


The
Salisbury
Review

MARCH 1992

Volume 10 Number 3 £4.00

The quarterly magazine of conservative thought



The Third Marquess of Salisbury
1830 - 1903

Architecture and Theology
Quinlan Terry

Totalitarianism
Roger Scruton

The Future of the Family
Paul Goodman

The Muslim Parliament
Mervyn Hiskett

The Clarence Thomas Affair
Esmond Wright

The End of Education
Geoffrey Wagner

The Claridge Press

The Salisbury Review

Editor Roger Scruton
Deputy Editor Andrew McHollam
Literary Editor Ian Crowther
Managing Editor Merrie Cave

Editorial address and Subscriptions
33, Canonbury Park South,
London, N1 2 JW

The collapse of the Soviet Empire ought to have been greeted here not only with prolonged rejoicing, but also with a renewed confidence in the values and institutions of Western society. In fact the rejoicing was so short-lived as to resemble a drug addict's elation, while the cantankerous attacks on our values have continued undisturbed. The case of Judge Thomas, analysed in this issue by Esmond Wright, shows America's liberal establishment sinking to a level of humbug that is shocking even to liberals, while the fashion for 'political correctness', far from being laughed into nothingness, has spread from America to Britain, to instil our universities with a new form of persecution. We may be proud that its first victim - John Casey - has been singled out because of an article in the *Salisbury Review*. And we may foresee an important role for our journal, in again drawing the venom of university bigots. Nevertheless it is cause for concern that nothing whatsoever serves to vindicate our traditional values in the minds of those who live outside their fields of force, and we are bound to wonder what can be done, in a society that seems so bent on rejecting its inheritance.

No doubt the decline of the family - sadly documented by Paul Goodman - offers a partial explanation of our present ills. It is in the family that the respect for authority is learned; and it is through family life that children come to understand that authority may be freely accepted. The rootless adolescent of today is brought up in the culture of 'relevance' described in these pages by Vivian Linacre. He is eager for arguments that deny the authority of settled things, and which vindicate his love of pleasure. An argument gains a hearing only when an interest is advanced by it. In modern democracies the ruling interest is self-interest, and the voice of other generations has long since ceased to be heard.

A case in point is architecture. The old values - scale, proportion, detail and order - were set aside by architects because they spoke too powerfully of permanent things. They carried connotations of dignity, constraint, and obedience to a higher law. It is for this reason that they comforted us, who can be at home in this world only

when surrounded by the symbols of another. Modern architecture is dedicated to the destruction of our sense of home; it connotes loneliness, isolation and the pursuit of selfish pleasure. It acknowledges no constraint besides the immediate purpose, and no permanence beyond today's desire. As Quinlan Terry argues, it is godless in its vision as in its effect. The only comfort - and it is a real one - is that, while rejecting every constraint upon his conduct, modern man still cannot rid himself of the need for home. He has therefore come to hate the architecture that his own vanity concocted, and to search for the path back to decency and order. If Quinlan Terry is right, however, the gateway to that path is the narrow one of religious faith, and the flabby soul of modern man will surely stick in it.

Just as the Christian religion gave life and form to our institutions, so other religions threaten them. The ignorant armies mustered by secular fashion pale before the disciplined cohorts of a real belief: and this is one reason why our assorted antis had so little to say about Islam, until one of their number found himself condemned to death through his offence to it. As Mervyn Hiskett argues, the demands of British Muslims, while sincerely expressing their religious convictions, challenge the established order of our kingdom. The secular state was a Christian achievement and is anathema to a religion that recognises no authority besides the revealed will of God. The silence of our feminists in the face of the Islamic law of marriage; of our anti-heterosexists in the face of Islamic treatment of homosexuality; of our multiculturalists in the face of Islam's resolute contempt for all cultures but one; of our pacifists in the face of Islam's doctrine of holy war - such silence speaks volumes about the state of mind of the modern 'anti'. The pursuit of 'political correctness' does not stem from the intolerable oppression exercised by our traditional beliefs. It stems rather from the absence of those beliefs and from the desire of those deprived of them to smash the gods which failed. It is the deficit of religion that has enraged the modern soul; and into the vacuum that religion left there crowd a thousand superstitions, the mumbo-jumbo of disenchantment.

Contents

Architecture and Theology <i>Quinlan Terry</i>	4
Totalitarianism, Civil Society and the Nation <i>Roger Scruton</i>	10
The Future of the Family <i>Paul Goodman</i>	15
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? <i>Esmond Wright</i>	19
Democracy or Theocracy? <i>Merwyn Hiskett</i>	23
The Culture of Relevance <i>Vivian Linacre</i>	27
The End of Education <i>Geoffrey Wagner</i>	33
The End of Don Juan <i>George Martelli</i>	40

Letters	40
---------	----

Book Reviews	42
--------------	----

Ian Crowther, George Chowdhary-Best, Helen Szamuely, Antony Flew, Ken Connelly, Roger Scruton, Mark Le Fanu

In Short	51
----------	----

Notes on Reviewers	50
--------------------	----

Subscription details

Published quarterly in September, December, March and June, volume commencing with September issue.

Annual subscription rates: £15, \$35 surface mail; £18, Europe; \$45 airmail; single issues £4.00, \$7.00, ISSN: 0265-4881.

Copyright © The Claridge Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or other without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

Printed in the UK by The Warwick Printing Company Ltd.

Typesetting by Typeright

Conservative Journals: *Orientacja Na Prawo*

In Poland the experience of 45 years of communist rule did not fail to leave its imprint on society, at least in fostering the illusion that rights come without responsibilities, law without submission, and property without inequality. Part of the responsibility must lie with the intellectuals of the opposition movement, who fostered the view that with the achievement of freedom would come a new paternalism, a new guiding force of enlightened leaders consisting solely of themselves and their fellow-travelling Western journalist friends.

Little wonder that true conservatives in Poland have begun to speak and to caution against these dangerous illusions. *Orientacja na Prawo* (Leaning to the Right) is the monthly journal of the Liberal Democratic Independence Party or *Niepodlegosc* to its friends. Through the 1980s, alone and frequently the targets of abuse from the leftist Solidarity opposition, the small group of editors battled for the acceptance of private property and the free-market as an integral part of the post-communist order. They too were the main force calling for continued opposition to communism when the Solidarity leadership was busy selling out to Jaruzelski and his

henchmen in 1989. How much further might Poland be towards the goal of economic prosperity, and what progress she might have made in ridding herself of communist criminals in high places, had the sensible advice of *Niepodlegosc* and other groups like it been taken more seriously.

Today *Orientacja na Prawo* is a well-produced monthly journal available in all good Polish bookstores. It devotes itself to warnings - through the pen of such authorities as Alain Besancon and Francoise Thom against the dangers of Gorbachevism and the corrupt intrigues of the new communist mafia. Above all it is blazingly critical of Poland's political elites for the opportunities they have missed for the sake of their own comfort and peace of mind. Perhaps the new Prime Minister, Jan Olszewski, will rectify these errors. If he does, he will demonstrate once again the paradox that to be progressive and forward-looking, you must first be a conservative looking backwards.

Orientacja na Prawo can be obtained by subscription from Delikon publishers, ul Paczkowska 40, Warsaw, Poland.

Architecture and Theology

*Quinlan Terry reflects on
where Art and Faith meet*

My subject is architecture and theology, or rather Art and Faith, the place where architecture and religion meet. The two great authorities on this subject from the last century were Pugin, who designed the Houses of Parliament, and Ruskin, the celebrated artist and writer. Both started their lives as devout Christians, and ended their days in a mental asylum. Perhaps this is a warning to tread carefully and not to expect too much from Art, and certainly not to look to Art for the supreme truth and consolation that faith alone provides.

These two subjects - music, architecture, and the other fine arts on the one hand; and theology and Christian doctrine on the other - can be compared to two great rivers springing from different sources, meandering through similar territory, sometimes flowing along the same course, sometimes flowing in opposite directions, and then running out to different seas.

In Old Testament times the fine arts formed an integral part of worship. Figure 1 is a plan of the Taber-

nacle in the Wilderness which is recorded in great detail in the Book of Exodus. When Moses went up to Mount Sinai and received the commandments, he was also given a specification of the Tabernacle, complete with its dimensions, its division into Outer Court, the Holy Place and the Holy of Holies. He was also given precise information about the furniture; the priesthood and their vestments; even a recipe for the incense to be used in their services. He received details about sacrifice and a calendar of special days for feasts throughout the year.

The next three figures are speculative, but I like to think that in this Tabernacle were the original and primitive form of the three classical orders, Doric, Ionic and Corinthian as they are now called. It would seem appropriate that a simple Doric order should be used for the Outer Court. The Ionic would be suitable for the five pillars at the front of the Tabernacle, its curved volutes like rams' horns, symbolising sacrifice. And Corinthian would be the natural order for the columns overlaid with gold, which divide the Holy Place from the Holy of Holies.

This small but highly ornate ancient building was extremely important. It was initiated and commissioned by God. The design and construction were entrusted to Moses; but the art work was carried out by two of the greatest artists the world has ever known, whose names are given as Bezaleel and Aholiab. These two men must have been a sort of Raphael and Michelangelo to the ancient world. And it is significant that the first reference to a man

being filled with the Spirit of God, is to these two artists:

God has filled them with the Spirit of God in wisdom, in understanding, in knowledge, and in all manner of workmanship; to devise curious works, to work in gold and in silver and in brass and in the cutting of stones, to set them, and in carving of wood, to make all manner of cunning work.

(Exodus, Chapter 35, verses 31-33)
This verse is of great importance. It tells us that artistic ability is a gift of the Holy Spirit; a creative gift from God the Creator.

An artist cannot produce beauty apart from nature; he must take his inspiration from the natural world. We can see something of God in His works: the trees, the animals, the sea, the dry land. We acknowledge His majesty, His power, and that He is the *supreme architect*. And unless we have some degree of humility and reverence for the Creator, we cannot produce creative work which is easy on the human eye. The two artists of the Tabernacle, Bezaleel and Aholiab, had these gifts in abundance.

When they designed their temple architecture was the visual image of worship. The two rivulets were running along the same course, and the art of building was inseparable from religious practice.

The same plan can be seen in the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem, five hundred years later; but it is a much larger building, in stone. Figure 5 does not show this temple, but an idealised version taken from

Plan of the Tabernacle in the Wilderness




fig. 1

Ezekiel's prophecy, which should give some idea of its scale and design. It was the envy of the ancient world and copied by the surrounding nations. It was destroyed and rebuilt again and again. It was so firmly fixed in the mind of the Jews, that the condition of their Temple mirrored the state of the nation. When the Temple was destroyed, the people felt that all hope had gone; and when the Temple was rebuilt the nation was revived. It was inconceivable to the Jews of this time that God should speak to his people outside the framework of this architecture. The rivulets of faith and art were still flowing along the same bed but the river bed was now wider and deeper.

A few islands began to appear in this wide river, islands of protest and dissent against the force of the current. Chief among them was King Solomon himself. Even at the dedication of the Temple, he says:

But will God indeed dwell on the earth? Behold, the heaven and heaven of heav-

ens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have builded.

(1 Kings, Chapter 8, verse 27) Already in those early days, even Solomon realised that there was much that was imperfect about the most magnificent building. This must have encouraged him to think that there would be, one day, a clearer and better way.

Another island of protest was the prophets, who spoke up when they saw the moral state of those who were most zealous for this architecturally-orientated worship. For all its art and architecture and music; for all its priesthood and liturgy and sacrifices, the pomp and splendour of the Temple could not satisfy the conscience or answer the deeper longings of an enlightened soul.

In New Testament times, the truths that lay concealed in the Old Testament were revealed in the New. Now it seems the two rivers divide and run in opposite directions. It is hard for us, brought up in a Christian culture, nearly two thousand years after

the event, to realise the extent of the change: the mental readjustment required by the work and words of this carpenter of Nazareth. The things He said were completely against the spirit of the times. He took materialism out of Temple religion, and replaced it with metaphor. Until He came, the whole concept of worship was neatly confined to particular buildings, on particular days and organised by particular people. All this He seemed to turn upside down when He uttered those memorable words:

I will destroy this temple and build it again in three days.

Such was the devotion of the priests to the Temple, that this statement was quoted at His trial and accepted as sufficient grounds for execution. Could we argue, I wonder, that a misguided love of architecture was the justification offered for the crucifixion? Architecture had now come close to worship and dangerous currents are formed, when the two rivers intersect.

It was left to the Apostles to reveal the full extent of the destruction and rebuilding to which Christ referred. Their task was to replace the image of worship as an activity confined by the dead stones of a building to an image of worship in Spirit and Truth surrounded by the living stones of like-minded people. This metaphor was repeated again and again by the Apostles, and I give but two examples:

Know ye not that ye are the Temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you. If a man defile the Temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the Temple of God is holy, which Temple ye are.

(1 Cor., Chapter 3, verse 16). This word *Temple*, repeated no less than four times in this one verse, is used each time as a metaphor.

The Apostle Peter also has a long section about Temple building when he says:

Ye also as lively stones are built up a *Spiritual House*, a Holy Priesthood, to offer up Spiritual sacrifices, acceptable to God by Jesus Christ.

(1 Peter, Chapter 2, verse 5) Peter is not thinking of rebuilding the Temple in Jerusalem made of

thousands of dead stones but of re-erecting a Temple made of thousands of believers.

The Letter to the Hebrews explains in unanswerable terms how all the old Temple worship was a type of Christ; that as the great archetype has come, all the shadows must fade away. It is fair to say however, that anyone who seriously and without prejudice studies these apostolic letters, will conclude that physical buildings played no part in the New Testament Church.

There is further evidence from our knowledge of language. The Greek word used in the New Testament for 'Church' is 'ecclesia', from which we have our word 'ecclesiastic'. It comes from two words 'ek' meaning 'out of' and 'ecclesia' meaning 'called'. It therefore describes a gathering of 'called out' people. The word is used a hundred and nine times in the New Testament, but never does it refer to a physical building.

Also, the word 'edify' comes from the Latin 'aedificare', meaning 'to build'. It is used twenty times in the New Testament and always means building up in knowledge, not building a structure. Our rivers are now running in opposite directions.

Has the art of architecture ceased now it has lost its spiritual meaning? Not at all! The gospel was spreading without the shell of architecture; and similarly, temple architecture was spreading to all types of building - markets, sports stadia, government buildings, private houses, without the straitjacket of religion. To the Christian all secular work is holy; all service to man is service to Christ; and all buildings should honour the Lord:


The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof.

Looking at history up to the beginning of this century we see a recurrence of Old and New Testament attitudes: both worship centred on a building, and worship where the building has no significance.


In the age of the Church's growth, up to the time of Constantine - AD 330 - there were no official church buildings at all. Thereafter, with toleration, buildings were erected called Churches, for the preaching of the Word and administration of the Sacraments. Some were little more than sheds to keep out wind and weather; some were converted pagan temples with second-hand columns from other buildings - the Early Christian and Byzantine epoch. But in time this simple worship - requiring a high degree of knowledge and understanding, gave way to more tangible and visible forms, and buildings became gradually more complicated as the gospel became less clear.

The Origin of the Doric Order


A. Primitive enclosure of canvas stretched on ropes supported between posts driven into the ground & held upright by guy ropes.



B. The enclosure formalised by the inspired artist in the Court of the Tabernacle. The hangings are supported from hooks on rails supported from silver capitals with hooks & fillets on columns of acacia wood set in brass bases.



C. The colonnade around the Temple Court.



Stone colonnade supporting cedar wood architrave under the beams bracing principal rafters, plates, common rafters & tilting fillet supporting a tile roof.

fig. 2

ET/111

By AD 1500, all over Christendom there were large and impressive religious buildings, erected on the Old Testament pattern, that were almost identical in function to the Temple. There were the daily sacrifices at the altar; the priesthood in all its hierarchy complete with vestments, incense, choirs, music, art and Holy Days. The rivers were running together again. But whereas in Old Testament times this type of worship had divine sanction, now, with the coming of Christ, it had none. The church of Christ had recreated the temple which Christ had destroyed; reintroducing a Priesthood and a sacrifice that Christ had superseded, all as if Christ had not yet come.

This went on until the Reformation, when the New Testament was rediscovered. But architecture was slow to change, since it was easy to convert these buildings to the new and simple service. Only later did the preaching box plan of the Wren churches evolve, so introducing a very different type of architecture to that of the Middle Ages. After the Reformation, however, came the Counter Reformation in Europe; while much later, in England, the Nineteenth Century Oxford Movement pulled architecture back to its Old Testament form.

All this is clearly demonstrated in many English parish

churches including my own in Dedham. Almost certainly there would have been a simple brick or wooden church there before 1492. (Wycliffe and his Lollards were active up and down the country and in East Anglia). But with the power of the medieval church and the riches of the wool merchants, it must have been decided to erect an impressive stone building with Nave, Aisles and Chancel. It would have had a rood-screen across the Chancel steps to separate the laity from the priests who would be up at the East end near a stone altar. In the roof structure were corbels carved with angels heads and, over the large entrance door, intricately carved panels with saints in niches. The image of God was no longer engraved in the hearts of the faithful meditating upon the Bible, but carved in wood and stone for an easier, less cerebral but highly visual adoration.

During the Puritan era the stone altar was replaced with a wooden table; the Ten Commandments, Lord's Prayer and Apostles Creed were clearly painted at the East end. A wooden pulpit was placed in the middle surrounded by box pews. There was clear glass in the windows and any human form which could cause idolatry was removed. Thus the English parish church was brought to its familiar Seventeenth Century form.

Although the Puritans cleared the building of these things, they did not destroy it, or move the congregation to a shed. This building was part of their culture; it reminded them of the divine attributes of order and privilege and raised their spirits as only art can do. So long as the building was not regarded as a means of grace it was harmless to their souls.

But history moved on, and in the last century, 'the saints that went out of the door at the Reformation, came in at the windows'. There were numerous images in stained glass; the concept of the altar was replaced, the Ten Commandments were covered by damask curtains and surrounded by a stone reredos with more images of angels; a choir vestry was added in high Gothic design. The visual effect of Cranmer's simple Anglican service was cathedralised, so that a surpliced choir could process behind a brass cross. No wonder the thinking world is confused by what it sees.

In conclusion I offer some thoughts on our Twentieth Century position. It seems that our river is nearing the end of its course and has become a wide delta of confusion. I believe we are now involved in the final crisis that confronts the world and which is leaving a devastating effect on our minds and hearts.

Up to a hundred years ago, everything carried on more or less as it had since the creation. The horse pulled the cart and ploughed the field; the wind

filled the sails of the boats that transported our goods; there was a *modest* use of the earth's resources and all waste was naturally recycled. Whether he liked it or not mankind *had* to live close to his Maker.


But now *everything* has changed. We are the victims of a voracious technology, ruthlessly consuming the resources of the earth. A Pandora's box has opened which no-one can close. Everyone realises that, for all their benefits, these things will bring about huge collective disasters. The march of progress has crushed the gentler species of animal and plant to extinction beneath its feet.

But the gentlest and rarest species are the *creative gift of art* and the *fear of the Creator*; both of which, speaking generally, have disappeared. 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom'; we have lost this fear, and so we have become foolish.

I do not know how to explain this phenomenon, except by relating this lack of creative gift to the Creator. The building of the Tabernacle showed that when mankind rejects the belief in the Creator, then his creative ability disappears. Never before in the history of the world, has man been able to reject God so completely and successfully.

Even the Ancient Roman at his most evil had a fear of God which we have discarded. He realised that his life depended on the one who gives rain and sunshine. If there was famine he prayed to Ceres, the God of Corn;

The Origin of the Ionic Order



@T 1991 fig. 3


if he was sick he brought libations to Aesculapius, the God of healing; when he was childless he prayed to the God of fertility; and he acknowledged his dependence on the goddess Fortuna for good luck. But the pride of technological man has no limits, and is infinitely greater than that of his Roman counterpart.

Whereas the heathen feared the creator and bowed down to wood and stone, modern man fears no God and has no hope beyond technology. Ancient man harnessed nature and expressed this in his art; modern man finds himself, tragically, opposed to nature and has expressed this defiance in his art. Thus the creative artistic gift must disappear.

This process has occurred in architecture. In the past, we were confined to the disciplines of natural materials - brick, stone, timber, slate and stucco. My own village is a good example. The height was controlled by our ability to climb stairs and the depth was controlled by natural light and air. In our cities the same disciplines applied. But now steel, glass, concrete and plastics, electric lifts, artificial light and air, have given us an unbridled and unlimited freedom which we are unable to control. Cheaper, temporary construction and maximum profit have become our gods. In the Eighteenth Century Canaletto painted a view of the city of London from Somerset House. It was a beautiful city with St Pauls dominating the skyline. Today the same view shows St Pauls dwarfed by the new Temples of Mammon: the banks, which live off usury; and the insurance companies which fix their stakes on our misfortunes. In the old days people built as Hawksmoor built in Oxford's Radcliffe Camera. Nobody can fail to notice the exquisite proportions, the genial use of the classical orders, the natural materials, human scale and accomplished harmony and how it fits in with its surroundings. Today we build skyscrapers looking like oil refineries eschewing natural materials, working with no sense of proportion, without harmony or grace. Buildings like these cannot be compared with the buildings of our forefathers. The ability to design and build beautiful buildings has ceased.



Likewise it is instructive to compare an artist like Mantegna whose subtle feeling for anatomy, colour,

The Origin of the Corinthian Order



A. A green palm branch with rope lower allows another layer of leaves to sprout & curl under square top

B. The inspired artists formalise the natural shapes in gold and place them either side of the entrance to the Holy of Holies in the Tabernacle, where they support the veil.



C. Solomon refines & enriches this capital in the Temple, with a belly & basketwork as described in I Kings VIII 16-20. These are also festoons hanging from the ossicles in the abaci.

fig. 4

GT 1991

perspective and composition lifts and cheers the soul, with an artist like Bacon who paints without real beauty, denying perspective and grace, so that all is an insult to the human form. The ability to paint, speaking generally, has ceased. Perhaps the final statement of nihilism is a work like Yves Klein's blue rectangle, selling for a vast sum. Who I wonder is taken in by these emperors' new clothes? Certainly not readers of this journal. But the people who run the galleries, the institutions, the academies, and the media regard the work of Bacon, Rothko and Klein as great art, rather than as what it is: the expression of emptiness, of an age which is morally and spiritually bankrupt, of a world that knows not what to do, nor where to turn.

So is our position today without hope? Are we of all men the most miserable? By no means! As in theology, so in architecture, there is always a remnant whose sights are fixed on another world. And as we toil below through this short, uncertain earthly life, we can at least attempt to recreate something of His creation. Every commission, however small, is an opportunity to keep the lamp of traditional architecture flickering and is a chance not only for the architect, but also for the workman, to practise the skills he was born to use; to create with his

hands the thing that is good, be it a Corinthian capital in stone or a scroll in an iron railing or a leaf carved in wood or even a fine rubbed arch in a brick wall. All these raise a man from a mere wage earner to a craftsman:


Who lest all thought of Eden fade
 Bringst Eden to the Craftsman's brain
 Godlike to muse o'er his own trade
 And manlike to stand with God again.

And though in our fallen state we do dimly grope after perfection, yet it is this quest for beauty that makes both their work and mine so worthwhile. As in theology, so in architecture; however, it is necessary to bear all the ridicule and scorn that are deployed by the high priests of a cynical and faithless establishment, poisoned by the Darwinian misconception that evolution and progress are mandatory. We are coerced into believing that every age must bring something new.

But here again, as in theology, so in architecture; there is nothing new worth having, as Solomon said:

The thing that hath been is that which shall be,
 and that which is done is that which shall be
 done and there is no new thing (worth having)
 under the sun. Is there anything whereof it may
 be said, See this is new? It hath already been
 before us in old times.

(Eccl. Chapter 1 verses 9-10).



Quinlan Terry is a neo-Georgian architect.

NEW TITLES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM FOUNDATION

laissez-faire

A radical new quarterly journal providing a free market perspective on political and economic developments in Europe.

The first issue includes:

Rt Hon Nicholas Ridley MP
My Europe

Dr Nigel Ashford
The Free Market Case for Federalism

Professor Tim Congdon
In Defence of Sterling

Jamie Shea
NATO 2000

Annual Subscription

£15

OXFAM – THE ABUSE OF CHARITABLE STATUS

This extensively documented report analyses the political abuse of charitable status by Oxfam, Britain's wealthiest charity, over more than a decade and was submitted to the Charity Commission's inquiry into Oxfam.

"[The IFF] has become the most visible opponent of Third World charities...Its criticisms of Oxfam and Christian Aid have won the backing of twelve Tory MPs, many of whom agree with its plan to strip the Charity Commission of its investigative powers and set up an ombudsman to deal with public complaints."

The Independent 14 March 1991

£10 (pp.42)

IFF (UK), Suite 500, Chesham House, 150 Regent Street, London W1R 5FA
 Tel: (071) 729 5664 Fax: (071) 729 2934

Totalitarianism, Civil Society and the Nation

*Roger Scruton analyses the means of
state control*

In her unjustly celebrated book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt identifies Nazi Germany as her paradigm of totalitarian government, and writes as though the most important political feature of Nazism was its ideology.

Arendt traces this ideology back to German nationalist movements of the Nineteenth Century. Nationalism, she argues, places the organic community before the free individual, and demands a quasi-tribal homogeneity among the citizens. And this is the origin of the collectivist state, and of the totalitarian regime that governs it.

This analysis lends support to a myth that has been accepted by many socialists in our time. Socialism, they argue, aims to liberate the individual from domination, and is hostile to every power-structure which gives one person control over another. Socialism is *essentially* democratic, and is therefore diametrically opposed to totalitarian power. If totalitarian states *call* themselves 'socialist', this is partly so as to conceal their true intentions.

Thus many Western socialists have welcomed the recent transformations in Eastern Europe as 'socialist revolutions', in which workers and students rose together against the structures of power. 'Objectively speaking', I have heard it said, these

workers and students were even disciples of Marx.

'Whatever its excesses', the socialist may add, 'communism at least defeated fascism in Eastern Europe, and obliged the nationalities to live together. Now, however, nationalism may once again emerge as a major political force, and the spectre of fascism will rise again. It is against this development that we socialists must fight'.

This new 'struggle' is often associated with another, on behalf of 'civil society', which expression suggests Hegel's famous distinction between civil society and state. By aligning oneself with civil society, it is implied, you are absolved from the charge of worshipping the state.

It ought not to be necessary to refute Hannah Arendt's view of totalitarianism. It is enough that she never notices Lenin, and sees nothing in the French Revolution that foreshadows the Marxist-Leninist party. To be more precise, however, let us proceed with the Hegelian terminology, and define totalitarianism as the enterprise of controlling civil society in the name of the state: an enterprise which leads to the destruction of civil society, and to its replacement by the party machine. This enterprise is not undertaken *by* the state, but merely in the *name* of the state. The true instigator is the party, which enjoys the power of the state while escaping the state's responsibilities.

Total control requires a 'party of the new type', whose features first emerged in the modern world in the Jacobin Club, but which was brought to perfection by Lenin. The Nazi

Party was modelled on the Leninist example, and we should therefore see Nazi politics as one instance of a more general phenomenon. Arendt's discussion concentrates only upon what is *peculiar* to Nazism (its inflated nationalism), and ignores all that it shares with its nearest political neighbours. In emphasising the differentia, she loses sight of the essence.

A totalitarian system needs an ideology: but *no particular* ideology. By 'ideology' I mean a doctrine, more or less reducible to slogans, promulgated at maximum volume, and granted a monopoly over the surrounding mental space. It does not matter that the doctrine is unbelievable, since its power does not depend upon its truth, and survives long after belief in it has vanished. The doctrine announces the ruling Party's claims to social and intellectual territory, and sounds a warning to all those who would resist them. An ideology is a discourse in the imperative mood: it asks for obedience, but so loudly as to become indifferent, at last, to the question of its own truth. Totalitarian power needs an ideology if it is to achieve its purpose: but any ideology will do, provided it is turned up to a deafening volume, and provided it condemns its enemies to death.

It is worth noting, however, that parties of the new type have usually described themselves as 'socialist'. Even now, when trying to evade responsibility for their crimes, the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe have reaffirmed their 'socialist' commitment. The same was true of the National Socialist Party of Ger-

many, and it is true too of the various fractions of the Ba'ath Party in the Middle East - a much neglected, though extremely interesting, instance of totalitarian power, which currently serves to maintain two of the world's most repulsive dictatorships.

If we are to understand totalitarian politics, we should see the ideology as part of a continuous process, the outcome of which is a certain kind of power structure. The process goes as follows:

(a) A party of the new type is founded. Such a party is organised in a military way, as a system of command from the centre, with its own internal discipline. Its methods are essentially conspiratorial; it is at war with the surrounding order, and self-absolved from its law.

(b) The party's activity is justified by some final goal: the communist millennium, the thousand year Reich, or some such nonsense. This goal is embellished by an ideology, founded on some version of the 'liberty, equality and fraternity' which inspired the world's first attempt at totalitarian government. (In nationalism fraternity is dominant; in communism equality, and in anarchism liberty.)

(c) Ideology makes way for a 'morality of the new type'. So noble is the final goal, that everything done in pursuit of it is well done. This morality of the new type is expressly advocated by Lenin, and by his mentors Chernyshevsky and Robespierre; it makes possible the immediate goal, which is:

(d) Total control of the state by the party, involving a military operation against all opposing forces, whether military, administrative, judicial or customary.

From this goal springs another, namely:

(e) Total control of civil society by the party. The party recognises no part of social life as irrelevant to its sublime and justifying purpose. Therefore every part of social life must be controlled. Once the state is in the hands of the party, therefore, society must follow its master to the dungeon.

Total control of civil society can be achieved only if society is totally observed, and each deviant act is punished. Hence the project requires:

(f) The secret police as final arbiter of every social question, and as the ultimate brokers of power. The secret police must operate outside the law (if there is any law remaining), and have total licence to pursue their victims. This development is remarkable. But modern history shows that it is also inevitable. Without exception, every communist, Nazi, Ba'athist and anarcho-fascist government has become, within months, dependent upon the secret police. Orwell perceived that this must be so, simply by studying the behaviour of the communists in

*Total control requires
a 'party of the new
type', whose features
first emerged in the
modern world in the
Jacobin Club, but
which was brought
to perfection
by Lenin.*

Spain. You could acquire the same impression, too, from a meeting of the British Socialist Workers' Party, or from your average British students' union, where the process is still incipient, remaining at stage (b) - the final goal. But this final goal already permits the morality of the new type. The person opposed to the goal does not merely disagree with you. Either he is opposing you from within your ranks, in which case he is a heretic, who must be eliminated at all costs. Or else he is one of the enemy - 'bourgeois', 'fascist', 'racist', 'Jew', 'bolshevik' - to whom anything can be done. (Descriptions of the enemy form a fascinating subject of study. We find, at a certain stage of development of the Nazi Party, a warning against 'Jewish plutocrat bolsheviks'; and, in the Soviet system during the 1970s, a threat from 'petit-bourgeois Trotskyite Zionists' - which means

roughly the same.)

Once you have described all opposition as a form of rooted enmity, the morality of the new type follows at once. All of us are endowed by nature with an instinct for war. However decent and peaceable we may be, we respond to real external threat with a new code of behaviour: the enemy must be eliminated, and we must group together in serried ranks to protect ourselves. No doubt there are Darwinian explanations for this instinct: but that need not concern us. It exists, and its laws of motion are fairly well known. It is from this instinct, excited by the party of the new type and by its pugnacious ideology, that the morality of the new type flows. Once this morality is in place, it must have its way, as it has its way in war: as in any military operation, control becomes the immediate object. The final goal for which we are fighting (the millennium) is soon lost sight of. Indeed, it was never clearly perceived in the first place, being a sentimental illusion whose function was precisely to release the military passions for which the party members crave. The more immediate purpose of control therefore usurps the final goal, and becomes the party's ruling obsession. Anyone who stands in the way of this control is an enemy: churchman, lawyer, judge or teacher; worker, manager or landowner - he will be shown by his resistance to be the 'bourgeois', the 'Jew', the 'bolshevik' or the 'fascist'. Rule by the secret police then follows as a matter of course. The final goal gives way to the all-encompassing purpose of social control itself; the means becomes the end.

The machinery of social control will continue to function even when the ideology is no longer believed. However, the instinct for war cannot be maintained indefinitely, and it is not in human nature to live with one's neighbour according to the morality of the new type. Bit by bit the morality of the old type creeps back, and the military machine begins to rust at the joints. What W.H. Auden, to his shame, described as the 'necessary murder' at last becomes impossible. The party cannot murder, torture and imprison on the scale required, and the party's monopoly of power gradually van-

ishes along with its justifying purpose. (Some commentators, notably Zinoviev, refuse to accept this, believing that the morality of the new type gives way to *no morality at all*, and that the New Soviet Man can live for ever, maintaining his own enslavement, in a condition of utter nihilism: see especially his recent *Katastroika*. Recent events make Zinoviev's conclusions seem highly implausible).

Control of the state involves certain interesting features, and it is worth describing them since they can be witnessed in all regimes commonly described as totalitarian, whether Nazi, communist or Ba'athist:

(a) Control of the law. The institutions of the law are structurally incompatible with totalitarian government. Law involves the impartial judgment of conflicts, according to settled principles which may be clearly understood in advance. The party can control the state only if it can control the outcome of every trial - and especially the trials of its political opponents. Hence it cannot allow the law to be the arbiter of conflicts. Law is therefore banished from its erstwhile central place in society and replaced by a peculiar substitute, in which vague language, the absence of records, and the indeterminacy of procedures exist side by side with a judiciary that is entirely subservient to the party.

(b) Control of institutions. The 'law of the new type' is one instance of the 'institutions of the new type'. The purpose of these - which might also be called 'Potemkin' institutions - is to provide a mask for the party, and to 'fictionalise' its violence. The soviets, the *komsomol*, the legislative assemblies and one-party elections: all are disguises for the party's absolute and irresponsible power. They also serve an additional function, in confusing the citizens, and in creating an impenetrable bureaucratic shield behind which the party can operate without undue disturbance from its victims.

(c) Control of the army. The 'army of the new type' is not the servant of the state, nor the servant of the people, but the slave of the party. The party structure is extended directly into the army, whose officers are all (with few exceptions) party mem-

*An ideology is a
discourse in the
imperative mood: it
asks for obedience,
but so loudly as to
become indifferent,
at last, to the
question of its
own truth*

bers, obedient to the central committee alone. Those officers in the Czechoslovak army who made preparations to defend their country against invasion in 1968 - the only patriots in uniform - were promptly tried for 'treason'. Of course, the real treason here was that of the party, which surrendered the Czechs and Slovaks to an invading power. Nevertheless, the verdict was appropriate, since the officers betrayed the party, whose true servants they were.

(d) Control of the police in general, and the secret police in particular. This leads to the only important division of power in the totalitarian state. A police force that is truly secret can evade the observation even of those who instruct it. The police can therefore, if it chooses, work independently of the party. It may even control the party, in which case - while the totalitarian system remains intact - the party's ultimate goals become irrelevant, and the apparatus of the state is surrendered to the secret police. This process can be seen in the USSR, with the rise of the KGB chief Andropov to the supreme position of power, and the subsequent appointment of Gorbachev, another KGB man, as his successor. We then witness a surprising fact: that the agenda of the KGB, once brought into the open, is milder than the agenda of the party, perhaps because it is more far-sighted.

Having gained control of the state, the party can set about controlling society. To understand what this in-

volves, we must first give a definition of 'civil society'. Hegel expressly contrasted civil society with the family. The family is founded in obligations of 'piety': ie, obligations whose ground is not the free choice of the participants, but the gratitude and respect that we owe to those with whom destiny has bound us. Civil society is a sphere which opposes itself to the close-knit bonds of the family: a sphere of free association and institution building, in which all obligations arise from our own agreement to be bound by them. Its ruling principle is contract, and its guardian institution is the law (which is the will of the state).

The broad contours of Hegel's account seem to me to be correct. He is right in identifying two kinds of social obligation, and in recognising a sphere of 'free association under law' as one of the prime conditions of citizenship. There is a distinction to be made, however, between two kinds of free association:

(i) Associations which come about as the unintended result of people's voluntary actions. The paradigm case is the free market: but this is only one instance of an institution, arising 'by an invisible hand', which affects the conduct of those who take part in it. (Other instances are costumes, manners and festivals).

(ii) Associations which are deliberately created, and which depend upon some criterion of membership - such as clubs, schools, universities and churches.

Such corporations are prime targets for totalitarian subversion. But in order to control civil society, you must also control the 'invisible hand'. The planned economy is therefore a necessary part of the totalitarian project. So too is the destruction of private property, since private property permits the two fundamental relations upon which free institutions are built: contract and gift. Rights must also be abolished - both the rights of individuals and the rights of corporations - since rights draw limits to what the party can do. Conversely, private property, the market, corporations and rights are preconditions of civil society. It is indeed difficult to see how a civil society can exist, without some version of the capitalist economy; I am therefore puzzled by socialists who

say that 'civil society' is the name of their ideal - especially if we remember the provenance of this idea in Hegel and the German phrase *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* or 'bourgeois society' which expresses it.

Control of civil society requires the creation of Potemkin institutions and a Potemkin economy. The highest posts in every civil institution must be assigned to party stooges, while the people lower down must be subject to harassment until their conformity is ensured. Thus we have seen a 'church' (the Russian Orthodox) whose episcopate consisted largely of atheist members of the KGB! In order to achieve this kind of control it is necessary not merely to destroy all property rights (which are the main vehicle of corporate freedom), but also to undo the laws of association. In normal societies an association is permitted until it is forbidden, and when permitted its actions are subject to the law, under which it has both rights and liabilities. In totalitarian societies associations are forbidden until expressly permitted - usually by some written dispensation from the party machine. Once permitted, however, their actions lie beyond the law: for the real decisions taken in their name are not taken by the corporations themselves, but by the party, which is immune from prosecution; while the responsibilities which fall on them can never be honoured, unless the party itself responds.

It is easy to see that civil society must be dear to any opponent of totalitarianism. But can civil society be the goal of politics? Can there be a politics of a still newer kind, which has the maintenance of civil society as its primary purpose? If there can be such a politics, then it certainly will not be socialist. It will involve the maintenance of rights and duties under law, of the rule of law itself, and of the institution of private property. And it will uphold the principle that all association is permitted until it is declared illegal. Under such a ruling, the free market and private investment will be the inevitable forms of economic order. The state may play a part in economic life, but only as one corporate person among others. If the state should use its legal monopoly (necessary to the rule of law, and therefore to civil

society) in order to make grants of economic monopoly, it becomes a threat to civil society. This is especially so if the state grants monopolies to itself. For then the state begins to eat up the sphere of civil society, and to extend its powers into areas where they cannot be competently exercised.

If we are to make civil society into our political goal, however, it should be obvious that our politics will be a very limited kind of politics, consisting of the maintenance of the institutions and the rights which enable people to associate freely and securely, and by which corporate persons can protect themselves. Different institutions and different traditions will emerge, according to the wayward drift of human encounters. Politics in such a society has no goal, except to protect the goals of others, and to reconcile the conflicts that arise between them. We must therefore renounce the belief upon which socialism is founded: the belief that politics has the goal of shaping society. The politics of civil society is a politics of guardianship. It involves the renunciation of goals - including the goal of 'social justice' - in order that the goals of citizens may emerge. Civil society has been likened by Oakeshott to a 'conversation': it goes nowhere, but is at every point a free response to the act which prompted it. And it is in conversation that we are fulfilled.

Such a picture of the place of politics is 'liberal' in the classical sense. However, it suffers from a crucial defect. Civil society does not create the obligations that maintain it. It consists in the sphere of free associa-

***Without exception,
every communist,
Nazi, Ba'athist and
anarcho-fascist
government has
become, within
months, dependent
upon the secret police***

tion within the community; but it endures only because people live peacefully together, in obedience to a common law, and with sufficient public spirit to defend the state in times of crisis. Societies survive because their members are prepared for sacrifice, and because each person regards his neighbour as entitled to the benefit of membership. In short, civil society comes into being and endures only because there are other sources of its unity. People do not need society only, they need a home; and a home is an exclusive place. They will obey laws only if they are sure that others too are motivated to obey them; and they will make sacrifices only when they are sure that the sacrifice will not be theirs alone. They are in need of a comprehensive solution to the prisoner's dilemma of society - the solution which Hobbes found in sovereignty, and which he tried so hard, but with so little success, to reduce to a social contract. (As Hegel argues, civil society is a sphere of contract, but it is not founded on a contract, since its foundation lies deeper than any human choice).

This is why totalitarianism presents such a temptation. It offers a solution to the problem of unity, and its solution does not depend, as the old solutions often depended, on common submission to a religious faith, or common allegiance to a king. The totalitarian party conscripts people to its purpose, and sets them marching side by side into the future. But the future has gone the way of all gods. It has been demystified. We know that we can neither control nor predict it, and that the utopian promises are lies. But we are no nearer to finding an alternative source of unity: a unity without a purpose, from which our true purposes may freely spring.

What form should such a unity take, if it is to maintain the condition of civil society? It must, I believe, offer some equivalent of the experience of 'membership' which religion and tribe offered to our ancestors. It must cause people to settle together, in a common territory, and to defend that territory against their enemies. It must be fortified by family ties and provide a motive to extend them. And it must make sacrifice seem worthwhile, even the sacri-

fice of battle. In short, it must forge a kind of first-person plural - a 'we' - which is something more than the fleeting web of contracts, and which endures across generations with a burden of inheritance, and a duty to pass things on.

I have argued elsewhere that such a 'we' is both necessary to the liberal political order, and also essentially 'pre-political', the creature of history and piety, and not of contract or law. Furthermore, I argue, the least dangerous form of the pre-political 'we' in the modern world is the national identity which defines itself in terms of territory, and which is therefore moderated by the experience of a territorial jurisdiction. Such an experience of nationhood is reinforced by a common language, by a common religion, and by a common history of trial and triumph. And it is the most treasured experience of those central European peoples who are currently emerging from totalitarian darkness. It is the resource of national loyalty which enabled the Poles and the Hungarians to make such striking gestures on behalf of civil society. And it is the lack of this resource that has ensured that Yugoslavia can emerge from its prison only in fragments.

To believe, with Hannah Arendt, that nationalism is the origin of totalitarian ideology is to close the mind to an important truth. National loyalty is the only force that has stood against totalitarian power. The German and the East European experience shows us that the liberal *Rechtsstaat* had no ability to resist the totalitarian party, and no desire to intercede on behalf of its victims. The spirit of the nation, however, fortified by the Christian faith which has been for centuries entwined with it, was able to unite people against their common enemy. It would be folly to pour scorn on this spirit, or to imagine that it can be discarded in favour of some pure 'social contract', defined without reference to the nation and its sorrows. National and religious loyalties are the foundation of public spirit. Without such a spirit no civil society can grow in those devastated lands where the totalitarian experiment has squandered every other resource.

On the other hand, there is no 'we' without a 'they'. Membership

means others, who do not belong. In times of strain, scarcity and privation we may find here a sufficient cause of enmity. Tension between the nations may therefore provide a threat to Central Europe: in this the socialists are right. But you do not overcome such a tension by fighting against the national idea: for that is to deprive the people of their only source of unity, and their only means to re-establish a law-abiding state. The people of East and Central Europe stand in need of some transnational institution, which will be a moderator in their conflicts, and also an object of common loyalty. In short,

The planned economy is therefore a necessary part of the totalitarian project. So too is the destruction of private property, since private property permits the two fundamental relations upon which free institutions are built: contract and gift

they need an imperial crown. It was the disappearance of this crown which led to the persecution, and near extinction, of the only nation in their midst which lacked the benefit of territory. And it is through a rival form of 'trans-national' loyalty - loyalty to the party - that so many of the Central European Jews were to take their revenge, realising only too late that they had fallen into the very trap from which they had believed themselves to have escaped for ever. So much bitterness remains from these conflicts that people are be-

ginning to lose sight of the fact that neither nationalism, nor anti-semitism, nor Jewish revanchism can really account for all that central Europe has suffered. Its misery was caused by a vacuum of legitimacy, following the collapse of Habsburg power. To put a final end to the totalitarian nightmare, the vacuum of legitimacy must be filled. And it must be filled without destroying national loyalty. How can this be done without a crown? Or will the throne of St Peter suffice?

Roger Scruton's *collection of stories, A Dove Descending, was published by Sinclair Stevenson in 1991.*

The Future of the Family

Paul Goodman reflects on a threat to our social fabric

In an age when meaningful debate both between and within Britain's political parties seems all but dead, at least one subject still has the capacity to raise it back to life. The subject is one that has particular implications - it cannot help doing so, since it seems certain to mark the political landscape for the next twenty-five years at least - for the Conservative Party. The collapse of the family - Britain's basic social unit, lest we need reminding - is beginning to engage something more substantial than the fitful attention of the media. As divorce rates, the number of one-parent families, co-habitation figures, and illegitimate births spiral, it is not fanciful to see a parallel movement of public unease, bafflement, and fear chasing its statistical neighbour upwards towards its unknown destination.

The response of the fashionable establishment, to this rising disquiet has been to cup a tin ear: we are reassured, firstly, that the collapse of the family plays no part in Britain's social problems and secondly, that even if it did, nothing can be done - in a ghostly echo of the debate on Britain's economic plight that dominated the early 1980s. The debate on Britain's social plight is beginning to dominate the early 1990s.

Such a debate must begin with statistics. More than a third of new marriages entered into this year are expected to end in divorce with most of the 150,000 petitions coming from the wives. The divorce rate has risen more than sixfold since 1961. (From 27,000 to 168,000 each year according to the latest figures, dating from 1986.) This leaves the United Kingdom heading the European divorce table with a yearly divorce rate of 12.9 per 1,000 marriages, nearly double the European average of 6.9.

These developments have altered family life in Britain almost beyond recognition. On present trends, approximately one in five children will experience a family break up by the age of 16; every day, 900 children under that age see their parents divorce. They then, overwhelmingly, move into one-parent families. Over a million of these are responsible for over a million and a half children; 90 per cent are headed by a woman. They form a sharply-rising proportion of all families with children, doubling since 1971 according to the most recent indicators (from 8 per cent in that year to 16 per cent in 1988).

Some think that this development

is responsible for the most startling development of all, the sharp acceleration in the number of illegitimate births. As recently as 1979, Britain's illegitimacy rate was slightly more than one in 10, one of the lowest in the industrialised world. By 1984 it was one in 6; by 1986 one in 5; by 1989, one in 4. The 1990 figures recently released, showed an 8 per cent rise on the previous year, accelerating the number of Britain's children born outside marriage towards one in 3.

A more plausible explanation is suggested by the rise in co-habitation. In 1975, the number of illegitimate births registered by both parents was approximately 50 per cent; by 1987, it had risen to 70 per cent. The proportion of women of marriageable age cohabiting rose from 9 per cent of single women in 1981 to 20 per cent in 1988; the rise in the numbers of separated and divorced women were 39 and 52 per cent for these respective years. And the total number of births, of course, is falling sharply: the British level is still below the rate needed to maintain the population size. The average British woman gives birth to one baby less than she did 30 years ago; the number of third-born children has nearly halved since 1960.

Human beings cannot bear too many statistics; after a while they provide information at the expense of understanding. Furthermore, effects can be exaggerated by over concentrating on households rather than people. In 1987, 77 per cent of people living in private households in Britain still lived in families headed by a married couple. But the net

effect of the figures quoted conveys a powerful impression of a culture whose familial values are shifting from commitment, stability and longevity to choice, flux and change, with autonomous men and women drifting in and out of unstable partnerships based, increasingly, on co-habitation.

Optimists - like Ferdinand Mount, whose *The Subversive Family* pays tribute to that institution's durability and flexibility - argue that family structure is undergoing the latest alteration in its continual process of evolutionary change. In an essay on 'Questions of sexual morality', Dr. Edward Norman has pointed out that, unlike what he terms traditional societies, modern societies are not 'wasteful of human life': infant mortality is less high, the life-span of adults less brief. The psalmist wrote that 'the years of our life are threescore years and ten, or if we have strength, fourscore'; this being no longer so, adult partners are confronted with the possibility of a life together lasting perhaps three times as long as those of their ancestors. And the past was less halcyon than imagined: as recently as the Nineteenth Century, three out of every five first children were illegitimate. Such debunking prepares one for the final psychological trick - whereby the more doom-laden the statistics, the more they are held to demonstrate the family's adaptability: the language of despair is replaced by *panglossolia*.

The past may not have been rosy and patterns of family living may have been less unitary than one might have supposed, but this does not mean that the future will prove heart-warming, or that present developments can be viewed with complacency. In addition, the cultural background against which these developments have taken place - as well as their sheer scale and pace - provides much cause for concern. Its most striking feature, unique to our times, has been the mass availability of contraception, which finally severed the cord which connects procreation and childbearing. This has taken place against a shift of moral attitudes that stresses rights rather than responsibilities. The clamour for 'rights' with its impoverished vision of what it means to be human, is philosophi-

cally anodyne, but it carries with it nonetheless the unmistakable flavour of the supermarket mall, with its bewildering variety of easily available goods and services. We are all, to adapt Sir William Harcourt, consumers now, and - in the absence of moral formation - successive generations simply select and discard other human beings like packets of microwavable food. In these 'new times', of which the middle-aged Turks of *Marxism Today* have written so engagingly, no problem - as Tom Stoppard once put it - is insoluble given a large enough plastic bag. In the western world, the family is moving towards unknown and uncharted regions.

***On present trends,
approximately one in
five children will
experience family
break up by the age
of 16; every day, 900
children under that
age see their parents
divorce. They then,
overwhelmingly,
move into one-parent
families.***

Such a posture of disenchantment is, perhaps, predictable enough. However, it makes an uncertain starting point for a defence of the family: being scoffed at by the optimists does not matter over much, but if the problems caused by family disintegration are to be addressed seriously, observers should agree about the consequences. One consequence that is simply irrefutable is the rising cost to the taxpayer.

The American political scientist Charles Murray, in his paper 'The emerging British underclass' has pointed out that single mothers are the fastest growing group on wel-

fare. 70 per cent of single parents are on income support; 40 per cent derive their income entirely from the state. There is even a state payment - one parent benefit - targetted specifically on this client group. The Family Policies Study Centre reports that ending this situation by co-habitation, rather than marriage, can make one better off when claiming unemployment benefit or the state pension. The Centre has also highlighted future implications of present trends, pointing out that the number of poverty stricken elderly people, particularly women, will rise sharply in coming years. The future cost of these phenomena remains incalculable.

Relate, the marriage support organisation, estimated shortly before the Fowler social security reforms that the cost of family breakdown, in the late 1980s, was approaching almost £1.5 billion a year - with £600 million extra being spent on supplementary benefit, £300 million extra on housing benefit, £40 million extra on family income supplement, and £90 million on one parent benefit. The cost to the health service is assessed to be £99 million extra, with local authorities spending an extra £27 million. The Government's own White Paper, *Children Come First*, puts the total cost at over £3 billion a year (the now defunct Conservative Family Campaign pitched the figure as high as £5 billion) but it is impossible to calculate the full costs to the social services, the police and the courts, or in lost productivity, to produce a watertight total. Public cost becomes inseparable from private grief.

Family break up leads immutably to private and indeed public grief. A profusion of serious research - such as that of the American National Association of Elementary School Principals and the Panel Study of Income, as well as our own National Children's Bureau; and David Willetts who, in his study *Happy Families*, quotes Kiernan and Wicks as well as evidence from Sweden - suggests an intrinsic link between familial disintegration and such contemporary evils as homelessness, illiteracy, unemployment, rising crime and drug abuse.

Even more significantly, the evidence speaks eloquently of what eve-

ryday happenings in modern Britain confirm - of a shattered landscape of psychic alienation and spiritual vacuity, in which, 'lost in a haunted wood', lonely men and women struggle to piece together their shattered lives and ruined dreams. Those who dismiss such sentiments rely on the defence that cohabitation is replacing marriage as the normal relational bond. The shifting kaleidoscope of co-habitation, they claim, offers semi-permanent refuge. A single, devastating figure will suffice as a response: cohabiting adults are three times as likely to end up as single parents as married couples.

There is certainly some mysterious, intrinsic difference between marriage and cohabitation. Murray suggests that the most worrying feature of family break-up is the rising illegitimacy rate, but in a sense his argument should be turned on its head: rising illegitimacy is, in its modern context, merely the inexorable consequence of the decline of the idea of marriage. We must return to this idea to preserve Britain's social ecology.

The phrase is the new Chief Rabbi's. In his recent Reith Lectures, Jonathan Sacks described the family as 'not just one of our institutions, but a formative one, the crucible in which much else of our social structure takes place...change it and you change humanity'. The family as a religious institution, he wrote, holds much of our moral world in place. Such an argument flows naturally from the Jewish tradition, which sees the home as the foremost institution in which consecration to God is realised: the recital at the wedding ceremony over a cup of wine of praises to God for the creation of man and woman to be companions to each other are, according to Dr. Isidore Epstein, 'drunk by the couple as an indication of their resolve to share whatever destiny Providence may allot to them in the years to come'.

Such a rite holds out a vision of conduct unutterably distant from the banality of the consumer mentality. Within it, a man achieves his humanity by a continuing act of commitment, of self-giving, to another and to others. Furthermore he does so not in existential isolation, but within the informing confines of a tradition that gives meaning and dignity

to his present and future by rooting him in his past. These sacrificial and redemptive themes are heightened and dramatised in the corporate and liturgical life of Christianity (although their present neglect is ample evidence of the blight that grips modern theology).

Politics and religion are not synonymous. You need not be a Jew or a Christian to believe in the preservation of the family any more than you need be Jewish or Christian to be conservative. Nor should marriage be sentimentalised: there has always been *realpolitik* at the altar, as for example, the institution of the marriage settlement indicates. But

The clamour for 'rights' with its impoverished vision of what it means to be human, is philosophically anodyne, but it carries with it nonetheless the unmistakable flavour of the supermarket mall, with its bewildering variety of easily available goods and services

this is precisely where the religious idea which underpins marriage in the Judaeo-Christian tradition found its strengths: the secular existed, so to speak, within the sacred, and even the most cynical dynastic arrangement, or the most hasty shotgun wedding, could and had to be accommodated within the latter's all encompassing boundaries. Many who view such arrangements with amused incomprehension will nonetheless envy the social and personal coherence that such an ethic - in the

face, all too often, of mutual attraction, painless compatibility, or conventional wisdom - is capable of sustaining.

Against the backdrop of totalitarian horror in our present century, the quietly heroic virtues of the family - loyalty, natural affection, respect for the experience of past generations, reverence for what is known and tested - have shone out with dogged insistence. Little wonder that one of the most vital projects set in motion by socialists, national or international, has been to try to snuff it out. Paul Johnson, in his *History of the Modern World*, notes that Konrad Adenauer - 'the patriarch', he writes, 'of a vast, close and ramifying family' - came to regard the family unit as the bedrock of any society founded on objective moral values. Like patriotism, the family does itself: with its feeling for custom and precedent, its sense of accumulated inheritance, its intimations of timelessness and contempt for urgency, it is a living rebuke to those who would impatiently seek to build, in Eliot's phrase, 'systems so perfect that no-one will need to be good'. (It is also, with its generation spans, the bulwark of private property - and therefore a powerful cause of socialist hostility). These values, so intrinsic to conservatives, are literally incarnated in the family; which is why the family was earlier described as an embodied idea.

The principal cause of its present disembodiment is the decline of another idea, that of fatherhood. This is seen outside the confines of the home, and discerned in more than the illegitimacy figures; again there are religious parallels. The past thirty years have witnessed a challenge to authentic Christianity unparalleled in almost two thousand years of theological opprobrium. The hysteria of 'feminist theology', with its blindness to the transcendent and its lymphatic obscurity, envisages God as mother. This movement has coincided, in a wider cultural context, with the denigration of father figures and of authority generally. In a world where information is derived increasingly from machines, those who were once conduits of knowledge, and who therefore possessed the authority to communicate it, are held up to ridicule as

outmoded and unwanted. This, rather than low wages, has been the real cause of the decline in the status of the teaching profession. The authority of God himself, the immutable one who 'does whatever he wills, in heaven and upon the earth, in the seas and in the great depths', finds its validation in the shifts of emotion that govern democratic assemblies. Ninety per cent of Britain's one parent families are headed by the mother - illustrative possibly of male irresponsibility - indicative, certainly, of the decline of fatherhood.

Such malign social change cannot but have its effect on a succession of generations. Just as it is only the mother who can predominantly provide the nurturing and cherishing elements in the home, so it is only the father who can ultimately instil a sense of discipline, obligation and social responsibility into his children. The roles are complementary: families need both parents. Indeed a family can almost be defined - in circumstances other than those brought about by bereavement - by its possession of two parents, which is why the conception of the 'one parent family' is not only misleading but inherently contradictory, like dry water or cold fire.

The cost to society of family breakdown - homelessness, illiteracy, unemployment, crime - has its own multiplier effect. Significantly, child abuse is frequently carried out not by the father, but by the foster-father or live-in consort. The Bronx of Tom Wolfe's *Bonfire of the Vanities* is desolated by an absence of fathers; little need to look further, in its British equivalents, for the origins of our own underclass.

The financial and social case for the resuscitation of the family, of our social ecology, by the Conservative Party is unanswerable. Why is it then, that the subject is frequently met in distinguished quarters by furtiveness and evasion? Perhaps the answer is partly to be found in the cross-party buoyancy of the movement - fronted by the sort of assertive 'independent' women whose electoral support is believed to be essential - that believes that a woman's place is in the office, and holds out for the tax breaks and child care provision that will make this easier. A more substantial reason, however,

The principal cause of its present disem-bodiment is the decline of another idea, that of fatherhood

has more to do with the intellectual differences that mark Conservative supporters.

The fundamental division between conservatives is not between those who believe that conservatism is 'the art of the possible' and those who follow 'the new conservatism' but between those whose vision of society is corporate and communitarian, and those whose values are libertarian and individualistic. This divergence may become especially marked in a period when social - rather than more narrowly-based economic issues - are at the forefront of public attention. Freedom has been one of the great *leitmotifs* of Conservative thought during the last ten years, and many will argue that the individual should be free to make his own moral choices without interference from others - even at the cost of disintegrating social cohesion. One might well reply that one man's freedom is another man's *gulag* - or even his own, in some cases. The Chief Rabbi, quoting Peter Berger, refers to 'the loss of the sacred canopy...that over arching framework of shared meanings that once shaped individuals into a society'. Conservatives are unlikely, in a future that may be dark and loveless, to view such a loss with equanimity, or to confirm it by allowing the family structure to crumble into dust.

Remedies that are not entirely uncontroversial will inevitably provoke lively reaction. The Conservative Party cannot play electoral Russian roulette by seeking to bar women from the workplace, as if that were possible or even desirable, or by seeking to ban divorce - although proposals that seek to ease divorce laws still further should be regarded with suspicion. But it can seek unambigu-

ously to support the family, by ensuring that the tax and benefits system supports marriage rather than undermines it. This was the original logic of the married man's allowance; it seems, in the alterations to the tax and benefits régime that have consequently taken place, as though successive administrations have been unable or unwilling to consider the financial and social consequences of benefits which, such as family credit, are distributed regardless of marriage or which, like one parent benefit, are available to specific interest groups.

Child tax allowances would miss perhaps 100,000 families who do not pay tax, but whose income would be above the qualifying threshold for family credit. They would, however, certainly encourage virtues associated with family life - self-improvement, earning one's way, working oneself up the financial ladder. Such allowances - restricted, of course to married couples - would complement child benefit by providing an extra source of financial support to families. One parent benefit would be abolished and the money redistributed within the social security budget - perhaps to couples on income support, who at present receive lower rates than two single adults. The anomaly whereby the level of Family Credit is the same for one and two parent families should also be corrected.

Such a programme could scarcely be introduced in one budget. Rather it should take place during a full Parliament; thus, it might be possible to distribute the balance of support between tax allowances and child benefit more evenly. This would also help to ameliorate the considerable short-term cost of the measures (although in the long term such a programme might well fund itself). Further assistance might be found from the approximately £8 billion tied up in mortgage tax relief which seems earmarked for eventual redistribution; a Conservative Government could find no more appropriate purpose for it than the support of the family.

Proposals such as extending the 'cooling off' periods before divorce, re-examining proposals for child care vouchers and providing more financial support for marriage reconcilia-

tion agencies will neither reverse the decline of the family overnight, revive the idea of fatherhood, nor create a public culture that respects marriage. They will, however, provide a modest but relentless means of reversing the mostly unwitting social engineering brought about by a tax and benefits system that has floated adrift from its roots. Furthermore they would help in calling back the Conservative party to a political philosophy more attuned to its nature, and more appropriate to the temper of the age.

'I will greatly multiply your pain in childbearing; in pain you shall bring forth children, yet your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall

rule over you'. The divine curse, as oppressive as it is mysterious, that occupies such a significant place in the opening chapters of the book of Genesis provides a reminder that family life, like any real thing, is necessarily difficult and arduous, even painful. A reminder that such is life itself, in a world that increasingly seems to envisage itself as a suffering-free zone, is not inappropriate. Perhaps Phillip Larkin, when he represented the action of parents on their children by the most direct of sexual metaphors, had something of this in mind. Elsewhere, however, the poet hints at the strange wonder, the sudden sense of enduring delight, that family companionship can

make possible -

And I, whose childhood
Is a forgotten boredom,
Feel like a child
Who comes on a scene
Of adult reconciling
And can understand nothing
But the unusual laughter
And starts to be happy.

Paul Goodman writes for
the Daily Telegraph.

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?

*Esmond Wright on the lessons
of the Thomas affair*

In all the ballyhoo of the recent Senate TV show what mattered was the verdict: Fifty-two Senators were for Judge Thomas with all but two of the Republicans voting for his confirmation, and all but eleven of the Democrats voting against. Many of those individual verdicts were more significant than the alleged misbehaviour of Judge Thomas.

The two Republicans who rejected presidential persuasion, and voted against him, were Bob Packwood of Oregon (who has a long record of support for women's rights) and the equally liberal James Jeffords of Vermont. Both came from states where blacks are much less important as a lobby than the National Organisation for Women. The NOW were massed on the Capitol steps outside the hearing, chanting 'We will remember in November', and encouraged from the chamber by the heartening if strident tones of the belle of Baltimore, Senator Barbara Mikulski, who kept up her battlecry, 'Let us send our message everywhere'. The bulk of the cross-over vote came from conservative Democrats from the

southern states, where white politicians among large black populations felt vulnerable to Judge Thomas's charges of racism. So the Judge was supported by both senators from Louisiana, both Senators from Georgia, by Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, by Richard Shelby of Alabama, Denis de Concini of Arizona, and not least by Chuck Robb of Virginia, President Johnson's son-in-law, who was seeking to contain the damage done to his presidential ambitions by his admitted session and nude massage (his word) with a model. He was all too familiar with accusations of sexual misconduct, and voted for the judge.

This analysis may suggest something of the atmosphere of the Old

South, where gracious ladies left politics to the men-folk. But not all the South is true to its stereotypes anymore and Florida, the sunshine state, never quite belonged anyway. There, women's groups, many of whose members are pensioners in flight from the frost zone to the north, are numerous, vocal and financially strong. Senator Robert Graham (of the *Washington Post* family) voted against the Judge. So did Harry Reid of Nevada, with the strict standards of a Mormon, and Chris Dodd of Connecticut who is Catholic, but liberal. Both Senators face elections this November and need both funding and support for their campaigns which is likely to come, in their states, more readily from women than from blacks.

The Judge Thomas affair has highlighted the problems faced by women in the market place, at the desk and in the office. It may assist Geraldine Ferraro (the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Vice-President in 1984) in her campaign for the New York Senate this year. But it has also revealed much more that is alarming. Only four years ago, Robert Bork, a more distinguished practising judge than Clarence Thomas, was similarly nominated to the Supreme Court by President Reagan, who described him as 'the most prominent and intellectually powerful advocate of judicial restraint'. He too was grilled, and he was rejected.

For the previous two decades those judges who practised what has been called judicial activism had been doing their best to steer the Court down a liberal-socialist path. Judge Bork was vulnerable as a critic of this activism, on the grounds that it imposed laws on the majority which they would never, through their elected representatives, have imposed upon themselves. The most notorious of these judgements was *Roe versus Wade* in 1973, when Justice Blackmun claimed to have unearthed a doctrine not explicit in the Constitution, which he called the right to privacy. By invoking this, a pregnant woman could kill, and authorise others to kill, her unborn child. Liberals rejoiced in a woman's right to choose; Catholics were horrified. Bork was and is a strict constructionist: 'Judges', he said, 'Must apply to modern circum-

stances the principles laid down by those who adopted our Constitution, but must not invent new principles of their own'. The members of the country's leading law faculties, liberal and 'politically correct' to a man, were prompt in helping to savage a conservative: Harvard, Stanford, Buffalo, Oregon to name only the most prominent, supported the role of the Supreme Court as a super-active Third Chamber - as long as it took a liberal road. Judge Bork, a former Appeals Court Judge, a former Professor at Yale, a former Solicitor-General, was denied a place on the Court.

President Bush has won this round. But he has done so by nominating less gifted men, since they are less likely to be challenged. The Court as such is the weaker

It is no disrespect to Judge Thomas, or to David Souter who was appointed to the Court after the rejection of Bork, to say that neither is a jurist of Judge Bork's eminence. Harvard law professor Christopher Edley has said 'If Thomas were white, he would not have been nominated... Bush's meritocratic language is fatuous unless one takes both colour and ideology into account in deciding what it means to be the best qualified'. President Bush has won this round, and the Constitution is now in general conservative by six to three. But he has done so by nominating less gifted men, since they are less likely to be challenged. The Court as such is the weaker.

The politicisation of the Supreme Court does not originate, as some have imagined, from the Chief Justiceships of Earl Warren and Warren Burger between 1953 to 1986, nor from the storms that followed

Brown versus the Board of Education of Topeka (which presaged the desegregation of schools and colleges and of much else) in 1954, and *Roe versus Wade* in 1973. It has been political, even controversial, from its inception, notably since the long tenure of John Marshall (the fourth Chief Justice) from 1801 to 1835, and the almost equally long Chief Justiceship of his successor, Roger Taney of Maryland (whose appointment was blocked for eight months in the Senate, on the grounds that as President Andrew Jackson's former Treasury Secretary he was 'a political hack'). The first Chief Justice, John Jay, resigned in 1795 to run for Governor of New York. (The second nomination of a Chief Justice to the Court, that of John Rutledge by George Washington, was blocked by the Senate in 1795). Until the passage of the 13th and 14th Amendments in 1865 and 1868 the Court held blacks to be unfree and thus not citizens; Roger Taney's Court held that a slave, Dred Scott, remained so despite a spell of residence in free territory to the north. It ruled that Congress could not limit the taking of slaves into the new territory being opened up, which in effect meant that the policy of the new Republican Party of 1856 (Lincoln's Party) was unconstitutional. On two occasions it upheld Fugitive Slave Acts, requiring the return of runaways to their masters, even though Congress was nowhere specifically authorised to pass such legislation.

When the Court threatened his New Deal legislation in the mid-1930s Roosevelt tried to increase the number of judges from nine to fifteen and to persuade judges to retire at seventy. Mysteriously and suddenly, in what is sometimes called the Revolution of 1937, the Court then reversed itself, and became deferential to the wishes of President and Congress on issues of public interest. From the start, the Court was neither democratic nor representative; it was designed to be difficult of access, and distant from popular pressures (immune from 'public panic, public hysteria and public greed', in Justice Learned Hand's words). Its task was to interpret the constitution by finding the law, and not itself to make the law.

The constitution makes the *find-*

ing of the law, however, far from easy. Indeed, the task of the Court from the start was essentially political. In an intensely and self-consciously democratic republic such as the United States, the role of the judge is complex, even contradictory. If the people are sovereign, and their voices are heard through an elected Congress, why are the judges appointed at two removes from the will of the people, with tenure for life? There is indeed an inherent tension, as William Lasser suggests, 'between the courts and the idea of democratic government'. There is nothing in the Constitution that authorises judicial review, but since Marshall's day the court has assumed the authority to overrule legislation that it deems unconstitutional. It was the Court's duty, said Marshall in *Marbury versus Madison* in 1803, 'to say what the law is'. In this judgement the Court declared invalid a Congressional statute that it held violated the Constitution. But this doctrine horrified many contemporaries, including President Jefferson - who, as it happened, was Marshall's cousin. To him the new doctrine constituted a judicial arrogation of power. Indeed it did, since Marshall owed his appointment to Jefferson's predecessor as President, John Adams, who, on being defeated for a second term and fearing that Jefferson would bring with him the revolution of 1800, 'an age of convulsions and overturning', was determined to put a strong conservative on the Court which would then block a legislative programme that might follow the pattern of the Revolution in France, 'the gallic mania'. Hence Marshall's firmness on the superiority of fundamental law over legislation. Neither in the United States' short history nor in the long history of Britain while the North American colonies were under its authority, were there any precedents for judicial review - even the puny laws passed by colonial 'parliaments' could be overturned by the Privy Council on administrative grounds or as a straight challenge to British sovereignty, rather than by a recourse to judicial interpretation. But Marshall saw himself engaged in what became a familiar theme in American politics: checks and balances. As a result, judicial review

came to be seen as basic and legitimate. And, by extension, so did judicial activism, where, when cases reach them, the judges become legislators under another name, as if the Court were a Third Chamber. American juridical history can thus be seen as a struggle between 'judicial restraint' (or 'strict construction') versus 'judicial activism'. And in the equally familiar words of Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 'the Constitution is what the Judges say it is', - even if only by a five to four vote.

Some of the initiatives of the Court in our own times have, nevertheless, been unique and valuable. Neither

American juridical history can thus be seen as a struggle between 'judicial restraint' (or 'strict construction') versus 'judicial activism'. And in the equally familiar words of Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 'the Constitution is what the Judges say it is'

President nor Congress, for example, would have initiated the desegregation of the schools in the 1950s, but equally, without political and even military support, the judges' rulings could never have been fully enforced. Nor in the 1960s did the majority of white Northerners, liberals strong among them, believe that blacks should have the right to buy a home wherever they could afford it. Even pro-black Northern liberals were quite prepared to sign house-purchase agreements containing a clause forbidding sale other than to 'Caucasians'.

The Court is now heavily involved, however, in issues that were absent from the four thousand words drafted by the Founding Fathers in 1787 - such as abortion, capital punishment, women's rights, affirmative action and the enforced school 'busing' of one minority to schools of another. Their number will increase during Judge Thomas' years on the bench - encompassing such issues as the control of the traffic in drugs and the question of whether such control conflicts with the provisions of the Bill of Rights such as the Fourth Amendment, which gives the citizen the right to be secure in his personal freedom and in his home against unreasonable seizure or search. The Judge should reflect on the word 'unreasonable', if he has not already done so.

In the light of the nationwide attention paid to the Congressional scrutiny of a judge that precedes his appointment, is there a case for judges serving for a fixed term, rather than for life? If this were to become the rule for judges, what of legislators? Some of them serve for many terms - Strom Thurmond of South Carolina was first elected to the Senate in 1954. Should there not be fixed terms for them too, and in particular, four-year terms for Congressmen and Senators, with their elections coinciding with Presidential elections? It is not a new idea. The 1774-89 Continental Congress precluded members from serving more than three years in a six year period. California, Colorado and Oklahoma already have term limitations for state officers. California's Supreme Court has just upheld a principle of change to 'guard against an entrenched dynastic legislative bureaucracy'. It could be done, as it has been done before: by an amendment to the Constitution, just as the Twenty-Second Amendment of 1951 limits the Presidency to two terms of four years each. Constitutional amendment requires the approval of thirty-eight of the fifty states. This would allow Judge Thomas to offer his verdict on the Senators, though it should not be assumed that the Constitution is easily amended. There are only twenty-six amendments, of which the first ten, (the Bill of Rights) were added *en bloc* at Madison's urging during the first Congress in 1789-

91. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to provide for the legal equality of the sexes, was first proposed by the National Women's Party in 1923. It won the necessary two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives in October 1971 and of the Senate in March 1972. Thirty states ratified it within one year of its approval in the Senate, but it ultimately failed to achieve ratification by the required thirty-eight states, despite the extension of its deadline to 30 June 1982. This was the result of the conservative backlash of the 1980s and the campaigning of Phyllis Schlafly and the 'Stop ERA' organisation.

In the course of the debate on fixed terms it would be legitimate, or perhaps essential, to consider just how honourable and indeed how honest, were and are the motives of Senators themselves. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Who guards the guardians themselves? And who, one might add, will guard society from the guardians? Accusations similar to, or more serious than, those made against Judge Thomas have been made about the late Senator Tower (whose nomination for Secretary of

Defense the Senate rejected), and Senators Robb, Durenberger of Minnesota and, of course, Kennedy of Massachusetts. Investigations are at present under way involving five Senators, as a result of their links to savings and loan associations (building societies); and New York Senator Alfonso D'Amato of New York is under scrutiny for the award of federal housing grants to some campaign contributors. In 1989 Representative Jim Bates of California was rebuked by the House Ethics Committee, when he admitted making lewd remarks and touching female members of his staff. But all serve on. So do their staffs: there are some 30,000 congressional staff employed on or near the Hill whose jobs are not only secretarial and promotional but include, most importantly, fundraising. Given the power of incumbency in American politics, thanks to constant publicity and free postage facilities, and the seemingly perpetual terms of some Congressmen and Senators, they and their staffs constitute a near-tyrannical and near permanent government.

All this may suggest that the Sen-

ate needs to put its own house (and House) in order. It is not to suggest that it does not contain some honourable men. At least one is distinctive: John Danforth of Missouri had the intelligence and the motivation to attend Yale Law and Divinity School at the same time. He is the only Senator endowed with theological qualifications. Should there be more of them? He is an old-fashioned Republican, and he stood by the Judge through his grim ordeal.

Perhaps we should remind ourselves that a British MP was once criticising his colleagues in the House of Commons and calling them 'b-fools'. Before the Speaker could rebuke the un-parliamentary language, came an interjection: 'If this House didn't have some fools in it, it wouldn't be a representative institution'.

Esmond Wright is Emeritus Professor of American History at the University of London.

*The
Salisbury
Review*

10th Anniversary Issue

In September we will be ten years old. A celebration is planned and a special issue of the Review including contributions from:

**Enoch Powell
Lord Chalfont
Brian Crozier
Lord Harris of High Cross
P.D. James**

Democracy or Theocracy?

Merwyn Hiskett on the implications of a Muslim parliament in Britain

On 9 May 1991, the London Times carried an announcement of the intention of certain Muslims to set up 'A Muslim Parliament in Britain'. Even if this first essay at Muslim separatism gets no further than The Times, it is unlikely we shall have heard the last of it. It will surely recur as the Muslim voice in Britain becomes more insistent and more confident.

In attempting to assess what the outcome of this may be, it is useful to look back at the precedent of the Muslims in India and elsewhere in the post-imperial world. For this shows important similarities with the pattern now emerging in Britain.

When the Indian Muslim leader, M. A. Ansari, sponsored the Nationalist Muslim Party during the 1920s, he did so with the intention of supporting Gandhi's initiative for Hindu-Muslim unity; and in the belief that the state could be religiously neutral, to the extent of accommodating both Muslims and Hindus as citizens of a secular, pluralist state. Ansari, a convinced modernist, failed to gain the support of his fellow Indian Muslims for this stance. As Robb puts it,

...what occurred from the 1920s among Indian Mus-

lims was a retreat from Indian nationalism, and a quickening slide from communalism towards separatism.

That is, the Muslims opted decisively for an exclusive religious, not a secular, pluralist identity. It proved impossible for Ansari, or any other, to overcome this inherent Islamic predisposition to the extent necessary for Indian Muslims to co-exist with Hindus in the secular nationalism envisaged by Nehru. He had declared that, 'There shall be no state religion...nor shall the state either directly or indirectly endow any religion...' The Muslim leader, Jinnah, opposed this with his 'Fourteen Points' as early as April 1929, in which he demanded preferential treatment for Islam and insisted, 'that state neutrality was not enough and that state support was demanded...' This Muslim position had already been foreshadowed as early as 1870, when certain North Indian *maulvis* issued a well-known *fatwa* to the effect that India was *dar al-islam*, 'Islamic Territory', by virtue of the positive protection given by the British Raj to Islamic observance. What lay behind this consistent Muslim demand for special status, was fear of the consequences of being exposed to universal suffrage, which is wholly alien to Islamic theocracy, based as it is on the absolute values of the *Koran*. This was forcibly put to Minto by a Muslim deputation in 1906, which repudiated democracy and argued that the status of Islam was alone sufficient measure of its proper representation. As time went on, Muslim leaders, employing

religion to secure credibility and support, demanded all the more fiercely to be excused the rigours of demography and a wide franchise. The twin prospect of adult suffrage and independence was a chronic political shock.

Elsewhere, commenting on what he considers to be the 'confusion' of British policy in India, Robb adds that '(The British) sought Muslim support but introduced ever-wider suffrage'. He thus puts a finger on what is indeed the basic inconsistency in any expectation that Muslims will participate contentedly in a secular, pluralist state grounded in adult suffrage. Such an expectation is contrary to the Islamic *dhimma*, which tolerates 'People of the Book', for practical purposes Jews and Christians, as tribute-paying citizens of the Islamic state, though without any form of franchise beyond their own community, but excludes all non-scripturians from any political rights whatsoever.

In the Indian case, the subsequent course of events is well known. The Muslims, having rejected the early nationalism espoused by Ansari, were unable to come to terms with the idea of membership of a secular, pluralist Indian state. By 1940, the Muslim League, unwilling to tolerate the consequences of the wider franchise this required, demanded, and was given, what amounted to a constitutional veto. This was followed, in 1947, by the separation of the Muslim areas from India, and the emergence of East and West Pakistan.

The same crux - the incompatibility between democratic pluralism and Islamic theocracy - has caught Muslims elsewhere in the world, where the colonial aftermath has left an unwelcome democracy where theocracy once reigned.

In northern Nigeria, in the closing years of the hapless Shagari government - a quite outstandingly corrupt federal administration selected on an adult franchise that included Christians and animists as well as Muslims and fell to a coup in 1983 - Muslim students at Bayero University, Kano, and at other northern campuses, paraded carrying banners that proclaimed in Hausa, Arabic and English, 'Democracy is unbelief. We do not want a constitution. We want government by the *Koran* alone'. It is probably only the present military administration, which includes a strong minority-Christian interest, that prevents the Islamic North, either from separating or, more probably, from attempting to take over the present Federation and turning it into a unitary Islamic state under the nominal rule of the Sultan of Sokoto. That, at any rate, is the unconcealed aspiration of powerful fundamentalist groups in the North.

The former Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, now the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, provides another example. Here,

the answer (to the problem of post-colonial self-rule) most Islamic groups gave tended to be anti-democratic, calling for the formation of an elite corps which would guide the people back to Islam.

But subsequent experience of tyrannical military dictatorships led to a reaction in favour of 'democracy', that became enshrined in the 'Sudan Charter' of the Islamic revolutionary, Hassan Turabi, and his *Ikhwan*, 'Brothers'. These were originally loosely affiliated to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but subsequently became an independent Sudanese Muslim party, opposing the military regimes. However, Turabi's democracy was to be based squarely on the exclusively Islamic concept of *shura*, 'consultation' and *ijma*, 'consensus', within the Muslim community, and not on any wider

franchise. For, as Turabi argued, such democracy was possible precisely 'because the people is overwhelmingly Muslim'. But, as Turabi's biographer, El-Affendi, points out, '...*shura* presupposes the sovereignty of God, while in democracy the will of the people is absolute'. In fact, the Sudanese constituency was less overwhelmingly Muslim than Turabi, in his enthusiasm, had supposed. This dilemma caused these Sudanese Islamic revolutionaries to argue such issues as whether or not non-Muslims could hold key offices in such an Islamic democratic government. Opinions wavered, less on considerations of principle, for most of the *Ikhwan* felt that they should not; but more out of concern for opinion in the world at large. However, there was general agreement that, democracy or not, the head of state must be a Muslim.

Some argued that under the Sudan Charter, non-Muslims would be allowed free expression of 'the values of their religion to the full extent of their scope'. But the majority, including Turabi himself, protested that this involved 'projecting Islam as the interest of a particular ethnic-sectarian group, rather than a universal ethical imperative'. In the end, the consensus conclusion arising from even such an apparently liberal Islamic initiative as the Sudan Charter was that, 'The answer is obvious: in case of conflict, Islam must prevail'. Here one encounters again the nub of the Indian Muslim League's demand for a constitutional veto; and of the act of separation when even this proved insufficient. Similarly, El-Affendi anticipates the ultimate problem that still confronts the Sudanese revolutionaries: 'the other alternatives (to the impossible one of full secularism, alias 'state neutrality') available to the *Ikhwan* are either to develop an Islamic polity that would be sufficiently immune to international pressures (one could think of Iran and Saudi Arabia), or carve out a separate state for Muslims'.

It has long been obvious that the same Islamic predispositions - an inability to come to terms with state secularism, religious pluralism and universal adult suffrage, of which the mirror image is a visceral longing for the hermetic and exclusive

theocracy of traditional Islam - have been forming the attitudes of the Muslim immigrant population of western Europe, especially Britain, in much the same measure as they have those of Muslims elsewhere, confronted with democratic pluralism. A general statement of the Muslim position will be found in Sheikh Shabbir Akhtar's *Be Careful with Muhammad*. This is far more than just a defence of the Muslim stand in the Salman Rushdie affair. Despite the author's protestations to the contrary, it is difficult to see it as other than an implicit justification of the Muslims' right to set up an Islamic theocracy in Britain as what he considers the only solution to the problem of the Muslim theocrat's irreconcilable confrontation with secularism. He says:

Yet one needs to rise above one's ethnocentricity to see what cultural memories theocracy evokes in the Muslim mind. For theocracy is as precious to Muslims as democracy is to Westerners...

One takes Sheikh Akhtar's point. Nevertheless, ethnocentricity cuts both ways when it comes to demanding a Muslim parliament and increasingly similar expedients within a constitution that has been democratic and pluralist, as well as progressively secular, since the Restoration!

A more specific criticism of the consequences, from the Muslim point of view, of the state neutrality so disliked by Jinnah, is expressed by Professor Ali Merad, a learned Muslim spokesman known for his advocacy of the Muslim immigrant case:

It is true that modern states claim to be abstaining from any interference in the affairs of religious worship and education which they leave totally to the responsibility of the churches and the various spiritual families. Nevertheless, the theoretical equality of the various religions under the law is translated in fact into glaring inequality to the detriment of the Muslim religion.

It is interesting to note that the Muslims in the former USSR and behind what was the Iron Curtain, were in some respects more content than their co-religionists in the pluralist

West. For there, although they were subject to rigorous controls, they were in some cases (the post-Stalinist USSR, Yugoslavia and Romania for instance) accorded specific recognition and some protection by the state, which had the effect of differentiating them from the surrounding non-Muslim population; they were also free of the threat presented by a democratic franchise. It therefore seems to be the official 'indifference' of Western governments - Jinnah's 'state neutrality' - rather than any deliberate discrimination against them, that so upsets the Muslims. Thus Ali Merad complains that Islam is 'marginalised'.

Indifference on the part of European nations to the human and cultural problems which assail Muslims, due to their social and cultural uprooting, to the difficulties which they experience in the face of modernity, as well as the process of secularisation which forces (sic!) them to live in contradiction to, if not break from, their own ethical and religious tradition.

One cannot escape the comment that the Territory of Islam is wide; there is therefore no obvious reason why the Muslims should be 'forced' into this unhappy position. But that is another issue.

It is characteristic of a secular, pluralist democracy that all religious beliefs are tolerated as long as they remain, within reason, within the limits of personal belief and do not impinge unduly upon those who do not share those beliefs. Or put another way, while religious beliefs are tolerated, religious practices and institutions may not necessarily be accorded the same freedom if they conflict with the law or constitution of the wider state. But this is apparently unacceptable to many Muslim spokesmen, of whose attitudes the following quotations are typical:

The implementation of Islam as a complete code of life cannot be limited to the home and to personal relationships. It is to be sought and achieved in society as a whole.

That was preached from the *minbar* of a Bradford mosque. A well-known

imam in France is reported as preaching to the effect that, 'There can be no government contrary to what God has revealed (in the *Koran*)'. He concludes that it is the duty of every Muslim to overthrow every power 'which governs in contravention of that which God enjoins and (to bring about) the erection of the Islamic state'. In more moderate terms, but to the same effect, Sheikh Shabbir Akhtar says:

Islam (is)...a charter for Muslim political life; it could not properly be reduced to merely an item of personal piety in the private sector and he also complains that:

Islamic principles and values have always been systematically excluded from exercising any influence on the policies of the British government.

One can but assume that the purpose of a Muslim parliament may be to insist that they shall exercise such an influence in future. Elsewhere, another Muslim spokesman asserts that:

Our inherited (Islamic) understanding of religious freedom, of the nature and role of religion in society, is in the last analysis being fundamentally challenged by the new religious pluralism in Britain.

Behind this, too, surely lies the plea articulated by Jinnah, that Islam must be protected from the consequences of democratic pluralism.

Perhaps the most direct expression of Muslim defiance of Western-style democracy is the following, uncompromising statement issued jointly by the two most representative Islamic organisations in Britain, the Islamic Academy, Cambridge and the Islamic Cultural Centre, London, criticising the admittedly egregious 'Swann Report'. The statement insists that the Muslim community:

cannot commit itself to follow all 'current laws' however anti-religious these laws may become *through democratic means* (my italics).

Quotations to illustrate these Muslim attitudes - discontent with state neutrality towards Islam; a visceral objection to living under a pluralist

dispensation; an inability to accept the authority of democratic decision-making when this conflicts with revelation and a refusal to contemplate the possibility of Islam existing simply as a personal belief system, shorn of its political and social institutions - could be multiplied indefinitely. They are clearly constants of the Muslim world outlook, whether in the context of post-imperial India, Nigeria, the Sudan or Muslim settlement in western Europe.

According to a report appearing in *The Times* of 29 October 1991, the initial policies and attitudes of the Muslim parliament which will meet for thirteen days a year in Kensington Town Hall, are predictably conciliatory. It is to send a letter of loyalty to the Queen (the Muslims of India also pledged loyalty to the Crown!) and is likely to confine its attention, in the first instance, to social issues. It is also, apparently, non-territorial. Furthermore, initial reactions suggest it enjoys only limited support from Muslims in Britain. This is not surprising. For it was to be anticipated that the Muslims' first attempts to assert themselves in this way would be tentative. It should be remembered, however, that the Muslim personality initiating this parliament, Dr. Kalim Siddiqui, has in the past adopted attitudes that have seemed far from moderate. His support for the death sentence on Salman Rushdie is well known. He is also reported as having advocated that the British Prime Minister should convert to Islam, as the only way in which the Muslim point of view can get a hearing in Britain a view reminiscent, surely, of the Sudanese *Ikhwan!* Even making allowances for rhetoric, such views and attitudes suggest that an underlying fundamentalist ardour informs this Muslim parliament; and may belie its bland initial presentation. Indeed, it remains to be seen how it will stand up to another testing issue such as the Rushdie affair. It is only then that its true timbre may become apparent.

Meanwhile, one may be reasonably sure that behind this initiative, there lies a determination, in the hearts of at least some of the participants, to address long-standing Muslim complaints against democratic pluralism. Thus one of the demands

one may expect to arise will be for special recognition to be given to Islam in Britain; or rather for an extension of the recognition already conceded. For Muslims, in common with the very much less numerous Jewish religious community and, in theory, with other non-Christian religious groups, already enjoy, for example, the right to apply for a determination entitling them to introduce their own forms of daily worship into British state schools, in place of the mandatory Christian form.

Moreover, while at least some Muslims currently proclaim that the present parliament is intended to be non-territorial, it is difficult to see how these Muslim aims - and especially the constantly reiterated demand for Muslims to be governed by the *Shari'a* - can be achieved other than through some form of Muslim separatism, whereby Muslims will be subject to the writ of their own parliament, largely autonomous of non-Islamic governing institutions and isolated from the surrounding mainstream culture - in other words independent theocratic Islamic enclaves within the wider British state. This may be a long way off. It would be rash to discount it, all the same.

It is also likely, at some point, to involve demands for powers of veto over certain aspects of mainstream democratic decision-making, particularly foreign policy. For this was clearly adumbrated in the letter of the Director-General of the London Central Mosque, to *The Times*, on 24 April 1986, when he warned HM Government that what he claimed to be two million British Muslims would not indefinitely tolerate foreign policies that offended against pan-Islamic sentiment. Similar discontent with British foreign policy was expressed by certain Muslim groups concerning Britain's participation in the Gulf war. They were noted in the *Yorkshire Post* and the *Telegraph and Argus* during January 1991.

If such a campaign makes headway, it seems highly probable that it will result, sooner or later, in demands for some form of territorial separatism for Muslims in the United Kingdom. The ultimate consequences of that are imponderable.

I confine myself here to discover-

ing what the Muslim 'parliamentarians' are likely to aim for in the longer run, and what will be the logic of these aims; not to predicting their chances of success. These depend on complex and protean considerations, among which are the rate of demographic increase of the Muslim population against that of the patril, non-Muslim majority, the pull of the mainstream culture against the mores of the mosque especially, perhaps, the willingness of Muslim women to go on submitting to the domination of the Muslim extended family male hierarchy, for that is immigrant Islam's most vulnerable Achilles's heel; and the fissile tendencies that bedevil all Muslim initiatives. These cannot all be considered in this article.

But one factor is particularly obtrusive at the present time. It is the will - or lack of it - on the part of the present and future British governments, to stand firm against this Muslim pressure. On 31 December, 1990, Mr. Michael Knowles, a prospective Labour parliamentary candidate of Congleton, Cheshire, published a long letter in the *Daily Telegraph*, in which he drew attention to the manner in which:

As a nation we have extended to fundamentalist Islam a tolerance...we would never extend to any other religious group...

and expressed his 'shame and regret at the way the Labour Party has behaved in putting votes before democratic principles'. He went on to conclude that there is very little to choose in this respect between the present Conservative government and the Labour Party. The former makes such concessions 'mainly for reasons of trade, the latter for electoral advantage'.

Mr. Roy Hattersley's notorious 'immigration' speech at the Labour Party Conference of 1991 indicates that Knowles's criticism was fully justified; and also that it has fallen on deaf ears.

It is clearly not possible, or desirable, in a democracy, to prevent persons with common interests from associating together to pursue these interests, and calling themselves a 'parliament' if they so wish (although the term is unfortunately provocative in the circumstances). Indeed, it

may sometimes be useful for the national government to listen to their more reasonable and responsible representations. But the danger arises that if that parliament succeeds in winning a degree of official recognition for itself it will become the thin end of a wedge that will eventually override the normal processes of decision-making established by an adult suffrage to which its members may be, at heart, ideologically opposed. The present climate, in the Labour Party at least, which seems to encourage a willingness to trawl for sectarian votes at any cost, is such that this seems by no means improbable.

Mervyn Hiskett was Lecturer in Islamic Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies.

Sophist's Corner

What might have been

Sir,
Boris Yeltsin has spoken of applying to join NATO and the news is hailed as 'breath-taking' development by the media.

On 31 March 1954 the USSR also applied to join, but was rejected by France, the UK and the USA, (reply dated May 7). On May 14th 1955 - six years after the formation of NATO and one week after the admission of West Germany - the Warsaw Pact was concluded. It might be interesting to speculate how many megabucks of military expenditure might have been saved had she been admitted.

Peter James,
Cliff Field,
Waldringfield
(East Anglian Daily Times)

The Culture of Relevance

Vivian Linacre asks: is relevance making humanity irrelevant?

The Twentieth Century has populated and exterminated, manufactured and consumed, invented and rendered obsolete, produced and scrapped, harvested and laid waste, travelled and incarcerated, explored and despoiled, built and demolished, published and pulped, recorded and expunged, in far greater quantities than the sum total throughout the whole of previous history since the emergence of humankind half a million years ago. Imperceptible evolution from an infinite past has been overtaken by a continuum of revolution with no sense of direction.

Explosive rates of change combine with insatiable appetites to create a universal preoccupation with the present; which is intensified by a sudden abandonment of reliance on divine authority, by fear of nuclear Armageddon or ecological nemesis and by the discovery of the physical insignificance of our planet in an ever-expanding cosmos. Even in the one per cent of time since the end of the last Ice Age, Homo Sapiens Limited has experienced a bigger turno-

ver of goods and services than in the previous ninety-nine per cent; but now, within our own generation, mankind has flipped. The species has collapsed from a state of imminent perfection, deriving from sublime order, to the wretchedness of a genetic freak confronted by various threats of extinction. 'For ever and ever' may end without even an 'Amen'.

The inner consolation of eternity has given way to the intimidation of outer space. So our society is possessed by a terrible sense of impermanence and hence by an obsessive desire to arrest the processes of aging and dying. A cult of youth panders to premature adulthood, while the old have lost their role, either being treated as geriatric patients or forced to behave like grotesque children. Once, money was not a polite topic, and later the forbidden subject was sex; but now the last of civilisation's tabus is death. Newspapers thrive on money and sex but cannot mention people without stating their ages. We have to hear tomorrow's news tonight. A very great event is an anti-climax after its relentless previews and 'hype'. Material acquisitiveness discounts the future by mortgage and endless credit. 'Live now, pray later!'

Time is the only commodity that we have left to sacrifice to the god of consumerism, so we devour time avidly: craving already the next millenium, which will be over by its proper commencement date of 2001.

History, for the purpose of teaching to my parents' generation, used to stop at 1832, then to my generation at 1914. Nowadays, it does not even begin until later than that. For history has become just another branch of the conglomerate 'social

sciences' which dominate education in an era that is wholly absorbed in our current predicament. Indeed, the criterion imposed throughout our culture is contemporaneity. The fine arts and even religion, as well as education, are dismissed as worthless unless considered 'relevant' and 'accessible'. This test has become an absolute in itself; not merely a measure in relation to other fixed values, since no others are recognised. If knowledge, belief and beauty, have merit only insofar as they assuage the present - while subject to constant shifts in perception as fashion and material demands dictate - then they must continue to diminish in quality and esteem. For without continuity, tradition, schools of thought and disciplines, respect for the past and faith in the future, pride in the achievements and destiny of the human race, existence has no purpose other than to serve or render tolerable the exigencies of its brief duration.

How can life be enjoyed (let alone justified) if our energies are largely devoted to resisting the passage of time; if, because of our loss of awareness of time immemorial and hereafter, we cannot experience eternity at first hand? Within the scale of creation and abundance of our inheritance, time is truly of no consequence; yet modern society has forfeited that natural indifference to time which is the secret of its transcendence and even its mere enjoyment. So debased has society become that the pursuit of happiness is increasingly identified with one's spare time; with holidays and retirement, which are regarded as respectively the means and object of enduring this life. Our fastest growing industry is 'leisure'; which, with its

principal subsidiaries, tourism and entertainment, is expertly pre-digested and packaged for instant distraction from the future. And even though the past is neglected educationally, it cannot be left to rest in peace, but is sanitised and cosmetised for promotion of the 'heritage' industry.

The ethos of the present is so ephemeral, so jealous of the lingering certainties of the past, that it finds some security in the vogue for conservation. This does not spring from any sudden discovery of the aesthetic or topographical merits of ancient buildings and areas of outstanding natural beauty, nor from any sense of history, nor from sheer nostalgia, nor from any concern to preserve for the benefit of posterity. No: it is simply because of the failure of confidence in modern architecture which reflects our general contemporary malaise.

Very few ancient 'listed' buildings would be granted planning approval for construction today, because they are all imbued with a timeless quality that we have lost. So developers and architects conform to the current dispiritedness by designing buildings which are either strictly functional and quickly obsolescent or period pastiches that offend nobody and say nothing.

The fine arts - music, painting, sculpture, ceramics, poetry, drama and opera - are likewise bankrupt. They, too, have cut off their roots and so do not even pretend to create works of permanent value. They are petrified in face of the dilemma between 'high culture' - in other words, 'elitism' and dependence on State funding - and 'popular' culture - in other words, fashion and profit. The dictates of bureaucracy and politics along the high road, or of commerce and the mass media along the low road, alike compel strict conformity to the new shibboleths of relevance and accessibility. One can attend meetings of the 'arts community' without meeting a creative artist, or watch an arts programme on television that is entirely devoted to questions of funding and politics: these being the only 'relevant' issues. Of course, both high culture and television provide perfect vehicles for perpetual celebration of anniversaries, which again exhibit our traumatic

obsession with age, and our desperate striving for some relevance (significance) in the present.

Even, finally, religion; which is conventionally supposed to have declined because of science, materialism, emancipation from superstition and ecclesiastic authority, but whose collapse derives, in fact, from the very same loss of an historical sense and of faith in the future. People are actually more superstitious than ever (witness horoscopes and the proliferation of strange cults) and are more subjugated than ever by the regimes of welfarism and consumerism; whilst the suggestion that the masses have suddenly had their metaphysical outlook transformed by the new cosmology is absurd. Very few of us can comprehend the astounding discoveries by astronomers of the infinities of the universe or by biologists of the origins of life, whose impact on the populace is less than that of the credit card or the microwave oven. Neither has the desertion of the churches anything to do with lack of spare time, when sports stadia and holiday beaches, rock concerts and acid parties, are packed out. No: it is, once again, because religion has been relegated to a minor branch of the social sciences, preaching politics and mundane morality rather than theology. Clergymen could well be designated 'The (Rt. / Very) Relevant...'!

Without its chronology - from its origins in the descent from God to man, by way of the prophets, to its promises of redemption and ultimate salvation - religion is dead. For faith is a foretelling, based on the inspiration of scriptures, which com-

*So our society is
possessed by a
terrible sense of im-
permanence and
hence by an obsessive
desire to arrest the
processes of aging
and dying*

prise a body of experience narrating the path from our primitive state to paradise. It is first of all the *way*, followed by the truth and the life. If we have lost that route from darkness to light, then religion has no mission. Instead of commanding and leading towards divine fulfilment, it merely responds to 'the needs of the community' here and now. Instead of the only question that matters, which is the relevance of mankind to God, it substitutes the relevance of God to mankind.

Our urban environment has suffered correspondingly. For the first structures erected by man were tombs for the dead: a cavern, a mound marked by a cairn, a communal barrow, developing through civilisation into shrines, pyramids, temples, citadels and mausoleum. Only recently have we lost that reverence for the dead; relying on discreet crematoria and abandoning cemeteries to vandals. So now our cities - the greatest monuments to civilisation - are being left to die; since hypermarkets, retail parks and leisure centres out of town are more relevant to 'the needs of the community' today. Note that, like those other buzz-words, 'caring' and 'compassion', the glib use of 'community' is in direct ratio to its decline. For the alienation of individual from community is everywhere manifest: as night school is replaced by Open University on television, church replaced by 'Thought for the Day', the local brass band by a Walkman stereo and ghetto-blaster, the public reading-room by the home video, the works outing by a time-share apartment, the hustings by party political broadcasts, the market-place by colour supplements and mail-order catalogues. The disintegration of the natural functions of our town centres inevitably follows from this depersonalisation of society.

Kenneth Clark wrote: 'Civilisation means something more than energy and will and creative power....How can I define it? Well, very shortly, a sense of permanence. Civilised man must feel that he belongs somewhere in space and time; that he consciously looks forward and looks back'. And later: 'it is a lack of confidence, more than anything else, that kills a civilisation....The moral and intellectual failure of Marxism has left us

with no alternative to heroic materialism, and that isn't enough'. Then Jacob Bronowski wrote: 'It sounds very pessimistic to talk about western civilisation with a sense of retreat...We are all afraid - for our confidence, for the future, for the world'. Twenty-one and eighteen years later respectively, these eminences would surely take an even gloomier view today, since a culture of uniqueness and perspective, of distinction and discrimination, has succumbed to a culture of relevance and expediency, which has made discrimination an offence and despises concern for the past as reactionary.

The addiction of the media to doomsday scenarios, the new classification of man in anthropological (anti-intellectual) terms as an irresponsible predator, a preoccupation with the superficial problems of the Third World - starvation and civil wars - at the expense of their causes arising from the collapse of indigenous cultures, all presume that our animal needs must commend every priority and hence that the values and aims of civilisation are relegated to luxuries that we cannot afford or dismissed as irrelevant. Whereas this subservience to the material and immediate is utterly self-defeating; for our global prospects of survival, if dependent on these cretinous criteria, can only diminish. The choice must lie between a reversion to savagery and a fresh spirit of confidence and permanence which can only derive from the restoration of civilised values and aims.

Yet today we have education without learning (other than superficial learning for occupational use) and religion without faith and art without beauty: for what learning and religion and art all have in common is *timelessness*, which is precisely what our universal dementia cannot contemplate or even tolerate. Instead, our compulsion to identify relevance in every event and phenomenon measures sporting records in microseconds and astronomic data in billions of light-years with equal fascination, as if the endless production of statistics for their own sake had enormous significance. We are suddenly stranded in the capsule of the present on a nebulous voyage without charts or logs or means of exter-

*The ethos of the
present is so
ephemeral, so jealous
of the lingering certainties
of the past,
that it finds some
security in the vogue
for conservation*

nal communication, surrounded by terrifying voids, desperate for any signal or trace or illusion of bearings.

So the frustration turns to rage. Hence the violence of our times: in manners as much as crime....in the foulness and brutality of contemporary art and humour, in gratuitously offensive public behaviour and in the media, entertainment, commerce, and a mania for vindictive litigation. Within less than a century we have shed the assurances that had sustained us ever since the first manifestations of our collective consciousness a century of centuries ago; based on divine providence and the infallibility or at least the dignity of man, and particularly on the nobility of his mission on this sanctified earth at the centre of a deferential universe. It is the loss of *dignity* - the worthiness of mankind, of virtue and beauty for their own sakes - that is the price paid for the doctrine of relevance.

The precise diagnosis of man's mental breakdown would make a good parlour-game among psychiatrists, assessing such conspicuous symptoms as chronic paranoia, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and manic-depression evidenced by compulsive suicidal tendencies alternating with hysterical euphoria. It is a condition complicated by a bitter disillusionment - as if we had been beguiled from our very beginnings into a state of false ingenuousness that has now left us utterly unprepared to face new-found reality - rather than any sense of wistfulness from deprivation of a precious innocence. Hence our furious rejection of historical

guidance, and the madness that seeks revenge on a God in whom society no longer believes. The only possible escape from God's apparent pronouncement of judgement upon man as an experiment that finally failed, or as an evolutionary aberration which at best might constitute useful practice for a repeat after another million years, is to retaliate by dismissing God as the great imposter, erected to support centuries of tyranny, or the delusion of those benighted souls who sacrificed this life for the next, and in any event as the supreme irrelevance. In this age of self-righteousness, that has turned four of the seven deadly sins - pride, envy, lust and wrath (especially the last) - into virtues, God is the One whom we cannot forgive.

With the approach of the next millenium, is the world facing early retirement or redundancy? Would that be surprising, after our performance this century? Shall we suffer a global heart-attack, as so often occurs after abruptly giving up useful employment; or shall mankind linger into decrepitude and senility? Or is there still some hope of retraining and a whole new career?

The merging of a multitude of diverse national cultures - resulting from the technology of communications, mass-media and advertising, global entertainment, world-wide travel and tourism, economic imperialism and international bureaucracy - into one bland, barbarian culture has hastened and intensified humanity's nervous breakdown, depriving peoples of identity and hence of impetus and continuity. British culture, typically, is a glorious compound of elements from the Orient to the Arctic Circle: and we exported our amalgamated culture from the Sixteenth Century onwards throughout a vast empire, from every part of which we in turn imported supplements of exotic cultures, so this process of hybridisation and proliferation is nothing new. But the enormous differences are that in history the process was bilateral and dynamic, with the culture of at least the dominant nation remaining intact and being enriched, while the subject nations (including Britain itself until the Twelfth Century) gaining far more than they lost; whereas now every national culture is flung into

the same poisonous, plastic melting-pot, which will never dispense anything creative. Worst of all, this process of assimilation is both cause and effect; having contributed to the paralysis of mankind, it is itself exacerbated as a consequence, setting off a vicious spiral of penetration, saturation, and lowering of standards.

It is the calamitous collision between, on the one hand, the collapse of confidence in the past and faith in the future and, on the other hand, the emergence of a monopolistic mass-culture, which has brought about this implosion into the present and a universal loss of will, discernment, insight and foresight. The Holy Trinity today consists of: Trash, Trendiness, and Triviality. The only remaining refuge and justification is the Rule of Relevance. It is a layman's General Theory of Relativity, barring absolutes. All that is left is the effete maxim: 'Only connect...!'

If the entire history of our sojourn on this planet can be defrosted and dished up as a spicy television series (shown in segments so as not to exceed the viewers' attention-span) and if our life-support system now is powered by leisure and the social sciences, supplied by the generating plant of a moronic mono-culture, is there any chance of recovery? If religion, arts, politics and education (I was almost tempted simply to put 'RAPE' inside square brackets, such is the current passion for senseless acronyms as yet another desperate device to add relevance to entities and abstractions!) are subservient to that mono-culture, administered by an all-embracing bureaucracy, is recovery even worth attempting? Has the tyranny of relevance rendered humanity irrelevant?

While we must as individuals protest and prophesy, and argue for a reversal of current attitudes and policies, it is obvious that neither a purely reactionary posture nor a piecemeal approach to this overwhelming predicament will make any impression on these all-consuming trends. We must go forward, seeking a radical change in direction, by means of yet another intellectual revolution; as powerful as that wrought by Marx, Freud and Einstein, and as dramatic as that in Eastern Europe. We have to create a new

ferment, in which individualism, learning, art and religion - and hence humanity - can flourish again.

This surely requires a fresh perception, in order fully to comprehend and gain general recognition of the causes and scale of the problem that confronts us all, from which the solution will be found only in a wholly new theory of collective or cultural consciousness, for which not even the methodology yet exists. I am content merely to sound the alarm and indicate the way to safety. For the subjective nature of individual consciousness remains a mys-

Without its chronology - from its origins in the descent from God to man, by way of the prophets, to its promises of redemption and ultimate salvation - religion is dead

tery - since no satisfactory substitute has been found for the discredited views of the materialists and reductionists - whilst the promising lines of research deriving from quantum physics are still tentative. These suggest that, contrary to the orthodox teaching that the human mind developed from matter which in turn had developed from the quantum level of reality, both human mind and matter emerged directly and independently from quantum reality - in other words, the mind is just as real as matter - thereby affording a rationale of free-will which has otherwise remained inexplicable. Meanwhile, even to contemplate the study of a *collective* consciousness might appear impossible if not absurd; but the maximum resources should be devoted to its pursuit, for this is where astro-physics and neuroscience meet. By way of background at a less technical level, there is enormous work to be done on the inter-relation of the culture and cosmology of suc-

ceeding civilisations, on which the views of sociologists and historians of ideas are still primitive and wholly materialistic. Are these not infinitely more useful projects than most current university or governmental research programmes?

How else are we to overcome the prevailing rationalist view that we are mammalian dinosaurs due for extinction or that the evolution of our species was a wildly improbable accident and hence our demise is of no consequence; and that in any event (instead of indulging in ancient history or metaphysics) it is more relevant to spend billions seeking other, doubtless superior, forms of life in outer space? How else can we overthrow the dictatorship of bureaucratic materialism? We need a second Reformation to emancipate humanity from that secular repression, and a second Renaissance which can only flower from seeds sown and cultivated by the sciences of the mind. Then we can enter a new Age of Enlightenment, exposing the sterility of consensus, the spiritual anorexia of oecumenism, and the bankruptcy of pragmatism - the apotheosis of the Rule of Relevance, which, in the absence of any post-industrial philosophy has been exalted as the prevailing code of pseudo-ethics - and revealing in that vacuum the uniqueness and splendour and infinite power of the human personality. Instead of denigrating the individual and family as merely relevant to the servile 'community' and the nation as merely relevant to the 'larger community' and mankind as merely relevant to the welfare of the planet, this consummation of science and culture will assert and affirm the distinctness and capacity of each.

Free at last from the impediments of the present, and the meretricious associations which submerge rather than establish identity and significance, we shall discard the doctrine of relevance as itself irrelevant, and discover once again that there is indeed all the time in the world.

Vivian Linacre is sole Principal at a surveying and valuation consulting practice in Scotland

The End of Education

Geoffrey Wagner on the 'victim culture' in America's colleges

It is apparent, both from the columns of the Salisbury Review and books published in England recently, that the worst excesses of public, tax-funded higher education in America are now being visited on 'the dear land of my nativity'. The chapter on Ray Honeyford in David Selbourne's *Left Behind* is nothing short of surrealistic, with its picture of burly Bradford councillors earnestly endeavouring to pathanise themselves, systematic, arcane and repressive Koranic prohibitions in local schools, and generally crying 'Down With Us!' Similar craven capitulations, chiefly by Presidents and Deans in higher education, continue apace in America; but Selbourne's picture of a Yorkshire educational Punjab, largely financed by a Tory government makes the mind boggle.

As one who taught through similar excesses at the City College of New

York, and even wrote a book about the same, I sense that the libertarian mimicry in education is largely of the American model, in the state and municipal colleges, and what are now called community colleges. Academic screening processes meant that the Jewish minority was the first into these colleges (they were also the first to assist black aspirations, a helping hand that has not been reciprocated). At the City College of New York we institutionalised Jewish holidays and observances, though not restrictively-dietary niceties were a matter of personal choice, never compulsory. This system worked well until the riots of the 1960s. Indeed, the Jewish element, highly sensitive to the educational bully, served free inquiry well and, when this became disfigured in the 1960s, demonstrated that racism was being reduced to a mere term of intimidation. However, when the educational bully becomes the State, as in Nazi Germany, provoking the disruptions and indisciplines we all know about and have suffered through in the past decades, it is essential that we understand the pattern of public higher education in a very plural country like America. Is this bully susceptible of management?

The two major American states seeking Federal funds for public (ie, minority) assistance in higher education are California and New York. Each has a Board of Higher Education under a Chancellor, a political appointee and usually a close friend of the incumbent Mayor. These career educationalists enjoyed astronomical salaries. Both systems employed Boards of Regents monitoring admission and accreditation patterns. The mayhem of the 1960s, when a day's front page read like a battlefield report 'Stanford Trashed',

'Guns at Cornell', Looting and Arson at Michigan and Chicago', had the effect of flushing out a number of astonishingly craven college administrations, mostly young Deans who dared not openly criticise minority aspirations. Today, the intellectual tendencies behind such riots have disappeared. What is left is the parrot cry of racism. Have the degrees at such colleges become otiose or spurious?

Not entirely. A system of 'choose your own grade' was established in some colleges. After the riots of the late 1960s the University of California Board of Regents studied the grading system of one Department with more than twelve hundred students: all but three were given As. The purpose of such institutions was clearly to 'process' students through a degree, and the more minority in profile they were, the better for the political health of the existing *apparatchiks* in City Hall. And, after all, how many of us check what medical or law school our doctor or lawyer attended? We take it for granted that some standards were applied.

At City, as elsewhere, the Financial Aid Office for students openly encouraged blacks to apply for assistance, on the presumption that their own jobs depended on numbers. The more applicants, the more needed to deal with such applicants: a real City Hall story. And the more applications culled for BEOG (Basic Educational Opportunity Grant, often obtained with forged taxation forms) to push forward to Washington, then the better might the bureaucracy be funded. In turn, BEOG made a student eligible for another pay trough, SEOG, the State Educational Opportunity Grant, and so on down the line. Filling in forms in quintuplicate may have given young

blacks some feeling of achievement, especially when they produced cornucopias: it had nothing to do with academic success. It was, in short, the worst sort of condescension. The colleges, meanwhile, collected the grants in a lump sum (often running into millions) at the start of the academic year, and then disbursed them *seriatim* throughout it.

In those troubled days, the President of our particular college was urged, though himself a Jew, to introduce as many blacks into our new Bio-Med School as possible, allegedly for future inner-city work. He was taken to court in a class action on behalf of excluded Jewish students by *B'nai B'rith*. The latter could point to far higher transcript records than those of their coloured competitors. The quailing President huffed and puffed about the 'commitment' shown in interview by the blacks over the Jews, but the argument was defeated when the failed Jewish candidates demonstrated that they had only been interviewed for seconds, against whole half-hours for the successful blacks. In the event, *B'nai B'rith* won its case of discrimination against Jewish students by a Jewish President and the college, which is to say the city, had to pay a large sum of indemnification to the injured students. Note that the taxpayer had to foot the bill paid to the *B'nai B'rith* plaintiffs and lawyers. The President was indemnified, as a civic appointee, and is today contentedly teaching at Texas A and M.

Put beside this the almost unutterable fact that in 1989 there were only six black Maths Phds in the whole of the United States; in the same period I know of two Chinese Yale students, both sons of an immigrant father, who earned such degrees. In that same year Professor Novak of the Philosophy Department of my college could only conduct classes with two security officers (tax-paid) on either side of his desk. I myself, in my last year of teaching, had to station one such outside my classroom door to prevent disruptions (during one of which a fire extinguisher was opened in my face).

Unlike the calmer pre-war Oxbridge which I experienced, the American university is generally divided into three disciplines or areas. First, there are the natural sciences

(maths, physics, chemistry, biology, even geography), which are objective and indisputable. Two plus two equals four, and forget the politics. Whenever there was some student strike or 'bust' at City, the natural science professor simply went home, put up the shutters, and tuned in to the best ball game about. Indeed, at one point, when our college gates were chained shut by belligerents from Harlem, a group of black students graduating from our Engineering College who wanted their degrees, broke these open and insisted on their classes being continued.

*The humanities are
the least empirical,
thus the most easily
and often attacked by
the Yahoos*

Next there are the social sciences like psychology and political science and anthropology and so on which utilise objective data (particularly in courses on say, statistics) and thus claim an often inauthentic status. In so many words, such subjects seem to me to be saying, 'yes, two plus two equals four, but we hate it'. The humanities are the least empirical, thus the most easily and often attacked by the Yahoos. In my experience it was the Philosophy Department which offered the most courageous resistance to the City Hall bully. Men like Professor Novak had come out of communist prisons, and had read the neurosis called Marxism. In America, it was invariably the university's cultural endeavours, pusillanimously protected by the inflated administration, which ceded to the effacement of culture. The numerous Deans and their assistants required large numbers to justify their own employment. They could not concede any impediment to minority applications (opposition to such being academic suicide). In this area of academy our fallen state is all.

It works as follows. In an American tax-levy college a teacher taken on is allotted by his or her Chairperson a

'line'. This carries with it a number of students. In other words, the teacher is required to process that number of students (teach, evaluate, grade them) by the end of the year. This is not difficult in maths. But in the English Humanities you are unlikely to accrue a sufficient number of applicants for any speciality (Chaucer, Milton, Wordsworth) in order to be given credit for a line. Similarly, if you thereafter fail a number of students for various reasons you will not have fulfilled your line and will thus be unemployed the following year.

To many of my colleagues, with specialities in various areas of English Literature, it then occurred that the only way out of this City Hall trap might be to devise one course, so sensational (and stupid) that it would bring in vast numbers of students; in this way some little 'racist' speciality (Spenser, Shelley, whatever) could be preserved in a seminar of a dozen or so. This happened. One semester, while courses on Chaucer and Milton were listed in the college catalogue but not given due to lack of enrolment, the Department's most popular course was one on Vampirism. Another such was on Pornography. Both freed their professors for some serious study in the canon, much to the irritation of the black professor who was imported to teach Swahili (a fad of the time) - and found no one interested in learning it. The vocational school is largely practical and therefore controlled by reason. The Bradford story shows an attempt to Balkanise a culture by racial intimidation. Our experience in the American city colleges substantiated the thesis of Professor Allan Bloom's popular book, *The Closing of the American Mind*, namely that if you have no tradition to go to at all, you pick your curriculum off the streets - feminism, homosexuality and, yes, vampirism. You teach, and thereby institutionalise, a victim culture.

*Geoffrey Wagner is Professor
Emeritus of English at the City
University of New York*

The End of Don Juan

*George Martelli offers a
new view of Byron*

The author of *Don Juan* was no conservative; indeed Byron loathed the Tories. He admired Napoleon, disliked Wellington, whom he blamed for restoring the reactionaries in Europe, and defended the workers who smashed their machines to protect their livelihood. He hated injustice and oppression, and even more humbug, especially the hypocrisy of the English upper classes. Above all he prized freedom, for individuals and nations.

But nor was he what we would call a liberal. Born a member of the nobility he respected heredity and tradition. He was proud of his title and his position as a peer of the realm, and appreciative of the privileges it gave him, including that of being tried by his fellow peers - if it ever came to that! (At one moment it seemed possible that his estranged wife might charge him with buggery, then a criminal offence, as it still is where a woman is concerned). While he was always a kind master worshipped by his servants, he had no illusions about the 'labouring classes'. He despised the mob, had no great opinion of democracy, little faith in human

progress, and still less in the power of laws to make men happier - or better. In religion he respected the Catholic Church without ever avowing himself a Christian. If he had obeyed any rule it would have been 'to live and let live'. For today's progressives, 'chartists' and social levellers he would have had nothing but contempt. He would have been quite at home, I think, with the *Salisbury Review*.

If the author's character and mentality can ever be deduced from his work, Byron's epic poem, *Don Juan*, could serve as an example. Without going so far as to suggest that parts of it are autobiographical, one could point to similarities of the poet to his hero. Both were of aristocratic birth, moved in the highest social circles, were endowed with physical beauty as well as physical courage, travelled in the same countries, notably Greece and Turkey, and had many adventures, both amorous and otherwise. Moreover neither of them bore any resemblance to the Don Juan of popular culture such as the vulgar libertine of Mozart's opera. Each was more pursued by women than pursuing. In fact, if the poem has a message, it is that in the sexual war the predator and huntress is the female, and the hunted prey the male, she needing him more than he needs her.

As for its place in literature, *Don Juan* is the longest epic poem in the English language: 16,000 lines of rhyming verse, composed in stanzas of eight lines and divided into seventeen cantos, the last unfinished. It is also one of the greatest - certainly the most entertaining. Although

uncompleted it is rightly regarded as the poet's masterpiece, and with the exception of Shakespeare's, is probably the English literary work most widely known outside Britain. Like the national bard, and unlike all but a very few English writers before and after him, Byron's appeal was universal. Ask any foreigner to name the greatest English poet and he will give you - not Chaucer, or Milton, or Pope, or Shelley, or Keats, or Tennyson - but Byron.

He wrote the epic over a period of five years, during which he was also engaged in numerous other works, not to mention his vast correspondence. He started on it when he left Venice in 1818, during the period of his sexual promiscuity, and left off in 1823 when he was living in Genoa with his last mistress, Teresa Guiccoli, while preparing his fateful, and fatal, expedition to Missolonghi, where he was to lay down his life in the cause of Greek independence - killed not by the Turkish enemy, but by his own doctors, who literally bled him to death.

The poem may be enjoyed either as a stirring adventure story, a history of the times, a panorama of exotic countries and customs, a comedy of manners, a satire of man's inhumanity to man (something like Voltaire's *Candide*), a study of human nature, or a lesson in psychology (especially feminine psychology). It is also difficult to decide what to admire most in it: the brilliance of conception and execution, the fertility of imagination, the power of invention and description, the lyric quality of its more romantic passages, or the unflinching humour.

In no other work has Byron's wit shone more brightly or been more charitable, his irony so deadly and yet so good natured. Seldom in it does he permit himself anger or indignation. Unlike Pope's, which were poisoned, Byron's barbs were sweetened by his sense of fun. The impression left is that he was happier composing this work than any other. He had found, at last, the right vehicle for his particular genius and he drove it with incomparable art and gusto.

The epic was nearly completed when Byron died, with only another canto or so to go, and in this essay I have been tempted to speculate how he would have ended it had he lived. In doing so I have quoted extensively from the poem, this being necessary to convey its unique savour. First, however, for the benefit of those not familiar with it, it may be useful to summarise the story.

Juan, of course, is a Spaniard, born in Seville towards the end of the Eighteenth Century, the son of a 'true hidalgo', who dies when he is still a child. He is brought up by his mother, Donna Inez, renowned for her piety and learning. (Her character may have been suggested to Byron by his wife, who was a prig and a prude). Her attempt to educate her son in strict moral principles is, however, unsuccessful. At the age of sixteen Juan kicks over the traces when he is found in bed with the pretty young wife of another *hidalgo*.

To remove him from the scandal Donna Inez dispatches Juan on a grand tour, accompanied by a tutor. They embark at Cadiz; but after the ship has entered the Mediterranean it is wrecked in a storm. Passengers and crew escaped in a lifeboat, which for many weeks is driven by winds or drifts across the empty sea. The rations of food and water soon give out and after drawing lots it falls on the tutor to be sacrificed and eaten. (Byron's description of their sufferings, based on a real incident in the life of his naval forbear, Admiral Byron, is a famous set piece and inspired the equally famous painting by Delacroix which hangs in the Louvre).

Eventually, when there are only three survivors, one of them being Juan, all the others having either died or committed suicide, land is sighted. The boat is dashed on the rocks, his two companions are

drowned, but Juan, in spite of his weakness, manages to swim ashore, where he lies more dead than alive. He is found by a beautiful maiden, by name Haidée, who revives him and nurses him back to health in a cave. She is the daughter of a pirate chieftain who owns the island where Juan has landed, and who is at present away on a raiding expedition.

The young couple - she is the same age as Juan - have an idyllic love affair (presumably speechless since neither of them speaks the other's language), mostly lying on the beach or amid wild scenery. As her father is still away, they decide to legitimise their union, and celebrate their nuptials in a barbaric feast to which all the islanders are invited. Unfortunately, this is the moment when the pirate chief chooses to return. He is understandably annoyed. Juan resists capture, but is overpowered and clapped in irons on board the pirate ship, which soon sets sail for Constantinople.

There, he is put up for sale in the slave market. With another captive, an Englishman, he is bought by a black eunuch called Baba, who acts as procurer for the Sultana and thinks Juan will do well for her. The pair are smuggled into the seraglio, where Juan is forced to dress as a girl on pain of being emasculated if he refuses. He is conducted into the presence of the Sultana, a young and beautiful woman, the fourth wife of the Sultan, who shows her approval of the eunuch's choice. But Juan is still in love with Haidée, the wild island girl from whose arms he has been dragged, and he is unable to respond in the way expected of the slave he now is.

From this embarrassing, and also dangerous, situation, he is rescued by the unexpected arrival, with his train of courtiers, of the Sultan, who has decided to spend the night with his consort. Juan is whisked away and returns to the seraglio, whose members welcome the addition to their ranks of such a pretty girl.

When their bedtime comes it is found that there is no spare bed for the new arrival and Juan has to share one with a 17-year-old Circassian. When she discovers the truth her shrieks-of-fright, shock, excitement, pleasure, (Byron does not tell us which) - awaken the whole dormi-

tory. She explains that she has had a bad dream, while Juan continues, apparently, to be asleep.

In the morning Baba recounts the incident to the Sultana, who has woken with a bad temper after a night with her lord and master. She is furious with jealousy and orders the eunuch to punish the culprits in the usual way: that is to sew them up in weighted sacks and drop them into the Bosphorus. But Baba, fearing that he will be blamed and suffer the same fate, arranges to escape with the two slaves accompanied by their female partners.

After many hardships the party arrive at the Danube, where a Russian army is confronting the Turkish garrison in the famous siege of Ismail. Juan and his new friend volunteer to serve with the Russians, and so distinguish themselves by their bravery that they are both decorated with the Order of Vladimir. As an additional honour, Juan is sent to St. Petersburg with dispatches. His good looks attract the attention of the Empress Catherine, who is reputed to have a different guardsman in her bed every night. After being tested by her *épreureuse* he becomes her lover - more out of politeness than inclination.

Catherine is old enough to be his mother and he soon tires of the role he is unwillingly playing. To escape from it he feigns illness, which arouses her maternal solicitude. To assist his convalescence she sends him to London on a secret diplomatic mission. It is at this point that the final episode begins in Canto XIII.

Juan is staying in a 'Norman Abbey' as guest of Lord and Lady Adeline Amundeville, an aristocratic couple whose acquaintance he has made in London. Among the household of twenty or thirty people, three women play a part in the story. The first is his hostess, Lady Adeline, who although only a few months older, has taken him under her wing. Of noble birth herself, and married to a nobleman, who besides being rich has a minor job in the government, Adeline is the fashionable hostess of her day. She is pretty, clever and virtuous. While not admitting it to herself she is strongly attracted to Juan, having succumbed to the fascination which he exerts on both

men and women, not only through his personal qualities of good looks and charm, but also because of his reputation, and a certain mystery which surrounds him. It is known that he has led an adventurous life, is an accomplished man of the world, and has all the gifts needed to succeed in it. But how his career started and where it is leading are an enigma. This however, although it intrigues, does not worry Lady Adeline. She could easily fall in love with Juan; but having resisted that temptation for the sake of her principles - or her reputation - she is determined that nobody else shall have him except with her approval and then only in the bonds of matrimony. While he is being lionised in London, with every hostess competing for his presence at her party (as happened of course, to Byron when he first became famous after the publication of *Childe Harold*) she appoints herself his spiritual guide and mentor. Having captured him for her autumn house party in the teeth of her rivals, her next objective is to find a suitable wife for him. Her motive, needless to say, is not so charitable as would appear or as she pretends to herself. Byron describes her state of mind in stanza 28 of Canto XV.

When Adeline, in all her growing sense
 Of Juan's merits and his situation,
 Felt on the whole an interest intense,
 Partly perhaps because a fresh sensation,
 Or that he had an air of innocence,
 Which is for innocence a sad temptation,
 (As women hate half measures on the whole) /
 She 'gan to ponder how to save his soul.
 (*Don Juan*, Canto XV, Stanza 28)

That Adeline is ripe for an extra-marital experience is partly the result of her situation. After three years of marriage and the production of two sons, she is bored with her husband, whose only interests are his estate and politics. Lord Henry is the typical English milord, 'a cold good honourable man', whose sort so strongly disapproved of Byron. His character is described, not unsympathetically, in two stanzas of Canto XIV, of which the second gives the more negative side.

But there was something wanting on the whole -
 I don't know what and therefore cannot tell -
 Which pretty women - the sweet souls! - call soul.
 Certes it was not body; he was well
 Proportioned, as a poplar or a pole,
 A handsome man, that human miracle,
 And in each circumstance of love or war
 Had still preserved his perpendicular.
 (XIV, 71)

(The ambiguity of the adjective in the last line is typical of the mischievous kind of joke with which Byron delights to shock - or titillate - his readers. With such a husband, who might also be *complaisant* (as was William Lamb, afterwards Lord Melbourne, during his wife's affair with Byron), Lady Adeline would have some excuse for succumbing to Juan's charms. But whether she does or not we are left to guess from a stanza towards the end of Canto XIV, which, if nothing else, prove Byron's gift for keeping the reader in suspense.

Whether Don Juan and chaste Adeline
 Grew friends in this or any other sense
 Will be discussed hereafter I opine.
 At present I am glad of a pretense
 To leave them hovering, as the effect is fine
 And keeps the atrocious reader in suspense,
 The surest way for ladies and for books
 To bait their tender or their tenterhooks.
 (XIV, 97)

Since Byron dies before finishing the poem, the fate he intended for Lady Adeline remains in doubt. In view, however, of what subsequently occurs at the house party, and of Juan's involvement with two other members of it, it seems likely that she would have preserved her virtue intact. Her principal rival is another guest, the Duchess of Fitz-Fulke, a woman of loose morals, whose current lover, Lord Augustus Fitz-Plantagenet, is also in the party. The Duchess is described as

....a fine and somewhat full-blown blond
 Desirable, distinguished, celebrated
 For several winters in the grand, grand monde.
 I'd rather not say what might be related
 Of her exploits, for this were ticklish ground.
 (XIV, 42)

Having set her sights on Juan the Duchess is somewhat put off by his lack of response, and begins to treat him 'with some small agacerie'. This soon becomes the talk of the party.

The circle smiled, then whispered and then sneered:
 The misses bridled and the matrons frowned:
 Some hoped things might not turn out as they
 feared;
 Some would not deem such women could be found;
 Some ne'er believed the half of what they heard;
 Some looked perplexed and others looked pro-
 found;
 And several pitied with sincere regret
 Poor Lord Augustus Fitz-Plantagenet.
 (XIV, 44)

As for the Duke he does not appear, but we are given his portrait.

But what is odd none ever named the Duke,
 Who, one might think, was something in the affair.
 True he was absent and, 'twas rumoured, took
 But small concern about the when or where
 Or what his consort did. If he could brook
 Her gaities, none had the right to stare.
 Their's was that best of unions past all doubt
 Which never meets and therefore can't fall out.
 (XIV, 45)

(As a victim himself of an unhappy marriage which had ended in a separation, Byron could never resist having a tilt at the institution). The Duchess's behaviour towards Juan infuriates Lady Adeline and she resolves to save the young man from her claws. It is not only that she forsores a scandal; she fears that Juan will be unable to resist.

When, however, she consults her husband on what measures to take to break up the relationship, Lord Henry advises against them.

Firstly, he said, he never interfered
In anybody's business but the King's;
Next that he never judged from what appeared,
Without strong reason, of those sorts of things:
Thirdly, that Juan has more brain than beard
And was not to be held in leading strings.
And fourthly, what need hardly be said twice,
That good but rarely comes from good advice.
(XIV, 66)

Lady Adeline is nevertheless determined to save Juan's soul by getting him safely married. When she suggests this to Juan he does not object in principle; the only difficulty, he says, is that the women he would like to marry are all married already. This may be intended as a subtle compliment to Lady Adeline, but it does not discourage her. There are several eligible 'Misses' staying in the house party in whom she seeks to interest Juan but without success. There is only one of whom apparently she does not approve, who happened, of course, to be the only one whom he finds attractive. Her name is Aurora Raby and Byron devotes several stanzas to describing her charms. She is sixteen, beautiful, rich, noble, an orphan and a Catholic to boot, as it is necessary for Juan's wife to be. Here is how she is introduced:

Aurora Raby, a young star who shone
O'er life, too sweet an image for such glass,
A lovely being, scarcely formed and moulded,
A rose with all its sweetest leaves yet folded...
(XV, 43)

But besides her youth and beauty there is a certain quality about the girl that makes her different from the rest.

She gazed upon a world she scarcely knew,
As seeking not to know it. Silent, lone,
As grows a flower, thus quietly she grew
And kept her heart serene within its zone.
There was awe in the homage which she drew;
Her spirit seemed as seated on a throne
Apart from the surrounding world and strong
In its own strength, most strange in one so young.
(XV, 47)

Is not Byron painting here the portrait of his ideal woman - the one he might have married had not his first love, the youthful Mary Chaworth, turned him down as a callow boy? Nowhere in all his work is the inner beauty of his subject, as opposed to her purely physical attributes, so highly lauded. It was as if only towards the end of his life has his imagination found the object that it has been seeking throughout. He compares Aurora with Haidée, Juan's first love (not counting his boyhood affair with a married woman), whom he encountered after being washed on her remote island following shipwreck. They are very different,
Yet each was radiant in her proper sphere

The island girl, bred by the lone sea,
More warm, as lovely, and not less sincere,
Was Nature's all. Aurora could not be
Nor would be thus....

(XV, 58)

Seated next to her at dinner Juan tries to chat Aurora up, but does not meet with any encouragement since she is not the sort of girl to be impressed at a first encounter either by his looks or his reputation as a lady-killer. This irks Juan not a little,

To his gay nothings, nothing was replied
Or something which was nothing, as urbanity
Required. Aurora scarcely looked aside,
Nor even smiled enough for any vanity.
The devil was in the girl! Could it be pride
Or modesty of absence or inanity?
Heaven knows! But Adeline's malicious eyes
Sparkled with her successful prophesies.

(XV, 78)

In her attempt to steer him away from Aurora, whom in her heart she recognises as her only serious rival, Lady Adeline has done her best to disparage the girl in his eyes.

She marvelled what he saw in such a baby.
As that prim, silent, cold Aurora Raby.

(XV, 49)

But it is, of course, the girl's reserve, and her apparent indifference to him that intrigues Juan, and attracts him to her. Nor is she as immune as she seems to the special kind of charm which has made Juan (like perhaps Byron) such a success with women.

But Juan has a sort of winning way,
A proud humility, if such there be,
Which showed such deference to what females say,
As if each charming word were a decree.
His tact too tempered him from grave to gay
And taught him when to be reserved or free.
He had the art of drawing people out
Without their seeing what he was about.

(XV, 82)

Anyhow, she unbends sufficiently

As once or twice to smile if not to listen.

(XV, 80)

At this point the subject of the poem abruptly changes to a discussion about ghosts, in which Byron argues in favour of their existence, with many classical allusions and citations from learned authorities (he never lost an opportunity for displaying his erudition). This has nothing to do with anything that has gone before and is a preparation for a scene in the following Canto (No. XVI) in which Juan sees, or thinks he sees, the ghost of a monk who, legend says, has haunted the place, a former monastery, ever since its seizure by Henry VIII in the Sixteenth Century, and its purchase by the ancestor

of the present occupant. (Byron, of course, is thinking here of Newstead Abbey, which he inherited with his title but sold to pay off his debts after he had emigrated). After his not very encouraging, but not wholly discouraging, passage with Aurora Raby, Juan goes to bed thinking of her and already more than half in love.

And Juan on retiring for the night
Felt restless and complexed and compromised.
He thought Aurora Raby's eyes more bright
Than Adeline (such is advice) advised.
If he had known exactly his own plight,
He probably would have philosophised,
A great resource to all and ne'er denied
Till wanted; therefore Juan only sighed.
(XV, 12)

A full moon which lights up his 'gothic chamber' and lets in the 'rippling sound of the lake's billow' helps to keep him awake and engender a sense of mystery 'by midnight caused'. After gazing from his window 'out on the cascade' he opens his door and goes forth

Into a gallery of sombre hue
Long, furnished with pictures of great worth,
Of knights and dames heroic and chaste too,
As doubtless should be people of high birth.
But by dim lights the portraits of the dead
Have something ghastly, desolate, and dread.
(XVI, 17)

While he stands musing on the past he hears a sound which might come from a mouse. But it does not.

It was no mouse, but lo! a monk arrayed
In cowl and beads and dusky garb appeared,
Now in the moonlight and now lapsed in shade,
With steps that trod as heavy, yet unheard;
His garments only a slight murmur made.
He moved as shadowy as the sisters weird,
But slowly, and as he passed Juan by,
Glanced, without pausing, on him a bright eye.
(XVI, 21)

Juan is 'petrified'. He had heard reports that the place was haunted but never believed them. Could they be true? He stands rooted to the spot, while the 'thing of air' passes him three times, before disappearing through one of the doors in the long passage. Juan returns to his room and after a long interval manages to fall asleep. At breakfast the next morning everybody notices that he is not his normal self. To polite enquiries about his health he gives confused answers, which only increase their curiosity.

The Duchess of Fitz-Fulke played with her veil
And looked at Juan hard but nothing uttered.
Aurora Raby with her large dark eyes
Surveyed him with a kind of calm surprise.
(XVI, 31)

Finally Lord Henry, suspecting what has happened, tells Juan that it looks as if his rest had been 'broken in upon

by the Black Friar'. 'What Friar?' says Juan. Lord Henry proceeds to tell him about the ghost in a not very serious vein, but is stopped by Lady Adeline who doesn't think the subject should be treated lightly. Eventually, she is persuaded to narrate the legend herself, in a ballad she has composed and accompanies on the harp, of which these are the first and last verses.

Beware! beware of the Black Friar!
Who sitteth by Norman stone,
For he mutters his prayer in the midnight air
And his mass of the days that are gone.
When the Lord of the Hill, Amundeville,
Made Norman Church his prey
And expelled the friars, one friar still
Would not be driven away.

Say nought to him as he walks the hall,
And he'll say nought to you.
He sweeps along in his dusky pall,
As o'er the grass the dew.
Then gramercy for the Black Friar!
Heaven sain him, fair or foul,
And whatsoe'er may be his prayer,
Let ours be for his soul.

(XVI, 40)

The song restores Juan's spirits and he jokes about ghosts in general, without referring to his own experience. The Duchess of Fitz-Fulke joins in the fun, demanding more details of the Black Friar's appearance. The house party then disperse to their various occupations: some to watch 'a goodly match...between some greyhounds on my Lord's estate'; others to inspect 'a young race horse of old pedigree'. (Having been a star guest, before his disgrace, in many an aristocratic house party, Byron knew the world he was describing). Lord Henry, a connoisseur and collector of art, goes off to meet a picture dealer, who has brought 'a special Titian, warranted original'. His Lordship is also a JP and there is brought before him by the constable, (one Scout), a local girl who has become pregnant and has to be examined to ascertain the paternity of her future offspring. The poet's sympathies are naturally with the girl. (As a young man living at Newstead Abbey he had seduced one of the maidservants, and when she bore him a son he made financial provision for them both). While Lord Henry is busy with other matters - his 'prize pig, ploughman, poachers, lawyers' - the offender is kept waiting.

But this poor girl was left in the great hall,
While Scout, the parish guardian of the frail,
Discussed (he hated beer yclept the 'small')
A mighty mug of moral double ale.
She waited until justice could recall
Its kind attention to their proper pale
To name a thing in nomenclature rather
Perplexing for most virgins - a child's father.
(XVI, 67)

That evening the Amundevilles give one of the banquets which they offer from time to time to their humbler

neighbours; the country gentlemen, the knights and their ladies, the squires and their wives and lesser folk. It is not only that noblesse oblige such charity; Lord Henry needs their votes. Not having as yet inherited his title he can, and does, sit in the House of Commons; but there is strong competition from the other party in the county, and a general election is expected. He therefore makes himself agreeable to his guests, to whom Lady Adeline is also particularly gracious. Juan, not yet fully recovered from his encounter with the ghost, is confused by the company, whose like, being a foreigner, he has never met before. By betraying his ignorance of such subjects as the market price of corn he loses Lord Henry several votes. He sits in a sort of daze, and when asked to pass a dish absent mindedly helps himself to most of it without noticing, to the indignation of the person who is waiting for it. To make matters worse,

Was that he caught Aurora's eye on his
And something like a smile upon her cheek.
Now this he really rather took amiss.

(XVI, 92)

It was in fact a friendly smile, which Juan might have seen as some encouragement to his love

Since he had gained at least her observation,
A most important outwork of the city,
As Juan should have known, had not his senses
By last night's ghost been driven from their defenses.

(XVI, 93)

Meanwhile, Lady Adeline plays her role of condescending hostess with dignity and courtesy. Watching her, however, Juan begins to doubt her sincerity.

Though this was most expedient on the whole
And usual, Juan, when he cast a glance
On Adeline while playing her grand role,
Which she went through as though it were a dance
(Betraying only now and then her soul
By a look scarcely perceptibly askance
Of weariness or scorn), began to feel
Some doubt how much of Adeline was real.

(XVI, 96)

At last the evening comes to an end. The guests depart, delighted with their reception and above all with the charm shown them by Lady Adeline.

Some praised her beauty, others her grace,
The warmth of her politeness, whose sincerity
Was obvious in each feature of her face,
Whose traits were radiant with the rays of verity.
Yes, she was truly worth her high place;
No one could envy her deserved prosperity.
And then her dress - what beautiful simplicity
Draperyed her form with curious felicity!

(XVI, 102)

No sooner has the last carriage left, however, than Lady Adeline drops her mask and reveals her thoughts about the party.

In a most edifying conversation
Which turned upon their late guests' miens and
faces

And families, even to the last relation,
Their hideous wives, their horrid selves and dresses,
And truculent distortion of their tresses.

(XVI, 103)

This provokes much mirth among the house party, in which everybody joins except Juan. An aristo himself he is no snob, and it is distasteful to him to hear people mocking their social inferiors (something that Byron was too well bred ever to have done). Aurora observes Juan's attitude and shows by a glance that she approves of it, which he is 'glad to see'. The incident brings them together in a tacit bond which separates them from the rest of the party, and bodes well for Juan should he decide to pursue Aurora. But before he can do so, disaster strikes. While he lies awake that night, fond

Of those bitter sweet thoughts which banish sleep
And make the worldling sneer, the youngling weep

(XVI, 110)

he hears strange noises outside his room redolent of the ghostly presence of the previous night. He lies quaking with fear, when the door opens and by the light of his candles he sees standing in the doorway the Black Friar in his hood. This time his fright turns to anger. He rises and advances on the phantom figure, which quickly retreats. He pursues it to the end of the passage where he had first met it, puts out his hand and only touches the wall. What happens next is described in the last three stanzas of Canto No. XVI.

But still the shade remained, the blue eyes glared,
And rather variably for stony death.
Yet one thing rather good the grave had spared;
The ghost had remarkably sweet breath.
A straggling curl shown he had been fair-haired.
A red lip with two rows of pearls beneath
Gleamed forth, as through the casement's ivy shroud
The moon peeped, just escaped from a grey cloud.

And Juan, puzzled but still curious, thrust
His other arm forth. Wonder upon wonder!
It pressed upon a hard but glowing bust,
Which beat as if there were a warm heart under,
He found, as people on most trials must,
That he had made at first a silly blunder,
And that in his confusion he had caught
Only the wall instead of what he sought.

The ghost, if ghost it were, seemed a sweet soul
As ever lurked beneath a holy hood.
A dimpled chin, a neck of ivory stole
Forth into something much like flesh and blood.
Back fell the sable frock and dreary cow
And they revealed, alas, that ere they should,
In full, voluptuous, but not o'ergrown bulk,
The phantom of her frolic Grace - Fitz-Fulke.

(XVI, 121-123)

As to the outcome of the encounter, Byron again titillates his audience by refusing to reveal it.

Our hero was in canto the sixteenth
Left in a tender moonlight situation,
Such as enables man to show his strength
Moral or physical. On this occasion
Whether his virtue triumphed, or at length
His vice - for he was of a kindling nation -
Is more than I shall venture to describe,
Unless some beauty with a kiss should bribe.
(XVII, 12)

The reader, however, can be in no doubt how the matter ends. Reluctant as he is to be involved with the Duchess - especially in view of his growing interest in Aurora Raby - it would be impossible for Juan to reject the amorous lady's advances without behaving boorishly, both in his own and her eyes. Moreover, it is more likely that as a young and virile man he is not impervious to the appeal of her 'full, voluptuous, but not o'ergrown bulk'.

In any case, it becomes clear how they have spent the night when the pair appear at breakfast the next morning, the last two to arrive at the table.

Which best is to encounter, ghost or none,
'Twere difficult to say, but Juan looked
As if he had combated with more than one,
Being wan and worn, with eyes that hardly brooked
The light that through the Gothic windows shone.
Her Grace too had a sort of air rebuked,
Seemed pale and shivered, as if she had kept
A vigil or dreamt rather more than slept.
(XVII, 14)

Here the poem ends. How would it have continued if Byron had completed it?

Juan would be suffering badly from the sort of hangover which usually follows a one-night stand of lust without love. He would have resented the fact that the Duchess, by a ruse that left him no alternative, had virtually raped him. But he would have been more angry with himself for letting her do so. Worst of all, what would be the reaction of Aurora Raby when she heard the news, as she was certain to do, since the Duchess was unlikely to keep it to herself? On the contrary, Her Grace would surely make it her business to spread the word around, especially amongst her rivals. Against strong competition she had succeeded in seducing the most attractive man in the house party; this was a feather in her cap and she would vaunt her triumph.

So we find Juan feeling utterly miserable, disgusted with himself and fearing that he has spoiled for ever his chance of winning the love of the one woman he knows - and perhaps the only one in his short life he has ever met - whom he could love himself and be happy with always. Juan, as we know by now, has been admired and courted by many women and the lover of not a few - including the highest in the land; but he has never fallen in love in the way he is doing when the poem ends.

(The affair with Haidée, the island girl, however passionate, cannot be compared with it, since he was still immature and there could be no question of his spend-

ing his life with her). So what did Byron intend to do with his hero?

There can be only one answer. Since the epic is a comedy, not a tragedy, it must end happily, like a novel; otherwise the public would never forgive the author, any more than they could forgive Trollope for failing to contrive the marriage of Lilian Dale to John Eames in *The Small House At Allington*. So after the truth of his tangling with the Duchess has come out, and no doubt many vicissitudes, Aurora, I am sure, will forgive Juan; they will declare mutual love, and become engaged, to the chagrin, not so secret, of Lady Adeline, and of the various 'misses' for whom she had failed to gain Juan's approval. The facts that Aurora is an orphan, an heiress and a Catholic make the marriage all the more suitable from Juan's point of view.

Byron, whose own marriage ended so disastrously, often mocked the institution. But amid all his amours during his years of exile - in his letters, in his conversation, and even in his poetry - there is sometimes a hint that what he yearned for above all, after the emotional storms of his life, was the peace and quiet and security which only matrimony can bring. Knowing that domestic bliss was not attainable by himself, and less likely to be attained the older he grew, is it not conceivable that he planned to console himself for the loss by inventing two idealised characters, Juan and Aurora Raby, and uniting them as man and wife to live happily ever after? If so, what a different Byron we have here from the one generally perceived!

George Martelli is an author and journalist.

Letters

Sir

Michael Lees' reminder of the atrocities committed during the early 1940s by Croats upon Serbs (September 1991) ought to have been associated with a specific reference to the barbarities subsequently committed by Serbs upon Croats. The fact that, in this country, very much less has been heard of the latter series of massacres than of the former is all the more reason why Lees should have cited the entire catalogue of infamy, rather than merely those items that may serve to support a particular standpoint. As it is, his selectivity is rendered all the more conspicuous. (Any argument that, since Tito himself was a Croat, no systematic butchery was inflicted by Serbs, as such, upon Croats, as such, would be an obvious quibble).

Why should young men who have been fighting and dying for Croatian independence be tainted with the disgrace of the wartime *Ustashi* regime when, in many instances, not even their parents would have been born before 1941? Nobody accuses the young Serbs of today being guilty of their ancestors' crimes. Serb irregulars - in concert with a Serbo-Montenegrin army and air force - have been and are making war, not merely upon their Croat counterparts but most brutally, upon noncombatants of both sexes and all ages and upon as much of the Croatian landscape as is within the range of their artillery. Dubrovnik has been battered from land, sea and air uncurbed by any call to consider the safety of local Serbs (there are none to speak of) and contemptuously unmindful of the original pretext for the assault of the Serb elements among the populace of eastern Croatia. Except for a brief sally by Croatian forces against a Serbian border town, the whole weight of the military aggression has been hurled against the Croatian people.

Unfortunately some Press and television coverage of these events has been characterised by the same determination to condemn the Croats through the images, deliberately distorted or manipulated, of their past historical associations.

However, some commentators and reporters - including most of those who

have been closest to the fighting - have written or spoken with clarity, honesty and intelligence, in some instances right against the grain of editorial policy. One thinks here of Mark Almond, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Martin Bell and Paul Davies.

Jeffrey Burton
Liss
Hants

Sir,

In his article 'Lessons from America' in the September 1991 issue of the *Salisbury Review*, Ray Honeyford is quite accurate in identifying the causes behind the popularity of David Duke - the erstwhile neo-Nazi, Democrat, and Ku Klux Klanner from Louisiana. Duke, despite the soundness of his remnants on welfare and social engineering, is clearly *not* a conservative, as his rather dubious political affiliations have illustrated. He is as radical as those blacks who speak of a 'white conspiracy' or 'black pride'.

Unfortunately, the type of political climate has been created in America in which anyone who criticises the black establishment must be a racist, and, moreover, deserves to be labelled a 'bigot' and shunned. This reaction effectively eliminates any chance of debate on the issue. More mainstream politicians (e.g. President Bush) are intimidated by this bullying; their reluctance to speak out against racial social policies has left the door open for political adventurers who have nothing - including their reputations - to lose.

The community spirit is indeed on the decline in America. The main pre-occupations are now individual life styles and ethnicity. Both the *Financial Times* and the *Economist* have recently suggested that this fractionisation could possibly lead to open conflict in the next decade or so. The situation is so desolate (though most Americans - preferring a trouble free life - will never admit this) that the appearance of David Duke on the scene can only mean that Americans are moving closer to a confrontation of some sort. A political system cannot be based upon such notions as 'equality' or 'tolerance' or 'racial superiority', for these

ideas would quickly prove to be quite disastrous.

T.W.Myerscough
Greenwich
Connecticut.

Sir,

Optimism or pessimism about the future for Poland? The outlook for the development of capitalism there is both better and worse than Mr. Robert Mellors, (Letters, December 1991), might fear.

Worse, since an appreciable proportion of the money being used for investment in new businesses is in the hands of the older Communist bosses, and it is they, as much as the new people in power, who are in a position to reap benefits. The robbery and betrayal which, he says, have formed a background to our own capitalist development in the past are being repeated on occasion in Poland today, but by the old guard rather than the new.

Better, because he underestimates the strength of the values which, he speculates, have been preserved by the rigidities of the Communist state. He is quite right to focus our attention on the young, and on the relative stability and maturity of their values when compared with those of our Western 'yooof' culture. But he concludes with an unnecessary degree of pessimism by omitting to examine the causes involved.

There would seem to be at least two. The importance of the first, an adherence to the teachings of the Catholic Church when it was the only source of opposition to the Communist authorities, will possibly fade, as alternative sources of protest develop. (I assume, as does your other correspondent, Mr. Adrian Pepper, that young people are rebellious until they acquire a measure of adult independence). It will become easier for a young person to ignore the moral and ethical authority offered by the Church when its now apolitical social teaching (especially on contraception and abortion) because more noticeable, make it unpopular as a focus for their dissent.

The second, a commitment to a thor-

ough secondary and tertiary mass education, long gone in the UK and the USA but prevalent in Poland, is likely to persist. There is nothing like a solid educational foundation to establish the values which allow one to discriminate between the meritorious and the meretricious, in consumer choice as in most human activity. The problem here will be to wean

Polish academics away from their excessive reliance on *ex cathedra* authority, towards the teaching of practical skills and independent thinking as well as of knowledge, without falling into the trivialisation which underlies much of our Western effort to train and develop people who will one day be managers.

As that is precisely what the Krakow

Consortium Project sets out to do, I can only be hopeful. But I know what Mr. Mellors means: it's a difficult business, and optimism is, at times, a conscious decision.

Dr. Devi Jankowicz
Stockton-on-Tees
Cleveland

EUROPEAN FEDERALISM AND THE ANTI-FEDERALIST LEAGUE

There were two headlines in the newspapers on Monday December 9th 1991 when the Maastricht Treaty negotiations opened. One talked of Jacques Delors' 'dream' of a federal, centrally-run Europe (or part of it, anyway), the other said, very simply, 'Soviet Union falls apart'. Other, smaller headlines spoke of unremitting fighting in Yugoslavia. On the basis of the degeneration and painful disintegration of the two federations closest to us geographically, we can give only one response to M. Delors and his 'dreams': 'we have seen the future and it does not work'.

Among the political leadership of all the parties there seems to be a consensus to bury the issue and to rush the country into a united Europe. The leaders of the two main parties have made it clear that they are against a referendum. The leaders of all three parties are, to a greater or lesser degree, federalist.

Within the parties there are MPs and candidates who are anti-federalist, who should be encouraged to speak and vote against the political consensus.

A number of constituencies do not have any anti-federalist candidates. It is to deal with that problem that the Anti-Federalist League was formed. Its inaugural meeting was also last December 9th. The League's aim is to present the people of the country with a real choice on what ought to be the most important issue at the next general election: sovereignty. The League is not anti-European and is not even against the Common Market, provided it is a genuinely free economic community, not an excuse for a great number of regulations. Its preferred vision of Europe (M. Delors does not have a monopoly on dreams) is one of a loose association of all the national states who function independently, who take pride in their own country and their own society while trading and co-operating with other states both inside and outside Europe. At a time when Europe as a whole is reasserting its historic values and democratic ideals, we ought not to allow yet another utopian ideology to set history back.

If you want to help the Anti-Federalist League, stand as a candidate, or make a donation, please contact:

**Dr. Alan Sked
Flat 3, Aberdeen Court,
68, Aberdeen Park,
London, N5 2 BH.
TEL: 071-226-5824**

Reviews

The Order of Reality

Ian Crowther

The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Volume 12, Published Essays 1966-1985, edited with an introduction by Ellis Sandoz, Louisiana State University Press, 1990, £30.90. **The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Volume 28, What is History and other late Unpublished Writings**, edited with an introduction by Thomas A. Hollweck and Paul Caringella, Louisiana, 1990, £21.40. **Autobiographical Reflections**, Eric Voegelin, ed. Ellis Sandoz, Louisiana, 1989, £16.00. **Eric Voegelin's Significance for the modern mind**, ed. Ellis Sandoz, Louisiana, £25.00. **The Balance of Consciousness**, Kenneth Keulman, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990. **Voegelin on the idea of Race**, Thomas W. Heilke, Louisiana, 1990, £21.00. **The Collected Essays of Gregor Sebba**, Edited by Helen Sebba, Anibal Bueno and Hendrikus Boers, Louisiana, 1991, £45.00.

Eric Voegelin, the philosopher-historian who died in 1985, was a prophet little honoured in his own time; perhaps because (as Lewis Simpson argues in his contribution to *Eric Voegelin's Significance for the modern mind*) he was one of the last representatives of that 'clerisy' which in the Middle Ages had devoted itself to unworldly contemplation, and which Coleridge had vainly sought to revive as an extra-ecclesiastical though nonetheless ethical entity in society. There is no doubt that Voegelin's understanding of man's existence as lived in the Platonic *metaxy*, 'the In-Between of this-worldly and other-worldly reality', distanced him from the modern, laicised cleric or intellectual whom Julien Benda famously excoriated for 'betraying' his transcendent calling, by abandoning disinterested in favour of practical activity that divinises human appetites and passions. What Benda called 'the apotheosis of the real' Voegelin was later to describe as the 'immanentization of the eschaton': or in other words, the process through which 'man's existence' ceases to be, as Voegelin puts it in his *Autobiographical Reflections*, 'that of the *viator* in the Christian sense - the wanderer, the pilgrim toward eschatological perfection' - and becomes instead a political pilgrim's progress towards a terrestrial paradise, to be achieved either by revolution or by the progressive application to human affairs of scien-

tific reason. Voegelin came to prefer the term 'immanentization' to 'secularisation' because it more sharply evoked modern man's loss of the tension between the immanent and the transcendent: between the temporal and eternal realms of Augustine's two cities, the *civitas terrena* and the *civitas Dei*, between *amor sui* and *amor Dei*.

Had Voegelin confined his diagnosis of modernity's ills to the totalitarian ideologies of Hitler and Stalin, he might more easily have found favour with the intellectual establishment. But unusually for one who saw Nazism close up, having narrowly escaped arrest by the Gestapo as he fled Vienna after the Anschluss in 1938, Voegelin did not think that a secure refuge from perverted order was to be found in moral and social disorder. Modern Western society is infatuated with freedom. It is not infatuated with order. Nor does it see, or wish to see, the vital connection between the two. It has preserved - in the shape of Western individualism - Plato's anthropological principle of politics, that society is 'man writ large', but it has lost sight of the corollary, that order in society is dependent on order in the psyche of man. Unfortunately the psyche of man has become inaccessible to us except as the reflection of our physical being and circumstances. Ellis Sandoz, in his highly illuminating introduction to the *Published Essays*, explains why

Voegelin could not celebrate the 'autonomous individual whose life is governed not by reason but by various self-indulgent passions'. Rather, Voegelin evoked 'as generally valid Aristotle's experience-symbolization of the true man as the good or mature man (*spoudaios*) whose ordered life reflects the hierarchy of being and goods in which he participates by virtue of a human existence that epitomizes reality, from materiality to divinity. This is the ontologically sound paradigm to be approximated by the man who seeks to fulfill the demands of his humanity by living a well-ordered life. Such a man is attuned to truth and lives, as best he can, in responsive openness to it, thereby cultivating balance in existence. The autonomous individual, by contrast, has lost the balance by falling victim of one reductionism or another.'

Before Plato's well-attuned soul or Aristotle's *spoudaios* could furnish the model for the order of society, experiences of transcendence had first to meet the challenge of man's primary experience of the cosmos as, in Thales's description of it, a world full of gods. Voegelin's *Order and History* (his five volume study of the order of human existence in society from ancient to modern times) opens with the ancient civilizations of the Near East, in which society is conceived as a *cosmion*: the world in microcosm. Here the order of society is modelled on ever-recurring vegetative rhythms and celestial cycles. Then, during what Karl Jaspers called the 'axis time' of world history, within the relatively brief span of five centuries, from about 800 BC to about 300 BC, there occurs a series of breaks with cosmological myth - in Israel at the time of the prophets, in Greece with the emergence of philosophy and tragedy, in India with Buddhism, and in China with Confucius. What had been a seamless whole of world, gods and human beings is replaced by separate partners. From the great spiritual eruptions - 'leaps in being' Voegelin termed them - of Hellenic

philosophy, Israelite Revelation and Christianity, Western man learned how to differentiate between the existent things and their non-existent ground in the world transcendent God.

Now it is central to Voegelin's interpretation of history that the rejection of the cosmological type introduces a tension in existence which, though precious, is also precarious - and dangerous. In *What is History*, one of his late *Unpublished Writings*, Voegelin puts it as follows: '... once man has become conscious that he is the source, if not of order, of at least the conceptions of order, an autonomy has been gained that can be used in the service of truth as well as of untruth. With the dimension of philosophy there opens the dimension of philodoxy (to use Plato's term) - the possibility of opining. Hence, in the new state of emancipation, there are as many conceptions of order possible as there are drives and desires in the psyche apt to harden into centres for organizing them.' The late Gregor Sebba, whose thought (it is clear from his *Collected Essays*) was greatly influenced by Voegelin, and whose association with him dated back to pre-war Vienna, himself devoted much study to man's experience of autonomy, and in particular to the experience of the autonomous modern self under the shaping influence of Descartes. In an essay entitled 'Time and the Modern Self', which admirably complements and extends key points made by Voegelin in the essay just quoted, Sebba traces the modern quest for the pure self in Descartes's *Meditations*, Rousseau's *Confessions* and two novels by Samuel Beckett. The quest ends in an anguished consciousness hovering on the edge of extinction.

The fragile 'balance of consciousness' thus becomes literally unbalanced. The modern world has been similarly drained of meaning and significance. The relocation of God in a world-transcending Beyond can prepare the ground for a world empty, not merely of the gods of polytheism, but also of all traces of divinity. In his essay 'Anxiety and Reason', from the *Unpublished Writings*, Voegelin speaks of the need to keep the old gods on, but as 'relay stations, as it were, on the way to the

newly differentiated absolute ground'. This is precisely what the Church did in the Middle Ages, providing, 'with psychological tact... Christian versions of holy places, miracle-working images, and rituals', and developing 'a host of saints to substitute for the gods'. But once we pension off the intracosmic gods, in the belief that they are expendable, the way is open for the arrival of divinised man: a totally 'world-immanent entity', manifested most horribly this century in the eugenically-bred man envisaged by the Germans as constituting the 'Aryan master race.'

It was Voegelin's early encounter with this deformed product of the modern, scientific imagination or 'scientism' that lies at the back of his lifelong concern with what he called a 'perverted immanence.' The Nazi idea of 'Aryan Man', is only a grotesquely radical version of a wider phenomenon, namely 'the transition from the transcendent to the immanent perspective.' In his exegesis *Voegelin on the idea of Race*, Thomas W. Heilke explains how Voegelin traced the genealogy of the Nazi race idea 'from its beginnings in a transcendent conception of life to the modern, atheistic, immanentist archetype of the biosphere... When the spiritual bonds, the purpose, and the development of the community become entirely immanent, both in terms of the lives of its members, and of the community as a whole, it becomes more tempting and easier to reject the aspects of mystery residing in the ontological nature of human beings, and to consider the completely immanent to be completely knowable. God no longer holds in His hand the secret of life; the 'secret of life' is no longer a secret, but an immanent phenomenon with its own immanent laws of existence and continuation. Consequently, we may come to believe that we can penetrate its mystery, that in fact, it is a mystery in appearance only.'

Voegelin's critique of ideology is not rendered obsolete by the 'end of ideology' or by the fact that communism now appears to be going the way of Nazism: into the dustbin of history. Eugenics is back in the up-to-date garb of genetic engineering, which derives its respectability from

the now widely-held notion that more sacred than life is the 'quality of life'; a notion which is also deployed by advocates of abortion and euthanasia. Thus, in place of 'Aryan Man' we are today offered, simply and uncontroversially, 'Healthy Man' or 'Socialist'. Among other reductionist accounts of humanity still in vogue perhaps the most potent in advanced Western societies is 'Economic Man'. We remain deeply in thrall to the idea that man is 'nothing but' his self-interested drives. Included in much that is fascinating in Voegelin's sketch of his intellectual life, *Autobiographical Reflections*, there is his discussion of 'the experiences that result in immanentist constructions... Perhaps the most important one is the removal of the *amor Dei* from the Augustinian structure of the soul by Hobbes, and the reduction of its ordering force to the *amor sui*. This reduction to the *amor sui* then became dominant in the Eighteenth Century through the psychology of the *amour-de-soi* developed by the French *moralistes* ... Only in recent years have I developed the concept of the 'egophanic revolt', in order to designate the concentration on the epiphany of the ego as the fundamental experience that eclipses the epiphany of God in the structure of Classic and Christian consciousness.'

Against the one-sided consciousness of modern naturalism Voegelin pitches *The Balance of Consciousness*. Kenneth Keulman's book bearing that title shows us that the materials for building the City of Man, as opposed to the City of some counterfeit Man, are ready to hand in Voegelin's 'open' theory of consciousness and the political theory that arises out of it. Keulman encompasses and elucidates the whole range of Voegelin's work, the central purpose of which he sees as the search for an understanding of human nature in all its fullness as well 'as a critique of one-dimensional images of the human condition that attempt to reduce the complexities of life to single factors or principles'. We may not have seen the last of Robert Musil's 'Second Order Realities'. But with the help of Voegelin and his interpreters we may see through them.

The Empire Europe Needs

George Chowdharay-Best

A Heart for Europe: The Lives of Emperor Charles and Empress Zita of Austria-Hungary, Jamie and Joanna Bogle, Fowler Wright Books, 1991, £6.95 (paperback).

Why did the Allies fail to make peace with Austria in 1917? The Emperor Franz Josef died in 1916. In rejecting his reformist successor Charles' peace proposals, then and later, did they prolong the war unnecessarily and start a chain of events which condemned Russia and Eastern Europe to suffer under various ideologically-based tyrannies for most of the Twentieth Century?

A Heart for Europe, an immensely readable biography, poses these questions, and blames notions of 'progress', in both Britain and the USA, for the fall of the Austrian Empire and ensuing tragedies.

The Boggles quote Charles' wife Zita's brother Sixtus, who enrolled in the Belgian army after being turned down by the French, and was entrusted with the first, secret negotiations: 'A separate peace with Austria would have realised the principal object of the war...The war would have concentrated on the French front and brought about the result obtained eighteen months later. The lives of thousands, nay millions of men would have been saved'.

How much were the Allies really to blame? The modern consensus among historians writing in English, at any rate, is that Charles' desire for an independent peace was genuine but was to some extent obstructed by his own ministers as well as by the might of Hohenzollern Germany.

On the subject of peace negotiations, President Wilson is not mentioned until comparatively late in the Boggles' book; yet the evidence shows that as early as February 1917 (See L.C. Gardner, *Safe for Democracy*, 1987) he had instructed Ambassador Page to 'sound out British leaders on the possibility of assuring Vienna that it was not intended that the Austro-Hungarian Empire be dismembered'. Austria intensely desired peace, he said. Lloyd George replied that Austria did indeed seem

to want peace, but that the country was now a 'convenient fiction' as the Germans even commanded its army. 'We have no policy of dismemberment', he continued, but would have to attend to the opinion of 'Romanians, Slavs, Serbs and Italians!' Indeed, according to V.S. Mamatey *The Habsburg Empire in World War I* (1977), an Allied note to President Wilson of 10 January 1917 had already made it clear that their war aims included the 'liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Romanians and of Czechoslovaks from foreign domination' (italics added).

Lloyd George is severely criticised by the Boggles, as is President Wilson; although the latter 'purported to be such a great believer in the principle of self-determination for all nations', he was in reality, say the Boggles, 'an eminent practitioner of the less morally sound business of imposing one's political prejudice on others'. It is of course true, as Dr. Alan Sked points out (*Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 1989) that the tenth of Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 1918 called only for the reorganisation of Austria-Hungary on federal lines, not its disappearance; but what Dr. Sked fails to mention is that later in that year the President had been forced to give up that point in favour of Czech independence. I have deliberately used the word forced because I do not, with due respect to the Boggles, believe that a consistent policy of dismemberment can be imputed to the Entente powers, despite what they say. As Paula S. Fichtner has pointed out, Woodrow Wilson and influential figures in the US Foreign Service were convinced that proliferating nationalisms were the central problem of Austria-Hungary and even the cause of the conflict. Wilson moved 'very reluctantly' to the point on 7 December 1917 of asking for a declaration of war on Austria-Hungary (the US had already

declared war on Germany in April). The way was prepared for this by articles and speeches by Theodore Roosevelt, who stated before a dinner of the Pennsylvania Society in New York that 'Austria-Hungary and Turkey are not nations, they are racial tyrannies by certain national castes, which in each case represent only a minority of the total population. Neither democracy nor civilisation is safe while these two states exist in their present form'.

Strangely, the Boggles make only a passing reference to the 1918 peace negotiations in Switzerland, about which we learn a great deal of what took place (on the Austrian side) from Betty Unterberger's *United States, Revolutionary Russia and the Rise of Czechoslovakia* (University of North Carolina Press, 1989). Unterberger introduces us to Heinrich Lammasch whom the Boggles mention briefly and somewhat dismissively as the last Prime Minister of Austria. But he had been tutor to the Emperor Charles and, states Unterberger, was 'a devoted advocate of a democratised Austro-Hungarian confederation of autonomous units', a description which seems to me, and would probably seem to the Boggles, an admirable summary of what Charles had in mind for the future of his Empire.

However, the end came on 11 November 1918 when Charles renounced all participation in the affairs of state. The Boggles pay tribute in this connection to the good offices of Colonel Strutt, acting for the British military representative in Vienna, who 'was to prove a loyal and devoted friend of the Emperor and Empress: acting indeed in an almost Rudolf Rassendyll fashion in support of their wellbeing and, later, their legitimate claim to their throne in Hungary'.

In October 1921 Charles and Zita succeeded for the second time in entering Hungary at the behest of Royalists, this time by air, to reclaim control from the usurping 'Regent', Admiral Horthy. It was a particularly trying experience for the Empress, as she was carrying her eighth child. The Royalist soldiers were finally overrun by the superior forces of Horthy's army. As the Boggles point out, the smug satisfaction of the authorities in London and Paris, re-

flected in the columns of *The Times* of the period, reads oddly today in the light of Horthy's support for the Nazis in the Second World War. Charles indeed seems to have been viewed by the Great Powers at this time rather like Napoleon returning from Elba. He was put on board a British warship, HMS Cardiff, whose captain 'asked him to give his word of honour that he would not try to escape during the voyage'. This of course he did, and the couple were taken to Madeira. There they lived in penury until Charles, not yet 35 years old, died of pneumonia on 1 April 1922. 'As you will it...Jesus!' were his last words.

The Empress continued to wear black throughout her 67 years of widowhood. 'Staunchly devout, immoveable in her faith, she became the matriarch of a vast family' (quoted by the Bogles from the *Imperial Gazette*). For her funeral in 1989 the Habsburg family led the mourners in Vienna where the ritual at the Capuchin church, last used for Franz Josef, was observed 'right down to the last detail - the knocking on the door, the repetition of the Empress' full titles, the denial of entry, and then the final admission after she had been described as simply a 'mor-

tal, sinful soul'.

The great merit of the Bogles' book is that it presents an optimistic, forward-looking view of constitutional monarchy, showing it not as an anachronism but rather as the best method yet devised in Europe or perhaps in the world of protecting minorities. The great weakness of pure democracy is that it tends to result in a 'dictatorship of the majority' as Lord Hailsham and others have called it. A constitutional monarch with a House of peers in support, can help to redress this imbalance. In the British constitution these functions are exercised with restraint and to some effect. It is of course dangerous to impose a prescription which is on the whole successful in Britain upon others, especially upon the large and disparate group of nations which make up the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Nonetheless the principle remains valid that the total impartiality between subject and subject which a monarch swears to uphold at his coronation is a valuable safeguard against the oppression of minorities. This point the Bogles clearly make in the course of their exciting, awe-inspiring and entrancing book.

'liberation' of Eastern Europe or were killed by the secret police. The total is incalculable and horrifying. Yet the world goes on, many of the butchers remain unpunished and the worst of them have been, until not long ago, applauded by some of the most eminent thinkers of our time. Who would not prefer a Christie novel?

The horror of the story that Conquest and Bullock unfold lies not so much even in the numbers killed, nor in the fact that so many innocent people were imprisoned or executed. It is not even that there was no redress against injustice. The ultimate horror is that the very concept of justice was destroyed. The Bolsheviks expressed this clearly by their notion of 'revolutionary justice' that is the pseudo-judicial murder of anyone who, innocent or guilty, belonged to the wrong class. The Nazi determination to destroy certain races, the Soviet determination to do the same to the class enemy, dispensed with the concept of individual guilt and innocence, a concept which had been a cornerstone of European civilisation. Both systems abandoned trial by evidence, a practice that had painfully evolved since the Twelfth Century, in favour of trial by faith and confession. Truly Europe returned to the Dark Ages.

In their own way and without being overtly moralistic, both authors make it clear that they are dealing with more than a simple historical analysis - those who write about Communism and Nazism have to wrestle with moral problems. Conquest's knowledge of the Soviet Union enables him to disentangle the purely Russian and the Marxist-Bolshevik aspects of the system and to attempt to uncover Stalin's personality; this task is difficult, for Stalin was always pathologically secretive. In comparing the two dictators, Bullock asserts that neither revealed more than they wanted about themselves. Unlike Hitler, who talked constantly, Stalin was taciturn. What can one discover about a man who watches and plans silently? Bullock approaches the dictators directly and tries to understand and encompass the havoc wrought by these two curiously mediocre yet outstanding personalities. His analysis of likenesses and differences is fascinating, but he

The Dark Age of Modernity

Helen Szamuely

Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives, Alan Bullock, Harper Collins, 1991, £20.
Robert Conquest, Stalin, Breaker of Nations, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991, £18.95.

Reading books like Conquest's *Stalin* and Bullock's *Hitler and Stalin* makes one feel that the detective novel has been underestimated both by its detractors like Edmund Wilson and its defenders like W.H. Auden. It is underestimated as a shining beacon of morality in our age. In a detective story one or maybe two or three people are killed for a reason, however sordid. The world is turned upside down by the heinous crime and those involved do not rest until the perpetrator is brought to some kind of justice. Lord Bullock gives

some approximate figures of those killed in Europe in this century. First World War: 7.7 million, Russian Civil War: 10 million, Spanish Civil War: 600,000, Second World War: 40 million. The last figure includes the six million or so Jews and an unknown number of gypsies. Add to this another 13-15 million victims of Stalin's collectivisation, 8-10 million, perhaps more victims of Stalin's purges, many thousands of victims of Hitler's concentration camps in Germany and Central Europe and thousands more who died in the

is more at home with Hitler. He displays a dry bemusement about Stalin, as if he cannot believe what he is writing about. Conquest believes it all too well, and as in his other books, a controlled rage informs his carefully collected and marshalled data. Bullock is perhaps the historian's historian, Conquest is the plain man's.

However because Bullock is not a Soviet specialist he points out anomalies that others would take for granted: the monstrous joke of the 1936 Soviet constitution - the most democratic and libertarian in the world - being published as the bloody purge gathered momentum. He also mentions that Khrushchev was as guilty as all the other Soviet *apparatchiks* of the Stalin era. Conquest seems inclined to forget that because of the later revelations.

What becomes apparent from Bullock's parallel lives is that although Stalin and Hitler were similar in some respects - small town backgrounds, being underestimated in youth, feeling the need to attach themselves to something greater than themselves, a gnawing feeling of inferiority - they were, in fact, surprisingly dissimilar. Hitler appears more normal and comprehensible, not because we know more about him, but on the basis of his behaviour. Hitler's German nationalism was the normal reaction of a young man of his background, Stalin's Russian nationalism was sudden, violent and quite incomprehensible. Hitler's paranoia was generalised and directed against the Jews, Slavs, Socialists and others. Stalin accepted the generalised class enemy paranoia of the Bolsheviks and added his own personal one. He really hated everybody. Hitler carried out only one purge of his party, that of the SA in 1934; he was devastated by it. Stalin quite cheerfully authorised the torture, humiliation and murder of almost all his closest associates. When the German communists were handed over by the NKVD to the Gestapo in 1940, the Germans were astonished that devoted Stalinists like Ernst Neuman had been executed. Hitler trusted his lieutenants and they remained loyal to him almost until the very end. Stalin did not know the meaning of the word trust. Hitler distrusted the civil service and the army, but

accepted that he must work with them because of their ability and efficiency. Stalin prepared for industrialisation by destroying engineers and prepared for war by decimating the army. Hitler and Stalin demonstrate that Camus' division of terror into rational and irrational was wrong. It was the Marxists in their Bolshevik guise, not the fascists and the nazis who instituted completely irrational terror. Materialism may sound rational, but its worship could not be. Hitler did not achieve comparable heights of insanity until the launch of the Final Solution and his *Ostpolitik* in the conquered Slav lands.

Hitler created his own party and ideology which effectively died with him. Stalin inherited an ideology that was alien to most people and had to be imposed by force. Hitler was popular for a long time, Stalin was on the whole disliked, though the hysterical cult of personality left its mark on the people. Bullock assumes that the show trials were popular. Mostly the people were indifferent and later cowed by the widespread terror. Whenever they could, Russians and others turned against the Soviet system. The fact that the hatred was not necessarily directed at Stalin personally was a result of his clever manipulation of information, but it also proved that there was a dim realisation that however terrible a man he was, his rule was only the fruition of the Bolshevik ideology, imposed on the country in 1917. This realisation paralysed his enemies and made resistance almost, but not quite impossible.

The poison of Nazism lost its strength when Berlin was destroyed. The poison of Stalinism/Communism became stronger not simply because the Soviet Union had won the war but because Stalin's aims and achievements were more thorough. He, as a good Bolshevik, wanted to change human nature at whatever cost. Hitler had no moral scruples or ethical standards, or rather his standards bore no relation to any other. His ideology was monstrous but relatively superficial. Stalin was the stronger, and as it turned out, the more able, representative of a total world view, a total tyranny.

Has the darkness imposed by these

evil men been lifted? Both Bullock and Conquest are optimistic, pointing to the considerable achievements of the last few years. Bullock is probably more hopeful as he is writing from a European rather than a Russian point of view. Germany has been reunited, Eastern Europe released from bondage, even the Baltic states are slowly regaining their independence. But much remains to be done. The legacy and potency of the poison can be perceived in the difficulties with which Eastern Europe and especially Russia are reacquiring the concepts of democracy, law and honour. It can be seen in the West too. Until we stop talking about 'relative truth' as many have done in the recent sex and race cases in the United States, until we all affirm unequivocally that it is individual guilt or innocence that matters, not the objective standpoint of some abstract cause, until then we cannot say that there is an antidote to the poison, or that the Dark Ages have gone for good.

Typewriter

Design
Layout
Typesetting

16, Highbury Grove Court
Highbury Grove
LONDON N5 2NG

Moonlight

Antony Flew

Inquisition, Carlton Sherwood, Regnery Gateway, \$29.95.

This massive book is a remarkable essay in the finest tradition of American exposure journalism. When he accepted a position on the *Washington Times*, Carlton Sherwood, a decorated and three times wounded Marine Corps combat veteran, had already won the Pulitzer Prize and a string of lesser journalistic awards. The Pulitzer Prize itself was awarded for his investigation of the monumental misdeeds of the Polish-born Pauline Fathers based in Doylestown, Pennsylvania.

The *Washington Times* was established under the auspices of the Unification Church ('Moonies') in order to provide conservative competition for the overwhelmingly dominant, establishment liberal *Washington Post*; and this embattled opposition paper continues to need and receive heavy subsidies from Unification Church sources. It was in the hope of learning more about that much abused organisation that Sherwood took the job with the *Times*. Once again his subsequent investigations uncovered an extensive and disturbing scandal. But it was a scandal, or a series of scandals, of a very different kind from that, or those, of the high-rolling Pauline Fathers. In the words of Sherwood's subtitle the whole shameful affair amounted to *The Persecution and Prosecution of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon*.

The prosecution, for what was at most a minor and purely technical Income Tax offence, which would normally have been dealt with by a fine, but which in the case of this choice victim led to imprisonment - constituted a paradigm case of selective prosecution. As Sherwood points out, no prosecution was ever brought in respect of any of five hundred or more offences with which one or other of those Pauline Fathers might, and surely should have been, charged. The fact that, when the case was brought against Moon, so many and such various individual

Christians and Christian organisations submitted *amicus curia* briefs in his defence was an index of their prudence as much as of their fairmindedness. For all knew that a conviction could one day serve as a precedent for equally well-grounded prosecutions of previously immune mainstream church leaders.

Quite apart from the eventual court case, earlier investigations both by Executive agencies and by Congressional committees were similarly selective and persecutive. The Internal Revenue Service began to make enquiries about the now notorious Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker's TV evangelism racket 'and timidly at that - a full quarter century after the first known US government probe of Sun Myung Moon'. Again, the proceedings of Congressman Donald Fraser and his subcommittee on International Organizations were as far removed from fairness and due process as those of the late Senator McCarthy and its now legendary predecessor. Fraser himself was clearly one of those anti-anti-Communists, who, when they said that they objected not to the aims but to the methods of that Senator and his Committee were speaking the diametric opposite of the truth. For it was not the methods, but the aims, to which they, and their all too numerous successors took, and have continued to take, such strong exception.

The conduct of the courts was similarly scandalous. In the grand jury hearings of Moon's financial adviser Takeru Kamiyama, hearings which were to provide the bases of successful perjury prosecutions against both men, the translator supplied to Kamiyama was so incompetent that Kamiyama could not have known to what crucial questions his responses were being construed as answers. Eventually, but only after both defendants had served their time in jail, the defence at last succeeded in

securing the release of a systematic study by a truly qualified linguist, Eisuke Sasagawa. Sherwood quotes enough of this study to vindicate his own summary judgement: 'that the whole grand jury process was a travesty of justice'.

Thanks mainly to the driving concern of Utah Senator Orrin Hatch - who, as a Mormon, knew plenty about the persecution of unpopular, minority, so-called cult religions - the necessary amendment to the 1978 Court Interpreters Act was made in 1985. Since Sasagawa's report was presumably known to the prosecution at Kamiyama's trial, and since they certainly refused to show it to the defence, as US law required, there seems no escaping Sherwood's conclusion that 'the wrong man went to jail'.

In the actual trial the judge was apparently concerned to ensure that even if justice were to be done it should not too obviously be seen to be done. Thus he began by refusing the usually accepted request for a bench as opposed to a jury trial. (The defence had abundant research evidence to show that any jury selected at that time and place would be, as the jury actually selected was later shown to have been, prejudiced against the defendants). On different occasions in the course of the trial the same judge compared Moon to a recently convicted multiple murderer, to Fagin, to Capone, to Hitler and finally - and in that context perhaps supremely damning - President Nixon and his Watergate team. Consistently with this flagrantly prejudicial approach he allowed the prosecution to disobey the rule that its evidence must be revealed to the defence before it was being presented in court.

One uncharacteristic but very important slip can and ought to be corrected in any reprinting. Sherwood first says of Unification Church businesses that 'In Japan these enterprises generated millions, and within a few short years, billions, of dollars in revenue'. A little later, he insists, truly, that 'The Unification Church by even the most liberal accounts took in each year far less than, say, the electronic religious empires', to say nothing of 'the mainline denominations'.

The Church's Fate

Ken Connelly

Quo Vadis? The Subversion of the Catholic Church, Piers Paul Read, Claridge Blasts No 5, £3.99.

Has the Catholic Church Gone Mad? was the title of a book written twenty years ago. The answer then was Yes: the answer is still Yes and Piers Paul Read has brilliantly summarised the mass of evidence.

The Church's liturgy, which had evolved and been enriched by men of faith over centuries, has been replaced by the vernacular of the Missal and new translations of the Bible. Of the vernacular Mass all one can say in approval is that it must be valid since the Church has declared it to be so. Without that, one could easily be persuaded otherwise. Much about it seems to be designed to make it more acceptable to other Churches, at its centre the Eucharist appears more like a meal and less like a sacrifice, and its language is often that of men without conviction or faith. The priest faces the congregation, presiding over them rather than acting for them, like the chairman of some secular community group. The old ethos of worship is replaced by a variety of moods. At one time the priest addresses Christ in words - 'Lamb of God, you take away the sins of the world' - which, depending on his tone, may be either a banal statement of fact or a hectoring, fingerwagging insistence: Don't wait for someone else to do it, Lamb of God, *you* do it. (Or is avoiding the relative clause - Lamb of God who... - one of the many mid-Atlantic compromises in this vernacular that, fortunately, nobody speaks?) At intervals the congregation makes a trite but congenial response: 'And with you also', to the celebrant who rewards them by inviting them to set aside worship for a while and shake hands all round.

Lex orandi, lex credendi: the new liturgy is not a re-statement of doctrine and worship but a watered-down version of it. A comparison of the way the King James Bible (there

all the time for the Church to adapt and use) relates the miracles with the accounts in the Jerusalem Bible makes the point: the miracles in the latter read as interesting possibilities which the translator must re-tell (they are in the original, after all) because others have vouched for them, but we can all have our own opinions. It is not for nothing that the New English Bible, seen in many Catholic schools, is often referred to as the 'Atheist's Bible'.

Comments such as the foregoing do not, of course, embarrass modern theologians, the more extreme of whom approach language through what Piers Paul Read calls the theory of Structuralism. So, as he says, 'doubt is cast on our understanding of words written in other eras. Meanings change so Scripture, Papal Encyclicals and Council Decrees cannot be assumed to mean what they say'. The meaning, as the less educated laity might put it, is 'explained away'. In fact, the language has been changed not because that was difficult, but because the doctrine was too hard. St John, in Chapter 6 of his Gospel, notes Christ meeting the same problem. When His teaching on the Eucharist met with resistance and disbelief among His followers, He simply repeated it and let those who found it too hard walk away. One of the rationalisations for the new liturgy was that it would be more acceptable to the 'New (post-1960) man'. It wasn't and it won't be.

From Structuralism to the other extreme theory, Marxism, which Piers Paul Read attributes to some Catholic theologians, is an easy progression. Structuralism shows history progressing towards a socialist millenium: as liberation theology would say, towards the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. Never mind, 'My Kingdom is not of this world': we are to be saved not from Hell but from

political oppression and social injustice and liberated not from sin but from the sinful structures of authoritarian regimes. It shouldn't be too surprising that many of the poor in Latin America have opted for the obviously wealthier Pentecostalist and Evangelical Church missions. The poor remain, but outside the Catholic Church.

The author's last section is a look at 'Weaving the Web - a modular programme of Religious Education', written for Catholic secondary schools and published with the apparent approval of such eminent ecclesiastics as the Bishop of Leeds, one of the Vicars-General of the Archdiocese of Westminster and the Secretary to the Conference of Bishops of England and Wales - though it was never accepted in the Archdiocese of Birmingham and was criticised by Cardinal Hume (in November 1991 - a little late, perhaps?).

Religious Education is not the same as Religious Instruction and there is much to be said for giving Catholic children some understanding of other religions but what are they, as believers, to make of a text that teaches them that ultimately religion is no more than a set of personal preferences and historical inheritance (religion and culture are, as so often, confused)? Accounts are given of several religions but the pupil will discover no compelling reasons for adhering to Christianity. Jesus, in the text, is a very important figure for Christians, and pupils are invited to explore 'the image of Jesus as liberator' but nowhere does it make clear that He is the only Saviour of the human race or that He is truly God, co-equal with the Father. For the rest, imagine the whole neo-Modernist package - Feminism, Indifferentism, Syncretism and a breath-taking Irenicism which finds compatibility between Christianity and Islam despite the latter's denial of the Incarnation, the Redemption and the Trinity (Allah has no son).

Quo Vadis? is a short text in which the author shows great skill in summarising and selecting from the vast amount of relevant material. The essential points are all there, however briefly. It would be interesting to have more from him on the 'how?' and 'why?' of the process which one Cardinal later called a 'real disinte-

gration' of the Church.

The agents of the 'subversion' of the pamphlet's sub-title are mainly those theologians whom Piers Paul Read refers to, collectively, as the Alternative Magisterium - the Magisterium being the Pope and the Bishops acting together and pronouncing on matters of doctrine. Among the theologians were many who attended the second Vatican Council as experts (*periti*) and who used their influence as drafters of documents and leaders of post-Council Commissions to transform the purpose and outcome of

the Council. Pope John XXIII, who summoned it in 1962, was a rather conservative, kindly old man who intended the Council to discuss pastoral and presentational matters, not doctrine. And yet, for example, a reasonable enough permission in the Constitution on the Liturgy, that 'suitable place may be allotted to the vernacular in Masses which are celebrated with the people' and instanced the Lessons and other reading, suddenly became justification for getting rid of Latin altogether. There was never an instruction that priests should always say Mass facing

the people, and so on.

Why? is a much larger, more mysterious question. One cannot criticise Piers Paul Read for not opening it up in a pamphlet. The Second World War had undermined authority everywhere by associating it with Fascism and the fate of the Jews had made denominational disagreements seem petty, but the aftermath of that War is not in itself an adequate explanation of the loss of belief, the decline of reason and the wholesale rejection of tradition which took place in the 1960s.

Daring Débutante

Roger Scruton

A Girl in Paris, Shusha Guppy, Heinemann, £14.99.

Shusha Guppy is a woman of unusual temperament and striking intellectual gifts. This second volume of her memoirs tells the story of her student years in Paris, to which city she came, a member of the Communist Party, in the late 1950s, believing in the backward nature of her own society, and hoping to discover in the intellectual Mecca of modern Marxism, the formula that would unlock the secret of the modern world. The courage required in a teenage Persian girl to undertake such a pilgrimage, and to refuse none of the experiences from which her well-bred moral sense told her she could benefit, was quite exceptional; and her lively invocation of her initial loneliness, and of the characters who gradually relieved it, is the record of a unique and intriguing personal drama. Shusha Guppy writes with modesty and charm, thereby discreetly implying the existence of moral qualities to which she never directly refers. But her good sense is revealed most of all in the speed and penetration with which she unmasked the humbug that surrounded her in the city of Sartre and Aragon - the latter vividly evoked and devastatingly castigated in one of the

book's most lively episodes.

Those who think of 1968 as a rejection of the old Communist Party and its ethos would do well to read this book, which shows the seeds of that quintessentially bourgeois revolution already planted in the snobbish leftism of the Parisian elite. Miss Guppy portrays the *gauchiste* culture from outside, innocently astonished at its moral baseness, while reserving her copious affection for those of its denizens whose sincerity and compassion caused them to preserve their decency. Others, like Sartre, were exchanging decency for mere wit: and Miss Guppy was quick to perceive as much. It is not difficult for a clever and beautiful oriental girl to make her way in Parisian society; but it is difficult for such a girl to make her way while retaining her innocence. So persuasive is Miss Guppy in enlisting the reader's sympathy, that even her final succumbing, to the charms of a useless literary man, seems less like a loss of innocence than a translation of innocence into another sphere.

The book contains many hilarious episodes - including a brilliant description of a phoney singing school and its prima donna director,

and an affectionate portrait of the ageing Jacques Prevert. These episodes are recounted in an English prose which displays Miss Guppy's copious talent for absorbing alien cultures. This talent led her in time to become as much a Londoner as she was once a Parisian. In so far as the book discovers a solution to her loss of faith in Marxism it is, indeed, in the form of an English-speaking husband with whose appearance the book concludes. But whether the marriage was successful, and whether the author's sneaking admiration (and evident need) for religious belief did not, in time, bear other fruit, the reader is not told. This is a pity, since Shusha Guppy shows more clearly than the usual Western commentator just how deep is the emotional need to which Parisian leftism makes appeal. It is the sense of that deep need which lends the greatest interest to her narrative; and which demands a final resolution. Perhaps a great talent for life will one day lead to consolation, and perhaps another volume of memoirs will tell us where this consolation lies.

The Truth Set Down

Mark Le Fanu

The Russian Revolution 1899-1919, Richard Pipes, Collins Harvill, £20, 1990.

The great Nineteenth Century historians - Macaulay, Parkman, Carlyle and so on - were masters of the art of pure narrative. One reads their work as one reads a great novel, for its drive and excitement. No matter how long, the succeeding sections seem to issue as part of a single inspiration. Modern historiography, alas, is much more fragmented, paying attention not so much to men and deeds, as to large impersonal causes and sociologies. At first one thinks that this is the way that Pipes's book will pan out. He is good at taking certain large general aspects of society - the peasantry, the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia - and 'doing' them in a strong synthetic chapter. But Pipes also turns out to be an excellent storyteller - granted that, with these events (the most momentous of the century) the historian of spirit almost cannot falter. His prose is strong and clear and serviceable. There is no jargon. The pleasure of the book is to discover that the mass of detail (which at first you think is going to overwhelm you) is subordinated to a wider general picture; a sense of space, drama, elegance and judgement.

The judgement, as we should expect, is complex. We could start with autocracy itself. Pipes is refreshingly unprejudiced, and I would even say gallant, towards the Romanovs, devoting an entire chapter, for instance, to the events leading up to their terrible end, stigmatised as one of

the morally blackest episodes of Bolshevik villainy. In this instance however, at any event, the forces of history are seen as greater than 'mere' individuals - of whatever station. While we may agree that the idea of Christian kingship, and even Christian autocracy, need not be, *ipso facto*, a despicable one, nonetheless by the turn of the century it had become, in Russia, absurd and unworkable. Pipes is not sentimental: he is humorous and sardonic about the Tsar's vacillations and vanities. But then the key question is: what form of governance should have prevailed? The effect of residual autocracy was to infantilise the bourgeois opposition, making the *Duma* deputies in the period after 1905 far more left-wing, irresponsible and confrontationalist than they would have been in the circumstances of ordinary Western democracy. Though he doesn't moralise, Pipes has little time for the posturing of these men: they ought to have loved themselves, and their motherland, better. The people he does admire tend to be patriotic realists, servants of the regime, men like Witte and Stolypin, bureaucrats faced with impossible tasks of reform, yet who brought to their individual fates qualities of resourcefulness, energy and courageous irony. (The great reformer Stolypin, Solzhenitsyn's hero, foresaw he would be assassinated, instructing in his will: 'let me be buried near where I am murdered'.)

The meat of the book, however, is in the second half, after the onset of the Great War. Pipes is clear-sighted about the moral baseness of the Bolsheviks and their leader, the criminal fanatic Lenin. But he tells the story of their rise with a minimum of *ex post facto* psychology. The events anyway have their own greatness - and, of course, their excitement. It is almost impossible to exaggerate how much happened in Russia, and how quickly, in the two fateful years 1917-1918. One tends to forget there were no less than three separate attempts in the first of these years to topple the Provisional Government, before success crowned the Bolsheviks' efforts in October. Even when they were in power too, the following year, in July 1918, it is sobering to think that the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, under Maria Spiridonova, actually captured the capital in a *coup d'état*, before handing it back to Lenin on a plate, thereby unleashing the Red Terror. Taken together, indeed, such episodes represent an interesting lesson in the rival claims of contingency and determinism relevant to Marxism's boasts about the iron laws of history. The conditions for the collapse of social order were evidently there, inherent in the weariness of war, and in the vast chasms between the different estates of society. Lenin's assault on the government constitutes, historically, one of the great modern acts of single-mindedness, carried out with a ruthlessness comparable in certain lights to the power of nature herself. Even so, as Pipes demonstrates, it was touch and go whether he and his fellow conspirators got there. If they had not, how unimaginably different things might have been! What appalling curses would have been avoided, what dreadful blackness lifted from our century.

Notes on Reviewers

George Chowdhary-Best was co-author with Sir John Biggs Davison of *The Cross of St Patrick* (1985).

Ken Connelly was a teacher and senior civil servant.

Ian Crowther is our Literary Editor

Antony Flew is a distinguished Research Fellow at the Social Philosophy and Policy Centre of Bowling Green State University, Ohio.

Mark Le Fanu is a literary and film critic.

Helen Szamuely is a writer on Russian affairs.

In Short

Prince of Music: Palestrina and his world, R.J. Stove. Quakers Hill Press New South Wales.

No other musical master except Bach, has provoked such unanimous admiration from later composers. Wagner described Palestrina's liturgical works as the 'model of supreme perfection in church music' and Liszt wanted to be known as the modern Palestrina. Unlike some of Europe's other great composers, Palestrina's personal life was relatively uneventful and like Bach he has suffered the stigma of dullness and worthiness, a view not helped by some musical scholarship, despite his appearance as the hero of one of the greatest of all post-romantic operas - Hans Pfiffer's *Palestrina*. Robert Stove's readable new study gives useful reflections on Palestrina's great works and relates his life to the stormy political events of Sixteenth Century Italy. The patronage of the church was as essential for Sixteenth Century composers as symphony orchestras are to musicians today. Stove traces the tortuous relationships between Palestrina and various Popes and grantees, the one with Cardinal d'Este being the most successful. The 'musical laureate' to the Counter Reformation is a misconception. Contrary to legend, the Council of Trent left church music mostly unchanged; composers like Palestrina continued to use secular tunes in their masses. His prolific output in the 1580s was subsidised by successful commercial deals in the fur trade. Palestrina must be one of the very few artists ever to succeed in business.

(MC)

The Unmentionable Face of Poverty in the Nineties, Digby Anderson, the Social Affairs Unit.

Every careful housewife knows what Digby Anderson brilliantly demonstrates, that while incompetent household management can be disguised in medium and high income families, in low income families it is crucial and the difference between disaster and equilibrium. Very few studies have been done in this field and unfortunately they usually blame

the wicked government and other forces over which the poor families have no control. Nevertheless some of them unconsciously show that the poor are deficient in shopping and cooking skills, relying on snacks and convenience foods to their consequent nutritional deprivation. Years ago, the respectable working classes were proud of how little they could manage on. This attitude arose from a basic morality which promoted stable well-run homes. Money alone will not solve the problem; different habits are required. Domestic science should be a compulsory subject in the National Curriculum. The productive classes on whom the poor depend are diminishing; before committing more of our money to a bottomless pit, we should discover exactly how incompetent domestic economy contributes to poverty.

(MC)

Sense on Sovereignty, Noel Malcolm, 30pp, Centre for Policy Studies, London SW1, £5.95.

The Centre for Policy Studies has published many well-argued and important pamphlets. But never has it published anything so brilliant and authoritative as Noel Malcolm's T.E. Utley Memorial Lecture on the nature of sovereignty. Nor, indeed, has anything so clear or persuasive been published before on this, the most important topic in contemporary political thinking. Here at last, lucidly set down, is the unanswerable argument that sovereignty exists, ought to exist and cannot be freely renounced or tampered with. Drawing on a rare combination of political philosophy, jurisprudence, historical knowledge and imaginative grasp of current realities, Noel Malcolm provides a challenge to the Euro-federalists that is so overwhelming in its intellectual power that they are sure to ignore it, rather than be forced to find an answer. As our political elite prepares to renounce the sovereignty whose exercise has been entrusted to it, arguments like Malcolm's attain a certain poignancy. They show the truth of Hegel's observation, that a form of life achieves self-understanding only when self-understanding can no longer save it.

Nevertheless, every conservative should study this pamphlet and treasure its arguments: for consciousness of loss is also a kind of consolation.

(RS)

Conservatism for Our Time, Torbjorn Tannsjo, Routledge, London, £14.95.

It is a truism that 'conservative' is the same as 'right-wing', but does this hold true in the light of the political developments of the last decade? The neo-liberalism of President Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher and their supporters hardly conforms to conservatism in the classic sense, while the contemporary vogue of 'green' issues tends to cut across traditional left-right divisions.

As a veteran Communist, Tannsjo rightly describes the rearguard actions fought in defence of their privileges by the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as conservative in character, as are the battles of European socialists and social democrats to preserve and extend the increasingly discredited concept of the welfare state.

Conservatism, Tannsjo suggests, insists that whatever exists as a well-established fact ought to continue to exist; and that the reason that it ought to exist is that it is well-established.

While the detailed application of his theories to the issues of nuclear policy and genetic engineering may be of little more than passing interest to many of us, he has, almost by accident, highlighted the contradiction inherent in the superimposition of radical reforming 'liberal' policies on groups such as the British Conservative and American Republican parties which have been traditionally 'pragmatic' in character. The recent return to 'pragmatic' leadership in both parties has provoked predictable tensions - only time will tell whether the electoral success they enjoyed in their 'radical' phases will survive their reversion to more conventional conservatism. 'Today's conservatives', declares the author, 'ought to think through their basic arguments, sharpen them and apply them to the most pressing issues of our time'. One can only add: 'Amen to that!'

(AJM)

THE CLARIDGE PRESS

Britain's most backward-looking publisher

THINKERS OF OUR TIME

OAKESHOTT
by Robert Grant

POLANYI
by Richard Allen

CARL SCHMITT
by Paul Gottfried

CHESTERTON
by Ian Crowther

SCHELER
by Francis Dunlop

all price £5.95 (paperback) £9.95 (hardback)

Also published by The Claridge Press:

LANDSCAPE INTO SOUND
by David Matthews Price: £4.50

KATASTROIKA
by Alexander Zinoviev Price: £8.95 (paperback) £14.95 (hardback)

FOOTSTEPS FROM THE FINLAND STATION
by Michael Charlton Price: £16.95 (hardback)

BLASTS!
LEFT HIGH AND DRY
by Peter Fuller Price: £3.99 (paperback)

EDUCATION AND DEMOCRACY
by Anthony O'Hear Price: £3.99 (paperback)

RESISTING LEVIATHAN
by Philip Vander Elst Price: £3.99 (paperback)

THE COMING ORDER
by Andrei Navrozov Price: £3.99 (paperback)

QUO VADIS
by Piers Paul Read Price: £3.99 (paperback)

RACE AND FREE SPEECH: Violating the Taboos
by Ray Honeyford Price: £3.99 (paperback)

Obtainable through your local bookseller, or direct from:
The Claridge Press, 6, Linden Gardens, London W2