all cultures, advocate development and modernization. This is illogical: if all ways of life (that is cultures) are equally good, then why try to make some more like the others? In reality, of course, the vast majority of the inhabitants of the poor tropical countries blindly imitate the material and external aspects of the Western civilisation, even when they are completely unsuited to the hot climate - like jackets, collars and ties.

My last addition in support of Finkelkraut's adverse judgement on multiculturalism is that the concept of a multicultural nation is self-contradictory since the sentiment of national solidarity rests upon the feeling of belonging together and of sharing fundamental values - that is the sense of a common culture. You can have a multicultural population but not a multicultural nation.

The notion of equal worth of all cultures - which implies that none of their constituents must be judged as inferior to something else - is, according to our author, connected with the abandonment of standards in education, literature and the arts.

The person who is regarded as elitist (and therefore intolerable) is not the one who would withhold culture from people but the one who would deny the label 'cultural' to any pastime... Today there is no more truth or falsehood, no stereotype or innovation, no beauty or ugliness, but only an infinite array of pleasures, all different and all equal.

...for fear of being tainted with elitism or with failing to meet the elementary requirements of the democratic outlook, your intellectual abases himself before the power-hungry world of show-business, or fashion, or advertising. The extraordinarily rapid transformation of ministers of cultural affairs into administrators concerned with entertainment as such, passes without comment.

The book offers no evidence to support the diagnosis. It fits well many of today's trends but it cannot, in my opinion, be accepted as the general assessment of the present situation. Not everything written nowadays is rubbish. Even on television there are good things, despite the mounds of rubbish. Nor was there a lack of cultural rubbish in former times. The author does not make it clear what he is comparing and where he locates the onset of the decline he claims to have discerned. If he takes it to be the 18th century, then he is wrong. True, it produced Bach, Kant, Lavoisier, Adam Smith and Montesquieu; but the most popular literature was about the misdeeds of witches, which prompted the burning of these unfortunates: hardly a better influence than that of the horror videos of today. If we take 50 years ago as the starting point, then a comparison suggests progress rather than decline, as that was the time of a resurgence of barbarism in

Europe.

Like our author, I deplore the fact that the wonders of communication technology are used to turn the masses into anti-social cretins. But the farthest I would go with him in cultural pessimism would be to agree that outside the exact sciences and technology, progress is open to doubt: that old vices and follies have been replaced by new. However, neither in my lifetime nor in history do I perceive a lost Golden Age. It is philistine to assume that the latest must always be the best, but one can fall into an unwarranted pessimism by taking the great works of the past as representing the general level, and then comparing them with what is merely fashionable today. At the beginning of the book we find such names as Montesquieu and Voltaire, while at the end we read about Claude Lévi-Strauss and Régis Debray.

ANGUISHED DIAGNOSIS

David Dale

The Shaking of the Foundations: Family & Society, by Ronald Fletcher, Routledge, 1988, £11.95, (pbk) (ISBN 0-415-008743).

The Abolitionist: The Family & Marriage Under Attack, by Ronald Fletcher, Routledge, 1988, £8.95, (pbk) (ISBN 0-415-00875-1).

About two thirds of the way through the first of these books, one begins to worry that Ronald Fletcher may not, after all, be quite sure which foundations are being shaken nor even what they are being shaken by. The worries prove to be unnecessary but when all is revealed - when, that is, Professor Fletcher finally explains what it is that is troubling him (and he is a deeply troubled man) - the result is a disappointment. After so many portentous pages is this really all?

Professor Fletcher is an authority on the family. Twenty-five years ago, in a book called *The Family and Marriage in Britain*, he presented a splendid defence of the family against its contemporary critics and in Part One of *The Shaking of the Foundations* he returns to the fray. Using the 1969 Divorce Reform Act (the Act which radically changed the grounds for divorce and which was followed by a massive increase in the divorce rate) as the base-line, he seeks to assess the strength of the family today and of the institution built upon it, marriage.

Using statistical evidence, Fletcher has, again, produced a first rate piece of empirical sociology. Objective, comprehensive and convincing, he demonstrates that

'there is no doubt whatever that *the family* is not only what the great majority of the people of Britain actively *want*, it is also what, in fact, they actually *have*'. Virtually nothing is left unexamined; divorce, re-divorce, duration of marriage, single-parent families, illegitimacy, second marriages, adoption, the changing expectations of women (the main factor in the higher divorce rate), and much more. That is Part One; were it to be published on its own it would doubtless become a major reference work.

Unfortunately, Professor Fletcher wants to go further, a lot further in fact, and in Part Two the dispassionate social scientist is replaced, first by the troubled observer of some insidious but elusive social malaise and, towards the end, by a sort of sociological version of Private Eye's Sir Bufton Tufton.

There is, he senses, a deep feeling of unease within society. 'Somehow, everyone feels, something, somewhere, has gone wrong.' We have become demoralised and apprehensive; we are in the midst of a moral crisis. Now, the popular explanation for this crisis is a breakdown in the family institution. But, as he has amply demonstrated in the first part of the book, no such breakdown has occurred. What, then, *is* the nature of the crisis?

For several chapters, an anguished Professor Fletcher wrings his hands around the edge of the malaise. The debilitating consequences of welfarism, war, a decline in the quality of human relationships, these and other weighty concerns are all touched upon but always something more profound is promised. Then suddenly, just as the doubts begin to nag, out it all spews, like a risen gorge, onto the page. A small sample: homosexual vicars; 1960's mini-skirts; 'immediate-open-mouth kissing' on the cinema screen; 'slicked-back hair-styles'; the Westland affair; gang-fights; Jeremy Thorpe; 'a proliferation of guitar-playing groups'; T. Dan Smith; punks with safety-pins in their noses; the use of the word 'gay' instead of 'pervert, poofter and nancy-boy'; swearing 'including one of the most unmentionable four letter words of all - fuck'; glossy magazines with 'provocatively nude women presenting their large round buttocks', the lampooning of Lord Longford. The list goes on for several pages.

These, it seems, are what are shaking society's foundations. And the cause of it all? Well, quite a few things really, including the poor quality of modern child play, but mainly a 'crisis of communication', a term which turns out to mean, if effect, too much telly.

One picks up the companion volume, *The Abolitionist*, with less enthusiasm. It is not that one necessarily disagrees with what Professor Fletcher has to say, (indeed, some of it, especially those frustratingly brief sections which touch on anthropological considerations, is of great interest) but rather that so much of it turns out to be too commonplace to be able to disagree. His second book examines the arguments put forward by critics of the family and it, too, is idiosyncratic. The 'abolitionists' include the anthropologist Edmund Leach, various Marxists including Marx

himself, and a clutch of feminists. Its idiosyncrasy lies mainly in its choice of subjects. Many pages are devoted to the work of Germaine Greer, for example, but Greer is very untypical of modern feminism. Similarly, the 'anti-psychiatry' triumvirate of Laing, Cooper and Esterson was fashionable two decades ago but receives little attention today. (It is also idiosyncratic in its startling - because so unexpected - inclusion of several bits of pornography).

Professor Fletcher's treatment of the work of individual abolitionists is always judicious but one is left with the impression that the full force of the abolitionist cause has been missed. For example, there is no mention of writers like Mary Daly or Andrea Dworkin who represent an influential strand of modern anti-family feminism.

Those who wish to understand the state of the modern British family are advised to read part one of *The Shaking of the Foundations*. Most of the rest, sadly, is rather unsatisfying.

TRUSTING OUR SENSES

Edward Levy

The Element of Fire: Science, Art and the Human World, Anthony O'Hear, Routledge, 1988, £19.95, ISBN 0-415-00618-X.

Anthony O'Hear takes his title from John Donne's 'The First Anniversarie', the passage in question also being one of the book's epigraphs:

And new philosophy calls all in doubt
The element of fire is quite put out;
The Sun is lost, and th'earth, and no man's wit,
Can well direct him, where to look for it. . .

The crisis began in Donne's century, and his verses summon up another lament, not cited by the author, voiced by Donne's contemporary Hamlet. The prince complains to his ex-university chums that:

. . . indeed it goes so heavily with my disposition that this goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory, this most excellent canopy the air, look you, this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire, why it appears no other thing to me than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours.

As for man himself, he has been eclipsed in Hamlet's mind to a 'quintessence of dust'.

It would seem, then, that extreme scientific rationalism and psychological despair, allied to a sense of an outraged moral and social order, bring us to the same pass - to a similarly reductive account of things. And not the least victim is Donne's 'element of fire' or the 'golden fire' which formerly lit Hamlet's heavens.

Professor O'Hear sets things to right in his vindication of the world as it is commonly apprehended by the five senses, and of the validity of these senses working with the critical intelligence as chroniclers of human existence. He champions artistic endeavour as a legitimate and, for man, the supreme activity not only for his spiritual sustenance, but for an understanding of his nature and place in the world; and he corrects the imbalance produced by the pretensions of a too absolutist scientific, or else pseudo-scientific, rationalism which has had a pernicious influence on aesthetic and social thinking. O'Hear's approach is not the defiance of 'anti-science' artists such as Blake or Yeats: he pays tribute to the exemplary spirit of modesty and collaboration in the scientific world and acknowledges the great scientific achievements as part of our cultural tradition; and he follows a sober and scrupulously reasoned argument in re-instating the authority of 'the manifest world' of form and colour from which we draw sustenance, knowledge and value. O'Hear holds the philosophy chair at the University of Bradford, and his philosophical training serves him well here.

It is apt that his argument begins with what Hamlet called 'this most excellent canopy' and is informed throughout by a commitment to man as more than a 'quintessence of dust'. In the century of relativity and quantum physics, our notion of time and perceptions of space, colour and form have been brought into question, and the author justly opens his argument by examining what we do know of the unknown from our experience of it when we look up at the sky. His conclusion is that there can be no alternative to an appearance characterised by space, form and colour, no matter where one might be in the universe; that a scientific rationalism which belittles our perception is itself perception-dependent and relativistic, though it may finish in a conceptualism more ambitious but more contestable than the experience of the five senses. O'Hear's argument is impressive as much for the carefully piloted journey on which he takes us as for the arrival itself.

Central too is the author's emphasis on a co-operation between the 'manifest world' which he has vindicated and human subjects sharing common perceptual faculties and able therefore to create shared communicative languages, not least through and for artistic works. Such a co-operation has implications for the character of a just human society, and in contrast to it, O'Hear challenges the pretensions of revolutionary iconoclasm in politics and aesthetics as contrary to our spontaneous relations with each other and with the natural world. There is, he implies, a kinship between an isolated subjectivity which ignores the traditional values of cooperation and the pseudo-scientific totalitarian reduction of men to masses divorced from value and identity.

O'Hear's discussion of various artistic fields is more uneven. Here he ranges widely but not wisely, and on occasion not deeply enough. He underestimates the

arts of photography and the cinema, oversimplifies Expressionism and pays little or no attention to artisan activity. The Leavisite echoes I find limiting, and one or two remarks are surprisingly slack in an otherwise rigorous essay. Why, for example, the ambiguous qualification in this acknowledgment:

...in the visual arts, Moore and Sutherland, and, in their own ways, Picasso and Matisse?

(Perhaps O'Hear did not intend a back-handed compliment to the two continental painters, but it does sound like one). Again this Leavisite tribute to two major writers nevertheless reminds one of how repetitive Leavis's own references sound after a time:

...and many figures, of course, of whom we need perhaps mention only Lawrence and Eliot.

Luckily, O'Hear mentions many more: his discussion of metaphor is acute and his architectural observations reflect a personal passion and capacity for contemplation always welcome, but not always present, when reading aesthetics. Above all, O'Hear's key citations from Rilke, Proust and Nietzsche give his argument authority and resonance. They confirm man's physical and spiritual dependence on the 'manifest world', his anxiety at the threat that it may be denied him by whatever powers, and his stubborn insistence through art on the value born of his collaboration with the world as apprehended by the senses. Editorial space does not allow me to quote these passages, but I am consoled by the hope that the reader will go to Professor O'Hear's book to find them.

ANGLICAN DISORDERS

Roger Watson

Graham Leonard, Bishop of London, John S. Peart-Binns, Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd. 1988, 262pp., £12.95. (0-232-51746-0).

To The Church of England, Gareth Bennet, Churchman Publishing, 1988, 256pp., £5.95. (1-85093-110-0).

Both these volumes are highly pertinent for anyone with more than a passing interest in the historical and contemporary situation - which some would describe as a 'crisis' - in the Anglican Church.

Gareth Bennet seems to have led an unremarkable life though he suffered a tragically remarkable death in circumstances which must be familiar to most Anglicans and other Christians in Britain. *To The Church of England* reveals a writer of considerable talent, with much more to offer than 'The Crockford's Preface', and a theologian with an acute knowledge of the history of his Church. There is a disarming honesty in his analysis of many of the events, viewed through a character like Luther and groups such as the Latitudin-

arians, which have shaped the Anglican Church over the centuries. Issues of immense importance to the formation of the church, namely the relationship between Church and State and the role of the Clergy, are tackled forthrightly and the historical article entitled 'The Englishman's View of the Clergy' is tinged with regret at what was lost by the Church in England when it became the Church of England. Bennet's thesis, on this point, is that the Church lost its erstwhile respect from and intimacy with the common people. Nevertheless Bennet was obviously intellectually as well as spiritually a committed Anglican, and his concern for the rôle of the Anglican Church in the life of the nation undoubtedly inspired his pungent and controversial preface to *Crockford's Clerical Directory*. The piece in question is reproduced, in full, in the present volume. It is well worth reading in its entirety, although it is one of the least interesting chapters of *To The Church of England*. Gareth Bennet saw clearly one of the main weaknesses in the Anglican Communion which could be exploited by the liberals. A decision taken out of necessity by one small section in some far flung corner of what used to be the British Empire could subsequently be used in an effort to bring the whole Church into line. The ordination of women priests in Hong Kong is a perfect example of the above. At the time of writing the preface the Lambeth Conference was still in the future and Bennet astutely commented that 'no one should underestimate the capacity of a Lambeth Conference to take its real decisions by doing nothing'. In retrospect, it would have been interesting to see what he made of the proceedings of the 1988 Conference.

Notwithstanding his awareness of the critical situation facing the Anglican Church, particularly at the ecumenical fringes, Bennet appears almost naive in his analysis of contemporary ecumenical movements. His apparent naivety is displayed through the fact that he gives these movements and their deliberations serious theological consideration. This could have been a ploy to ensure that the dangers inherent in many such bodies came to the attention of the hierarchy of the Anglican Church. It is hard to believe, given his analysis of other issues, that Bennet did not see that the majority of such movements, and particularly the politically leftward World Council of Churches, while possibly being founded with worthy motives and by sound individuals, are currently at the forefront of a wider movement to undermine both the spiritual and temporal orders.

Unlike Bennet, the subject of John Peart-Binns' highly sympathetic biography of the man he describes as being 'sociable but self-sufficient' has always been at the forefront of controversy and conflict. While not coming from an Anglo-Catholic background, Graham Leonard has now earned himself the title of the 'Lefebvre of the Anglican Church'. Above all else the Leonard biography reveals an extremely hard-working man of immense energy. His career in the Church of England has given him wide experience in many

aspects of the work of an ordained priest. He threw himself with real enthusiasm into pastoral work and with equal enthusiasm into his pivotal work in Christian Education.

Leonard takes the issue of unity between Christians very seriously. So seriously that he has rather 'jumped the gun' in some suggestions for inter communion with other denominations including Roman Catholics. He was particularly involved in Anglican/Methodist unity talks, but not so involved or blinded by the issue that he sought to compromise on fundamental issues of Christian doctrine. Time and again he appears to have produced minority reports in this vein, to the great irritation of those with whom he has been involved. More than once he has pointed out that if the fundamental issues which divide denominations are not tackled then those very issues which are being minimised will ultimately lead to further division.

Perhaps the most absorbing chapters of *Graham Leonard* are those on his selection as the Bishop of London. They are absorbing for two reasons. First because they deal in depth with his Anglo-Catholic convictions and secondly because they exemplify the highly political process of selecting bishops for the Church of England. Whether or not God works in mysterious ways, He would certainly appear to work through mysterious people. The author, however, reveals either his own prejudice, or else ignorance of Roman Catholic teaching; for it is hard to believe that an intelligent man like Leonard would not understand the teaching of indulgences, even if he 'thinks the concept nonsense'. The Pope does not believe himself to be 'infallible in all things' as is asserted by Peart-Binns.

There are some similarities between the 'Lefebvre affair', which recently came to a head in the Roman

Catholic Church, and the 'Tulsa affair' whereby Leonard has threatened to bring an outlawed American Anglican group into communion with the Anglican Church against the wishes of local Bishops. He has also made his services available for some confirmations which were widely reported in Britain. The main difference between the two 'affairs' is that, fortunately, there has been a characteristic display of indecision by the Church of England over any debate or discipline on the issue and Leonard remains Bishop of London. In common with other chapters of the book, the events are supported by substantial quotes from Leonard's personal correspondence, giving the reader an insight into his determination and clarity of thought on the issues concerned.

The two volumes reviewed here 'dovetail' neatly on the issue of the 'Crockford's Preface' for, indeed, Leonard was one of Bennet's subjects. Despite a forthright swipe at his 'popish' ways, Leonard was highly pleased with his appearance in the preface and it is thought that this could have led to a reconciliation between himself and Bennet. They became deeply divided over the 'Tulsa affair'. In another way, the two volumes are complementary. Bennet's writings display his supporting rôle in analysing current and historical Church of England affairs. Peart-Binns' biography, on the other hand, gives an 'action packed' account of the life of one of the men at the 'frontline'. It is ironic that the man who has taken all the risks and provoked the ensuing unpopularity of the 'liberal establishment' is still fighting and capturing the limelight. The other, who dared to expose from a position of considerable authority, the weakness and malleability of the current hierarchy of his church, and who did so anonymously, appeared unable to face the consequences of his actions.

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Ciarán ÓMaoláin, *The Radical Right: A World Directory*, Keesing's Reference Publications, Longman, 0 582 90270 3, 500 pp., £45.

Keesing's Record of World Events has, according to Longman, its publishers, 'an unrivalled reputation for accuracy and impartiality'. No doubt it was pride in this reputation that led to the choice of Ciarán ÓMaoláin as editor of this Directory. For ÓMaoláin, whose claims to political expertise derive from a spell at Portsmouth Polytechnic and a connection with Sinn Féin, the Workers' Party, has produced a work that rivals in its impartiality anything produced by the Novosti Press in Moscow. He acknowledges the help of Maurice Ludmer, communist editor of *Searchlight*, to which scurrilous rag he has had frequent recourse for his 'information'. The book goes alphabetically through the countries of the world, beginning with Afghanistan - which 'has had to rely heavily on Soviet military and economic support' against 'Muslim fundamentalist tribesmen'. Typical of the book's political sketches is that of Hungary - 'stable and peaceful since the suppression by Soviet and Hungarian forces of civil disturbances in 1956' - and Poland, a 'socialist republic' whose 'parliament' is elected by 'universal suffrage'.

According to Keesing's Directory the 'radical right' includes all 'anti-communist' movements, and therefore all those victims of communism (including social democrats) who have tried to organise resistance in exile. In this one can see an interesting return to the 'social fascist' label of the nineteen thirties. The Directory also supposes that the spiritual, and political condition of the 'radical right' is most apparent in such ghastly excrescences as the National Front, and it contrives to give the impression that the citizens of communist countries are uniquely privileged in being free from such a menace. Perhaps it is to the credit of the *Salisbury Review* that it is given extensive dishonourable mention by ÓMaoláin. But it is scarcely to the credit of Longman - our former publisher - that it should lend its imprint to such shameless and mendacious propaganda.

(R.S.)

Geoffrey Blainey, *The Great Seesaw, a New View of the Western World, 1750-2000*, Macmillan, 0 333 46055 3, 355 pp.

Geoffrey Blainey, the Australian academic who has done more than anyone to justify his country and vindicate its history, is well known in Britain for his brilliant study of the *Causes of War*. A patient collector of facts, with a keen gift of synthesis, Blainey has proved himself more than a match for the Marxists and the Marxists who have made so much running in the universities down under. Now, after years of cultivated hesitation, he has succumbed to the historian's temptation, and produced his own typology of history: not a cycle this time, nor a Spenglerian

decline; neither endless progress nor perceived reform; no revolutions, neither of the old and glorious nor of the new and destructive variety. In place of all those schemata Blainey discerns, with a childlike homeliness, a great seesaw, as the Western world (which includes Australia) fluctuates from optimism to pessimism and back again. The motor of the seesaw is unclear: it is neither exclusively economic nor religious, nor cultural. It seems to derive from the totality of social forces, as enshrined in the attitudes and intentions of an educated class, endeavouring to take charge of human destiny and experiencing the exhilarating disappointments that attend the labours of finite beings.

The seesaw is more apparent, Blainey argues, in democracies than dictatorships, since it is in democracies that the contagion of ideas is most effective. Leaving aside that doubtful thesis (for it is, after all, Russia which has been the nursery of the great modern glooms and exultations), one may admire the skill with which Blainey fits his own favoured facts and fantasies into the scheme, generating as lively a sense of inevitability as ever afflicted the readers of Marx, Toynbee or Spengler. Nevertheless, is it really true, as he suggests, that our present mood of pessimism is nothing more than a return, after years of confidence, to the self-doubt of the romantics, who sought to recover through nature and its imagined nobility, the sense of community which civilisation denied them?

(R.S.)

Alfred Schüller, *Does Market Socialism Work?*, Centre for Research into Communist Economies, 2, Lord North Street, SW1, 0 948027 07 X, 71 pp., £4.

There are three stock socialist responses to the arguments for a market economy. The most popular is silence, followed by a renewed denunciation of the 'evils of capitalism'. Almost as popular is the scholastic sneer, accompanied by economic abracadabra of the kind practised by Marx. More rare, however, is the admission of the case for market distribution, accompanied by a theory as to how the market may be combined with socialist objectives. In so far as there is any *intellectual* tendency within modern socialism it is towards such a 'market socialism', and towards a reassessment of the arguments given in its favour by the followers of Oscar Lange.

Here is an important terrain where socialism may still be encountered, therefore, as an *intellectual* force; all thinking conservatives should do well to acquaint themselves with it, and with the powerful arguments that may here be mustered in their favour. Alfred Schüller's pamphlet lucidly presents the case against market socialism, showing that *all* state-sponsored restrictions on competition will produce insoluble problems of control and information, and that the actual evidence from existing 'market socialist' systems merely confirms what could have been predicted anyway.

(R.S.)

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