


The Salisbury Review

A quarterly magazine of conservative thought



The Third Marquess of Salisbury
1830-1903

<i>Post Mortem on the French Revolution</i>	A. L. Rowse
<i>The Soviet Green Offensive</i>	Michael Haselthine
<i>Culture and its Enemies: An Answer to J. L. Wilson</i>	Ian Small and Marcus Walsh
<i>Is Science Racist?</i>	Beverly Halstead
<i>Humburg and South Africa</i>	David Davies
<i>Them and Us</i>	George Marshall
<i>The Western Left and Eastern Europe</i>	Marek Matraszek
<i>The Moral and Occult Roots of Nazism</i>	Angela Ellis-Jones
<i>Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Life of Nature</i>	Anthony O'Hear
<i>In Our Power to Love or Hate</i>	David Pryce-Jones
<i>The Politics of Health: A Radical Assessment</i>	John Marks and Caroline Cox



The Clarendon Press

The Salisbury Review

*A quarterly magazine of
conservative thought*

*Editor Roger Scruton
Deputy Editor James de Candole
Literary Editor Ian Crowther*

*Editorial address and subscriptions:
The Claridge Press,
43 Queen's Gardens, London W2*

There is a certain 'character' to the politics of Europe, a character which is hard to define, and which finds expression in a variety of ways, but whose life and unity are always recognisable. Politics in the European tradition involves an openness to the complexity of human affairs, a disinclination to meddle where interests seek their natural equilibrium, and a desire for a legal and impartial solution to social conflicts. This conception of politics has spread across the world with the European diaspora: to Australia, to North and South America, to the Pacific fringes, and to Africa. And with it has spread the European conception of law, as the mediator between citizen and state, and the conscience of the body politic.

In only one part of Africa does this character now survive as a real political force, endeavouring, against growing odds, to maintain a rule of law and compromise in a continent where anarchy and violence are the norm. So greatly has South Africa offended the progressive conscience, however, that the rabble of opinion-makers now recognise only one possible view of it, condemning all others as unpardonable sins. In a courageous challenge to them, David Davies reminds us of the truths that have been conveniently forgotten by those who are now frantically at work to bring ruin to the last civilised country in a continent of darkness. It is hard to know what the word 'racism' means - and all the harder, as Beverley Halstead reminds us, to think objectively about the facts upon which this charge is habitually grounded. Yet surely there is *something* wrong (whether or not 'racism' is the appropriate word for it) with the liberal conscience which rages against the last law-guided government in Africa, merely because it refuses to extend the franchise to blacks, while ignoring the fact that wherever blacks have obtained the franchise, it has been cancelled at once in a stream of bloodshed. The supposition that blacks deserve no better fate is a difficult one to justify,

even for the liberal who thinks that each man should pursue his own idea of the good, without reference to the views of others.

One of the most important features of the European political character is its ability to correct its own mistakes. But even this ability can be submerged in the tumult of revolution. Only by a miracle did France recover from the disease described here (through the eyes of Walpole) by A. L. Rowse: and then only because Napoleon had resurrected the idea and the institutions of legality, and only because, having done so, he slept badly on the eve of Waterloo. And even if Europe recovered at last from the utopian follies of the Revolution, the ideas which inspired them - ideas attributed with some justice to Rousseau, and criticised in these pages by Anthony O'Hear - remain influential, having been launched again on the world by Marx and transformed into the perfect instrument of tyranny by Lenin. Lenin's admirer and successor, Mikhail Gorbachev, continues his successful efforts to deceive us. It is therefore useful to be reminded by Michael Heseltine that the European spirit, open as it is to question and compromise, can easily be captured by those who pretend to enter negotiations, while arguing from a position of absolute and non-negotiable power.

As Mr. Heseltine observes, the Greens, who are by no means innocent of utopian fervour, are ripe for conscription by the world's most 'progressive' power. The Soviet Union has survived not by its achievements (which are impressive only in the sphere of killing), but by its rhetoric, which captures the sympathy of those who feel thereafter 'alienated' from the surrounding system of power. The Greens are the latest incarnation of the spirit of 1789. Like the Jacobins they seek a reign of virtue in which the good will finally triumph. Such an attitude spells the end of the politics of compromise. Let us hope that, if the Greens do not come to their senses, the way will be found to make them submit to ours.

Contents

Post Mortem on the French Revolution <i>A. L. Rowse</i>	4
The Soviet Green Offensive <i>Michael Heseltine</i>	6
Culture and its Enemies: An Answer to J. L. Wilson <i>Ian Small & Marcus Walsh</i>	9
Is Science Racist? <i>Beverly Halstead</i>	11
Humbug and South Africa <i>David Davies</i>	16
Them and Us <i>George Martelli</i>	19
The Western Left and Eastern Europe <i>Marek Matraszek</i>	22
The Moral and Occult Roots of Nazism <i>Angela Ellis Jones</i>	25
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Life of Nature <i>Anthony O'Hear</i>	30
In Our Power to Love or Hate <i>David Pryce-Jones</i>	34
The Politics of Health: A Radical Assessment <i>John Marks & Caroline Cox</i>	40

Editorial	47
Letters	48
Notes on Contributors	49
Book Reviews	50
<i>Jessica Douglas-Home, Jonathan Savery, James McNamara, Helen Szamuely, David J. Levy, Vinay Lal</i>	
In Short	59

Subscription details

Published quarterly in September, December, March and June, volume commencing with September issue.

Annual subscription rates: £14, \$30 surface mail; single issues £4.00, \$7.50, ISSN: 0265-4881.

Copyright © The Claridge Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or other without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

Printed in the UK by Biddles Ltd.

Conservative Journals: *THE IDLER*

Canadian conservatism, like Canadian everything, is shy and softly spoken. Although Canada is able to return people who call themselves 'conservative' to Parliament, its Conservative Party has incorporated the word 'liberal' into its title, lest anyone should accuse it of believing something. As for conservative journals, they seem not to exist - unless you can apply that description to *The Idler*. Edited by David Warren, and with a large and cultivated staff of 'editors-at-large', *The Idler*, as its title suggests, takes a Johnsonian stance, standing back from the world of politics to explore the currents of life and meaning which flow beneath it. The articles are literary and philosophical, although a pronounced anti-communist slant from the editor, and a recognition among many of the contributors of the realities of global power, lend a political flavour to many of the meditations. The current issue (July and August 1989) contains an account by Paul Wilson (the talented translator of Havel, Skvorecký and Hrabal) of his days in Czechoslovakia and of his encounter with the thought of George Orwell. Candidly and touchingly written,

this piece of intellectual autobiography stands as an effective symbol of the conscience of modern Canada, and of the transition of its educated class from sixties leftism, to the mild-mannered hesitation which characterises the best of its thinking today.

An article by William Humber on Lacrosse, the Canadian national sport, contains some of the most conservative and sceptical thoughts in the current issue, Humber taking the occasion to conduct a philosophical invocation of the Canadian identity. For Humber, the Lacrosse following is 'a sporting Hutterite community'. Among other interesting features, not the least entertaining is the highly conservative 'lonely hearts' column, containing such last ditch appeals for survival as this: 'Professor, male, 49, tall, slim, presentable, never places personal ads. Seeks woman who never answers them.' An allegory, perhaps, of the conservative search for order in a disorderly world.

The Idler is published bi-monthly, from 255 Davenport Road, Toronto M5R 1J9, price US\$24 annually.

Post Mortem on the French Revolution: A Contemporary English Reaction

A L. Rowse

It is illuminating to follow a contemporary English reaction to the French Revolution month by month as it unfolded, with all the excitement of not knowing how things would turn out. How better than in the Letters of Horace Walpole? No reactionary Tory, a pure Whig addicted to the principles of the English Revolution of 1688, not at all struck on monarchy. Also a Francophile, who knew France and the French well, fond of the famous Mme Du Deffand, who had been briefly a mistress of the Regent Orléans.

It is well known that at first the Revolution was warmly welcomed in England: 'Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive', etc. Walpole's friend, Charles James Fox said that it was the best news he had heard since Saratoga and Yorktown! Walpole had better judgment than that irresponsible aristocrat, with his bastard descent from both Charles II and James II. Wise old Horace suspended judgment at the 'momentous' news. He detested the previous régime of the French monarchy, but recognised Louis XVI's disposition for reform: 'No man living is more devoted to liberty than I am, yet blood is a terrible price to pay for it'

Actually at the storming of the Bastille Walpole's fears were all for the mob, little realising that the boot was on the other foot. He was afraid that mob-action would bring about a backlash that would restore despotic rule. But he saw that despotism - as he regarded it, rather unfairly - could not be cured all at once. That very July he wrote, 'their government was certainly a very bad one; but I cannot conceive that such a sudden and tumultuary revolution can at once produce a good and permanent constitution.' That was what France needed, but the whole spirit of the nation would need change for that, 'that whole system of their laws and usages too'.

Next month he credited Louis XVI with a return to constitutional government in summoning the States General, but blamed the latter for overturning the whole frame when they might have obtained a good government, possibly a permanent constitution instead of replacing it all at once with a new model. They have now 'let loose havoc through every province, which sooner or later will end in worse despotism than that they have demolished.'

In September, he felt glad at the end of the Bastille: 'I always hated to drive by it.' Yet it had held only half-a-dozen prisoners: it was a symbol more than a real threat. The destruction of the building itself was silly - just like mob-action. More important, 'a revolution procured by a national vertigo does not promise a crop of legislators. It is *Time* that composes a

good constitution: it formed ours. Our Revolution was temperate and has lasted.'

By October Walpole ceased to have any hopes, when 'with any sense and any temper the States General might have obtained a very reformed system of government.' Instead of that the doctrinaires, 'a parcel of abbés and philosophers thought they could pick out a model from all the various visions and controversies on government; and that a nation, and all its laws and all its debts, could wait till they could frame something on which no three of them would have agreed.'

Meanwhile, violence was unloosed, King and Queen carried off prisoners to Paris by 'a rabble of fish-women'. Châteaux being burned all over the country, some thirty in Burgundy alone; mob rule and indiscriminate murders. Exiles were arriving in England to report how things really were in the distracted country - some of them friends he knew well from his frequent visits to Paris. 'Isn't France the most contemptible as well as the most *Iroquois* [savage] of nations?' To Walpole their 'great demerit is that they disgrace the cause of liberty.'

To a devoted follower of the English Revolution of 1688 these events forfeited all sympathy for the French. He was now reading the Universal History of Voltaire, who 'more than once allows the cruel nature of his countrymen in turbulent times.' There had been the Massacre of St Bartholomew, and then Louis XIV's insane persecution of the Huguenots which had cost so many thousands of lives. Louis XVI's enfranchisement of the Protestants had been widely unpopular. What *was* one to think of the French? Their previous government had been 'detestable', but this was no way of replacing it.

The Americans had done much better - Walpole had been wholly pro-American over their Revolution. But the goings-on in France were stoking up hatred of the French everywhere. Walpole had been Francophile; now, 'I am so shocked at French barbarity that I begin to think that our hatred of them is not national prejudice but natural instinct.' When Talleyrand arrived in London as an emissary he was shunned by society, not so much as a professional rake as a sacrilegious ex-bishop. In America Washington would not receive him.

The mania in France was all for Equality, not liberty, which Walpole valued above all. People travelling with scutcheons on their coaches, in the regular way then, even English visitors, were liable to be mobbed; a French duke was dragged out of his coach and lynched. At Avignon Mme du Deffand's nephew

and four others were murdered for refusing to recognise the rape of Papal territory which never had been French. Territorial aggression abroad was to go along with violence and terror at home.

In the autumn of 1790 came out Burke's book on the Revolution, which marked a turning point, not only for English opinion and political parties, but for all Europe to which it gave a leading analysis. Walpole was profoundly impressed by it, yet 'I am very far from subscribing to almost all of Mr Burke's principles. The work, I have no doubt, will hereafter be applied to support very high doctrines.' This was very percipient of him. Its immediate effect was to expose the illusions still entertained on the Left by such as Fox and Lansdowne, not to mention fellow-travellers like Price and Priestly. It led at once to the breach between Burke and Fox, and broke the Whig party in two.

These Whig leaders had all been pro-American - Burke, Fox, Lansdowne and all the Pitts, Walpole describing himself as 'a hearty American.' The men of the Left became the inspiration of the new Toryism, with Burke as its philosopher, the younger Pitt as its political leader. The younger generation who had been such enthusiasts for the Revolution - Wordsworth, Southey, Coleridge - carried the reaction against it far into the 19th Century.

As for the English mob, they showed what they thought by burning Dr Priestley's house at Birmingham, with its scientific library, and driving him to take refuge in America. There too opinion was turning against the appalling excesses in France. And no wonder, when the leading French Admiral, D'Estaing, who had defeated the British fleet and decided the surrender at Yorktown, was guillotined.

Walpole tried to maintain a position half-way between Burke and Fox, but it was no use: the French Revolution inspired the dominance of the new Toryism for the next forty years. Lord Liverpool, who ruled it longest as Prime Minister, had been present at the storming of the Bastille. The Whig Gibbon, who had no religious beliefs, even sympathised with what Burke saw about religion - that the philosophers and doctrinaires had prepared the way by undermining it. Again Walpole, no religionist, agreed that it was not the French clergy who preached the doctrine of killing and massacre.

Hundreds of priests were now taking refuge in England, and Walpole subscribed to the funds for their relief. But in the massacres of August 1792 in the Paris prisons hundreds more innocents were hacked down - altogether some 1400; at the Bicêtre most were adolescents under eighteen, while Danton as Minister of Justice turned a blind eye. This exemplum of Enlightenment was followed all over France, in the leading cities, especially at Lyons and Marseilles. At Nantes hundreds were bound and tied then drowned in the *noyades* in the Loire. It may be imagined that this finished all sensible people's liberal illusions about France; even aristocratic irresponsibles like Lord Stanhope and Fox drew back from supporting the

fellow-travelling Corresponding Societies. Pitt was enabled to suppress them. Tom Paine, who thought he had answered Burke with *The Rights of Man*, narrowly escaped the guillotine and had to escape from France. It was Burke who had foreseen that the promised dawn would lead to military despotism.

Walpole also foresaw this despotism, though he did not live to see the career of Napoleon. As a 'hearty American' he admired Franklin and Washington as great men. What a contrast with France! In England the fireworks of November 5, Gunpowder day, passed with 'not a drop of blood.' In Paris the Tuileries were invaded by the mob, the Guards massacred, the Queen's waiting-women butchered. The King's sister, Madame Elizabeth, protected him. The mob made to kill her thinking she was the Queen, who was hiding. 'Don't enlighten them', said the sister, who insisted on sharing their eventual fate.

Naturally Marie Antoinette hated the Revolution, and perhaps also the French people themselves - after the years of malice and traducing she had to put up with, married to a weak man of good will who had begun the reforms which started the avalanche. (Curiously enough, her brother the Emperor Joseph II was a doctrinaire liberal innovator.) As an old man who had always been gallant towards the ladies, Walpole could not get the sufferings of the young Queen and her children out of his mind. Now the mob, having hacked her great friend, the Princesse de Lamballe, to pieces, were brandishing her head on a pike outside the windows of the Temple, where the Queen was imprisoned, for her to see. He was no monarchist, yet 'the Queen of France is never for three minutes out of my head. Long as I have lived I had not conceived that human nature was capable of such execrable barbarity and meditated wanton malice as the French have committed within these five years.' (In the enlightened 20th century we have witnessed far worse.)

Walpole, from being a Francophile, was turned into a Francophobe. He summed up the essence of the experience with justice: 'Abominable as the government of France was, it is plain that speculative philosophers were the most unfit of all men to produce a salutary reformation. What ignorance of human nature to proclaim to 24 millions of people that all laws are impositions; and what medium have those mad dictators [this was now Robespierre and Co. of the Reign of Terror] been able to find between laws and the violence of force?' This was the crux of the matter, the dilemma the Revolution never resolved. Nothing to hope from the successive assemblies, the members holding on to their seats with 18 livres a day which they would never have gained otherwise. Only force would resolve the issue, and as early as 1792 he too foresaw 'revolutions of military despotism.'

This Francophile was forced to conclude that 'the nation never did possess sound sense. Their egregious vanity was the consequence of their extreme ignorance. They would not condescend to know what was out of their own country, scarce what was out of Paris; and

each Frenchman thought himself qualified to dictate to the rest of the world.'

He looked on the Reign of Terror dispatching their Girondin precursors without regret: 'Who can be sorry to hear that the savage Convention has destroyed one-and-twenty of their own murderers?' These were the people who had forced on war: it was the Revolution that proclaimed war against England, a challenge that Pitt was very reluctant to take up. Walpole observed the Reign of Terror without surprise; and Robespierre's death as merely 'a characteristic event. It is the fifth revolution in the governing power of that country in five years, and I see no durability in a system compounded of such violent and precarious ingredients.'

He watched the reptiles eat each other up - just as we saw Stalin dispatch nine out of eleven of Lenin's original Politbureau. He regarded the whole system as

'a vast experiment', as we should say today, in social engineering. 'It would be curious, could one know, of the 24 million inhabitants of France five years ago, how many it has lost by emigrations, banishment, massacres, executions, battles, sieges, captives, and the hosts of peasants destroyed.' La Vendée alone lost a quarter of a million inhabitants.

Even in my youthful Leftist days I asked whether the hypothetical gains of Revolution were worth the actual lives lost, let alone all the destruction. Walpole puts his finger on the nub of the matter. 'I confess I did not conceive how abominable human nature could be on so extensive a scale as from Paris to Marseilles; nor indeed so absurd.' That is the point: a conservative view of human nature is the true one. Liberal illusions about it only betray humans to disaster; and it is criminal irresponsibility when intelligent people are so silly as to hold them.

The Soviet Green Offensive*

Michael Heseltine

You will need no reminder of the impact that peace movements have made on European politics. An amalgam of neutralism, pacifism and varying forms of socialism: three times in this century they have advocated policies that in the 1930s did lead, and twice since, could have led, to catastrophic misjudgements about the realities of foreign policy.

Nor will you be unfamiliar with the environmental movements flourishing in virtually every Western country. *Greenpeace* is an active spearhead: Extremely dedicated, often highly controversial, no one can dismiss the case they argue nor ignore the impact of their protest. To say this is not to give blanket support for their tactics nor even to embrace all their views. It is to recognize that they are pushing at an emotional and intellectual door that is swinging freely on its hinges.

Mr Gorbachev is the inheritor of the Russian exploitation of the peace movement. His predecessors, by the self-evident menace of their foreign policy, and by their continual recourse to the traditional Russian instinct of suppressing all protest, undermined the impact of CND beyond credibility. Indeed the contrast between the military capability of the Soviet Union and the naivety of the peace movement has proved an inestimable asset to those Western governments determined to rely on deterrence and strength. There is an impression around that we are now living in a different world, that Mr Gorbachev has changed all that: new rules, new life, a fresh start. I myself doubt if the fundamentals of history can be so lightly disregarded!

But there is a new language and an impressive attempt at a new sophistication in the Soviet approach.

This might well lead to a more dangerous, less predictable world, in which a new ingredient of instability returns the continent of Europe to yesterday's dangers. The early manifestations of *glasnost* have succeeded in stimulating openness and debate within Russian society far more effectively than *perestroika* has stimulated economic progress. Far from *glasnost* enabling people to meditate on the economic merits of their newfound freedom, in practice it enabled them to discuss only the absence of economic benefits.

Mr Gorbachev needs Western resources, both cash and technology. I doubt if we will see a significant reduction in Soviet defence spending, but I can well believe that Mr Gorbachev would like to stimulate faster economic growth, and to divert a higher proportion of that growth to the restructuring of an investment in the Soviet economic base. He must be conscious not so much of any possibility of a Soviet economic challenge to the West but rather of the danger that the West will drive even further ahead. In the West, therefore, the cost of defence could - unchanged in real terms - become relatively a smaller proportion and thus a smaller burden on our national product.

But Mr Gorbachev knows that Western foreign policy is driven by realists with no interest in making it easier for Russia to afford its present scale of defence spending. He knows too that Western technology is expensive and often strategically protected. He has watched the refusal of Western public opinion to bow in the face of enhanced Soviet weapons deployment. What in the early 1980s was predicted as the politically dangerous policy of modernising our medium range nuclear weapons in practice brought substantial political divi-

dends to the Western governments with the stomach for the fight. The peace movements led their political allies onto the battlefields of political oblivion.

By a trick of the time zones, Mrs Thatcher and Mr Shevardnadze both made speeches on September 27, 1988. Both speeches came as a surprise to their audiences. Mrs Thatcher's was widely reported for the excellent contribution that it made to public debate about the environment. 'Protecting (the) balance of nature is ... one of the great challenges of the late Twentieth Century' she said. She went on to refer to four themes in particular: global warming, acid deposition, ozone depletion and the achievement of sustainable development.

Eduard Shevardnadze's speech was delivered to the U.N. General Assembly. Unlike Mrs Thatcher's speech, his went largely unreported. But I believe it has profound implications for the West. Mr Shevardnadze formally made some forceful proposals. The first was to turn the United Nations Environment Programme into an 'environment council'. This new institution will have the job of taking 'effective decisions to ensure ecological security'. The second proposal was for a series of emergency meetings intended to 'co-ordinate efforts in the field of ecological security'. A three part cycle of meetings was proposed, beginning with an expert level meeting in 1989, to be followed by a mini-global summit in 1990 with the leaders of 15-20 states and then by a second United Nations International Conference on the Environment in 1992, or even earlier, at summit level.

These proposals imply action. They appear vigorous. They will appeal to environmentalists. They will appeal to the swelling ranks of green voters throughout Western Europe. They will also appeal to the far wider general public whose concern about the health of our planet has been so much in evidence this summer, and which will go on growing.

Mr Shevardnadze's speech adds a new phrase to our vocabulary - 'ecological security'. It is clearly intended to join Mrs Brundtland's 'sustainable development' as one of the signposts towards a healthier planet. 'Sustainable development' is no doubt to be the achievement of 'ecological security'. But what is 'ecological security'? Mr Shevardnadze is not very explicit. To broaden our understanding we must turn to a statement issued on October 11th 1988 by his deputy, Mr V. F. Petrovsky. Here we find that 'in the face of the global ecological threat ... the paradigms of national security based on egotism and military, above all nuclear, deterrence require urgent revision. The biosphere does not accept discussion from strength, division of the world into systems and blocs'. It is not hard to imagine what is coming: 'The problem of environmental pollution has been exacerbated as a result of the squandering of the planet's resources that are not by any means limitless. The arms race, above all nuclear, constitutes a most dangerous cause of the worsening of the natural balance'. We have arrived at the punch line: 'We believe that the renunciation of certain military

programmes, whether planned or undergoing, could be made use of to channel the released resources to establish an international regime of environmental security'.

In other words, 'ecological security' means that we should stop spending money on weapons and spend it instead on protecting the environment. I do not wish to suggest that Mr Gorbachev, Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Petrovsky are not genuinely concerned about the state of the planet's environment. They should be. Their hopelessly inefficient economies do more than most to squander its scarce resources. And their outdated industrial process has left the worst of environmental legacies. There is no shortage of evidence that they know what has gone wrong and know whose fault it is.

First the scale of the disaster. Chernobyl left 33 dead, 2,000 more to die and 150,000 evacuated. In the rice fields near Rostov excessive pesticide use had led to a 27% increase in cancer over 5 years and a rise in birth defects by between 55% and 60%. In Bratislava in Czechoslovakia the incidence of cancer has risen 35% in five years and child mortality is 65% higher than in 1960.

Water quality is deteriorating nearly everywhere. The Ob and the Irtysh, two West Siberian rivers, have 20 times the permitted level of oil products. The concentration of phenol in the Caspian is nine times the permitted level, and in the Baltic four times. The Aral sea is drying up. It has lost 60% of its water. Its shore line has retreated by 65 km in some places. The 13 metre drop in level is an ecological catastrophe, converting the Aral Sea into the Aral pond.

Most of these statistics came from official Russian sources. So they know the scale of the problem. And they also know who is at fault. I quote from *Pravda* on 2nd July 1988, where Morun, the Chairman of the new USSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature is reported as saying:

The chief polluters of air, soil and water are enterprises of the Ministry of Power and Electrification, the Ministry of the Chemical Industry, the Ministry of Mineral Fertiliser Production, the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy, the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, the Ministry of the Oil Industry, the State Agro-industrial Committee and others.

The Soviet Union, then, has huge environmental problems of its own making. But we should not let our own concern for the environment blind us to political realities. What we are seeing here is a well thought-out, carefully crafted attempt to hijack the environmental agenda for ulterior purposes. You do not have to be a 'cold warrior' to recognise that a new arena has been opened in which to fight old battles.

The fact is that Mr Gorbachev has spotted that the West has a long and vulnerable flank exposed in its environmental record. The message of the rise of the Green parties in Western Europe is clear. The environmental record of governments on both sides of the

Atlantic, even when seen through the eyes of their own supporters, no longer matches the expectations of their democracies. Western leadership is now under threat for its perceived failure to respond early enough and adequately to the developing ecological crisis.

Mr Gorbachev has one advantage in a battle for hearts and minds on the environment. He does not live in a free society. He has no vigorous environmental groups rousing public opinion and applying sustained pressure to improve performance. He has no free media inquiring where they will uncover the real scope of environmental damage. He can raise the rhetorical stakes without fear that anyone will be able freely to point out the gap between rhetoric and reality.

We face the prospect of a difficult round of weapons modernisation within the Atlantic Alliance. We have complex negotiations to pursue on conventional force reductions and on the next round of strategic nuclear arms limitations. The linking of the environment and security offers many opportunities for mischief-making with Western public opinion. To take the most obvious example: the Montebello decision of the NATO alliance was to modernise our short range nuclear capability. As the British Secretary of State who signed that declaration, I profoundly agree with it as I do with the coincidental decision to reduce dramatically the number of such weapons available to the Alliance, by the destruction of older weapons systems. There is every argument to reduce nuclear weapons and to rely on smaller numbers of more effective weapons. There is no argument worth the name to rely on any weapon system that is out of date and thus ineffective in its deterrent role.

Mr Gorbachev would dearly love to prevent this modernisation. He can analyse the significance of green voters in the Federal Republic of Germany where the issue of short range weapons is most acute. His new 'Green Peace' is tailor-made for the West German electorate.

We must not close our eyes to these realities simply because we agree with the Russian premise, namely that the planet faces unprecedented environmental threats. Indeed, if we are too gullible, too naive in our approach to Soviet ecological initiatives, we run the great risk that progress on protecting the environment will be slowed as the ecological issue becomes ensnared in the conflict between the super-powers.

It is not difficult to imagine that many genuine environmentalists may be swept up in a wave of enthusiasm for 'ecological security'. Nor is it difficult to imagine further how the Soviets might develop this line: siren calls for resource-and technology-transfer, to help the Soviets play their part in the global effort to protect the environment. Mr Petrovsky's speech is quite explicit. In his call for United Nations' action 'to adopt binding principles and rules of behaviour' he suggested the definition of main areas of international co-operation in the ecological field, including 'mutual access to advanced technologies'.

It is easy to paraphrase what the Soviet arguments will be: 'We in the Soviet Union wish to reduce our

defence spending, but all our proposals for doing so are frustrated by a refusal of the West to give up the most dangerous of its capabilities in the nuclear field. When we have signed an intermediate range treaty getting rid of your Cruise and Pershings and our SS 20s and are urgently pursuing strategic reductions of up to 50%, you in the West are putting this process at risk by introducing new short range weapons into Europe. And worse, we wish to reduce defence expenditure and use the cash to modernise our industry, the principal benefit of which will be higher environmental standards for us all. Not only are you forcing us to spend more on defence than we wish, denying us the chance to modernise our industry and protect the environment, but you will not share with us the advanced technologies we need to secure such environmental improvements'.

The straightforward equivalence is stressed by the Shevardnadze speech: 'For the first time we have seen the stark reality of the threat to our environment - a second front fast approaching and gaining an urgency equal to that of the nuclear-and-space threat'. Thus the Soviet case will run. Thus Green Peace will be proclaimed. The prudent Western leader will not fall for it - although sadly some, particularly on opposition benches, will. Transferring technology to the Russians to clean up their industrial legacy is as attractive to the Russians as transferring technology for directly military purposes. They will be quite relaxed about the motives of those who transfer the technology - as long as the technology arrives. They will then decide how much of it is used for environmental purposes, how much for military purposes or how much to help an inefficient economy to catch up by our efforts where their own have failed.

In truth much environmental technology is close to military technology. To explore the parameters of environmental damage from space, to model global climate patterns or to build the necessary data bases to co-ordinate scientific knowledge and policy-making, you need the most sophisticated information technologies, including the largest computers. Already the Soviet Union has sought from both the French and the Germans access to more modern and safer nuclear power technologies. No one should doubt, in the wake of Chernobyl, the difficulty of making a persuasive case for denying them technology that is as crucial to our safety as it is to theirs. New material technologies based on carbon or silicon are replacing metal-based technologies with their higher environmental impact. But these newer, lighter and stronger technologies are also critical to future advances in sophisticated weapons.

The West should not underestimate the seductive power of this latest round in the battle for hearts and minds. You have only to remember that it was the decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing in 1979 that gave rise in due course to the German Greens. But pointing out the suspect motives for the greening of Mr Gorbachev will not on its own carry the day. His presentation will carry more the feel and flair of

Madison Avenue than anything that Mr Brezhnev or Mr Andropov or Mr Chernenko could have dreamt up.

We are approaching an unprecedented set of international meetings on the environment, over and above those Mr Shevardnadze has called for, starting with the ECE regional meeting in Bergen in May 1990 and running through until the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Conference in 1992. We should begin by recognising that the Soviet Union has already signalled its intention to make these meetings into ideological battlegrounds. We must calibrate our response accordingly.

We know that it is possible to develop a green capitalism. We must use that knowledge and our widening experience of environmental solutions to take the initiative on the environment. We are witnessing the birth of green geopolitics. We must be sure we are well prepared.

* This article is a shorter version of a speech delivered to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, on 23rd November, 1988.

Culture and its Enemies: An Answer to J. L. Wilson

Ian Small & Marcus Walsh

In October 1886 Edmund Gosse, the second Clark lecturer at Trinity College, was attacked by John Churton Collins for the inadequacy of his knowledge of literary history. Collins was to become Professor in the newly established school of English at Birmingham. For his pains in exposing academic mediocrity Collins was criticised (at least according to Osbert Sitwell) by Tennyson as a 'Louse upon the Locks of Literature'. As academics in the School of English at Birmingham University we therefore have an honourable precedent for answering J.L. Wilson's attack on contemporary university teachers of English in her article 'Lice in the Locks of Literature' (*Salisbury Review*, December 1988).

Wilson's argument is difficult to follow, composed as it is of so many unrelated complaints about the academic life, but it is apparent that her general points are these. English has taken over a role which until the turn of the century was fulfilled by classics - a generalist education in letters. However, since their subject (allegedly) does not possess the intellectual rigour of the classical disciplines, departments of English have encouraged ignorant and unmotivated students to enter the universities, and have trained poor teachers. Wilson then lists a series of complaints and proposed remedies. The 'English Literature industry is a self-inflating Leviathan', which produces speculative, bizarre, esoteric, and opinionated criticism. This has led to a conflict of interests between academic critics and 'ordinary' readers, the latter having no need for criticism, academic or otherwise. Indeed, Wilson suggests that 'classic works of literary criticism' are produced by creative writers. Her remedy for this state of affairs is to restrict the size of English departments, to change the nature of the courses run there, and to limit the number of students reading English in favour of subjects which supposedly possess greater utility.

None of these arguments is persuasive, and none is adequately supported. Wilson's use of evidence rarely

rises above the anecdotal ('fifteen years ago a colleague at Edinburgh was unable to recognise a biblical allusion in D.H. Lawrence'). While no one would want to claim that a degree in English has the same kind of narrow utility as a degree in electrical engineering, it is nonetheless true that the final arbiters of educational utility, employers in both the public and private sectors, are eager to woo graduates in English as well as in other arts disciplines. Wilson's allegations about the poor quality of English teaching in schools, and the lack of interest of undergraduates, are not substantiated by any evidence, and are contradicted by our own experience. It is not true that the 'number of candidates for teaching posts [in English] at universities has increased'. To imagine that a typical tutorial or seminar consists of 'a discussion of a book or a poem one has enjoyed reading in the previous week' is possible only for a writer who knows nothing of modern university teaching in England. Wilson's case that literary criticism has always been produced by creative writers rests upon the naive assumption that an object can only be assessed by one capable of its creation, an assumption most famously demolished by Samuel Johnson: 'You *may* abuse a tragedy, though you cannot write one. You may scold a carpenter who has made you a bad table, though you cannot make a table. It is not your trade to make tables' (Boswell's *Life*, 25 June 1763). Occasionally Wilson descends to the merely fatuous, as in speaking of the 'comfortable lives' of academics. It is sad to have to conclude that the view of the university world, and of English studies, available to Wilson from the windows of Trinity College, is so imbalanced, and so incomplete.

So far we have drawn attention to dubious or unsubstantiated matters of fact or assessment in Wilson's argument. The more damning errors are of logic. About the role of knowledge in English studies she seems to be entirely confused. All disciplines, if they are to claim

the status of disciplines, must lay claim to some body of special knowledge. At a number of points she seems at least implicitly to allow that English may in principle claim such a body of knowledge. Her criticisms of students entering university courses in English, and of teachers at the secondary level, are substantially founded on her belief in their ignorance of the 'broad sweep' of English literary history. She argues for 'the introduction of a rigorous curriculum'. She insists on the necessity of 'the grounding in classical and biblical legend that is necessary to understand all literature written at least until the nineteen-thirties, the ability to scan that is fundamental to the appreciation of verse, or the rules of grammar without which it is impossible to write or read the language'. She values most highly 'the painstaking scholarship which is exercised by responsible editors and biographers'.

This is all, no doubt, laudable. The issues are not, however, quite as simple as Wilson thinks. What, for example, does she imagine to be 'the rules of grammar' without which none of us can write or read? (It needs to be pointed out that virtually all English degrees in this country incorporate a substantial element of English language work.) The relationship of biography to literary interpretation, similarly, raises theoretical issues of which she does not appear to be at all aware. Nonetheless, these are all serious, and at least potentially tenable, arguments, and they make clear that at some level Wilson understands that literary interpretation and scholarship in Departments of English, can, and must, lay claim to its own body of knowledge.

How then can she permit herself an entirely contradictory argument: that reading requires no special knowledge, is properly the domain of the literate amateur, and has been misappropriated by self-seeking, and self-advertising, university academics? 'All that is needed to read literature in English', it transpires, 'is a knowledge of the English language'; not, after all, a knowledge of the Bible, or of the classics, or of scansion, or of 'the broad sweep of English literature', or of what she calls, rather charmingly, (no doubt attempting to set herself up as a latter-day neo-Aristotelian) 'the various *genres*'. Wilson appears to think the contradiction in her argument can be resolved by a rhetorical trick, the insistence that the special knowledge which is the defining mark of any discipline, and of any profession, must in the sole case of English be described, pejoratively, as 'esoteric'. Academics in English departments are accused of being an introverted priesthood, who jealously guard their Eleusinian mysteries: 'By making English literature the province of the few, English departments take it away from the literate'. But Wilson never substantiates her assumption that specialist knowledge in English is more 'esoteric' than that of any other discipline. She can maintain her position only by a romanticising celebration of individualism and amateurism in reading, and that celebration in itself is inevitably founded on an insistence on an extreme subjectivism: 'The relationship between author

and reader is at once direct, intense, personal and nebulous... The reader is his own interpreter; each relationship will be different, because the reader is different.'

A coherent argument for English, as for any humanities subject, must be grounded on the possibility of knowledge, and in English that knowledge must inevitably derive from the possibility of valid interpretation of the texts which are the substance of the subject. For Wilson, meaning and valid interpretation are of very little consequence: 'If a reader interprets *Persuasion* as an attack on British policy in the Napoleonic War, he is wrong, but Jane Austen has no grounds for complaint'. It is Wilson, in fact, who is the apostle of Bunthorne: For her 'the meaning doesn't matter, if it's only idle chatter of a transcendental kind'. If Jane Austen is worth reading, it is surely because she has consequential, and at least potentially determinable, things to say, things which it is an important purpose of professional literary commentary and criticism to explain. To reduce reading to the sort of individual subjectivism Wilson seems to have in mind is to deprive any study of seriousness. She is one of those who, in Wordsworth's damning characterisation, treats of literature as if it were 'a thing as indifferent as a taste of Rope-dancing, or Frontinac, or Sherry'. She appears to argue that the interpretations which academics offer are characteristically 'speculative', 'bizarre', 'abstruse'. She offers no evidence for these allegations, and one can hardly know what particular critics, or schools of critics, she has in mind. Even were she able to make good her case that some particular critics offer mere re-interpretation with no authority beyond what she calls 'the imprimatur of a university post', however, she would still be in no position to argue that literary interpretation may not in principle be a legitimate activity, founded not on the sort of mystic, unmediated communion between author and reader which is her model of reading, but on the possibility of a coherent use of the body of knowledge which constitutes English as a discipline.

Our second substantial objection to Wilson's essay is its misconception, and artificial limitation, of the utility of English. She argues that all university departments have a responsibility for 'service to the public and contribution to the general good'. This is an entirely reasonable position; but she defines this service and contribution extraordinarily narrowly. She argues that English leads directly only into teaching, publishing and advertising, and perhaps into 'government service'; but this is seriously to underestimate the number of spheres of life in which a highly-developed ability to read, and write, and think, may be useful. It is true that many English graduates take jobs in areas related only indirectly to their degree work, but this is true also of graduates in many other disciplines, in the sciences as well as in the humanities. Wilson thinks of the universities primarily as training institutions for 'our future administrative class', for whom, she argues, 'apart from the sciences, mathematics, economics,

computer studies, geography, history and modern languages... would offer more'. Even so hard-headed and self-interested a judge as the market-place refutes this. In fact, as Wilson defines utility, her arguments against the direct applicability of English to the demands of the industrial world (as she, more narrowly than any personnel officer we have encountered, conceives them) are arguments against all the humanities, including political philosophy, or aesthetics, or even the study of Elizabethan entertainments.

As Wilson should know, there are arguments for a higher kind of utility for literary studies than she wants to allow. Those arguments have been made, with a cogency and elegance which we can only aspire to, in a tradition of humane criticism from the Renaissance to the present. It is writers such as Philip Sidney, Samuel Johnson, Matthew Arnold, F.R. Leavis, Meyer Abrams, and Wayne Booth who have established the grounds upon which any argument about the uses of a humane literary education must be conducted.

Is Science Racist?

Beverly Halstead

In 1958 the International Congress of Zoology met in London to celebrate the centenary of the presentation to the Linnean Society of the communications by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace on the role of natural selection in the origin of species. The Director of the British Museum (Natural History), Sir Gavin de Beer, arranged for the exhibition bays in the Central Hall of the museum to display a series of topics illustrating the evolutionary theme of the Congress. The fourth bay was devoted to the Races of Man. In 1963 the Museum published Sonia Cole's *Races of Man* (with a second edition in 1965, reprinted 1968) as a handbook complimenting the exhibit. This book is packed with information on the physical and biochemical features of human races, such as the dark pigment of the Negroid eye being in the outer layer of the iris, whereas in Caucasoid brown eyes the pigment is in the middle layer. The Melanesians with their frizzy hair, everted lips, broad nostrils and dark skin, are in no way related to Negroids but are an admixture of Archaic White (Australoid) and Mongoloid. The original Hottentot population of the Cape of South Africa was absorbed by admixture with the Dutch Colonists and forms the basis of the Cape Coloured population. 'Man is a polytypic species, that is one consisting of several subspecies and races.' The primary or major stocks of mankind are properly the three subspecies 'Caucasoids (Whites or Europeans), the Mongoloids (Asians) and the Negroids (Blacks or Africans). There are also survivors of an ancient "archaic White" or Palaeo-Asiatic stock... grouped in the Australoid division of mankind.'

In the Second Edition new information was added regarding blood groups and other biochemical characters. But the lasting impression that was left was the wonderful diversity of our species. There is nothing untoward in documenting the features of our species and indeed the British Museum (Natural History) in London became an international centre for the study of human populations at the level of identifiable marker molecules. The sudden closure of the Biological and

Physical Sections of the Sub-department of Anthropology on 31 March 1985 brought to an end the museum's study of 'human populations, their variation, and evolution' and the supply of 'valuable information not only on the origins and affinities of various ethnic groups, but also on the effects of intermixture and isolation between communities' - research precipitately 'no longer regarded as appropriate.' (See *Salisbury Review* vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 37-39, 1987, for an account of this episode).

Detailed information on race is not that easy to come by nowadays. There is almost a conspiracy of silence about the facts. First of all, it needs to be acknowledged that the Asian communities, from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh or from East Africa, belong to the Caucasoid race or subspecies. The Afro-Caribbeans are Negroid and the immigrants from Hong Kong, China and Japan Mongoloid. Perhaps it would not come amiss for children of all races to learn something about the history of the human species in all its biological diversity. Antony Flew in his 1984 booklet *Education, Race and Revolution* (Centre for Policy Studies) has drawn attention to the inconsistency of terminology employed by the Commission for Racial Equality and in particular by the document *Education for Equality*, distributed to teachers in Berkshire. In this official paper 'black' is defined as 'both Afro-Caribbean and Asian people. The term black emphasises the common experience which both Afro-Caribbean and Asian people have of being victims of racism, and their common determination to oppose racism.' This in spite of the fact that some of the more serious racial outbreaks in Britain have been between Negroid Afro-Caribbean and Caucasoid Asian communities. Apart from being an abuse of language, the confusion engendered in mixing cultural, ethnic and racial terms can only result in serious social divisiveness. Indeed this is Antony Flew's contention.

There is, however, no doubt that the various races, when carefully compared and measured, differ much from each other - as in the texture of

the hair, the relative proportions of all parts of the body, the capacity of the lungs, the form and capacity of the skull, and even in the convolutions of the brain. But it would be an endless task to specify the numerous points of structural difference. The races differ also in constitution, in acclimatisation, and in liability to certain diseases. Their mental characteristics are likewise very distinct: chiefly as it would appear in their emotional, but partly in their intellectual, faculties. (Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, J. Murray, London, 1871).

Thomas Henry Huxley in his famous essay 'Emancipation - black and white' written in 1865, after the conclusion of the American Civil War, wrote that:

It may be quite true that some negroes are better than some white men: but no rational man, cognisant of the facts, believes that the average negro is the equal, still less the superior, of the average white man. And, if this be true, it is simply incredible that, when all his disabilities are removed, and our prognathous relative has a fair field and no favour, as well as no oppressor, he will be able to compete successfully with his bigger brained and smaller jawed rival, in a contest which is to be carried on by thoughts and not by bites. The highest places in the hierarchy of civilisation will assuredly not be within the reach of our dusky cousins, though it is by no means necessary that they should be restricted to the lowest.

This nineteenth century view of the relative nature of the races was mirrored in the generally accepted assessment of the nature of the female of the species. Here again is Charles Darwin:

Woman seems to differ from man in mental disposition, chiefly in her greater tenderness and less selfishness: and this holds good even with savages... Woman, owing to her maternal instincts, displays these qualities towards her infants in an eminent degree; therefore it is likely that she should often extend them towards her fellow-creatures. Man is the rival of other men; he delights in competition, and this leads to ambition which passes too easily into selfishness. These latter qualities seem to be his natural and unfortunate birthright. It is generally admitted that with women the powers of intuition, of rapid perception, and perhaps of imitation, are more strongly marked than in man; but some, at least, of these facilities are characteristic of the lower races, and therefore of a past and lower state of civilisation.

The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shewn by man attaining to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than woman can attain - whether requiring deep thought, reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the senses and hands.

We may also infer... that if men are capable of decided eminence over women in many subjects,

the average standard of mental power in man must be above that of woman.

T.H. Huxley addressed this problem. He too recognised the fundamental differences between the sexes and saw clearly the solution - emancipation:

Women are by nature more excitable than men - prone to be swept by tides of emotion and female education does its best to weaken every physical counterpoise to this nervous mobility - tends in all ways to stimulate the emotional part of the mind and stunt the rest. We find girls naturally timid, prone to dependence, born conservatives; and we teach them that independence is unladylike; that blind faith is the right frame of mind; and that whatever we may be permitted, and indeed encouraged, to do to our brother, our sister is to be left to the tyranny of authority and tradition.

With few insignificant exceptions, girls have been educated either to be drudges, or toys, beneath man, or a sort of angel above him... The possibility that the ideal of womanhood lies neither in the fair saint, nor in the fair sinner; that the female type of character is neither better nor worse than the male, but only weaker; that women are meant neither to be men's guides nor their playthings, but their comrades, their fellows and their equals, so far as nature puts no bar to that equality, does not seem to have entered into the minds of those who have had the conduct of the education of girls.

What is the first step towards a better state of things? We reply, emancipate girls. Recognise the fact that they share the senses, emotions, of boys, and that the mind of the average girl is less different from that of the average boy, than the mind of one boy is from that of another; so that whatever argument justifies a given education for all boys justifies its application to girls as well.

So far from imposing artificial restrictions upon the acquirement of knowledge by women, throw every facility in their way. Let us have 'sweet girl graduates' by all means. They will be none the less sweet for a little wisdom; and the 'golden hair' will not curl less gracefully outside the head by reason of there being brains within. Let them, if they so please, become merchants, barristers, politicians. Let them have a fair field, but let them understand, as the necessary correlative, that they are to have no favour. Let nature alone sit high above the lists, 'rain influence and judge the prize.'

And the result? For our parts, though loth to prophesy, we believe it will be that of other emancipations. Women will find their place, and it will neither be that in which they have been held, nor that to which some of them aspire. The big chests, the massive brains, the vigorous muscles and stout frames of the best men will carry the day, whenever it is worth their while to

contest the prizes of life with the best women. Darwin and Huxley articulated with great skill the basic attitudes held by most thinking people of their time on the issue of the differences between races and the sexes. It is not an exaggeration to say that their views are not all that different from the general perceptions held today. Superficial evidence of sex and race in terms of physical proportions, skin colour and texture, type and distribution of hair, are readily recognised. The physical differences between the sexes are self-evident; furthermore, as Darwin and Huxley clearly recognised, the mental attributes of men and women are readily distinguishable.

It is exactly the same thing when it comes to race - it would be astonishing if any two races turned out to be identical in say for example their visuospatial or verbal abilities. It was therefore accepted as self-evident by the likes of Darwin and Huxley that the differences between the sexes and the races were a consequence of their long evolution.

A different approach arose as a response to the aftermath of the Second World War, which had been dominated by pseudoscientific ideas of racial purity and the attendant genocide of Jews and other supposedly impure races. There were moves to deny the existence of racial differences. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Department of Social Sciences drew up in 1949 a *Statement on Race* which included the following: 'For all practical purposes "race" is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth. The scientific evidence indicates that the range of mental capacities in all ethnic groups is the same. Biological studies lend support to the ethic of the universal brotherhood; for man is born with drives toward cooperation'. As no biologist or geneticist had been on the committee that drew up this statement, the credibility of UNESCO was thrown into question. Both geneticists and physical anthropologists objected vehemently, as they recognised race as a biological reality and many considered there was indeed evidence of differences in mental ability. A new meeting, this time of geneticists and anthropologists, was convened in 1951, and UNESCO's definitive *Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences* was produced.

The concept of race is unanimously regarded by anthropologists as a classificatory device providing a zoological frame within which the various groups of mankind may be arranged and by means of which studies of evolutionary processes can be facilitated. Most anthropologists do not include mental characteristics in their classification of human races. . . Even those psychologists who claim to have found the greatest differences in intelligence between groups of different racial origin and have contended that they are hereditary, always report that some members of the group of inferior performance surpass not merely the lowest ranking member of the superior group but also the average of its members. . . The study

of the heredity of psychological characteristics is beset with difficulties. . . we are less familiar with the part played by heredity in the mental life of normal individuals.

We wish to emphasise that equality of opportunity and equality in law in no way depend, as ethical principles, upon the assertion that human beings are in fact equal in endowment.

We have thought it worth while to set out in a formal manner what is at present scientifically established concerning individual and group differences.

(a) in matters of race, the only characteristics which anthropologists have so far been able to use effectively as a basis for classification are physical (anatomical and physiological).

(b) Available scientific knowledge provides no basis for believing that the groups of mankind differ in their innate capacity for intellectual and emotional development.

The major change was the recognition of the reality of human races and the replacement of the assertion of the identity of mental capacities among all ethnic groups, to the more non-committal 'provides no basis for believing', but the inferences to be drawn by the reader were substantially the same. In spite of the official pronouncement from UNESCO, most geneticists continued to believe that there were probably genetic differences in the mental capabilities of the different races but conceded that the scientific evidence was not conclusive. The factor that brought the subject into the limelight was the discrepancy being monitored in the intelligence testing of blacks and whites in the United States. The controversy burst forth with a long article by Arthur Jensen in the *Harvard Educational Review* in 1969. The gist of his paper - 'How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement?' - was that there was very little that could be done, since most of the variation was due to heredity. Jensen gained notoriety overnight because he used the same arguments in discussing the differences in IQ between blacks and whites. 'So all we are left with are various lines of evidence, no one of which is definitive alone, but which, viewed altogether, make it a not unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are strongly implicated in the average Negro-white intelligence difference.' The fat was well and truly in the fire, the so-called hereditarians and environmentalists became locked in a bitter and inconclusive struggle as to the relative importance of the genetic make-up and the role of the environment in producing such discrepancies. The genotype determined the ultimate potential, the environment the level to which it was expressed in the phenotype.

From 1973 to 1976 the Genetics Society of America grappled with this emotive and now highly political issue. The report of their *ad hoc* committee and the *Resolution on Genetics, Race and Intelligence* was issued in 1976. Now there issued the ringing and rallying phrase: "There is no convincing evidence as to

whether there is or is not an appreciable genetic difference in intelligence between races.' Walter Bodmer and L.L. Cavalli-Storza in 1970 believed 'no good case can be made for such studies on either scientific or practical grounds. We do not see any point in particularly encouraging the use of public funds for their support.'

This last view became the received wisdom. Sir Andrew Huxley in his 1977 Presidential Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science made a forlorn plea:

It does seem that there is now a body of scientists who . . . in relation to the heritability of human ability, regard the assumption of equal inherited ability as something which does not require experimental evidence to establish it and which it is positively wicked to question because the conclusion might disagree with their social and political preconceptions.

Attempts of this kind to subordinate scientific judgement to political ends are misguided even from a strictly practical point of view . . . any such attempt to deflect scientific conclusions, however well meaning, is a betrayal of science. Science has a claim to be listened to only insofar as her pronouncements are firmly based on evidence about what actually happened in the world we live in, and are independent of what we wish or hope.

In the 1970s the era of Affirmative Action dawned in the United States - it was accepted that ethnic minorities had been seriously disadvantaged in the past and that it was time for society to attempt to make amends. Thomas Henry Huxley's attitude 'Let them have a fair field but . . . they are to have no favour' was considered too harsh - allowances would have to be made. A kind of quota system for the disadvantaged was instituted. The prosecution of such policies led inevitably to conflicts of loyalty between concepts of social justice and academic integrity. These were brought to a head in 1976 in the scandal of the Harvard Medical School fracas over Bernard D. Davis, Professor of Bacterial Physiology.

It is important to remember that Davis was the first departmental chairman in the history of Harvard to have a negro appointed to a tenured professorship. Davis's crime was to question the policy of lowering standards in order to meet the need for qualified medical practitioners among minority communities. Davis had long championed the rights of minority communities but always insisted that this should not be at the expense of standards. A colleague suggested to him that he 'might be interested in questioning a technically illegal action that the dean was planning to slip through the next faculty meeting, involving a black student who had failed the basic science part of the National Boards for the fifth time.' In the event the student was awarded the appropriate qualification allowing him to practice medicine. Davis was 'troubled to see how far the virtuous aim of trying to meet affirmative action goals was in effect distorting the

tradition of *veritas* in the university.' Davis wrote a guest editorial for the *New England Journal of Medicine* (vol. 294, p. 1118) in which he highlighted the problem:

It would be a rare person today who would question the value of stretching the criteria for admission, and of trying to make up for earlier disadvantages, to help disadvantaged groups. but how far faculties should also stretch the criteria for passing students is another matter. If a board licensing airline pilots allowed extraneous considerations to interfere with objectivity it would be considered criminal. The temptation to award medical diplomas on a charitable basis raises the same question, even though the consequences of fatal error in the two professions are not equally visible and dramatic . . . It seems time for medical faculties to ask whether we have been properly balancing our obligation to promote social justice with our primary obligation to protect the public interest, in an area in which the public cannot protect itself.

R.C. Lewontin, professor of Genetics at Harvard, was quoted in the *Harvard Crimson* as saying Davis 'thinks blacks are mentally inferior and incompetent and argues that these minority students don't have the intrinsic ability to become doctors.' Davis stated 'nothing in my article justifies this grave charge. Neither does anything else that I have said or published.' The dean gave a press release, which stressed 'Dr Davis, in publishing his article and speaking to the press, speaks only for himself and not for the administration of the Harvard Medical School or the rest of the faculty . . . Dr Davis's statement was also irresponsible because of the general implications about the professional acumen of all minority students.' The issue escalated with abuse being heaped on Davis's head by all and sundry. The full blow by blow account was not published for a further decade (B.D. Davis *Storm over Biology; Essays of Science, Sentiment and Public Policy*, Prometheus Books, 1986). His account concludes:

Quotas were introduced - and many feel they were necessary - to open gates that were long closed to minorities: and it is essential to hold them open. But if, in carrying out this task, we force through these gates individuals who are poorly qualified we undermine both justice and effectiveness in our society. We impair the self-respect and motivation of those who receive handouts, and we even risk a backlash.

The evidence that there is a discrepancy between the Negroids and Caucasoids seems to be incontrovertible, however one argues the possible reason for it. But now a new factor in the debate has emerged: the place of Mongoloids (Asian in American terminology) in such comparative studies.

Richard Lynn, Professor of Psychology of the University of Ulster, has over the years, assembled evidence which concluded that Mongoloids had high general intelligence and low verbal, high visuospatial patterns of ability. This he related to their adaptations

to life in a cold climate. It is also reported that Negroids have high verbal and low visuospatial abilities. There does not seem to be anything untoward or threatening about such data. Nor does it seem unreasonable to postulate climatic factors and geographical isolation to account for such racial differences. Nor that they might well be part of the genetic make-up of the racial groups in question.

When the Genetics Society of America was tackling these thorny problems, after five drafts a version was sent to the members of the following: 'there is NO CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF GENETIC DIFFERENCE IN INTELLIGENCE BETWEEN RACES' [emphasis by GSA]. Only one response, that of N. Horowitz, considered the relationship of science to morality:

The proposed statement is weak morally, for the following reason: Racists assert that blacks are genetically inferior in IQ and therefore need not be treated as equals. The proposed statement disputes the premise of this assertion, but not the logic of the conclusion. It does not perceive that the premise, while it may be mistaken, is not itself racist: it is the conclusion drawn (wrongly) from it that is racist. Even if the premise were correct, the conclusion would not be justified... Yet the proposed statement directs its main fire at the premise, and by so doing seems to accept the racist logic. It places itself in a morally vulnerable position, for if, at some future time, it is found that the premise is correct, then the whole GSA case collapses, together with its justification for equal opportunity. (Quoted in W. Provine 'Geneticists and Race', *American Zoologist* vol. 26, 1986, pp. 857-887).

The evidence does suggest that the premise, that there are racial differences in intelligence, may well, after all, have been correct. The corollary, therefore, follows, at least in the eyes of the Radical Science Movement, that to present data in this area or to research in it must perforce be, by definition, racist activity. Scientists are asked to examine their motives for wanting to research racial differences. Much the same when one comes to delineate the mental differences between the sexes, anyone contemplating such research is automatically seen as a potential, if not actual, sexist. At the very least unwitting tools providing succour for racists and sexists, at worst something more sinister - ensuring the continued oppression of the other sex and other races. The underlying assumption is that unless we are all demonstrably equal then at the end of the line social justice must be an unattainable goal.

The relation of the sexes is instructive in this regard. The common perception of the mental and physical differences when stated as a fact of life - the consequence of differing roles in the evolution of humans

- was vociferously castigated as sexist propaganda. The differing attributes of the sexes were socially engineered, the sexes were basically the same, with one the oppressed, the other the oppressor. Equality was the banner, a disadvantaged group required special treatment. Equal opportunity was a fair and just demand - as T.H. Huxley clearly saw. But what is now recognised is that males and females really are, as we long had guessed, fundamentally different. What is more, the scientific evidence is such that it cannot be denied that there are genuine differences in the way the brains of the sexes actually function - men and women do think differently.

When it comes to race, some groups excel in certain areas, others in different ones. It would be too much to expect every racial grouping to excel equally with every other. It is not surprising that a race that originated as an adaptation of life in a cold climate, with its wide open spaces, should have particular visuospatial skills, nor that adaptation to the humid tropics, with their dense high forests, put a premium on verbal skills. Nor that regimentation and conformity in one group is matched by anarchy and individualism in another.

Intelligence comes in many categories and Howard Gardner, yet another Harvard scholar, in his *Frames of Mind: the Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (William Heinemann, 1984) recognised seven types of intelligence: linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic and personal, both inter and intra-personal - a spectrum which can be obscured by tests of general intelligence or even of verbal-visuospatial comparisons.

What is important in the comparative study of the sexes or races is not the fact that there may be fundamental differences, but rather what is the exact nature of these differences. *Homo sapiens* is a polymorphic species and it is the wide range of the species intraspecific variation that gives humanity its adaptability - the hallmark of ultimate success in the evolution of the living world. It is the very diversity of human beings in all their physical and mental attributes to which we owe our survival in the longer term. Deliberately to refuse to examine the nature of this diversity is a betrayal; to deny others the right to follow this quest is a crime. Science in its discovery of facts cannot be racist, even if the facts that are uncovered are in themselves unpalatable, and may be exploited by the unscrupulous. The fact that Hitler justified his racial policies by reference to the work of Charles Darwin in no way diminishes the validity of Darwin's contributions to knowledge. As Charles Darwin states in *The Descent of Man*: 'But we are not here concerned with hopes and fears, only with the truth as far as our reason allows us to discover it.'

Humbug and South Africa

David Davies

Africa the homeland is in a state of racial and tribal turmoil, far worse off than it was a century ago, as a result of the attainment of black autonomy. The dark ages have truly returned to almost all of Africa except South Africa. And yet it is the white government of South Africa that has been under attack from the rest of the world. Far worse outrages go unremarked elsewhere: the Sharpeville six, Steve Biko and Nelson Mandela are remembered, while massacres throughout Africa are forgotten.

A great error is in the process of being perpetrated in South Africa, with much humbug and hysteria besides. The World Service of the BBC panders to black opinion, as do Congressmen in Washington who seek black votes. Much of the momentum of the anti-apartheid movement derives from well-meaning people who have a need to express their sense of compassion and to expiate their consciences in an easy way.

Let us examine more closely some of the issues and misconceptions.

South Africa belongs to the blacks.

This probably implies that the blacks were there first, and in a sense that is true. But they were not the same blacks as are there now, many of whom came later from the north, to find work that had been created by the efforts of the white man. The original inhabitants were removed by other blacks, not by the white man. If the case were being made on behalf of Bushmen and Hottentots it would be a stronger one.

The first whites went to South Africa from Holland in 1652. Later, German and Huguenot settlers arrived and merged with the Dutch to form the Afrikaners. They were a fiercely independent Calvinist people, hard-working and proud. They migrated or were driven into the heartlands of the Transvaal and Orange Free State following the arrival of the British in 1814 and there they continued to farm and worship in the tradition of their forefathers. They developed the *laager* mentality of self-sufficiency and a determination to preserve their way of life against all odds. The disbandment of the Empire after World War II led inevitably to independence. In 1961 South Africa left a Commonwealth increasingly dominated by traditionless and unfriendly black countries, some of whom were already practising forms of government which were by any civilized standards deplorable. For these white people South Africa is home and the only home. They have created its organisation and its infrastructure, and they are defending it with all their strength. They have a perfect right to do this, as has anyone who defends his home against those who seek to destroy it.

South Africa is not democratic.

This is true, in the sense that the black does not have the vote. The fact that this is also effectively the case everywhere else in Africa, and in much of the rest of the world, is conveniently ignored. The position of someone like the leader of the Labour party in England is typical. After he had been sounding off about sanctions and one-man one-vote he was asked specifically if this was really what he wanted for South Africa. One of his staff replied and confirmed that it was. He has not been heard to express similar views in respect of Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe or Zaire. It seems that black-on-black injustice is acceptable to liberal thought, while white-on-black is not.

Since blacks dominate numerically in South Africa, one man-one vote inevitably means black government, and as one of the vocal black clerics said the other day, 'when we get power we will just substitute the word black for the word white'. It needs little imagination, given the history of Africa since World War II, to know what this means. The whites, their families, and their property would all be at risk of being engulfed in a rampage of revenge for perceived past injustices. That black factions would struggle for power is also inevitable, and the blood-letting would certainly be on the scale of that which occurred after the partition of India in 1947. Somewhere between a quarter and half a million people have been killed in Uganda. There has been wholesale slaughter in Burundi: a hundred thousand are estimated to have been killed there in the last few years. Corruption is everywhere, the press is silenced, human rights are violated, and political freedoms abolished. Where is the outcry from those who rail at the smallest indignity to blacks in South Africa.

Given one-man, one-vote, in five years this beautiful and prosperous country of South Africa would be reduced to the dreadful condition in which Mozambique and Angola find themselves now. This must have occurred to Mr Kinnock, and his blindness is an example of the ruthlessness of the liberal conscience.

Apartheid is evil.

This sentiment is commonly expressed, even by people who appear to think clearly about these issues. I have no reason to question whether or not they mean it, but it would be indiscreet for a politician of any ilk to say otherwise at this time. Mr Kaufman proclaims loudly, and ridiculously, that the government of South Africa is much viler than that of Colonel Gaddafi.

It is not clear to many that it is the sort of evil which it is held up to be, and the case in favour of apartheid is rarely heard, such is the taboo. In the media, those great formulators of opinion that are riddled with

liberal ideologues, every opportunity is taken to stir up anti-apartheid feeling.

About a year ago, on the BBC World Service, the presenter made a spontaneous anti-apartheid outburst, obviously expressing his personal views. The appropriateness of such comment in that context was questioned, and when later he presented a programme on South Africa - during the Lambeth Conference - he seemed much more circumspect and neutral. On this occasion the guests were the anti-apartheid campaigner the Right Reverend Trevor Huddleston, the Archbishop Denis Hurley of Durban (who has refused to condemn necklacing), and the admirably impartial Graham Leach, the BBC correspondent in South Africa. The technique of using surrogates to express producers' opinions is usual. If, for instance, they want a pro-sanctions statement from the USA, they call on Congressman Solarz, a New York Democrat, who is articulate and persuasive and it sounds as though this is representative of American opinion.

Apartheid means separateness, in this case essentially of blacks and whites. Whether or not all men are equal in the eyes of God is not the issue. What is the issue is that there are forces which operate against the free mixing of races, and which explain the fact that the races do not coalesce and become one homogeneous whole. An American friend said with confidence in 1957 that in a generation or two that would happen. Thirty and more years later, despite all sorts of pressures towards true integration, the blacks and whites in the USA are further apart than they were then. They live in separate areas, they do not intermarry in significant numbers, and their social lives are essentially separate. That they can lie together and breed is clear. But in general they choose not to, and the choice is mutual. Separateness between sub-species is the natural order. Homo sapiens has not, we can be sure, evolved to the point where his instincts have been bred out of him.

There is an innocent and natural basis for the separateness of races, and the biologic underpinnings of apartheid exist and cannot be denied. This is not a moral or an ethical issue, though it can certainly be argued that an attempt should be made to make such considerations prevail. But that is another argument, and has to be pursued in its own right and in full knowledge of what the price might be. Separateness of whites and blacks is, in any event, far from having its roots in white racism. Steve Biko broke away purposely from the white liberal students' movement NUSAS to form SASO and promote black consciousness. His lieutenant Barney Pitso Mosimota said that the future was not 'through a directionless multiracialism but through a positive unilateral approach. Black man, you are on your own.'

The situations in the USA and in South Africa are very different, though there seems to be scant understanding of this in the USA, where issues concerning South Africa tend to be considered in terms of civil rights in the style of Alabama, or of colonial emanci-

pation. Neither of these applies. In the USA the blacks constitute 12% of the population, and the whites can afford to be generous, for they are hardly threatened. In South Africa the blacks make up over 70%, and South Africa is not a colony.

If the rights of the white South Africans not to be subjugated and thrown out of their homes are morally defensible, and separateness is a natural order, the perspectives become different. As human beings the charge is firmly placed on us to mitigate in whatever way we can any hardships which might follow from these principles. But we must realise that that is the charge, not the abolition of apartheid. The road to hell here is certainly paved with good intentions, and the passage along it is hastened by the sirens who call from the sidewalks and encourage us to quicken our pace. Among these are the Churchmen who have chosen to devote their energies to social and political issues while the spiritual ones are left to take care of themselves; the African National Congress; the liberal conscience-hawkers; the communists, anarchists, anti-imperialists, Marxist/Leninists; the professional protestors; and those who make an industry and a living out of race relations, who thrust upon us *ad nauseam* the rights of blacks without any suggestions about their duties.

The blacks in South Africa are well-paid in relation to blacks elsewhere. They have trade unions, and are entering the ranks of the skilled and semi-skilled in appreciable numbers. They can own property, though only in designated areas. In South Africa this segregation is *de jure*; in the USA *de facto*. There are other things, such as pass laws, identity cards, closed beaches etc, but in the USA it is also difficult for Jews and blacks to get into social organisations such as country clubs except in modest numbers so as to avert criticism, and in South Africa there is a gradual but real erosion of these points of contention. There is no vote, the *amour propre* is hurt, and it were better that it were not so. But the ultimate concern is one of survival and power, and certain things remain incompatible, goodwill notwithstanding.

The ANC and Nelson Mandela should be supported.

The most prominent organisation representing blacks in their struggle against apartheid is the African National Congress. This is perceived by many as a fundamentally decent and authoritative body, with generally pro-Western sentiments despite some minor contacts with the Soviet bloc which are no more sinister than those of the Physicians for Peace. Congressman Solarz, in making his powerful advocacy of sanctions, cited Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo as his authorities, the former being the founder of the ANC's military wing and the latter its president. In England, a whole-page advertisement appeared in the *Observer* on 6 December 1987, under the banner headline WILL YOU PUT YOUR NAME TO THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE, FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA?

In smaller print was:

We the undersigned send our warmest best wishes to the African National Congress in its 75th Anniversary Year. We wholeheartedly support the ANC's justified struggle for a unitary South Africa with freedom and justice for all. We call on all British people to add their voice to the call for a new South Africa, a South Africa where human dignity and equality will prevail in the life of all its people.

Beneath that, in heavy type, was the name of the Right Reverend Trevor Huddleston C.R., and then seven prominent people whose names would presumably catch the eye. These were Diane Abbott M.P., Dame Peggy Ashcroft, David Astor, John Dankworth CBE, Sir Raymond Hoffenburg, Cleo Laine CBE, and Stephen Sadley Q.C. Then, in ordinary type, came a list of about 1500 individuals and groups, including the Communist Party of Great Britain, the Chilean Communist Party, Haringey Trade Union Council, the secretary of the London Communist Party, and Socialist Action. The presence of the President of the Royal College of Physicians came as a bit of a surprise. At the foot of the coupon which invited the *Observer's* readers to send their money was "This advertisement has been paid for by those listed above and produced by other supporters of the African National Congress." It was left to our imagination as to who these other supporters were.

The ANC is in fact an organisation which practices and advocates violence, is committed to Marxist-Leninist ideology, and has political intentions which are anti-Western and totalitarian. Let us examine some of the evidence for this to be found in the public statements of its luminaries. I draw also on the article by David Roberts Jr. entitled "The ANC in Its Own Words" which appeared in *Commentary*, July 1988.

First, Oliver Tambo. It is clear from Tambo's statements that he views the activities of the ANC as part of a world-wide struggle. At Kabwe, Zambia in June 1985 he spoke about 'the liberation of mankind from the forces of imperialism and reaction' and 'the progressive transformation of the world, including our own region of South Africa.' He identified the 'progressive forces' actively pursuing world transformation as consisting of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the progressive governments and liberation movements of the underdeveloped world, and 'the democratic movements within the imperialist countries.' He linked the victory of progressive forces in Indo-China to the ANC's own forthcoming triumph over imperialism. Francis Meli, the East German-educated editor of the ANC monthly *Sechaba*, told his comrades in the East German Communist party that 'when you give solidarity to us, you are not helping some needy, poor blacks in the jungles of Africa, you are promoting your own struggle in your own country . . . because the liberation of South Africa will mean the weakening of international imperialism.'

For Tambo and Mandela, NATO is an aggressive military bloc, part of the American conspiracy to turn

many countries of Western Europe into vassals of the United States. In 1962 Mandela wrote that applying 'the great qualities of revolutionary geniuses like Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin' would make of South Africa a land of peace, freedom and plenty:

Under a Communist party government, South Africa will become a land of milk and honey. Political, economic, and social rights will cease to be enjoyed by whites only. They will be shared equally by whites and non-whites. There will be enough land and houses for all. There will be no unemployment, starvation, and disease. Workers will earn decent wages; transport will be cheap and education free. There will be no pass laws, no influx controls, no police raids for passes and poll tax, and Africans, Europeans, Coloureds, and Indians will live in racial peace and perfect harmony.

For Mandela's wife Winnie, the Soviet Union is 'the genuine friend and ally of all oppressed people fighting the dark forces of world reaction' and the country where 'genuine power of the people has been transformed from dreams into reality.' She endorsed necklacing (burning people by setting rubber tyres alight which have been placed around their necks) as an agent of liberation in her Munsieville speech, and the practice has been regularly extolled in *Sechaba*, over Radio Freedom, and by sundry ANC spokesmen. One of Mrs Mandela's houses has recently been burned down, not by whites but by blacks. She has built a large mansion, and has been engaged with her American legal advisers and public relations organisers about the franchise of the family name.

Roberts tells us that the ANC draws its inspiration for the future of South Africa

from the most brutal, incompetent, famine-creating, and freedom-loathing one-party regimes on the continent. The ANC is on singularly cordial terms with the genocidal Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, which plays host to the ANC's Radio Freedom, and with Julius Nyerere's Tanzania, where the ANC founded its two party colleges, both of which practice Tanzanian-style indoctrination. Both the ANC's political offices and the headquarters of its military wing, *Umkhonto we Sizwe*, are in Zambia, and it repays this hospitality by dismissing its host country's rapid economic decline under Kenneth Kaunda's increasingly collectivist policies as the consequence of 'capitalist exploitation' and 'colonialism'. But the ANC has chosen to associate itself most intimately of all with the overtly Leninist states of Angola and Mozambique, governments which have given their respective peoples nothing but economic collapse, famine, and a totalitarian regime leavened only by corruption and incompetence. Both Angola's ruling MPLA and Mozambique's Frelimo have reduced the courts, the press, the trade unions, the economy, and, in brief, the whole of civil society to mere adjuncts of themselves. Neither

regime tolerates the slightest dissent or even neutrality, and both administer justice through revolutionary tribunals and keep thousands of political prisoners in some of the world's most squalid prisons and 're-education camps'. Both nations were agriculturally self-sufficient when they became independent in 1975, and both have since seen their agricultural output diminish by at least half. And both regimes are kept in power by thousands of foreign troops and by vast amounts of Soviet military aid.

It is with such things that so many seem to want to ally themselves. It is for such causes, that stand in direct antithesis to our own culture and our own interests, that the BBC devotes 10 hours of prime television time to celebrate Mandela's birthday and then has the effrontery to repeat the jamboree for five hours on Christmas Day; that Neil Kinnock, who pretends to the qualities of British Prime Minister, unveils a bronze statue of Mandela and travels those countries praising their ways and vilifying those farther south who are the bulwark of our proper interests in the South Atlantic. And it is for such reasons that the cry goes out to undo a country that has the courage to resist the cancerous advance of liberal and racist destructiveness. It is convenient, as the TUC honours Mandela and the good burghers of Newport, Gwent name streets after him, that he has refused to renounce violence. The new South Africa, according to Mandela, was to be created through guerilla warfare in which nobody was to be killed, yet according to the prosecution at his trial he ordered 210,000 grenades and 48,000 anti-personnel mines for the ANC.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union processes her diamonds through de Beer's, the USA is dependent for chromium on the USSR, South Africa has the atom bomb and has

perforce had to become a major manufacturer of arms. Sanctions are proposed and imposed which serve only further to punish the blacks and to delay the amelioration of their lot.

Oliver Cromwell wrote in 1650 to the Church Assembly of Scotland: 'I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.' So should it be here, for the time has come for a re-orientation of thought. South Africa should be allowed back into the comity of nations, and the automatic obeisance to all things black should now be seen to be, in large part, a sentimental assuaging of misplaced conscience.

Before he died, T.E. Utley visited South Africa, and wrote two articles in *The Times*, on April 13th and 14th 1987. He saw clearly that the conclusions of the Eminent Persons Group, to the effect that there would be a steady acceleration of disorder which would end in a bloodbath, were so much nonsense. He saw that the established power of the South African state was such, and its determination so strong, that there was no prospect of change imposed by force. He saw that one-man one-vote would last one minute, 'after which there will be a one-party state, probably controlled by Marxist blacks, and therefore both tyrannical and incompetent.' He saw, as did Alan Paton towards the end of his life, that sanctions were impeding the orderly progress towards improving the life of the black population, and he concluded by saying 'My final message: for God's sake, leave them alone!'

It would be well to hesitate and consider what are the greater evils, for to destroy a country is a form of macro-vandalism, which, if it were to succeed, will go down in history as one of the more disgraceful and purblind actions of a blundering mankind. Those who are of real goodwill, who are prepared to think rather than repeat fashionable slogans, should cease to put their shoulders to this fateful wheel.

Them and Us

George Martelli

When President de Gaulle vetoed the entry of Britain into the EEC his motive was not merely hatred of this country. It is true that his 'Anglophobia', as Churchill described it, was so virulent that even during the war, when he and the Free French were wholly financed by the British Government, he never lost an opportunity of biting the hand that fed him. All the same, he was only speaking the truth when he argued that Britain could never become a part of Europe in the way that its other countries were.

The reasons for this are so obvious that it seems scarcely worth stating them. But since they are apparently ignored by the enthusiasts for European union it may be useful to repeat them.

The first, of course is geography, which largely determines history. When Churchill, after the collapse of France in June 1940, was trying to persuade General Weygand, the French commander, to fight on, he concluded his harangue by declaring that, whatever the French did, Britain would continue the struggle

and was prepared to resist invasion if the Germans tried it. To which Weygand, rather ruefully, responded, 'It's true that you have a formidable tank trap in the Channel'.

It is more difficult, obviously, to transport an army across water than simply to march it over a frontier. But the Channel by itself would not be an obstacle to the invasion of Britain without British command of the sea - and in modern warfare of the air above it. This command we have exercised (with occasional lapses) for the last 400 years at least. It was what prevented the Spanish army, massed in the Netherlands, from embarking for England in 1588; what caused Napoleon to break up his camp in Boulogne and march east in 1805; and what gave Hitler such cold feet in 1940 that he cancelled operation 'Sealion'.

Of all the differences separating Britain from the rest of Europe, her immunity from invasion for so many centuries, in fact since the Norman conquest, is probably the greatest in determining the attitude of the nation. Never to have seen the arrival of foreign troops on their soil (except those of William III who came by invitation); never to have taken orders from an army of occupation, or from a puppet government set up by that army; never to have ceased to be masters in their own house; in short never to have lost control of their own destiny - it is these that make the experience of the British unique in Europe, if not in the world. We may smile today at those lines in *Rule Britannia*. But the fact remains that unlike the Dutch under the Spaniards, the Spaniards under the French, the French under the Germans, the Germans under the Russians (not to mention the British and the Americans), and the Italians under almost everybody, Britons never *have* been slaves, and this is bound in some degree to set them apart from the continentals.

Nor, unlike the latter, have the British ever come under the unifying influence exerted at different periods of European history by some power seeking to establish its autarchy, whether it was the Holy Roman Empire, the monarchies of France or Spain, a Napoleon, or a Hitler. The legacy of the *Code Napoléon* is still visible in many European countries - the rule of the road for example. Crossing from one to another one often scarcely notices any change. How different on arriving at Dover!

Thanks to her immunity from invasion Britain is also the only member of the European Community which has been able, over a period of 900 years, to develop her own institutions - political, economic, social and cultural - without interruption (except in time of civil war) or interference from abroad. As a result the traditional infrastructure of British society - parliament, the monarchy and the judicial system is much older here than in any other European country. Contrast it, for example, with that of the French, who have seen five French Republics in just over 100 years, or of the Germans and Italians, whose modern states are scarcely older, while their democracies are even younger. After so many constitutional changes, a few more, necessitated by European union, would scarcely

make any differences to peoples who in the course of their history have lost their independence, not once but repeatedly. A diminution of sovereignty would not appear so great a sacrifice as it would to those, like the British, who have never surrendered any.

Another consequence of geography was that Britain became a maritime as opposed to a land power. Situated on the edge of the continental shelf it was inevitable that the British should look outward rather than inward, westward rather eastward, and seek their fortune on the sea, not on the land. Europe, with its competing dynasties, interminable wars, and bloody revolutions, the British knew only too well and wanted none of. But across the oceans all was new: discoveries, adventures, riches; and it was in pursuit of these that they laid the foundations of what was to become the greatest empire the world has seen. The open water was their element, and by comparison - notwithstanding the feats of the Spanish, Portuguese, and French explorers, and of the German navy in two world wars - the continentals have always appeared as landlubbers.

It is true that we have frequently fought wars on the continent. But the aim of these wars since the Middle Ages at least, was not to acquire territory, but to prevent any European Power from becoming so powerful as to threaten our security. Our foreign policy was to divide, not to rule, but in order to survive.

The gap separating the British from the European experience, which has been widening ever since the collapse of Christendom and the rise of nationalism, was probably enlarged still further by the last war. Although the British had to endure the blitz, and their armed forces suffered very high casualties, their sufferings as a nation were nothing compared with those in other countries, who experienced military defeat followed by foreign occupation. Thus the effect of the war was both to set the British further apart and to bring the continentals closer together. This was seen, for example, in the historic reconciliation of France and Germany, which was the first step towards European union. A cementing factor, especially for the French, may have been envy of Britain for having fought a better war and suffered less from it. Excluding her from the Common Market could be seen as the revenge taken by the vanquished (of which France, because of her poor military showing, was the most resentful) on the victors. And now that Britain is only one of twelve it must give some satisfaction to see her cut down to size.

It may be objected that all this relates to the past and has no relevance to the present. However, just as the character of an individual is formed largely by his experience of life, so that of a nation is the product of its history. Because the other members of the European Community, in the course of time, have had so many shared experiences in which Britain played no part, there is bound to be much more in common between all of them (with the exception perhaps of Greece), than between any of them and Britain.

To take one example. Most continentals, especially in what are called the Latin countries, are legal-minded but not law-abiding. The British, on the contrary, tend to obey the law even when they deride it. It is what they call 'playing the game' - a virtue not recognised across the Channel, at any rate as far as governments are concerned. For instance, some time ago it was agreed by the EEC that no ransom should be paid for hostages. Since then both the French and the West German Governments have paid large sums (which they deny) for the release of their nationals kidnapped in the Lebanon; and for not doing the same the British Government has been criticised both at home and abroad. There is thus a danger that when regulations are made which do not suit other members of the Community they will manage somehow to evade them. Only British civil servants, with their public school ethos, will feel in honour bound to comply, regardless of the national interest.

The greater danger is that we allow ourselves to be persuaded by those who see European union, not as a means to an end, i.e. a better life for all, but as a desirable end in itself, like world government or permanent revolution, justifying any means. For these people internationalism is intrinsically good, and nationalism, with which they equate patriotism, intrinsically evil. They would have us be ashamed rather than proud of our past, and belittle the difference between ourselves and the continentals. They would regard the transfer of power from Westminster to Strasbourg or Brussels, not as a regrettable expedient, but as a great step forward on the path of human progress. If we listened to them our nation would be like a man who has lost his memory: they would not know who they were; and would be at the mercy of anybody. This would surely be too high a price to pay for any commercial or other advantage that resulted.

The immediate threat comes from two bodies: the European Commission, with its monstrous army of Brussels bureaucrats, and the European Parliament. The first is entirely unrepresentative, and the second representative only in name, since it is absurd to imagine that one MEP can adequately represent the interests of seven hundred thousand constituents, the vast majority of whom do not even know his name, or that the interests of the country as a whole can be adequately represented by a few score members in an assembly of over five hundred. Both bodies are hellbent on power and dedicated to the creation, not of a *Europe des Etats*, as envisaged by de Gaulle and the other founding fathers, but of a federal Europe administered by a supra-national government, with national governments playing a role analogous to that of our local authorities.

If there is anybody who regards this as an exaggeration let him consider the declaration made a few months ago by M. Delors, President of the European Commission, when he predicted that in a few years time 80% of our social and economic legislation would be dictated from Brussels (what, one might ask, would

be left for our own Parliament to do?). As a foretaste of what the Commission has in store for us M. Delors has unveiled his Social Charter, which, if it ever became law here, would effectively destroy all the good done by successive Thatcher governments in curbing trade union power. As the Prime Minister commented: she and her colleagues had not rolled back the frontiers of socialism only to let it in by the back door.

But can she be so sure, even if she is still in power? Having abandoned the right of veto in the Council of Ministers, Britain is likely to find herself increasingly over-ruled by the majority, if not in a minority of one. Mrs. Thatcher may dig her heels in, but would a Labour Government? With all their anti-national prejudices, I do not think so.

This country has preserved its freedom from foreign interference through all those centuries because Europe was always divided. If the others now gang up against her, can that freedom survive? It can if the will is there, but not if our Europeanists have their way.

Čarnogurský on Trial

Readers of the *Review* will be alarmed to learn that one of our Central European contributors, Ján Čarnogurský, is now (at the time of going to press) standing trial on charges of subversion.

As he wrote in our issue of June 1989, "Recent experience confirms that when the totalitarian state controls the whole of society, the church is the last island of freedom: on its fringe can exist not only the dead leaves of the past but also the new shoots of civil society." (p. 36) Čarnogurský, as a sincere and courageous defender of religious liberty, has therefore been identified as a major threat to the security of the Czechoslovak state. He must now pay the penalty for activities which are not only natural, but also obligatory.

We hope that our readers will ask their church leaders to pray for him, and their MPs to make representations on his behalf to the embassy of that faraway country in which mad ideologies still cling to power.

The Western Left and Eastern Europe

Marek Matraszek

Eastern Europe has long been neglected by conservatives in the West, who remain unfamiliar with the true nature of the socialist state. To some extent this is an error deriving from a mistaken understanding of what it means to be a conservative in international affairs, where the Tory principles of caution and concern with established power, translated to the international plane, have traditionally resulted in a tacit acceptance of the post-war status quo. More often, conservatives are suspicious of those who tend to believe in anything in an uncompromising fashion, and tend to regard it as clever to be disdainful of firmly held views. In this they have an affinity with liberals, who are confirmed in the attitude that people should be allowed to voice whatever views might cross their mind, as long as they do not actually believe in them.

It has been difficult therefore, for the conservative to press the case for a concerted alliance with the anti-communist opposition in East-Central Europe. His problems have been compounded not only by the apathy of his fellows, but also by the efforts of the Western left, which is busily attempting to re-establish the grip of socialist ideas in the face of the crumbling facades of the East European political systems, long discredited in the eyes of their populations. Abandoned by the Western right, East European dissidents and opposition activists are increasingly being confronted by Western socialists, who insist that, insofar as there is a crisis in Eastern Europe, it results not from socialism itself, but from the fact of its appropriation by the 'State bureaucracies' in those unhappy lands; and in their enterprise, Western socialists are achieving remarkable success.

How is this possible? To a large extent, the burst of energy by the socialist in promoting his dogmas in Eastern Europe is a function of the failure of classical Marxism to explain change in the real world at all. It is well known that for Marx, property was the locus of the central exploitative power relationship in capitalism. The conflict between bourgeois and proletarian was to be resolved not by what we today would consider the mechanisms of mediation, resolution and consolation - namely law, culture, custom, the market and religious faith - but by the abolition of these very institutions. They were perceived by Marx as mere masks of the underlying conflict, to be torn aside and replaced by the institutionalized will of the proletarian, eager to impose his angry response.

This analysis necessarily places the contemporary socialist in a quandary. For where Western civilization has been allowed to develop unhindered, there the proletarian as Marx understood him has definitely disappeared, if he had ever existed at all; and in

contrast, where property has indeed been abolished, there the working classes have grown in strength, and in their increasing impoverishment become steadily more ready to overthrow the institutions informed by the Marxist vision. The solution to this dilemma has been relatively simple for the socialist: to substitute for the universal proletarian of Marx the 'universal citizen', owing a loyalty to nothing but his own self-realization, and untrammelled by anything other than the whims of his subjective will. It may be granted to Marx that his idealized proletarian had a certain charm, a clear identity of sweaty toil and determination with which one might feel a twinge of sympathy; but as irrational as such sentimentality might be, it is as nothing compared with the emptiness of that which replaced it. Less a Marxist-Leninist figure of stern substance, and more a Freudian-Nietzschian will-o'-the-wisp, the ideal of today's socialist is indeed a ghost, an empty vessel alternatively labelled 'humanity', 'the individual', or 'the citizen', which precisely because it may be fleshed out with whatever substance takes the socialist's fancy, signifies nothing of value. That which truly is of value - the culture into which we are born, the loyalties to which we are enjoined, and the piety with which we reflect upon our relationship to God - are not to be found in the socialist's vision of man. These are but fetters, and they must be cast aside in the quest for an authenticity to be discovered only in the struggle against authority. And here, as we shall see, is the key to the socialist's optimism even as his certainties of old begin to disappear.

For the very shifts of argument which permit the socialist to argue his cause in the West enable him to present himself as the herald of a liberating intellectual order in Eastern Europe. Capitalism is flawed, no longer because it fails the proletarian - who has in fact gained most from it - but because it fails the 'individual', whether he be black, cripple, single mother, or sexual deviant. And if the individual is to be liberated here, so he must be liberated in the East as well; not from socialism, of course, for that is still the goal to be achieved, but from sexism, paternalism, nationalism, racism, and even statism itself. The enemy of the East European peoples is not the socialist system under which they have groaned for half a century, but the fetters on the individual that it has as yet failed to remove. If the socialist systems have failed their inhabitants, he will claim, it is not because the concept of liberation is flawed, but because there has not been enough liberation; and it is the task of the Western socialist to carry forward this ideal into countries where it has been usurped by a 'Stalinist bureaucracy'.

The concern of the Western socialist over the fate of Eastern Europe is a new phenomenon. His shouted proclamations now are in marked contrast to his silence of forty years ago, when whole nations and cultures were disappearing into the communist abyss. But then, of course, the order which was being destroyed was that to which the socialist was traditionally hostile: that rooted in religious faith, suspicious of untrammelled reason, and pious towards a historical past. That the socialist emerges now is a sign not so much of his conversion, but of his realization that those values he had wished to destroy are being reborn in Eastern Europe; and he sees his task as not to aid their recovery, but rather to impede them, and to seek their replacement by the pronouncements of his own rejuvenated ideology.

It may be felt that these fears are exaggerated; therefore, let the socialists speak for themselves. It is well known that the position of the socialist in Britain is strongest in the academic world, where like one of the minor gentry grouped around Lenin in 1917, he finds himself a member of a privileged rentier class, deriving financial benefits and, without an eye for duty, free to pursue his hunger for the power from which he is excluded, deaf to the criticisms which he would otherwise face and absolved from confronting his learned effusions with the reality that denies them. If this is true of the university lecturer, then it is doubly so of the employee of the polytechnic, the vanguard institution of thrusting egalitarianism; and it is no surprise that the platform he uses in order to project his propaganda is the academic conference, where he may preen himself and his academic 'achievements' at no financial or intellectual expense to himself. One such conference was recently organized in Budapest - a city which needs no lessons as to the 'essence of socialism' - by the Institute of Sociology at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, on the theme of 'Citizenship in Europe'. It could have been the occasion for a celebration of the end of the socialist idea in a country which has perhaps done more than any other to bury it, and an opportunity to renew the intellectual case for those social institutions - property, law, and family - which are the best guarantees of the dignity of the human person.

Yet it was here that Western socialists were able to proclaim their message that the solution to the problems of Eastern Europe was not less socialism, but more. Some ten socialist activists, in the guise of disinterested academics, had come from Britain for the conference, pretending to represent Western opinion rather than the attitudes which in reality they must by obligation hold if they are to obtain employment in our education system. Dave Spart figures, spitting their hatred of 'Thatcher' and 'the capitalist system', almost every paper they presented was, in the stilted language that now dominates learning, 'an ongoing contribution to the democratic socialist debate', full of 'issues to be addressed' and 'new agendas' to be set; the unifying goal was to inform the Hungarian audience that,

having removed the shackles of socialism, they should promptly gird themselves for a struggle with the oppressiveness of capitalism.

Thus we were told, by one Ursula Vogel, that the market economy - which even the most obtuse economist would recognize as the only solution to the collapse of the East European economic systems - was to be rejected, since it would mean the 'integration of Hungary into the exploitative global capitalist market system'. The fact that Hungary is already part of a global economic system called Comecon, and that it might be thought that the threat to democracy lay in this latter organization rather than in a mythical ideological construct, was an irrelevance. Instead it was proclaimed by Larry Ray, of the Department of Sociology at Lancaster University, that the introduction of the market would spell the end of democracy and freedom because of the inherent exploitation involved; and this despite the well-known refutations of the Marxist theory of value in which the concept of exploitation is rooted. Nor, warned menacingly Dave Taylor, of the Polytechnic of North London, should Hungarians look to the liberal idea of citizenship as a model for their activity: such a 'discourse' masks gender and racial inequalities, and conceals the fact that the hallmark of British citizenship is institutionalized racism. What then of the traditional forms of association, including that most fundamental - the family? Are these not worthy of protection, and redeemable from the socialist's condemnation? The answer was predictable: Dave's colleague, Mita Castle, assessed that no freedom was possible unless the paternalistic repression of women within the family was abolished, East and West.

In my paper¹ I argued that it was Marxism which was to blame for the destruction of civil society in Eastern Europe, through its abhorrence of law and property, and negation of a universalist morality. This was of course a grave error on my part, since it marked me down as a reactionary, immune to the revelations of the Marxist vision. Henceforth I was to be ostracised, made into a lonely figure of contemplation for my ideological mistakes, ignored by those I had insulted. I was allowed merely to listen in silence as successive speakers droned on in Foucauldese - that sociological newspeak understandable only on its own terms and translatable only by those who peddle it. It is no exaggeration to say that the obscurantist language of neo-Marxist sociology is just as destructive of European reality as communism, for it is designed to conceal moral and spiritual values, and to reveal instead a world of conflict and struggle. This is of course what our new high priests of truth desire, for they, like the communists, have discovered that in order to control ideas it is first necessary to control the language through which they are expressed. Here the debt to Marxism is clear: nothing is as it seems, and the true application of thought - the thought of a privileged few - is to discern the concealed structures of power in political systems. Not surprisingly, when this attempt

is made, all delicacy is banished from language, and in consequence from thought. The idiom becomes harsh and unfriendly, suited only to the mechanistic applications of the sociologist, where reality is obscured by a pervading sense of hatred against 'the capitalist system'.

Yet the relationship to Marxism goes further. Just as Marxism spawned its own priestly caste, the class of initiates whose task it was to transform the master's confused utterances into terms which the masses in their simplicity could absorb, so modern sociology has given rise to its own mediators, the academics who have become propagandists of their own ideology. It is impossible for even the educated outsider to understand quite what is being said. After all, what does the following actually mean?

The work of authors like Oestreich, Elias, MacMullen, Veyne, Meier and, of course, Foucault have illuminated in valuable ways the continuities and complexities of the relations between practices in which power is exercised and individuals are objectified as subjects; between practices through which those who exercise power over others objectify themselves as subjects, practices through which those subject to power are objectified by others as subjects, and practices in which these same individuals subject to the power wielded by others objectify themselves and their rulers as subjects.²

Whatever it does mean, it is not for us to decide: we are told that reality is power, and if we do not understand this, it is as a result of our deficiencies, perhaps because we too are subject to a power of which we are unaware. It becomes clear that the Western sociologist develops a vested interest in the maintenance of this vision, since it is the only one which will sustain his profession. And it is clear that he cannot allow Eastern Europe, where the task is to transform the brutality of illegitimate power into the consolation of legitimate authority, to offer a refutation; and it is for this reason that he seeks there the hegemony of his own interpretation.

By seeking out the hidden structures of power on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Western Marxist at once threatens to impose it where none exists, and to trivialize it where it truly does. It will not occur to him that religion, the traditions of the family, the habits of trade, the fidelity to one's Nation, are the essential components of what it means to be truly East European, and are those aspects of identity which communism has uniformly sought to undermine. If there has been abuse of 'human rights', then it is precisely in this sense of forbidding the peoples of Eastern Europe the right to live as their culture demands of them. If we hear instead that the family is an instrument of paternalistic repression, that religious faith is dogmatic and reactionary, that the market is a mechanism for the exploitation of the proletariat, and that the national community is a vehicle for obscurantist intolerance, then the question arises as to what our Marxist proposes to do about it. Doubtless the solution will be the same

as that pursued by his ideological forebears in the same part of Europe after the World War II: to construct a mechanism of State dominance, staffed by determined ideologues such as himself, and whose task it shall be to eradicate these illicit structures of subordination. The rhetoric is directed against power; the reality would involve its genuine institutionalization, the relentless politicization of those areas of civil life which forty years of Soviet-imposed Marxism have not yet managed to destroy.

If the Western Marxist seeks out power where none exists, then he correspondingly trivializes it when he actually finds it. If he is to 'deconstruct' reality in both halves of Europe, if oppression is equal in both the East and the West - and if Mita Castle was to be believed, it is worse in Britain, where the repression of unions by 'Thatcher' illustrates the fact that 'civil society' has ceased to exist - by what criteria are we to condemn the horrors of Ceausescu's Romania, and praise the conditions of tolerance and liberty at home? I recall a discussion about precisely this problem at one of the conference meetings. The theme had been that of Romania, when one of the Marxists piped up: 'Well, I would like to expand the discussion, and bring in the issues of ethnic minorities in Britain today, as well as the oppression suffered by the people of Northern Ireland under the West European imperium. . . .'

It is clearly absurd for the Western left to present itself as a friend of Eastern Europe. It is not friendship that the Marxist seeks there, but a new struggle for 'liberation', a new playground where he hopes to impose his sterile dogmas on societies made uneasy and malleable by their experience of socialism hitherto - all the better for him, in his goal of creating a new man from the stuff of the past. There is little hope for the re-establishment of that which is valuable to the peoples of East-Central Europe when the Western left is allowed to speak in their name. It must fall to the conservative to make a gesture, by seeking to reassert an understanding of politics in terms which do not lead him into the errors of the Marxist. He will speak of duty rather than rights, of obedience rather than choice, of fulfilment rather than authenticity, of faith rather than conviction and of law rather than liberation. For one of the weaknesses of the East European oppositions has been the loss of a language in which conservative values may be articulated: in mouthing the slogans of social democracy, they merely act to legitimate the system against which they purport to speak, which even now is seeking to rescue itself by attracting a new class of intellectual apologists in both East and West Europe. In this context, the conservative discovers an obligation to articulate a vision of human fulfilment which is to be found not, as the socialist would have it, in politics, but rather through it, in religion, submission, and love. The picture which emerges from such a politics is an imperfect one and often contradictory, but it is precisely the conservative position that there is no final solution. If he speaks in this way, he will discover that those most ready to listen will be where the

socialist least expected them: in those societies it has been the task of Marxism to destroy. And in doing so he will be forging an alliance that may yet be sufficient to defend all of Europe against the Western left.

Notes

1. Marek Matraszek, 'Civil Society and the Polish Opposition', *Słowo*, Vol. 2, No. 1, May 1989.
2. Graham Burchell, 'Citizenship and Liberal "Ways of Life"', unpublished conference paper, pp. 1-2.

The Moral and Occult Roots of Nazism

Angela Ellis Jones

In the year which marks the centenary of the birth of Hitler and the fiftieth anniversary of the war he started, we have been offered many politico-economic explanations for his rise to power. The classic analysis of Nazism is familiar: National Socialism was essentially a political-economic phenomenon, suffused with a strong racial tinge, which was invoked as a remedy of last resort by the demoralised Germans in the 1930s. Its protagonist, Hitler, was an unbalanced megalomaniac.

The truth is far more complicated and more sinister. While the success of Nazism owes much to the conditions created by the Versailles Treaty, it must also be seen in spiritual terms. What is invariably overlooked as a causative factor in the Nazi tragedy is the moral condition of Germany for some decades before the descent into barbarism. Nor can the involvement of leading Nazis in the occult be regarded as irrelevant to a full assessment of the evil of National Socialism.

In order to understand this moral condition we must go back into the nineteenth century. With the impact of industrialisation and the concomitant decline in religious belief and loosening of traditional bonds and loyalties, the German people had become 'rootless'. People were in a state of what Durkheim called 'anomie', that condition of lawless freedom in which the very value of existence comes to be questioned by the isolated individual.

This was the society for which Nietzsche proclaimed 'God is dead'. Yet this ringing affirmation struck fear in the breasts of many. Indeed the perceptible spiritual vacuum among the German people had for some time caused disquiet amongst the thinking classes. As early as 1853 the Biblical scholar Paul de Lagarde summed up in his first essay the views of a growing number of intellectuals pre and post-World War One who ruminated over the inadequacy of a purely secular society. A thoroughgoing cultural conservative, Lagarde criticised the emerging mass society with its lower standards of taste and morals with as much vehemence as his contemporary Matthew Arnold in England. In a thoroughly anti-liberal critique of modernity he was to articulate the widespread feeling of cultural decline and inner hollowness beneath the façade of Imperial Germany.

While recognising that the Christian faith was no longer tenable for nineteenth century man, Lagarde,

like many of his English contemporaries, nevertheless passionately believed that religion and the capacity to see the spiritual dimension of life were essential to the survival of men and nations. He saw *religio* not merely as binding society together but as linking the believer with the supernatural and the striving for excellence.

Lagarde was not alone in such views. His near-contemporary, Max Weber, pointed to a complex of attitudes he called *Entzauberung*, or disenchantment, which results from desacralisation, as a characteristic of the modern world. It brought in its train a sense of void, of infinite boredom and pervasive falsehood which oppressed in particular the young and many artists. Desperately seeking a faith, they proclaimed their yearning for a less materialistic and more 'natural' life:

In the 1880s passed over western Europe one of those movements of mind that history perceives but cannot easily analyse or define. It was something to do with a reviving sense that the world holds mystery and that the prosaic explanations of the age after the romantics will not satisfy.¹

What was the remedy for this spiritual malaise? Lagarde considered that the disastrous secularisation of the German soul could be overcome only if her political life could be charged with a religious purpose and sanction; what was needed was a new faith, a new community of believers, a world with fixed standards and no doubts, a new national religion that would bind all Germans together in a new Reich (the term had originally referred to the Holy Roman Empire). Considering Christianity with its Judaic and Roman roots to be alien to the German people he prescribed a new religion which fused Gospel doctrines with the national characteristics of the Germans, a religion rooted in German soil that would express the special ethos and destiny of the Teutonic people. Towards the end of his life Lagarde called for a Führer or Aryan saviour who would so completely represent the people that in him they would be united and his command would represent their will.²

Lagarde's writings can be seen as a natural development of *völkisch* thought, a nationalistic tendency which grew out of the Romantic movement and which sought to equate Germanness with everything that was best in the world. 'Rootedness' in the traditions of

the *Volk* and the German countryside was its catchword. By contrast the Jews were stigmatised as rootless. They were also disliked because of their evident success as capitalists, whom *völkisch* theorists greatly detested as representatives of modernity. A strong current of antisemitism began to flow.

Antisemitism had never been far below the surface in Germany, although no more so than in other European countries, especially Poland. Martin Luther had in 1543 set out some 'honest advice' as to how Jews should be treated: 'First their synagogues should be set on fire.' Jewish homes should likewise be 'broken down or destroyed'. Jews should then be 'put under one roof, or in a stable, like Gypsies, in order that they may realise that they are not masters in our land'. They should be put to work, to earn their living 'by the sweat of their noses' or, if regarded even then as too dangerous, these 'poisonous bitter worms' should be stripped of their belongings 'which they have extorted usoriously from us' and driven out of the country 'for all time'.³ Nevertheless, in late eighteenth century Berlin it appeared that earlier animosities had subsided as the literati flocked to the salons of distinguished Jews. But this new rapprochement was not to last.

In the wake of the stock market crash of 1873 a new wave of antisemitism was unleashed. In his pamphlets Lagarde attacked the Jew for being an alien element in German society, carrying a disease that contaminated its vital forces. In a series of popular novels which continued into the next century Jewish characters were portrayed as lacking a soul and all other human qualities. Victims of their egoistical power drives, they met miserable fates. By the 1920s the Jew had become a principal figure of derision and hate in *völkisch* and much conservative thought. Paul Johnson comments: 'By the 1920s, in brief, any political leader in Germany who wished to make antisemitism an agent of his 'will to power' could assemble his campaign from an enormous selection of slogans, ideas and fantasies, which had accumulated over more than half a century'.⁴

Lagarde's writings were devoured voraciously by educated Germans, especially younger ones, and were to be accorded a special place of honour in Nazi circles in the twenties, together with those of Julius Langbehn and Moeller von den Bruck. Numerous societies and clubs sprang up animated by the *völkisch* ideal. In the Wandervogel youth were immersed in a romanticism based upon the native landscape, elemental vitality and awareness of the German past. Nazism itself was to lay great emphasis on the 'return to nature'.

The nationalism of the *völkisch* theorists was given official backing. The authorities, after the German victory in the Franco-Prussian War (1870), anxious to make a nation out of the various German peoples - Prussians, Saxons, Bavarians and others - enlisted historians, philosophers and myth-makers in order to create a national ideology. In doing this they mixed together all the nationalist preoccupations of the mid-nineteenth century: ancient history, racial theory, folk religion and literature. Historians found evidence from

which they inferred that ancient Germanic civilisation, far from being backward, had been equal if not superior to the classical civilisations of Greece and Rome. Biologists commended the racial superiority of the Germans. In his music the virulently antisemitic Wagner commemorated the triumphs and disasters of the Teutonic heroes.

Another current of thought that began to flow at about this time was Theosophy. Founded in America by the notorious medium Madame Blavatsky in 1875, the Theosophical Society aimed to expound the virtues of esoteric Buddhism, the universal brotherhood of man, the propagation of ancient skills and wisdom, and the conscious mastery of man's latent psychic powers. In her *Secret Doctrine* Blavatsky argued that a Master Race would evolve from the most advanced branch of the Aryan race, the Teutons.

Soon a host of groups sprung up which incorporated both nationalist and theosophical elements. Their beliefs were outlandish, but were taken seriously by educated people. The Vril Society believed that there existed a subterranean kingdom in which a superior race waited to seize its chance to destroy humanity. This race possessed a very powerful force called Vril, which society members wished to locate and channel. The Thule Society was formed to investigate the legend and remains of Thule, reputed to be the lost Northern Atlantis. The group, which claimed that Thule had been the origin of the German race, adopted as its emblem a sword, oak leaves and curved swastika. The swastika, also adopted by the Vril Society and the Theosophists, is an ancient Indo-European symbol with occult associations.⁵

Another stream of thought in which contemporary German literary groups showed great interest and which was to influence Nazi thinking was Cathar Gnosticism. The Cathars were a heretical sect that flourished in thirteenth-century France. Like other occultists, they claimed to resurrect the 'ancient wisdom' and repudiated the canonical gospels. It is believed that the Holy Grail had been kept at their stronghold of Montsegur in the Pyrennees, to which Hitler is reputed to have sent a scout. Like that of the old Germanic legends, the Nordic sagas and Hindu vedas, which both theosophists and nationalists joined in resurrecting, the Cathar outlook was a Manichaean one - they saw two distinct principles of good and evil fighting for domination in the universe, but believed that the world was the handiwork of the evil principle. Their identification of Jehovah with the demiurge or evil creator of the world led inevitably to antisemitism.

So much for the ideas that smoothed the way for the triumph of Nazism. But what sort of a people was it that voted for Hitler? The moral decay noted by Lagarde in the nineteenth century continued apace in the twentieth, aggravated after the First World War by the hyper-inflation and its attendant destruction of values. A contemporary writer noted of Berlin in the Weimar days: 'On the east side resides crime; in the centre, chicanery; on the north side, misery; on the

west side, depravity; and on all sides dwells decadence.⁶ A distinguished historian has written:

Morality came to be divorced from sexual matters and in Berlin all manner of sexual licence and aberrations could be indulged without shame or restraint. Virginity lost its esteem and contraceptive practices gained official recognition. Nudism, homosexuality, sadism, masochism, flaunted themselves with immoderation that shocked visitors from Latin countries. The repulsive licence of republican Germany was a preparation for the callous immorality indoctrinated by the Nazi creed.⁷

Hitler's coming to power did nothing to lessen the immorality prevalent amongst German youth; in 1936 when approximately 100,000 members of the Hitler Youth and Girls' League attended the Nuremberg Rally, 900 girls aged 15-18 returned home pregnant. Sexual offences constituted a significant proportion of the Third Reich's rising juvenile delinquency problem; the Nazi Women's League's monthly journal in 1938 suggested a reason for this:

It must be seriously considered whether the character of our youth is not profoundly affected by pornography and illustrated sex crimes displayed at every street corner. Youngsters cluster around, and one hears the most obscene comments and perverse questions.⁸

Saddest perhaps was the fact that this decadence was widespread among those who might have been expected to show moral leadership:

Amid the general collapse of values, a kind of insanity took hold precisely of those middle class circles which had hitherto been unshakeable in their order. Young women proudly boasted that they were perverted: to be suspected of virginity at sixteen would have been considered a disgrace in every school in Berlin.⁹

The President of the Berlin Cameral Court in his report to the Ministry of Justice deplored the fact that judges were taking too little account of marriage as a foundation of the racial and moral life: 'In the consciousness of fold-comrades, divorce proceedings are being reduced to a mere formality, in which the guilty party admits his own transgressions without any compunction'.

These are points which Libertarians in their naive and narrow-minded obsession with individual 'freedom' might care to ponder. As I have shown elsewhere,¹⁰ people who have no values and no control over their personal lives are easy victims for totalitarian political manipulation. The type of person who snatches sexual pleasure out of the context of real love and trust that only marriage can provide, is likely to be spiritually empty and lacking in self-direction and integrity. He is also likely to be indifferent to other abuses of the human personality - for example, drug-taking, which flourished in Weimer and Nazi Germany as it does in our permissive society.

In his classic *Fear of Freedom*, Erich Fromm described the trajectory of such a personality, for whom the

unbearable fact of boundless liberty and the existential anxiety it provokes leads to a willingness to surrender the self to an exterior authority:

What then is the meaning of freedom for modern man? He has become free from the external bonds that would prevent him from doing and thinking as he sees fit. He would be free to act according to his own will, if he knew what he wanted, thought or felt. But he does not know. He conforms to anonymous authorities and adopts a self which is not his. The more he does this, the more powerless he feels, and the more he is forced to conform.¹¹

Nevertheless it should be remembered that the Nazis only ever gained the votes of a maximum of three-eighths of the population (December 1932). One might like to think that these were exclusively the votes of the lower-middle and working classes, that Nazism was a lower class phenomenon, worlds away from the refined sensibilities of the middle and upper classes who could justifiably have claimed to be Europe's most cultured people. Sadly, despite the well-articulated contempt of the Nazis for middle-class intellectuals, this was not so. Although the functionaries of the NSDAP were overwhelmingly plebeian and lower-middle class, until 1930 the intelligentsia was over-represented in the Party, although of course small in absolute terms. Only gradually did they begin to see their mistake, and by then it was too late. Voting records show that support for the Nazis was proportionately higher in the upper-class than in lower-class districts of Berlin and other major cities.¹²

The group of supposed intellectuals who most strongly supported Hitler were the students; at each stage in the growth of the Nazis, student support preceded general electoral support - so much for the idealism of youth! The students were among the first to organise boycotts and mass petitions to force Jews out of government jobs and the professions, especially teaching, and these forms of action soon developed into actual violence.¹³ Their elders joined in: A prestigious block of 300 professors addressed a manifesto to the electorate, asking them to vote for Hitler in March 1933. Many academics who were by no means committed to the Nazis welcomed this wave sweeping the nation as essentially healthy and regenerative, despite such regrettable side effects as Jew-baiting and storm-troop brutality.

What was the reason for this insanity? Firstly, the fear of communism, which led even the Catholic Church to capitulation,¹⁴ cannot be underestimated. Connected with this was an attitude of desperation; since everything else had failed, Hitler should be 'given a chance'; it was naively thought that high office would tame him. This despite the fact that the virulently antisemitic *Mein Kampf* had been on sale in Germany since its publication in 1923. Secondly, the intellectuals more than any other class had been heavily infected with the *völkisch* ideology out of which Nazism grew; cultural pessimists, they viewed Nazism as a protest against modernity. Thirdly, abject obeisance by so

many intellectuals to Hitler can partly be explained in terms of the capitulation of bankrupt rationalists before the principle of irrationality incarnate. Heidegger, the Rector of Freiburg University, was the epitome of such a type. Fourthly, it would appear that most people, most of the time, have remarkably little moral conviction and will just 'jump on the bandwagon' (how else has the permissive society been so successful in our day?) Few will speak up against evil, even if to do so entails little personal risk. In the whole history of the Third Reich no single body - civic, academic or religious - made use of what opportunities it had for publicly protesting against the regime's inhumanity.

But there was in addition a motive of expediency. Since Jews accounted for 12% of all German professors, their removal from academic positions improved the prospects of remaining non-Jewish Germans. The legal and medical professions were overcrowded; the prospect of the removal of Jewish competition recommended itself to many. While the law still afforded Jewish doctors a measure of protection their German colleagues, 45% of whom were members of the Party during the Third Reich, used every legal pretext to get them proscribed. Subsequently harassment was resorted to. When Jewish doctors were routinely rounded up for deportation to the East those who remained, ostensibly pledged to the service of humanity, were able to enjoy the pickings.¹⁵

All these explanations for this terrible *trahison des clercs* assume that the discipline of religious belief among these people had weakened. A study of individual conversions to Nazism concluded that:

(These) persons . . . were 'rootless', that is, free of all compelling personal examples. They had the task to find themselves, to decide for themselves who they wanted to be. Neither religion nor political tradition, neither an occupational model nor any other indisputable model provided them with a pattern for their ego foundation.¹⁶

Nazism provided an *ersatz* religion. The Nazis saw their revolution as primarily one of the spirit. They aimed at the creation of a new human type, who would be completely 'rooted' in the natural world and the traditions of the *Volk*. This new man, with his religion of 'blood and soil' would be engaged in a Manichaean struggle with the forces of evil, the main representative of which was Jewry.

Hitler took great advantage of the decline in religious beliefs among the Germans to fill the spiritual void in their hearts with alternatives which buttressed the power of the Nazi Party. A key device for inculcating a mood of reverence towards the Party, its personnel, history, practices and aims was the institution of a cycle of high holy days, such as the Day of the Seizure of Power, Day of the Nazi Party's Foundation, Hitler's Birthday, and the Day of the Summer Solstice. The whole ritual year was brought to a climax with the annual Reich Party Rally at Nuremberg. Just as the Church had taken over pagan festivals, so the Nazis put the process into reverse.

It was not only large public celebrations which parodied Christianity in this way. Liturgies were drawn up for the various rites de passage - Baptism, Youth Dedication, Marriage and Death. In the SS *Namensweihe* ceremony, which the Nazis prescribed in place of Christian baptism, a picture of Hitler as the new Christ stood in the middle of an altar decorated with swastikas, the perverted 'hooked cross' (*Hakenkreuz*). Goebbels referred to *Mein Kampf* as the 'sacred book of National Socialism', and ordered a copy to be placed on every Church altar in place of the Bible. When at the height of the war he exhorted all Germans to pray for Hitler, (children had been schooled to pray to him since the early days of the Third Reich) those who responded by lighting candles in the Hitler corners of their homes included many who had never bought a votive candle for any other 'saint'.

Hitler quite plainly saw himself as a magician, using occult powers, Pied-Piper-like, to entice the people. His rallies were carefully orchestrated, intended to bring people to the requisite fever-pitch of adulation. He succeeded spectacularly. The ecstatic faces of the crowds at Nuremberg, which look as if they had seen the beatific vision, quite clearly show that they regarded Hitler, just as he regarded himself, as a Christlike messianic figure, the Saviour of the German *Volk* who had been prophesied by the *völkisch* writers. He made deliberate use of Christian language, e.g. 'thou are in me and I in thou'. The Redeemer and Great High Priest spoke of deliverance, miracle, rebirth and sacrifice. During his lifetime he was credited with supernatural powers, and many found it impossible to believe that the demigod had really died in the Berlin bunker in 1945.

In the Sixties and Seventies many books were published on Hitler's involvement in the occult. Much of it was farfetched, but there is some truth in it.¹⁷ As a penniless artist in Vienna, Hitler drunk up occultist ideas with relish. He sought to unite religion, science, magic and politics into one all-embracing *Weltanschauung*. When he arrived in Germany in 1918 Hitler met many congenial souls. Apart from Goebbels, all the men who were to become Nazi leaders were heavily involved in occult practices. When the SS was set up, the troops were not only taught how to wield power without regard for human rights. They were also compelled to attend courses on occult topics. Yet Hitler was afraid of any others - and there were many - who might be resorting to occult practices independently. Himmler was charged with investigating and suppressing any organisation which might pose some threat, and on two occasions there was a crack-down on astrology, and occult books were confiscated.

Another occult Nazi interest was Geomancy, the pseudoscience which aims to locate the energy systems on the earth's surface, and to use them for evil purposes. Hitler believed that if he could find a significant place for the centre of his Black Order, he could psychically influence the whole of Germany. This he found in an ancient fortress in Westphalia, Schloss Wewelsberg.

Hitler's fatal mistake in sending his troops to Russia in the summer of 1941, with no provision for winter combat, has sometimes been explained by the German High Command's optimism that Russia would be defeated before winter set in. But an alternative explanation could be Hitler's misplaced faith in the weather forecasts of the occultist and pseudoscientist Hans Horbiger, an associate of Horst Wessel.¹⁸

Perhaps the most striking evidence of Nazi involvement in the occult is furnished by accounts by people who observed Hitler closely. They exude a presence of unmitigated evil. On the occasion when the Führer beheld what was believed to be the spear of the crucifixion, it was reported that:

The very space around him seemed enlivened with some subtle irradiation, a kind of ghostly ectoplasmic light. His whole physiognomy and stance appeared transformed as if some mighty spirit now inhabited his very soul, creating within and around him a kind of evil transfiguration of his own nature and power.¹⁹

Was Hitler a Satanist? It is a short step from the 'soft' occult of theosophy to the 'hard' occult of devil-worship. There is some evidence that Hitler engaged in perverted ceremonies similar to the Black Mass.²⁰ Few people in the history of the world could have incarnated evil to the extent that he did. And just for good measure, the Nazis suppressed a prayer which was traditionally said after Mass, in which the Archangel Michael was called upon to destroy Satan and Evil Spirits which work for the destruction of souls.

Strangely, the power of the occult and the perversion of Christian religious practices in Nazi Germany has been greatly overlooked by historians. In his classic work, *Hitler, A Study in Tyranny* (1952), Alan Bullock hardly mentioned Hitler's interest in the occult. Similarly, none of this found its way into the copious evidence at the Nuremberg trials. According to Airey Neave, one of the Nuremberg prosecutors, the ritualistic and occult aspects of the Third Reich were deliberately ruled inadmissible, because the prosecutors feared the psychological and spiritual implications in the West if it became publicly known that a twentieth-century state has established itself and attained the power it had on the basis of such principles.²¹

This information is particularly interesting insofar as we are seeing a resurgence of the occult in the contemporary West in the form of the New Age movement, whose inclinations are strongly theosophical. A visit to any British bookshop will confirm that trade in literature on the occult is booming. What people who buy such literature are seeking is something very similar to what religion, particularly Catholicism, has traditionally provided, although in a far more wholesome form. Catholicism gives one a sense of harmony with the whole created universe and a rootedness in the traditions of one's past. This is precisely what many Germans were searching for, and it is significant that National Socialism made little headway in Catholic areas.

How could it have happened? In a sense the result was overdetermined: Germany's political and economic dislocation, superimposed on its spiritual malaise, virtually guaranteed that Nazism, or something similar would occur. But when all the causative factors have been isolated, we are left with an experience of evil so radical as to defy comprehension. Depending on our metaphysical point of view, we may or may not feel that such evil has to have a supernatural explanation. The Nazis themselves certainly saw their movement in spiritual rather than in political terms. If we view Nazism, and Hitler himself, only in political and economic terms, we are missing a large part of the lesson they gave us.

Notes

- Owen Chadwick, *The Secularisation of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 239.
- Two excellent books on the spiritual malaise of nineteenth and early twentieth-century Germany are Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, and George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology* (1966).
- Luther: *Von den Juden und ihren Lügen*, Wittenburg, 1543.
- Paul Johnson, *A History of the Modern World*, p. 120.
- Nigel Pennick, *Hitler's Secret Sciences: His quest for the knowledge of the ancients*.
- Quoted in Craig, *Germany 1866-1945*, p. 484.
- Nicolai Tolstoi, Address to NVALA Annual Convention, 1984.
- Quoted in Grunberger, *A Social History of the Third Reich*, Weidenfeld, 1971, p. 280.
- Stefan Zweig, *Die Welt von Gestern*, quoted in Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture*, p. 287.
- Angela Ellis Jones, *The Morality of Conservatism*, forthcoming.
- Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom*, Ark, 1985 at p. 220.
- For the detailed analysis of voting results in the Weimar period, see Richard Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* Princeton 1982.
- Paul Johnson, *A History of the Jews*, p. 474.
- The role of the Catholic Church vis-a-vis the Nazis is a matter of controversy. An understandable fear of communism and atheism prompted the Vatican to sign the Concordat with Hitler in 1933, which signalled to rank and file priests and laymen that they should fully accept the new regime. Although some individual clerics very bravely spoke out against subsequent actions against the Jews, neither the leadership of the Church in Germany, nor the Vatican (apart from Pius XI's encyclical *Mit Brennender Sorge* of 1937) did anything. In sum, one might conclude that this was one of the most shameful episodes in the history of the Church.
- Michael Kater: *The Nazi Party - A Social profile of members and leaders*, Blackwell 1983.
- Stern *op cit* p. 293.
- Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, *The Occult Roots of Nazism*, Aquarian 1985.
- Pennick, *op cit* passim.
- Trevor Ravenscroft, *The Spear of Destiny*, p. 58-9. This book has been criticised by Goodrick-Clarke, but I feel that this story rings true with what we know about Hitler.
- Christopher Nugent, *Masks of Satan*, 1983 at p. 155.
- Michael Baigent, Richard Leigh and Henry Lincoln, *The Messianic Legacy*, p. 204.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Life of Nature

Anthony O'Hear

The first man who, having enclosed a piece of land, thought of saying "This is mine" and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. How many crimes, wars, murders: how much misery and horror the human race would have been spared if someone had pulled up the stakes and filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow-man: "Beware of listening to this imposter. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to everyone and that the earth itself belongs to no one!"

Thus Jean-Jacques Rousseau opening the second part of his *Discourse on Inequality*; on that very passage Voltaire tartly commented

What! He who has planted, sown and enclosed some land has no right to the fruit of his efforts! Is this unjust man, this thief to be the benefactor of the human race? Behold the philosophy of a beggar who would like the rich to be robbed by the poor!

Thus the man of reason and civilization answers the archetypal demagogue, the mouthpiece of the resentment of the oppressed and the fomenter of revolutions. Rousseau is in Voltaire's terms a thief, a beggar taking their deserts from those who have worked for them, and bringing everything down to the level of the lowest, while Voltaire for Rousseau is the representative of a corrupt and decadent society, which papers over its gross unfairness with frivolous pursuits - such as 'useless' and 'pernicious' arts and 'foolish' sciences - and with laws and ceremonial which simply favour those in positions of power and pander to their vanity. At a deeper level, the very reason and enlightenment which Voltaire stands for are, for Rousseau, a large part of that which makes so-called civilized life possible. Reason according to Rousseau separates us from our immediate feelings and from our natural absorption with our own needs. It leads us to compare ourselves with others and at the same time to stifle our 'reckless' natural feelings of sympathy with others. These invidious comparisons with others are the source of that pride in self which for Rousseau is the motive force of civilized life and the origin of the hardness of heart which makes it possible.

Rousseau's hostility to civilized life is deep and his criticisms of its forms thoroughgoing. Just as the Marxist and the Freudian charge their critics with false consciousness or sexual repression, so Rousseau treats every criticism as simply another symptom of the unnatural state of affairs he is criticizing. The critic's reasoning is mere self-serving rationalisation.

In order to assess the force of this reply we need to uncover the extent of Rousseau's nihilism about human life, and to indicate how little of human life remains in his state of nature. Rousseau was no doubt aware of the radical, not to say impossible, nature of his position, when he declined to turn to a more primitive form of existence than the one to which he had become accustomed. The advocate of a primitive form of life found himself no more able to live on plants and acorns, and without laws and magistrates, than was the author of two lengthy treatises on education willing to have anything to do with the five children, whom he fathered, and assigned to orphanages.

At the start of *Émile* Rousseau writes

God makes all things good: man meddles with them and they become evil.

I think we should attend literally to what he says here. *Man* meddles. The being that exists in a state of nature, and which Rousseau contrasts so favourably with civilized mankind is not man. Nor is it the actual naked savage referred to in the *Discourse on Inequality*, scorning European pleasures and braving hunger, fire, sword and death to preserve his independence. Nor could it be the elevated being of the *Social Contract*, who subordinates his own will and purpose to the general will of the community; in a perfectly virtuous democracy. The reason for this is given clearly by Rousseau himself in the *Discourse*. The pre-social savage he admires, simply wanders the forests

without work, without speech, without a home, without war, and without relationships... without any need of his fellow men... perhaps not even recognising any one of them individually...

The whole thrust of the *Discourse* is to point out that this creature would not suffer from any of the ills of civilized life (which Rousseau rather fancifully-foreshadowing some contemporary radical writing on medicine - takes to include many physical diseases). Nor would he suffer from the more obvious insults and oppressions rendered possible by social existence. Nor, being self-sufficient, would the pre-social being of the *Discourse* need the help of others to preserve his life. He would fend for himself and, having only natural needs to satisfy, nature would provide for him.

The ills and oppressions of civilized life are in many cases, we might suppose, merely the obverse of its benefits. The law's delay and the insolence of office are perhaps just inevitable consequences of having laws and offices at all. Even the abuse of law and the corruption of office may be a small price to pay for the benefits of an ordered society, if indeed we have to pay

them. Rousseau, however, would deflect this line of criticism, both by coming to a different appraisal of the net benefits of civilized life and by suggesting bad faith on the part of his critic.

The basic distinction on which Rousseau bases his philosophy is that between vanity or pride (*amour-propre*) and self-love (*amour-de-soi*). The man in the state of nature is moved primarily by self-love, which is a natural sentiment prompting every animal to watch over its own conservation, and which, so far as is consistent with the conservation of one's own existence, may be modified by pity towards the sufferings of others. Vanity, on the other, is a desire to see oneself as superior to others, and is the source of hatred, vengeance, envy - and, one might add, the very resentment which motivates so much of Rousseau's own writings. For Rousseau, it is vanity which comes into play whenever we have a fully-fledged society of people mutually dependent on each other, for *mutual* recognition of mutual needs brings in its train comparisons of self with others, and the desire to be seen as better than the other. Language, too, arises only in the context of society and the operation of *amour-propre*. For the natural man, bound up simply with his own immediate needs, hardly needs to communicate with others beyond uttering cries for help in situations of immediate danger. Hence he will not develop a language of any sophistication. Nor does he need any concept of property or ownership, beyond what is required to satisfy his immediate needs; he will not, therefore, need a framework of law or rights to protect his property or secure his inheritance.

Amour-propre, language and society, all develop together, in mutual support and influence. And the institutions of society, such as the law and political systems, are seen as arising through the conscious invention of the rich and powerful, who will benefit most from the security and stability they provide. Indeed, all civilized institutions, including the arts and sciences and the values of civilized life, are seen as arising from the desire of men to dominate one another. But vanity is insatiable and not even the rich or famous are ever satisfied. At the start of the *Social Contract* Rousseau says that those who think themselves the masters of others are indeed greater slaves than they. Unlike bodily needs, which can be satisfied for a time, after which the savage rests under a tree or in a cave, the man of society is never satisfied. He is, forever seeking new diversions and new opportunities for self-aggrandisement and the titillation of his *amour-propre*.

The reason why I said that Rousseau is not describing a human life in his delineation of the state of nature is because anything recognisable as a human life is one including just those institutions and ties seen by Rousseau as intimately linked to the exercise of *amour-propre*. This is as true of the so-called savages preferring their independence to European blandishments as it is of Western societies today. Nor should Rousseau's undoubted insights into the devious workings of human

self-deception and vanity, or his often pertinent criticisms of eighteenth century French society, in any way seduce us into accepting the whole story of civilised existence as he tells it.

Against Rousseau's picture of the natural, pre-human man grunting his way through trackless forests in search of food or a mate, before dozing off under a tree when satisfied, we must insist that there is more to life than Rousseau's *amour-de-soi* and *amour-propre*. A human life is a life of meanings, in which there are aims, desires and relationships not reducible to either of those motivations. One can, for example, enjoy a poem or a piece of music for its own sake and because it satisfied standards internal to the practice of poetry or of music. The poet or musician can be motivated by a desire to match those standards and to say something significant in a particular medium, rather than simply by the desire for praise or competitive success. A parent may dutifully and lovingly educate a child in practices and traditions he recognises as worthwhile in themselves. None of those activities are typically motivated by *amour-propre*; even if a well-brought up child may be to the parent's credit, this is not the reason for the parent's care and concern.

Rousseau is often credited by commentators on the *Discourse* with having revolutionised anthropology and social science by what he says on the transition from a state of nature to civilization. But largely because of his unshakeable conviction that social life is permeated through and through by vanity, he shows himself inferior as a social scientist to his Scottish contemporary, Adam Smith, who wrote about the development of civilized life in rather similar terms. Both Smith and Rousseau discuss the division of labour, and both agree that the source of individual actions in the marketplace is self-interest. But while Rousseau sees nothing but the loss of peasant self-reliance in the specialisation entailed in the division of labour, Smith is far more realistic, far more responsive indeed, to genuine human need. He sees the increases in population of his time as sustainable only through the exercise of the human inventiveness and through the specialisation made possible by the division of labour. And, more to the point, Smith argues that their division has had a liberating effect, in so increasing general wealth that even the poorest labourer in a modern society might have, absolutely speaking, a standard of comfort far above that of, as he puts it, 'many an African king, the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages'. Moreover, the wealth of individual rich people in commercial societies, though according to Smith used by them only for their own gratification, is actually spent in the marketplace, and so divided with the poor. Thus in Smith's view, perhaps rather optimistically, 'they are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessities of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal proportions among its inhabitants, and thus, without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest

of society, and afford means to the multiplication of society.'

Rousseau, on the other hand, is so obsessed with resentment against the rich that he is unable to see that in a great society many actions may have effects which were no part of their agent's intentions, and that, even though an institution such as the law or the economy may initially have stemmed from self-interested motives (as he suggests), it may develop spontaneously for the general good. Rousseau's lack of any sense that a social science should address itself to the *unintended* consequences of actions and policies vitiates much of what he says about society, which remains on a purely psychological level. The sociological is, however, a separate category, irreducible to the psychological. However over-optimistic Smith may have been about the workings of a free economy, he can at least be credited with having clearly seen this irreducibility, and this was a major advance in our thinking about society.


Rousseau is clear that inequality is in itself a great evil. He did not have the benefit of our century's experience with societies which attempt to compel equality by edict or law. But this experience might well lead us to conclude that those societies in which inequalities of wealth and reward are permitted are, even for those less well off, more humanly tolerable, less corrupt and more materially rewarding than those societies which attempt to enforce equality. If this is so, then we should certainly be wary of accepting Rousseau's insistence in *The Social Contract* that the wise legislator may attempt a complete transformation of our present human nature, so as to produce a society of individuals who will do nothing of their own but will always look to the general good. The lesson of this century is surely that social engineering of this sort is not possible, and always likely to result in a worse state of affairs than the one it was designed to remedy.

Rousseau's picture of the original life of nature is not a picture of a human life at all, nor is his global rejection of civilized existence and calls for transformation of its citizens seriously defensible. There remains, nevertheless, something highly attractive for many people in Rousseau's call to lead a more natural and less artificial existence. Following Rousseau we have come to realise that we are creatures with pre-social, biological roots and needs, and that the costs of civilization are costs which, if unchecked, may well be too high. But it is hard to get from Rousseau any actual guidance concerning the proper attitude to nature and to our own nature. For his thought contrasts human life, of whatever sort, with life which is not recognisably human at all - lacking *amour-propre*, to be sure, but also lacking all human arrangements. The purely natural being of the *Discourse* is neither bad nor good: it follows the demands of its instincts, and is compassionate to the extent that instinct allows and

sentiment dictates. True virtue, on the other hand, consists in dispositions to the good, where there are also pulls to the bad. Charity, fidelity, honour, truthfulness and the other virtues all imply a steadfastness and a holding firm through vagaries of instinct, sentiment and circumstance; they involve the exercise, in other words, of just those imaginative powers which Rousseau sees as leading inevitably to pride and *amour-propre*.

No, the natural life people find attractive is not that of Rousseau's natural being. It is far more likely to be that of the savage Indian turning down the seductions of European civilization or of the Savoyard peasantry, xenophobic and rightly suspicious of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the articulate bourgeois from Geneva who for a time lived among them. And there is no guarantee that the Indian or the Savoyard are not blessed or burdened with a full measure of *amour-propre*.

There may indeed be virtues possessed by peasants and the like which are conspicuously absent from the over-refined salons and cafés of cosmopolitan intellectuals like Rousseau. But these peasant virtues are actually no less artificial than those long-cultivated landscapes of hedgerows, fields, terraces and fruit groves, the disappearance of which many of us find so distressing. But these landscapes were formed by centuries of human 'meddling', and not the less beautiful for that. One can, of course, point to our roots in animal nature and find the prospect of a controlled urban life, completely insulated from nature and the elements, disturbing and unnatural. But for Rousseau, *any* human life, even that of the ideal citizen of the social contract, would be unnatural by definition. His concept of nature leads to no appreciation of the harmonious balance between the natural and the cultural which Ruskin saw in the Gothic style or Horace saw in the life of an Italian farm - the one escaping from the distressing conditions of Victorian industrialisation and the other from the opulence and squalor of Rome. But both the Gothic church and the classical farm are as much products of human art and artifice as are the salon and the steam engine. Both depended for their existence on the division of labour, and on the institutions of property so heartily criticized by Rousseau. But if many now have a preference for the rural and the Gothic over the urban and the concrete; if the stock reaction to personal problems is to seek to 'get in touch' with one's 'true self', and with those natural feelings which society 'represses': this just shows the extent to which Rousseau's rhetoric has played its part in shaping our sensibility. His advocacy of the natural over the artificial and of the virtues of the country over those of the town has been enormously influential in European romantic and revolutionary thought, and has forever undermined the Enlightenment belief that society and the city are man's triumph over a brutal nature.



What do the KGB*, Roger Scruton and the US Pentagon have in common?

All are regular subscribers to the publications of the Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies. Often unconventional, usually controversial and invariably well written IEDSS publications challenge the prevailing orthodoxy, think the unthinkable,

Who else reads them?

Academics, politicians, journalists, broadcasters, diplomats, students and business people with an interest in what's going on in the world. The Institute has readers in over 50 countries.

Who writes them?

Distinguished academics, retired public servants, and specialist journalists. Authors of past issues have included Angelo Codevilla, Alun Chalfont, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Hugh Thomas, George Urban, Edward Norman, Radek Sikorski, Christopher Donnelly, Richard Pipes, Jillian Becker, Mark Almond, Christopher Coker, David Carlton and Patrick Cosgrave.

For a full list of publications and subscription details contact:

The Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies
13/14 Golden Square, London, W1R 3AG, England
Telephone: 01-439 8719, Telefax: 01-439 2034
(Subscription/Circulation Dept: 01-278 0146)



confront the unpalatable. If you are interested in current trends in international relations, politics and national security policy, you need IEDSS Occasional Papers, European Security Studies and the European Security Analyst every bit as much as they do.

What do they say about them?

- ‘remarkable...graphic’
Christopher Booker DAILY TELEGRAPH
- ‘...chilling and powerfully argued’
SALISBURY REVIEW
- ‘perceptive’ SOVIET ANALYST
- ‘...remarkable vigour...the criticism is clear and damaging’
Edward Mortimer, FINANCIAL TIMES
- ‘...dramatic...clear and well argued’ CROSSBOW
- ‘Valuable’ THE TIMES
- ‘robust and revealing...exhaustive and damaging...’
BRITISH ARMY REVIEW
- ‘Essential’
Julian Critchley DAILY TELEGRAPH

*Colonel Eugueni Smirnov, former deputy air attache at the Soviet Embassy in London was so keen that he called personally to collect our publications. Sadly, he will have to wait a little longer to read them. He was one of 11 spies sent home by the British Government in May 1989.

In Our Power to Love or Hate: Latterday Romanticism in the English Novel

David Pryce-Jones

This paper was presented at the Wheatland Conference held in Budapest between June 19th and 25th 1989. The conference was the third in a series of four to discuss the state of literature today. Besides myself, the British delegation consisted of Paul Bailey, Angela Carter, Holly Eley, David Hare, Christopher Hope, Kazuo Ishiguro and Jeremy Treglown.

Naturally I had anticipated that such representatives of London literary fashion would respond to the paper with an indignation which might perhaps be high and even comic. In the event, not one addressed my argument, but all in due alphabetical order rose to denounce me in person, in a process '*aussi ennuyeux que sinistre*' as a baffled French delegate was to put it. My supposed class and background (about which they actually knew little or nothing) were held to explain my views. I must be a conservative, middle-brow, asking for 'anyone for tennis' literature. To them, literature had no concern with existential questions of life and love and death, but by definition served social or 'progressive' purposes, whether or not readers wished to be so improved.

One said that if I was right, then his life's work was worthless, and provided sales' figures to establish that this could not be the case. Another considered that my joke about 'expletive deleted' to draw attention to specially limited language was censorship. A third thought fit to tell an audience with Hungarians and Soviet Russians in it that while 1956 might be a date with local resonances, to many Englishmen 1979 was comparable, thus equating a democratic election with a Soviet *coup de main*. Yet a fourth said that it was mean-spirited of me to be at all critical of a first novel. Had I not been briefed to restrict myself to publications within the past year, I would have included Martin Amis, Adam Mars-Jones, Fay Weldon and the host whose disgust with themselves is their whole art. But how the cap fitted these people, and how instructive it was to see them wearing it.

their country, their way of life and the values by which all of them lived. Something here was not consonant: either the country was wicked and corrupt as these playwrights said, and audiences ought to have been scandalised by the mirror in which they were reflected, or the applause was hypocritical, some sort of tribute paid by the man in the street to what he deems, or perhaps fears, to be 'art'.

No illusion persists long, of course, and the gap between the melodrama of those plays and reality soon became too wide to be sustained. Audiences lost interest in what seemed marginal fantasies. Consequently theatres today are full of musicals and revived classics. Plays which depict England as one of the worst of all possible worlds now thrive mainly in the state-subsidised margin, which may be their natural habitat. The novel has taken up where the theatre left off.

Any generalisation about something so diffuse as the English novel is bound to be only that, arbitrary in its nature, an avenue of approach rather than the whole landscape. Writers such as William Golding, Iris Murdoch, William Trevor, Anthony Powell, Muriel Spark, V.S. Naipaul, are not about to refashion their idiosyncratic selves, to become untrue either to experience or imagination. Among perhaps as many as fifty thousand men and women who with reason can consider themselves professional novelists, every taste is to be found - and it may be worth pointing out that the work of writers like Catherine Cookson or Dick Francis, who are truly popular and have a mass audience, is not the sort discussed at international conferences.

Granted these reservations, it seems to be the case that hatred or dread centering upon their native country, coupled with contempt for the individual, characterise novels written by British writers born since the war, those at least earning vogueish and critical approval. Here is a sentence from a specimen dust-jacket, supposedly serving the purpose of certifying the evident attractions of this particular novel: 'Written in a language of brilliance and power, it is a bleak, disturbing tale, haunting, perceptive and strange.' Turning also at random to a literary page, here are critics' approving descriptions of two new collections of short stories. In the first instance, 'These are brief, mordant accounts of obsession, violence and despair; picture postcards from the emotional front-line'; in the second instance, the author claims to be a recording angel for drug-addicts, prostitutes and skinheads, to provide what he calls 'the rainbow' of human misery. Readers are duly warned that they can expect to be assaulted in every sense except the physical.

In what might be labelled the age of Tynan, the strange spectacle could be observed in England of audiences applauding plays which held up to ridicule

Condition-of-England novels are nothing new in themselves. At the onset of industrialization a century and a half ago, a sense took hold that a wrong turning was at hand. Writers and other people of influence believed that in factories and cities the masses were being subjected to a life more abusive than the customary and rural ways of the past. Consequent attitudes of wilful pessimism can be seen with hindsight as the romanticism that it was, a posture struck against the common run of experience. In fact people everywhere, including the romantics themselves, were acquiring increasing freedom and choice.

To most readers, the strength and lasting appeal of the novel as a form lies in its depiction of the choices that a character may make, whether for good or bad, but always through the exercise of free will. Which choices are made and how they have been influenced may well depend on wider social and political factors, but in fiction as in life, the individual is responsible for himself and seen to be so. This moves the reader to wonder whether he too would have behaved that way, to identify, and so to feel pity and human solidarity. The most limited or parochial setting may therefore have the potential to convey a universal message.

Socialist realism is little heard of nowadays, but in its heyday it claimed that the sole choice available to the individual was obedience to what had been determined for him by his social and political superiors: the more the obedience, the greater the hero. In countries which remain despotisms or autocracies, choice and freedom are necessarily restricted, factors of absolute power, at the mercy or the bidding of the powerholder. Almost by definition, intellectuals in such countries are in opposition, for the act of writing is itself a choice and an assertion of freedom, therefore a likely challenge to power. In despotisms and autocracies, especially in the Third World, truth-telling may carry the severest penalties, and it is probably better, safer, sometimes the only possible recourse, to convey truth by means of symbol and metaphor, sometimes brilliantly conceived for the purpose. The Third World novel more often than not is a Condition-of-the-country statement or disquisition, a plea in disguise for freedom and choice in circumstances hostile to the emergence of such values. Describing what he thinks is wrong with society, and advocating reforms which he believes right, such an author is treating fiction as a tolerated alternative to newspaper editorialising.

The novelist who pretends that things are so in England is taking enormous liberties with reality. More threatening still to the emotive powers of his work, he is depicting a society in which choice and freedom depend less upon the individual than the government or powers-that-be, and a character therefore proves to be a pre-determined victim of circumstances. The reader is invited to confront the powers-that-be rather than feel pity and solidarity for the character. In this respect the novel forfeits its claim to universality. The sort of English fiction which I am discussing is instead akin to Third World literature in

its intent and its attack.

A process which separates writers from the general run of people, from reality itself, can only be complex. Here is a critic from the Third World commenting on English novels, with all their hotchpotch and rumpus, to use his words: 'I find nothing which is artless, simple, open, generous, bright, soft, tender.' He goes on, 'Only one turn of the screw after another, analysis piled on analysis, attempts to draw out ever new theories and moral lessons by wringing, squeezing, buckling, crumpling and forcibly twisting human nature.' The critic in question was the Bengali Rabindranath Tagore, writing in 1892, then a subject of the British empire, and soon to win the Nobel Prize. Since then, of course, theories of alienation have provided one novelty after another, until the man in the street is assumed to be alienated, whether or not he knows it. At the end of the war, Cyril Connolly made a pronouncement that henceforth the artist would be judged by the quality of his despair - what then was a notorious case of coat-trailing has become a truism.

Perhaps it is no retort to champions of despair to observe that they themselves are prime beneficiaries of choice and freedom to an extent without precedent in the course of English history. The last four decades have been years of peace and plenty unknown since the reign of George III, quite likely to be considered in centuries to come a Golden Age. Every culture, from all places and historical periods, is readily available in reasonably cheap and accessible forms to those with a wish for it. English writers who present themselves as persecuted and despairing are evidently romanticising.

Refusal to accept the increasing choices and freedom of the present is at one level a fascinating replay of *Weltschmerz* from the era of Werther and Childe Harold. Here is another denial that change is producing something of greater benefit to everyone than the old order. At another level, it is more interesting to set oneself apart from the common run, to detect decay and ominous portent where others find pleasure, especially if one can contrast the profundity of one's despair against the shallow and odious cheerfulness of the crowd. But that is a Byronic and self-flattering pose. Beneath it may lie some undefined urge to extremes. In many contemporary English novels there is what can only be called a longing to be persecuted, an instinct on the writer's part that he is being denied the grand gesture of self-sacrifice and martyrdom. Portraying their own society as though it were monstrous and even totalitarian, these novelists seem to display a bizarre envy of situations in which the artist is really put to the test and may have to pay for freedom and choice with his liberty or even his life. Universality is lost where biased editorialising begins. To such privileged writers, democracy apparently is too dreary for words.

No novel has had wider repercussions in the last year than Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*. The author's point of view is so febrile and unsteady that not much can be safely attributed to him. No firm line

seems to exist in the novel between reality and illusion. Anything that might look like a statement neatly evaporates into magic, rhetoric or joking. Nonetheless the author's hostile view of England is unmistakable. As though it were a province of the Ottoman empire, England is referred to as a Vilayet (perhaps a pun for Viler yet?), and London has become Babylondon. Mrs Thatcher is recognisable as Mrs Torture, and as Maggie the Bitch, and when her effigy is burnt, the watching crowd sighs with ecstasy. This might all the more truthfully have been expressed in the form of a hostile newspaper editorial.

Early industry and its inventions were once described with the same fastidious horror that Rushdie brings to daily life now:

the dawn chorus began, chattering of road-drills, chirrup of burglar alarms, trumpeting of wheeled creatures clashing at corners, the deep whirr of a large olive-green garbage eater, screaming radio-voices from a wooden painter's cradle clinging to the upper storey of a Free House, roar of the great awakening juggernauts rushing awesomely down this long but narrow pathway. From beneath the earth came tremors denoting the passage of huge subterranean worms that devoured the regurgitated human beings, and from the skies the thrum of choppers and the screech of higher, gleaming birds.

Babylondon proves to be a world in which there is the 'Granny Ripper' who specialises in murdering old ladies, in which black men die in prison as a matter of course, where drunken white louts spit in restaurants on the food of Indians, and the ultimate expression of social energy is a race riot. The hatefulness of the race riot is almost secondary to Rushdie's disgust over the squalid details of the urban setting in which it occurs.

The tower stands up on stilts, and in the concrete formlessness beneath and between them there is the howling of a perpetual wind, and the eddying of debris: derelict kitchen units, deflated bicycle tyres, shards of broken doors, dolls' legs, vegetable refuse extracted from plastic disposal bags by hungry cats and dogs, fast-food packets, rolling cans, shattered job prospects, abandoned hopes, lost illusions, expended angers, accumulated bitterness, vomited fear, and a rusting bath.

The police here go in for witchcraft, supposedly a cross between Freemasonry and voodoo. Beating and killing regularly, they are not brought to account even when they set fire to a community centre, deliberately murdering those in it who intended to bring legal evidence against the witchcraft practice. *The Satanic Verses* is scattered with asides and remarks upon the nightmare which this society has become, for instance commenting upon 'the depths to which the denizens of the city had sunk', or 'This civilisation; things are closing in on it.' Death, flight and exile are the resolution which those unfortunate enough to experience this Vilayet can expect.

The Comforts of Madness, by Paul Sayer, won two important prizes in 1988, the year of its publication. This novel concerns Peter, who is catatonic, refusing to speak, or according to those in charge of him, perhaps unwilling to do so. Nonetheless the novel is given the form of an interior monologue, so making Peter a character fully capable of observing his surroundings, and commenting upon them in intelligent language, even with such literary similes as 'like almonds on a mosaic'. No explanation is provided for the discordance between his capacity for considered reflection and his incapacity to give voice to it.

The novel starts with a suicide, only the first of what proves to be a series. Incontinent, Peter records his excretions, the way he is sexually molested by a nurse and then by triplets who are fellow-patients, as well as many other physical indignities inflicted upon him. Tanya is some sort of unspecified doctor or psychologist who believes that she may be able to cure, or at least treat, Peter. For the purposes, she removes him to a special institution, where she and her assistants have unlimited power. In fact, what she does amounts to terrorising and torturing the defenceless men.

'What made me the way I was in the first place?' Peter asks himself, to continue, 'Illness? Paralysis? Trauma?' In a flashback, he reminds himself of his childhood, a truly horrific childhood, in which he was abandoned by his mother and his sister, and left with a derelict father. One day, still a child, he finds this father ill, and - 'I couldn't help myself, I don't know why' - he takes a knife and kills him.

Like everyone else, Tanya fails to make Peter communicate, and like everyone else again, she becomes vindictive. A visitor proves to be his long-lost sister, who at first weeps and appeals to him, only to reject him finally, telling the staff that he is a stranger, not her brother at all. 'They would do with me what they would,' Peter tells himself as the staff indeed come to do away with him in the name of mercy-killing against which he cannot utter a protest. The treatment of mental patients, catatonics included, may well be in need of urgent reform in England, but if so, a newspaper article is the appropriate forum for the topic. What has been created in this fiction is a world too enclosed and abnormal to be true to reality, in which there is neither choice nor freedom as everyone proves to be either a torturer and murderer, or a victim.

An even crueller example of this distortion of reality is *The Fifth Child*, the novel Doris Lessing published with acclaim in 1988. Crueller, because it posits madness and abnormality as something pre-ordained, in the nature of original sin, against which ordinary people are helpless. Harriet and David Lovatt, the central characters, are both depicted as going against the grain of the times. They believe in romantic love, domestic values, the work ethic. Old-fashioned parents, they cherish their four growing children in the face of an England hostile to values like theirs.

Doris Lessing gives repeated indications that the state of the nation is bad, even sinister.

The little town they lived in had changed in the five years they had been there. Brutal incidents and crimes, once shocking everyone, were now commonplace. Gangs of youths hung around certain cafes and street-ends and owed respect to no one... There was an ugly edge on events: more and more it seemed that two peoples living in England, not one - enemies, hating each other, who could not hear what the other said.

Or again, in the case of a child looking at television to see 'Wars and riots; killings and hijackings; murders and thefts and kidnappings... the eighties, the barbarous eighties were getting into their stride.'

Ben, the fifth child of the title, is born violent, ineducable, inarticulate, unregenerate. His father tries to hide him away in a mental institution quite as murderous as the one in *The Comforts of Madness*. Harriet rescues him from there, but in so doing destroys the household, sacrificing the happiness of herself, her husband and the other children. Only the gang of youths from the local cafe are able to deal with Ben, by making him one of them. The choice and freedom available to Ben is simply to become a criminal. What appeared to be Harriet's and David's choice and freedom were only ordained steps to the destruction of their hopes and happiness, and Lessing gloats in rubbing it in.

Once again, no explanation is given for how or why this child came to be a monster beyond the reach of love and reason. Time and again, Lessing refers to his 'cold eyes', to the incomplete grunting of his speech, 'the alien, the destroyer.' To his mother finally, he seems some sort of throwback, from 'a race that reached its apex thousands and thousands of years before humanity, whatever that meant, took this stage.'

The novel is no doubt intended to be an allegory around the type of mindless thug who certainly does exist in England, and whose vandalism or lawlessness is the subject of innumerable pages of the newspapers every day. It would have been truer to life, more believable, if Lessing had stated a legitimate dislike of the Bens of this world in a direct journalistic outburst. In the way that Ben has been invented, in the selection of those words and deeds which characterise him, Lessing has instead created something untrue to life, unbelievable, a preconceived Frankenstein horror. What purports to be a Condition-of-England statement actually reveals hysteria in the author's cast of mind.

A process far too unfathomable to be open to analysis throws up writers who all of a sudden are thought to be 'important' or somehow representative of their time. Two such as Maggie Gee and James Kelman,¹ and both have been awarded prizes and much praise. Maggie Gee was one of the 'Best of Young British Novelists' on a list put out by a publishers' organisation to promote books. A review of Kelman's novel of 1988, *A Disaffection*, speaks of him in the same breath as Zola, Beckett and Tolstoy, and concludes that the reader is left 'optimistic about the state of British literature today.' Both Kelman and Gee in fact describe

a country which is a derelict quasi-totalitarian police-state, hardly recognisable as England at all. Plainly both authors wish to give as grim and intimidating a depiction of the country and its inhabitants as Rushdie in *The Satanic Verses*. They differ from Rushdie in that they do not resort to magic and rhetoric, but take it for granted that fear of the authorities and a sense of doom are the basis of realism.

Maggie Gee's recent novel has the title *Grace*, after the elderly central character of that name, but also an ironic reference to the utter lack of any such quality today. Within the first twenty-five pages, the reader discovers that the women so far introduced refuse to bear children or hate the babies they have, that everyone believes a nuclear disaster to be imminent and is resisting government policy on nuclear issues; and that in consequence they think they are under close police surveillance; and that the country has gone to pieces. Whole passages share Rushdie's spirit:

Underneath the city's shining surface of plate-glass windows, Porsches, computers, essential structures are rotting away. The dark is furry, slipping, sliding. Summer's come early; it's intensely hot. In Regent's Park, Arab women are walking slowly through the rose garden, their black robes humming cones of heat, tired eyes caged in sweaty bird-masks. Behind them, body-guards pant in suits. This isn't what they meant by England. A trembling desire can be felt in the heat haze through which the sun finally starts to sink; caught in the maze of mirrored towers, trains, rats, telephone lines, everyone wants to escape.

Like Rushdie's caricatured policemen, so Gee's police are not accountable to anyone, free to enter premises and humiliate defenceless women. In the opening twenty-five pages are a number of diatribes and gibes to support the view that England is beyond the rule of law, in collapse or near anarchy. For instance, the rats are so numerous that they may be chased in the streets: 'Things come up from the crumbling sewers'. The right kind of dustbins are not provided, not even made in England. Also people no longer walk for pleasure. And the name of the Empire Hotel sparks political irony, while 'dear' and 'patriot' are both words conveying sarcasm. Even the famous white cliffs of the southern coast prompt the qualifying clause, 'where nothing ever happens except death and holidays.' What the cliffs best provide, it seems, is a place off which to jump.

This style of editorialising is sometimes on the part of the author, sometimes in the mouth of a character. Paula, Grace's niece, lives with her lover Arthur and Sally, a two-year-old child he had by another women. 'I hate living here. I hate you both!' Paula shouts at these two. She thinks, '*England is hell. It really is.* Fluorescent faces; painted faces. A pigeon hops on a rotted foot.' What terrible thing were we waiting for? What had foreshortened life so much? Why was the country being knocked down? These are the sort of questions that

recur in the interior monologue given to Grace. Some youths in the street to her look 'bestial, brutal, the savage animal face of the male.'

In the hotel where Arthur works is Ian, a young man on the staff, described thus: 'most of all he hates himself, staring at his hands, the familiar tremor, peasant hands not city hands, and the stubby wrists with faint white scars.' In another hotel where Grace stays is Faith, a maid, who was hated in her native Ireland, 'so what did she lose by going to a country which hated the Irish?' Her prospects are summed up, 'Sometimes dirt and mess is all she can see, stretching on into the future. She's bringing a child into a world like this. The dirty country England is.'

Violent assault, rape, burglary, corruption, suicide and murder are the everyday lot of the characters, even those who are marginal. A leading agent of crime is Bruno, a freelance detective, and a debt collector who terrorises the poor and defenceless. Bruno considers himself to be 'fighting evil... for the good of the country.' Loathing for this character is unrestrained. Unloved as a boy, beaten by his father, he had no time for school or education. Thinking himself despised by others, he is out for revenge on society, but is too stupid to realise his motivations. Beating up an old woman, he could only think, 'Good riddance to bad rubbish.' He has fantasies of carrying a gun, and in addition he is a transvestite, finally described in the intimate details of his sexual perversion. Worst of all, in the novel's perspective, is that he allows himself most willingly to be bribed by a secret policeman to do illegal and dirty work. He hero-worships these secret policemen although 'he could hardly bear to meet their eyes, the eyes of officers, the voices of gentlemen.' The violent *denouement* which Bruno wreaks upon Grace and Paula, in effect a blind destruction of all they stand for, is thus ultimately the work of a sinister and corrupt secret police.

Nobody reading *Grace* could for a moment suppose that this is a fiction invented for its own narrative sake. Here is a passionate condemnation of England and all its works, passionately advocated, and unmistakably sincere. From large issues of policy down to trivial domestic details, the author's opinion is crystal clear. The novel could indeed be redrafted as a series of editorials upon nuclear energy and its uses or abuses, upon town planning, upon the proper function of the state's surveillance agencies, and so on. Such fiction as there may be in the novel serves the subsidiary purpose of substantiating and communicating editorial preconceptions.

This is also the case with James Kelman's *A Disaffection*. In form this novel is the lengthy interior monologue of Patrick, a teacher in his late twenties in a school in Glasgow. How equipped he is for such a job it is impossible to tell from parody-like snippets of Latin cropping up in his thoughts, or from passing references to the likes of 'auld Hegel' or 'auld Holdelin', as he puts it in his Scottish way. A more likely indicator of his general cultural level - at any

rate an indicator remorselessly applied - is his use of those words which the Watergate affair immortalised as 'expletive deleted.' Without these four letter words, Patrick seems almost unable to express feelings or emotion, and with them, he does little better.

Like Paula in *Grace*, Patrick imagines himself to be under the surveillance of the state. Lying in his bath, he has an image of 'something like a crowd of masked stormtroopers.' A mere passer-by makes him think, 'You could picture him being Special Branch.' Television, he has learnt from a friend and likes to repeat, is not something to watch, but a system whereby the state spies into the nation's living-rooms. England, he thinks, has 'the finest policing system the world has ever seen.' One of Patrick's objectives is to declare to a fellow teacher, Alison, that he loves her. Alison is married, shy, possibly already guilty about what might transpire with Patrick. It comes naturally to Patrick to decide that Alison's husband is not the salesman he says he is, but 'an undercover detective perhaps, working for the Economic League or Special Branch, or MI5 and the CIA. It was possible. Everybody knew they had all infiltrated the educational establishments of the entire country, and that includes primary schools and nurseries.'

Patrick in fact fails to declare his love for Alison, fails even to hold her hand. Sensing his loneliness, Gavin and Nicola, his brother and sister-in-law, try to draw him out, but he succeeds only in quarrelling. He also condescends to his parents, rebuffing them. At work, the headmaster transfers him to another school, though Patrick is unsure whether this is a clever intrigue to be rid of him or the consequence of a decision he himself made on his own behalf. Assuring himself all the time that it is pointless to be bitter, he dreams only of escape, to the Mediterranean, to Spain. The alternative escape of suicide is not right, he feels, but the novel ends with him finding no other solution to his complete failure in everything: 'the same temptation and it is suicide, it is actually suicide. What is that story in the bible about a guy who commits suicide. Who is that guy who commits suicide, as a thing to be committed.' And simultaneously two policemen came running after him with murderous intent. 'What are they shouting? They're just shouting they hate him they hate ye we *expletive deleted* hate ye, that's what they're shouting.'

Apparent paranoia and half-formulated language might have suggested a study of a pitiful young man at the point of breakdown. But that is evidently not the author's intention. He too editorialises strongly, so that there can be no mistaking his opinion that Patrick is a decent young idealist, and that someone like him in England today had no choice but to become a victim, sacrificed upon the altar of a hateful society, perhaps Christ-like in persecution, if the story of the guy who commits suicide in the Bible does indeed refer to Christ.

With the author's evident approval, Patrick is made to explain time and again, to himself and to his friends and to his pupils, that being a teacher means occupying

an essential position in a calculated system of repression. School is 'institutionalised terror', and he tells his class that their parents are 'a bunch of *expletive deleted* idiots whose esteem of the ostrich is a byword in the corridors of high finance', going on to ask them why they themselves don't resort to terror: 'Why don't yous (sic) go and blow up the DHSS [Society Security] office?' Headmasters, he thinks, 'are *expletive deleted* autonomous, just like police commissioners and admirals of the fleet and the foreign office and the *expletive deleted* aristocracy and all the secret services, the Watchdogs of Great Britain (sic).'

'I hate Great Britain,' Patrick declares outright. Hate is spread wider, however. 'I see North America's (sic) being its usual fascist self.' If he were to escape to the Mediterranean, as he dreams, he would only find more of the same, 'bypassing the whole of *expletive deleted* Europe because he was sick of it, the whole thing, its politics and its history. Even this kind of thinking was a malaise, a western malaise - a luxury.' What finally drives him to turn on himself is that he finds no satisfactory answer to the main question, 'Who do I kill?'

It may be that schools and mental institutions exist as described in these novels, and are crying scandals which should be brought to light. It may be that there are cases as wretched as Paul Sayer's speechless Peter or Doris Lessing's mindless Ben. A few must find in their daily lives evidence of police surveillance which justifies a persecution complex or a political persuasion. But why the selectivity? Why the abnormality and fear and hate, to the exclusion of so much else? Why the attraction of suicide? Where, to recall Tagore's words, is the simple, open, generous, bright, soft and the tender? What about the freedoms so evidently unprecedented in the nation's history?

Of course there are writers like Molly Keane, Penelope Fitzgerald or David Lodge and Mary Wesley and J. I. Carr who still write comedies of manners which seek to illuminate in the traditional English way the events and human foibles around them. Generally speaking, these are older writers. In not a single one of

the novels on which I have focussed can anything be found approximating to humour or a joke, to generosity or empathy for others. Devoid of any sense of the human comedy, tragedy itself is lamed, and becomes aggression. Without some link between comedy and tragedy, there can be no universality.

In general terms again, the contemporary English novel has lost the ambition to aim for universality. The parochiality of the handful I have discussed is characteristic in that they typify nothing and represent nobody beyond the author. Allied to that parochiality is the fear and disgust that so many authors seem to feel about England. Experience at large apparently is not providing them with sufficient material upon which to base meaningful fiction, and they blame circumstances rather than their own limitations or lack of vision and fellow-feeling for others. It is not necessary to be a Marxist to see here a relationship between these novels and an acceptance of decline, whether this is real or imagined. The greater the loss of confidence, the more melodramatic the tone, and the more oppositional the author's stance. So fiction merges into editorialising, serving as in the Third World what is really Condition-of-the-country analysis or programming, altogether an alternative fantasy of power.

English novelists are much given to complaining that nobody pays much attention to them, and few people actually buy the books. It might be that many contemporary novels bear so little relation to external reality that they are of no concern to anyone but self-delusions and personal psycho-dramas, fading on the hour as the theatre did a whole fashionable generation ago.

Notes

1. Maggie Gee was a judge of this year's Booker Prize. James Kelman was one of the six authors short-listed to win it; and Kazuo Ishiguro won it. Such cosiness is usually described in these circles as 'enduring under jack-booted Thatcherite phillistinism'.

NOW AVAILABLE FROM THE CLARIDGE PRESS

THE GORBACHEV PHENOMENON

"Peace" and the Secret War by Brian Crozier

Gorbachev, Crozier argues, is a "pure" product of the Soviet system who made his career as a KGB informer and a protégé of Andropov, leader of the KGB for fifteen years before becoming Party boss. It is in the light of this fact that his career and policies should be understood.

Brian Crozier is an internationally recognised specialist on Soviet strategy.

ISBN: 1-870626-21-4 Price £14.95 (hardback), 220pp approx.

A Claridge Study in Communism

The Politics of Health: A Radical Assessment

John Marks & Caroline Cox

'The wounded surgeon plies the steel
That questions the distempered part;
Beneath the bleeding hands we feel
The sharp compassion of the healer's art
Resolving the enigma of the fever chart...'

From *East Coker* in *Four Quartets* by T.S. Eliot

In 1988 the British National Health Service (NHS) was 40 years old. Initiated by a Labour government against Conservative opposition, it has nevertheless been sustained, substantially unmodified, for two-thirds of its life by Conservative governments. Why? Because in its conception, and very largely in its performance, the British NHS is one of the most beneficent and humanitarian institutions the nation and the world have known. It has won a unique place in the affections of the British people because it has dealt sensitively and humanely with the most intimate matters of life and of death on the basis of two key principles:

- that medical care should be available to all without regard to income, resources, influence and power;
- and that the best possible quality of care should be free at the point of need and should not be withheld due to lack of ability to pay.

These principles are based on a uniform respect and compassion for each individual. They may not always have been realised. They may even be incapable of being fully realised. But keeping them always in mind has shaped the NHS and has given it much that should be cherished because it is of enduring value.

What does the NHS do? Its extensive services currently comprise primary care, provided by general practitioners, dentists, pharmacists and opticians; hospital care for both acute and long-stay patients; community health care, provided primarily by nurses, midwives and health visitors; public health and preventative medicine; organisations for research including research on drugs, medicines and vaccines; occupational health services; and the training of health care professionals of all kinds.

All this costs over £22 billion a year - nearly £400 for every man, woman and child in the country. Roughly a quarter is spent on primary health care, organised through 98 Family Practitioner Committees, which have contracts with about 29,000 doctors, 16,000 dentists, 9,000 opticians and 12,000 pharmacists. The hospital services employ about 40,000 doctors, 400,000 nurses, 250,000 support staff and 100,000 admini-

strators, while community health services are staffed by about 50,000 nurses, midwives and health visitors. The hospital and community health services are organised quite separately from the Family Practitioner Committees - through 192 District Health Authorities grouped under 14 Regional Health Authorities. Overall the NHS treats around 1 million patients every day and, with its million or so employees, is the biggest employer in Western Europe.

Principles

As a nation we take health and the care of health too much for granted. We make daily assumptions concerning the quality of our health, and the services available to protect it, which would never have been possible in earlier times. We also take for granted the NHS, which offers its help impartially and universally and which is always ready in the hour of need. Its principles enshrine a philosophy to which the mass of the British people subscribe and which underlies the process of British democracy: the philosophy of equal respect. The misfortunes of the rich are of neither greater nor less account than those of the poor. Sickness, which comes to all of us, brings dependence, and to the dependent we owe a duty of care. The State has become the guardian of that duty, and can fulfil it only if it deals impartially with its citizens, offering help regardless of whether they can meet the cost of it, and with the aim of making them as well as is humanly possible or of enabling them to die as comfortably and with as much dignity as possible.

But what precisely is humanly possible? As medicine advances, and ever more complex and expensive operations are devised, the question naturally arises whether it is right to devote time, money and energy to saving one person, when the cost of doing so may be to deprive hundreds of others of the cheaper treatment by which they could be cured. Health care is no different from any other human good in that it is available only in finite, even if increasing, quantities, and must be distributed in conditions of inevitable scarcity. And it is quite clearly a public good, since most will be unable themselves to bear its unpredictable costs. Which method of distribution best satisfies the requirements, not necessarily compatible, of efficiency and justice? How can we minimise waste, while ensuring the best possible standards of care?

Such complex questions are not capable of indisputable answer. Yet they cannot be shirked by politicians of whatever persuasion even if tackling them may mean a temporary loss of popularity. To ignore them would

show a culpable disregard for duty and could lead to permanent distrust.

The NHS has been widely but wrongly identified with socialist conceptions of government. Its principles were set out in the Beveridge report, which drew extensively on existing legislation, itself originating in many policies introduced by nineteenth-century Tory administrations, and heavily influenced by the social philosophy of Shaftesbury and Disraeli. If there is fundamental disagreement between socialists and conservatives, it does not necessarily concern the existence of the NHS, but the way in which it is justified. For the socialist, health care is a right, stemming from need alone. For the conservative, it is a gift - something which we have a duty to provide out of charity. Socialists often deride charity as an out-moded concept associated with humiliation for its recipients. But this is to misconceive its fundamental Christian meaning, long clarified in English common law.

The NHS, in essence, is a publicly funded charity which offers its services universally. It will thrive so long as it remains accountable and continues to enshrine the charitable motive which has been its most striking and appreciated characteristic in the minds of the British people. We see no alternative, in the historical conditions of modern Britain, to the active involvement of the State, both in providing resources for health care and in enabling people to use them. Private providers, including charities, must certainly be given the opportunity to grow and diversify.¹ But it is unrealistic to suppose that they have the ability to answer to all existing needs.

Its charitable principles will serve the NHS as well in the future as they have in the past provided that two major kinds of problem are appreciated. First, providing health care so that it is free at the point of need encourages a high demand, while leaving patients, the public and health care professionals with very little idea about costs because it fails to provide information about how best to use scarce resources. Policies are therefore needed which recreate the beneficial aspects of the market (greater information about costs, consumer choice and public accountability) while maintaining the spirit of unconditional charity.

Secondly there is the need to strike a balance between different kinds of health care. The traditional view, still widely held today, is the medical model with its emphasis on specific diseases or malfunctioning for which appropriate treatment will lead to prevention and cure. The success of this model for some kinds of health care does not mean that it is universally applicable. Medicine cannot cure the frail, the elderly and the dying or the physically and mentally disabled. 'When what is curable has been cured and what is preventable has been prevented, there is still a good deal left. And what it needs is care.'²

Maintaining the right balance between prevention, cure and care, with the constantly evolving nature of illness and disability, will require significant organi-

sational changes in the years ahead. Such changes must take account of costs, including opportunity costs. Needs can easily outstrip the necessarily finite available resources. The last Royal Commission on Health concluded that it would be possible to spend the whole GNP on health and all the Royal Colleges concerned with health are currently calling for more and more resources. So every improvement must be weighed against the competing improvements which must be foregone for its sake. The first question to be asked of every proposed practice or innovation is therefore this:

to what extent does it improve the quality of care, taking into account the competing benefits foregone?

This constitutes a third basic principle whose effect, like the two original principles of free access and universality, should be registered throughout the service and in every possible way. It asks us to be not only benevolent, but also economical. To obey it is not to be materialistic; it is to take seriously the need to reconcile conflicting goals. We must be economical in order to be benevolent: for money inefficiently spent means less money available for other purposes.

Constraints

The most important constraints on health care in Britain at present are created by demographic trends. There will soon be 30% less 18-year olds from which to recruit potential health workers; a decrease in the proportion of the healthiest - those between 18 and 45; and a rapid rise in those who make the most demands on health care - those over 65. There will also be more people over 75, care of whom costs twice as much per person as for someone between 65 and 74, and four times as much as for someone between 15 and 64. More is already spent in total, just over £5 billion per year, on health care for the 15% of the population over 65 than on the 65% of the population between 15 and 64.

Pressures also come from rising public expectations combined with the rapid increase in medical knowledge. Many expensive facilities and forms of treatment, which not long ago were rare, have now become part of common practice. As such treatments spread, expectations rise, and what was once the exception becomes the norm. This leads to a real rate of increase in some health care costs, greatly exceeding real rises in GNP or retail price indices - not least because the spread of new treatments across the country may require more highly trained and specialised staff.

Old distinctions - such as that between hospital services and those of the family practitioner - are breaking down, and responsibilities - for example, those which fall on nurses - are being constantly revised. Moreover, every medical advance brings, as well as benefits, unforeseeable and possibly harmful consequences.

These upward pressures on costs will continue whatever system of funding or pricing is adopted. Nearly

every advanced nation is currently scrutinising how it provides health care for its citizens, for the simple reason that the human condition has, in this respect, undergone an unprecedented change.

Proposals for Development and Change

The essence of that 'sharp compassion of the healer's art', of which T.S. Eliot speaks, has nothing to do with sentimentality. True compassion is sharp - like a two-edged sword. It should be used to attack any obstacles which stand in the way of providing the best possible care. For all those involved in health care, it should have another kind of cutting-edge - the cutting-edge of criticism and self-criticism.³ To put into practice the new principle we believe should underpin the NHS will involve difficult and painful choices. To avoid such choices, or to believe that they need not be made, is to be sentimental, rather than truly compassionate.

Before making specific suggestions for change, we will first meet the arguments of those who think they order these things much better in other countries or that changing the basis of funding is the main key to improving health care.

The Health of Nations

There are a wide variety of different systems around the world - varying from the United States model, based largely on private health insurance; countries in Western Europe like West Germany and France, with complex mixtures of public and private insurance and fee-paying; to the wholly state-controlled systems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Yet practically every major country has significant problems. In the United States between 25 and 35 million people have no insurance cover for medical care of any kind. These are not generally the poorest or the elderly, who are covered by Medicaid or Medicare, but those in mainly low-paid employment with small employers, who do not provide health care benefits for their employees. For millions more insurance cover is far from comprehensive and ill-health can be financially crippling. Countries like the United States and West Germany, with significant fee-for-service components in their financing systems, have witnessed rapidly rising costs and an increasing tendency to perform unnecessary operations or treatments. Probably the main problem for many mixed insurance based systems lies in the proportion of people - anything from 1% to 30% or more - who remain uninsured; even 1% of the British population would represent nearly 600,000 people.

Other kinds of problems have arisen in the centralised and purely state-run systems of the Soviet bloc. 'Socialist' countries have experienced dramatic rises in mortality and falls in life expectancy unprecedented in recent times elsewhere in the industrialised world. Life expectancy for men in Poland has actually decreased by five years - from 69 to 64. There are acute shortages of many medical supplies, even of basics such as syringes, needles and bandages. Many drugs and medicines are not available, including antibiotics and

cytotoxic drugs for cancer, and there is a complete dearth of new drugs produced by research. There are also massive organised inequalities in health care with whole separate networks of hospitals, clinics and other facilities reserved exclusively for the political elites. Even for non-members of the élites there are still massive inequalities, with many services and facilities available only to those who can pay, either officially via the charges which are levied in fee-paying poly-clinics, or unofficially, via the bribes which are endemic throughout the nominally free health services available to ordinary people.

While there is much to be learnt from comparative studies of different systems of health care, there is no clear case for recasting Britain's NHS in a substantially different form.

Health Care Costs and Outcomes— International comparisons for the seven most populous OECD countries⁴

	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Spain	UK	USA
Population (millions, 1980)	54	62	56	117	37	56	228
Costs per Head (US\$, 1982)	931	874	441	602	302	508	1388
% GDP on Health (1982)	9.3	8.2	7.2	6.6	6.3	5.9	10.6
Life Expectancy at Birth (1980)	M 70.1 F 78.3	69.7 76.5	70.7 77.4	73.7 79.2	71.5 78.0	70.2 75.9	69.6 76.7
Infant Mortality % live births (1980)	1.01	1.27	1.43	0.75	1.11	1.21	1.26
Perinatal Mortality % live & stillbirths (1980)	1.29	1.16	1.75	1.20	1.57	1.34	1.32

Funding

Britain, compared with other Western countries, spends relatively little on health care - both per person and as a proportion of GNP. At the same time Britain performs reasonably well according to the usual main indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality and age-specific death rates. So it should be recognised when changes in funding are discussed that the NHS has been cost-effective.

It is frequently argued that market prices and the laws of supply and demand are needed throughout the provision of health care. This is unlikely to be feasible, even in principle, given the extent to which such care constitutes a public good. Moreover many factors militate against a market in health care: the near monopoly position of doctors in most countries and the restrictive practices operated by the medical profession;

the massive efforts needed before consumers can be adequately informed; the life and death consequences of the exploitation of professional power or consumer ignorance; and the problems associated with rising real demands.

Underfunding is also frequently identified as the main problem with health care in Britain. This emphasis tends to confuse inputs with outputs. There may be a case for spending a higher proportion of GNP on health and the population may be willing to pay for this. But it is vital to ensure that extra resources actually do result in improvements and are not spent on extra administrators or unnecessary treatment.

Alternatively some see intrinsic merits in private insurance and in private treatment, arguing that as many people as possible should opt out of the NHS and take private health insurance - usually via a voucher, to be given to pay some or all of the insurance premium. However there are numerous problems with insurance schemes: they generally cover only a limited range of risks, usually those that are easiest to insure; making insurance claims and establishing the limits of what is and is not insured is difficult at times of crisis; many insurers load premiums heavily for, or even exclude, bad risks; private providers, sustained mainly by insurers, do not reimburse the NHS for training and other costs; and there are problems of cost containment, both for administrative and for direct health care costs. Then there are the acute anxieties for both patients and their relatives, on top of those of illness and dependency, over how to pay the bills when the limits of insurance cover are reached. Above all insurance schemes tend to fragment rather than to integrate medical provision because they usually focus on consultations with GPs and specialists and on acute hospital care - in other words, on curing rather than caring.

The NHS was devised precisely because the economist's concept of a 'need' is almost entirely insensitive to the real distinction between the need of the sick for treatment and the desire of the consumer for some specific item. Goods which are not of intrinsic moral concern may be most efficiently produced and distributed by a market: but in the case of medical care there is not merely a need to receive it, but also a duty to provide it. Under a system of private insurance, those most in need of treatment will very often be least able to afford it. For, as the likelihood of illness increases, so do the insurance premiums required to guard against it. Only if a central, and publicly funded, agency steps in to supplement the premiums of the frail and the failing, can the duty to provide for them be satisfied. The present system of exemptions for prescription costs in Britain - for children, pregnant women, the chronic sick and the elderly - means that patients pay for only 19% of the 300 million or so annual number of prescriptions which cost in total nearly £2 billion. A workable system of private insurance is therefore unlikely to be very much different from the existing National Health Service.

We therefore remain sceptical as to whether a full health care market would be compatible with the fundamental charitable principles of the NHS or whether the British public would really wish to move whole-heartedly in that direction.

Reform of the NHS

None of this means that the NHS should be above criticism or that its real problems should not be recognised and addressed. There is a need for a coherent package of reforms which will recognise those principles together with the inevitable constraints outlined above.

1. The 192 District Health Authorities should, as in Scotland, be responsible for:

- family practitioner services provided by doctors, dentists, opticians and pharmacists;
- hospital services, including both acute and chronic care;
- community health services of all kinds.

This change will balance the various requirements for different types of care, together with the diverse constraints described above, so that difficult choices are made in a professionally informed way. It is necessary to link curing, caring and prevention in the context of the inevitable growth in demands for care.

Better policies for community care could also emerge from such a system. Recent national policy requires that, whenever possible, those who are mentally or physically handicapped or chronically ill should be removed from institutions and transferred to the community. Without greater resources than are currently available, this could lead to isolation and deprivation for patients and to financial and emotional stress for families. Nor do we believe it would be right - as has been proposed⁵ - for community care to be placed under the control of local authorities, many of which are highly politicised and grossly inefficient, and run mainly by social workers who are not trained to care for clients with clinical problems associated with mental illness and the infirmities of old age.

2. District Health Authorities should sustain these services with funds from the government which rise in proportion to the number of people for whose health care needs they are responsible according to a formula which allows for the varying needs of different age-groups and categories of patient.

3. There should be more opportunity for patients to choose a doctor, and for doctors to refer patients to facilities outside their District, the costs being covered by transfer payments between District Health Authorities.

This would extend the financial disciplines now applied to the hospital and community health services to those provided by Family Practitioner Committees,

whose budgets are still largely open-ended. The district budget for any year should depend on the number of people living in the district during that year and should be divided by the District Authority according to priorities which it determines, while respecting any existing contractual arrangements. Annual budgets and accounts, including both recurrent and capital costs, should be presented as soon as possible; the existing system of transfer payments for treatment carried out by other District Health Authorities, which at present only applies to hospital in-patients, should be extended to cover out-patients, day patients and community care, together with the services currently provided by Family Practitioner Committees.

4. Regional Health Authorities should be abolished. Their responsibilities should be taken over partly by the NHS Management Board, whose functions should be revised and clarified, and partly by consortia of District Health Authorities in order to rationalise specialist facilities across geographical areas.

The NHS Management Board should: devise and administer the new funding formula; oversee and encourage best practice amongst the new District Health Authorities; be responsible for national policy on public health and on licensing and prescribing of drugs; be responsible, in consultation with the appropriate professional bodies, for the training and remit of health care professionals; and sponsor a limited amount of appropriate research.

5. Nurse practitioners should be introduced, with limited rights to prescribe drugs and treatment and to refer patients to other professionals. Such practitioners are especially suitable to work in community care, in long-stay residential hospitals and institutions, and in primary health care.

Nurses, midwives, health visitors and other professions allied to medicine, could and should have much greater responsibility for the organisation and delivery of care than they do at present. As nurse practitioners they should have the right to prescribe medicines from a limited list; the right to use their own professional judgment concerning the administration of certain drugs prescribed by doctors; and the right, under certain circumstances, to be a first point of contact and to refer patients either to general practitioners or to hospitals. Nurse practitioners could make a valuable and cost-effective contribution in acute hospital wards, for example in intensive care units, and in long-stay wards for the elderly, the mentally and physically handicapped and the chronic sick, where care predominates over cure. In hospital ante-natal clinics, it has been found that 60% of mothers with *normal* pregnancies are seen first by a midwife and then by a doctor—a process which is wasteful, alarming to the patient and an affront to the skills of the midwife. Nurse practitioners would be useful too in

some areas of primary care currently covered by Family Practitioner Committees; and in many areas of community care, where nurses should play a much more important role than social workers.

Nurse practitioners have been recommended by the Cumberlege report⁶ which found that 60% of the public would be happy to see a nurse in the first instance for the majority of reasons for which they now see their GP. Their introduction would make much better use of the considerable range of nursing skills which are at present available and underused; could be economical because they would do some of the work now done by highly paid doctors; would be widely welcomed both by the nursing profession and by the public; and could by creating more posts of greater responsibility and reward for practising nurses, reduce the numbers of qualified nurses who, while remaining on the Nursing Register, cease to practice their profession.

6. District Health Authorities should be able to commission services from voluntary and charitable organisations and from other private providers. The private sector should recompense the NHS for the costs of training the staff it employs and for any other NHS facilities it uses.

District Health Authorities, while responsible for ensuring that care is available to all, do not necessarily need to provide it themselves. The voluntary sector, including charitable organisations and hospices, should be encouraged to compete with and to complement the facilities provided directly by District Authorities. These are just the kind of mediating institutions which need to be encouraged if the charitable roots of the NHS are to be nurtured.

The same welcome should be extended to private hospitals and other kinds of private health care organisations, provided that the private sector makes some significant recompense to the NHS for the costs of training the staff it employs and pays the full costs of any other NHS facilities that it uses. Given such a constructive approach, concerns about a two-tier service could be dissipated and the way opened for many new and popular initiatives, suited to the varying situations in different Districts.

7. The NHS should be funded primarily by a new earmarked tax, the NHS Insurance Charge, levied and collected like income tax; the current rate would be around 14p in the pound, which would mean a reduction of income tax to 11p in the pound.

The principal source of funding for the NHS would thus continue to be tax revenues collected by the government since this kind of funding accords well with the fundamental principles of the NHS. However, this change would have several obvious advantages: the better off would pay proportionately more towards the NHS; the poorest would pay nothing; and the public would have a much clearer idea than at present of the true costs of the NHS and of how they are increasing in

real terms. The social and political advantages of this change, together with the special status enjoyed by the NHS in British public opinion, should outweigh the usual Treasury objections to an earmarked tax.

District Health Authorities, voluntary organisations and private providers should also be encouraged to raise additional funds in a wide variety of ways, for either general or specific purposes.

Salaries, which make up approximately 70% of running costs of the NHS, should continue to be primarily based on professional competence and responsibilities. However, responsibilities should be taken seriously. Strikes and other disruptive actions which threaten patient care must be ruled out, as incompatible with the universal charitable duty that is the basis of the NHS. Salaries should also vary in different parts of the country so as to allow for variations in the cost of living, and of housing in particular.

8. Much greater effort should be devoted to informing the public about their rights as patients; about the quality of services provided by their own and other family practitioners and District Health Authorities; and about how the NHS budget is spent both nationally and district by district.

Choice is vital in improving health care. But choice without information is blind and there is no reasonable or humane possibility of a system in which information about every detail is reflected in prices. So much more needs to be done to provide information.

The government should inform the public how the £22 billion pounds (or, more graphically, how the 14p in the pound of taxable income) is spent. In particular taxpayers should be shown how it is divided between the different aspects of health care, and they should at the same time be reminded of their rights as consumers, perhaps through a Patients' Charter.

District Health Authorities should be required, every year, to publish and to make readily available to any member of the public on request, information concerning its total income and how it is calculated; how much is spent on each main area of care; a limited number of performance indicators, including average waiting times and lengths of waiting lists for common operations; information about primary health care facilities; comparable statistical information for the country as a whole, including the range of figures for different District Health Authorities; comparable statistical information for neighbouring Authorities; information about patients' statutory rights and their right to change their GP; and any other background information which the Authority considers is needed to put the statutory statistical information into proper context. District Health Authorities should be required to publish this annual report, perhaps in a shortened form, in local newspapers.

All primary providers, whether they be doctors, dentists, opticians, pharmacists or nurse practitioners,

should also be free to advertise the services they offer including such arrangements as appointments systems, out-of-hours and deputising services, and preventative care, so that patients can have access to and choose between a wide variety of services.

Those proposals may not be sufficient but they are a necessary beginning. They will make it possible for the public to make better use of the NHS and also to understand and to assess it, not as a vague and unquestioned ideal, but as a reality.

* * *

Our proposals are radically conservative in seeking to go to the roots of the charitable social philosophy on which the NHS is founded. They are radically reforming in advocating new ways of organising health care across the country; in advocating a revision of professional responsibilities; and in suggesting new ways to fund the NHS. They are also radical in both senses in building awareness of the many and changing constraints on health care into the ways in which decisions, both large and small, are made. By offering more choice and accountability, they will make the NHS more responsive to changing needs and thus produce better care. Changes will be facilitated but not compelled while the public will have much more information on which to decide whether they are receiving a good service.

The current review of health provision in Britain is the first time for many years in which debate about the central principles of the NHS has been brought into the open, and made fundamental to a large-scale review of policy. Decisions may therefore soon be taken which will shape the health service for the foreseeable future. Hence it is important to recognise the serious limitations of the current proposals of the Conservative government. Its NHS White Paper is inadequate, being firmly based on a primarily medical model of health care and not taking adequately into account the totality of needs. It has nothing to say about community care and thus fails to see the care of the infirm elderly, the chronically sick, the mentally ill and the mentally and physically handicapped as part of the seamless web of support. Its provisions for hospitals to opt out⁷ of District Health Authority control - but not, it should be noted, out of the NHS - may lead to pressure on them not to provide adequately for low income generating patients, for example by discharging long-term elderly patients prematurely; such pressures could lead to a less equitable system. Finally, the proposals give scant recognition to the need to make up for a backlog in investment over recent years, when funding has not kept pace with increases in costs. Nor do they consider the long-term implications for training professionals, or changes such as the government approved Project 2000 for nurses which means more time spent in training and less on hospital wards.

Unless these proposals are modified so as to take more account of fundamental principles, the govern-

ment may well lose the respect of the electorate and give its enemies an unassailable advantage.

The British people will not accept that the NHS is safe in anybody's hands if those responsible do not endorse its charitable principles of accessibility, universality and accountability and put these principles at the centre of any proposals for change.

They are also aware of the shift towards long-term support for the elderly, the handicapped and the chronically ill, and they are beginning to recognise, in consequence, the need for a radical reassessment of priorities. If the NHS ossifies to the point where the young and the curable are neglected in favour of the old and the helpless, there may well be a decline in the prosperity needed to sustain it - for prosperity lies with the young and the healthy. On the other hand, if the NHS ceases to care for those for whose longevity and fragility it is largely responsible, then its value will be questioned and its moral credit diminished. All reasonable people foresee the growing tension between these various requirements, and therefore should welcome a radical reassessment whereby they might be reconciled.

The fundamental aim should be to give everybody the power - which the rich have always enjoyed - to choose and to obtain the best available health care whenever in their lives they need it.

Notes

1. There are a growing number of schemes which incorporate public and private sector care in ways which complement and enhance each other. Such a mixed economy is being encouraged in Australia under a Labour government to an extent which make the Tories in Britain look pink by comparison.
2. J. Clark, *Bevan's Masterpiece or Bevan's Folly? - the NHS - Should we start again?*, address to the Royal College of Nursing Professional Conference, June 1978.
3. C. Cox, Eileen Skellern Lecture, 1986.
4. OECD, *Measuring Health Care 1960-83*, HMSO, 1985.
5. R. Griffiths, *Community Care - An Agenda for Action*, HMSO, 1988.
6. J. Cumberlege, *Neighbourhood Nursing - A Focus for Care*, HMSO, April 1986.
7. Comparisons with proposals for schools to opt out are invalid because of the very different nature of education and health care.

INTIMIDATION OF A CONTRIBUTOR

Paul Rowlandson, a lecturer at North East London Polytechnic and a recent contributor to the Review, has been threatened with disciplinary action following the publication of his article "Gender, Psychoanalysis and Intelligence: The Case against Affirmative Action" (*Salisbury Review*, September 1989).

According to one Ms Judith Hamilton, who describes herself as the "equal opportunities co-ordinator" at the Polytechnic, Rowlandson has "deeply offended" his colleagues and could face disciplinary action as a result. In the *Times Higher Educational Supplement* (6th October 1989) Hamilton writes that "This Polytechnic is committed to equal opportunities and individual rights. Mr Rowlandson would be breaking our rules if he acted on these ideas, which I believe it may be difficult for him to avoid doing." She goes on to describe his work as "intellectually shoddy", full of major logical inconsistencies and "alarming".

Striking up an attitude of prickly self-righteousness, she declares herself to be opposed to the censorship of ideas. But only, it seems, if such ideas satisfy a strict ideological conformity which it is the task of individuals such as herself *both* to determine and to enforce.

Editorial

The remarkable events in Poland and Hungary have led many to foresee the demise of communist power, and the end of the enslavement of Eastern Europe. The rising politicians in the socialist countries, and their supporters in the West, seem to agree in their analysis. Two things, they suggest, are needed for the regeneration of these wasted lands: political democracy, and a market economy. In a sense these are one thing: freedom, in its political and economic application. For a market is an economic system which arises when people exchange goods by consent: it is the economic expression of the sovereignty of the individual, whose consent thereby becomes the foundation of the social order.

But is it realistic, in present conditions, to place political and economic democracy so high on the agenda? It is one of the great illusions of our time that an economy can be freed, and a political process democratised, without any other social transformation. People forget, because it is inconvenient to remember, that free economies and representative assemblies have emerged only slowly and painfully, and only here and there - in Europe, in the European imperium, and in a few scattered places, mostly on the Pacific fringe, which have enjoyed the protection of Europe, and the benefit of European law. The ludicrous Marxist view, that economic change is the motor of political evolution, still retains its hold over the progressive intellect. This, combined with legal and historical ignorance, and with an unseemly preoccupation with 'material' facts, has led to the widespread superstition that economics is the first concern of government. In fact the business of government is law; the economic system evolves in response to law and not vice versa.

Economic freedom came to Europe because European law moved, under its own impetus, towards a regime of private property, security of tenure, and individual right. Transport these legal artefacts to another clime and - however different the culture, temperament and resources of the people - you will obtain the same result. (Hong Kong, enjoying a European rule of law, produces 15% of the GNP of China; yet it contains none of China's natural resources, and only 0.5% of its population.)

Law is equally decisive in the political sphere. Without law, and the rule of law, the citizen has no veto against his rulers, and cannot compel those in power either to sue for his consent, or to uphold their own agreements. It is the rule of law, therefore, which is the root of democracy. It alone can create the stable institutions, and self-limiting habits of government, which are the safeguard against 'democratic despotism', of the kind we still see in Eastern Europe.

The rule of law is the secret of Europe's longevity, and should now be at the top of the Polish and Hungarian agenda. In their understandable impatience to achieve political and economic democracy, the politicians of those countries have yet to proclaim law as their goal, or take the necessary steps to secure it. On the assumption (not altogether unreasonable) that they are all readers of the *Salisbury Review*, we hereby make a contribution to their cause, listing some of the elementary steps towards legality:

(1) Judicial independence. This means that no judge can accept instructions from anyone - not even from the Communist Party. Since the Communist Party assumes the right to instruct all its members in every matter relating to its interests, judges who are members of the Party should be compelled to resign from it, and party membership must be made incompatible with any future judicial appointment.

(2) The ascription of legal personality to all potential wrongdoers - including the Communist Party, the Secret Police and their agents. It must be possible to prosecute all these for their crimes, and to sue them for their civil wrongs: even to the point where their assets are forfeit.

(3) The law must be extended into those areas - tort, contract and property - where 'socialist legality' has left a politically convenient twilight. The *ad hoc* devices of communist tyranny (state arbitration, for example) must be abolished, and full legal remedies provided for every legally specificable wrong.

(4) These remedies must include injunction, placed in the hands of every citizen, and valid against every wrongdoer, including the state enterprises. (Nothing short of this will enable the Poles, for example, to solve their ecological problems, and even this may not be enough.)

(5) There must be an end to retroactive legislation, to extension of laws by 'analogy', and to government by edict.

(6) There must be an accurate record of the law, and a procedure for resolving the ambiguities and obscurities which until now have been deliberately retained, so as to facilitate political persecutions.

(7) Those who betrayed Poland and Hungary to their enemies, who collaborated in the atrocities of recent history, and who violated laws with impunity, must be brought to justice, so that public confidence in the law is restored.

Some of those measures will be hard to implement. But without them, the Polish and Hungarian people will remain in their present twilight, deploying the small change of freedom, but without the capacity for a real investment.

Letters

Sir,

'Still in a posture of obsequiousness and without once lifting his eyes to look at the audience, Tao took a few sheets of paper from his pocket and started to read a prepared statement in a low voice devoid of any emotion. He admitted humbly all the 'crimes' listed by the speakers and accepted that his downfall was due to the fact that he did not have sufficient socialist awareness ...' (from *Life and Death in Shanghai*, by Nien Cheng, p.30, required reading for anybody who wants to understand what is happening in Britain at the present time).

'As to the role of the Historical Association towards the New History, that is a rather large question! The first thing to say is that the HA has been going now for rather more than 75 years, intends to continue for at least another 75 and, consequently, takes a long view. Its main *raison d'être* is to sustain and foster public interest in and serious study of History in all its aspects, of which school history is an important, but only one important part. Clearly school history is going through a crisis at the moment. Our aim is to weather this crisis by giving a positive lead and carrying the majority of teachers with us if we possibly can.' (Extract from a letter to me by Martin Roberts, Chairman of the Education Committee of HA, dated 30.8.88).

I have received a copy of the Historical Association's submission to the History Working Group, which is studying how History should be taught and assessed as a Foundation Subject from 5 to 16 in the National Curriculum. I am appalled. There is no hint that the HA cares two hoots about either civilization or its values. All it seems to care about is ingratiating itself with the Red Guards among the teachers.

It has to be said that the role played by the Historical Association (whose patron is Her Majesty the Queen) in the perversion of school history in recent years is deplorable. We expect something with the status of HA to stand up for the integrity of the subject. In this case we have been shamefully let down.

Stewart Deuchar,
Campaign for Real Education.

Sir,

There seems to be a persistent assumption in the *Salisbury Review* that all libertarians have the same opinion, i.e. that man is and should be solely 'self-interested' and 'atomistic', to take terms from Mr Levy's review (June 1988). This assumption also seems to be heavily implied in a lot of the writings of Professor Scruton and others. As Professor Rothbard lays very great stress on the *duties* of the individual to defend the property of others (property being defined in Lockean terms of life, liberty and possessions) for *moral* reasons, regardless of the cost to oneself, to accuse him of believing in a solely 'self-interested' and 'atomistic' individual (as those terms are commonly used) is absurd.

More broadly, there is the view implied in the *Salisbury Review* (though not in every article) that all libertarians are moral subjectivists and relativists; some indeed say they are (I would say they were being inconsistent, as they consider 'liberty' an objective value) but many are not - Rothbard being an example. A final point: Mr Levy refers to a 'Platonic devotion to the truth'. As Mr Levy no doubt knows, Plato (at least if we take his writings literally) was a convinced collectivist (as *The Laws* most clearly shows) who advocated the rewriting of history and theology and the ignoring of

observation if these conflicted with what he wished people to believe (see *The Republic*). Hence his term 'Noble Lie' - 'Excellent Myth'.

So I can only assume that Mr Levy means truth in some mystical sense. It is this mystical 'truth' - an idea with Germanic overtones - which sometimes seems to shadow conservatism. Of course, if man is merely an electro-chemical process, then where is the 'ghost in the machine' i.e. freewill? Antony Flew, to the contrary, believes that total materialism does imply determinism (this is where, in my view, the philosophy of Ayn Rand and others goes wrong). Nevertheless, one must not allow this partly mystical view of man to overflow into politics, and make the State - a legitimate object of reverence - into an object of worship. The true conservative view of central Government (if not of the local parish which, like the J.P., the squire, the family, the church etc., is seen as part of organic civil society) is to see its functions as those of protecting property from invaders and criminals ('fraud and violence' as Locke put it in his *Essay on Toleration* (1667)) and of settling disputes. In other words, although the State is connected to man and Civil Society in their spiritual dimension it is also separate from them and limited in respect of them. (As you know, even Hegel endorsed this to some extent.) Hence the old English phrase 'the King should live off his own', or in the Greek world and in the phrase sometimes put by translators into the mouth of Plato in *The Laws*: 'hands off fundamentals'. I write as a loyal British subject.

Paul Marks,
4 Northumberland Road,
Kettering,
Northamptonshire.

Sir,

Mr. Stove (*Salisbury Review*, June 1989) comments on Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feurbach to little purpose: at least three remarks are in order:

- 1) He claims never to have seen 'one word of criticism' of the thesis. He cannot have looked in all the likely places for quite a few people have criticised it, including myself.
- 2) Marx, he writes, was interested in one thing only, namely that the poor were getting poorer than, in his opinion, they ought to have been; the contrary is true: Marx was *looking forward* to the proletariat's total pauperization and attacked all attempts at amelioration.
- 3) Several of Mr. Stove's points are misconceived because of his strange belief that the *dictum* was really addressed to the learned in general, including mathematicians and scientists. In fact, Marx must be numbered amongst the uncritical admirers of mathematics and the natural sciences: he even took them as models for his own investigations. His attacks on philosophy rather were directed at metaphysicians and contemplative thinkers who have no wish to change anything.

And while others wanted to 'change the world' by science plus social reform, Marx thought in terms of science and political revolution.

R. Gruner,
Newton Stewart,
Wigtownshire.

Sir,

Both Hugh Lloyd-Jones' article on Greek (March 1988) and John Carroll's on the fate of the post-humanist university (December 1988) made me reflect on the role of the classical world in shaping today's Western civilisation and on the relative decline of classical studies in modern society.

Today's egalitarian and technocratic thinking encourages subjects of a narrow vocational kind rather than the study of Latin and Greek, and an interest in Third World cultures before the achievements of the Classical Age. We forget that unless we understand our own cultural tradition, it is impossible to understand the cultural traditions of another.

The obsession with Third World politics and oppressed minorities turns classical studies into something which animated only the white imperialists of a certain age. Far too often classical studies are condemned as 'elitist'. According to *Encounter* (February 1988) Latin, Greek and classical studies have been dropped from the curriculum in a North London girls' secondary school because they are 'monocultural'. The budget for Classics teaching was transferred to finance the teaching of Bengali. In *The Observer* (8th November 1987) I read that Latin was 'elitist' because 'working class children use hardly any words of Latin derivation compared with their middle class peers'.

This kind of thinking leaves us both culturally poorer and less educated. Without a knowledge of the languages that shaped the literature and philosophy of Europe, we cannot appreciate in full our past and cannot understand her masterpieces which raise questions of universal interest. Professor Ian Jack of Pembroke College, Cambridge remarked: 'If the present age, so curiously indifferent to the continuities of civilisation, so obsessed with computers and the cult of the "entrepreneur", wilfully abandons the attempt to keep communications open with the European civilisation of the last 2-3000 years, it will be responsible for losing ground which is unlikely ever to be recovered.' (*The Times*, 27th October 87). With the elimination of classical studies from the curriculum, errors of English grammar and spelling would increase, 'no longer confined', as Professor Thomson, Head of Greek at the

University of Aberdeen wrote in *The Times*, on 31st October 1987, 'to schoolchildren's homework, but printed and painted, large as life, on notices and signboards'. Enoch Powell, in a memorable speech at Warwick School, on 9th October 1984, asserted that 'unless classical studies continue vigorous in our schools and universities, civilisation in this land is condemned to shrivel into barbarism.' I share his fears not only for Great Britain but for the whole of Europe. In our modern utilitarian society, where the obsession with computers makes us depend on them to an ever increasing degree, classical studies can play their role in shaping our thought and in gently shifting our attitudes towards the future: a future which, we may hope, will not only be dominated by machines and software but also by a better, and more profound knowledge of the past, and therefore of ourselves.

Michael Danikas,
Eindhoven University of Technology,
The Netherlands.

Sir,

I would be grateful if any of your readers could provide me with information on any of the following High Tory journals, associations and individuals which were involved with the evolution of Conservative thought between 1918 and 1939. These are: *The Patriot* and the Boswell Publishing Company, the Unity Band, the Liberty Restoration League, and the Economic League, Dorothy Crisp and Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw.

Paul Bee,
Department of History,
University of Reading,
Whiteknights,
Reading,
RG6 2AA.

Notes on Contributors

Caroline Cox was head of the Sociology Department at the Polytechnic of North London. She was created a Life Peer in 1982.

David Davies is a free-lance writer.

Jessica Douglas-Home is a painter and stage designer.

Angela Ellis-Jones works as a research analyst in the City.

Beverley Halstead is a reader in Geology at the University of Reading.

The Rt. Hon Michael Heseltine M.P. sits in the Conservative interest for Henley-on-Thames.

Vinay Lal teaches in the Department of South Asian languages at the University of Chicago.

David J. Levy is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Middlesex Polytechnic.

Marek Matraszek is a graduate student at Magdalen College, Oxford.

John Marks is Director of the Educational Research Trust.

George Martelli is an author and journalist.

Anthony O'Hear is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bradford

David Pryce-Jones is an historian and novelist.

A. L. Rowse is a well known poet, biographer and Tudor historian.

Jonathan Savery is a teacher and part-time taxi driver awaiting rehabilitation.

Ian Small and Marcus Walsh are Lecturers in English at the University of Birmingham.

Helen Szamuely is a free-lance writer on Soviet affairs.

Book Reviews

ROMANIA BETRAYED

Jessica Douglas-Home

Operation Autonomous, Ivor Porter, Chatto and Windus, 1989, £18.00, (0-7001-3170-5).

During the first decades of the century the Romanians, far more than the Poles or the Hungarians, had begun to think of themselves as part of liberal democratic Europe. This was particularly so after the major electoral reforms which followed the First World War, enfranchising the vast peasant electorate. Ivor Porter charts the turbulent path towards democracy and turns the microscope onto political and social life in Romania between 1937-1947. He came to know and love the country first through the British Council and then through S.O.E. The book ends with his eye witness account of the destruction of Romanian democracy.

Anyone reading this fascinating and thoroughly documented account will be saddened by the British government's behaviour towards Romania and the contribution made by Britain to Romania's destruction. During the pre-war months Romania looked in vain to the British and the French for concrete help in an attempt to protect themselves from Russia and Germany. Historically neither was to be trusted: distrust of Russia, however, produced a different and deeper hatred in most Romanians. For the Russians had pillaged Romania whilst pretending to be allied to it. They had also provided the Romanians with a vision from close quarters of what communism is like.

At the outset of World War II Romania declared itself neutral. However, King Carol I had already been forced into economic alliance with Hitler, having failed to obtain an agreement over oil sales from Chamberlain. The complexity of Romania's involvement in the war is beautifully presented by Porter. Most students of the period will know of the Iron Guard and of the flirtation with fascism. But this was only a small part of the story. Far more important was the indigenous resistance to fascism, which culminated at last with King Michael's decision finally to confront the evil and stage a *coup* against the Germans. This *coup* - for which the communists today mendaciously claim the credit - was successful. But the plans were based on the assumption that British or American troops would appear in Romania to give support. They did not do so. Since the *coup* hastened the end of the war by several months (Hitler was cut off from oil and the Red Army was able to advance into Central Europe), the

Romanians concluded that the great contribution made by them to the allied cause would ensure they would be treated with respect and gratitude. It was not so. Porter goes on to describe the tragic events which led to the Soviet takeover of Romania - the outcome which the Romanians most feared. Immediately the Soviets began to treat Romania as a conquered nation. Equipment, including oil field equipment and most of the merchant fleet, was seized, even before the armistice was signed. No questions were asked about such behaviour by the British or American governments. Appeasement of Stalin was the order of the day. Within weeks the Soviet command established the 'right' to interfere in every aspect of human life. It is to the great credit of the Foreign Office that at no stage did it misrepresent the situation (as it did in Yugoslavia). At first the Bucharest embassy was not informed of Churchill's repudiation of the Atlantic Charter. Porter could not understand why his reports and proposals were not better received by London. He and American colleagues had been working actively since the *coup* to establish a parliamentary government in the country. Only much later was the embassy informed of the Churchill-Stalin percentage agreement. Nor was information about the agreement ever given to the Romanians: again and again politicians asked, reasonably enough, whether Romania had been sold into the Russian sphere of influence? Porter quotes a memo from Churchill to Eden: 'Surely we are not called to make such an admission'.

How many people now know of the tenacity with which Romanians tried to impede the communist takeover? Although there were only 900 Party members (mostly members of the Hungarian speaking Transylvanian minority, and many of them Jews) in a country of 1 million, Moscow had been training them for years. The familiar communist tactics were put smoothly into operation. In the circumstances the Romanians held out far longer than could ever have been expected. It was not until 27 February 1947 that troops surrounded the palace and King Michael was given an ultimatum to appoint a communist government.

For anyone who doubts the lack of support for communism throughout the whole of Romania at this time, it is worth reading the draft Porter wrote for the legation annual report in 1946 (page 239). It should also stand as a corrective to the widely held opinion that, if modern Romania is so ghastly, the fault must be with the Romanians themselves: on the contrary, it is precisely because the communist force is only a tiny minority, that they have had to assert themselves in such extreme and disgusting ways.

ANTI-ANTI-RACISM

Jonathan Savery

Integration or Disintegration?, Ray Honeyford, Claridge Press, 1988, £9.95, (1-870626-85-0).

It would be regrettable if the modest intention of this timely book discouraged the casual reader from recognising the almost unique and inestimable contribution Ray Honeyford has made in it towards explaining certain usually impervious theories concerning 'racism'. He has described - perhaps ridiculed in a way - the quarrelsome opinions, opportunisms, political intrigues, lack of charity and intellectual infidelity of the Anti-Racist movement and the wider race lobby. Few have been so intimate with the sort of fulminating race controversy that the left have so studiously ignited, or so perceptive in discerning their mischievous intentions; and so stubborn in defending the need for children to be properly educated in a British society that honours the matrimony between past and present, thus furnishing the offspring future with its safest cradle. For after all, isn't it to this country and to the best that this generation has inherited that all must make their commitment? If not, our children may be condemned to a sort of permanent and disruptive condition of cultural orphanage and may learn no more than the brief, shallow wisdom of the streets.

Honeyford's contribution is almost inestimable because the full value of his insights and conclusions will perhaps not be calculable finally until they have had more time to circulate around a wider audience. I hope they will. Certainly this book should be in inner city, mixed race school staff rooms and on all PGCE book lists. For the book is a warning to all the docile liberals and the well intentioned who, lacking horse sense and still smitten with sentimental notions of equality (almost compulsory equivalence) and social justice (often quite arbitrary) have become infatuated by the uncompromising self-styled and 'certain' righteousness of the Anti-Racists. The docile liberal has allowed the Anti-Racists almost monopoly rights on race matters, and has foolishly connived in their divisive binary classification of people as racists or anti-racists, white or black. It is no discredit to Ray Honeyford that he cannot shed much light - who can? - on the strange psychology of those so readily taken in by the fluent sales patter of a thriving Race Relations Industry - one is tempted to nominate it for a Queen's award - for his lantern casts its beam on much else. And in the straightforward and plain manner that ought to make this book accessible even to the N.U.T., he explains why pusillanimous toadying to the Anti-Racist movement is unnecessary, unseemly and hazardous.

For example, there are real risks in having foisted upon us the belief that a multi-ethnic society is unquestionably desirable, particularly if this implies a relaxation of racist immigration laws. Or indeed, that racial admixture has always been a virile feature of

British society and that recent immigration is merely the latest, healthy event in an historical process of enriching and beneficial arrivals. There may be an element of truth in these claims, as in others. Nevertheless, we must be cautious and realistic in our assessment of them. Along with a positive view, Honeyford seems to say, let us also be mindful of the pitfalls and tensions that have been the depressing hallmark of so many multi-ethnic communities forced together in fraternal coexistence. Moreover, there are other familiar dubious assertions - concerning contemporary capitalism's exploitation of the black population; black rights to their own cultures and languages; the cultural imperialism of British schools and so on - that should be evaluated in the same discerning manner by people justifiably unwilling to wholly abandon our own indigenous traditions the better to accommodate different, perhaps even unacceptable traditions and life styles of the recently arrived.

About progressive race relations ordinances Honeyford raises legitimate doubts: not as expressions of personal antipathy towards minority groups - no evidence of this - nor of insensitivity towards the genuine opportunities or problems that they bring, but in order to freshen an otherwise stifling and oppressive atmosphere with the stiff breeze of realism and intelligent scepticism that should have ventilated the Swann Report, but didn't.

But to say this is not really to do justice to the book, for although he is concerned with these general matters of race, his central and most fundamental motif seems to be his profound suspicion of the Anti-Racist movement, for which he reserves his most lethal criticism. Ostensibly concerned with the altruistic removal of racial discrimination in Britain, this loose though fairly coordinated affiliation of blustering Utopianists, race careerists, impatient left wing intellectuals and calculating caring Marxist schemers have sought to use the race issue as a lever for unbalancing and overturning a society that serves them to characterise as endemically racist: especially in terms of its unequal distribution of economic and political power. And it is convenient to their political purpose for them to antagonise relations between the two sections of society that they have conveniently devised: blacks (sometimes incorporated into workers) and whites, in other words: groups segregated by colour or class status (either their own or those assigned to them) and then set against each other. Honeyford is correct to examine this phenomenon - and the attendant language issue - and in some detail because if ever there was a recipe for strife - and as he puts it, disintegration, this must surely be it. And so we are presented with a stark choice between a society that somehow peacefully achieves integration or suffers the fatal alternative to which the Anti-Racists condemn us.

The latter and catastrophic option is clearly most unattractive. But how can one build an integrated society that is still British, and oppose racism without adherence to the extreme left wing Anti-Racist political

intolerances that would propel the country into an unrecognisable totalitarian Marxist state? Part of the answer to this may lie in Honeyford's interesting and novel concept of the *non-racist*. It is a concept that has yet to be fully elucidated but it does offer a sound and fertile talking point for those who see much to cherish and celebrate in British traditions, who are generally conservative (as indeed most are) and yet who want our society to welcome and absorb as much of the unfamiliar and challenging as is commensurate with the nation's political and cultural integrity, and continuity.

It would be foolish to pretend that the stubborn weeds sown by Anti-Racism will be entirely removed by the publication of *Integration or Disintegration?* But with this volume Ray Honeyford has fashioned a sharp sickle with which to begin the task.

THE ILLS OF MODERNITY

James McNamara

Political Theory and Modernity, William Connolly, Basil Blackwell, 1988, pp. 196, £9.95, (0-631-17034-0).

This is the book many neo-liberals have been waiting for but were unable to write. William Connolly reformulates an old liberal dilemma while reaching a conclusion which, given his warning that late-Modernity is a time of danger, comes over as a trifle perverse. All the same it is a highly professional piece of analysis by a competent political theorist.

Connolly's thesis is that after the collapse of the medieval synthesis, God was displaced from the centre of the moral universe, and many directional 'signs' were withdrawn from creation. In particular we can speak of the disappearance in Europe of a commonly held belief in the existence of natural law as God-given. Into the gap stepped the conceit of self-sufficient individuality, which slowly became the presiding universal. Otherness is felt most acutely in the area of willed communality - in the State.

The State was forced then to act in place of God, as at once the commonly accepted guarantor of social harmony, the rational lynch-pin for a science of government and a lofty arbiter between rival self-interests. As it did so the universalist side of individualism came into conflict with the Renaissance project of self-mastery. A good example of this is the endless quarrel between natural rights liberalism and utilitarian liberalism; universality versus mastery in a dramatic form. The conflict between the otherness of the State and the thrusting individuality of subjects has culminated typically in the emergence of rival party government.

Connolly enters the argument through three masters of individualism, Hobbes, Rousseau and Hegel. The book should be read for this brilliant exegesis alone,

even though he is weakest on Hobbes, not doing proper justice to the notion of responsible egoism as giving legitimate social formation to rampant individuality. He also seems a bit vague about the medieval synthesis citing Paracelsus of all people as an example. He takes a somewhat blinkered view of democratic theory as a whole, leaving out Locke and concentrating too much on the subjectivist element in classical liberalism. But the chapters on the failures of Rousseau and Hegel are outstanding. Connolly's argument is that Liberalism cannot help generating *resentissement*, or formations of individuality which feel excluded or alienated by so much organised otherness around them. Such formations clamour constantly for a fresh inclusivity, either by demands for reform or by general mayhem. This situation is endemic to liberalism, and democracy legitimises it, so to speak. It seems that individualism, otherness, and alienation were born triplets. If this is so modernity has a lot to answer for.

Connolly has selected his thinkers carefully on the basis of the extent to which they became aware of this problem. He demonstrates that Rousseau was so aware of it that after several attempts at a solution he gave the whole thing up as a bad job and recommended coercion (see his Polish Constitution). Hegel was so troubled by it that eventually he transcended individualism altogether, bringing back God to the centre in a huge reworking of the medieval synthesis. But by then it was too late; Europe was already suffering a crisis of Faith. It was this fact which explained the extraordinary appeal of Marx and the other socialists. Marx was the greatest of all those who exploited the concept of alienation as the chief characteristic of liberal democracy. He taught that the State was a moral exclusion zone, an exercise in coercive otherness hidden behind the apparatus of efficient administration. Unfortunately for those foolish enough to follow him, his own projected resolution - total communality - turned out to exclude wealth, mastery, and individuality altogether, even failing to hide efficiently its own coercive otherness. After Marx we pass from the optimistic phase of modernity to our own phase of pessimism, what could be called authentic modernity.

In his final chapter *Politics and Homesickness* Connolly brings the argument to a close by stressing that the great prophet of self-disintegration, Nietzsche, correctly diagnosed the central problem. He recognised that self-knowledge without God was the underlying teleology of liberalism. It is a world defined by a permanent quest for self-examination in a realm emptied of ontological significance: the unstructured site of an individual with an ineliminable urge to find a home in it. Liberal political structures pretend to be this home by using undeclared presumptions left over from the world they displaced. Connolly rejects Nietzsche's own solution to this state of affairs - triumphalist aristocratic individualism willing a new order - but draws upon his dystopian critique of liberalism to explain the present dangerous impasses. We have arrived at a moment when democracy seems

able to produce only self-satisfied citizens or enraged ones. Bereft of honesty and transcendence it tends towards the formation of passive nihilisms of the affluent type. Mastery of nature has finally outrun mastery of self. The book concludes with its own prescription - reconstituted radicalised liberalism - which is really a passionate plea for one more attempt at the totally inclusive state, but this time stripped of its metaphysical pretensions.

For all the brilliance of his analysis, Connolly's conclusion is both uninspiring and dangerous. Democracy still retains some faith in its original ideal and is not merely the flabby consensus whereby we are reconciled to our own spiritual devitalisation. This is why Europe at least is still able to resist its enemies. There is an underlying ethical senility in Connolly's position of which Nietzsche would not have approved. Nevertheless, the book explains what is wrong with modernity. It describes a world full of non-directional energy, inchoate rivalries, and lacking in unitary coherence. The liberal democracies are prey to aberrant forms of subjectivity which they gestated out of themselves. Our collective harmony is threatened by the inflation of 'rights', by ever new demands on the sexual commonwealth, by revanchist terrorism, and by fluctuating fashions in crazy ideas, all insisting on 'freedom of expression'. And it is surely correct to see all this as the legacy of subjective individualism. All the same the author's recommendations can only inspire amazement. A conception of the political realm as a finite fluidity awash with non-directional energy to be reconstituted within a new liberalism - we already have had enough of this. Such thinking marks a terminal stage of modernity: forward to the medieval synthesis.

STALIN'S DAUGHTER

Helen Szamuely

Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev, Fontana, 1989, £12.50, (0-00-215660).

Perestroika Annual, Futura, 1988, £12.99, (0-7088-4262-3).

Elites and Political Power in the USSR, David Lane (ed.), Edward Elgar, 1988, (1-85278-044-4).

A few months ago BBC's *Timewatch* devoted a programme to the Bukharin trial of 1938 and the purges of 1935-39 in general. Pride of place was given to a well-known icon of the Soviet regime, that of Stalin lifting a little girl shoulder high. In the thirties and later this picture was used as the image of that happy childhood Soviet children were supposed to experience 'thanks to Comrade Stalin'. Against all odds the little girl survived. She was interviewed and afterwards the commentator remarked that things have changed in the Soviet Union. The camera, intentionally or other-

wise, zoomed in on Gorbachev lifting a little girl shoulder high to the sound of thunderous applause.

When I stopped laughing I realised that I had just been presented with a graphically accurate reason for my distrust of *perestroika* oratory: so much of the pictorial and verbal imagery has remained unchanged. Any reader of *Perestroika* and *Perestroika Annual* will recognise a large number of well-worn, exhausted Soviet clichés. *Perestroika*, we are told over and over again, aims to build a society where, as Gorbachev says in his book 'the human factor in the broadest sense is [the] main priority.' But is that not what socialism was supposed to be about in the first place? Have we not been told for years, decades even, that unlike capitalism which is based on the despicable profit motive, socialism is an entirely humanitarian system? Why do we need a complete reconstruction (the English equivalent of that glamorous word) to turn the socialist society into one that is run for the people and by the people? What was it before? What, dare one ask, did the millions of victims die *for*? These are hard questions to answer. But one would be more inclined to trust writers who raised them than ones who repeated tired Stalinist slogans, albeit against Stalinism.

We cannot expect the Soviet leader to use anything but tired Soviet clichés. There might be a revolution if he wrote anything original. The book *Perestroika* is supposed to be a general blue print for the process. Even a blueprint could be a little more precise in its account of what has gone wrong and what can be done about it. It seems that a system that was the best in the world at its inception and in the initial stages has somehow mysteriously become an extremely oppressive one (Gorbachev is a little vague on this point) and, eventually, an extremely inefficient and unjust one. This last development occurred during a period called "stagnation" whose origins are completely incomprehensible. Of course, the West played its usual nefarious role. For instance, the Soviet Union, according to Gorbachev, was a little naive when it negotiated detente. It believed in openness and fairness and was unpleasantly shocked when the West slapped on embargoes and restrictions for no apparent reason at all.

What about the ways in which the situation can be mended? Simple: 'we [must] combine the advantages of a large collective economy with the individual's interests.' '*Perestroika* requires greater organisation in society, and conscious discipline of citizens.' Similar statements by Western politicians would have been greeted with well-deserved guffaws. Gorbachev's book was taken seriously, despite the fact that it consists almost entirely of such pronouncements: vague, meaningless, full of the right noises, above all, repetitious. For we have heard it all before, mostly from Soviet leaders and their acolytes. Let me refer to one more example. It concerns the question of socialist legality, a curious beast. 'Observance of law is a matter of principle for us and we have taken a broad and principled view of the issue. There can be no observance of law without democracy. At the same time, democracy

cannot exist and develop without the rule of law, because law is designed to protect society from abuses of power and guarantee citizens and their organisations and work collectives their rights and freedoms. This is the reason why we have taken a firm stand on the issue.' What does all this mean? Not only does Gorbachev go round in circles, he then gives a historical analysis of socialist legality that is completely misleading. To start with, Lenin did not believe in the rule of law, did not believe in such a thing as legality independent of the class struggle. One cannot return to Leninist norms of legality, for there never was such a thing.

What of the update on the situation? The publishers are promising to bring out a *Perestroika Annual* every year to give us the latest information from the field of action, described by the people involved: economists, scientists, journalists, politicians and so on. The first issue even has Gary Kasparov explaining why *perestroika* is essential to the well-being of chess and sport in general in the Soviet Union. The articles in this volume present the reader with the same problems as Gorbachev's book. There is very little rigorous analysis and very many assertions. These promise wonderful things: a thriving economy, personal and collective freedom, rule of law, moral regeneration. What lets the writers down is the language. This is the language we have heard for decades, used as if it had just been discovered by Gorbachev: socialist legality, peaceful intentions, care for the individual, social justice, real democracy etc. Every one of these expressions and most of the articles could have been read in *Pravda* of 1933, 1937, 1948, 1957, 1965 etc. Why should we, or, indeed, the people of the Soviet Union believe them? They are beginning to think that perhaps there are other possibilities and other words. One of the members of the Siberian miners' strike committee said to a TV interviewer: 'We need to have freely elected deputies at every level. Then we can say for sure that the Soviet system will survive.' This is no longer *perestroika* oratory: this is serious talk that should worry the Soviet leaders as they scour the works of Lenin and, perhaps, Stalin for terminology they can recycle for their *glasnost* performance.

The two essays that are of interest in *Perestroika Annual*, because they use different, unexpected language, are by the economist Abel Aganbegyan and the sociologist Tatyana Zaslavskaya. Aganbegyan paints a dark picture in his discussion of the economic situation. He freely admits that the country is in a far worse position than anyone had realised, the changes are far slower and are resisted by far more people than anyone (and this has to include enthusiastic Western writers) had expected. Aganbegyan is not ambitious. He would be happy for the country to get back to the far from ideal situation of Lenin's New Economic Policy. Though he is not as radical as his colleague Shmelyov, he is clear-sighted and knows that no amount of

jargon-mongering will save the reforms if the people do not have enough food, do not even approach the standard of living in the once (and by some still) derided rotten capitalist West.

Nevertheless, Aganbegyan maintains that the Soviet Union does not want to follow the Western road in its economic reforms because it does not want to lose the achievements of socialism. What achievements? The only completely unsurpassed one is the production of jargon and hot air. This sort of productivity has had one group of Western imitators and even rivals: students of the Soviet Union. *Elites and Political Power* is not altogether hot air since it is full of minutely detailed information on personnel, elite mobility, and the organisation of various groups that have allegedly had a great deal of influence (unspecified) on Soviet policy. Jargon there is a-plenty and all the figures that come from the Soviet Union are suspect as any Soviet economist or sociologist will tell you. But the worst of this book, edited by David Lane and made up of contributions by the elite of sovietology, is that it is so irrelevant to what is happening in the Soviet Union. To be sure it is hard to find out what *is* happening. But can a detailed analysis of the careers of local party committee officials or a discussion of elite complexes or institutional complexes explain how a great country like Russia found itself in an economic, moral and intellectual dead-end and why all the efforts to get out of it have been so far unsuccessful? Perhaps western Sovietologists are not interested in the question. At least some of the authors of *Perestroika Annual* are interested in the second half. Tatyana Zaslavskaya tries to give an answer by analysing the forces for and against *perestroika*. The result looks like an essay written by a western sociologist but for the fact that she has absolutely no data at all. Otherwise, she does very well. She groups people into spurious social groups: highly skilled workers, averagely skilled workers, the mass of the working class, junior bureaucrats, senior bureaucrats and so on. She then tries to imagine their attitude to *perestroika*. Her theoretical analysis works well and is, apparently, more cogent and more important than detailed descriptions of ministerial careers. Whether what Zaslavskaya says is true in practice is hard to say. Certainly she is right in pointing out (one wishes more Western observers paid attention to her) that it is not only the bureaucrats who oppose reforms. Many people do, because the lives of the people in the Soviet Union have been shaped by and are closely involved with the system as it exists. The nature of the system is such that any change in it will change it unrecognisably. While most people in the Soviet Union understand the need for change, the reality of it frightens them. Who can blame them? Every change in the last seventy years has been for the worse. In plain, jargon-free English they prefer the devil they know.

HOLY MODERN EMPIRES

David J. Levy

Sacralizing the Secular: The Renaissance Origins of Modernity, Stephen A. McKnight, Louisiana State University Press, 1989, 131 pp., £22.50 (0-8071-1449-9).

The argument over the nature and worth of modernity is as old as the modern world itself. And many of the most perceptive contributions to it have come from scholars of a conservative political persuasion. This applies as much to Stephen McKnight as to the figures of Voegelin, Hans Blumenberg and Karl Löwith, with whom he engages in debate. Untouched by the myths of necessary progress and delusive dreams of a utopian transfiguration of the human condition, conservatives have been better prepared than their opponents to understand a century in which the gaps between the promises of modernity and its achievements have become so scandalously obvious. Suspicious from the beginning of the modern project, and in particular its ambition to free man from the bounds of nature and history, they have shown a greater sensitivity to the hidden, unavowed features of the distinctively modern mind-set - its appropriation and distortion of the messianic themes of religion, its hubristic quest for total mastery over nature, including the nature of the human master himself, its uncritical trust in the reconstructive capacities of human reason, and its ruthless willingness to destroy whatever it judges to be imperfect in the interest of achieving a humanly unachievable perfection.

Though brief, McKnight's book is a valuable, original contribution to the diagnostic enterprise. Building on the work of his predecessors, and in particular on Löwith's theory of secularization and Voegelin's analysis of the gnostic elements in modernity, McKnight is concerned to bring out a feature which he considers to have been underestimated in previous writings. That is the element of 'sacralization', of what is, in effect a quest for human self-destruction, referred to in his title. Through a careful reading of the Renaissance literature, illustrated with a wealth of revealing quotation, McKnight demonstrates the presence in the consciousness of nascent modernity of a will to attain a divine, world-renewing status on the part of its most characteristic thinkers. This is true not only of the Italian neo-Platonists, Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, in whom the magical nature of the transformatory quest is openly avowed, but also of the more sober figure of Francis Bacon and those recent 'magi' of modernity, Auguste Comte and Karl Marx. The stress on sacralization is not intended to replace either the secularization thesis or Voegelin's characterization of the gnostic character of modern ideologies, but to show that alongside these elements there exists another, whose presence alone explains both the scope of modern ambition and the inevitability of the clash between the new image of humanity and

the traditional conception of God as creator and measure of man.

McKnight modestly describes the purpose of his book as to introduce the concept of sacralization into the debate on modernity. In this he deserves success. What he says is important and revealing of issues often hidden in other accounts of the genesis of the modern world. At the same time I have two reservations about the work. The first concerns the level of his discourse, which operates on the plane of the history of ideas. Following Eric Voegelin, McKnight's mentor as well as my own, I regard as insufficient any history of ideas which does not relate the ideas to the experiences out of which they arise and the historical conditions in which they become socially effective. Here McKnight's analysis could usefully be supplemented by reference to Reinhart Koselleck's book *Futures Past* where the modern appeal of world-transforming ideologies is related to the historical experience of a rapidly changing world in which expectations, based on past experience, are regularly belied by the novelty of unfolding events.

My second reservation concerns McKnight's rather overhasty dismissal of Blumenberg. The suggestiveness of Blumenberg's work resides in his highly original attempt to identify the absolutising elements in modern thought as not properly modern at all, but rather as misguided attempts on the part of the thinkers of the new age to 'reoccupy' positions, or answer questions, which belong legitimately only in the older theocentric world-view. Seen thus, the very features, such as the quasi-religious messianic structure of utopian ideology, which are crucial to Löwith's characterisation of modernity in terms of the illegitimate secularization of religious themes, are presented as potent but inessential residues of an older world view only partially transcended.

The 'legitimacy of the modern age', Blumenberg contends, can only be properly established when modern thought escapes the fatal attraction of these questions and recognises man's responsibility for his own fate. There are awkward echoes of Comte's Law of the Three Stages in this formulation but in Blumenberg's work they are given a powerful back-up by reference to the well considered anthropology of Arnold Gehlen. Central here is the argument that man is, by nature, an inherently deficient being, *Mangelwesen*, forced by his nature and place in the world to create, through the institutions of civilization, an *unnatural*, cultural space in which alone he can survive.

McKnight sees in this argument a threat not only to Löwith's identification of modernity with secularization but to his own complementary sacralization thesis as well. For precisely what is most essential to both these radically anti-modernist views is presented, by Blumenberg, as accidental and ultimately unnecessary to the thought and order of modernity. A full appreciation of the place of sacralization in the past, present and future of the modern world requires a

longer and more discriminating discussion of Blumenberg's thesis than McKnight here provides.

INFLUENCES ON ELIOT

Vinay Lal

T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism, Richard Shusterman, Duckworth, 1988, p. 236, £19.95.

T. S. Eliot and Indic Traditions: A Study in Poetry and Belief, Cleo McNelly Kearns, Cambridge University Press, 1987. p. 286.

T. S. Eliot's reputation as a major twentieth century poet has not suffered; but as a critic he has been less fortunate. The new, or allegedly new, strategies of interpretation and analysis developed by deconstructionists, Marxists, and others in this age of post-structuralism and post-modernism have pushed Eliot to the periphery of the critic's consciousness. It is the aim of Richard Shusterman, in his book on *T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism*, to restore Eliot the literary critic to his proper place and to defend his critical theory against the disparaging attitude of the post-structuralists.

Eliot was a student of philosophy at Harvard where he wrote a doctoral dissertation on F. H. Bradley under the supervision of Josiah Royce, then the most celebrated idealist philosopher in the United States. Shusterman, a philosopher trained in the analytical tradition, argues that in spite of Eliot's association with idealist philosophy, his true intellectual sympathies lay with champions of logical atomism and analytical philosophy in general.

Indeed, Eliot's development follows the path taken by twentieth century Anglo-American philosophy: as the analytical tradition grew out of a revolt against Hegel and Bradley, so Eliot turned from idealist philosophy to the philosophical doctrines espoused by Russell and Moore. Eventually both analytical philosophy and Eliot were led to a 'growing awareness of the historicist, non-foundational, pragmatic character of human understanding' (p. 3).

Shusterman shows that there is no basis for the 'grossly distorted' view of Eliot which depicts him as 'non-rational, anti-intellectual, and unphilosophical', and even as the supreme example of the alleged 'narrow-minded insularity' of the Anglo-American tradition (pp.4-11). Shusterman shows how Eliot came to be attracted to logical atomism, of which several central doctrines are to be found in Eliot's early criticism (p.19). Where, for example, Russell had stressed that 'the business of philosophy ... is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis', Eliot in *The Function of Criticism* asserted that 'comparison and analysis ... are the chief tools of the critic' (pp.22-3). Both insisted on the primacy of facts and on the desirability of having a logically

correct language so that, in Russell's words, 'there will always be a certain fundamental identity of structure between a fact and a symbol for it' (pp.25-27). Eliot's critical activity was 'significantly influenced, perhaps even inspired, by Russell's philosophy', by his rigorous empiricism; thus, 'the debt of modern literature to analytical philosophy is very much greater than has hitherto been acknowledged' (p.39).

Shusterman is not content to reveal only the similarities between logical atomism and Eliot's early criticism; rather, Eliot comes across as a superior kind of analytical philosopher, as Shusterman's discussion of the 'Eliotic themes of Wittgenstein's aesthetics' amply demonstrates (p.91). The 'new account of critical reasoning' that Wittgenstein offered incorporated the twin themes of the 'radical indeterminacy of aesthetic concepts' and the 'logical plurality of critical discourse' (pp.91-95). But Wittgenstein came to argue that perceptual persuasion is the only valid form of critical argument; and in so doing he contradicted his own critical pluralism (p.106). Eliot, who subscribed to similar doctrines, did not fall into this trap.

At the very outset Shusterman proclaims that his book 'is not a pious hagiography' (p. ix), but it is clear that for him Eliot as a critic can do no wrong. The outcome of his devout reading is that Eliot turns into 'a precursor of certain positions in postmodernist theory': the central ideas of the hermeneuticist Hans-Georg Gadamer in particular are said to be prefigured by Eliot (p.108). To both poetry is a kind of game: Eliot described poetry as a *superior* kind of amusement, one which gives only minimal enjoyment when not attended to properly (p.139). More arresting is the suggestion that both Eliot and Gadamer see the good that emerges from prejudices. To be prejudiced is to have a point of view - and to have no point of view is tantamount to being consigned to limbo, where men receive neither praise nor blame. 'Genuine taste', wrote Eliot, 'is always imperfect taste': 'A catholic taste would be indistinguishable from no taste at all'. In insisting 'that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudices', Gadamer was only rehabilitating a concept which had been anticipated in Eliot's writings (pp.114-5, 168). But the thesis that Eliot shares a good deal (or even something) in common with post-modernists is too bold. To be convincing Shusterman must find more than comparable quotations. Now there is the important consideration of Eliot's sensitivity to certain issues, such as representations of the 'Other' and colonial discourse, of which Eliot, even from the vantage-point of the seat of the largest empire in modern history, was almost entirely ignorant. Shusterman cannot dispel the feeling that ultimately the critical worlds of T. S. Eliot and, on the other hand, Foucault, Adorno, Derrida, and Jameson are far removed from each other.

Much of Eliot scholarship has revolved around the concepts of 'influence' and 'tradition', although the kind of traditions and influences which interest Kearns, in her *T. S. Eliot and Indic Traditions*, are of an

altogether different order. Kearns explores in exhaustive detail Eliot's knowledge of Indian texts and the means by which he came to acquire an interest in Eastern modes of speculation. Part I of her study examines the Indic texts and traditions with which Eliot was familiar and the many intermediaries - William James, Royce, Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, Whitman, Yeats, and many others - who in various ways fed Eliot's curiosity about Indian texts written by philosophers whose 'subtleties', Eliot was at one time to write, made 'most of the great European philosophers look like schoolboys.'

We have noted already the primacy of facts in Eliot's critical theory; and if Kearns had confined herself to facts, her study would have been largely successful. The middle and largest portion of her book discusses the various 'influences' on Eliot - religious, philosophical, and literary. Eliot is said to have been influenced by so many of the major figures of his generation that it would have been better to mention those under whose influences he did *not* fall. It may be, as Kearns points out, that 'of all the moderns, Eliot had the greatest susceptibility to influence, both conscious and unconscious': he was widely read, unusually appreciative of the music of poetry, attuned to many traditions because of his belief that wisdom everywhere is the same, and possessed of 'an ability to meet a work on its own terms' (p. 19, 177). But the looseness with which the term 'influence' is used by Kearns (and many other scholars) weakens its value as an analytical category. By assimilating Eliot, through the concept of 'influence', to the universal traditions of 'metaphysical literature' and 'wisdom poetry' (e.g., p. 161, 217, 231), it becomes possible for Kearns to argue that because Eliot was greatly influenced by 'wisdom literature', it was natural that he should be moved by Indian literature as one of the supreme embodiments of man's quest for wisdom.

This commonplace equation of Indic literature with 'wisdom' leads in the final third of the book to predictable readings of *The Waste Land* and the *Four Quartets*, though at places Kearns' suggestions are quite endearing: for example, that the four opening lines of *The Waste Land* are informed partially 'by the concept of unconscious motivation in the Yoga-sutra and in many texts of the Pali canon' (p. 201), or that the 'water-dripping song' owes something to 'many technical treatises on meditation, both Indic and Christian' (p. 217).

Are we then justified in assigning Indic traditions an abiding place in Eliot's intellectual, spiritual, and moral world outlook? Kearns admits that Eliot considered Indic texts to be not only a fount of wisdom but 'a preparation for certain important Christian insights' as well (p. vii). In his younger days, Eliot came to the conclusion that the categories of Indian thought were so different from the distinctions common to European philosophy that he would have to forget 'how to think and feel as an American or a European' if he hoped to penetrate 'to the heart of that mystery' of European speculation. This attitude was to remain unchanged

over the years. Indian philosophy Eliot found congenial; Eastern religions, with their greatly attenuated concept of sin, in which Eliot was a great believer, were less palatable; and that Eliot made a distinction at all between the two suggests how far removed he was from the Indian tradition.

The 'Indic traditions' of which Kearns speaks amount to no more than a handful of books, principally a few of the Upanishads and the *Gita*. The India of Eliot, and regrettably of Kearns too, is very much the Indologists' India, a slim foundation indeed upon which to write a whole book. To speak of 'Indic traditions' as though they could be equated solely with the Upanishads, the *Gita*, the *Yoga-sutras*, and a few books of the Pali canon is analogous to the Western intellectual's tendency to equate modern Indian literature solely with the names of R. K. Narayan, V. S. Naipaul, Ved Mehta, and Ruth Jhabvala. No doubt Kearns is constrained in her explorations to discuss what Eliot himself knew of 'Indic traditions'; but that Eliot ultimately knew so little is a telling fact about how much voyaging into far-off lands the Western writer has generally dared to do.

Sophist's Corner

'Acid rain, the greenhouse effect, the deterioration of the ozone layer, the destruction of the rain forests, the widening gulf between rich and poor, the poisoning of the seas, the proliferation of weaponry, the wholesale destruction of species, race and gender inequality... have their root cause in a world view originating in the West but now girdling the globe on account of Western power and influence.'

From: *Green Prints for Changing Schools*. Sue Grieg, Graham Pike and David Selby. Published by The World Wild Fund for Nature, 1989.

Freedom Today

Tired of superficial journalism, left-wing bias, and political complacency?

Then subscribe to *Freedom Today* – the widely read national journal of The Freedom Association, which presents news, fact and comment about the dangers facing freedom today (see tributes overleaf).

Past and present contributors include Jillian Becker, Vladimir Bukovsky, Ronald Butt, Baroness Cox, Brian Crozier, Louis Fitzgibbon, U.S. General Daniel Graham, Ralph Harris, Anthony Lejeune, Norris McWhirter, Patricia Morgan, John O'Sullivan, Edward Pearce, Arianna Stassinopoulos, Dr John Laffin, Digby Anderson – and many other distinguished names.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Freedom Today	£6 p.a.
Freedom Today (airmail)	£10 p.a.
Special student rate	£2 p.a.

Cheques payable to: The Freedom Association Ltd., 35 Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7JB.

If you would like to become a supporter of the Association and participate in its varied activities, contact us for further details (tel. 01-928 9925).

SOME TRIBUTES

Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher:

"Over the past years you have provided a platform for many people to highlight issues which are fundamental to the maintenance and extension of freedom – long may you continue."

The Independent:

"..... a highly professional magazine."

EEC Commission Officer:

"Along with The Spectator, it stands head and shoulders above any paper being produced in Britain today."

Peter Worthington, in The Toronto Sun (Canada):

"I find it an invaluable source of comment and commonsense."

Sir Ranulph Fiennes, leader of the Transglobe Expedition (1979-82):

"..... a true force for freedom."

Uncovering Soviet Disasters, James Oberg. Robert Hale, pp. 317, 1989, £14.95 (0-7090-3725-2).

Students of Soviet life will be familiar with the pathetic tale of a father worried about the non-appearance of his daughter who had been taking exams in Moscow, eventually discovering after three weeks that her plane had crashed. Secrecy about disasters in all areas and callousness towards their victims is not peculiar to the Soviet era: the phenomenon goes back centuries and may reflect Russia's deep seated inferiority to the outside world. A modern Soviet official explained it in another way: 'In our country we don't want to demoralise people - we treat the population as children'.

Readers of this poorly written book will find plenty of depressing but illuminating information about anthrax in Sverdlovsk, disasters on land, air and water, in the Moscow Metro and tragedies among the cosmonauts. Chernobyl was the first time that the government admitted that all was not well and has been acclaimed as an example of *glasnost*. The truth is that *glasnost* in this area amounts to little more than a public relations exercise: any Soviet citizen who divulged any of the information contained in this book would be severely punished.

(M.C.)

Stalin and The Kirov Murder, Robert Conquest. Hutchinson, 1989, £14.95 (0-09-173713-7).

All those who are interested in the Soviet Union owe a great deal to Robert Conquest, in particular to his two major studies: *The Great Terror* and *The Harvest of Sorrow*. *Stalin and the Murder of Kirov* is far smaller in scope. Was there any point in producing this book? Does everybody not know that Sergei Kirov was murdered by the NKVD on the orders of his erstwhile friend and comrade Joseph Stalin; that Stalin blamed various groups of alleged conspirators; and that he used the murder to launch a purge that claimed millions of lives?

The book had to be written for three reasons. Firstly, the story of the murder and subsequent cover-up is complicated and it is useful to have all the details set down clearly and coherently. Secondly, the people of the Soviet Union have been deprived of their history for many years. This is a terrible crime against a people and anyone who tries to put it right deserves their gratitude and ours. Thirdly, although the revisionist historians who have tried to prove that Stalin did not really murder all those millions have been lying low, devastated by official Soviet pronouncements on the subject, they will rise again. I hope that we shall never need to use Conquest's evidence in debates with Stalin's apologists. But I know, with a bitter certainty, that such hopes are vain.

(H.Sz.)

Learning to Teach, The Hillgate Group. The Claridge Press, 1988, £2.95. (1-870626-060-0).

This Educational Research Centre study recommends improvements in the training and appointment of teachers. Wisely noting that thorough subject knowledge is more relevant than the ideology pumped into many PGCE and BEd students, it emphasises the critical importance of classroom expertise and experience. Paper certification formalities are a trivial matter, as long as teachers can achieve in practice what is reasonably required. *Homines dum docent discunt*.

Nevertheless, it is more important than ever to attract into schools well-educated people who can think quickly on their feet and command the attention of children, with what used to be called a 'vocation'. 'Learning the job' will not succeed, however, unless sufficient time and incentives are provided for their teacher-supervisors who will be expected to add complicated guidance and responsible appraisal to all their other tasks. 'Licensed teachers' should not be an excuse for a cheap-labour patching-up operation, especially when so many qualified ex-teachers might be attracted back by professional conditions of service. On the other hand, teacher licence schemes, *properly organised*, could help re-introduce realism to management and 'craftmanship' to the schoolroom.

(D.L.W.A.)

Officially Present: An Investigation into Post-Registration Truancy. Patricia Stoll and Dennis O'Keefe, IEA Education Unit, 1989, £5.00 (0255-362-84).

Truancy is not new, but its extent will be disconcerting to many. Stoll and O'Keefe see truancy as a reaction against a curriculum which many pupils find boring or irrelevant, or both.

The authors sensibly call for a tightening up of school organisation and pupil surveillance, together with a re-thinking of parts of the traditional curriculum, particularly as it affects those pupils with a non-academic bent. They advocate an increase in the choice in subjects, with optional courses of a practical, domestic and recreational kind which reflect the post-school expectations of many pupils.

This is no doubt the best way of reducing truancy: for the truth is that 'there are large numbers of children who do not want and cannot manage the liberal curriculum' (p. 86). But while curricular reform is the priority, we also need to consider what is to be done with those pupils now kept compulsorily at school until the age of 16 for whom *any* sort of school curriculum is likely to seem pointless.

(T.W.M.)

THE CLARIDGE PRESS

Britain's most backward-looking publisher

Claridge Studies in Education

SEEDS OF BANKRUPTCY:

Sociological Bias Against Business and Freedom

by David Marsland Price: £8.95 (paperback) £12.95 (hardback)

"A coolly argued work ... Mr. Marsland produces systematic and incontrovertible evidence that British sociology is *against* private production, against profits, against advertising." (*Wall Street Journal*)

SCHOOLS FOR BARBARIANS

by Isabelle Stal and Françoise Thom Price: £6.50 (paperback)

"Its polemic against permissive slackness will strike a chord here ..." (*Encounter*)

INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION?

by Ray Honeyford Price: £9.95 (paperback) £15.95 (hardback)

"It is impossible to read Ray Honeyford's story ... without drawing parallels with the Salman Rushdie affair." (*New Statesman and Society*)

DEWSBURY: THE SCHOOL ABOVE THE PUB:

A Casestudy in Multicultural Education

by Fred Naylor in collaboration with Roger Peach Price: £7.95 (paperback)

Claridge Conflict Studies

RED CALYPSO: The Grenadian Revolution and its Aftermath

by Geoffrey Wagner Price: £8.95 (paperback) £12.95 (hardback)

"Mr. Wagner's book exposes [the West's] folly in chapter after unanswerable chapter." (*National Review*)

MOZAMBIQUE: A NATION IN CRISIS

by David Hoile Price: £6.50 (paperback)

Also published by The Claridge Press:

THE UNDOING OF THOUGHT

by Alain Finkielkraut Price: £6.95 (paperback)

"A book like this comes along once in a decade. It is difficult to do it justice in a review: too spacious, too original, too controversial." (*The Times*)

NEWSPEAK: The Language of Soviet Communism

by Françoise Thom Price: £8.95 (paperback)

SEEING THROUGH BERGER

by Peter Fuller Price: £8.95 (paperback)

Forthcoming:

DUST IN A DARK CONTINENT by Robin Page

THE GORBACHEV PHENOMENON by Brian Crozier

KATASTROIKA by Alexander Zinoviev

Obtainable through your local bookseller, or direct from:
The Claridge Press, 43 Queen's Gardens, London W2 3AA