


The Salisbury Review

A quarterly magazine of conservative thought



The Third Marquess of Salisbury
1830-1903

Carl Schmitt as a Conservative Thinker	David J. Levy
The National Curriculum	Ray Honeyford
Religious Education	Mervyn Hiskett
Enlightenment, Racism and Racial Prejudice	David Stove
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Events in Lithuania have reminded us once again that gradual 'reform' is not, and has never been, a real possibility in the Soviet Union. Either the communists relinquish power - and with it the chains that bind the subject nations of the union - or they hold on to power by force and subterfuge until another crisis finally flings them into the gutter where they belong. As Marek Strzala and Rodney Leach persuasively argue in this issue, the Soviet economy cannot be reformed; if it can be replaced by a market economy this will not be by a process of piecemeal reform, and certainly not by Mr Gorbachev's *perestroika*. Like every word introduced into political language by the Communist Party, *perestroika* has only one sure and settled meaning - the perpetuation of communist power. And it is communist power which will prevent all reform in the Soviet Union.

As the re-emerging nations of Eastern Europe are discovering, however, the vacuum left by the communists cannot easily be filled except by the very bureaucracy which the communists created. The bureaucrats continue to exercise power, while evading the responsibility which is the most pressing public need. The Eastern European experience reminds us of something that we know in less acute form in Britain: the ability of socialism to silt up the system, to settle in the bureaucratic sewers, from which even repeated application of the Thatcherite Dyno-rod fails to remove it. As Mervyn Hiskett and Ray Honeyford remind us, the educational bureaucracy is rapidly finding the ways by which to neutralise the government's reforms, and to reinterpret the Education Act in terms of the old socialist imperatives. In this, as in many other areas, Her Majesty's elected government seems to function merely as a kind of high-profile discussion group, tolerated by the civil servants who pretend to obey it, but accorded no more real authority than the

theatrical troupe which now performs each day in the Castle of Hradcany.

Perhaps we should not complain too much. President Havel's exhortation to live in truth may sound the right note for the Czechs and Slovaks in their present euphoria. But the mass of mankind is generally suspicious of truth and unable to live with it for long. Socialism is corrupt and inefficient; it is also a pack of lies. But it offers a solution to the problems of modern life that the indolent, the unimaginative and the parasitical can rest content with. And these are large and growing classes of society. Even if, as Ralph Segalman and Alfred Himelson show, the socialist solution to their problems is merely a way of accentuating them, it also offers a way of living with them. Besides, such people are not in the business of understanding the world or their place within it. Socialist solutions have the advantage of breeding the need for them, a need that is hostile to truth or at best indifferent to it. It therefore requires more than valid argument to overcome the socialist inertia.

Indeed everybody knows this. For as David Stove demonstrates, everybody knows that the ruling idea of socialism - the idea of human equality - is a falsehood. At the same time, however, we all have a motive to claim equality with those who are most evidently able to overtake us. Hence the enduring paradox of modern society, in which nobody believes the very principle which everyone pronounces, and in which that most inequitable network of privileges - the bureaucratic state - is summoned repeatedly as the sole remedy for inequitable privilege. How far Mrs Thatcher has been able to wrest our society free of this binding paradox is hard to say. But, as we argue in our editorial, Mrs. Thatcher's days may well be numbered. In any case the great socialist illusion - banished from Eastern Europe - may well be drifting now in this direction.

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Conservative Journals: *NUCLEUS*

Not all Belgians are liberals and internationalists. Whatever the Euro-nonsense that is spouted in Brussels, it is spouted in French. Belgium, however, includes Flanders, and the Flemish speaking Catholics are staunch patriots, with a strong sense of identity and an awareness of the need to fight for it. It is in the Flemish heartland that Belgian conservatism finds its most lively and dedicated following, and the birth of a conservative journal in Bruges should be no cause for surprise.

Nucleus is a Catholic monthly, inspired by the American *Crisis* (published in Washington by Michael Novak). Its editor, Paul Belien, is young, active and with a strong interest in the social and cultural issues which conservative politics has so often, and to its cost, ignored. In the January 1990 issue, arguing with Herman Van Rompuy, chairman of the governing Christian Democrat Party, Belien argues for a total prohibition of abortion and defends the Christian absolutism which was once the common property of the Catholic Church. The foetus, he argues, has become an '*Untermensch*', and in a telling comparison with Nazi ideology, he endeavours to awaken the liberal conscience (which, as Van Rompuy shows, is the natural

conscience of the politician in a modern society) to the full consequences of its moral standpoint.

In the issue for February the Belgian minister of Foreign Affairs, Mark Eyskens, distances himself from the cruder forms of Euro-speak and argues for a vision of Europe as a 'geography of values': a force-field of the moral sense which includes the United States and the European diaspora. Like every publication addressed to educated speakers of Dutch, the journal assumes a broad culture and an acquaintance with European languages, reviewing books in German, English and French (including Françoise Thom's *Moment Gorbachev*). At the same time it endeavours to translate specimens of European conservatism that are of relevance to the Flemish reader. (The issue for January contains a long consideration by Paul Johnson, on the theme 'Is Totalitarianism dead?')

Nucleus is published by five prominent Belgian lay Catholics. They are looking for like-minded people in other European countries to set up a European Heritage Foundation in Brussels.

Nucleus is available from Filips de Goedelaan 22, B-8000 Bruges, price BF 1,000 annually.

Carl Schmitt as a Conservative Thinker

David J. Levy

When Carl Schmitt died in April 1985 he was approaching his ninetyseventh birthday. The man who has been described as the Hobbes of the twentieth century had shared his predecessor's gift of a long life; but this was hardly the only thing he had in common with the great English political philosopher. There is, I believe, a Chinese prayer which runs: 'May I be spared from living in interesting times.' Schmitt, like Thomas Hobbes, was not so blessed. Both were fated to live in times made 'interesting' by war and revolution, by political collapse and the displacement of regimes. Hobbes's life, which began in 1588, encompassed the reigns of James I and Charles I, the English Civil War and Cromwell's Protectorate. By the time he died, in 1679, Charles II had occupied the throne of England for nearly twenty years, but the foundations of monarchical order had been shaken in a way from which they were never to recover. Schmitt too was to live through a series of historical crises in which the possibility of individual survival and the bases of civilised existence were called together into question. To that, above all, we owe the character of their works - closely argued and coldly impassioned writings which revolve obsessively around what their authors conceive to be the fundamental questions of political order and disorder.

Reading Hobbes, it often seems to me that while he has every claim to be considered the greatest English political thinker, he is also the one who appears most foreign to the English tradition. This is because, since Hobbes's day, we have been spared the experience of the utter breakdown of legitimate order which is the normal consequence of revolution, civil war or foreign conquest. Few others have been so lucky. We are fortunate to have escaped the circumstances that might have thrown up another Hobbes; and fortunate therefore, in consequence, that the implacable dialectic of fear and force that is the core of Hobbes's political theory has, in its native land, remained a topic of academic, rather than of practical, political concern.

In England the perceived unity between legality and legitimacy, between accepted procedure and acceptable power, has been the norm for so long that the Englishman finds it hard to recognise how rare it is in the modern world and even how fragile it may have become in his homeland.

Enjoying our political good fortune, we tend to take this state of affairs for granted; even though the history of the twentieth century should remind us of how exceptional it is. With the historical complacency of the politically privileged we imagine liberal democracy to be a universal norm of political life,

a goal to which all peoples should aspire and which each is desirous and capable of achieving. We forget the historical and geographical accidents which have saved us thus far from the worst the world can offer - factors without which even the greatest heroism might not have protected us in the wars of this century.

The closer we are to the heart of liberal democracy the more it is worth recalling that it is, even now, a relative rarity. Nor can we comfort ourselves with the thought that this is merely a problem of 'underdevelopment' - a transient stage on the way to universal democracy. Less than fifty years ago it seemed that liberal democracy was finished in the continent of Europe; and, for decades afterwards, half our continent remained subject to an imperial power from whose traditions the political ideals that define the West are almost wholly absent. It is with this sense of the fragility of constitutional order in mind that we should seek to come to grips with the work of Carl Schmitt, a man whose reputation was indelibly tainted by his period as a prominent intellectual supporter of Hitler's Third Reich, but whose writings contain some of the most searching analyses of the conditions of order in the modern world.

Though the subject of increasing attention in recent years, Schmitt is not a widely read author in either Britain or America. Until recently hardly any of his work had been translated; and, when he was referred to at all, it was in the context of the history of Nazi Germany, of which he was assumed to have been both a prophet and an enthusiastic apostle. This alone seemed to render his work unworthy of attention; and, as a result, historians and political thinkers failed either to examine what Schmitt actually wrote or inquire whether his reputation as a theorist of Nazism was really justified.

In fact the first English translation of Schmitt's works appeared as long ago as 1931 when the Catholic historian Christopher Dawson published his 1923 essay *Römischer Katholizismus und Politische Form* under the title of *The Necessity of Politics* as one of seven 'Essays in Order.' After that, however, there was a break until 1976, when *The Concept of the Political* was published alongside Leo Strauss's contemporary commentary on the text, dating from 1932. George Schwab, the work's translator, was already the author of *The Challenge of the Exception* (1970), the first book on Schmitt's political ideas to appear in English; and a second valuable book, Joseph Bendersky's *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich*, followed in 1983. Since then the MIT Press have published translations of three of Schmitt's works dating from the early 1920s as part of their series of

'Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought'. These are *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, and *Political Romanticism*. The appearance of these books and the responses they have engendered, indicate a new level of interest in Schmitt's thought. This interest is not merely historical, still less apologetic, but bound up with a new and unexpected appreciation of the relevance of Schmitt to some at least of our present problems.

The publication in English of a considerable portion of Schmitt's work dating from the years of the Weimar Republic will allow readers to judge for themselves how far his reputation as precursor and ideological lantern bearer of the Third Reich is justified. For even now, in so far as Schmitt enters our historical memory at all, it is as the 'Crown Jurist' of Hitler's regime, the legal and political theorist who sought to legitimise the morally and politically unacceptable. For the period between 1933 and 1936 there is just enough truth in this image to ensure that Schmitt is and will remain a controversial figure whose works must be approached with particular tact and caution.

The historical reality of the Third Reich casts a long shadow over our times. In relation to Schmitt it has lead some commentators to read his pre-1933 writings solely in the light of what was to happen after Hitler came to power. Given the enormity of the Nazi experience, this is understandable, and yet, in Schmitt's case, it is more than a little misleading. Historical knowledge is, by definition, knowledge with hindsight; but the events we seek to know, though always understood in retrospect, were experienced by those who made and endured them as a present process leading on to an unknown future. The historical actor is subject to pressures and influences which condition actions whose outcome he cannot foresee. In 1933 Schmitt was such an actor, compelled to make choices in circumstances he had sought to forestall. That he chose wrongly is a judgement with which few would disagree; but that is not the main issue for the reader seeking to learn from his work. The relationship between the period of Schmitt's career under the Third Reich and the earlier stages is complex; and in the case of so intelligent a theorist of political existence, it is one we should try to make intelligible. This cannot be done by reading his pre-1933 writings through the distorting lens of our knowledge of subsequent events. Nor, by the same token, and from the constitutional security of the Anglophone democracies, should we take the unthinking acceptance of liberal democratic ideals as the perennial mark of the civilised mind. Schmitt's life and work, must be understood against the background out of which they emerged.

Schmitt was born in 1888 in the Westphalian town of Plettenberg in the Western part of what was then the German Empire. The majority in the town was Protestant but Schmitt's family were, like many other Rhinelanders, Catholics. Three of his great uncles were priests and Carl too was expected to

enter the priesthood. In the years immediately after the establishment of German political unity, following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/1, Bismark had made a major if unsuccessful effort to destroy the influence of the Catholic Church; and though by the time Schmitt was born this pressure had eased, many German Catholics, especially those who lived within the boundaries of Prussia, still felt themselves to be, in some ways, members of a potentially threatened minority in a predominantly Protestant empire.

Schmitt's background was to exercise great influence on his intellectual and political development. He grew up in the cultural orbit of Rhineland Catholicism, the most Westward looking element within Imperial Germany. Later he was to tell Ernst Niekisch: 'I am Roman by origin, tradition and right', and this sense of affinity with the Catholic, Latin world was to endure throughout his life, finding expression in a continuing interest, rare among his contemporaries, in Western, non-German, thought. One aspect of this was Schmitt's life-long concern with the works of the 19th century, Catholic counter-revolutionary thinkers, Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald, and, especially, the Spaniard Donoso Cortes to whom he was to return often in the course of his life. While the origin of this interest may have lain in Schmitt's religious affinity with a prominent tradition of Catholic political thought, its persistence reflects his awareness of living in an age of radical political uncertainty; in which the inherited foundations of order had all but vanished and which required a total reorientation of political thought and action to cope with the situation. Schmitt considered that the writers of the counter-revolution like Hobbes and Machiavelli before them, had faced parallel problems, and turned to their writings to find a source of political insight for his own age.

In Schmitt's youth this crisis lay in the future. He grew up at a time when Germany was confident and strong. In 1900, after a period of education in a Catholic school, he became a pupil at the *Gymnasium* in Attendorn, where he was exposed to other, non-Catholic currents in intellectual life. There, and later at university in Berlin, Munich and Strassburg, he encountered, in particular, the influence of German nationalism which was, alongside his original Catholicism, to form his outlook. Schmitt chose to study law, and, in 1910, he graduated with distinction from the University of Strassburg. Still a devout Catholic, Schmitt found himself drawn to the Neo-Kantian school of jurisprudence which emphasised the authority of state-created norms, while also claiming that such norms were subject to a 'higher law' knowable to reason. In Bendersky's words: 'Neo-Kantianism offered Schmitt a means of synthesizing the dichotomous principles he felt as a German nationalist and as a Catholic.' The dictates of universal moral principles could be reconciled with the authority of the state; morality and power, religious conviction and nationalism, could be harmoniously integrated. On the eve of the First World War

he wrote that the incontestable value of the state emanated, not from power, but from its relationship to a 'higher law.' It was the function of the state to transform this higher law into a worldly phenomenon.¹

Bendersky entitles his account of Schmitt's early years, up to 1921, 'From Apolitical Scholar to Political Theorist.' The term 'apolitical' is apt but requires clarification. Before the war Schmitt, like most German academics and intellectuals, took for granted the political structure of the monarchical state of which he was a subject. Schmitt's pre-war outlook, though distinctively marked by his Catholic inheritance, was in many ways typical of that of the majority of his similarly placed contemporaries. What Bendersky calls the 'apoliticism' of the young legal theorist, destined as he thought for a career in the Prussian civil service, was itself a characteristically German political outlook. It was one in which contempt for the partial and sectional struggles of party politics and a deep distrust of the social forces that the advance of democracy might unleash went together with profound patriotism and a steady reliance on, and faith in the guiding hand of the monarchical state.

This was the politics of the 'unpolitical man' which Thomas Mann expressed when he wrote, in *Reflections of an Unpolitical Man*: 'I want the monarchy, I want a passionately independent government, because only it offers protection for freedom in the intellectual as well as the economic sphere... I don't want this parliament and party business that will sour the whole life of the nation with its politics...; I don't want politics. I want competence, order and decency.'² The desperation evident in Mann's words reflects what many Germans felt and feared in 1918. For the novelist it was a moment of personal anxiety as well as of national disaster. For the young Schmitt it was also to prove a moment of challenge and opportunity.

Germany's defeat brought with it not only the fall of the Kaiser but the collapse of the monarchical houses in the states of the German *Reich*. Only a year before the Bolsheviks had seized power in Russia and the threat of a communist revolution seemed real enough. In Bavaria, Kurt Eisner actually succeeded in seizing power; briefly establishing a Soviet regime in the most Catholic and conservative of the German states. At the other end of the political spectrum right-wing nationalists, many organised in military bands, the *Freikorps*, were calling for the restoration of the monarchy, the rejection of the peace imposed by the Western allies, and the trial for treason of those who had accepted the allied terms. In the middle, politicians of various hues, ranging from the moderate Left of the Social Democratic Party to the German People's Party of Gustav Stresemann, strove to create a constitutional framework which would preserve the unity of the German state and maintain the fabric of German society against revolution from Left or Right. One essential element in this disparate coalition, from whose efforts the Weimar Republic was to emerge,

was the Catholic Centre Party with which Schmitt was, at this stage, closely associated.

Within its ranks the Centre encompassed a wide spectrum of Catholic opinion. While Schmitt was never a Centre Party member, he wrote for its publications and participated in conferences organised under its auspices. In terms of its political spread he stood somewhat to the right of the party. And, like such older intellectuals as the historian Friederich Meinecke and the sociologist Max Weber, he accepted the republic but without enthusiasm; seeing in it not the realisation of a cherished ideal but only the historically necessary means for preserving the political integrity of the German nation. Something of Schmitt's attitude is brought out in the following passage from his book on constitutional law, published in 1928: 'By accepting the Weimar constitution, the German nation does not want to disavow its identity with the German nation of the constitution of 1871; it wants to renew its *Reich*... but not establish a new *Reich*. Just because it is a democratic constitution, the new constitution does not establish a new German state. It only signifies that a people, which until now believed in... monarchical principles...has decided to continue its existence on the basis of a constitution which it has granted itself.'³

Politically speaking, therefore, Schmitt emphasised the continuity between the republican and the monarchical state. Whatever its form, he argued, the German state continued to command the allegiance of its citizens as the custodian and sovereign authority of the nation. This set him apart from the overt anti-republicanism of the 'radical conservative' intellectuals with whom he is often linked. As a constitutional lawyer, Schmitt strove, throughout the republican period, to strengthen those institutions, especially the Presidency, which represented and acted on behalf of national unity. From the start he supported a strong interpretation of the scope of the famous Article 48 of the Weimar constitution - an article in whose drafting Max Weber was a crucial influence - which authorised the *Reichspräsident* to use force in the case of rebellion or 'when public security and order are seriously disturbed or endangered.'⁴

Schmitt's interpretation of the constitution as authorising the temporary institution of a 'commisarial dictatorship' by the president in the event of national emergency provoked dispute from the moment it was first put forward at a conference of constitutional lawyers in 1924. In the last years of the Weimar Republic, after 1929, it was to provide justification for the rule by decree practised by the executive branch of government, the President and Chancellor, in the face of the domination of the *Reichstag* by parties, Nazi and Communist, dedicated to the overthrow of the Republic.

Schmitt's attitudes throughout the period were governed by one overriding purpose; to prevent the destruction of the established order by the extremist parties of right or left. As early as 1923, in the first edition of *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*,⁵ he

had pointed to the existence of a potentially irresolvable tension between the liberal-parliamentary and the democratic principles in the Weimar constitution: and though hardly a democrat by conviction, he saw the democratic institution of a directly elected president, authorised to rule by decree in situations of national emergency, as the sole possible guarantee of the integrity of the state in conditions in which there existed no national consensus supporting the legitimacy of the established form of government. After 1929, the composition of the *Reichstag* bore out his worst fears. The parliamentary body was dominated by the representatives of parties whose prime purpose was to cripple government and so destroy the existing state. The aftermath of war, the threat to the state, and so to the integrity of the nation, seemed to come from the possibility of armed revolution. By the end of the Twenties the main danger came from within the parliamentary system. Extremist parties could bring down any government by a vote of no confidence, so provoking new elections and eventually forcing the President to appoint a Chancellor from among their own ranks. Schmitt's answer to this problem, put forward in *Legalität und Legimität* (1932), was to argue that, since no constitution could provide the legal means for its own destruction, the powers of the president, laid out in the second part of the constitution, could and must be used to stop the anti-constitutional parties from gaining power. This would, he recognised, eventually require revision of the constitution in order to restrict the principle of 'equal chance' to parties that accepted the constitutional system. But since he believed that such a revision could not take place before political stability had been restored, presidential rule, as authorised by Article 48, must continue until that point had been reached.

Schmitt hoped that the efforts of President Hindenburg and the political circle around Kurt von Schleicher would bring this about. Unfortunately not only was Hindenburg unhappy with the quasi-dictatorial role being forced upon him, but the manoeuvres of Schleicher and his associates were not enough to prevent a deterioration in the government's position. Germany's economic state favoured the growth of the anti-constitutional parties; and though, between the elections of July and November 1932, the Nazis lost two million votes, they remained, at the end of the year, the largest party in the *Reichstag*. This was the background to Hindenburg's appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in January 1933. Schmitt's immediate reaction was one of disappointment and distaste. Unlike many conservative Germans he had little faith in the ability of other rightist politicians to 'tame' the National Socialist government. But events moved swiftly as Hitler strengthened his grip upon power; and, increasingly, Schmitt, conscious of his vulnerability as a prominent figure in the lost struggle to prevent Hitler's appointment, felt that he had better accept the *fait accompli*.

In late April he received a letter from the philoso-

pher Martin Heidegger urging him to reconcile himself to the new regime, and, on the 1st May 1933 he joined the Nazi Party. Over the next three years Schmitt made great efforts to ingratiate himself with the Nazi Party and government; but despite the patronage of Goering and Hans Frank, he could not overcome the suspicion with which he was regarded by the party ideologues. At the same time, his revisions of his work to fit in with the ideology of the regime, his disowning of his Jewish former associates, his highly publicised initiative to rid German legal thinking of what he now called pernicious Jewish influences, and his development of new theoretical justifications for German expansion, gave him a reputation he was never to lose, as a leading intellectual ornament and theorist of the Third Reich.

The complexity of the events in the period that lead up to Hitler's acquisition of power through constitutional means is only slightly greater than the complexity of Schmitt's motivation in the months and years that followed. Detailed examination of both is beyond the scope of this essay; but in order to understand the true significance of Schmitt's theoretical work before 1933 it is necessary to make a few points about the latter.

In a review of Bendersky's book on Schmitt, Daniel Johnson made the point that: 'Unlike the romantics, who suffered from many illusions about National Socialism, Schmitt fell victim to one only: that he could prove his disingenuous loyalty useful by theorising.'⁶ In Schmitt's acceptance of and engagement with the Nazi regime we may recognise various factors: among them, a streak of opportunism in his character; a fear that he might pay, perhaps with his life, for his previous opposition to the Nazi quest for power; a vanity that was flattered by the thought that he might indeed become the Crown Jurist of the new German Empire; and an ingrained unwillingness, rooted in his political outlook, to place himself in a position of opposition to politically established power. Of these only the last is important in judging the significance of his pre-1933 writings.

It is notable that all Schmitt's works that have appeared in English were written in the decade following the end of the First World War. The books themselves are relatively short, but packed with ideas. Unlike most of his contemporaries, Schmitt put clarity and brevity at a premium. It has been said that he wrote German as though it were Latin; and, though something of this is lost in translation, the quality of his mind shines through clearly enough. These are writings marked by the rigour of their arguments and by the writer's sure instinct for identifying the fundamental points at issue.

Faced with a number of brief books, produced in quick succession at a time of widely perceived political crisis, it is tempting to regard them as only occasional works. And so at one level they are. Whatever the richness of their theoretical content, Schmitt's purpose in writing them was eminently practical. In conditions of defeat and potential

political disintegration, Schmitt found himself engaged in the business of theorising in order to discover the roots of and the possible solutions to Germany's practical political problems. The fundamental character of his considerations, which extends to an analysis of the foundations of political order, is a reflection of the depth of the problems which Germany's new republic faced.

The first question that such works must raise in the mind of the contemporary English reader is: how far were such problems peculiar to the situation of Germany in the aftermath of war? Or, putting matters another way, to what extent are they problems shared by other, more deeply rooted, liberal democracies? To these questions there can be no simple answer. Whether he is writing about the shortcomings of the apolitical tradition of German romanticism — a tradition marked both by the cult of the politically disengaged individual and the cultivation of a nationalist political vision — or the problems of reconciling presidential authority with liberal representative institutions in a viable nation state, Schmitt's starting point is the German political reality of which he is part. At the same time, the radical nature of his reflections pulls him in the direction of a deeper anatomy of the conditions of order as such.

He searches his own and his nation's past and present to discover what is the universal essence of politics. But this essence, whose core is to be found in *The Concept of the Political*, is not a timeless thing divorced from the changes brought about by history. Schmitt's outlook is rooted in the nationalist and Catholic traditions which formed him. But, unlike more sentimental creatures of these traditions, he is aware that the development of the modern world has changed the nature of the political. Not for him the dreams of reviving the political forms of medieval Christendom or the ethnically homogeneous *Volksgemeinschaft* beloved of German nationalism. Schmitt's political thought is not simply a creature of its author's present concerns, but an attempt to cope theoretically with changes that the passage to modernity has introduced into the political picture.

Schmitt's attitudes to the political culture of modernity are those of a man conservative both by instinct and intellectual formation. Central here is the insistence that politics is a basic dimension of human existence — a sphere of activity concerned with the organisation of a human community for action in a world that is always potentially threatening to the survival of individual and group alike. Man is a being at risk. His nature is such that conflict and war are ever present possibilities.

In contrast to his friend, Ernst Junger, Schmitt neither glorifies this situation nor claims that war provides a unique opportunity for the expression of what is highest in human nature. The possibility of human conflict and, at the limit, war is, in Schmitt's view, simply a fact of life; and one whose recognition is fundamental to political considerations. The desire for a world without war is perfectly understandable; and, unlike some, Schmitt saw the pre-

vention of war as a political imperative of the highest order. His point was not that we should not seek to keep the peace between nations, but that such an end is not served by the utopian pretence that the risk of war can ever be definitively overcome.

Despite the present discomfiture of the Soviet Union I believe that Schmitt's words are as pertinent as when they were first written more than fifty years ago. 'It would', he writes, 'be a mistake to believe that a nation could eliminate the distinction between friend and enemy by declaring its friendship for the entire world or by voluntarily disarming itself. The world will not thereby become depoliticised, and it will not be transplanted into a condition of pure morality, pure justice, or pure economics. If a people is afraid of the trials and risks implied by existing in the sphere of politics, then another people will appear which will assume these trials by protecting it against foreign enemies and thereby taking over political rule... It would be a deranged calculation to suppose that the enemy could perhaps be touched by the absence of a resistance... If a people no longer possesses the energy or the will to maintain itself in the sphere of politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only a weak people will disappear.'

While fully supporting his nation's cause in the First World War, Schmitt, unlike many other German intellectuals, never interpreted the conflict as a necessary and desirable spiritual struggle between idealistic German *Kultur* and the liberal materialist civilization of the West. As a Catholic, he was too conscious of his roots in Western civilization and of the ambiguities of the Bismarkian Reich to interpret the struggle in such terms. The same factors explain the gulf, never overcome even in his post-1933 writings, between Schmitt's state-centred political vision and the *volkisch* cult of a racially pure, or purified, German nation. In Schmitt, the state is conceived not as an instrument of an ethnically based and so biologically united nation, but as the guarantor of order within politically defined borders and the institution responsible for the preservation of national, territorial integrity. This distinction, often ignored by those who condemn Schmitt as a prophet of the Third Reich, was quite apparent to the ideologues who dismissed his reconciliation with the regime as a fraud and who, by 1937, had driven him out of public life in the new Germany.

In contrast to the ideological exponents of nationalist or socialist dictatorship as well as to liberal advocates of parliamentary democracy as an end in itself, Schmitt's attitude to the form of the state is essentially pragmatic. What counts is not the state's institutional form, republican or monarchical, but its ability to carry out its essential functions. Schmitt's increasing impatience with the Weimar Republic was not the result of a principled rejection of republicanism but of frustration at the inability of Germany's politicians to maintain the authority of the state, and with the impossibility of reconciling necessary executive power with a legislature dominated by anti-constitutional parties. Faced with the

choice between supporting executive authority or the principle of parliamentary government, Schmitt consistently opted for the former. Far from expressing an ingrained hostility to the constitutional form of the post-war German republic, this reflected Schmitt's desire to make the new constitution work. That this entailed the consistent assertion of the executive sovereignty of the president over and against the legislature was a function of the depth of the divisions within the German electorate.

The reflection of these divisions in the *Reichstag*, the domination of parliament after 1929 by the anti-constitutional parties, the Communists and the German Nationalist Party as well as Hitler's National Socialists, made parliamentary government unworkable. Schmitt's support for rule by presidential decree in the final years of the Weimar Republic was intended, not to prepare the way for the institution of a permanent dictatorship, but to provide the constitutional forces with the time and political space to overcome what he hoped would be a temporary crisis. Throughout this period Schmitt argued that the measures adopted by the executive were consistent with the provisions of the constitution and in accord with the emergency powers reserved to the president in Article 48.

The position Schmitt maintained had, of course, a particular significance in the circumstances of the time, in which he was seen as the main academic supporter of presidential rule by decree. But the considerations underlying his attitude have a more general significance. Schmitt's arguments are based on recognition that the possibilities of maintaining liberal democratic institutions and the rule of law depend upon the effectiveness of the executive power no less than in any other political dispensation. No formulation of the democratic principle in terms of popular self government can negate the fact that every political entity requires that there be an effective sovereign power. No viable theory of the rule of law can blind itself to the reality that, in the last resort, law itself requires the guarantee that only such a sovereign can provide.

Schmitt had argued this point in his *Political Theology*, published in 1922, where he develops his celebrated and controversial 'decisionistic' theory of sovereignty. Liberal legal and political theorists had argued that in the modern constitutional state ultimate authority resides in the rule of law itself. In Schmitt's view this ignored the basic political fact that the operation of normal, and hence norm-governed, legal order presupposes a continuing general conformity with the very norms the law is meant to ensure. The authority that undergirds the rule of law is not, and cannot be, simply that of law itself.

Politically speaking, the rule of law is not self grounding; for if the legal order is called into question - if, as is always possible, 'law and order' breaks down - its maintenance or restoration is seen to depend upon the existence of a sovereign endowed with the authority and, ultimately, the power to renew it. The normative order of law rests on the

absolute, if final, authority of the political sovereign. According to Schmitt, the essence of sovereignty lies precisely in possession of the authority to decide when the normal conditions presupposed by the rule of law obtain and when they cannot; or as he tersely formulates it in the first sentence of *Political Theology*, 'Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.'

Schmitt's point is that whether or not such an eventuality is foreseen and explicitly provided for in constitutional law, the decision as to when it has been reached, as well as subsequent decisions as to how to resolve it, cannot be settled by reference to legal norms. These issues are and must be matters of political decision by the sovereign. In what he calls 'a state of exception', a constitutional sovereign is bound, not by norms of the legal code, rendered ineffective by the break down of respect for lawful obligations, but by his constitutional duty as *sovereign* to take such political measures as may be necessary to restore a situation in which legal norms may, once more, be made effective. Schmitt's argument is, now as ever, a timely reminder of the political foundation on which the rule of law rests and which is its final, if still imperfect, guarantee.

In the third chapter of *Political Theology*, Schmitt argues that sovereignty, like other major concepts of political thought, represents the secularisation of what was originally a religious concept. The issues raised on this point by Schmitt's critics are complex and important and cannot be settled here. What we can say is the question of sovereignty - what it is, where in any given state it resides, whether it can ever in fact be limited - has been at the centre of political-theoretical discussion for some three to four hundred years. It has occupied this place ever since the religious disputes of the Reformation and the subsequent assertion of the unequivocal primacy of secular political authority as an answer to the problem of political order in religiously divided societies. The liberal democratic ideology of our time, with its assertion of the conceptual identity of rulers and ruled - government of the people, by the people, for the people - can scarcely be said to have clarified the issue, whatever its undoubted symbolic value. The idea of popular sovereignty, as much as the Neo-Kantian identification of legitimate sovereignty with the rule of law, tends to mystify a state of affairs in which effective rulership, involving personal decisions informed by the criteria of political effectiveness and authoritative for the citizenry as a whole, has lost none of its importance in the life of nations.

Schmitt's assertion of the continuity between the republican state and the *Kaiserreich* reflected not only his personal preferences as a conservative and a nationalist, but a sense, unclouded by liberal sentiments hostile to the very recognition of the reality of political power, of the continuing significance of effective sovereignty in the modern democratic state.

No less interesting is his chapter, again in *Political Theology*, 'On the Counterrevolutionary Philosophy

of the State.' Here Schmitt traces the path between Joseph de Maistre's self-doubting project of restoring the traditional legitimacy of the monarchical state and Donoso Cortes's assertion of the inevitability of choice between anarchy and dictatorship in a world which no longer recognises the sovereign's authority as legitimate. This is not only a fascinating excursion into a neglected area of the history of ideas, but illumines the troubling logic of Schmitt's own political development. More generally, the examination of the path that lead Cortes, the great Spanish conservative, to endorse absolute dictatorship as an answer, though hardly a solution, to what he perceived as a new 'fall' into a no less absolute disorder, throws light on the complex and often equivocal attitudes of continental European conservatives to the rise of fascism in the inter-war years.

The weakness of parliamentary democratic institutions in most European countries between the wars, the perceived threat of communist revolution combined with an apparent atrophy of executive power, made many conservatives receptive to the appeal of authoritarian political movements. During the Weimar years Schmitt was, if anything, unusually immune to this temptation. At the same time he considered that parliamentary democracy embodied a dangerous contradiction between its liberal and its democratic elements. Thus, in *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* he argues that the rise of mass politics, a politics characterised by the predominant influence of extra-parliamentary pressure groups representing special interests, has undermined the legitimacy of parliamentary government. According to Schmitt, this legitimacy originally rested on a belief in parliamentary debate as a quest for true, disinterested judgement in issues of public concern, and on a Burkean notion of representation. According to Burke, the representative is not the deputy or spokesman of any particular interest group but a figure elected in order to exercise his judgement on behalf of all his constituents in accord with what he believes to be the general, political interest. The democratisation of politics threatens both these foundations. The representative comes to be conceived as a mandated deputy of an ideologically founded party, perceiving itself and perceived as the collective representative of a particular element in society. Parliamentary debate ceases to be seen as a means of achieving objective judgement and becomes an arena of struggle between competing and often incompatible ideologies and interest groups.

The history of the Weimar Republic illustrated only too well the political *impasse* to which this situation can lead, where no historically formed consensus underpins national political institutions. In such circumstances the executive can only act effectively to the extent that it is able, and constitutionally entitled, to exercise the functions of government independently of the legislature. If parliamentary democracy today seems rather less fragile than it did when Schmitt was writing, this is not, I think, because it has resolved the dilemmas he identified, but because justified horror at the alternatives on

offer has made us rather less demanding of its intellectually dubious *raison d'être*. It is perhaps this negative experience which is the main source of the renewed legitimacy of parliamentary institutions in Europe since the war.

It is too early to judge Schmitt's work with anything approaching a disinterested eye. Perhaps every political writer whose works continue to be read beyond his time must be and will remain a controversial figure; for if the issues he raises are no longer matters of debate and dispute that means that they are no longer politically alive. Such writers have only an antiquarian interest. They belong to the history of ideas but not to the perennial debate of political philosophy. In truth, we do not yet know to which class Schmitt belongs; though I suspect that his discussions of sovereignty and of the nature of the political ensure him a permanent place in the great tradition of Western political thinking. Only time will tell. For the moment only this is certain: that Carl Schmitt remains essential reading for those concerned with the future of the free nation states of the West. As diagnostician and critic he is worth a score of uncritical admirers of what we take too readily for granted of our birth-right of freedom.

Notes

1. Joseph Bendersky: *Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich* (Princeton University Press, 1983)
2. Thomas Mann: *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* quoted by Ellen Kennedy in her introduction to Schmitt's *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (The MIT Press, 1935) p.xxiv
3. Quoted by Bendersky in his study of Schmitt. See note 1.
4. On the significance of this article see the work of Bendersky and Ellen Kennedy's informative introduction to *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*.
5. See note 2 above.
6. Daniel Johnson: *The New Machiavelli: Carl Schmitt at 95* in *The Salisbury Review* (Winter 1984) pp.48-50.
7. Carl Schmitt: *The Concept of the Political* (Rutgers University Press) pp.51-53.

PETER FULLER

1947 - 1990

Our readers will be sorry to learn of the tragic death of Peter Fuller in a car accident in April. He was 42. An appreciation will appear in the September issue.

The National Curriculum and its Official Distortion

Ray Honeyford

The advent of a compulsory National Curriculum led many of us to believe that the state education service might at long last rediscover that true sense of purpose which has been systematically undermined by the ravages of the social engineer and the ideologue. Schools, we fondly imagined, would get back to the 3R's, sensible discipline, and the study of established and demanding subjects. Teachers would teach, rather than function as psychological and sociological observers of the child. Gender issues, multiculturalism and 'positive attitudes' were out. Plain speaking was to replace psychobabble as the medium of educational discourse. The days of the pressure group curriculum were surely numbered - we thought.

But there is growing evidence that our best hopes are, once again, to be dashed. In the gap between the principle of a statutory, no-nonsense curriculum and its actual implementation original aims are being distorted. It is increasingly clear that, at the point of delivery, the Education Reform Act is in the hands of that coterie of the Department of Education and Science (DES) civil servants, official appointees and progressivist zealots which has been dictating the terms of educational development over the past thirty years or so. The triumph of the supply-side mentality can no longer be concealed. There has already been widespread anxiety expressed over the proposals for English, Religious Education (RE), and daily worship - and the row about the 'new history' has become a scandal.

The clearest indication of the gap between the law's demands and what is coming out of the educational sausage machine lies in the contrasting viewpoints embedded in official pronouncements. In 1987, and before the passage of the Educational Reform Act through Parliament, the DES published the pamphlet, *Educational Reform - The Government's Proposals for Schools*. This was intended for parents, teachers and governors. It is written in robust English, and frankly admits, 'The overall picture is one of disappointingly low standards.' Though there is reference to 'themes and skills', these are relegated to the status of 'other topics', having only peripheral significance. To the question, 'What will the National Curriculum consist of?' there is an unequivocal answer - the three core subjects of English, Maths, and Science, and seven foundation subjects, as specified in the Act. So far so good.

This impression of fidelity to the Act was strengthened by the DES leaflet, *National Curriculum - A Guide for Parents*. Millions of copies were distributed. They were to be found wherever parents were likely to congregate - public libraries, launderettes, supermarkets. The purpose was clear. This was the official

version of the National Curriculum - with the imprimatur of the DES to support it. Parents were informed, 'This leaflet explains what the National Curriculum is and how it affects what children are taught at school.' In plain, simple English parents were told of the new dispensation in their childrens' schools - proper, established subjects were to be taught, there was to be an end to pupils dropping important subjects too soon, all children were to be regularly tested, and transfers between schools were to be made easier since there would be a high level of agreement about the nature of the curriculum in all schools. There is no mention in this document of 'the whole curriculum', 'skills', 'themes' or 'dimensions' - nor any other of those weird and woolly notions in which 'educationists' communicate. Neither the political operator nor the liberal sentimentalist could take any comfort from this source.

The DES leaflet, *A Bulletin for School Teachers and Governors* (Autumn 1988, Issue 1) followed the same pattern. At this point, teachers and governors were being offered information consonant with that provided for parents. The curriculum, we are unequivocally told, is to be understood to consist of proper, universally accepted, scholastic and creative disciplines. There is no mention of non-subjects or other irrelevancies. The intentions of Parliament, as reflected in the Act, appeared to be being honestly conveyed to those most affected.

However, this impression was shattered by the most imposing of all the documents so far issued - *The National Curriculum - From Policy to Practice* (DES, 1989). This was distributed to all headteachers, teachers and student teachers, i.e. to those charged with actually implementing the reforms. But it was not distributed to parents. This states, 'A description of the curriculum in terms of subjects is not of course the only way of analysing its scope. HMI have helpfully analysed essential elements in terms of areas of learning and experience...The Educational Reform Act does not require teaching to be provided under the foundation subject headings.' In other words, a school could comply with the Act whilst abolishing all the subjects named in the Act. But this is what the Act actually says - Section 2(2): 'The curriculum referred to in sub-section (1) (b) above shall comprise the core and other foundation subjects...'. Section 3 states what those subjects are - English, Maths, Science, History, Geography, Technology, Music, Art, PE and a modern language. (RE is dealt with in section 6 - where its compulsory nature is stressed.) This raises two questions. How can such an unequivocal legal requirement be so readily distorted, and why are parents and headteach-

ers being given such different versions of the National Curriculum? One also wonders about a child who moves from Conservative Kent, where the schools are very likely to stick strictly to the Act, to hard-Left Sheffield, where the HMI version of the Act will be seized upon with glee, since it justifies the wholesale abolition of traditional subjects. Such a child would probably be less confused under the system the present reforms are supposed to improve.

This impression of official distortion is evident in the philosophy which clearly underlies the work of the National Curriculum Council - the quango entrusted with the implementation of the new curriculum. Its Circular No.6 (Oct,1989) brings out how unhappy are its officials about conceptualising the curriculum in terms of proper, traditional subjects. This document fails even to name the subjects as laid down in the Act. The National Curriculum, we are told, 'is not intended to be the whole curriculum,' which 'goes far beyond the formal timetable, and involves the personal and social education of pupils.' 'Whole-curriculum planning must be flexible', and, 'Schools should consider what provision they wish to make for subjects outside the National Curriculum.' The whole thing is dominated not by how the required subjects can be effectively taught, as you might reasonably expect from such a body, but by 'Cross-Curricular Provision' - which the authors claim can be broken down into 'Cross-Curricular

Skills, 'Cross-Curricular Dimensions,' and 'Cross-Curricular Themes.' The contrast between the plain English in which parents have been officially addressed and this sort of jargon could scarcely be greater.

The suspicion that this document originated not in York (the N.C.C. headquarters) but in Brent, Haringey, or the obsolescent Inner London Education Authority is confirmed by talk about the need to promote 'positive attitudes' towards cultural diversity, gender equality and the handicapped, and the reference to 'Personal and Social Education' needing to 'permeate the curriculum.' These references are straight out of the Inner London Education Authority's notorious 'Race, Sex and Class' documents - which symbolise for so many people all that was wrong with the old and discredited dispensation in state education. The new age of clear purposes, intellectual and creative rigour and the pursuit of excellence promised by the Act can never be more than a chimera so long as this sort of mentality and language determines what happens in our schools.

It is time the Secretary of State took a long hard look at the material which is being issued in his name. It is not too late to get the state education machine on to the right lines. If he lets things go on as they are, generations of parents will find it hard to forgive him.

Sophists' Corner

Sir,

...Cuba initiated its own revolution against an unjust dictatorship, and 30 years later it remains a popular revolution. The execution of General Ochoa is rightly represented as a public demonstration of the maintenance of the integrity and propriety of that revolution, which wishes to remain untainted - precisely because it is untainted - by the corruption which has been instrumental in the downfall of puppet regimes in Eastern Europe.

My recent visit to Cuba revealed a population proud of its revolutionary heritage, its health service and education, which has built a medical research programme second to none in the Caribbean and Latin America, through sheer national willpower and commitment to the welfare of the population, in consequence of the United States' reactionary and irresponsible neglect.

...We have learned enough from the past few months' events in Eastern Europe not to venture predictions on what may develop in the West, but I believe we shall not see a popular uprising against a government which was wanted and remains wanted by the people of Cuba.

PETER LAWSON

(This letter appeared in *The Independent*)

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Religious Education in the Wake of the Cox Amendment

Mervyn Hiskett

The publication of the Swann Report in 1985, and of the multicultural multifaith syllabuses that preceded it but to which Swann gave final official approval, provoked fierce debate. Opposition came partly from Christian evangelicals, for whom religious education meant 'to show them the Way, the Truth and the Life', and in part from adherents of other religions, especially the Moslems. They vigorously rejected Swann and multiculturalism in a joint statement published by the Islamic Academy, based in the University of Cambridge and the Islamic Cultural Centre, London. They argued that Swann was 'extremely secular' and incompatible with divine revelation and with the 'ultimate aim of Moslem education which lies in the realisation of complete submission to God.' Thus Swann was rejected by many of those it was intended to accommodate.¹

To this essentially religious opposition was joined a substantial body of secular and agnostic opinion. It consisted of those who were affronted by what they saw as the excesses of the multiculturalists who used the new multicultural religious education (RE) as a vehicle for politicisation in the classroom. They pointed to the almost obsessive preoccupation in the multicultural syllabuses with such contemporary and contentious issues as South Africa, civil rights, unilateralism and so on; and to the one-sided manner in which such progressivist issues were presented and handled in these syllabuses. In particular, the issue of homosexuality in the notorious Midland GCSE Religious Studies Syllabus for 1988 caused public outcry and occasioned an exchange of correspondence in *The Times* during 1987.

Added to this disquiet was that of many parents, especially those of younger children, who were uneasy about the obvious confusion multiculturalist teaching caused in their children's minds. Some were opposed outright to the teaching of any form of religion in state schools; others, surely the majority, while not practising Christians themselves, none the less recognised and valued the Christian roots of European culture and preferred the teaching of Christian ethics and belief both to multicultural relativism and to no religious teaching at all.

These various streams of opposition to Swann and multiculturalism converged in such organisations as Baroness Cox's influential 'Education Issues' Group, Policy Search and the Campaign for Real Education. Baroness Cox emerged as the spokesman for this loose alliance of interests and on 26 February 1988 rose in the House of Lords, 'to ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to ensure that all state schools provide a Christian act of worship and Christian religious education for all

children whose parents request them'. In effect, Baroness Cox was calling for the restoration of the collective worship of the 1944 Education Act which had been omitted from the first draft of the Education Reform Act (ERA), with the added requirement that this should be specifically Christian. Curiously, this had been assumed, but never spelt out in the 1944 Act.

In the speech that followed her question it is clear Baroness Cox was aiming for a somewhat more affirmative commitment to Christian values than she in fact achieved. Many noble lords supported her. But from the Bishop of Truro, who spoke on behalf of 'the Church', she received only lukewarm support, qualified by numerous reservations in the multicultural and secular interest. The Earl of Arran, for the government, took the surprising line for one speaking on behalf of a Conservative administration, that 'We are no longer a predominantly Christian nation' and presented what amounted to a defence of the official multiculturalism. His speech was a disturbing testimony to the extent to which liberal progressivism has seeped into Conservative thinking.

Despite this, the outcome was that the ERA was amended on two counts. First, it now provides for a daily act of collective worship, 'of a wholly or mainly Christian character' in state schools. Second, RE becomes one of the foundation subjects of the National Core Curriculum, although it will not be subject to the Periodic Attainment Tests. These provisions have come to be known as 'the Cox Amendment'. This was indeed an achievement. But it left unsettled the question as to whether or not the multicultural and multifaith syllabuses still had a part to play in schools that were now to adopt a distinctly Christian form of collective worship, but none the less ought surely to be consistent with that act of worship; to continue in the *via moderna* of the multiculturalists, return to the *via antiqua* desired by the evangelicals, or settle at some compromise in between. In what many hoped would be a clear cut resolution of this issue, the DES published circular No 3/89 of January 1989, '*The Education Reform Act 1988: Religious Education and Collective Worship*'. It was not clear cut. Nor did it provide a resolution. On the contrary, it turned out to be a tortuous compilation of checks and balances designed to avoid any change to the existing state of affairs. As will be argued below, its most probable effect is to restrict the Cox Amendment to the act of collective worship alone, and to prevent it from influencing either the teaching of RE, or the life of the school as a whole.

The circular begins by making it clear that RE in

County schools 'must still be in accordance with a locally agreed syllabus.' It goes on to state that: *new* locally agreed syllabuses must reflect the fact that religious traditions in this country are in the main Christian whilst taking account of the teaching and practice of other principal religions (Sect 5.) (my italics)

But nowhere in the Circular is it made mandatory to produce such new agreed syllabuses. Nor is it laid down that existing agreed syllabuses must also reflect the mainly Christian tradition if they are to remain in use.²

Of course, 'mainly Christian' is an elastic term. Even so, it would be stretching a point to absurdity to claim that, for instance, the notorious Birmingham Agreed Syllabus of 1975, with its 'five faiths and a non-religious stance for living',³ could fairly be described thus. Yet it is clear from the circular that it may continue to be used if steps are not taken to replace it.

The procedure for producing a new agreed syllabus is as follows: The initiative lies in the first instance with the local Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education (SACRE), which every local education authority now has a duty to set up under the ERA. A SACRE may - but not must - establish a conference to review the existing agreed syllabus, and if it so decides, produce a new one. But even if the initial proposal to do this surmounts the SACRE hurdle, the composition of a conference makes it most unlikely that it will come to anything. For a conference must consist of four committees, each with one vote. These four committees are to represent respectively, 'such Christian and other religious denominations as... will appropriately reflect the principal religious traditions in the area'; the Church of England; the teachers' associations; and the local education authority. Any decision to proceed with a new agreed syllabus must be unanimous among the four committees, although a majority vote is sufficient within a committee. Given the strong left-wing bias of most teaching unions, the passionate attachment of the progressivist establishment in the teaching profession to multiculturalism and the profound opposition of secularist teachers to countenancing any return to the evangelical nurture teaching of Christianity, it is unrealistic to imagine that new agreed syllabuses that embody any significant shift towards greater Christian emphasis are likely to be approved by the teachers' committee.

As for the remaining committees, the religious traditions committee comprises representatives of non-Christian religions as well as Christianity (in fact it is intended to accommodate the main non-conformist Churches, the Greek Orthodox as well as Jews, Moslems and Sikhs and Hindus). While one should not underestimate the Moslem willingness to join with Christians in opposing multiculturalism, it is none the less unlikely that this committee would stand out very strongly against the more unified and articulate stance that may be predicted of the teachers' committee. On the other hand the relig-

ious traditions committee would be unlikely to resist if the other committees were in favour of adopting a new syllabus.

The record of the Church of England on the issue of multicultural education - as was frequently emphasised in the Lords' debate of 26 February 1988 - has been inconsistent. One recalls the Archbishop of Canterbury's reported comment that the multicultural syllabuses are a 'religious smorgasbord'. In what one might assume to be the Anglican position on the matter, *The Rochester Statement*, published by the Rochester Diocesan Board of Education which represents one of the great dioceses in the land, we find the following, unequivocal expression of opinion concerning the teaching of religion in state schools:

while many may not worship, the British people would still claim to be a Christian people... and an intuitive belief that morality is, in its origins at least, rooted in the teaching of Christianity... suggests very strongly that most parents want their children to be brought up in a Christian way, even if they themselves no longer attend Church.⁴

Such an affirmation, which is surely well founded in observation and experience, seems hard to reconcile with the frank relativism of multiculturalism. Yet representatives of the Church of England working on these SACREs and other education committees, are reluctant to come out with any unambiguous rejection of multiculturalism, let alone to offer a firm lead in favour of the *Rochester Statement's* central proposition. On the contrary, many of these Anglican clergy seem content to confine their contributions to supporting the incessant teacher demands for more, and yet more money to be poured into multicultural 'resources'.

How the LEA committee reacts is likely to depend on the political complexion of the County Council. If this is Conservative, it will probably take the lead in calling for a new syllabus with greater Christian emphasis. If it is Labour or Liberal, then it will almost certainly fall in behind the teaching unions. All four committees must be unanimous in order for any new syllabus to be introduced. The DES circular is so contrived that the power to block the Cox Amendment rests with any one of four committees of a conference convened by a SACRE. Experience suggests that the teachers' committee is most unlikely ever to agree to abandon the existing multicultural syllabuses in favour of new ones that have a greater Christian emphasis.

Neither the Cox Amendment, nor the DES Circular resolves the question of to what extent the intended new emphasis should influence not only the collective act of worship and RE, but also the whole curriculum. For it should be understood, that under the provisions of the Swann Report, officially adopted by Sir Keith (now Lord) Joseph when he was Secretary of State for Education, multiculturalism was not only to be the form of religious education in state schools but also a total philosophy that was to inform the whole life of the school. Is this to

remain the case or should the Christian emphasis now have the predominant formative influence? Section 7 of the circular states a requirement to ensure that the curriculum of each maintained school is balanced and broadly based and 'promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the school and of society; and prepares such pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life'.

It goes on to argue that all those concerned with religious education should 'seek to ensure that it promotes respect, understanding and tolerance for those who adhere to different faiths' (Sect 8)

But it is not clear whether 'maintained' schools is intended to exclude County schools, though this seems unlikely. More importantly this sole reference throughout the circular to a relationship between the curriculum at large and RE in particular makes no mention of the need to apply broadly Christian emphases to that curriculum. In so far as the multiculturalism may claim to be 'moral, spiritual and cultural', this vague and rhetorical requirement may as well be adduced in support of the multicultural status quo as of the Amendment.

The requirement of 'respect, understanding and tolerance for those who adhere to different faiths' begs some questions and adumbrates multiculturalist attitudes. Few would argue against senior pupils understanding Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism and so on, although the present practice of introducing juniors to them is absurd. The same applies to respect, provided this is understood to mean simply civilised and courteous behaviour, not the sycophantic 'celebratory approach' of the multiculturalists. But tolerance is a different matter. Are we expected to tolerate a religion and its adherents that seeks to enforce the death penalty on apostates; or a religion whose fundamentalists advocate the return of slavery on scriptural authority; or the ritual death of widows on their husbands' funeral pyres; or one that continues to permit child marriage and the stoning of women for adultery? 'Tolerance', as the multiculturalists, with their dogma that world religions are to be judged solely from the standpoint of those who practise, understand and teach them, all too often means a denial of the right to criticise and disapprove. It shuns theological argument. It fears polemic lest this should cause offence. It will sacrifice principle for the wholly spurious appearance of harmony. Such teaching must lead, in the end, to the suspension of all moral judgement and thus to a relativistic amorality among those taught along such lines.

The law already lays down the parameters of physical tolerance, whether this applies to religion, political opinion or social behaviour. Beyond that, intellectual and moral tolerance ought to remain matters for the individual conscience, not for bureaucrats to prescribe. It would therefore be sufficient for DES circular 3/89 to require 'an understanding of non-Christian faiths', and leave it at that.

A third question to arise from study of the circu-

lar is the extent to which it enables the mainly Christian emphasis of the collective act of worship to be replaced by a non-Christian worship. Section 5 lays down that any head teacher may apply to the local SACRE for a 'determination that the requirement for Christian collective worship should not apply in the case of the school or of any class or description of pupils within it.'

The head must consult the Governors, who in turn are to consult the parents, before applying for such a determination. In Section 37 the Circular states that: 'It is for the head teacher to decide what form the alternative worship will take'.

Moreover the collective worship 'may not be distinctive of any particular denomination of any faith or religion, but may be distinctive of a particular faith or religion'. One wonders how many of Her Majesty's Inspectors would be in a position to ensure that, in the Islamic case, it was the mainstream Sunni Islam and not the Shi'ite 'denomination' of the Iranian imams that was celebrated, given that the worship would be conducted in Arabic!

Be that as it may, the effect of these regulations is undoubtedly that, with his governing body behind him, the head of a school with a majority of Moslems on its roll could apply to the SACRE for a determination to introduce an alternative form of worship. If the application were granted, the head, not SACRE, could then decide that that act of worship was to be wholly Islamic. The non-Moslem pupils would of course have the right to opt out of this collective worship. None the less, there seems little doubt that the introduction of such worship would colour the ethos of the school in ways that non-Moslem pupils could not avoid. To make this possible is to invite the Dewsbury imbroglio all over again. It would be less objectionable to allow Moslems the right to grant-aided denominational schools of their own.

Circular 3/89 is part of a wider campaign on the part of the progressivist education bureaucracy to keep power over education in its own hands, and those of its ideological allies in the teaching unions. The circular amounts to a veto, granted by the DES, to any conference committee that wishes to block the application of the Cox Amendment to the teaching of RE, and its extended influence over the wider curriculum. Whatever may be the wishes of other groups, the circular provides a defensive mechanism that makes the existing multicultural system unassailable for as long as the teachers choose to defend it.

If government is serious in its intention to give effect to the Cox Amendment, it must take certain positive steps to that end. It must lay down clear and firm guidelines about what is meant by 'mainly Christian'. Does a syllabus that covers five faiths and includes Marxism and Humanism fulfil that requirement? If not, what is the appropriate balance between Christianity and other faiths? Having established this government must then insist that all syllabuses that continue to be used for teaching RE in state schools - and not just new ones - shall be examined with a view to deciding whether or not

they are consistent with the Amendment. The decision concerning this may be left to a conference. But boards of governors and parents' associations should have a very substantial representation on such conferences, as well as the groups already represented. Decisions of conference should, in future, be by majority vote of the whole membership. It should no longer be possible for one group to enjoy a right of veto over the rest.

Notes

1. The joint statement is given in full in *News of Muslims in Europe*, No 36, published by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham.

2. If an LEA adopts an agreed syllabus already in use by another authority, then, for the purpose of the Act, 'any such syllabus would constitute a new syllabus for the adopting authority.' Therefore, an authority could presumably only adopt such a syllabus if it were considered by its Conference to reflect the Christian tradition. Such a decision would require the unanimous agreement of the Conference. The effect of this would seem to entrench the syllabus already in use.
3. Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Research Papers, No. 19, September 1983, p.24.
4. In the series *Papers on the Church and Education*, published by the Rochester Diocesan Board of Education, Diocesan Office, St Nicholas Church, Rochester, Kent.

Enlightenment, Racism and Racial Prejudice

David Stove

When two races of people are in contact for long, antagonism between them seems to be inevitable. Of course the degree of antagonism varies greatly: it may be unbridled hatred, or merely a mild distaste, or anything in between. Even when racial antagonism is both intense and violently expressed, it need not extend to everyone: there may be many people of each race who feel no animosity at all towards members of the other. Still, overall, it is antagonism, rather than amity or indifference, which seems to be the invariable result of the contact of two races.

This may be true of the past but many people believe that the future will be different. I believe that optimism on this subject is misplaced. Racial antagonism is a stubborn creature even where the differences between two races have been almost entirely effaced by time. In Britain, the antagonism of Celts towards Anglo-Saxons still contributes something - no one could say how much, but certainly something - to the Gross National Animosity. From instances like this, we can judge how unlikely it is that antagonism will ever be absent in cases where the differences between races are pronounced. The reasonable expectation is that racial antagonism will flourish in the future much as it has done in the past; unless we can point out some countervailing cause which is now at work, and which, though it was absent or weak in the past, is likely, in the end, to triumph.

Antagonism between races has almost always been regarded as something perfectly natural and inevitable. To think of it as constituting a reproach to either race hardly ever occurred to anyone until

recent times. But somewhere around 1840, a change in language and thought on this subject took place. A few English-speakers, who would previously have called the feeling which typically exists between races 'antipathy', or 'aversion', or 'animosity', began instead to call it 'prejudice'. This usage steadily spread, until nowadays, in contexts of race, the latter word has virtually driven out all others.

This change calls for explanation. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, English-speakers have used the word 'prejudice', in the sense relevant here, since at least 1600. They knew as well as we do what the feelings between races typically are, and they had any number of words for those feelings: words which we still have. Yet until about 1840, no one ever spoke of prejudice between races; and anyone who had so spoken, in (say) 1700, would have met with blank incomprehension. Whereas now we can hardly open our mouths on the subject of animosity between races, without this word 'prejudice' popping out. How is this curious change in usage to be explained?

Part of the answer is obvious enough. The phrase 'racial prejudice' is a euphemism, while in the last 150 years many racial antagonisms have become more intense, and some of their expressions have been so appalling as to make euphemisms virtually irresistible. Who is there that could describe Auschwitz, for example, without seeking a measure of relief in the use of some cushioning phrase? Or, to take a contemporary example, 'prejudice' is a very tame word for what Maoris nowadays feel towards white New Zealanders; but it is obviously in

the public interest of New Zealand that those feelings should not be called by their right name.

English-speakers on the whole needed a euphemism for racial antagonism more than other people did because they found themselves on the winning end of racial antagonisms more often than anyone else. That state of affairs has now almost ended and having renounced the pleasures of power, we discovered the pleasures of guilt. By contrast, I do not think that the concept of racial prejudice has yet made much headway among the Japanese.

But its euphemistic character is only part of the story of the phrase 'racial prejudice'. There is something else, less obvious but more important, behind the recent origin and great popularity of this phrase. To see what this is, consider what it means to accuse someone of prejudice.

If you ascribe antagonism to someone, you are not attributing fault to them; but if you ascribe prejudice to them, you are. When we call a man's antagonism towards a certain race an instance of racial prejudice, we imply that his attitude depends upon some false or irrational beliefs which he has about that race.

Now, that is a distinctly cheering thing to imply: not in itself, of course, but because we all know, independently, that false or irrational beliefs can often be corrected. That is one of the very purposes which education exists for, after all, and one which it often achieves. Here, then, is the main reason for the popularity of the phrase 'racial prejudice': it suggests that it is within the power of education to dispel racial antagonism.

The belief in the power of education to dispel racial antagonism is more widespread now than it has ever been before. All the same, it is far from being a new belief. It stems from the Enlightenment belief in the 'perfectibility' of man. The reasoning behind the belief in perfectibility was quite simple. Indeed, there was nothing at all wrong with this reasoning, except the stark absurdity of the premise that human beings are naturally equal. From this it follows that the inequalities and differences which we actually find among them must all be due to external causes: to variable historical accidents, such as the education they received, the system of government prevailing at the time, the distribution of wealth in their society, and so on. All that is needed in order to bring about indefinite future improvement in human beings is to improve their education, government, the distribution of wealth, or other external circumstances.

The Enlightenment, since it believed that external circumstances are the *only* causes which make people what they are, was inevitably led to ascribe to education a virtually infinite power to bring about human happiness. This utopian faith in education is written everywhere in the literature of the Enlightenment, a perfect specimen of which is William Godwin's *Political Justice* (1793).

The education from which Godwin, and the enlightened in general, expected so much, was not education of any historically-familiar kind. It was

education set free from the influence of gods, kings, priests, governments, soldiers, and - above all - parents. Only the enlightened are fitted to be the educators of the human race. Their influence, however, has been increasing rapidly ever since the invention of printing, the discovery of the 'new world', the Reformation, and the birth of modern science with Copernicus. And in 1793 in France, Godwin believed, enlightenment was in the very process of assuming total control of human life: a process which would soon be replicated everywhere, and irreversibly.

Once this happened, Godwin thought, error would become a thing of the past: all false or irrational beliefs would simply fade away in the daylight of Reason and Truth. Antagonisms between nations, between religions, and between races - since they all depend upon false or irrational beliefs - would inevitably expire along with the unreasonable beliefs which sustain them. Even the most deplorable and inveterate of human failings, such as sickness, ageing and dying, are only prejudices according to Godwin. They will therefore suffer the same fate as witchcraft, priestcraft and kingcraft. Once enlightened education holds sway, in fact, it will be a marvel if a broken heart or wooden leg is left in the world.

It would be out of place here to enlarge on these absurdities, or on the political horrors to which they have led. But in fairness to people like Godwin, it should be said that they were not the founders of *educationism*. They had got it from the Greek Enlightenment of the 5th and 4th centuries BC: from the Athens of Pericles, Socrates and Euripedes and from such Socratic disciples or companions as Antisthenes, Plato and Diogenes. Happiness, according to the Socratic school, depends on virtue and virtue is knowledge, and therefore can be *taught*. We are still paying dearly for this antique folly, because those would-be educators of the human race still dominate us, especially through their 18th-century disciples.

I do not believe that education can dispel racial antagonism. Of course, I admit that racial antagonism is typically, and perhaps always, accompanied by false or irrational beliefs about the other race. I will also admit that all of these false or irrational beliefs can be corrected by education: an admission which, it should go without saying, is wildly optimistic. I make it merely in order to concede as much as I can to the power of education, and to clear the ground of irrelevant disagreements. These two admissions, even together, do not touch the question at issue at all.

For what educationists believe is not only that racial antagonism is always accompanied by false or irrational beliefs which education can dispel. They believe that racial antagonism always depends upon false or irrational beliefs about the other race. It is because, and only because, they believe that proposition, that they expect the antagonisms to dissolve, once the beliefs have been corrected by education. And it is that proposition which I deny.

Racial antagonism, I believe, always depends to a greater or lesser extent on *true* and *rational* beliefs about the other race. Common sense suggests that in fact racial antagonism is always mixed: partly rational and partly not. But I think that there could be a racial antagonism which was entirely rational; and I am confident that there could not be a racial antagonism which depended *only* on false or irrational beliefs about the other race. I hold, indeed that there is no such thing as a groundless racial antagonism; and my reason for believing this is that, if there ever were such a thing, it would itself promptly bring about *real* grounds for racial antagonism. In the causation of racial antagonisms, there may be as much prejudice - that is, as much antagonism dependent upon false or irrational beliefs - as the most enlightened person cares to suppose; but there will always be an element, whether small or great, of rationality as well.

It does not follow, from the impossibility of a groundless racial antagonism, that all racial antagonisms are equally rational. It does not follow, and it is also ridiculously untrue. Neither does it follow from my thesis that racial antagonisms are never groundless, that they are always morally justified. Indeed, it does not even follow that any racial antagonism is ever morally justified. My thesis concerns only the causation of racial antagonism, not its moral justification. All it says is that the part played in causing racial antagonism, by true and rational beliefs about the other race, is never nil. This proposition is as devoid of moral consequences as the proposition that the part played by gravity in causing road accidents is never nil.

I have indeed assumed, not that it is moral, but that it is rational, to resent real and intentional injuries. There have, of course, been people who denied this. But then such people must embrace the consequence that, if I hate one man who has intentionally done me real injuries, and also hate another man who has never done or even intended me an injury, my attitude is as irrational in the first case as in the second. And if this is not a sufficient *reductio ad absurdum*, it will do until one comes along.

My argument about races holds equally good for any two large and enduring groups: antagonism between them, even if it began by being groundless and one-sided, would never remain groundless or one-sided for long. I therefore believe that there is no such thing as a groundless social antagonism.

When, therefore, you hear or read of the wrongs of Ireland, the oppression of Negroes or Jews or Catholics, the injuries France has endured at the hands of Germany, or vice versa, the crimes of the rich against the poor, or vice versa, the sufferings men have inflicted on women, or vice versa, the sins of the old against the young, or vice versa, believe it: it is sure to be true. Of course many of the details are likely enough to be false, but the general complaint, that there are true and rational grounds for animosity, is certain to be true, whoever makes it. The wrongs suffered may not be equally grievous

on both sides, or equally long-standing, or equally widespread. But that they exist, you will believe, if you are rational.

Believe it, and *forget* it: 'divide through' for it, since it is a factor common to all social antagonisms. At least, you must divide through for it, if your object is to justify the giving of special sympathy or (for example) compensation, to just one of the antagonists. What is common to both sides cannot justify the preferential treatment of one.

No one needs to be taught this more than our contemporary journalists. Many of these people are so foolish as to imagine that they need only discover a group of people who have suffered some wrong, in order to justify special consideration for those people. Since any group whatever is certain to be able to point out to a journalist some such wrong, nothing could be more fatuous; or better suited to provide journalists with a permanent supply of work.

'Victims of discrimination', the journalists call such people nowadays. Discrimination, forsooth! As though the most fortunate human beings ever born were not discriminated against, consciously or otherwise, every hour of their lives, by someone or other, because of something or other!

It is literally true as the Enlightenment maintained, that man is a progressive or perfectible or educable species. No other species is. With slight exceptions, all other species of animals have only one way of determining the character of their offspring: unconsciously and inflexibly, by the genes which they pass on to them. Humans alone have at their disposal an additional way of determining, consciously and flexibly, what their offspring shall be like: by educating them. Of course improvement is no more guaranteed as a result of education than it is as a result of the combination of the parents' genes. Still, two chances are better than one.

The only question - though of course an immense question, is, how much could education improve people? 'Virtually without limit', is the answer of a million educationists today, as it was of B.F. Skinner in *Walden Two* in 1948, as it was of Godwin in 1793, etc. But even though no one knows the right answer to this question, it is as certain as anything in human life that the answer of the educationist is wrong.

Konrad Lorenz once said that he would turn Behaviourist when, but not before, Skinner succeeded in teaching his pigeons to copulate upside down. The price should be set a good deal higher than that. All the education in the world will never prevent most human beings from mating, raising offspring, making a place to live, defending territory and so on; any more than it will prevent kookaburras from doing so.

Some present-day educationists, it is true, have been consistent enough, or desperate enough, to maintain that even the normal direction of sexual interest is entirely an artifact of education. But even if we could believe this about our own species, it is evidently ascribing far too much to the education

systems of our four-footed and our feathered friends. We might have conspired to discriminate in the schools against homosexuality, but the kookaburra, kangaroo, etc., can hardly be supposed to have been in the plot.

If anything could educate educationists, it would be something like that mortal storm of antagonisms which is present-day Beirut. Can any rational person believe that more education there would help? That city already has the world's largest surplus population, (proportionately speaking), of high-school and university students. How could more schools or universities do anything but intensify the antagonisms already existing? Western educationists were in fact out in force in Lebanon from at least 1850 up to a few decades ago. They reached the height of their influence, such as it was, soon after the Second World War, through the American University of Beirut. Of course this university succumbed long ago to the political, religious, and racial antagonisms which surrounded it. But the only rational conclusion to be drawn, from this case as from a million others, is that social antagonisms are simply not, as a rule, removable by education. Unfortunately, nothing ever educates educationists.

There is, then, a foolish belief behind the custom of calling antagonism between races 'prejudice': the belief that it is within the power of education to dissolve racial antagonism. In the last two decades, however, the expression 'racial prejudice' has been superseded in its turn by another which is even more foolish: 'racism'.

Some words, though they are foolish and useless in themselves, are useful indirectly, because they give the people who use them away. 'Scientology' is a recent example. No sensible person would ever use this word, except in quotation marks: so you know what to think when you come across someone who uses it in earnest. 'Spiritualism' is, or used to be, another example of the same kind. A third example is 'racism'.

This word is so new that it had still not found its way into the *Oxford English Dictionary* as late as 1971. But once it did arrive, it swept all before it. Nowadays you cannot open a newspaper or a popular periodical without meeting it. Many journalists would be struck dumb if they were forbidden to use it: how did they make a living before this word came along? A politician, too, must now neglect no opportunity to pronounce a curse on 'racism'. He can probably still remember the first time he ever encountered the word, but he must now pretend that 'racism' had been one of the items on his curse-list all along. His real feelings towards people of other races are almost certainly no warmer than the feelings of most of the voters. Still, he must pretend otherwise, and pronounce the ritual curse whenever a chance to do so presents itself.

A more ridiculous spectacle than all this is not easy to imagine. Around 1700, Daniel Defoe said that most Englishmen were prepared to fight to the death against Popery, without knowing whether it

were a man or a horse. But the spectacle which we present is both more comic and more dishonest than that one. For almost everyone unites in declaring 'racism' false and detestable, while absolutely everyone knows it is true.

'Racism' is the belief that, in certain respects, some human races are inferior to others, and that it is sometimes proper to make such racial differences the basis of our behaviour towards people. It is this proposition which is nowadays constantly declared to be false, though everyone knows it is true; just as everyone knows that some people's health (for example) is inferior to others', and that it is sometimes proper to make that difference the basis of our behaviour towards people.

Of course, inferiority between races, like inferiority between any two other things, can *only* be in particular respects. Japanese are inferior to Scandinavians in the ability to produce red-haired children. Scandinavians are inferior to African Negroes in the ability to produce frizzy-haired children. A Malaysian is almost certain to be inferior both in height and weight to a Maori. An Ethiopian is more likely than an Eskimo to have a physique adapted for long-distance running. Arabs are less noted for industriousness than Chinese are. If you are recruiting potential basketball champions, you would be mad not to be more interested in American Negroes than in Vietnamese. If you are recruiting people of business ability in Fiji, you would be mad not to favour Indian Fijians over native Fijians. Any rational person, recruiting an army, will be more interested in Germans than in Italians. If what you want in people is aptitude for forming stable family ties, you will prefer Italians or Chinese to American Negroes. Pronounced mathematical ability is more likely to occur in an Indian or a Hungarian than in an Australian Aboriginal. If you are recruiting workers, and you value docility above every other trait in a worker, you should prefer Chinese to white Americans. And so on.

Of course all these things are utter commonplaces, but that is part of my point: everyone knows scores, probably hundreds, of truths like these. Naturally, these truths can still lead you astray in particular cases: the most rational recruiter might come up with a lazy Chinese, or miss a native Fijian who is a financial genius. But if this is advanced as an objection to what I have said, then it is simply silly, because such possibilities are already allowed for, by the statistical nature of the truths in question.

Since everyone knows that 'racism' is true, why is it that, in countries like ours, there are constant, belligerent and almost universal declarations that it is false? I know of no rational explanation of this. It seems to be often believed that, if you admit truths of the kind which I listed above, consistency requires that you try to murder entire races of people. I do not know what one can say of a belief as ridiculous as this, except that it is extremely ridiculous.

Why is 'racism' a foolish and useless word? For the

same reason that 'eastism' would be, if we had such a word for the belief that the sun rises in the east. There is no need for a word, and therefore no usefulness in a word, for a belief which everyone knows is true. Least of all is there need for a word which ends in 'ism', since that has precisely the effect of suggesting that not everyone shares the belief in question.

If we are to have 'racism', we ought also to have 'healthism', for the belief that some people's health is not as good as others', and that differences in health are sometimes properly made the basis of differences in our behaviour towards people. The disadvantage is that there are going to be far too many new words at this rate. For the crime, (already notorious), of preferring one neighbourhood to another, we will need 'neighbourhoodism'. And so on.

We have seen that education could never entirely dispel racial antagonism, because such antagonism always depends to some extent on true and rational beliefs about the behaviour of the other. But it does not follow, of course, that education cannot lessen racial antagonism; and it is obvious enough that in fact it sometimes does so. Many adults have discarded, under the pressure of education, hostility which they had absorbed in childhood towards another race and which had been based on stories too ridiculous or discreditable for an educated adult to believe.

But what is of practical importance, of course, are the questions of how much reduction of racial antagonism education could achieve, and how much educational effort it is worthwhile putting into the discrediting of ridiculous or wicked falsities about other races. Experience does not furnish any grounds for optimism about the first of these questions. Hitler had no trouble recruiting people with Ph.Ds in the biological sciences for some of the most unspeakable parts of his racial policies. But in any case, the above two questions clearly admit of no general answer at all. The answer to them must depend on a multitude of circumstances of the particular case: how intense the racial antagonism is, how large its irrational component is, the economics of mass education, and so on.

But suppose even the most favourable possible case: suppose that two races, by an immense educational effort, were to purge themselves of all irrational antagonism towards one another. They *might* then be an even greater danger to each other than they had been at first. For the rational component of the original antagonism would still exist on each side; and an antagonist is not necessarily the less dangerous, if he is less hostile to you than he once was, but no longer labours under any of the illusions which he once had about you.

Besides, if education ever did expel all irrational antagonism between two races, its effects would not end there. Enlightenment is not like one of those weed-killers which work only where they make direct contact: it is like a systemic and non-selective weed-killer. If you teach people to laugh at ridicu-

lous or wicked beliefs in one area of life, they will soon learn to laugh at them in other areas as well. But popular religion and popular morality, like popular attitudes to other races, always abound with ridiculous or wicked beliefs. If, therefore, education ever dispelled irrational antagonism between races, it would be at the cost of dispelling a large part of the popular religion and morality of each race too.

That is precisely what the enlightened in the 18th century intended it to do, of course. But we have had far more opportunities than they had, to judge from experience, how undesirable such revolutions are. Combine the observations of the two preceding paragraphs, and ask yourself which you would rather be: accused of heresy in Spain in 1600, or accused of being a kulak in Russia in 1933? The animosity which the enlightened Stalin felt towards kulaks was probably not a tenth part as intense as that which the benighted Inquisitor felt towards heretics. But whereas the Inquisitor laboured under a mountain of religious and moral delusions about the proper treatment of heretics, Stalin was entirely unhampered by popular religious or moral beliefs about the proper treatment of anyone. I do not deny that both situations are extremely unenviable: still, which would you rather be in?

Concerning religious antagonisms within a society, David Hume wrote, near the end of his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1778):

in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to popular religions is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society. Every expedient which he tries, even for so humble a purpose, is surrounded with inconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every consideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his own independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the wiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect; otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions, persecutions, and civil commotions.

These wise words about religious antagonisms are equally true of racial ones: the two kinds of social antagonisms which stand apart from all other kinds both as being more destructive, and as having a larger component of irrationality in them. All the same the 'wise magistrate' will not be over-zealous about extinguishing either racial or religious antagonism by a policy of universal education. He will try to keep racial antagonisms within bounds, as he tries to keep religious ones, but he will also hope that they in turn continue to keep enlightenment within bounds.

Africa's Hidden Apartheid

John Gardner

There is a country in Africa where the indigenous population is dominated by a racial minority. The minority, which accounts for less than a sixth of the population, monopolises for itself all political power and socio-economic privilege in a system of institutionalised racism. The black majority, with its leaders imprisoned, exiled or killed, is periodically put down with police violence.

Although the above statement would be taken by most people to be a description of South Africa, it in fact refers to another African state that matches South Africa's political circumstances in virtually every detail. The country is Burundi.

Burundi, located in central Africa, has a population of about five million, divided into two black races: the majority Hutus, short and dark, and the minority Tutsis, tall and brown. The similarities between Burundi and South Africa are striking. The Tutsis migrated to Burundi at the beginning of the 1700s; the Europeans sailed to South Africa at the end of the 1600s. The Hutus make up around 85% of Burundi's population and have no political power; non-whites make up 86% of South Africa's population and have no political power. Tutsis are alarmed at the overthrow of minority Tutsi rule in neighbouring Rwanda. Whites in South Africa are alarmed at the overthrow of minority white rule in neighbouring Zimbabwe. Both countries have a heavily skewed distribution of wealth in favour of the minority. In both countries, the distribution of political power is on the sole criterion of race. The Tutsis, some 15% of Burundi's population, hold 16 out of 20 government ministries, 58 out of 65 seats in the National Assembly and 63 out of 65 places on the Central Committee. Of Burundi's 15 provincial governors, 14 are Tutsi and one is Hutu. The president, Major Pierre Buyoya, is Tutsi.¹

Although the systems of discrimination in Burundi and South Africa are very similar, repression in Burundi is much harsher:

Whereas South African blacks have legal anti-government political parties such as the Mass Democratic Movement and Inkatha, Hutu political organisations of any kind are strictly forbidden.

Whereas South African blacks have sometimes blocked government policy in South Africa's courts, Burundi has no independent bodies whatsoever for Hutus to turn to for redress of grievance.

Whereas South African blacks have freedom of worship the Burundian government has effectively banned Sunday prayer meetings for Hutus, expelled hundreds of Christian missionaries and outlawed Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists.

Whereas South African blacks have limited scope

for expressing political thought in newspapers such as the *Sowetan*, Hutu newspapers are banned outright.

Whereas 80,000 South African blacks attended an anti-government rally in Soweto in September 1989, Hutu gatherings are simply unheard of.

Another factor that distinguishes Burundi from South Africa is racial extermination. In April 1972 a violent Hutu challenge to minority rule was bloodily put down. What then followed was one of the greatest racial crimes in history: the Tutsi military elite exterminated in cold blood all Hutus with the ability to read and write. Impartial observers estimate the death toll was between 100,000 and 150,000 although some Hutu exiles claim the loss of life eventually reached 250,000 or 8.6% of the Hutu population.

Burundi was quiet for 16 years. Then in August 1988 rumours drifted down to wary Hutu villagers that the new head of national security was planning another 1972 massacre. Hutu wariness turned to panic when the Army (which reserves its ranks for Tutsis and receives its weapons from the USSR) moved unannounced into the Hutu town of Marangara. In an attempt to hamper troop movements, Hutus felled trees across roads and burned bridges. A murder, either of a Hutu for burning a bridge or of an old Tutsi soldier for killing a Hutu, was all that was needed to start a bloodbath.

A Hutu mob attacked a Tutsi settlement, murdered the occupants and escaped. In another part of the country, where Hutus had given the army no special reason for revenge, Tutsi soldiers moved from house to house, village to village, searching out Hutu occupants and shooting them. When ammunition ran out, soldiers continued with bayonets and knives. More Hutus were killed by helicopter gunships as they fled Burundi to seek refuge in neighbouring Rwanda. The report from a *Times* correspondent, who visited a makeshift hospital for survivors, makes horrific reading:

Fifty of them...had as many as twenty bayonet wounds each...One woman has an infected hole in her breast left by a bullet that entered her back. There was a 17-month baby girl with a bullet wound through her jaw. Her mother had also been shot in the face and the father killed. In another bed were two eight-year old girls. One had been bayoneted in the back while she was lying on the ground, the other had machete wounds to the hands and neck.²

After a week's killing, some 10,000 people were dead (although estimates have varied between 5,000 and 24,000), including a thousand Tutsi. Shortly after,

thousands of Hutu corpses were found floating in Lake Tanganyika.

The 1988 massacre, like 1972's genocide, failed to produce a modicum of outrage from the European Community or the Commonwealth or the British Council of Churches or the National Union of Students or the Revolutionary Communist Party or the *Caribbean Times* or the Young Socialists or the teaching profession or Equity or Christian Aid or Camden Council or War on Want or the Church of England synod. Or anybody else for that matter.

Nor did the massacre inspire any sit-down protests or films or plays or demonstrations or rallies or freedom songs or peace poems or petitions or T-shirts or conferences or sporting boycotts or sanctions or TV documentaries or candle-lit night vigils. Not even a multi-million pound Wembley Stadium pop concert.

Why is it that apartheid in South Africa produces endless international anger while something far worse than apartheid in Burundi is treated with virtual indifference? Repression in Burundi is incomparably more severe than repression in South Africa, so this cannot be the reason. Both countries have minority governments which deny the majority group social, economic and political rights on grounds of race, so this cannot be the reason. In both countries, the repressed majority is black, so this cannot be the reason. In South Africa the ruling minority is white, while in Burundi the ruling minority is black. Here is the answer. The campaign against South Africa is based not on opposition to a government whose crime is injustice and repression, but against a government whose crime is its colour.

When white soldiers strike demonstrators with sjamboks on South African beaches, the response from the Western world is outrage. When black soldiers in Burundi bayonet villagers, Western politicians look the other way. The logical inference is that whites in the West expect higher standards of behaviour from white Africans than they do from black Africans. Racism is not, therefore, confined to right-wing fascists (as we are supposed to believe), but pervades our churches, trade unions, universities and local authorities: white-run Africa must have a rule of law, democracy, freedom of speech and nothing less. Black-run countries like Ethiopia, Zambia and Angola can have detentions without trial, press censorship, states of emergency, and no-one is in the least perturbed.

Nowhere is racism more rampant than in the corridors of the BBC and ITV. The killing of about twenty Cape Town demonstrators by the South African police in 1989 made headline news. Yet television news has not bothered to report the killing of over 2,000 people by black political movements in South Africa's Natal province over the last two years.

But if whites condemn South Africa because they expect a higher level of decency from whites, why do blacks single the Republic out for special attention? The usual explanation, that apartheid is a 'unique

evil', is invalidated by the existence of apartheid in Burundi. Logic again provides the answer. If groups like Black Sections believed in black rights, they would demand political freedom for blacks in all African states. They do not. Of twenty-seven African countries where black people cannot vote for the candidate of their choice, black radicals only attack the one run by whites. Opposition to South African apartheid is not, therefore, a crusade for black liberation. It is a socially acceptable exercise in white-bashing, and white liberals are reluctant to criticise because of their numerous guilt complexes.

Black people are incapable of racism, say the anti-racists. Racism, they say, is a peculiarly British custom created out of the legacy of the slave-trade. Black people, the victims of slavery, are inherently non-racist. Needless to say, events in Burundi bring this lofty theory to earth; however, rather than have facts rudely contradict their theories, many anti-racists believe that minority-rule in Burundi is 'different' from South African minority-rule.

The Chinese and Romanians are not like this at all. When the governments of China and Romania massacred their citizens in 1989, the Chinese and Romanians in Britain had a choice. They could either support the politicians responsible for the killings or they could stand by the people. They stood by the people. Why are not more black-rights activists like this? Why, even after hideous crimes of mass racial slaughter, do black politicians in the West continue to sympathise with black politicians in Africa rather than with the African people?

The fallacy of racist double standards should have been learned during the 1970s. While the world clamoured for the downfall of the white Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia, black rule in Uganda went uncriticised until 300,000 people were dead. Genuine opponents of racism give their support to groups like Amnesty International which condemn the oppressors regardless of colour, whether in Burundi, South Africa or elsewhere.

An uneasy peace has returned to Burundi but for many it is the peace of the grave. Although the killing is over for now, the future will almost certainly hear the sound of machine-gun fire on a scale more terrifying than before. It is a tragedy that people in this country will not notice, being too busy naming parks and roads after Nelson Mandela.

Notes

1. For more detailed information, see *Burundi since the Genocide*, available from the Minority Rights Group, 29, Craven Street, London WC2N 5NT
2. *The Times*, Page 7, August 29, 1988. Also see *The Economist* magazine, August 27 and September 3, 1988

Women and International Relations

Christopher Coker

Women's Studies have been colonising academic disciplines at an astonishing rate. They have now reached International Relations.

What can students expect to study if they choose 'Women and International Relations' as a special Masters subject? They would explore a world of which most of us are unaware, a world of books with pretentious titles, and equally self-regarding themes, as well as specialist feminist journals in which women are subjected to close scrutiny as economic dependents; as innocent bystanders in war; as the victims of colonialism and post-colonial development; and finally as members of an international community in which their role is still narrowly restricted and defined. It is a subject which offers the curious male student the chance to be debunked. By implication, the international order comes off even worse. The study of Women in the international system seems to be designed to turn our attention away 'from the state and its power as a unit of analysis' to the needs and interests of women as 'an identity group'. Gender planning, in other words, is a vital step in solving the world's problems as well as in meeting womens' 'strategic needs'.

The second purpose of what threatens to become yet another MA or MSc in Women's Studies is to deny the 'autonomy of the political', since the political realm is identified with masculinity in Western culture. The feminists propose not only to broaden the study of International Relations, but also to encode it with a message. The principal aim is to replace the 'realist' view, which still predominates in the general study of International Relations, with a paradigm embodying 'value-directed' research.

It is easy enough, of course, to make fun of those radical or not so radical feminists who take life too seriously merely because society fails to take them seriously enough. Their cause is not helped by the arcane social science jargon in which so many have chosen to discuss their common predicament:

The refusal in post-structuralism to validate the subjective experience of specificity not only cripples its capacity to analyse change or theorise resistance, but indicates a disingenuous reluctance to acknowledge the 'indeterminacy' of a specific, situated critic the progression out of the political paralysis of post-structuralism lies precisely in the attention to the subjective experience of specificity, of the 'situatedness in the social'.¹

This linguistically contrived passage appears in an article on the feminist approach to Women in Development. It is not untypical of the genre. Women,

it suggests, are urgently in need of an interlocutor like Shaw, a textbook written in the precise, perceptive language of *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism*, if they are to escape the semantic strait-jacket into which so many have voluntarily laced themselves.

Let us consider the literature which is accessible to rational argument. There seem to be three claims which are central to the justification for studying 'Women and International Relations'.

Many women writers suggest that International Relations as a discipline is still informed by a 'gender specific' idea of the national interest, and the nation state. International Relations is written by men, about a male dominated world, to the complete disregard of womens' role, rights or responsibilities.

Another argument, logically incompatible, but of similar moral force, is that the discipline is 'gender neutral'. Although allegedly 'objective', in reality it is entirely oblivious to the subjugation of women in the Third World and to their continued subordination in the First. The division of labour is still tied to the 'strategic' needs of men.

Finally, there is the claim that in ignoring women altogether the classical writers of International Relations, such as Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wright and Raymond Aron, have dismissed the valuable contribution women could make to international security. As a subject, International Relations mirrors a world in which male dominated states have perpetuated an inherently violent and intrinsically unjust social and economic order. As Lichtenberg once observed, if an ape looks into a mirror it should not expect to see an apostle looking back.

To begin at the beginning, International Relations cannot be 'about' women any more than it can be 'about' men. The point of departure for many feminists is the point at which they and I have to part company. The argument is that the state system is still a patriarchy despite the admission of women to democratically elected assemblies, or the passing of acts in favour of affirmative action. For a society which discriminates in favour of women as rational individuals may, nevertheless, we are told, discriminate against them as a sex. The public world is still male dominated, even if the private world is not.

For Jean Bethke Elshtain, Machiavelli's account of International Relations 'revolves around a public-private split in and through which women are constituted either as mirrors to male war-making, or as a collective Other embodying the softer values and virtues which are out of place within, as well as subversive of, *realpolitik*'.² Only when the discipline succeeds in transcending this public/private divi-

sion will women be afforded a rightful place in life.

The problem with such assertions is that they are already out of date. The tension between the feminine in Man and masculine in Women in a non-androgynous society negates the proposition that international relations, any more than political science, can be about gender at all. Sex is a continuum which we are only just beginning to comprehend. The male and female chromosomes in each of us do not permit a total male/female division any more than society allows the public/private worlds to co-exist independently of each other. Descartes, who was so unyielding in his certainty about other matters, was not at all certain about gender. When we look through a window, he maintained, we may well persuade ourselves we see John and Mary, but what we see is '*chapeaux et manteaux, rien de plus*'. Echoing the French philosopher, Gonzalez-Cruz adds that sexual differentiation is no longer an adequate avenue for recognising the different forms of human existence. When we look at men and women 'we believe we see psychological attributes, expected behaviour, assigned roles, position in society but all we see is certain somatic features, perhaps certain genital configurations. Hats and coats, nothing else.'³

Western civilisation may not have produced anything akin to the Tantric practices of India whose purpose was to make people consciously aware that human beings are composed of intermixed elements from both sexes. Gnosticism, however, came close to it. For the Gnostics, God has sent out manifestations of himself in sexual pairs, the thirteenth of which, wisdom (Sophia), showed her imperfection, not like Lucifer by rebelling against the Almighty, but by desiring too ardently to be reunited with him. As E.M. Forster observed, in recounting this attractive legend, fleeing her responsibilities 'she fell through love', not ambition.

Perhaps, in their hostility to Gnosticism, the early Christian Fathers were sometimes overtly misogynist. Emmanuel Royides' Pope Joan is persuaded to ignore the biblical injunction against women wearing men's clothes by invoking the opinion of Origen that all women would be transformed into men at the Last Trump. How different from the teachings of the anubashya-s in Mughal India, who promised the devout that they would be rewarded for their piety with a feminine body uniquely formed for sexual pleasure.

If in the nineteenth century, however, there were still Christians like Baudelaire who thought women to be "the sin and the Hell that punishes it", for a thousand years the intercession of the Virgin and the cult of the Madonna at times eclipsed the worship of the Child, Christ Himself. According to Michelet, unlike the Ormuz of the Persians, the Jehovah of the Jews, or the Zeus of the Greeks even the soft and melancholy Almighty of the Middle Ages was *imberbe*, hardly a man, unendowed with the generative force'⁴ an androgynous being in whom the feminine was clearly pronounced.

If Christianity has been ambiguous about the femi-

nine in man, the Greeks frequently failed to draw any distinction at all in political life. How else can one explain the 'role models' in Greek tragedy such as Antigone, whose defiance of her father-in-law Creon is motivated by the private need to break a public injunction forbidding her to bury her unburied brother. The true hero of the *Oresteia* is not the vengeful Elektra but Clytemnestra. Unlike Lady Macbeth, she is motivated, not by ambition, but by revenge for the adultery of her husband and the sacrifice of a daughter. Unlike Macbeth's consort, Clytemnestra does not need to be 'unsexed' to steel herself for Agamemnon's murder.⁵

Perhaps the best way of illustrating the feminists' dilemma is by turning to Muriel Rukeyser's version of the Oedipus myth, in which the ex-King, now old and blind, encounters the Sphinx in his exile from Thebes. Why didn't he recognise his mother and thus escape his fate, he asks plaintively, since he gave the right answer to the Sphinx's riddle? 'You answered Man', his old adversary replies, 'you didn't say anything about women'. 'When you say Man' Oedipus argues, 'you include women too. Everyone knows that.' 'That's what you think', replies the Sphinx in a feminist retort, which explains why, contrary to legend, she felt no necessity to throw herself over the cliff after their first encounter.

The Sphinx, of course, is wrong. She is, after all, herself only half woman. 'The Sphinx must solve her own riddle' wrote Emerson in his *Essay On History*. So she must. The riddle is that in a male dominated world in which women as women are subordinated, man is not master of his fate either. His gender is no defence. Even the politician has to sleep soundly at night. He is not impervious to the promptings of his private conscience, as Oedipus's successor, Creon, discovers too late. In trying to put public duty before his responsibility to his family, Creon inadvertently becomes a tyrant, a king who is found out, not 'unmanned'.

In that sense the feminist argument that the private and public worlds co-exist uneasily is difficult to sustain. Creon has right on his side, that is the hallmark of tragedy. His weakness is not that he stands by the law which has forbidden Polyneices to be buried but that he compromises 'for reasons of State'. Instead of insisting that Antigone be stoned to death, as the law prescribes, he orders her to be buried alive to save the city from the guilt of her death. Lacking magnanimity until too late he settles on a political device, a ruse whose meanness and hypocrisy is Antigone's final vindication. Only through her death, not her arguments, can she show us that private and public morality are the same after all - that Creon's crime is not his refusal to bend the law but his refusal to live by it.

The argument that International Relations is 'gender neutral' is equally dubious. According to Ann Tickner, the feminine/masculine dichotomy has become a mirror image of a world which prefers the objective to the subjective, culture to nature, knowing to being. In so far as women are more subjective than men, more emotional without necessarily

being more irrational, more intuitive than 'informed', writers such as Morgenthau have tended to dismiss feminine attributes which, had they been allowed expression, might have resulted in a less violent, power-obsessed world.⁶ In similar terms, Carol Gilligan has challenged Lawrence Kohlberg's discussion of Man's different stages of moral development, a model based on a random sample of young American adolescents. Moral growth, Kohlberg argues, develops from an instrumental morality concerned with the advancement of one's own interests (while acknowledging the interests of others), to a contextual morality in which people are sensitive to other peoples' needs, to the highest morality of all: the ability to reason in the abstract about abstract principles of justice. In her critique Gilligan maintains that if women rarely rise above the contextual, is this necessarily a fault or a shortcoming? Abstract thought notoriously ignores the need for compromise, for a re-definition of power in terms of persuasion rather than coercion. It pays little enough regard to cultural differences either.⁷

These claims are serious, but ultimately unconvincing. If we are to challenge the subordination of women in Islamic society, or the practice of female circumcision in Africa (a deplorable custom, defended eloquently enough by the young Jomo Kenyatta in *Facing Mount Kenya*), we must be as intolerant of cultural differences as were our European forebears during the last century, or American human rights activists today. However, I doubt whether Marxist-Feminism will liberate women in the Third World, any more than Marxist-Leninism has liberated the human spirit elsewhere.⁸ If we really are concerned about human rights, the male rites of initiation which so many adolescents have to undergo at puberty are horrific enough. Strangely, in recognising them, we tend to keep our own counsel. Being a man in many Third World countries can be a painful psychological experience. Custom, which denies individual freedom in the interests of gender solidarity, compounds the misery of a life made grim enough by poverty and economic deprivation. The absurd affirmation of manhood in Marquez's *Chronicle of a Death Foretold* is matched only by the Mexican painter Pousada's comic painting, 'A Rustic Don Juan pursued by his Victims', clearly out of his depth, desperately unhappy with the role society has prescribed for him.

Male children in Mexico are also denied the father figure who helps to make childhood a less traumatic, although not necessarily happier, experience in Western societies. As Santiago Ramirez points out, a measure of the hostility between fathers and sons is shown by the fact that the expression 'I am your father' (*yo soy tu padre*) is used in Mexico as one of the gravest insults, often leading to murderous encounters between father and son.⁹ Clearly, it is the responsibility of anthropologists and sociologists to understand the plight of Man - the human condition. It is not at all clear that it is the responsibility of those studying International Relations to suggest that initiatives such as the UN

Decade of Development for Women accomplished, or could have accomplished, very much in the 1970s, in the name of cultural understanding.

There is a much more disturbing problem, however, in arguing that International Relations should take notice of gender, or the role of women as women rather than human beings. In arguing for total equality between the sexes, feminists are reifying equality as a moral absolute. In his *Travels in Central America* Patrick Markham recalls attending a depressing Catholic mass at St. Boniface, the headquarters of the Franciscan Friars, conducted by a woman from the Alternative Catholic Church. At the end of the service she produced a Litany for the Alienated 'for those living in sin, homosexuals, women and meths drinkers.' She did not make it clear, Markham adds:

whether these unfortunate people were supposed to be alienated through their own fault, or through that of the Church, but since the first two categories are still regarded as sinners, the third as people and the fourth as desperate it did not seem to matter¹⁰

It was the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr who argued thirty-five years ago, in *The Irony of American History*, one of the landmarks in the literature of International Relations, that human oppression can only be eliminated, rather than ameliorated, by self-awareness - not by state policies or international declarations of human rights. The Americans have frequently made the grave mistake of reifying freedom or justice as ends, when they are only crude means of realising human possibilities. In acknowledging that man is fallible, and society corrupting, all we can do as human beings, regardless of gender, is - in Popper's phrase - to try, err, and try again.

Finally, the idea that women have a special contribution to make in preserving peace, in making the world much safer, lies at the heart of treating 'Women and International Relations' as a subject in itself. It is also its greatest fallacy. It was a fallacy that was popular enough, of course, at the height of the Peace Movement in the early 1980s when the Labour MP for Pontypool, Leo Abse, praised the women of Greenham Common for illustrating such traditional female qualities as 'the desire to nurse, care and tolerate, improve and preserve.'¹¹ The fact that the demonstration revealed that those who took part preferred to immure themselves in their own little world, rapidly losing touch not only with reality but also with the people who made it, has not prevented the Women's Press from producing a collection of essays entitled *Greenham Common: Women at the Wire*.

The thought of nuclear war is terrible enough; but the women members of the Peace Movement, including West Germany's Petra Kelly, or East Germany's Christa Wolf, have made no contribution to securing a safer world by surrendering so readily to their fears. Nor is their case helped by writers such as Bram Dijkstra, who blame both world wars on

the misogyny and 'gynocide' of the *fin de siècle* middle-class European male.¹² If this is really what some women believe, it is a pity they haven't turned to Jung's theories of the collective unconscious. If *this* is what we are to expect from women, as their distinctive contribution to peace, then we must regard women as a far greater danger than men have been. For it was just this attitude that prevented us from deterring Hitler. Nevertheless, feminists argue that women are intrinsically more 'peaceful' than men, and that men are intrinsically more violent. It is an assertion of which we are likely to hear more, as the 'demographic winter' through which Western Europe is passing will require our armed forces to recruit an increasing number of women. It will soon be difficult to write as confidently as Micaela di Leonardo of 'Morale, Mothers and Militarism', in such blatantly 'anti-militarist' terms, as if serving in the army and militarism were one and the same.¹³

Meanwhile, we can expect further demonstrations by women for a more peaceful world, initiatives as disingenuous as the Women's Peace March through Central America in 1985 (a kind of modern Children's Crusade, without the bloodshed). The same might be said of the decision the following year by 4000 Finnish women not to bear children unless their government agreed to close Finland's nuclear power stations by 1990 (a version of the *Lysistrata*, though sexually less demanding in the contraceptive age). It is doubtful whether the particular approach and experience of women 'equips them to act effectively to bring about a safer world.'¹⁴ It is doubtful whether the approach is either remarkable or exceptional except as another example of Caliban retreating into his cave, unwilling to confront either the reality outside or Prospero's Phantoms.

Most feminists are speaking in a language whose currency has long been devalued through overuse. The only evidence for the proposition that women are less aggressive than men are the few tribes or clans around the world in which the latter are the subordinate sex. Most stories of such people are in fact nineteenth-century myths, describing tribes or clans which will not be found among the 1,179 societies listed in George Murdock's *Ethnographic Atlas*. Even the assertion that male dominated tribes are naturally aggressive is countered by those Indian tribes such as the Iroquois who, despite being more violent, more warlike and more merciless in their treatment of prisoners than almost any other, were matrilineal, matrilocal, more or less monogamous, and had no particular rituals for suppressing women at all.

What is anthropologically interesting is not that matrilineal societies were less warlike than their patrilineal counterparts, but that the former engaged in 'external' rather than 'internal' warfare, attacking, not their immediate neighbours, but societies many miles distant. The Iroquois used to venture from New York as far as Illinois, mounting expeditions which were not intended to maintain a local demographic balance, but to seize the commodities

of other tribes.

Many anthropologists, in fact, no longer attribute warfare to male aggression but rather male aggressiveness to warfare, and warfare itself to the need to fulfil productive, reproductive and ecological functions in a pre-industrial age.¹⁵ For the first time in history we inhabit a world in which ecology and reproduction can be regulated by non-violent means. If we seize those opportunities then the 'role playing' that regulation made necessary in the past will be rendered anachronistic.

In the modern industrial and post-industrial worlds, alas, war has fulfilled a different function altogether; that of moral improvement, or social engineering. Whether that improvement was pursued in the Nazi concentration camps, or the Gulag, societies have gone to war either against each other, or against themselves, in the name of a higher good: the Brotherhood of Man. The subject of 'Women and International Relations' is really an attempt to suggest that the horrors of the Twentieth Century, the means by which the goal was sought, could have been avoided had women been emancipated, and afforded equal rights.

It is an interesting but doubtful historical claim. The true prophet of the twentieth century was not Rousseau (the first totalitarian who preached Man's perfection, and elected love), but the Marquis de Sade who railed against the Brotherhood of Man and chose cruelty instead. Sade's phantasies were not entirely at the expense of women. For the plight of Justine, there was the indulgence of Juliette, who in choosing the road of vice 'encountered nothing but roses'. Nor is Sade's message entirely about sexual perversion. If his work had spoken only to the sexually ambivalent or perverse it would have survived only as a literary curiosity, consulted by such unfortunates as Karl Kraus' fetishist who, yearning for a woman's shoe, has to settle instead for the whole woman.

Sade has survived because his message is both universal in its application and quite unequivocal in its intent. He needs no interpreters. Sade cared nothing for the Brotherhood of Man, a doctrine clearly 'contradicted' by Man's baseness. His is not an attractive message, but it should have particular resonance for a century which has seen Buchenwald, Katyn and the killing fields of Cambodia, not to mention today's 'lesser' crimes in East Timor or Burundi, from which we have chosen, as usual, to avert our gaze.

'The merit of Sade', wrote Simone de Beauvoir in the 1950s, 'is not only to have cried loudly what all confess shamefully themselves: it is to have taken sides. Instead of indifference, he chose cruelty. And that is why he finds so many echoes today, when the individual is aware of being the victim not so much of the malice of men, as of their good conscience.'¹⁶

The New Man has not been perfected. We may yet have to await the outcome of the genetic experiments initiated by Pavlov, as Lenin had the foresight to recognise in giving the scientist a state pension. Although we have not yet seen the century out, the

final emancipation of women offers no immediate prospect of a better world. What the feminists have created is a vision of society in which the human condition has been reduced to the male sexual drive, and the latent aggression of the male dominated state. It is a wholly self-regarding vision, not because it denies women can be monsters too, but because it explains such 'aberrations' in terms of the need to 'over-compensate' in a world in which male vices are held up as virtues. 'It is time for deeper passions' confesses Seneca's Medea. 'Now that I have become a mother, more impressive crimes are expected.'

Over-compensation is only half the story. Mankind does not admit to a strict male/female duality, but to a sexual ambivalence which can make beasts of women and saints of men. Even saints like St. Francis have to confront the reality that the birds which they feed by hand fly on to pick clean the teeth of crocodiles, as the poet Anthony Hecht disarmingly reminds us.

Whether they love or hate humanity, feminists seem unable to look it in the face. They have to study it, 'sanitising' their research in university doctorates, of which we may now expect many more in yet another otiose academic field of enquiry. A study of Mankind renders the sensitive enquirer after the truth not into a misogynist, but into a misanthrope. If we were really honest with ourselves we should have to agree with Nietzsche that, after the creation of Adam, 'Woman was God's second mistake.'

Notes

1. Anne Marie Goetz, 'Feminism and the limits of the claim to know: Contradictions in the Feminist Approach to Women in Development', *Millennium* 17:3 Winter 1988, p.491 [Special Is-

- sue: Women and International Relations].
2. Jean Bethke Elhstain, 'The Problem with Peace' in *ibid* p.444.
3. F Gonzalez-Cruz, *Three Forms of Sudden Death and other reflections on the grandeur and misery of the human body* (Picador 1986) p.64.
4. Lytton Strachey, 'Ought the Father to grow a beard?' (1892) in Michael Holroyd/Paul Levy, *The Shorter Strachey* (OUP,1980) p.20.
5. For a superb interpretation of Clytemnestra's 'defence' see Marguerite Yourcenar's essay 'Clytemnestra, or Crime' in *Fires* (Ate 1981) pp.101-12.
6. J Hans Tickner, 'Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: a Feminist Reformulation' *Millennium*, op.cit., p.431.
7. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1982). p.15.
8. Cecelia Green, 'Marxist-Feminism and Third World liberation', *Fireweed: a Feminist Quarterly* (Winter/Spring 1985).
9. Stanislav Andreski, *Parasitism and Subversion: the case of Latin America*.
10. Patrick Markham, *So far from God: travels in Central America* (Picador 1985), p.20.
11. *The Guardian*, 24 May 1984.
12. Bram Dijkstra *Idols of Perversity: fantasies of feminine evil in fin de siècle culture* (Oxford University Press, 1989), p.282.
13. Micaela di Leonardo, 'Morale, Mothers and Militarism: antimilitarism and feminist theory', *Feminist Studies* (Autumn, 1983).
14. Marvin Harris, *Cannibals and Kings: the Origins of Cultures* (Collins,1978) pp.57-66.
15. McLean, 'Women and Decisions on Nuclear Weapons', op. cit., p.263.
16. Simone de Beauvoir, *Fait-il brûler Sade?* (Gallimard,1955).

ANNOUNCEMENT

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Can the USSR go Bankrupt?

Marek Strzala

My question is purely rhetorical since everybody seems to know the answer: No, the Soviet Union will never go bankrupt. The USSR is a world superpower and nothing can be forced upon it. No earthly power, not even another superpower, is able to make a superpower honour its obligations when it chooses otherwise. Hence the USSR cannot go bankrupt: nobody will dare to take over its assets, nobody could subject it to compulsory management and it certainly will not submit to liquidation. At the very most, the USSR will default.

The USSR is bent on reforming and invigorating its economy. It has determined on thorough modernisation: rapid improvement in the quality of products, to bring them up to the best world standards; steady increase in growth rates; radical reorganisation of the economic system and betterment of living conditions - all those things, and over the next five years. The character of the reforms, and their extent, are both still unclear; but somebody will have to pay for them. Traditionally, it has been on the Soviet citizens that the burden of the USSR's inefficient economy, and of previous attempts at reform, has fallen. Although the Soviet people are no longer condemned (as they were half a century ago) to starvation, their nutrition, housing and commodities are well below the minimum standard recognised in the civilised world.

Since the Second World War the subject nations of Central Europe have also contributed to the Soviet economy. And through practically the whole seven decades of its existence the Soviet Union has been in the habit of borrowing just enough from the West to supplement other resources and to meet its needs. At present, most sources of extra revenue seem largely exhausted. Hence, huge foreign credits seem to be the only means of financing Gorbachev's reforms, especially the modernisation of Soviet industry, which is the heart of the matter.

Theoretically, investment funds could be obtained through cutting down consumption. And such has been the practice of Soviet industrialisation from the very beginning. Stalin's grandiose projects were carried out at the expense of peasants, millions of whom died of hunger during famines in the 1930s, not to mention the legions of political prisoners in labour camps, overworked and starved to death. It is unthinkable that modernisation today could be achieved by such methods. For one thing, nowadays it is a political impossibility; for another, unlike the early primitive stages of industrialisation, the present-day economy seems altogether incompatible with Stalinist policies. Moreover, there is little room for any decrease in consumption. Soviet living standards are already low enough to produce social

unrest, and, to make matters worse, the promise of economic reforms adds to consumers' expectations.

Experts in Soviet affairs are generally in agreement that further deterioration of living conditions poses one of the most serious threats to Gorbachev's *perestroika*, if not to the very existence of the Soviet system. There are already many signs of such deterioration: even those few commodities which were previously abundant, such as ordinary soap and potatoes, have become much sought-after rarities, and for the first time since the end of the last war sugar is rationed in Moscow, like many other necessities of life. Even the Soviet authorities now admit that 40 million Soviet people - or 13% of the population - live below a 'poverty level' that is already far below the social minimum acceptable in the West. On the whole, Soviet citizens believe that their standard of living is continually on the decrease under Mikhail Gorbachev, despite - or even because of - 'radical reforms.' For the time being the consequences of social discontent can be neutralised to some extent by *glasnost* - that is, cautious changes in the style rather than in the character of government, to divert people's thoughts from their growing problems. Nevertheless, sooner or later, and certainly before the completion of *perestroika*, means must be found to improve supplies. On top of that, the USSR has not yet even started on those truly significant and naturally costly economic reforms which would lead to genuine competition and free markets.

It is possible to economise in certain areas. For instance, realising an average Soviet investment project takes three times the normal time for investment projects in the West. Enormous assets are frozen as a result. More often than not the capacity of most Soviet enterprises is under-utilised, usually on account of the chronic mismanagement inherent in the Soviet system. A large number of newly built shops are obsolete whilst at the same time thousands of loss-making shops continue working, though on economic and technological grounds they should have been shut down many years ago.

In fact, the Soviet leaders now in power have openly addressed themselves to these questions. The five-year plan for 1986-90 gives investment priority to machine-building (80% increase) and chemicals, at the expense of fuel-energy complexes, construction, housing and agriculture. This implies an ambitious programme to renovate and re-equip existing enterprises, together with a radical improvement in the effective use of raw materials, fuels and labour. On many occasions both Gorbachev and Prime Minister Ryzhkov have pointed out the need to abandon some ongoing projects and to redesign

many others. The Soviet leadership has also called upon industrial ministries to double the scrapping rates for obsolete equipment, and to double or even triple shifts wherever possible in order to increase the efficient use of machinery.

Although it would seem that nothing could be easier for the Communist 'centrally planned economy' than to transfer investment funds from one sector to another or to cancel a project, such modest 'reforms' turn out to be quite difficult for the Soviet bureaucracy. During the first two years of the five-year plan, the growth of investments in the machine-building sector was several times the planned rate and there are doubts whether all these funds can be used effectively. The worst of it is that the investments in fuel-energy complexes, housing, raw materials and other sectors, where only a moderate increase had been predicted, grew correspondingly. In consequence, owing to characteristic imbalances between supply and demand, numerous projects have begun with little chance of being completed on time. What is more, the overall share of investment in national income has risen considerably above the planned quota. The resulting deficit is made up by printing money, which causes huge, though mostly hidden, inflation and adds to the embitterment of the population. The admitted budget deficit for 1989 is 100 billion roubles (\$160 billion at the official rate of exchange): actually it may well exceed 350 billion roubles. The 'over-hang' of spendable roubles chasing non-existent goods is estimated at more than 300 billion.

Enormous military expenditure has certainly placed a great strain on the Soviet economy. The USSR's official data on its defence budget are altogether incredible. Not only do Soviet economists themselves often question those figures; Gorbachev himself has let the cat out of the bag, revealing during the Congress of People's Deputies a figure four times the amount previously maintained by Soviet government sources. Presumably, estimates of military outlay which suggest that it is 30% or more of Soviet GNP are quite correct. If the USSR's defence budget were to be substantially lowered, it would make huge resources available for reform. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would resign its status as a superpower. Thus, it cannot drastically lessen its military posture. Sure enough, thanks to certain policy changes, arms control agreements, a less aggressive international posture, and certain economies in national defence, a number of troops as well as weapons systems might prove redundant. Nevertheless, even Gorbachev's goal, put forward in May 1989, of a 14% decrease in military expenditure, seems unattainable, all the more so as the military requests for a thorough modernisation of many weapons systems and the introduction of the most up-to-date technology - to say nothing of requests for higher pay and better conditions - are requests which, for purely political reasons, cannot be ignored by the Soviet party leadership. Thus, at best the ratio between military and civilian production will be 50-50 throughout the

1990s.

Even if, as seems improbable, the USSR secured the domestic resources necessary for reform, it could hardly solve the key problem of financing the mass transfer of modern Western technology. For domestic resources alone cannot provide the foreign exchange. For one thing, the rouble is and will remain, unconvertible; for another, the Soviet economy cannot offer (at least for the time being) many more exportable goods than now. Practically every ten years the Soviet Union has procured, by fair means or foul, a large inflow of Western technology, in order to modernise its engineering as well as to introduce new products into the country and make the Soviet industrial output more saleable abroad. The USSR has always lagged well behind the west in this field. (There are certain apparent exceptions such as the first 'Sputnik' launch - but these, which involved a superhuman concentration of resources, prove the rule.)

The country has always needed periodic injections of Western design, methodology and know-how, and the import of machinery indispensable to their implementation. Soviet constructors build upon the acquired portion of foreign technology, improving the original product until Western or Japanese inventive ingenuity renders it obsolete even for the not very fastidious domestic customer. Thus in the 1950s, Soviet cars resembled Detroit's output of the late 1930s, whereas those in the 1970s were basically of an outdated Italian design. Contrary to conventional wisdom, military equipment is seldom an exception; it is just more painstakingly updated: long after the Western 'silicon revolution' the electronics on Soviet fighters contained thermionic valves, and almost a decade later than NATO, the Red Army has been providing its new tanks with 'reactive armour', a simple though effective invention of the Israelis during the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

Over the years since 1917 the Soviet procurement of Western technology has taken different forms, ranging from espionage and the unauthorized imitation of products, through direct Western investments in the Soviet Union, joint ventures, licences etc., to the straightforward purchase of goods. The mixture of these practices has varied with the circumstances.

Up to now there have been at least five periods of intensified procurement aimed at injecting modern engineering and scientific knowledge into Soviet agriculture and industry. These were successively: Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' in the 1920s, Stalin's forced industrialisation in the 1930s, wartime co-operation together with US lend-lease in the 1940s, Khrushchev's modernisation rush in the late 1950s and the early 1960s and Brezhnev's detente with the West in the 1970s. Needless to say, the Soviets more often than not have been using Western capital for financing at least part of their modernisation programmes. Why the USSR appears inherently incapable of keeping up with modern technology remains one of its greatest secrets.

Now the Soviet Union is launching another high-

tech transfer offensive, although the Kremlin still refrains from massive purchase of Western technology. Instead it resorts to other cheaper and more effective means. Intelligence officers, abundantly scattered throughout the Soviet and Eastern European government as well as allegedly non-government agencies, have stepped up their activities in acquiring military, dual-use and purely civilian high technology. According to the US Department of Defense (*Soviet Acquisition of Military Significant Western Technology: An Update*) (September 1985), the USSR can now, thanks to information and equipment illegally obtained from the West, eliminate or shorten more than 1000 research projects every year in the military sector alone. The Russians have also instituted the practice of re-exporting to the USSR as cheaply as possible, every piece of modern technology obtained by any Warsaw Pact country. Recently the Soviet government has set its hopes on joint ventures as vehicles for transferring both Western engineering and Western management skills to the Soviet Union at little cost: typically, the buildings, workers and controls are Soviet; the technology, expertise and equipment are Western; profits - if any - are shared, though the Western partner may find it difficult to repatriate his portion owing to the vagueness of Soviet regulations as well as to such economic factors as the inconvertibility of the rouble.

Nevertheless, there seems to be no alternative to large-scale purchase of Western technology, if the USSR is to choose (Hobson's choice indeed) to catch up. What is more, the sands are running out. No matter how strenuous and elaborate the illegal high-tech transfer is, there are limits that cannot be by-passed. One may cut down research projects and avoid some bottle-necks, but it is impossible to modernise the economy thoroughly merely by occasional and fragmentary espionage. For all the publicity enjoyed by Soviet joint ventures outside the USSR, direct Western investment is doomed to remain a marginal, auxiliary measure, so long as the Soviet authorities persist in keeping a tight rein on the whole economy. At the same time, full control over the economy is a *sine qua non* of the Soviet system. Two years after the introduction of the joint-venture scheme only 450 or so enterprises, largely of trifling value, were registered, and no more than 50 of those were operational.

In short, the USSR is likely to become one of the world's greatest debtors before the end of this century. This is all the more so in that the Soviet Union is generally considered a cautious and reliable borrower. This reputation has been earned over the last thirty years, during which time the Soviet government borrowed little from the West and usually paid back in due course. Nowadays, too, the Soviet hard-currency debt (roughly \$41 billion by February 1989) may seem insignificant in comparison with those of Brazil or Mexico. However one should contrast the debt and merchandise balance: the Brazilian and the Mexican trade surpluses (when they exist) are several times the size of

that of the Soviet Union. Thus in 1985, a good year, Soviet exports exceeded imports by \$4 billion, while Brazil's surplus stood at \$12.4 billion. What is more, only a part of the Soviet exports bring in hard-currency earnings. And things are going from bad to worse: in 1989 the Soviet foreign-trade deficit may reach \$52 billion or more. Under these circumstances the USSR's foreign debt could soar to more than \$100 billion in the near future. Every year Moscow borrows more. In 1986 the borrowing requirement was approximately \$6 billion; during the last quarter of 1988 Western and Japanese banks have extended at least \$10 billion credit to the Kremlin. Despite occasional Soviet declarations to the contrary, this trend will probably continue. An American economist has estimated that the Soviet government needs new Western loans of \$8.5 billion a year to meet its investment programmes. Nikolai Shmeley, a Soviet economist, recently exhorted the Congress of People's Deputies to borrow some \$15 billion, since 'ordinary people need something in the shops': in other words, to borrow for consumption rather than investment.

If the Soviet leaders adopt a strategy of immense foreign borrowing, their tactics will be careful and discreet, at least initially. Both Western governments and Western financial circles vie with each other in offering credit. The Kremlin need only maintain a low-key attitude and bargain on the quiet over better terms. Up to now this method has worked, so that the Soviet Union has been able to bring its indebtedness close to, if not beyond, the limits of solvency. As was revealed at the Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989, earnings from oil exports, the largest source of Soviet hard-currency revenue, can hardly cover interest on existing debt. Nonetheless, creditors appear untroubled. On the contrary, they seem as confident as ever. In the course of time the Soviet government may more actively seek foreign capital in the form of loans. Some day the USSR might even launch a 'credit offensive', after the fashion of Gorbachev's notorious peace offensives, embracing ostentatiously huge loans readily provided by foreign lenders anxious to outbid each other (or rather not to be outbid); such a stratagem possibly would enable the Kremlin to amass, before any second thoughts on the part of creditors-to-be, enormous credits at short notice. Finally, the creditors might well be compelled to support the insolvent debtor's faltering economy with new loans and endlessly to reschedule the debt.

Current opinion has it that the Soviet Union, mindful of its international prestige and autarky, would never indulge in excessive borrowing. But this may prove just another myth - comparable to the myth that the USSR held, in the past, a financial umbrella over the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Until the late 1970s it was common knowledge among Western bankers that the USSR would not let its Eastern European allies go under. Yet, evidently, Moscow has not had the slightest intention of paying any of the debts of Poland, Hungary or Romania. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I venture an

opinion that Eastern Europe's experiences with foreign capital, troublesome as they are, do not necessarily discourage Soviet leaders from raising large loans abroad. Thanks to vast Western credits the communist regimes of Poland, Hungary, and to a lesser degree also Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, were able to delay painful economic and political decisions for at least a decade. And what the Kremlin needs most desperately now is time. So, why not buy it with Western money?

Huge debts are a weapon in the debtors' hand: it is the creditors rather than the debtors who find themselves obliged to make concessions. And the Russians are not novices at this game. Before the Great War, Tsar Nicholas II's loans from France were the largest of the time; both they and the Tsar's war-time debts have never been repaid. Likewise, the USSR failed to return \$12 billion or so of US Second World War lend-lease - not to mention foreign

property nationalised twice: after the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, and then after Lenin's death, when his New Economic Policy of the early 1920s was called off by Stalin.

Ultimately, the USSR's solvency will depend upon its ability to produce, very soon, low-cost, up-to-date, high-quality, internationally marketable manufactured goods, both consumer and capital. Never and nowhere has a 'planned' or 'command' economy been able to attain this. The Soviet Union's solvency depends upon the will of its leadership to dismantle the existing economic system in its entirety and replace it with the only reliable type of modern economy: that is, a genuinely free market. Unfortunately, there is no such possibility. For all the pro-market rhetoric, Gorbachev and his colleagues would not turn their 'socialism' into 'capitalism', even if they could. For that would be the end of their power.

The West Cannot Save Perestroika

Rodney Leach

The question of whether Gorbachev should be given financial help by the West continues to generate a heated debate whose unreal air stems partly from Gorbachev's failure to request the financial aid which his Western admirers wish to thrust at him, but more from the fact that it is the wrong issue that is being debated. Instead, we should be considering whether the emergence, survival and prosperity of freedom in the Soviet Union's dwindling sphere of influence are served by Gorbachev's brand of reformist Communism, and if so whether foreign loans would help advance the cause.

The discussion to date has been largely shaped by George Soros, who brings to the task redoubtable credentials - a detailed practical knowledge of Communist economies gained from his pioneering philanthropic work in Eastern Europe and his role as organiser of an international task force, under the aegis of Prime Minister Ryzhkov, to investigate the establishment of an open sector within the Soviet command system; a comprehensive grasp of Western finance; and a record of rare business success as president of Soros Fund Management in New York.

When such a knight enters the lists, the rest are tempted to leave the field without a challenge. Yet his conclusion that the future of *perestroika* lies essentially in Western hands is unconvincing. He argues that the imminent collapse of the economy and the threatened disintegration of the Soviet Union may soon put Gorbachev in the hands of the army or force him to resign, but that catastrophe may yet be avoided if the United States comes to the rescue with loans to stabilise the rouble. Soros estimates the cost of stabilisation at \$25 billion, or approximately

350 to 400 billion roubles at the black market rate, a figure which he derives from the estimated 250 to 300 billion roubles of surplus unspendable cash in the hands of the population and the Soviet Union's budget deficit of over 100 billion roubles.

Nowadays, \$25 billion is certainly a manageable sum. It is less than 10% of the U.S. defence budget, less than 25% of the external debt of Brazil and approximately what the U.S. Government will have to raise in each of the next three years to repay depositors in failed Savings and Loan institutions. Few Western taxpayers would grudge their contribution towards a \$25 billion aid programme for the Soviet Union if the effect were to be comparable with the post-war reconstruction of Europe, let alone if there were to be the prize of Peace in our Time.

But there's the rub. Marshall Aid was supplied mainly to countries possessing four characteristics diametrically opposed to communism: the rule of law; open-market pricing; private ownership; and sound currencies. In the Soviet Union there is no rule of law, no independent judiciary. Under *glasnost*, Soviet citizens can finally speak out about wrongdoing and incompetence, at least within limits, but since they are offered no legal redress they withdraw into the unresolved bitterness of their predicament, finding a sense of purpose primarily in nationalism, religion or strikes, which easily degenerate into superstition, tribal hatred and anarchy as their condition worsens.

As for private ownership and free market pricing, these remain as incompatible with reformist Communism as with Brezhnevism. The notion that there is a degree of possible convergence between West-

ern mixed economies and the Soviet central planning system, with its new fringe of co-operative ownership, finds no support among serious Soviet economists, nor did it survive the analysis of Ryzhkov's task force.

Western state-owned concerns do not operate to Government command. They have to compete with domestic and international private sector companies and with suppliers of substitutable products; they account to taxpayers for their results; they buy materials, recruit staff and sell their output in a discerning and globally competitive market-place; They obey the laws, whether of contract, patent, tort, environmental protection or anti-monopoly; and they respond to fluctuations of demand like any privately-owned company.

By contrast, Soviet state-owned enterprises are insulated alike from natural forces and the law. Quality imports are non-existent and price-cutting is unthinkable when any available consumer item is grabbed by a populace starved of goods. Heavy industrial manufacturers are free to pollute the environment, but are adamantly opposed to market freedom, since they distribute their otherwise unsaleable output only through the planning system. Soviet accounting is a branch of propaganda and there is no commercial law. Competition is confined to the field of corruption.

In open economies, where traders and entrepreneurs automatically eliminate bottlenecks and surpluses, relatively modest (by Soviet standards) imperfections, such as cartels, protectionism or subsidies, visibly impede the market's efficiency. This phenomenon has become still more pronounced in an era of decentralised high-technology business and sophisticated international communications. That is why deregulation and freer competition is the order of the day in the most advanced countries. At the heart of the system lies the price mechanism - an impartial, classless semaphore transmitting a massive volume of signals to producers and consumers about scarcities or oversupply of goods, labour and capital, which no Plan could begin to replicate.

The out-of-context adoption by the Soviet Union of elements of the open market is therefore a great delusion. In the days of unrelieved central planning, private enterprise could live parasitically round the edges of the economy and ease its path - a traditional function of the black market in poor countries. But by introducing scraps of capitalism, such as 'financial independence' for factories or partially free pricing, Soviet planners have achieved nothing but chaos. The rudimentary market instruments may signal (as if everyone did not already know it) surplus steel and no toothpaste, but without the will to cut steel production and without the materials, capital, manufacturing capacity and distribution network to expand the supply of toothpaste, the signals might as well be sent into outer space. As for dual pricing, this simply leads to seepage from the State sector to the free sector - the classic Communist arrangement which in the Soviet Union, as in China, encourages embezzlement and dries up offi-

cial output.

The last pre-requisite for effective use of foreign aid is a sound currency - a proposition that is turned on its head by those who advocate dollar credits to stabilise the rouble. Stable money comes only from financial discipline and efficient production. The absence of either virtue in the Soviet Union is perfectly caught in the ironic Russian description of the operation of their economy 'we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.'

The collapse of the rouble remains as yet partially disguised, manifested in empty shelves, soaring black market prices and the overhang of useless cash. But the official retail price of jewellery and gold was raised by 50% in January to deter panic buying, and wedding couples now need ration coupons for rings. The dollar equivalent cost of pearls values the rouble at one-hundredth of the official exchange rate.

Nor is the experience of neighbouring countries encouraging. Yugoslavia, succumbing to regional pressures, completely gave way to monetary profligacy with an annual inflation rate of over 500%, while East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria will shortly have to face the Polish phenomenon of a massive once-for-all shift in prices (about five-fold in the case of Poland) as they switch from allocation of resources by graft to allocation by the market. It requires an extraordinary faith in the economic grip and financial prudence of the Soviet apparatus to imagine that a \$25 billion loan will restore integrity to the currency. Such faith is not shared by Comecon, which is discussing a move to abandon the rouble and trade in dollars.

Anyone cherishing illusions about *perestroika* should look at the 13th Five-year Plan outlined by Ryzhkov to the Congress of People's Deputies in December. Ryzhkov stated that central planning would remain untouched for the time being and price reform would be postponed for three years. In future the command system would 'rest on laws and economic mechanisms' (which ones?) but the Government had rejected 'contentious' proposals such as the introduction of private property. Before price reform is brought in there is to be 'nation-wide discussion', though since reformers and hardliners disagree about the first principles of economic management there is no prospect of consensus. In March Gorbachev promised that the pace of change would be radically increased. In April, however, he promised that there would be no dramatic change at all!

December's issue of *Soviet Analyst* quotes an article in *Novy Mir* by the economist V. Selyunin in which he describes the total absence of economic gains from *perestroika*, including the failure to divert resources to consumer goods, the inflationary effect of piecemeal introduction of elements of the free market system, and the unchecked production of shoddy goods by heavy industry. He instances tractors, estimating that the number of faulty machines lying around the country is equal to America's entire tractor production over the last 70 years.

According to Selyunin, Western visitors often simply cannot believe him, so programmed are they to a rose-tinted view of *perestroika*. 'The decisions taken at the highest level, viewed as a whole, present an integrated, harmonious and, alas, all too well-known concept of command regulation of the economy' he says. 'It's as if the authors themselves do not believe in the ideas of *perestroika* and are urging on the rejected plan-command system...'

If, therefore, the U.S.A. were to press \$25 billion into the Soviet Union's hand, the effect would be similar to that achieved by loans to the more corrupt and inefficient parts of Africa and Latin America. The money would disappear. No doubt the numbered bank accounts of the *nomenklatura* would prosper and a little cash would be left behind to provide the population with a modicum of toothpaste, tights and so forth. But the rest would go down what Selyunin calls the 'black holes' of the economy. (In these trusting times, one hesitates even to mention the fact that \$25 billion could also buy a lot of arms and influence, or that if Gorbachev is succeeded by civil war or a Stalinist hardliner the U.S.A. could hardly ask for its money back).

Given that the positive outlook for subsidising the Soviet Union is so unpromising, there remains the negative reasoning that if Gorbachev fails, the Soviet Union is quite likely to produce as his successor an atavistic authoritarian in the mould of Stalin, Lenin or Ivan the Terrible. The breakaway tendencies in the constituent republics would be ruthlessly put down and the resulting turmoil would pose a threat to world prosperity and peace. On the other hand, if we could just help Gorbachev to feed, heat and clothe Russia through the winter, and then to provide video recorders, soap and blue jeans in the summer, he might survive long enough for his reforms to start working.

The idea that foreign generosity might avert domestic repression stretches the testimony of history too far to form the basis for Western policy. China was liberally supplied with foreign credit before the crushing of the rebellion, while Germany fell into Hitler's hands at the precise moment when the former Allies were offering far-reaching easements to First World War reparations. But the crucial defect in the argument is that Gorbachev's economic 'reforms', being self-contradictory, cannot work, however much time is bought for them.

Before he died Sakharov recorded a conversation with Gorbachev, who had expressed concern that real economic reform had 'not yet begun'. 'It is not for me to tell you' said Sakharov, 'how serious things are in the country, how dissatisfied people are and how everyone expects things to get even worse.... Your personal authority and popularity are down to zero. People cannot wait any longer with nothing but promises. A middle course in situations like this is almost impossible'. Sakharov's advice was either to start the reform process in earnest or to revert to the old command economy. Gorbachev's reply was interesting chiefly for its defensiveness and its evasion of any economic rationale - blaming lack of progress

on the desire of delegates to 'play at democracy.'

Writing in the winter edition of *Daedalus*, 'Z' argues that Leninism has reached its terminal impasse. '*Perestroika* and *glasnost* are pale substitutes for the market and democracy, halfway measures to make a resurrected society compatible with the party's leading role. But the circle cannot be squared.' The 'false problem' of restructuring Communism must give way to the real problem of dismantling it.

This dismantling process cannot be piecemeal. Whole sectors of the Soviet economy will have to be freed completely. The Baltic States could form a pilot project, operating as a free economic zone akin to Hong Kong. Western aid, and the natural resurgence of a liberated people, would soon expose the emptiness of Soviet threats of economic sanctions and a model would have been set for other Soviet Republics to follow. (The viability of the individual republics, like the viability of Central Europe after its patterns of trade are re-directed westwards, is a subject that would repay serious study).

What private companies do by way of joint ventures in the Soviet Union can safely be left to them, with minimal official interference or calculation of political consequences. But the sole justifiable objective of large-scale financial assistance from Western governments would be to ease the Soviet Union's exit from Communism and to consolidate that of Central Europe. Whether what remains of the Soviet Union will be a federation of republics, and whether Gorbachev will be around to see it, is a matter of indifference. What is not a matter of indifference, however, is whether freedom is reached bloodlessly or through civil war. But that is beyond our power to influence.

Autumn Meeting

Readers have recently indicated to us that they would like to meet fellow subscribers to the *Review*. We hope to have an informal gathering in central London in the Autumn. If you would like to come please inform the managing editor, Merrie Cave.

The Politics of Poverty

Ralph Segalman and Alfred Himelsohn

After the flames and violence subsided in Miami in January of last year, reporters asked the residents of this piece of the inner-city ghetto, 'What happened here, why were the people so angry, what were their grievances?' From past episodes such as this, one would have expected and received the usual 'the Police behave like the Gestapo'; 'nobody cares about us here'; 'we don't see any better life in our future.'

But there was one common response that was different. The locals said that Miami's growing population of Hispanics, especially the recently arrived immigrants, were getting more help and advancement than they were and were consequently able to make dramatic improvements in their lives. Most of these refugees and immigrants had arrived in the United States destitute, without knowing English, and, despite these handicaps, were getting further ahead than many black native-born Americans.

Why is it that most new immigrants are able in six short months or less to move into steady employment, re-unite their families, with reasonable success for their children in schools and with relatively stable lives, while the native-born black underclass are still in the inner city, dependent on monthly government support, with problems of street violence, ineffective schooling, gangs, weak or non-existent family structure, a pervasive drug culture, domestic violence and many other ills?

Miami has come and gone, yet inner city violence continues apace with gang killings, school disturbances, murders, child and spouse abuse, and drug wars. Such news has become so banal that it is relegated to the back pages of the newspaper. It is obvious to most observers that things are out of control in the inner city.

With the civil rights revolutions and the opening of opportunities in housing and employment in the 1960s and 1970s, many minority residents moved away from the ghettos and became part of the working class or the middle class. But millions of other minority residents remained behind. In the 1960s many of us had an unbounded optimism in our ability to eliminate poverty, using public assistance, community organisation and job training. Despite the best of intentions and the expenditure of money and effort at all levels of government, the social condition of the inner city has not improved and in many places has deteriorated even further. Despite the massive involvement of the government and the best academic minds, we are still unable to find a solution.

Up until the mid-1980s one of the major obstacles to the realistic examination of the problems of the inner city was the unwillingness of academia and government to acknowledge the nature of the

population of the inner city, and in particular the breakup of the black family. Why did it take so long for informed observers to admit the existence of a population which perpetuated a culture of poverty?

Americans are not alone in their reluctance to confront the unpalatable and to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy. A similar set of circumstances developed in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. The consequences were that Soviet agricultural and biological sciences seriously lagged behind other countries of the world. The grain that the Soviets are still forced to buy from other countries is, in part, a legacy of that unscientific adventure.

It started with a Soviet agronomist, Trofim Denisovich Lysenko, who claimed that plants and animals could acquire new characteristics by simple environmental manipulation. This theory was in direct opposition to what reputable geneticists held to be true, based upon the mass of accumulated knowledge in the field. Under ordinary circumstances Lysenko would have remained obscure and uninfluential. But under Stalin, such a genetic theory accorded well with the political aim of creating the 'New Soviet Man'.

Stalin insisted that all further work on genetics in the Soviet Union should follow Lysenko's theory of acquired characteristics. And thus, by dictate, Lysenkoism became the official doctrine for the study and analysis of Soviet genetics. Discussion and research on alternative models were prohibited. Scientists who opposed its hegemony were dismissed from their positions and in some cases were sent into banishment or imprisonment. For more than twenty-five years Soviet genetics remained in this twisted strait-jacket. As a result, Soviet agricultural science and productivity suffered a severe setback, and science in general in the Soviet Union was hindered. It was not until several years after the death of Stalin that Lysenkoism was totally abolished as official scientific dogma.

The American equivalent of Lysenkoism, which first appeared in the 1960s, did not evolve around one leader and did not lead to the physical banishment of critics; instead it captured the loyalty of many individuals in academia and government. The set of beliefs that was soon to dominate the American social policy scene was created by social scientists, members of the 'helping professions' and other advocates of social change. These imposed a new orthodoxy which was based on a number of mutually contradictory assumptions. Only recently have they been challenged in any serious way. They are important to examine because they formed the foundation for the welfare system that emerged in

the United States after 1965. The most important of these assumptions was that the poor today are similar in behaviour to the poor of the depression era. If one accepts this, then it follows that the legislative remedies that worked during the 1930s should be effective when applied to this new generation of poor people. If most of the poor of the 1960s and 1970s were really like the depression poor, then their only problem would be a lack of money and job skills.

If they were similar, then they would be imbued with general American norms and values of hard work and self-reliance. All the new (minority) poor would need in addition to money would be to have the barriers of racial and ethnic discrimination removed. The possibility of poverty developing across generations among a significant proportion of the new poor was discounted. This led people to discount as well the possible development of an American version of the culture of poverty which anthropologists had shown to be a feature of the less developed nations.

Because the depression poor had quickly risen out of poverty as soon as employment opportunities and the means for regaining self-reliance were available to them, welfare planners using this past experience as a guide began seriously to consider whether the intensive monitoring of financial assistance under welfare was really necessary for this new era. This position was supported by social scientists and the large city welfare establishment who believed in a model of altruistic behaviour. And for many, if people did not behave altruistically, it was due to factors in their social environment over which they had no control. It follows, then, that removal of such social controls over the poor as making them conform to welfare regulations, will not have a harmful effect on their prospects for success in joining the mainstream of the society.

These assumptions about the nature of the new poor and of the interaction between the welfare system and its clients had not been adequately tested, if at all. Ordinarily, in the course of the development of any new approach to a problem, social scientists would have made rigorous efforts to test the validity of their hypotheses. In this instance, why weren't these tested? How was it possible for American social scientists to discount their usual norms of scientific objectivity? The answer is to be found in the actions of leading figures in sociology, economics, social work, public administration, minority affairs, social engineering, academia and politics. There were two overriding considerations that guided their thinking and actions. The first was that nothing should interfere with the rapid implementation of the anti-poverty programmes. Objective research about the assumptions underlying their project plans would have delayed the immediate installation of these programmes. Their second concern was that such research, if the findings were negative, could totally thwart the war on poverty.

In order to promote the dominance of this new orthodoxy, this loose coalition of leaders labelled

anyone who questioned their assumptions as either racist, ignorant, without compassion, or unscientific. After all, they said, weren't the assumptions obviously true, so that testing them would be an unnecessary elaboration of the obvious?

Scholars who asserted contrary viewpoints about the nature of poverty were frequently accused of misrepresenting the characteristics of this new poverty population, and were accused of weakening the ability of poverty programmes to achieve their goals. This pattern of making scapegoats of social scientists who posed appropriate questions about poverty started with the ideological treatment of Moynihan and Lewis.

Moynihan's conclusion that many of the new poor were dissimilar to the depression poor was based upon his findings that many black lower-class families did not rise out of poverty even when employment became available during the period of increasing prosperity and economic expansion. Moynihan became an 'arch villain' when he specifically pointed to the breakup of the black family as a major cause of persistent poverty. Oscar Lewis derived his unpopularity among the same people because of his description of 'the culture of poverty' (a phrase that he coined).

An important component of the culture of poverty, he argued, was the persistence of a self-perpetuating life-style among the urban poor throughout the world. This life-style prevents those who adopt it from moving upward in the society. It is not merely the lack of money that hinders their progress (although Lewis did not disparage the importance of money and social barriers), but rather a set of values and beliefs that deters them from upward mobility. These include a matriarchal family structure, absent fathers, a fated view of life and an emphasis on immediate gratification with little or no concern for the future. Lewis' theory posed a threat to the new orthodox position, which painted a drastically different picture of the life of the poor. Lewis' theories were disparaged and described as the myth of the culture of poverty.

The effect of this treatment of serious scholars was to discourage less well-known persons from research. Instead, it became fashionable and safe for scholars to focus on simplistic and popular notions of income distribution or on the plight of persons designated as objects and victims of the social system. American Lysenkoism had arrived.

For the past twenty-five years the dominance of this ideological dogma has had a number of chilling consequences in the study of poverty and social problems. Research designed to answer crucial questions about the poor was often rejected for funding because results might challenge these orthodox assumptions. Peer review panels in government and private foundations were frequently dominated by those holding this orthodox view of poverty. In public and academic forums free and open discussion of the differential dynamics of poverty was often discouraged. From a review of the literature of this period one can conclude that there

was a general rejection of articles for publication in prestigious journals and presentation of papers at professional meetings which were counter to the then prevalent ideology. Books published by otherwise noted scholars were given negative reviews or, even more effectively, were refused reviews by influential journals. This treatment was rendered to the important studies done by Martin Anderson and the early work on absent fathers by George Gilder. At the same time, many lesser works about 'heroic welfare mothers' and their children, and the plight of unemployed and unattached fathers were lauded to the public. Data that came out of studies on poverty were often reinterpreted so that the scope of chronic poverty was minimised. In place of the traditional description of the norms and values of the poor and poverty a new set of symbols and definitions, derived within the boundaries of the approved ideology, was used in describing the poor and their life patterns. Accompanying this was a reluctance by welfare authorities to impose social rehabilitation programmes for fear that such efforts might conflict with individual rights. Promoting the use of increased social control for some of the poor, and emphasising personal and social responsibility in these of welfare, was an anathema to many of the individuals and interest groups in sympathy with the new orthodoxy. Instead, these advocates and intellectuals sought to encourage the expansion of welfare rights and entitlements.

It was possible for anti-establishment social scientists and administrators to gain ascendancy over scientific thought and public discussion because of a general disillusionment with a number of previously accepted positions on ways to help the poor. Most directly relevant was a general disenchantment in government circles and the public with the traditional social work management of welfare which had used the casework model. There had been negative findings from controlled research studies on the effectiveness of casework. But there had been little or no analysis of why these results were negative. For example, the psychological 'feeling model' was never challenged by practitioners. (The earlier models of social work, as based on the writings of Mary Richmond and others, directed social workers to encourage group and family goals which would promote the well-being and satisfaction of the individual and the group. The models for social work, paralleling the American 'cultural revolution' of the 1960s, removed the emphasis on responsibility and replaced it with an emphasis on the client's feelings of 'satisfaction'.) Nor were there adequate studies of alternative models.

Also abetting the shift to the new orthodoxy was the *'Volksgeist'* of the 1960s with its general distrust of government and authority, its antagonism towards the military draft, its fear of bureaucratology (i.e., the harmful effects on the individual of an unconstrained bureaucracy), and its concern for the results of government repression of the 'little people.'

This was also the time of the War on Poverty. The

concern to help the poor was primarily based on the view that they were trapped in poverty because they were unorganised. They were deliberately being kept poor by being discouraged from organising themselves. A bowdlerised version of Durkheimian social theory with a conflict component was adopted. It defined the situation as follows: the poor are poor because they have weak social solidarity. The way to help them was to promote conflict, with the result that there would be a redistribution of power and money. In the process this would weaken the power of the local political establishment and the power elite which sustains the status quo. This new redistribution would promote the ascendancy of the non-rich and a more egalitarian society. Other theoretical approaches of a deterministic nature that became popular during this period were also 'injected' into the redirection of power. The Marxist goal of proletarian power was applied by many social scientists. The proposed clienteles of the War on Poverty were relabelled as blameless victims of an unfair society. Single parent families which were formerly viewed as dysfunctional were now redefined as survivors whose mode of adjustment was the only appropriate response to the conditions in which they found themselves. School dropouts were now seen to be the result of the inflexibility of the public education system. Criminals and delinquents were described as victims of life in the ghetto. The importance of family responsibility was played down.

While the intellectuals, academics and social policy designers of the new orthodoxy helped to create a consensus of definitions of the poor they were not all motivated by similar goals. One group saw themselves as architects of a welfare state based on a redistribution of income. One of the ways of achieving this was to transfer money from state and federal treasuries to welfare recipients. Concurrently, they sought to redefine welfare as another form of social insurance although the beneficiaries would receive benefits without having made prepayments. The 'entitlement' to welfare also relieved clients of any responsibility for education, training for self-sufficiency or for pressing their children to prepare for employment.

The mid and late 1960s were also characterised by attacks on the legitimacy of authority, both governmental and private, at all levels. Antagonism towards bureaucracy had been fostered by social scientists and philosophers in America for at least a quarter of a century, and the ethos of the late 1960s compounded it. This made the welfare bureaucracy an appropriate target for endless claims and fostered the belief that anyone who did not take advantage of welfare was a 'sucker'.

A third component lending impetus to this change came from the long established advocates of expanded civil liberties. The post Second World War era saw an enlargement of two basic areas of civil liberties. One was the expansions of the rights of ethnic, racial, gender and religious group members. The second was an expansion of the rights of indi-

viduals. The underlying idea was that there should be a broadening of what constitutes inalienable rights, and concomitantly with this, that government at every level should not be allowed to oppress groups and individuals. This new legal orientation dramatically affected the nature of the welfare system. The advocates of expanded civil rights sought the granting of these rights to welfare clients and applicants without exception. Thus the right to privacy of a welfare client was inalienable. Now government agencies were unable to determine if welfare rules were being observed. Also, the welfare workers were now unable to monitor the welfare clientele to see if the purposes of welfare were being pursued. This was especially damaging to efforts by some social workers to encourage clients to become self-sufficient.

A fourth group had a far more radical intention in their involvement with poverty policy. Their real purpose was to undermine the functioning of the democratic, capitalist government. In order to achieve this they deliberately sought to flood the welfare system with new applicants and expanded claims. This was to be accomplished by organising local community groups whose purpose was to urge people to become welfare recipients, even if they had not previously considered this alternative.

Another mechanism was to develop welfare rights advocates, who would promote appeals against administrative decisions by potential and actual welfare clients. Unlike the Durkheimian advocates of community organisations for the poor, the purpose of this fourth group was to bring about general social unrest, including the collapse of the welfare system itself.

In sum, people in all four of the groups adopted a set of goals which included: to provide welfare for all who desire it; protect the poor from analysis of their true situation; to expand welfare provisions; to become a broadening base of support for all who might prefer welfare to self-sufficiency. These goals brought with them a set of new definitions for poverty, the nature of the client, and the mechanisms for changing the social environment. The adherents of this new orthodoxy were convinced that there was only one set of truths about poverty and that those truths were contained in the new dogma. They provided a vast informal network which became part of the political reality. They were now in a position to define what was altruistic and what was not. Many academics, if only by their silence, also provided support. The movement pervaded not only the university classroom, the introductory textbooks in the various disciplines, and the social-science establishment, but also the vast federal, state and local bureaucracies, the labour movement and the philanthropic foundations. It also reached into the legislatures and especially influenced their staffs. It was the accepted view that the media used in presenting news and commentary on the problems of poverty and the welfare population. It influenced the way that the courts decided key issues regarding the purposes of welfare and the

operation of the welfare system. Even today, this view remains imbedded in the law, in the operational manuals of welfare agencies, and in the basic literature of sociology, social welfare and psychology. Despite all we have learned since the 1960s, undergraduate and graduate students are still being assigned textbooks which are based on this orientation.

The cumulative effect of the power of this orthodoxy, even today, makes it impossible effectively to revise or redesign the welfare system so that it will not promote dependency and poverty across generations.

After all the years since welfare Lysenkoism became the dominant dogma, the fact of welfare-dependency is finally being accepted. And despite the dearth of research, Americans now accept the association between the deteriorating condition of the ghetto family and intergenerational welfare-dependency. It is no longer heretical to discuss the connection between prolonged welfare and other social ills such as crime and delinquency (including victimisation), drug addiction (including intergenerational drug and alcohol abuse), domestic violence, unemployability and the related social ecology. Yet, despite the new recognition of intergenerational poverty and all of its implications, few are doing research on it. Why? Is the fear still there?

During the time American Lysenkoism inhibited careful analysis of what was really going on, the intergenerational poverty population increased in size and complexity and became more entrenched. American society now pays dearly for this chapter in the intellectual avoidance of reality. One result is the creation of a situation where sizeable segments of society are *de facto* segregated from the mainstream.

American Lysenkoism has thereby damaged the basic institutions of the community. It has also damaged American social science. Departing from basic scientific norms for political purposes has had great costs. American social science will not be able to deal effectively with social problems until it faces up to this Lysenkoist episode, and learns the errors of its ways.

ERRATUM

In the article 'The Burt Affair', March 1990 two paragraphs were printed out of order. The section on page 40, beginning 'all that, however, is now scattered to the wind' down to 'the issues involved', should have appeared on page 39 in column 2 after, 'The denunciation of Burt had gained academic respectability'.

Our apologies to Professor Fletcher for this unfortunate error.

Cambridge, Right or Wrong

Dennis O'Keeffe

To what extent should human beings venerate intellectual distinction? In fact, most citizens do not, or at any rate not in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The opulent man of business and the glamorous star of film or television, by contrast, are widely adulated by many people in the United States and Great Britain. When persons of great intellectual gifts *are* famous, this tends to be because of their political activities or eccentricities rather than their scholarly accomplishments. Bertrand Russell was an obvious case in point. In his native country he is remembered mostly for his work in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. His philosophical and mathematical work is closed to most Britons, who indeed would be hard put to name a single Nobel Prize winner, British or otherwise, in science or the arts.

The reader should be reminded then, in the context of two interesting and in some ways complementary books on Cambridge, that this ancient and august institution is more widely thought of in Great Britain today, in terms of Marxist-inspired espionage and homosexuality than in terms of a centuries-long contribution to knowledge.¹ Russell himself is a powerful presence in both books, though he was neither traitor, nor Marxist, nor homosexual. The interest in him has in the event, been quite eclipsed more recently by that in Anthony Blunt, who was all three. The public concern with the two men is, nevertheless, similar. It combines a fascination for the wayward and the perverse with an indifference to scholarship.

Both men were Apostles, members of that powerful semi-secret Cambridge society founded in the early 19th century and still active, if somewhat subdued, today. Its history is mixed; undoubtedly many good men have belonged to it. The idea of a brilliant elite is not, moreover, an improper one. All societies have elites; and it is imperative that some of them should be based on knowledge and intellect. Unfortunately it is impossible to claim that the world has been improved by the existence of this particular fraternity. By no means all of Cambridge's men of bad influence were in the Apostles and Cambridge has undoubtedly produced much that is good. But Cambridge in general, and the Apostles in particular, have also produced so much that is bad that the University is fortunate that it has not incurred greater hostility to its existence.

It is probable that neither Sinclair nor Deacon would be prepared to accept this view. Yet their books uncover such a story of swollen pride, perversion, dishonour and self indulgence among some of our most cosseted citizens and scholars that it really is a wonder that the public continues to be merely uninterested in eminent scholars *qua* scholars.

On the whole it is a question of indifference, not hostility. This bespeaks an admirable tolerance. There is a clear line of rottenness and corruption running through the last century and a half of Cambridge's history. If this is combined with the history of public policy errors which, however well-intentioned, have also issued from that citadel of learning, then one might conclude that Cambridge is lucky not to have incurred outright scorn.

Indifference to learning is not necessarily a bad thing, yet almost all those who have studied to a high level usually do retain a high regard for intellectual distinction. And this in turn is understandable. Those who have sweated their way through difficult texts and assignments will tend to see those who excel therein as excellent. There is a kind of unintended verbal alchemy operating on diffuse words like 'good'. 'Good-brilliant' transmutes imperceptibly into 'good-worthy' and finally into 'good-full-stop'. The highly educated minority end up thinking nothing more worthy of admiration than the educated output of educated people. A moral confusion obtains whereby moral decay is excused if it is accompanied by brilliance. As George Orwell icily pointed out, the work of Salvador Dali is simultaneously brilliant and foul.² The former in no way justifies the latter. Precisely this kind of moral failure, however, lay behind the complaints of many establishment figures when Anthony Blunt was stripped of his knighthood. Because he was a distinguished art historian, we were all supposed to overlook the fact that he was a traitor, a liar, and a proxy murderer. Educated people abound in high places and it was his 'educated' intelligence which long protected Blunt. It is not too much to say that while there *are* educated people who would reject this nonsense, virtually all so-called 'uneducated' people would. This is just one of many instances in the last two centuries when the humble have been wiser than the elite, certainly in the British case.

Both our authors know this. Deacon in particular has some bald comments to make on the dangers of homosexual elitism. Yet from neither writer do we get a terse, formal statement of the moral problem of high intelligence. Intelligence is *not* a virtue in itself. It can be allied to and employed by virtue; but there is no necessary connection. There are many examples of brilliant and evil people, like Marx or Goebbels, to be set against those like, say Edmund Burke, in whom integrity and brilliance were admirably joined. Often in the pages of these two works we find outstanding academic ability in the possession of moral cripples like Blunt and Burgess, or of those like Keynes who though not in any way traitors did not possess the wisdom and balance necessary to

temper their gifts.

Many, though not all, of Blunt's connections were built up through the careful and deliberate nurturing of homosexual ties. The exact impact of Anthony Blunt, Guy Burgess, Kim Philby and Donald Maclean on the deaths of Western agents abroad cannot be estimated. Nor can the part they played in betraying the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe to international communism. But Deacon brings out the utter ruthlessness of Anthony Blunt. He was instrumental in ensuring that thousands of refugees not protected by Yalta were handed over to *SMERSH* in Austria. And both Deacon and Sinclair make it clear that the senior spies in the Cambridge, M.I.5, Foreign Office and Military Intelligence network having once been detected, were astonishingly lightly treated.

Blunt served no time in prison, and his treachery was known years before he was publicly dishonoured. Philby, Burgess and Maclean all ran off to Russia. John Cairncross was allowed to retire to Italy. He had been recruited as a 'mole' at Trinity and must have been a real trump for Blunt, since he passed through the diplomatic service, the Treasury and the codebreaking team at Bletchley Park in Bedfordshire. Leo Long, who confessed from retirement, was also recruited at Trinity, Cambridge, again by Blunt. His war-time work gave him important knowledge of military movements. He was judged unworthy of punishment.

Keynes was no Marxist, nor even a socialist. Nor did he ever prefer the interests of any foreign country to those of his own. But in addition to his morally corrupt nature, he was also guilty of a species of intellectual corruption. As Deacon puts it:

Keynes' much admired theories on how best life can be improved by pouring out so-called government money - i.e. the money taken from the people in taxes - were marked by an abysmal ignorance of what life for the masses was like and how much they survive in the long-run solely by their own efforts and not by the benevolence of any government.

We know that Keynes was frantically hostile to the puritan ethic and that sexually this hostility took the form of an unlovely promiscuity. Deacon insists that his attitude lay behind his actual economic theories. Spend to create work, spend to get out of depression, spend to stimulate growth! The exact status of Keynes in the history of economic thought will be debated by our grand-children. At the very least it is possible that Keynesianism will come to be seen in time as part of the interventionist fantasy in which many free societies have so vainly sunk so many irrecoverable resources in the last half-century.

What makes books like Sinclair's or Deacon's necessary is precisely this failure of brilliant minds to grasp that intelligence on its own, without mercy or wisdom or moderation, is quite useless. What makes them marketable is, at least in part, our disreputable human prurience, our love of scandal, our desire to uncover the antics and perversions of those in privi-

leged places. Indeed, the critical glare turned on these appalling Cambridge *glitterati* is much in danger of diverting our attention from Cambridge's extraordinary and continuing contribution to human endeavour. As Sinclair observes, the 'third industrial revolution' began at Cambridge. The radical genetic engineering of our time evolved from the discovery of the double helix in the DNA molecule made by Francis Crick of Churchill College. And Cambridge made indispensable contributions to the advance of electronics, computers and the peaceful use of atomic energy. Sinclair points out that the treachery of some Cambridge dons in the Second World War came quite unfairly to eclipse the sacrifice which Cambridge men had made in the First, and has diverted attention from the continuing distinction of this institution.

In Deacon's book we find, to offset the story of the treacherous Apostles (far more than the one Judas of the original, alas!) vivid accounts of many admirable men. The scholar and administrator Noel Annan, distinguished patron of the arts, was only one of many worthwhile post Second World War Apostles. There is one of the best and most open-minded of modern British sociologists, W.G. Runciman. There has also been the journalist John Gross of the *New York Times*. There has been the polymathic and controversial Jonathan Miller, medical scientist and stage-director both.

Even in the Thirties there were among the Apostles outstanding and good men. There was the poet and critic Hugh Sykes-Davies. There were also outstanding scientists like the neurologist William Gray Walter, the philosopher Richard Braithwaite and the logician Robin Gandy. And today research scientists everywhere will confess a debt to Sir Alan Hodgkin's revolutionary work on the nervous system in those years. Auden was to call the 1930s a 'low decade'. This was only partly the case, certainly at Cambridge.

Though the intrinsic interest of the subject matter makes both Sinclair's and Deacon's books rather compelling reading, neither is in fact a very satisfactory book. Sinclair's is not long enough to be the kind of intellectual history its author obviously intended it to be. The enormous range of its subject matter, embracing politics, psychology, modern history and the interwoven connections of all of these with academia and espionage, leads Sinclair to start up too many hares which he cannot pursue very far. He rightly demonstrates how the legal and open presence of the Russian physicist Kapitsa at the Cavendish Laboratory in the 1930s paralleled the contribution to the advance of Soviet power and interests and weaponry made by the Cambridge spies. But I was left none the wiser as to the real appeal of Marxism in the 1930s or the real provenance of treachery and betrayal.

Deacon's book is narrower in scope, but longer in historical focus than Sinclair's. This is because it concerns a history (of the Apostles) which began long before the build-up of international espionage at Cambridge, and is continuing, indeed with Dea-

con's best wishes, to the present. It gets more into the self-indulgent psychology of Blunt and Burgess than Sinclair manages to do, and for this reason makes their treason slightly more comprehensible. At the same time it is written in dull prose and with too many of the slips of grammar that mar modern English writing. Perhaps also what is most strikingly missing from both books is something that, given the continued secretiveness of British society and law, no writer could have included. How much was known in high places about the 1930s and war-time spying of certain, mostly Cambridge dons? How much covering-up was there? Did the Queen know what her artistic adviser, Sir Anthony Blunt, had been doing? The whole business has constituted an abysmal comment on the British upper class. It all reads like a depressing attempt to keep alive the otherwise defunct body of Marxist theory. If you are a little army corporal or an insignificant minor civil servant, treason brings down terrible vengeance on your head if you are discovered. If you are a well-connected upper-class pederast you can betray your country and get away with it. At a time when some American traitors were executed and others received long prison sentences, whatever their background, these exquisite upper-class Englishmen continued to lord it over us.

When it comes to who knew and suppressed what, we are, of course, in a realm of speculation. But we can also speculate and theorise about certain aspects of Cambridge's history where the facts are more or less known to us. We have allowed with Sinclair and Deacon that Cambridge has been a very distinguished place in many ways. But we *do* know about certain dismal facts about homosexual corruption; about the adoption of Marxism, and treason as a sub-version of this; and about a number of outlooks leading to domestic and international policies that have had disastrous consequences. How may we speculate here? What, for a start, and in the light of the Cambridge disaster, is the appropriate attitude for a civilised society with regard to homosexuality?

The Problem of Homosexuality

It is very difficult to say what policy is best. The quite contrary policies of polite hypocrisy and openness and tolerance both have much to recommend them. Both also, as the Cambridge experience shows, incur very serious costs. Nineteenth century hypocrisy allowed the most appalling corruption to flourish by preferring not to confront the problem. Deacon instances the Eton-Cambridge connections of the Apostle William Johnson, who became a Fellow at King's in 1845 and for more than a quarter of a century was at the same time a master at Eton. This composer of the Eton boating song specialised in recruiting homosexual favourites to the Apostles. So in turn did one of these favourites, Oscar Browning, also a master at Eton. Browning went further. Affecting an interest in the labouring classes, he often invited sailors and workmen to his rooms.

Bertrand Russell, incorrigible heterosexual, was

surely guilty of more than what Deacon regards as 'massive understatement' when he claimed that 'since (Lytton Strachey's) time, homosexual relations...were for a time common, but in my time they were unknown.' Deacon reckons that in Bertrand Russell's time most of the Apostles were homosexual. Russell was lying. The man who prided himself on his austere and uncompromising rationalism, and indeed left a chain of broken heterosexual hearts behind him, preferred in the instance of perversion not to disturb the Victorian conventions of hypocrisy in which he had been raised.

This tendency of upper-class homosexuals to closet themselves in a sort of hermetically sealed-in private world, sallying forth if at all among the common folk only to seek consolation in the rough embraces of sailors and slum proletarians, is an enduring phenomenon. Guy Burgess, a central figure in the Marxist betrayal-mentality and therefore in both our texts, was addicted to casual pick-ups, as was his biographical defender Tom Driberg, who although an Oxford man, also figures briefly in both books. What looks to the disinterested heterosexual observer like a malady, an affliction, is surrounded moreover by an extraordinarily unpleasant defensive ideology. 'The Higher Sodom' is the title of one of Deacon's chapters. It is the name the Apostles gave to their preferences. And the problems this gave rise to are all interconnected. As Deacon observes, all sexual mafias are dangerous; but history reveals that homosexual mafias are the most dangerous of all. I believe that we British are still not free of the influences in high places in academia, in the press, in broadcasting, in government itself which these brilliant, spoiled men bequeathed to us. Brilliance serves homosexuality no better than it serves any other vice.

However, our recent experience is surely evidence that casual tolerance of homosexuality will not do either. We tolerated. We even applauded, or rather we allowed others to applaud themselves and pull the wool over our eyes. The result is the dreaded scourge of AIDS, potentially more terrible by far than the suffering of a minority of despised and unfulfilled human beings. Let us hope that a worse than ever intolerance does not come back to plague this unfortunate minority, to whose cruel and mysterious dilemma there is no unambiguous answer. Since the 1960s the dreams of the 19th century homosexual Apostles have come true. They have, indeed, been most tragically fulfilled.

The Marxist Fantasy

This is not the place to enter the debate about the intellectual viability of Marxism. However two views, at least, may be hazarded. First, it is rare, very rare, for *epigoni* to be more than withered reflections of whatever maestro they applaud. There have been many brilliant men at Cambridge who were Marxists. It is doubtful if there were any whose *Marxism* was brilliant. J.D. Bernal was an eminent physicist. His political thinking (his Marxism) was muddled and simplistic and disingenuous. In an encounter

with George Orwell he was left intellectually legless after Orwell's withering observation that whenever the learned professor had anything especially foul to say he invariably slipped into Latin. And does anyone take Maurice Dobb seriously as a Marxist theorist today? He does not even rate a separate entry in Kolakowski's history of Marxism. Eric Hobsbawm is referred to as a 'brilliant' (that word again!) Marxist historian by Andrew Sinclair. On inspection his admittedly very interesting writings do not contain any high-powered incorporation of Marxist *theory*. The truth is that if there were any great Marxist acolytes, they were not at Cambridge.

As for Blunt and Burgess and their sad crew, whatever was accomplished about them it was certainly not their Marxism. Their attitude now seems so reprehensible not because they accepted the Marxist fantasy as a vision of some faraway future; but because they regarded it as successfully embodied in the sinister despotism of Soviet Russia. What the Marxists of the 1930s and 1940s were guilty of above all was a failure of historical imagination and moral discretion. Blunt visited Russia in the 1930s and still did not shift his ground. Was it all mere dilettantism and power-crazed trickery? Ostensibly the Blunt position is more horrible even than Trotskyism. The Trotskyites make the error of denying that the Soviet Union is the empirics of Marxism. Blunt and his friends claimed that Russia was its fulfilment.

The Marxism-treason connection is more problematic. One could be, many people were and are, Marxist without being traitors. What does need recognition, however, is that Marxism is *antinomian*. Within its schema, law and loyalty are mere ideological constructs. Marx would have understood perfectly E.M. Forster's clap-trap about preferring to betray his country rather than his friend, though Leopold Schwarzschild's superb book makes it apparent that in pursuit of the 'cause' Marx had no scruples about betraying his friends either.³

Other False Witness

The human situation is intolerably ambiguous. To be in a European empire overseas was doubtless to see some dirty work at close range. Yet the results of the dismemberment of the British, Belgian and Por-

tuguese empires, especially in Africa, have been manifestly disastrous. My own view is that millions of innocents are going to starve (i.e. join the millions who have already starved) because of this intemperate and untimely dismantling. In the British case, the Cambridge Apostle Andrew (later Sir Andrew) Cohen had a particularly lamentable influence in the course of his subsequent career as a distinguished administrator during the decline of empire under the 'winds of change'. The truth is that the European empires were benevolent in the main, and that it was only the misplaced guilt of the educated British and the unjustified optimism of the *Pax Americana* which have delivered countless souls to murderous neglect and exploitation.

Yet most scholars at the time failed to see it in this light. It was the same with the inexorable growth of the state, for which Keynes must bear a heavy responsibility. The interventionism was undertaken for good intentions: it has produced a Leviathan which threatens us all.

Perhaps the overall tragedy is that Great Britain, though the world's first industrial society, never went the whole way in developing a meritocratic hierarchy appropriate to a fully confident capitalist civilisation. The gentry-aristocracy hung on, both producing and colluding with a new class of state employees, an 'expertocracy' aiming to manage the lives of the citizenry, indeed to recast it in a new paternalised guise. Fortunately, and for the first time in British history, we now have at the helm a Prime Minister who believes both in the British nation and in the economic system which they invented, and then taught others to use more effectively than they.

Notes

1. Andrew Sinclair, *The Red and the Blue: Cambridge, Treason and Intelligence*, Little, Brown and Company, 1986.
Richard Deacon, *The Cambridge Apostles*, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1986
2. George Orwell, *Collected Essays*, Penguin, 1970.
3. Leopold Schwarzschild, *The Red Prussian*, Pickwick Books, 1986.

THE SALISBURY REVIEW FOR CENTRAL EUROPE

In rebuilding their institutions and in deciding on the values which will underpin them, the governments and people of Central Europe will need guidance. The Left in Western Europe is keen to provide it, and has rushed in where the naturally more reticent conservative still fears to tread. It is very important that the arguments for conservatism are put, and its language re-learned in Central Europe. To this end, the *Review* would like to offer our readers the chance to open a half-price subscription (£7 pa) on behalf of individuals and institutions in those countries from which the deadening hand of communism has been lifted at last.

Editorial

It is not only the 'poll tax' that has led to such a decline in Mrs. Thatcher's popularity and in the popularity of her party. After ten years of uninterrupted rule, a government inevitably begins to suffer from the restiveness of the electorate. And the relentless media hostility to Mrs Thatcher - a hostility which she has attracted largely because she is honest, lower middle class and a woman - inevitably begins to colour the popular perception. Yet there is no doubt that, in introducing the Community Charge, the government took a great risk. Every new tax is resented and even if, by some philosophical standard, the new tax is more equitable than the old, it does not have, as the old tax had, the authority of custom. The public, being used to a local tax in which those with the largest property paid most, finds it difficult to adjust to a tax in which the size of property is irrelevant, and in which a family is penalised according to its size, rather than its holdings. To persuade the fair-minded British people that this new dispensation is just would have required a far greater effort of propaganda than the Tory party was prepared to expend on the task.

That said, however, we may reasonably doubt whether the Community Charge is the right solution to the vexed problem of local taxation. It is acknowledged on all sides that *some* reform was required, and that local government was becoming every year more powerful and less responsible. The British public would surely welcome a tax which succeeded in making local government accountable to those who elect it. But the British public also expects taxation to conform to its inherited idea of fairness, and this idea is not the logical outcome of a clear philosophy, but the muddy residue of a thousand years of dealing between sovereign and subject. The British idea of fair play is a British product, as much part of our island identity as brass bands, the Grand National and Marmite. To defy it may be rational; but it is never reasonable; and even if the most impeccable philosophical grounds can be found for the 'poll tax', the knowledge that the tax requires massive changes that bear no relation to previous household budgets, rather than affordable re-adjustments that leave everything roughly the same, is bound to awaken the spirit of every town and village.

Furthermore, the justification offered for the tax - that all those who vote in local elections will now have an equal burden of expenditure - is manifestly false. The Community Charge retains the single most obnoxious and most socialistic feature of the rating system: namely, a penal tax upon businesses, which not only have no vote, but which are required to pay through the nose for services, such as education, for which they have no conceivable use. The

government has chosen to perpetuate one of the major causes of social decline: the crippling taxation which makes it all but impossible for a business to begin or to survive in our inner cities.

Nor is it only profit-making enterprises that are burdened in this way. Charities, private schools and hospitals, clubs and sports centres - institutions which, far from depending on local services, do their very best to replace them - all have to give a large part of their hard-earned contributions to the local mafia.

We witness here the survival of the most wicked feature of socialism: its hostility to civil society, and to institutions which lie outside the reach of the state. A truly conservative reform in local government would have had as its first concern the liberation of voluntary associations (including businesses) from a tax that is calculated to destroy them.

It is too early to judge whether the government will recover in time from the adverse effects of this tax. But everything now hangs in the balance. It is therefore regrettably necessary to ask whether Mrs Thatcher should not retire as leader of the Party. She has done nothing wrong - nothing that cannot be blamed with more justice on her party and its advisers. She has begun the heroic task of freeing the British people from their socialist manacles. She has reversed decades of social and industrial decline. And she has immeasurably improved our standing in the world. But, when all is said and done, the odds are now against her. The British electors, wrongly but predictably, are in the mood to jettison her. If she has their interests at heart, she will consider how best to save them from the enormous mistake by which they are tempted: the mistake of placing Mr. Kinnock in the office which is presently hers.

It needs little percipience, however, to recognise that Mrs. Thatcher has left the Conservative Party with a succession problem: neither Mr. Heseltine nor Mr. Baker has the qualities which led Mrs. Thatcher to her victories - an instinct for truth, and a harmony with popular sentiment. Mr. Major has not been sufficiently tried in the public arena, Mr. Hurd has no real following, and the long line of wrecks - from Edward Heath to Nigel Lawson - contains none that could plausibly be refloated. Our future therefore remains uncertain. A generation exists that knows nothing of socialism apart from an education system which has ensured that it knows more or less nothing useful at all. It is to this generation that the Conservative Party must address itself at the next election. The Party must think long and hard as to which of its members, if any, might have the talent and language to get across to them.

Letters

Sir,

Comprehensiveness is the problem of comprehensive schools; the idea that every child merits the same treatment; that putting them in the same building eliminates undesirable differences. At best this similarity of treatment fosters collective mediocrity; at worst it pulls the majority down to the standard of the least able, who are often the most disruptive and the most demanding.

The true comprehensive ideal is the elimination of selection. Exams remain the major obstacle in the achievement of this ideal and the advent of the GCSE abolishes any remaining practical reason for streaming within schools; all take the same exam so all can be in the same class.

Mixed ability classes still exist in many schools and are a microcosm of the failure of the comprehensive ideal. A teacher cannot be expected to find a level suitable for the whole ability range. There is no suitable environment for work if there are no like minds within a group, no common link.

The justification for all this impracticality is the equality it fosters. But where is the equality of opportunity for the child who wishes to work in a class which does not? Placing all children, irrespective of their separate ability and needs, in the same class, denies them dignity and ignores the fact that their different needs can never be served by a purely arbitrary classification. It fails them all; it fails those who have a talent for academic work; it fails those who will never have any interest in it; and it fails those in the average range who unable to lift themselves out of the mire by themselves, are dragged down to the lowest level.

Many proponents of the comprehensive school do accept the need for classification according to ability; yet they remain passionate in advocating that this must be done within a single school. This fails to address the problem. Within a single school of average size the classification can never be fine enough. In most subjects the best that can be done is to separate those who will gain A, B or C grades at GCSE from those who will not. This still means a wide range of ability within a class, from those who will scrape a C to those who will easily gain an A. The ability will still be mixed, only not quite as extensively. The only way to gain the finer classification is either to have a school catering for a particular range of ability and aspiration or else to have extremely small classes.

Quite clearly any system of selection has to be flexible enough to allow transition from one school to another so as not to condemn children at one particular age and on the strength of one performance, to a particular education. It should and could take into account the desires and choices of the child and allow for the fact that these might change.

At the age of fourteen or fifteen there are large numbers of children at school just waiting for the moment they can leave. They find school irrelevant and

restrictive; a selective system which allowed them to start vocational training much earlier would benefit them and their future employers. There have been attempts to cater for this need, which again misses the point, for it is imposed comprehensively. The result is that academic subjects are squeezed, and those who want a higher education are forced to waste their time in 'practical living lessons'. It is the blind refusal of the comprehensive idealist to look at the child as an individual and to see that it is not selection that is demeaning but universality, which has caused the real and separate needs of children to be neglected.

Were the system flexible enough, and were the training schools for the less academically able of a high standard, a selective system could be made to work. It would not be unfair and it could give both equality and variety of opportunity. Such a solution however is decried as elitist. It is at this point that the so-called 'social aspects' are raised. Teachers wax eloquent about the benefits of working together with whole social strata. They fail to point out the misery involved in doing so. The endless barracking of the studious can destroy the will to succeed, especially at secondary school level where peer group pressure becomes so important. Being different is a position of isolation that few at the age of fifteen can either relish or sustain. It is not a question of social class but of like minds; the embryonic football hooligan has nothing in common with the embryonic degree student and once such differences become apparent, it is folly to insist on their being thrown together. Social co-operation will never emerge and mutual antipathy can only deepen.

The problem is made worse by a refusal to acknowledge the individual's achievement for fear of charges of elitism. There is a constant denial of the importance of academic success. A great number of teachers make it part of every pep talk to relate tales of the inability of clever people to cope in society, and to hint that academic success should never be flaunted. This makes the poor child wonder if such a shameful act is really worth the effort.

Competition is discouraged unless it is between teams, and there are no losers. All are applauded. My school decided to hold an awards evening; then found itself faced with the dilemma of how to avoid rewarding academic success and of how to maintain equality. The solution was simple: by a savage irony, the GCE successes were rewarded with certificates while those who fed the guinea pig gained book prizes.

The educational theory which permeates the comprehensive system is anti-individual, anti-exams, anti-success and anti-education. The only way out of the mess is through selection.

Fiona Bulmer,
Bristol,
Avon.

Sir,

Only 240 students from Czechoslovakia visited Britain in 1988 compared with 5,610 from Turkey, 7,860 from Sweden and 22,100 from Switzerland. Two years later Czechoslovaks are free to travel, and this gap should now begin to close. The speed with which it does so, however, will depend on the willingness of institutions and individuals in Britain to invite young Czechoslovaks here. This is because the Czechoslovak currency is non-convertible and few are able to raise the foreign currency to finance even a short stay abroad.

To overcome this difficulty, an Anglo-Czechoslovak exchange link has been established. It acts as a go-between for young people from Britain and Czechoslovakia. If you are under 30 and would like to invite a young Czechoslovak to stay with you for a minimum of two weeks, and could return to Czechoslovakia, please write with some information about yourself. I will put you in touch with a young Czechoslovak with whom you can arrange a private exchange.

James de Candole,
Anglo-Czechoslovak private exchange link,
12, Heyford Avenue,
London S.W.8.

Sir,

Many of your readers must have been dismayed, as I was, to read your Editorial (March 1990) in which you say 'One of the many beneficial effects of the collapse of Eastern European communism is that it will no longer be so easy for socialists to lie to us about the advantages of collectivist planning.' If we imagine that even the most complete and public exposure of the hollowness of the communist system will dampen the ardour of left-wing militants everywhere we are indulging in the grossest self-deception.

We may point to the bankruptcy of ideas in this communist country or that: the left-wing ideologists get on with their programmes of disruption nevertheless, utterly untouched by reality. Communists have always worked by infiltrating existing organisations, whatever form these may take. Show them a respectable cause of any kind, working conscientiously towards some reasonable goal, and they will enter it and subvert it to their own ends: we have recently witnessed just such subversion in the riots in the West End of London.

The left-wing organisers will always be able to whistle up a horde of young people, drop-outs from the educational system (itself a prime example of left-wing infiltration), consumed with envy of those better-off and bent on material destruction for its own sake, as cannon fodder support for their schemes to disrupt society.

If we delude ourselves into thinking that this infiltration of our institutions will cease or even be momentarily checked because the communist system in Eastern Europe (and everywhere else in the world) has shown itself to be unworkable then we do so at our extreme peril.

Peter M. Basset,
Arundel,
West Sussex.

Sir,

I enjoyed reading your editorial "Finding Central Europe"; it seems to me very pertinent and offers a way of understanding many problems of both the parts of Europe. I would make only two little remarks. You mention, speaking about totalitarianism, the complete destruction of the natural language of politics. I think, there is no natural language of politics, although there may be a natural language in politics, as opposed to the largely artificial language of totalitarian propaganda, which was intended to destroy any meaningful notion of political life. Secondly, you address very hard reproaches to Western intellectuals, particularly to the conservative ones, concerning their failure to understand the problems of communist rule in Central Europe. I ask myself however, whether we did enough, whether we did all we might have done to make these problems comprehensible to those who did not share our experience?

Petr Fidelius,
Prague.

Sir,

May I take issue with two of Professor Thody's remarks in his article on 'French Caesarism' in your March issue? General de Gaulle, he says, 'whatever his more absolute admirers say', did not assume power in 1958 'with perfect legality'. This may or may not be true but it is an important claim and he offers no evidence for it. De Gaulle, he says, 'knew what was going on' in Algiers but what he knew we are not told. General Salan had openly sided with the European population and called for de Gaulle's return to power, but then the whole world knew this and it scarcely points to a conspiracy; any more than the fact that he may have had 'no precise solution in mind' at the time to the Algerian problem as a whole. It is possible that a number of options may have still appeared open to him, including the solution most disastrous for the European population and the now impoverished and politically backward Algeria, which he felt it necessary to accept in 1962.

Professor Thody also claims that the 'Third Republic was (...) by far and away the most democratic regime on the continent of Europe in the 1930s' Female suffrage was introduced in Norway in 1913, Denmark in 1915, the Netherlands in 1917, Sweden in 1918, Germany and Luxembourg in 1919 and France in 1945, on de Gaulle's insistence as head of state of the first post-war government and despite the opposition of his communist and socialist ministers.

Geoffrey Strickland,
Reading.

Sir,


I read with much interest Ronald Fletcher's article on the Burt Affair (March 1990). Robert Joynson's book does not show that Burt's scientific methods were always perfect; it does not claim that Burt's analyses should have an ever-

lasting influence upon our knowledge on the interplay between IQ and heredity; it does pose, however, some questions in great need of an answer.

Ronald Fletcher's account of the Burt Affair is generally correct. He claims, however, that Hearnshaw and his supporters did no more than complain about Joynson's book. This is not correct. In fact, Hearnshaw claimed that Joynson's research was incomplete because he did not consult 66 boxes of archive material (*New Scientist*, September 1989 p 24). On the other hand Hearnshaw and the Clarkes did not publish anything to refute Joynson's allegations.

The questions raised in the book concern Hearnshaw and his supporters rather than the validity of Cyril Burt's results, which were attacked in order to deliver the death blow against the thesis of the hereditarians. Even if Burt's data was not true, it would not matter because of the vast amount of research on IQ issues led by internationally known experts like Arthur Jensen, Hans Eysenck, Richard Lynn and others, namely, that heredity plays a major role in the observed IQ differences. Hearnshaw's effort to discredit Burt is largely irrelevant since the majority of experts tend to agree on the IQ-heredity interplay without taking Burt's doubtful data into account.

Michael Danikas,
ABB Research Centre, Baden,
Switzerland.



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Is communism "crumbling" or is it making a tactical retreat? Is "ethnic strife" in the Soviet Union merely fratricidal warfare or is it a label the Soviet authorities have affixed to the activities of national independence movements? Are oppositionists in Eastern Europe universally satisfied with the agreements some among them have struck with the communist authorities? *Uncaptive Minds* takes a hard look at questions such as these and doesn't always answer them the way the rest of the Western media does.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE WISDOM OF ENOCH

Andrew McHallam

The Lives of Enoch Powell, Patrick Cosgrave, Bodley Head, 1989, pp.518, £16.50, (0-370-30871-9)

It is already becoming difficult to explain to the rising generation the position that Enoch Powell occupied in British politics from 1968 to 1975 when his influence was at its height. From 1972, as the Heath government desperately searched for solutions to the problems which were enveloping it, Powell launched what Cosgrave rightly calls a 'sustained...even demoniac attack'.

It must have seemed at that time that Powell's rise to the highest position was inevitable given the wide support he commanded among rank and file Conservatives and in the country generally. Yet the irony is that this was one of the factors which worked against his achievement of high office.

It is remarkable that a Professor of Greek should have become the object of such extraordinary public enthusiasm. Powell captured the public's imagination by evoking its feelings of nationhood. The mass immigration of the 1950s and 1960s together with a loss of national self confidence produced a crisis of national identity. In characteristic British or rather, English fashion this was normally discussed in an undertone, if it was discussed at all. Powell's intervention in the debate on immigration produced what amounted to an emotional spasm. His vivid and refined use of language on the subject struck a chord with many of his fellow countrymen without offending their sense of decency and propriety. Above all, he had brought the issue out into the open and they resented the obloquy which was heaped on him for doing no more than speak, as he put it, about the 'deep fears, the resentments and anxieties for the future which I know exist.

But the broad cross section of British society which rallied to his cause was the very last sort of constituency which would appeal to the 'liberal' political establishment then in control of all the major political parties and most of the media. It was never likely that Powell would become leader of the Conservative party. His support within the parliamentary party was never broad enough and, like that of Churchill in the 1930s, varied from issue to issue. As an opponent of British membership of the European Community Powell could never match his previous public standing, and his removal to Ulster can have won him few new English friends. Only a crisis of the system could have brought Powell to power but such a patriot would never have wished that on his country. No doubt he would have endorsed the view of the late Franz Josef

Strauss who 'hoped that the German people would never come to such a pass that they would have to have him as their Chancellor'. With his strong sense of party, Powell undoubtedly performed a service by keeping the debate on Britain's character and future within the established political framework, resisting what must have been a strong temptation to set up a party or group of his own.

Cosgrave had many advantages in writing this book. One was the willing consent and co-operation of his subject. Given this and Cosgrave's outstanding previous work, it is disappointing that we do not discover much that has not already been uncovered by earlier biographers.

Powell's humanity is pleasantly evoked: Cosgrave describes how Powell, on giving the author cuttings from his garden, quipped 'You are the foster parent of my favourite shrub. I warn you, I may call in the social workers to demand an early return.'

Division of the biography into 'lives' was an interesting idea but sits uneasily at times with Cosgrave's narrative approach. The most disappointing section is on Powell 'the philosopher' which is really an extension of his chapter on 'the Ulsterman'. The fascinating osmosis between 'Powellism' and 'Thatcherism' largely, though not exclusively in economic affairs is hardly explored.

Perhaps this influence on the thinking of his old party will be Powell's true legacy to British politics. In the meantime one can only agree with Cosgrave's concluding words: 'Look upon him. Learn from him. You will not see his like again.'

GOING NATIVE

Mervyn Hiskett

Dust in a Dark Continent, Robin Page, The Claridge Press, London, 1989, 348 pp. £16.95, (1-870626-90-7)

This book is anecdotal - a series of vignettes ranging from reflections on the author's early days on a farm in England to his unsuccessful attempts, against African official obstruction, to visit a game reserve in East Africa.

In his Introduction Robin Page muses that his work may be banned in Africa and prove unpopular and unfashionable in the West. He may well be right, at least on the second point. He clearly dislikes that Afrikaner stereotype, van der Merwe. Few will fault him for that. But equally, he dislikes van der Merwe's

African Nationalist counterpart. This will be deeply resented by white liberals. They will consider such a balanced view an affront to their cherished double standards.

There is little attempt in the book to analyse the deep cultural factors that account for van der Merwe and his mirror image. But there are some provocative comments:

Whereas the British trade union movement vociferously condemns racial discrimination - as most of its members feel no threat - the South African working class of European origin makes up apartheid's staunchest supporters. Not only does it feel under threat - it is under siege.

True, though one may wonder whether this really represents the view of the British trade union rank and file, or merely that of their Left-wing leaders. But there is surely more to it than just economic insecurity. There is massive cultural incomprehension as well.

In West Africa during the colonial days, where there was no permanent white settlement and no economic threat beyond distant independence (for which there was substantial lump sum compensation), similar attitudes were evident. The whites of the Public Works Department (PWD) tended to be a class on their own in the colonial social hierarchy. Attitudes to black Africans expressed in the bars of what were the local equivalents of Working Mens' Clubs habitually horrified the delicate consciences of District Officers *et al.*, programmed by courses in liberal anthropology before they got to West Africa. It was not economic insecurity in this case that was at the root of the cultural contempt, but the African inability to cope with the technological culture these working-class types represented. The scorn had more to do with running a vehicle without oil until the engine got red hot, than it did with blackness as such. They had a point. For in the wake of PWD's departure the electricity grid began to fail for weeks on end; the piped water supply dried up and the roads became impassable. The liberal conscience became increasingly frayed after three weeks without a fridge or a bath in the West African hot season!

Yet when independence came, it was the PWD types, with all their unconcealed 'racism', that African governments hired to come back, not the dainty-footed DOs, adept at not stepping on racial sensitivities. One wonders, therefore, how much van der Merwe's attitudes really matter, so long as he does the job his culture has formed him to do. There is much to be said for the realistic acceptance that man is racist. South Africa would be the better for such acceptance.

Page also comments that if apartheid could be outlawed tomorrow, this would do nothing to change how ordinary whites and blacks live. If South Africa does not now collapse into tribal and civil war - which it well may - it will surely become, as far as physical amenities are concerned, a much less pleasant place to live in, in the measure that van der Merwe packs up and leaves. In so far as he remains, then socially, things will continue much as before. What Page calls 'apartheid of the heart' will remain. Racial integration will

not take place, except perhaps in the very long term. That is the dreary reality behind that hyped-up but essentially unimportant media event, the apotheosis of Nelson Mandela.

Another, quite different comment caught my attention. Page is struck by the fact that in many parts of East Africa the word for 'animal' is *nyama*, which also means 'meat'. This is the case in West Africa as well. For instance, in Hausa, the main language of West Africa, *nama* is 'meat' in general, while *naman daji*, 'meat of the bush', describes all wildlife. The word is almost certainly a remnant of a very early east-to-west migration of the Bantu, which later receded under pressure from peoples speaking Chadid, Saharan and Benue-Congo languages. But a few Bantu roots survived as basic words. *Nama* is one of them. This piece of linguistic history, redolent of mammoth skulls cracked with stone axes, bodes ill for the future of African wildlife. It did not matter too much when Africans had only the *sango*, the elephant harpoon, with which to do their hunting. At the turn of the century elephant were still present in uncountable numbers in the Niger-Benue Confluence. Now that modern weapons have replaced the *sango*, the outlook is grim indeed.

It is a pity that man will not put more effort into improving his relations with other species, and leave his own race relations to look after themselves!

The book is at times somewhat rambling. It would have been better for stricter editing. It is none the less a thought-provoking piece of reading in the present times. It is also squarely within the emerging, and salutary, tradition of the Claridge Press - that it will publish what the liberal establishment would much prefer were left unpublished.

A SLOVENIAN ODYSSEY

Marko Milivojevic

Between Hitler & Tito: Nazi Occupation and Communist Oppression, Ljubo Sirc, André Deutsch, 1989, pp.200, £17.95, (0-233-98405-4).

In 1989, thirty four years after having been forced to flee from his own country, Ljubo Sirc returned to Yugoslavia at the invitation of the Yugoslav Association of Sociologists. It was a sign of the changing times in Yugoslavia that not only was Sirc cordially received by his hosts, but that he was also allowed to present his hitherto banned views in the Yugoslav mass media: times most obviously marked by the terminal collapse of Yugoslav communism, whose most flawed legacies - rising economic chaos and worsening intra-ethnic

conflict - now threaten to tear Yugoslavia apart. When Yugoslavia's future looks bleak, it is particularly appropriate to look at the country's troubled communist past, as experienced by one of its earliest victims.

Born in 1920, in Kranj, Slovenia, Sirc grew up in a comfortable bourgeois world that enabled him, among other things, to go to a Swiss sanatorium for the treatment of his tuberculosis (1937-39), and to commence graduate studies in law at the University of Ljubljana (1939). His world was brutally obliterated in April 1941, when royalist Yugoslavia was invaded and then dismembered by the Axis powers. For Sirc, as for so many of his peers, the next four years were to be marked by a struggle for survival and political integrity in a precarious no man's land between the barbarism of a Nazi occupation and the horrors of a domestic civil war. This civil war was provoked and ruthlessly promoted by Tito's communists, whose sole objective was absolute power, and whose so-called 'national liberation war' was no more than the systematic extermination of the communist's domestic political rivals, real and imagined.

Although primarily focused on the Tito-Mihailovic struggle to the south, the Yugoslav civil war was nevertheless of exceptional brutality in Slovenia. As a direct participant of the events he describes, Sirc provides a detailed and perceptive analysis of how the communists destroyed the non-communist national resistance in Slovenia through direct extermination and, where this was not possible, through discrediting their rivals by intimidating some of them into a disastrous collaboration with the Nazis. Sirc managed to avoid falling into this particular trap later in the civil war (1942-43), but he did unwittingly become one of Lenin's useful idiots in its early stages, when a student resistance group he joined (*Pravda*) was variously absorbed and then expelled by the communist-dominated 'National Liberation Front'. Henceforth, *Pravda*, led by a certain Dr Crtomir Nagode, was to be Sirc's chosen political vehicle, both within Yugoslavia and when he served as its often disappointed courier to various European countries. Sirc's journeys proved to be politically fruitless, as the Western allies decided to hand over Yugoslavia to Tito in 1943-44.

By November 1944, when Sirc returned from Italy to Yugoslavia as a volunteer in Tito's army, it is hard to believe that he could have had any illusions about the communists and their Anglo-American 'allies'. Since Sirc was not an opportunist, it seems that naive illusions were indeed responsible for his fateful decision to return. Of the communists, Sirc incredibly 'surmised that Tito might be less sectarian than the Slovenian communists' (p. 51). Of the Western allies, Sirc seems to have inexplicably believed in the entirely worthless Tito-Subasic agreement, which in fact was no more than a face-saving device for Churchill's hand-over of Yugoslavia to Tito. Such illusions were to cost Sirc dear, as once he had put his head in the lion's mouth, it was only a matter of time before its jaws snapped shut.

The event took place in August 1947, when Sirc and a number of people, including Dr Nagode, were arrested, charged and convicted of being so-called 'Brit-

ish spies' in a Stalinist political show trial. They were then sentenced to death or long periods of imprisonment. Sirc was sentenced to death (later commuted to twenty years' imprisonment); Dr Nagode was shot. The trial, which constitutes the core of Sirc's memoirs, is obviously one of the key events in his life, but even here Sirc's perfunctory, oblique and rather unforthcoming style tends to inhibit a deeper understanding of its principal political lesson: that the communists, as the high priests of a secular religion, must necessarily hate, despise and destroy those who, like Sirc, began as half-hearted volunteers to their sacred cause and then became its committed political opponents.

Sirc, who remained imprisoned until 1954, is, however, a perceptive witness to the terrible human consequences of the ruthless implementation of communist dogma in early post-war Yugoslavia. At that time, Yugoslavia's communists were the most dogmatic, sectarian and inhuman in Europe and as such, the worthy pupils of Stalin. During the period 1945-60, for example, they murdered around 300,000 people, while one million people, or 10%, of the adult population, passed through their prisons (p. 143). This post-war bloodbath was over and above the 1.1 million people killed in the 1941-44 civil war, of whom only 10% actually met their deaths at the hands of the country's Axis occupiers, the rest being murdered by their own countrymen for either political or racial reasons.

Since fleeing from Yugoslavia into exile in 1955, Sirc has been an academic in the UK, and, since his retirement from the University of Glasgow in 1983, the director of the London-based Centre for Research into Communist Economies. During his career, Sirc witnessed and struggled against the pro-communist sympathies of many British intellectuals, who have long had a particularly strong love affair with Tito's dictatorship dressed in its post-1950s 'self-management' garb. As an economist, Sirc pointed out the disastrous economic consequences of that dictatorship long before it became fashionable to do so, in such books as *The Yugoslav Economy Under Self Management* (1979). He is to be commended for that achievement while he can draw considerable satisfaction from the fact that his democratic and free market views were accepted as the only way forward in Yugoslavia itself in 1989.

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THE POST-LIBERAL MIND

Marek Matraszek

Beyond Glasnost: The Post-Totalitarian Mind, Jeffrey Goldfarb, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 248, £14.95, (0-226-30097-8)

The phenomenon of East European opposition movements has never been a concern of Western 'Sovietology', and for many reasons. One may point to the subliminal belief in the myth of 'reform socialism' - the view that it is possible to maintain - in the long run - a healthy economy, cohesive society, and stable political order whilst at the same time maintaining the 'leading role of the Party'. Opposition movements are reduced to mere epiphenomena of the 'reform process'; and if they are addressed, it is only to lecture them on the need for 'realism' and 'caution', lest the utopian plans of this or that leader to maintain the crumbling facade of socialism be disturbed. Revisionism, long since dead in East Europe, survives only in the mind of Gorbachev, and in Western Sovietology.

This then is the political project of Western Sovietology - the intellectual arm of '*perestroika* socialism' - and it rests on the initial methodological assumptions of 'value-free' social science itself, which attempts to categorise the evolving situation in communist countries in terms which do not admit of the central motive force of moral reasoning which lies at the roots of dissident movements. Morality is reduced to mere values, themselves a projection of desires, initiated by the rational calculus of perceived economic deprivation. Ethical categories are driven out. Little wonder then that Sovietologists are surprised to find that truth, dignity and honour still matter to some inhabitants of Eastern Europe, and that these are capable of being the motors of political change. And how embarrassing for them to see their assiduously cultivated contacts with various Central Committee apparatchiks become suddenly worthless, as dissidents, long scorned as 'marginals' become the leaders of their peoples.

The New School of Social Research in New York purports to overcome these restrictions. It has conferred an honorary doctorate on Adam Michnik, the doyen of East European intellectuals, and has on its staff a formidable array of writers devoted to transmitting the ethos of the 'democratic opposition' to the Western reader. Among them is Jeffrey Goldfarb, associate professor of sociology at the NSSR, who seeks both to challenge the credibility of modern social science and to systematize the moral critiques of socialism implicit in the writings of Michnik, Vaclav Havel, and Miklos Haraszti. He succeeds, in that he reflects not only their concern to re-introduce both society as subject and the category of 'the moral' into Soviet studies, but also their understanding of Soviet-type totalitarianism as a 'velvet prison', in which the individual is locked into multiple dependency relationships which ensure passivity at the hands of the

Party.

Goldfarb is not merely a social scientist who has discarded the restrictive methodological garb of his profession, and entered into a privileged understanding of the dissident mentality; he is also a concerned political crusader, dedicated to 'freedom' and 'democracy' both East and West. Here one must be cautious: Goldfarb is indeed scornful of knee-jerk leftism, which insists on describing the West in terms of class repression and sexual/ethnic discrimination, and which regards the East European societies as some sort of advance on the iniquities of 'capitalism', however imperfect they may be. But in his uncritical acceptance of the axioms of liberal thinking - that man is an essentially universal entity whose telos is the achievement of true freedom and autonomy, unfettered by the historical contingencies and traditional moralities into which he is born - Goldfarb merely repeats the criticisms of the West, made by the left he purports to scorn.

Just when the reader is about to acknowledge that here at last is a Western writer who is 'at home' in the East European spirit, there appear in the text strident leftist jibes and 'critiques' of Western life. The consumer society 'enslaves' rather than 'liberates', although Goldfarb does not explain what a society 'liberated' from consumerism would look like, or how we could get there; the anti-totalitarian project is aimed not so much against tyranny, but against the totalitarianism of 'modernity'; elections in the US are equated with elections in Eastern Europe since both are an exercise in conning the masses, and - a bigger sin - are in the West based on 'irrational sentimentality'; and Western citizens are in thrall to the 'lies' that are pumped daily from their television screens. Here the Havelian notion of 'living in truth' is revealed by Goldfarb to be not merely a call for a respect for common morality and decency in everyday life, but a slogan in tune with the discontented Western intellectual's drive for 'freedom' from all those ugly and imperfect aspects of life in Western democracies uncomfortable only to those, like Goldfarb, who are to be the liberators, and not the liberated.

It is unsurprising, therefore, to find that Goldfarb's enemies are not only those who would defend the socialist order in the East but also those who would defend capitalism in the West. The text is littered with references to 'neo-conservatives', who are 'dogmatic' and identified with 'reaction', 'serve a narrow ideological purpose', and who are no ally of the autonomous individual; they are 'anti-communists', which for some reason is for Goldfarb a pejorative label rather than one of which - given the nature of communism - all should feel proud. Such neo-conservatives have allies, such as the dangerous Solzhenitsyn, who it is true has experienced the communist gulag at first hand, but who remains a 'distant relative of the White Russian aristocracy', a 'fashionable anti-communist' who has sold out to the Western media and become a washed-out 'dissident-celebrity'.

The book is interesting, not for its repetitions of the arguments of East European dissidents, which one could better understand from reading their original

texts, but for the evidence it provides of the nature of even the most progressive sections of the U.S. academy. Its rhetoric is eminently reasonable, but it represents no less a political project than that of the Sovietology it decries, designed not as a scholarly enterprise or a 'search for truth' but merely as providing new ammunition for the eternal task of the intellectual: to liberate humanity from the iniquities which ensnare it. It is unfortunate that Goldfarb did not pause to reflect that it is precisely these flaws of the human personality - discontent with one's lot, the pervasive ethos of envy, and the desire to escape responsibility - which lie at the root of the longevity of the socialist myth, and whose institutional culmination is only now crumbling. It is ironic indeed that at the very moment the East European peoples are seeking a true liberation from socialist illusion Western intellectuals should pander to the very sentiments which fed those illusions, and it is perhaps fitting that those peoples should now be looking to Western models of democracy and consumerism which Goldfarb believes it to be his task to destroy.

UNWELCOME TRUTH

Brian Crozier

Katastroika: Legend and Reality of Gorbachevism, Alexander Zinoviev (trans. Charles Janson). The Claridge Press 1990, 238 pp., £8.95, (870626-26-5)
Newspeak: The Language of Soviet Communism, Françoise Thom (trans. Ken Connelly). The Claridge Press 1990, 218 pp. £8.95, (1-870626-70-2)

At a time when so many writers and public figures praise President Mikhail Gorbachev's 'reforms' and express fervent hopes for his success, it is refreshing to read the reflections of two observers who are quite unswayed by Gorbymania. I write at a time when the Soviet leader's brutal treatment of gallant Lithuania may well signal a downturn in his unbroken run of PR successes; but the point is that these two works were written before the elected Lithuanian government declared its country's independence. (The right of constituent republics to secede from the USSR, incidentally, is enshrined in Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution as indeed it was in Stalin's 'democratic' Constitution of 1936; such rights existing on paper only.)

Alexander Zinoviev is unusual among Soviet dissidents in that he has never 'attacked' the Soviet system, campaigned against it, or even denigrated it. Indeed, in a much debated interview (Reprinted in *Can the*

Soviet System Survive Reform? G.R. Urban, Ed. Pinter/Spiers, 1989), he even defended Stalin in historical terms. The 'offences' that landed him in prison and sent him into his Western exile consisted simply of telling the truth about Soviet society.

Zinoviev's truth is that of the mathematician and logician (he had occupied the Chair of Logic at Moscow University before his exile), not of a champion of democracy. He has claimed that Soviet society can only be correctly interpreted from within, thereby disqualifying the legion of Western Sovietologists. Indeed, he has come close to saying that his 'mathematical model' of that society is the only valid one (thereby coming close to our own A.L. Rowse's claims of exclusive insight in Shakespearean studies.)

Having said this, I have to add (as a mere Western observer of the phenomena he describes from within) that he is at his most convincing when dismissing the misguided Western enthusiasm for 'Gorbachevism'. As he rightly says (and proves) there is really nothing new about Gorbachevism. The ideology had lost its hold over the masses. It was therefore necessary to create a new super-power structure standing above the Party apparatus; to overcome economic difficulties by exploiting the West; and to modernise military industry. These objectives were to be 'masked by an apparent, and short-term, westernisation of Soviet society' (p.15).

To declare an interest, I came to almost identical conclusions, while writing my own study of the Gorbachev phenomenon, working independently and as a Western observer. Having read *Katastroika*, however, I cannot help wondering whether Zinoviev's calm assumption that everything would soon be back to Soviet normal has survived the events of the last months of 1989. In its original form, the book was finished in 1987, but the Foreword to the English edition is dated June 1989. Since then, the collapse of the East European satellites, and the extensive challenges to Gorbachev inside the USSR have transformed the situation.

For my part, I incline to the view that despite the West's naive desire to 'help' Gorbachev, the Soviet system is now probably doomed to collapse. But I could be proved wrong, if such devices as changing the name of the ruling party (as in Romania) and allowing politically approved parties to 'compete' with the old party (as the Soviet Union itself is bracing itself to do) yield the desired result of perpetuating rule of the elite with apparent popular support.

Whatever the outcome, this devastating analysis of the real nature of Gorbachevism should be required reading for prime ministers, presidents and foreign ministers, and especially for Moscow correspondents, many of whom are taken in by the vogue words of *perestroika* and *glasnost*.

Françoise Thom, in my view the best of the younger generation of Sovietologists, shares to the full Zinoviev's clear-sighted understanding of things as they really are. In this, she stands in stark contrast to certain fashionable specialists not a million miles from Saint Antony's College, Oxford, who know everything but understand nothing because their knowledge of

Russian and diligence in daily reading is not matched by any imaginative grasp of Leninism in power.

Having surveyed *perestroika* in practice (notably in *Le Moment Gorbatchev*, 1989), Dr. Thom turns her attention to a more fundamental field: the distortion of language to meet the needs of ideology. It was one of George Orwell's claims to immortality to have isolated this phenomenon and coined his famous neologism, 'Newspeak', to describe it. Totalist ideologies need Newspeak to survive. The Nazis had it, but were not in power long enough to perfect it. The Communists have been at it for more than seven decades.

The originality of Françoise Thom's book lies in its dry, almost pedantic syntactical dissection of its subject. From the moment Lenin took over in October 1917, language had to be adapted to the stubborn refusal of realities to conform with his and Marx's prophecies. She rightly singles out Manicheism as the most important of Lenin's concepts. The world being divided into two hostile and irreconcilable camps, every official utterance has to be presented in terms of struggle and exhortation. Meaning was the first casualty.

Let not the reader be deterred by the dryness, which is academically necessary. Thom's style is, as always, enlivened by wit and Gallic irony. Whether the undereducated, post-Shirley generation, deliberately kept ignorant of grammar, will understand the book is a question to be answered only in the reading. I wish for my part that she had widened her scope to dissect the political semantics of such concepts as 'cold war' and 'peaceful co-existence', which have antithetical meanings on either side of the vanishing iron curtain. But that is a minor criticism of a splendid intellectual exercise.

SUSTAINED MYTHS

Paul Helm

The Presence of Myth, Leszek Kolakowski, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 138pp, £15.95 (0-226-545041-4)

Professor Kolakowski wrote this book in 1966, and it was first published in France in 1972. In his view, myths are intended to answer questions which are ultimate and incapable of conversion into scientific issues;

questions about origins, about the permanence of values, and about continuity. They are indispensable for providing understanding beyond what is empirically manifest, and are without parallel and experience. Myths are not doctrines, nor are they susceptible of proof or disproof; they have not to do with empirical investigation, nor can convictions about a myth be advanced by rational persuasion.

In logic, for instance, logical rules and constants do not reduce to sets of psychological responses, nor are they a matter of human convention. Rather, logic requires a view of truth, necessary truth, which is a part of myth.

The term 'myth' partly does duty, in Professor Kolakowski's eyes, for what others have referred to as metaphysics; not for him, because in his view metaphysics is bound up with proof. He says in one place that myth 'has no reasons', but are there no reasons for his view of necessary truth? Has he not given some himself? And does not the appropriateness of these reasons warrant the conclusion that there are necessary truths? Such considerations would cut no ice with Kolakowski because of his conviction that whatever goes beyond the empirically given is mythical. Thus, logic and love are in the same boat; for love, like the assertion of a necessary truth, goes beyond the empirically given. But what can be the sense of a concept which possesses such a disparate reference?

There is another side to the appropriation of myths; the author writes of participating in mythical experience 'with the fullness of one's personality, in which the acquisition of information and the acceptance of directives are inseparable' (p.128). Such language is usually reserved for mystical experience, except that 'acquisition of information' looks like a straightforward cognitive change. And how can one experience necessary truth with the fullness of one's personality?

Another difficulty with the central concept is that the author claims that whatever goes beyond the empirically manifest, and serves certain needs, is mythical. And so he assumes the mythical category of Christianity, a thesis that is highly disputable even by those who most emphasise the symbolic and analogical character of its language. The relation between God and the world is without parallel, and transcends what is empirically manifest, but it does not follow that there are no truths about that relation.

Despite these difficulties, the book contains passages of considerable interest and of acute observation. In one of the central chapters Professor Kolakowski cites the desire to escape from the world's indifference as one source of myth. It is the experience of this indifference which gives rise to suffering, and to love and death as the opposite, extreme ways of responding to it. Another discussion which is particularly acute, concerns what Kolakowski calls 'Myth in the Culture of Analgesics', views of life which lead to the use of pain killers to evade responsibility and to a refusal to face life. Both these discussions, and other observations, for example, on fashion, and the totalitarian tendencies of the myth of human equality, have a value that is quite independent of the author's general views on myth.

The closing chapter is concerned with exploring the question of whether myths can be sustained if and when they come under intellectual attack; if, for instance, they are given a genetic explanation. Quite apart from Kolakowski's flirtation with the genetic fallacy at this point, the acceptance of such an explanation of myth supposes a capacity to step outside a mythical framework, since scientific explanations (of which genetic explanation is an instance) are inevitably set in a mythical framework. But such a step was said earlier in the book to be impossible. The author's conclusion appears to be that although myths are under constant attack, and become particularly vulnerable, when we become self-conscious about them, their survival is assured - myths have an irremovable share in all human activity.

This is a stimulating and engaging book. It is wide-ranging in scope, and while written in a somewhat overwrapped style, in the form of essays or reflections, even the most dense and difficult passages repay attention. The sermonic character of some of the material is leavened by the author's use of the first-person plural.

A MODERN MONSTER

Oliver Knox

A Time You Remember, 1969-70, Diana Spearman, Merlin Books, Devon, 1989 £8.95 (0-86303-468-3)

The political novel is the master-medium for the creation of monsters. One thinks of John Mortimer's odious Titmus. Even in non-political novels, such as the *Music of Time*, the most satisfactorily grotesque of the 'heroes' seem immersed in politics: nobody will ever forget Widmerpool, so often glimpsed in Westminster, in Artillery Row, in the Cabinet Office, in the House of Lords. Squarely in this horrible tradition steps forth Roy Tarlington, Conservative MP for East Malling in the late sixties, the inhuman creation of Diana Spearman in *A Time You Remember 1969-70*.

Our monster Tarlington is (or was, in that distant pre-Thatcherite era) progressive and vital; the very model of a modern conservative of those days. He:

had entered politics in pursuit of a career, not of an ideal. No sensible man could be a socialist, but he regarded the passionate concern of some of his colleagues with the rule of law, the freedom of the individual, the preservation of British traditions, as just as silly, and more dangerous than the antics of the Labour Left because it interfered with the demands of modern administration. Being an educated man, he looked outside England for his model, and prided himself on a resemblance to Machiavelli.

Occasionally we find Tarlington remembering that 'The Prince must be a lion but he must also know how to play the fox'. Tarlington has however antagonised some of the older county members of his constituency party. He is against capital punishment. He is for homosexuals. He is against White Rhodesians. He is unsusceptible to the charm of the countryside: '...it meant to him chiefly an assurance of the Conservative opinions of its inhabitants'. And he defends himself against the old-fashioned, out of date reactionary constituents, foremost of whom is an old Etonian ex MP.

Diana Spearman's views, when she lets the veil of irony slip are, as one would expect from one who has a certain respect for the great Lord Salisbury, not altogether the same as those of her awful progeny. She intersperses the odd sentence or two. She talks of another scenery:-

the ancient heritage of house and lands, which saw to it that trees could live and grow, gates open, and that hedges, not wire, enclosed the silky cattle.

But if Tarlington's political views never fail to give us unspeakable masochistic pleasure, his sexual conduct, obeying the same rules of hypocrisy, is in some respects even finer. We see him confronted with the virginal Susan, a nice girl. ('The essential point about a nice girl is that she has nothing to do but get married': we see her making 'that signature movement of the modern girl, twisting the ends of her hair') and brooding on her perfect suitability to be the wife of an MP.

Before crusaders' tombs, Tarlington told Susan of his real secret dreams, both for his own career and for the future of Great Britain... Her response seemed to him childish rather than feminine; in his bemused state even this added to the glamour in which his imagination had enveloped her. Also he had never slept with a virgin, and felt that the notorious difficulties of this enterprise were better encountered in the marriage bed than in any premature experiment.

He always recalls his political priorities. So it is unsurprising that his courtship goes through some bad patches:

The play bored them both, and when he took her to the station, his chief feeling was irrita-

tion with her, with himself, with the weather; it was a relief to turn to his weekly study of Hansard.

Worse is to come. Unfortunately her brother is involved in a riot. There is a chance that he may be prosecuted under the Race Relations Act.

For an MP to be faced with the prospect of a brother-in-law in prison or even charged with an offence under the Race Relations Act was a very serious matter. He did not sleep well that night ... he thought of consulting with one of the MPs whose views he shared ... for a moment he even wondered whether a Labour MP might not make a better confidant; but in the end 'the obvious man to talk to was his agent...

Susan is a little innocent. She reflects that Tarlington:- had murmured sweet nothings to her, had kissed not only her mouth, but her eyelids ... had once held one of her breasts in hands which trembled. Men did not give up all this for political disagreements.

His agent is more realistic. It would be better for the MP to reconsider his entanglement. There follows a bouquet of flowers, a plea that Susan and he should remain forever as very old friends. Later, this authentic monster's memory rather fails him. The awkwardness of the infringement of the Race Relations Act has passed away. Perhaps marriage would be politically wise for him. The agent inquires about Susan:-

'Don't tell me you chucked your girl because of what I said.'

'Naturally not. It had nothing to do with it.'

Diana Spearman's novel contains an intricate plot, and at least two sub-plots. And her ending — a story of recount and recounts at a general election in 'East Malling' has something of the haunting, perpetual horror of the last pages of *A Handful of Dust*; why should it ever end? Is Tony Last still reading Dickens up the Amazon? Are they still recounting at East Malling?

But the reason why we should read *A Time You Remember*, written by one who has lived so much of her life within the sound of the division bells, is to remind ourselves of the sad obsession for politics which captures its practitioners. When Susan enters the House of Commons as a dazzled visitor she is impressed 'when as a man brushed past them, Tarlington said "That's Enoch". She gazed at him as she might have gazed at Milton's Satan.'

The tension between the true and the false espousal of principle, between the respect for tradition and the desire for change, between humbug and honesty, sycophancy and friendship - these may count among the normalities of political life. But they do make for readable villains, and scandalous escapes from 'stress'. Nor does Diana Spearman, except in ironical inflection, put on the black cap of the hanging judge. She is, except to those who will read her closely, remarkably kind to the familiar monster whom she has created; and it makes him all the more appalling.

A BROAD CHURCH

Roger Watson

The Crockford's File - Gareth Bennett and the Death of the Anglican Mind, William Oddie, Hamish Hamilton, 1989, £14.95, (0-241-12613-4)

It is to be hoped that the title of this book will not deter those with an interest in the crisis of Anglicanism in general, and of the Church of England in particular. It is readable, exciting and informative, and yet the picture of the contemporary Anglican Church that emerges can only depress the churchgoer.

In summing up the Crockford's affair Oddie writes that 'Garry Bennett, who for most of his life had shrunk from controversy, had now died of it.' (p.24) The tragic event surrounding the death of Gareth Bennett are presented by someone who knew him well and held him in high regard. The story is told in such a way that the reader is taken on an adventure, beginning with Bennett's decision to write the Crockford's Preface, his suicide and the aftermath. More than once I thought, 'What if...?' and no more poignantly than at the point where Oddie describes the phone call from Archbishop Runcie to Bennett (p.36); Bennett replaced the receiver upon hearing the familiar voice of an old friend and had he not done so, the outcome might have been very different.

It has always been claimed by Runcie that he was aware of all the points which Bennett made in the preface to *Crockford's Clerical Directory* and it is to be assumed that these included the personal points. While Oddie does not state it clearly, it would appear that Runcie, who had many speeches written by Bennett, was convinced of his authorship of the anonymous preface. Others were probably not so clear, but Gareth Bennett was hunted mercilessly up to the hours before his suicide.

The question why Bennett should take his own life is not answered in Oddie's book but there are several clues. It is probable that a combination of factors, including his realisation that he had ruined his chances of achieving high office, together with the intense pressure of cheque-book journalists and the severe criticism of his colleagues, became too much to bear.

Of Dr. Habgood, the Archbishop of York, Oddie concludes that he does not hold an idiosyncratic or eccentric view: he is entirely representative of the 'mind-set of many, if not most, of his episcopal colleagues.' (p.66).

What is clear from the *Crockford's File*, is that Robert Runcie behaved impeccably throughout the furore surrounding the anonymous piece by Bennett. Notwithstanding his reputation as 'a kind of ecclesiastical chameleon' which is exemplified 'by his use of different speechwriters to suit the different ecclesiastical preferences of his audiences' (p. 218), it would appear that the Anglican communion can be thankful for the time being. Oddie devotes considerable space to evaluating the present primate and it is easy to draw comparisons between the present incumbents at

Canterbury and York.

The easy style of this book is misleading. There is considerable depth in Oddie's analysis of trends in the worldwide Anglican communion. In particular, a frightening picture of the pace of events in the United States is presented. Oddie recognises that nothing happens by accident and describes the state of the Episcopal Church of the USA as having been changed by 'a process consciously planned and executed, issue by issue, and achieved by dedicated activists determined on seizing the structures of power.' (p.164) The outcome has been to transform the Episcopal Church from a 'denomination' to a 'sect.' Nevertheless, the American Church represents a powerful lobby with '2.5% of the world's Anglicans represented by 25% of its bishops' (p.184) and this power was masterfully exploited at the Lambeth Conference in 1988.

The traditional Roman Catholic must find much to sympathise with in his Anglican peers. While the events in the Anglican Church cannot be ascribed to one particular event such as the Second Vatican Council, the outcomes, measured by the disappearance of long established practices and the consequent emptying of churches, will be familiar. Oddie sums up the situation in the Church of England very well: 'The notion that any irreducible minimum of faith (let alone of discipline) is required....has largely disappeared except in certain kinds of parish which increasingly operate as refugee centres' (p.120).

The Crockford's File is divided into three very different sections but Oddie has resisted the temptation of simply developing his own thoughts in a vacuum. Constantly, and without any artificial attempts to do so, he returns to Gareth Bennett and the Crockford's Preface. Very few of the words are wasted on the personal criticism of Robert Runcie or, indeed, with personal comments directed at other individuals. As anyone who has read the preface in its entirety will vouch, the majority of the preface was concerned with what the Church of England was becoming, and not with who was responsible. In this light, Oddie develops the theme that the liberal ascendancy in the Anglican Church is exerting its own form of tyranny of which the remaining church-going public is largely unaware (p.107).

Similarly, Oddie has refrained from launching his own personal attacks. Naturally, it is impossible to omit the main players, and some of them will doubtless be displeased with their casting in the present plot. Oddie is quite aware of this and knows that his analysis will be described as 'disloyalty' (p.17). However, the main character is, and remains throughout this work, that of Gareth Bennett. He dared to question and expose what Oddie describes in one chapter heading as 'The Theology of Pontius Pilate'. 'He stirred the hornet's nest of subjectivism' which, as this book reveals, 'is an essentially intolerant mental attitude' (p.148).

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In Short

Andrei Navrozov: *Second Nature*; Forty-six poems by Boris Pasternak, Peter Owen, 83pp, £13.95, (0 7206 0751 5)

Pasternak's poetry is difficult, full of allusions and symbols which have little resonance for the modern English ear, meticulously refusing the plain statement and the final word. It is a poetry of atmosphere, of electric sensitivity to the surrounding play of nature, a poetry which seems to vibrate in its own self-created stillness like the air of a theatre after an actor's sudden 'hush!' Andrei Navrozov is a deeply serious writer who has sought long and hard for the lines and words that will render this all-too-Russian verse into English. Brought up in Moscow, he knows the value of words and the ease with which they are corrupted; and through his American education he has learned the hard fact of modern life, that the worst is never believed, and that smoothing rhetoric will be poured over every fire that springs from suffering. He therefore wrestles with the English language, of which he is a master, in order to recreate the extraordinary lyric stillness in the midst of pain which is Pasternak's authentic voice. The result does not always flow smoothly, certainly not always as smoothly as this:

Spring, I am from the street where poplars are
aghast,
Where distance is appalled, the house afraid to
fall,
The air is blue, like clothing bundles passed
To one discharged from hospital...

But, as the extract shows, Navrozov enables the reader to understand how this Holy Fool, with his helter-skelter images, can touch the wound which lies in every Russian heart.
(R.S.)

Schooling for British Muslims: Integrated, opted out or denominational? Mervyn Hiskett, The Social Affairs Unit, 1989.

This booklet provides much needed information on Muslim education. Proper understanding of this problem has not been provided by the liberal educational establishment whose deficiencies have been enshrined in the Swann report with its multicultural humanist solutions. The Muslim community quite rightly rejected it; indeed their position is much closer to the 1944 Act for religious collective worship. Opting out therefore offered another solution after a failure to secure maintained status and anxiety about being exposed to Swann in state schools. However, the Kirklees affair is a warning of the kind of opposition which Muslim opting out would produce. A minority of non-Muslim children might have to submit to an Islamic education against their will and that of their parents.

Dr. Hiskett develops a convincing argument for denominationalism as the least worst solution. On demographic and fiscal grounds the Muslims have a strong case. The multiculturalists and others will claim that Muslim schools will be ghetto schools and certainly Muslim demands already made in state schools, such as no music, dance or representational art, explain this attitude. However, Islamic schools will have to provide education for employment in British society, otherwise parents will continue to send their children to state schools. Surely denominationalism would be vastly better than the present situation for many British Muslim children: 'Swann by day and Islamic orthodoxy from teatime until the next morning.'
(M.C.)

Hitler's Children: the story of the Baader Meinhof gang, Jillian Becker, Third Edition, Pickwick Books, 1989, (0-948859-25-3)

Jillian Becker's account of one of the most extraordinary episodes of modern times is as gripping as a P.D. James thriller. The author skillfully dissects the psychological motives of these young nihilists. Indeed, Ulrike Meinhof's stepmother remarked that no one had succeeded in understanding her daughter so well. The astonishing tolerance of the West German authorities, as well as the misplaced sympathy of the world at large, is another remarkable feature of the story.

This third edition carries an additional essay which examines the anti-semitic and millenarian dimension of German terrorism. Becker makes several allusions to Norman Cohn's book, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, and both books are essential reading for anyone who wants to understand the nature of political fanaticism.
(M.C.)

The Perception Mongers, George Bailey, IEDSS, 1990, £5.00, (0-907-967-12-4)

Propaganda is commonly associated with totalitarian governments in the twentieth century and despite its importance in diplomacy has never attracted serious academic study. In this cogently argued essay, George Bailey traces its roots from the clash between socialism and capitalism. Propaganda notwithstanding, the Soviet economy has collapsed, forcing Gorbachev, as a good Leninist, to change his methods. The author believes that the West is being invited to provide more 'rope'; he also thinks the Soviet Union might resort to strategic terrorism. The West is still vulnerable and unprepared to meet these new and subtle challenges.
(M.C.)

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