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Keynes & Communism

William Coleman

Thoughts of Dr Siddiqui

Mervyn Hiskett

Happy Diwali

Roy Kerridge

Yugoslavia


Norman Stone

Thatcher in Taiwan

Andrew Roberts

European Integration

David Marsland



The Third Marquess of Salisbury
1830 - 1903

The Salisbury Review

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In this, the second of our anniversary issues, we return to one of our most important themes: the dishonesty of Western intellectuals, in the pursuit of socialist goals. As John Marks points out, we have been exposed for several decades to a systematic subversion of academic ways of thinking, in favour of the 'ideological mode' which values political correctness over scientific truth. The unscrupulous destruction of the reputation of Sir Cyril Burt, by such ideologues as Professor Steven Rose, ought to have been exposed decades ago. But the publication of the books by Joynson and Fletcher (whose untimely death prevented him from contributing to our anniversary issues), has awoken the intellectual world to the way in which scientific research in Western countries has been jeopardised. The truth about hereditary characteristics has been deliberately suppressed: not only in psychology, but also in sociology, political science, social policy, and the theory of education. Decisions of vital importance to the future of our country, concerning education, social welfare, planning and employment, are made on premises that are known to be false, but which cannot be publicly questioned.

The process of falsification can be seen at work in that laboratory of mendacity, the Commission for Racial Equality, whose latest 'scientific' research is here exposed by Ray Honeyford. That this organisation should continue to receive public funds, in order to carry out its campaign of lies and subversion against the innocent people who pay for it, is as great a scandal as the campaign against Sir Cyril Burt. But it is not only in the area of race relations that a premium has been set on falsehood. More notorious still have been the sustained attempts, by those charged with objective study of the Soviet system, to portray this monstrous machine as a normal member of the community of nations. As Mervyn Matthews shows, the subject of sovietology was rotten through and through. He mentions some names: but let us add to them those of the Gorbymaniacs such as Jerry Hough and Archie Brown (the principal culprit so far as British sovietology was concerned); of the appeasing institutions, such as the Institute for Strategic Studies, and Chatham House, and of the fellow-travelling departments, such as the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University. Reputations were made, salaries

distributed, and opinions offered to those in responsible positions, by people with a vested interest in falsehood. Tell the truth about the Soviet Union, and you lose your visa: lose your visa and you drop to the bottom of the sovietological league table. And what self-respecting academic would wish to do that?

But it was not self-interest that led to this perversion of academic values. Ideology was also at work: not necessarily the hard-line Marxism of a Steven Rose, nor the communist commitment of an Eric Hobsbawm. Even the mildest of socialists would incline to excuse the power which had done so much to make socialism respected – or at any rate feared. As William Coleman shows, Lord Keynes, not known for his bolshevik sympathies, was prepared to endorse the Soviet claims in the interests of his own ideology. There are those who believe that the scientific aspect of Keynes's *General Theory* is a sophisticated sham; but there is no doubt that, by the standards set by sovietology, he retained a respect for truth and scientific method which ought to have inoculated him against Soviet mendacity.

The suppression of unwanted conclusions and the free enquiry that leads to them, is the death of science. And indeed, social science in the West is now effectively dead: killed by the ideological obsessions of its adherents. In politics however, falsehood, and the methods which secure it, have a longer life-expectancy, and more damaging results. We have seen a new example, in the Maastricht agreement, discussed here by David Marsland. There is no doubt that a serious effort was made by the Tory Party machine, to suppress information about Maastricht, and to stifle free discussion of its terms. Why this was so, it is extremely hard to know. But that it was so, is now apparent to every observer.

The deepest problems of modern society are neither scientific nor political, but religious. In this issue Mervyn Hiskett and Annette Thornton discuss two of the new religions that are contending for spiritual space in our once Christian country: the one a source of law, but a law which denies our national inheritance; the other a source of lawlessness, inviting us to worship the Golden Calf. Our readers are not likely to be happy that it is these religions, rather than the religion of our forefathers, which are making conversions among the young.

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Conservative Journals: *Counterpoint*

It was American optimism, American energy, and most of all American suspicion of European socialists, which ensured that Conservative Politics —both here and across the Atlantic — did not simply expire in wistfulness and resignation, during the post-war period. But America would be nothing without its colleges, dedicated to spreading education as widely as possible, in circumstances that permit excellence to emerge, and mediocrity to retire with dignity. Europeans often laugh at the antics of feminists, radicals and homosexuals as they play in these privileged dominions, unhampered by responsibility towards the world that pays for them. But they should not laugh. For, if the radicals have their way, it will soon be impossible for the youth of America to obtain an education consonant with their country's leading role. Mediocrity will not only spread: it will be encouraged, and excellence condemned as an elitist threat to 'minorities'.

But who is to resist the tide of corruption? Not the administrators, who weakly capitulate. Not the conservative professors who, scared stiff that they are next in line, prefer to keep their heads down. At M.I.T. and Wellesley College, therefore, inspired and led by Avik Roy, a Biology undergraduate from M.I.T., the students have

founded their own journal, devoted to the fight against 'political correctness'. In the current atmosphere, it takes courage to attack the fabricated crime of 'sexual harassment'; to blame AIDS on promiscuous homosexuality; to criticize your professors for their tendency to make appointments on political grounds —yet all this and much more can be found in the pages of *Counterpoint*. Unlike the leftist magazines which call for the closure of *Counterpoint*, on account of its racist, homophobic, elitist etc. views, the journal opens its pages to opponents, and tries to counter its own opinions with a reasoned alternative, so promoting the cause of education in an atmosphere of frenzy. It also carries reviews of the politically incorrect but important books that students will not hear mentioned by their teachers.

Conservatives have learned not to hope for the backlash that will reclaim the institutions of learning for the cause of reason. But they ought to be encouraged when the perception of danger is articulated so tenaciously and with such style by the next generation.

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The Pursuit of Truth

John Marks on the destruction and resurrection of Cyril Burt

Two recent books — *The Burt Affair* by Robert Joynson and *Science, Ideology and the Media: The Cyril Burt Scandal* by Ronald Fletcher — have reawakened interest in the ideas and career of Sir Cyril Burt, who was probably the foremost educational psychologist of his generation. Burt pioneered the use of intelligence tests, especially for the recognition of the intellectual ability of able children from poor homes. He also explored the multiple disadvantages suffered by those from poor home environments and thus paved the way for much subsequent work on educational disadvantage and special educational needs. His ideas helped to shape the development of the education system, first in London and then across the country.

When Burt died in 1971, his reputation seemed secure but, less than a decade later, it was in ruins. In 1980, the Council of the British Psychological Society, following the official biography of Burt — *Cyril Burt, Psychologist* by Professor Leslie Hearnshaw — publicly declared that Burt was guilty of fraud in his professional writings and organised a symposium based on the presumption of Burt's guilt. Then came the screening in 1984 of a BBC documentary — *The Intelligence Man: A Story of Scientific Fraud* — which *Radio Times* described as “a drama documentary... about the scientific fraud perpetrated by Sir Cyril Burt” who “not only created an immense body of fraudulent scientific findings but invented a whole team of non-existent characters to bolster his credibility”.

Yet now Joynson and Fletcher have shown that virtually all the allegations against Burt are unfounded and the evidence for them is false or insufficient or open to serious question (see

The Salisbury Review, June, 1992). For all fair-minded people Burt's reputation should now be restored.

But that is not the end of the story. There are important matters arising from this saga of duplicity, character assassination and misrepresentation.

Two fundamental topics relating to Burt's work concern the nature of human intelligence and the part played by hereditary and environmental factors in shaping that intelligence.

There is substantial agreement amongst most psychologists about the nature of intelligence. In 1987, more than 96 per cent of psychologists surveyed in the USA agreed in identifying the three most important elements of intelligence — abstract thinking or reasoning, problem

are the sole factors involved and those, the environmentalists, who think that environmental influences are all important. In fact there is once again substantial agreement amongst almost all psychologists that both heredity and environment are important in shaping intelligence. The debate concerns the relative importance of the two factors and the size and nature of the interaction between them.

There is however a small minority, which includes Professor Leon Kamin — author of the widely read book *The Science and Politics of IQ* — and Professor Steven Rose of the Open University, who believe either that there is no reasonable evidence for any heritable component in intelligence or that the whole debate is intellectually misconceived.

Estimates of the size of the heritable component vary but the survey concluded that the mean estimate amongst expert psychologists is that between 55 per cent and 60 per cent of the variation in IQ is due to genetic factors.

Many studies have also shown a substantial correlation between the social class of parents and the IQ of their children — a correlation which is due to a combination of hereditary and environmental influences. US estimates of the size of the correlation are about 0.30 while recent studies in Britain have shown comparable figures. Earlier studies, such as that by Douglas based on the national cohort born in 1946, show approximately one standard deviation between the mean IQs of children from the upper middle class and that of the lower working class. It needs to be emphasised that with correlations and variations of this size, the differences between classes are much less than the differences between individuals from within specific social class groups.

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tests.***

solving ability and the capacity to acquire knowledge. Moreover since intelligence test scores correlate highly with academic attainment and numerous other factors, it is not true, as critics sometimes claim, that intelligence tests measure nothing but the ability to do intelligence tests.

The debate about the second topic has frequently been misrepresented as being between those, the hereditarians, who think that hereditary influences

It is the most extreme environmentalists – like Kamin and Rose – who have, in the view of many, unnecessarily polarised the debate and have also played leading roles in the attack on all those who argue for some hereditary influences and on the work of Burt in particular.

It is worth noting, in this context, the major example in this century of the adoption of an extreme environmental position – what came to be called the Lysenko affair in the former Soviet Union – in the course of which the science of genetics, and many individual geneticists, were persecuted in the Soviet Union from the late 1920s onwards. In 1948 official decrees were issued banning the teaching of genetics in any school or university, withdrawing books on genetics from libraries and deleting all mention of the leading Russian geneticist Vavilov and other geneticists from other books. It was even decreed that stocks of *Drosophila*, the fruit fly used in so many classic genetic experiments, were to be destroyed.

The Integrity of Psychology

As long ago as 1972 fifty distinguished scientists from the United States and Britain published a statement in *The American Psychologist* which compared what was happening in contemporary psychology to the pressures brought on scientists like Galileo, Darwin, Einstein in National Socialist Germany and Vavilov in the Soviet Union:

Today, a similar suppression, censure, punishment, and defamation are being applied against scientists who emphasise the role of heredity in human behaviour. Published positions are often misquoted and misrepresented; emotional appeals replace scientific reasoning; arguments are directed against the man rather than against the evidence (e.g., a scientist is called “fascist” and his arguments are ignored). A large number of attacks come from non-scientists, or even anti-scientists, among the

political militants on campus. Other attackers include academics committed to environmentalism in their explanation of almost all human differences. And a large number of scientists, who have studied the evidence and are persuaded of the great role played by heredity in human behaviour, are silent, neither expressing their beliefs clearly in public, nor rallying strongly to the defence of their more outspoken colleagues.

The results are seen in the present academy: it is virtually heresy to express a hereditarian view, or to recommend further study of the biological bases of behaviour.

The scientists therefore affirmed the following beliefs and principles:

- We have investigated much evidence concerning the possible role of inheritance in human abilities and behaviours, and we believe such hereditary influences are very strong.
- We wish strongly to encourage research into the biological hereditary bases of behaviour, as a major complement to the environmental efforts at explanation.
- We strongly defend the right, and emphasise the scholarly duty, of the teacher to discuss hereditary influences on behaviour, in appropriate settings and with responsible scholarship.
- We deplore the evasion of hereditary reasoning in current textbooks, and the failure to give responsible weight to heredity in disciplines such as sociology, social psychology, social anthropology, educational psychology, psychological measurement, and many others.

Five years later in 1977, Sir Andrew Huxley, in his presidential address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, was reported as saying that:

There was now a body of scientists who regarded the assumption of equal inherited ability as something which does not require experimental evidence to establish – and which it is politically wicked to question, because the conclusion might disagree with their social and political preconceptions.... There is a taboo on open-minded investigation of these topics at least as strong as the resistance in Darwin's day to questioning the authority of the Bible.

Huxley later became President of the Royal Society.

Joynson suggests that the public endorsement by the Council of the British Psychological Society (BPS), in 1980, of Hearnshaw's verdict that Burt was guilty of fraud has serious implications for the integrity of psychology as an academic discipline. More recently, following the books by Fletcher and Joynson, some BPS members have been pressing the BPS Council to repudiate this position. So far, the BPS Council have refused to do so and, as recently as February, 1992, turned down a request to set up an independent review of the evidence concerning Burt. Nevertheless the Council did state that “Twelve years ago the Society assumed that Burt was guilty of fraud. We no longer hold that view.”

These events reveal something of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in many institutions of higher education on both sides of the Atlantic over the last two decades. They illustrate the need to restate and to maintain the principles and procedures of such institutions, if they and the wider academic community are to function effectively. The key decisions in academies – what is taught, who is taught, who teaches and where and how to extend knowledge – should be made primarily or solely on academic grounds, that is by taking into account qualifications, subject knowledge and adherence to academic criteria and values such as the primacy of logic, evidence and open public criticism in approaching the truth. The academic

mode of thought and procedure and the institutions which embody it have been gradually articulated and established over the centuries, and are one of the prime gifts of European civilisation to the world.

Academics and the Media

There are many parallels between the role played by the principles and procedures of open public criticism in the academic world and the role of the media of communication in open democratic societies. Such parallels are crucial in transmitting academic findings to public opinion. To do this satisfactorily, however, requires both accurate reporting and a respect for academic disciplines and procedures – qualities which *The Sunday Times* and the BBC manifestly lacked in the Burt case.

That these are not isolated examples is shown by recent detailed studies in the USA by Snyderman and Rothman (*The IQ Controversy, The Media and Public Opinion*, Transaction Press, 1988). These studies describe significant differences between the views of scientific experts and journalists on two controversial topics – environmental issues, especially the safety of nuclear power, and the use of intelligence tests. The authors provide evidence that these differences lead to inaccurate reporting of the views of experts – with possibly distorting effects on public opinion:

The media of mass communication exert increasing influence on public opinion in general and even upon opinion in other parts of the centre of society. Indeed, the press and the television are probably the most influential institutions in the United States in the shaping of public opinion. Journalists thus are among the more influential groups in our society. The social and political views of journalists influence how they perceive the world and how they describe it to others... Despite the high prestige of scientists and scientific knowledge in most circles of American society, the

views of scientists about events in which scientific knowledge is relevant are not presented in the press and on television in a way which reports the state of opinion prevailing in the scientific community. Because of the high prestige of scientists and scientific knowledge, journalists and broadcasters do invoke the names and opinions of scientists, but usually these are not representative of the main direction of scientific knowledge about the topics in question and are selected for the support they provide for the journalists' own political views. A final word should be added. To a larger extent than in the

The social and political views of journalists influence how they perceive the world and how they describe it to others...

past, issues in which scientific knowledge is required for the making of public policy are becoming more numerous and more important in our society. Whether we are concerned with the "greenhouse effect", alternative sources of energy, acid rain or the use of therapeutic drugs, a range of issues has emerged which journalists generally are ill-equipped to handle, since most journalists are quite ignorant of scientific issues and find it very difficult to deal with them accurately. This only increases the tendency for political ideology to play a role in determining how they cause the public to view these problems.

Insofar as decisions require that the public be adequately informed about the scientific aspects of issues, the media of mass communications have not, and are not, making the positive contribution which they ought to make.

It is interesting that the work of Rothman and Snyderman only applies to the USA. No similar study for Britain has been done by any of the numerous departments of media or communications studies which have proliferated in recent years in British institutions of higher education. However the evidence presented above concerning the Burt case suggests that such a study may be long overdue.

Implications for Education

Fletcher's book also discussed some of the implications of Burt's work for educational policy. He notes that there are profound similarities between Burt's writings and those of many sociologists of education – such as Glass, Floud, Halsey, Douglas and Bernstein – who were working in Britain in the decades immediately after the Second World War. Fletcher points out that all these authors were involved in post-war studies concerning the same social and educational problems which Burt had pointed to both before and during the war.

Burt's 1943 paper had been a forward-looking diagnosis offered before the end of the war; the work of this group was a body of social research continuing after the war – investigating the extent to which the same facts, injustices and problems remained and, in particular, how far the changes brought about by (or at least envisaged in) the 1944 Education Act were proving successful in providing a remedy.

In every case (without exception) their studies rested on the acceptance of the fact that intelligence was primarily determined by heredity and could be satisfactorily measured

by carefully devised “non-verbal” as well as “attainment” tests. On this basis – of the “measured potential” of the child – they then studied the effects of various environmental influences (social class, the home and its conditions, family size, language and speech differences, etc.) to see how far this “measured potential” was accurately identified in the selection process.

In summary:

The position of Burt and these sociologists was exactly the same. On the basis of the most reliable measurement of ability they could establish, they sought to assess the influence of those environmental factors that seemed obstacles in the way of its fulfilment, hoping to identify, understand, and remove them.

These matters are still deeply relevant today – especially in the debates and controversies concerning the testing requirements of the 1988 Educational Reform Act. There has been a concerted hostility to the use of standardised tests by many members of the educational establishment and an even greater hostility to the publication of the results of such tests. There has also been concerted opposition to the Government’s proposals to publish the results of such tests and other examination results on a school by school basis in a form that is easily understood by the general public. A campaign has been mounted to try to ensure that such data should only be published in a form which would be corrected for alleged socio-economic factors. One major factor which is clearly relevant but which has not featured in such discussions is the well-known correlation discussed above between social class and IQ.

For many years the emphasis in discussions of under-achievement in schools has been on social factors and on social class in particular. But surely the elevation of social class into a

central position in the debate is mistaken. The crucial questions to ask about pupils and their education are not about what social class they come from, but rather about whether their abilities and aptitudes are being recognised and encouraged. The asking of the right kind of question has been frustrated for too long by a climate of opinion which has stressed equality of outcome before equality of opportunity and which has resulted in a near taboo on the public discussion of differences in individual abilities and attainments. In future much greater attention may well need to be paid to assessing individual differences, to devising policies which enable them to be recognised and to assessing the effectiveness of those policies. This will not be easy but it surely cannot be done by ignoring the work of Burt and of others working in the same tradition.

Politics and the search for the truth

Snyderman and Rothman suggest that journalists’ political views affect the balance of their coverage of some scientific matters. This raises the possibility that similar connections exist between political views and lack of balance in the academic world. Joynson suggests five criteria which may indicate that political views have influenced scientific conclusions:

- explicit support for a political position in a supposedly scientific work; use of violent and inflammatory language;
- presentation of contrasting positions in black and white terms, such that extreme judgements are favoured;
- the rapidity with which conclusions are reached, pointing to a desire to reach preconceived conclusions;
- intolerance of differing opinion, such that there is a desire to suppress opposed points of view.

Nevertheless, Joynson warns that:

Neither singly nor in combination do they conclusively

demonstrate bias; but the more of these signs are present, the more likely it becomes.

Furthermore:

... the three people who took the initiative in publicizing the case against Burt (Kamin, Gillie, and Tizard), all were on the left politically, and all betray their motivation by displaying one or more of the characteristics listed above.

Likewise, in 1984, Leon Kamin, Steven Rose and Richard Lewontin (in *Not in Our Genes, Biology, Ideology and Human Nature*) had affirmed that the aim of their “campaign against IQ and class society” was “to create a society of greater social justice, a socialist one.” Joynson concludes that:

One of the most striking features of the Burt Affair is that no fewer than four psychologists were willing to co-operate with a journalist in attacking the reputation of one of their most eminent colleagues. They ought surely to have reflected that Gillie’s article could not provide a statement of the evidence sufficiently detailed to establish the charges; and that the public sensation which would be caused would be highly detrimental to a calm and rational discussion of Burt’s alleged guilt. They surely should have appreciated that a thorough discussion in the academic journals would have served the interests of psychology better.

Fletcher too concludes that:

The evidence we have assembled has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt – in my view beyond all doubt – that this testimony, throughout, has been of the nature of a long-sustained campaign of vilification. At best (adopting the most charitable view

possible) it has been shown to contain grave flaws of interpretation, careless errors, incorrect charges, and the publication and widest broadcasting of deliberate distortions and oversimplifications, in an ongoing and mounting polemic that has seemed at least in large part to be rooted in ideological rather than scientific motivation.

Joynson has also expressed doubts about the balance of the reviewers of Hearnshaw's official biography.

Those who were hostile to Burt, or to the positions which he had defended, had little difficulty in expressing their agreement with the verdict. Halsey, well known as a left-wing critic of selective education, asked whether Hearnshaw had yet revealed the full extent of Burt's dishonesty – contriving to suggest that there was much more to be found without giving any reason for supposing so (*Times Higher Education Supplement*, 3 November 1979). Steven Rose, another socialist and anti-hereditarian, referred to 'the biggest scientific scandal since the Piltown hoax' (*New Statesman*, 28 September 1979). Such writers were far from subjecting the book to the kind of critical analysis they would have given without question to an hereditarian treatise, and took it as an opportunity to gloat over Burt's exposure and suggest that we didn't know the half of it.

Snyderman and Rothman, in the detailed study referred to above, have analyzed the political views of both the psychologists and journalists involved in the debate on testing. They conclude that, while "experts are not immune to the influence of political ideology"

Overall... ideology does not have a large influence on expert

opinion, despite the highly political climate surrounding testing. That political perspective accounts for so little of the data variance, and that experts hold generally protesting attitudes despite being slightly left of centre politically, are important points, and must be contrasted with the heavy political influence apparent in public discussion about intelligence and aptitude testing. That policy makers seem more influenced by the critics of testing than by the opinions of experts is an indication that the expert voice is being lost somewhere between the halls of academia and public policy arenas. An examination of news media coverage of testing related issues reveals that the news media are at least partially to blame for this state of affairs.

In the open democratic societies of the West, such matters are important, but in Communist societies they could have very serious implications for the individuals involved, as the Lysenko affair demonstrates. In an article published in 1991, which "the security service of East Germany (the Stasi) prevented from being written in 1982", one East German scientist, Volkmar Weiss, has recently described how he was taught Lysenkoism as a student but in the 1970s managed to carry out some work on psychogenetics. He describes what happened when he tried to publish it:

In 1980, the manuscript of the monograph "Psychogenetik" (Weiss 1982) was complete. Now some fierce dogmatists were discovering that a cuckoo's egg had been laid in the nest of socialism. One example: S. Rose asked his East German colleague, the neuro-chemist Professor D. Biesold at the Karl Marx University of Leipzig (personal communication by Biesold), whether there was no means of stopping further publications by Weiss, because

such publications printed in a socialist country were particularly disadvantageous to the propaganda of the radical left in the Western world.

One result, according to Weiss, was repression of academics by the Stasi, and the arrest and imprisonment of one of his colleagues who refused to inform on "hereditarians" in East German universities.

The Long March through the Institutions?

Following Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin and the brutal suppression of the 1956 reform movement in Hungary, many Communists in Western countries ceased to be party members but nevertheless, retained their primary commitment to Communism and played a major part in the emergence and development over the next two decades of the New Left which played down the traditional Communist Party emphasis on trade union activity. Instead, they followed a strategy which was described by Rudi Dutschke, the revolutionary Marxist student leader who came to prominence in the student uprisings of 1968, as *The Long March through the Institutions*. Inspired by the Italian Communist Gramsci, they devoted their revolutionary energy to establishing an 'alternative cultural hegemony' to replace what they described as the 'bourgeois cultural hegemony' imposed on society by the ruling class. This was to be done by propagating Communist ideas throughout all the institutions of civil society and by placing Communists or sympathizers in key positions in those institutions.

It is this development which, in part, explains why, since the death of Stalin and the growing awareness in the West of the full horrors of Stalin's rule, there has been a considerable increase, rather than the decrease which might have been expected, in the activities and influence of Communists and Marxists of all kinds in Western societies. Central to this strategy is the fundamental conflict between the academic mode practised in the acad-


emies of the West and the ideological mode of thought and attitude to knowledge which was practised throughout Communist societies.

The New Left espoused some form of Marxism or Marxism-Leninism and aimed at nothing less than the total deconstruction of the academic mode and of all the institutions that supported it. They recognised far better than their opponents the deep links which exist between the academic mode and the ways in which the institutions of open societies operate. They therefore grasped the need for a thoroughgoing and broadly based attack if the ideological mode was to prevail both

in the academies and in all the institutions of society. In such an attack, Communist intellectuals – Gramsci's 'organic intellectuals' – had a key role to play in promoting the one-sided intellectual, cultural and moral disarmament of open societies that they sought, just as they did in their persistent attempts to bring about the one-sided military disarmament of the West. It is not implausible to suggest that many of the apparently bizarre events of the Burt affair may be better understood by standing back from the details of the specific controversies and viewing them in the context of this development. Maybe we should now

be examining the academic credentials, not of Burt, but of his critics, and notably those like Steven Rose who have abused their academic positions in order to discredit those whom they see as their political opponents.

John Marks is Director of the Education Research Trust.



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Succumbing to the Soviets

William Coleman on Keynes and Communism

Just as the “true” boundaries of the 18th century are said to extend from 1688 to 1789, and those of the 19th century from 1815 to 1914, so future historians may nominate 1914 and 1991 as the opening and close of the 20th century. That interval has a unity about it; it is dominated by the cataclysm which began August 1914, and which only finally worked itself out 77 years later, with the final and astonishing end of one of its creations, the Soviet state.

If one accepts this delimitation of the 20th century it is not premature to ask who were the most influential thinkers of that century. Who were our “eminent Victorians”? In the field of economics I have no doubt of the answer; as Ricardo was the economist of the 19th century, so John Maynard Keynes was that of the 20th century. Not only was his economics produced by the 20th century, he also saw it as produced by that period, as supremely modern, as an effort in reason coping with the new chaos, hoping for the future, but ruthlessly shedding any nostalgia for an abolished past.

If this identification is correct, we might expect a waning in the influence of Keynesian economics. In fact, Keynes’ influence began to ebb several decades ago in the realm of pure theory, and has receded with great rapidity in the field of economic policy since the 1970s. A large number of economists remain content with Keynes’ conclusions; but those who engage in any *progressive* research do so from premises very different from that which Keynes used. Some theorists have pursued the research programme initiated by Axel Leijonhufvud in the 1960s; but, whatever its merits, Keynes would find that programme quite foreign. Other “New Keynesian” economists in the 1980s, such as Blinder maintained “Keynesian” conclusions about the macro-economy, but based them on the operations of labour markets; something which Keynes was uninterested in and hardly

said anything about.

Paradoxically, this decline in Keynes’ influence in policy making and research has coincided with a swell of interest in Keynes, manifested in a never ceasing flow of new books. But the focus of interest has shifted away from Keynes’ economics and towards his personal history, his ideas on probability, his “philosophy” and his politics. This interest in the non-economic Keynes is correlated with his persisting prestige with politicians and social commentators, even amongst those on the “right”.

It is interesting to ask what Keynes’ political philosophy actually was. I will restrict myself to a single topic which makes contact with this question; Keynes’ views on Soviet

Russia held a special place in Keynes’ emotional and artistic world.

Communism. Soviet Communism was the distinguishing political event of the “twentieth century”, almost exactly spanning its boundaries as I have defined it. If we are interested in Keynes as a “social” and “political” philosopher we must be interested in Keynes’ views on this event. Further, we will find that he expressed himself at length on the Soviet Union once, and more briefly many times. And we will find in these judgements a strange tale.

Before moving directly to examine Keynes’ views, it will be helpful to notice his opinions on two related, but distinct topics.

Keynes was vigorously anti-Marxist. This stance never altered, and he is at his most quotable when expressing it. “How can I accept” he wrote in 1925, “a doctrine which sets up as its

bible, above and beyond criticism, an obsolete economic textbook which I know not only to be scientifically erroneous but without interest or application to the modern world?” (*Collected Writings (CW)* IX p. 258). Some years later he pursued the comparison of Marxism with revealed religion with George Bernard Shaw, “My feelings about *Das Kapital* are the same as my feelings about the *Koran*. I know that it is historically important and I know that many people, not all of whom are idiots, find it a sort of rock of ages and containing inspiration. Yet when I look into it, it is to me inexplicable that it can have this effect. Its dreary, out-of-date academic controversialising seems so extraordinarily unsuitable for that purpose” (*CW* XXVIII p. 28). “I can see they [Marx and Engels] invented a certain method of carrying on and a vile manner of writing, both of which their successors have maintained with fidelity. But if you tell me that they have discovered a clue to the economic riddle, still I am beaten -- I can discover nothing but out of date controversialising” (*CW* XXVIII p.42).

I know of only one occasion where Keynes makes a favourable reference to Marx. In preparing the *General Theory* Keynes granted that Marx made the “pregnant observation” that money is the “first mover” in economic circulation, but “the subsequent use to which he put this observation was highly illogical” (*CW* XXIX, p. 81). Keynes’ opinion of Marxism is summarised well in his remark in *The End of Laissez Faire*, “Marxist Socialism must always remain a portent to historians of opinion – how a doctrine so illogical and so dull can have exercised so powerful and enduring influence of the minds of men (*CW* IX, p.285)... [It is] together with theological literature, perhaps the most useless, at any rate the most boring form of verbal creation” (Keynes, *CW* X, p.67).

Russia held a special place in Keynes’

emotional and artistic world. One of Bloomsbury's novelties was its taste for Russian literature. Lytton Strachey was one of the first critics in the English language to appreciate and publicise the works of Dostoevsky, whose work was known only by a few intellectuals before the First World War. Some critics have claimed to observe an extremely important influence of Dostoevsky on *Eminent Victorians*, a book which has strong parallels to the biographical elements of *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. "Dostoevsky's extravagance, his exaggeration, his comic fantasy, his untraditional complexity, indifference to the commonplace... strong psychology... their complex "feel" for life, their fondness for the abnormal... greatly excited him." These qualities would also excite Keynes. Keynes actually believed he had a psychological affinity for Russia; he once wrote "I am not really English but -- if looked at close to -- a sympathetic Russian". Keynes married a Russian, Lydia Lopokova, and he visited Russia three times: in 1925, in 1928 and in 1936.

His strain of Russophilia and his conception of "Russianness", may have coloured his views, especially if he held (as many have) that Soviet Communism was as much Russian as it was Soviet.

Keynes' First Views

Keynes made his first trip to the Soviet Union in 1925, after his marriage to Lydia. The principal purpose of this unlikely honeymoon was to visit Lydia's relatives, but Keynes also gave a lecture on economic conditions in England to the Industrial Economic Council of the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy. On his return he published his judgement of what he saw: *A Short View of Russia*. It is his longest single piece on the Soviet Union, so it is worth quoting.

Keynes begins by presenting himself as being predisposed to judge Soviet Russia favourably, but being repelled by what he observes:

"I sympathise with those who seek for something good in Soviet Russia. But when we come to the actual thing, what is one to say? For me, brought up in a free air undarkened by the horrors of religion, with nothing to be afraid of, Red Russia holds too much which

is detestable. Comforts and habits let us be ready to forgo, but I am not ready for a creed which does not know how much it destroys the liberty and security of daily life, which uses deliberately the weapons of persecution, destruction and international strife" (CW, IX, p. 258).

But Keynes' judgement is not entirely negative. He detests the deeds he sees, but not the purported ends of these deeds. What was that purported end? It is, according to Keynes, the delegitimation of the "money motive."

"I do not mean that Russian Communism alters, or even seeks to alter, human nature, that it makes Jews less avaricious or Russians less extravagant than they were before. I do not merely mean that it sets up a new ideal. I mean that it tries to construct a framework of society in which pecuniary motives as influencing action shall have a changed relative importance, in which social approbation shall be differently distributed, and where behaviour which was previously normal and respectable, ceases to be either the one or the other" (CW, IX, p. 260).

To Keynes the delegitimation of the money motive was extremely significant since "it seems to me clearer every day that the moral problem of our age is concerned with the love of money, with habitual appeal to the money motive in nine-tenths of the activities of life, with universal striving after individual economic security as the prime object of endeavour, with the social approbation of money as the measure of constructive success, and with the social appeal to the hoarding instinct as the foundation of the necessary provision of the family and the future" (CW, IX, p. 268-269).

He ends with a call to tolerate the Soviet system until the results of this well intentioned experiment are known. "So, now the deeds are done and there is no going back, I should like to give Russia her chance; to help and not to hinder. For how much rather, even after allowing for everything, if I were a Russian, would I contribute my quota of activity to Soviet Russia than to Tsarist Russia!" (CW, IX, p. 271).

In summary, Keynes does not claim to find any essential failing in the Soviet System. His objections to the Soviet system are of a "contingent" nature. The Soviet system was despotic,

but there is no reason why it must be so. It may be inefficient, but there is no reason why it must be. He makes no theoretical objection to the efficiency of Soviet communism on the grounds of its removal of efficiency-inducing incentives and competition.

Audacious Speculations

His one "fundamental" consideration is one which casts favour on the system; its removal of the money-making motive. What can we make of Keynes' thoughts here?

Keynes was not quite the person to object to money-making. He devoted a good portion of his energies to making money, and the records of his audacious and energetic speculations occupy over 100 interesting pages of his collected works (CW, XII 1-113). During his lifetime he, starting with almost nothing, made four fortunes, lost three, and ended his life with a net worth of £411,000, (excluding real estate), which amounts to about £6-£7m in 1992 values.

But, whatever the degree of effrontery in Keynes' objections to "money-making", the objection itself may still be a sound one. But deciding the justice of the objection requires a clarification of what he is objecting to. By "money-making" Keynes could merely mean "income earning". But it is obviously difficult to make a blanket objection to income-earning activities. In all societies there are activities which will earn incomes. We can easily think of cases where in earning an income a wrong is done (contract killing, the slave trade). And we can conceive of societies in which a large part of income is earned through wrong doing. In the Marxist indictment of capitalism the wrongs done in making money are beyond enumeration. But liberal economists believe that in a competitive economy, under the rule of law, income is earned by using oneself, or the resources under ones command, in a way which other people consider useful to them. It seems hard to object to using your resources in a way which other people consider useful. And it seems hard to object to "approbation" of income earning, if this is in fact how people earn their incomes.

But Keynes is not finding fault with consequences of "money-making".

The focus of Keynes' objection is the "money-making motive". Therefore, Keynes is, in part, objecting to the psychology which values only "economic satisfactions". Almost in the manner of traditional moralists, he is objecting to those beholden to "worldly pleasures". It is a plea to put away the false idols of material opulence, and to pursue one of those natural Bloomsbury lives; a "cottage" in some agreeable rural stretch, painting, reading, walking.

The advocate of liberal society could reply in its defence that there is nothing in a liberal society which requires its members to prize materialistic satisfactions, and use their resources in a materialistic way. Keynes' could reply in turn that, yes, liberal society *could* use its resources in a non-materialistic way, but liberal society in its current state does not do so. To put it another way, the Artist (that Bloomsbury hero) *could* conceivably survive under liberal society, but doesn't under the present one, or at least not enough of them do.

But such a riposte is a weak one. It is easy thing to say what is the proper number of artists, or the proper amount of "uncommercial" activity. But if there is an underpatronage of "uncommercial" activities in liberal society the solution would not lie in the abolition of that form of society, but by subsidising deserving "uncommercial" activities.

Egotistical Motivations

There is another element in Keynes' objection to money-making. Keynes seems to be objecting to the dominance and reliance upon egotistical motivations in the existing social framework. But there is nothing in the constitution of liberal society which presumes or relies upon egotistical motivations; Adam Smith's butcher may well be (and doubtless is) selling the meat for the well being of his family as much as for his own interest. Whether liberal society nurtures egotistical motivations is a nicer question. The usual liberal reply is that human nature in this regard is unmalleable, and the best way to cope with egotism is to create incentives which manipulate that difficult passion to secure useful ends.

Whatever the wisdom of his views

Keynes' closed his *Short View* unimpressed by the Soviet Union, but sufficiently hopeful to remain interested in its subsequent development.

The Five Year Plans

A Short View of Russia was Keynes' longest single piece of writing on Russia. But he returned to the topic more briefly on many occasions later.

His ambivalent attitude of *A Short View* is seen several years later in a discussion of the Five Year Plans. In a radio broadcast of March 1932 Keynes judged the Five Year Plan neither a "realised success" nor a "preposterous failure" (CW XXI p. 84).

In 1933 appears the first sign of a concern with political repression in Russia. In March of that year he rebuked Kingsley Martin, the editor of the *New Statesman and Nation*, for comparing political repression in Soviet Union and British India ("I do not see how any one could read yours as otherwise than, in effect, an apology for the Russians"). In July 1933 he expressed himself in the strongest and severest tones he ever used: "Russia exhibits the worst example which the world perhaps has seen, of administrative incompetence and of the sacrifice of almost every thing that makes life worth living to wooden heads.... Stalin has eliminated every independent, critical mind, even when it is sympathetic in general outlook. He has produced an environment in which the processes of the mind are atrophied. The soft convolutions of the brain are turned to wood. The multiplied bray of the loud speaker replaces the inflection of the human voice. The bleat of propaganda, as Low has shown, bores even the birds and the beasts of the field into stupefaction. Let Stalin be a terrifying example to all who seek to make experiments" (CW XXI pp. 243, 246).

The words are strong, and the subject of this censure is serious, the absence of free-thought. But it still has a strange ring; the trouble with Stalinism is its stupefying boredom.

It is at this point, the mid 1930s, that Keynes' thoughts suddenly reshape. Previously his views had sometimes been diffident, sometimes negative. But after the publication of Beatrice and Sidney Webb's *Soviet Union: A New Civilisation?* they were recast.

On June 1 1936, in the lull after the completion of the *General Theory*, Keynes made a broadcast on the BBC which included these words:

Until recently events in Russia were moving too fast and the gap between paper professions and actual achievements was too wide for a proper account to be possible. But the new system is now sufficiently crystallised to be reviewed. The result is impressive. The Russian innovators have passed, not only from the revolutionary stage, but also from the doctrinaire stage. There is little or nothing which bears any special relation to Marx and Marxism as distinguished from other stems of socialism. They are engaged in a vast administrative task of making a completely new set of social and economic institutions work smoothly and successfully over a territory so extensive that it covers one sixth of the land surface of the world. Methods are still changing rapidly in response to experience. The largest scale empiricism and experimentalism which has ever been attempted by disinterested administrators is in operation. It leaves me with a strong desire and hope that we in this country may discover how to combine an unlimited readiness to experiment with changes in political and economic methods and institutions, while preserving traditionalism and a sort of careful conservatism, thrifty of everything which has human experience behind it... (CW XXVIII 334, BBC 1 June 1936).

This must be one of the more ludicrous judgements ever passed on Stalin's Russia. How did Keynes find the state of the Soviet Union in 1936 such a source of "hope" for the rest of the world? How is it that the Russia of 1925 so disappointed, the Russia of 1933 dismayed, but that of 1936 "impressed"?

The immediate circumstance, as I have noted, was reading *Soviet Union: A New*

Civilisation? But it is not immediately apparent how this dismal tract could be so influential; its 1006 stony-hearted and evasive pages are not attractive material. But Keynes had a high regard for Beatrice Webb ("That she is the most distinguished woman alive goes without saying") Further, the book held a certain special appeal to Keynes. There is no Marxist doctrine in it to speak of, and it brings news of a Soviet Socialism free of it. ("There is little or nothing which bears any special relation to Marx and Marxism" *CW XXVIII*, p. 334) The book does not even contain a "communist party line"; the Webbs do not commit themselves to the Revolution, and make little reference to the Party outside the Soviet Union. In addition, it contains a mass of statistical material, something which Keynes enjoyed. Finally, it allots considerable space to "organisation and administration", something which Keynes was fascinated by, and at which he had judged the Soviet Union poorly before.

But perhaps another factor lent him to adopt this new stance: a personal one. Keynes had noticed how many younger and (to him) appealing personalities had been attracted to communism. He expressed this opinion in 1939,

"There is no one in politics to-day worth sixpence outside the ranks of liberals except the post war generation of intellectual communists under 35. Them, too, I like and respect. Perhaps in their feelings and instincts they are the nearest thing we now have to the typical non-conformist English gentleman who went to the Crusades, made the Reformation, fought the Great Rebellion, won us our civil and religious liberties and humanised the working classes last century" (*New Statesman and Nation* 28 January 1939).

Regrettably, it is not clear which persons constitute the "splendid material of young amateur Communists. . . [with whom] in their ultimate maturity lies the future..." (*New Statesman and Nation* 28 January 1939). Keynes was aware that several younger fellow members of "the Apostles" had adopted far left stances in the early 1930s. These included Julian Bell, Anthony Blunt and Guy Burgess. But Bell had been killed in 1937, two years before the quotation in question.

Keynes maintained relations with Guy Burgess after his graduation. But at this time Burgess, following a trip to Russia, was playing the role of the disillusioned communist who had "gone fascist", and now enjoyed visiting Nuremberg Rallies and Nazi sporting events. Evidently, there are some unanswered questions here, which new biographers may shed light on.

There is a tail to this story; shortly after the June 1936 broadcast, Keynes took a trip the Soviet Union. It would be interesting to know what he observed there of the "impressive smooth working of disinterested administrators". The *Collected Works*, as far as I can see, yield nothing.

The Low Dishonest Decade

There is a third factor which contributed to Keynes' strange attraction to Soviet Communism at this period; the tenor of the times. The 1930s was the "low dishonest decade", a period of low morale for liberal society; a time when the greatest examples of this form of society were beset by economic misery at home and menaced by fantastic evil abroad. It was the decade when liberal society was, in large part, abandoned by its natural constituency, people like Keynes, in favour of political forms far to the right and far to the left.

The Left's infatuation with Stalin's Russia is notorious. Edmund Wilson, Julian Huxley, G.B. Shaw, J.D. Bernal, John Strachey are some of the better known "progressives" who adopted idiotic views of the Soviet Union. In comparison to some of these Keynes was positively cautious. He may have found "hope" and "success" in Stalin's Russia, but unlike Harry Dexter White, his American opposite number at the Bretton Woods Conference, he refrained from spying for it.

The Left's attraction to Soviet Communism, was mirrored, if more weakly, by an attraction to the far right by conservatives. Wyndham Lewis, an early advocate of poetic modernism, later took upon himself to press Hitler's cause in Britain (Lewis, 1931). He was confident that Hitler in power "would remain peacefully at home, fully occupied with the internal problems of the *Dritte Reich*" and would duly

honour such Jewish notables as Albert Einstein. Less grossly, Evelyn Waugh provided a half-hearted apology for Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia in *Waugh in Abyssinia*.

This subornation of the Right did not exclude all of its economists. Joseph Schumpeter was one of the great liberal students of society. But a recent biography has revealed how strong was Hitler's allure for Schumpeter. "We are confronting a powerful movement which is singular in our history", Schumpeter told his students in Bonn in 1932. "This powerful apparatus is like a monster of infinite impulse. But how important might it be if this colossus was to be counselled properly in economics? What enormous subjective individual possibilities there might be for a young man of today if there were any who, not deprecating economic techniques, felt like an National Socialist?" Schumpeter's diary at this time records the tug of Hitler against his own better counsel. "I have to leave [Germany]. Everyone who is close to me and with whom I could work stands on one side [against Hitler]. And what I feel in my inner most self is around Hitler. But is it really so?"

In the crisis of the 1930s even "natural" liberals had an undeveloped appreciation of liberal society, and were liable to fall under the spell of extreme political forms. Keynes own absurd remarks on Russia in 1936 are one manifestation of that. Keynes was a fairly representative member of the patriotic, establishment, English liberal-left, comparable to some degree in this regard to George Orwell. In normal circumstances he would be quite immune to visions of political utopia, but in the weakened and disorientated state of time his immunity slackened.

I would go further. I would say that the *General Theory*, published just a few months before Keynes found hope in Soviet civilisation, is a manifestation of that same loss of hope in liberal society. It is a bizarre irony that in the early 1990s when socialism is experiencing almost total defeat, that the *General Theory*, Keynes' counsel of despair in desperate times, has been proposed as a model of economic philosophy by those on the "right".

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The New Age

Annette Thornton awaits the New Age with trepidation

Most people are familiar with the words 'New Age'. It is a phrase increasingly seen in conversation, on the media and in newspapers and magazines. It seems to indicate a brave, new world which holds endless bright promise and will deliver all things to all people. How should Christians react to this seemingly benign, positive and all-pervading idea?

This article examines the origins and credentials of the New Age Movement and looks at some of its manifestations. It will quickly become apparent that the New Age and Christianity are not only incompatible but in direct conflict, for, as one Roman Catholic bishop has recently said, the New Age is the most powerful attack on Christianity ever mounted by the Devil. Indeed, a prominent disciple of the movement has characterized The New Age as "Anarchy, Revolution and Disobedience".

New Agers believe that as planet Earth travels through space, changing its physical relationship to the stars, so a mystic change or shift occurs in the consciousness of mankind. At present we are leaving the Age of Pisces (the Fish, with its Christian connotations) and entering the Age of Aquarius. This Age is bringing us an expansion of consciousness and a movement away from the Judaeo-Christian framework with its 'male-dominated' ethos; no longer are ideas about God, morality and good and evil clear cut and specific. The psychologist and occultist Carl Jung incorporated these ideas into his world-view and taught that mankind passes through phases approximately 2000 years in length. He shared the Hindu New Age belief that each age has an 'avatar' or leader who propounds new doctrines and teaches followers; thus Moses was superseded by Jesus Christ, who in

turn is to be replaced during the Aquarian Age by another charismatic figure. For a New Ager, all that exists is good, inter-dependent and divine, and opposites fade into insignificance. A kind of cosmic harmony will prevail and conflict will wither away. This passing from one perception of reality to another has been termed a 'paradigm shift', a phrase used by the writer Thomas Kuhn in 1962, and one which

As one Roman Catholic bishop has recently said, the New Age is the most powerful attack on Christianity ever mounted by the Devil.

has played a seminal part in the recent development of New Age Doctrine.

The roots of the New Age are to be found in three major areas, Theosophy, eastern religion and the occult. Alice Bailey (1880-1949), an influential member of the Theosophical Society, taught her disciples about 'The Plan', according to which the world would be increasingly unified and finally visited by the Lord-Christ Maitreya, the 'avatar', who would come to Earth in human form and initiate the New Age world-wide. For all Bailey's use of Christian terminology, the Lord Maitreya bears a definite resemblance to the Anti-Christ, and Bailey is one of many New Agers who use Christian terms which have been emptied of their sacred meaning and filled with pagan and occultic significance.

From Hinduism the New Age Movement derives its 'monist' view of the world. According to the General Systems Theory propounded by many New Agers, the Earth and its inhabitants are evolving towards a unity which will make of 'the entire globe, and of the human family a single consciousness'. One of the most influential proponents of this view was the Jesuit priest Teilhard de Chardin who argued that the earth and its inhabitants are a spiritually evolving entity which will reach a critical "Omega Point" of development; at that stage a new "noetic" consciousness will emerge. De Chardin's ideas have been of crucial importance in the formulation of New Age philosophy and his views mirror the Hindu belief that the world is one, with an immanent, impersonal divinity or life-force indwelling every aspect of creation. From this area of New Age belief spring many of the current, fashionable beliefs about holism in medicine, ecology, religion and politics.

The third and potentially most destructive and powerful strand of New Age belief is occultism in its multifarious forms. Theosophy was founded by a spiritualist, Helena Blavatsky, and the teachings 'revealed' by spirits to members of this sect blend syncretistically many ideas from both eastern and western sources. In recent times various channelers or spiritualists in the U.S.A. have made fortunes from sharing the teachings of their spirit guides with the American public. Jane Roberts and 'Seth', Jack Pursel and 'Lazaris' and J.Z. Knight and 'Ramtha' have all conveyed a stream of spirit messages to a largely unsuspecting public. The actresses Shirley MacLaine and Sharon Gless are devoted followers of Ramtha and Lazaris respectively, and MacLaine has written many books expounding New Age

ideas. Hand in hand with this direct spirit contact has come a proliferation of other occult practices and beliefs. Witchcraft, astrology, palmistry, fortune-telling, divination, black-magic, and an obsession with pseudo-mysticism, reincarnation, horror and the paranormal have all burgeoned in the last two decades. A comprehensive view of the New Age activity as a whole is given in the diagrammatic New Age wheel; the activities of the Movement are with skill and cunning devolved to apparently disparate and unconnected groups which together form a huge network. It is quite possible for unsuspecting individuals to become innocently involved in a particular New Age activity without realising the significance of their actions. Imperceptibly, though, attitudes are changed by contact with the ideology in any form, and the next step towards enslavement is seductive and easy.

New Age Practitioners

Entertainers and industrialists alike have been increasingly involved in New Age practices over the last two decades. George Lucas (Star Wars), Gene Roddenberry (Star Trek), Stephen Spielberg (E.T.) and Oprah Winfrey are all examples of show-biz New Age devotees. Industrial firms and enterprises such as IBM, RCA, Ford, NASA and Lockheed have inflicted Transformational Technologies (T.T.) on their employees. T.T. is an offshoot of Erhard Seminar Training (EST) founded by a giant of the New Age Movement, Werner Erhard. Countless other companies force their employees to attend role-play sessions and awareness expanding symposia.

Perhaps the best known and most overt example of New Age practice in Britain is the Findhorn community in Northern Scotland, with its emphasis on organic food. Eileen Caddy who, with her husband, founded the community nearly forty years ago, spoke frankly about her beliefs on a recent television programme. Although she claims to be a Christian she openly admits that she and the community are guided by a 'voice' which tells her what to do. She claims that she and the voice which she identifies as the Father, are now one,

and that everyone should look inside themselves to seek the god within. She herself yearns to be a 'balanced' individual, both feminine and masculine; girls, she argues, need a goddess as role-model, not a bearded patriarch. The time of the pervasive male-god image has passed and true

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form*

spirit is sexless. Death is not to be feared since it is an entry into the light.

Here in a nut-shell are encapsulated many New Age beliefs and practices. Reliance on a 'spirit' for advice, rejection of God the personal Father, and substitution of self as the god-head, refusal to accept sexual differentiation and the belief in death as an unconditional entry into a new, joyful phase of existence all remind us of the lies of the serpent to Eve in the Garden of Eden, "You shall not die the death," and "You shall be as gods."

There are countless other organisations in Britain and America specifically devoted to New Age teaching, but two in Britain deserve particular mention. The Lucis Trust, which began as the Theosophical Lucifer Trust in New York is now established in London and will provide enquirers with a correspondence course containing a large occult component to train them to live in the modern world. The Trust's 'Occasional Papers and Related Publications' on the theme of 'World Goodwill' are by writers such as David Spangler (ex-Findhorn), Fritjof Capra (the New Age physicist) and Jonathon Porritt (Friends of the Earth).

The Wrekin Trust founded in 1971 by Sir George Trevelyan is another highly influential New Age foundation in Britain, and Trevelyan, who taught Prince Philip at Gordonstoun, has a classic New Age outlook. His

Trust emphasises holism, and organises conferences on astrology, meditation, psychic awareness and Earth mysteries. In August 1987 he helped to organise the 'Harmonic Convergence' centred in this country on Glastonbury. From his writings it is clear that he approves and recommends spiritualist practices, and he too has had links with the Findhorn community.

During the recent election campaign advertisements have appeared both in the tabloid and 'quality' press for the "Natural Law Party" whose manifesto, when the jargonised gobbledegook has been deciphered, is purely New Age. The advertisements were placed by the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi University of Natural Law with headquarters at Mentmore Towers, Bucks., and were crowned by the archetypal symbol of the New Age, a rainbow or 'tankharana'. The Maharishi has already enjoyed considerable success in promoting Transcendental Meditation and it is likely that these advertisements are only the beginning of a sustained propaganda offensive in the U.K.

Feminism and Ordination

The feminist movement has embraced all spheres of activity and, in general terms, is a product of the secular humanist outlook which pervades Western society. However, feminism within the various Christian Churches has taken a particularly twisted form. Let the 'Catholic' theologian, Rosemary Radford Ruether, a tireless campaigner for female ordination, give us the general flavour of Christian feminism.

"I knew that Ba'al was a real god, the revelation of the mystery of life ... as for (his) defects, were they more spectacular than the defects of the biblical God or Messiah, or less so? I could hardly tell her (a nun) that my devotion to Mary was somewhat less than my devotion to some far more powerful females that I knew; Isis, Athena and Artemis."

From the same pen we read, "As a feminist, I can come up with only one reason to stay in the Catholic Church: to try to change it."

Many of those most prominently concerned with this type of feminism

and with female ordination adhere to the concept of 'creation-centred spirituality', which is in essence a pagan Hindu view of the Universe in perfect accord with New Age thinking. The concern of these women is with the creation and not the Creator. A seminal influence within feminist Christianity has been Father Matthew Fox who has emphasised the importance of 'compassion'. In New Age new-speak this means 'the realisation of the interconnectedness of all things'. From creation-centred spirituality women such as Miriam Simos (Starhawk) have moved on to practise the Craft (ie witchcraft); Starhawk has written, "In the Craft we do not believe in the goddess — we connect with her ... She is within us all". Another 'Christian' feminist, Mary Grey, has written, "The joy and celebrative life-giving energy ... of the Goddess religion is based on an attentiveness and harmony to the rhythms of nature ...". Characteristically, the words roll endlessly, soporifically onwards, devoid of real content, meaning and rationality but producing a bland, hypnotic effect. Examples could be multiplied, all leading inexorably to outright rebellion against God and His commandments. For such women the demand for ordination is one strand, albeit a crucial one, in a general web of revolution and pagan anarchy. In effect, female ordination is a stepping-stone to the destruction of Christianity and the formation of a new religion for a New Age. They hate and fear God the Father as revealed in God the Son and condemn orthodox Christianity as patriarchal and oppressive.

The statements which follow are expressions of orthodox Christian belief.

1. Christians are *expressly* forbidden to meddle with the occult.
2. Jesus Christ is the *only* Way, Truth and Life and the *only* path to God the Father.
3. God is an objective personal reality, the Father; He is not a mindless life-force permeating the universe.
4. God is the centre of existence, and the ground of being; man was created by Him to serve, love, glorify and enjoy Him for ever.
5. The Earth and its creatures were made by God and are not divine; man has been given stewardship of them.
6. There is one death, and after that comes judgement.
7. Woman is subordinate to man in the order of creation.


To every one of these statements the New Ager is vehemently opposed. For him, the occult is an integral and necessary part of existence and the spirits he consults all deny the divinity of Christ. All that exists is good and *per se* divine. The self is pre-eminent and man is his own god and salvation, while the Earth and its lifeforms are but extensions of himself and as divine

as he. The Christian God is an out-moded concept and must retire from centre-stage to allow man to take his place. Death is a joyous experience leading to re-incarnation and men and women are in almost all respects indistinguishable. Man is no longer answerable to God, the fear of death is removed, and the New Age practitioner can feel a smug sense of satisfaction in 'doing good' for the world as a whole, without any great personal sacrifice. New Age philosophy is perfectly attuned to the secular humanism and mankind-centredness of modern life; whilst corrupting and enfeebling the intellect and repudiating rational thought, it turns the soul away from God and fixes its centre in the narcissistic self, leaving that self at the mercy of Satan and his ministers. A world unity of weak-willed, sanctimonious and muddled-minded creatures would provide the perfect setting for the coming of the "Lord Maitreya". The Father of Lies has well and truly ensnared a whole generation of well-meaning but shallow-thinking men and women through the power of the media and the leisure and energy generated by affluence.

Is the stage set for the imminent coming of the Anti-Christ as the Theosophists intended? Certainty is impossible but the indications are suggestive. Creation of a one-world state and religion are nearer than ever before, and the New Age Movement has played and is playing a crucial role in that development. Meanwhile it is for Christians to remain alert and informed, countering New Age arguments and propaganda in every way possible, with knowledge, with determination and above all with prayer.

Annette Thornton is a classics teacher.

The New Age Wheel



Male and Female

John Carroll reviews First Principles

To go wrong on the fundamental problem of "man and woman", that is a typical sight of shallowness, and a thinker who has proved shallow in this dangerous place -- shallow in his instinct -- will be too "short" for all fundamental problems of life.

Nietzsche

An ancient Greek myth, recounted by Hesiod, held that Aphrodite married Ares and they produced a daughter called Harmony. In other words there is celebration of the union of the goddess of beauty and love with the god of war and valour. This myth reveals universals, that there is a male principle and a male ethic, and a female principle and female ethic, both pairs of which are distinct. They do not vary fundamentally from time to time or place to place. Moreover, gratifying relations between the sexes and a harmonious human community depend on their right fusion.

The male principle and its ethic derive from an ascending hierarchy of three linked phenomena: aggression, power and valour. They are the key to understanding both masculinity and manliness. Male aggression is a central problem for any human society. Indeed, much that is culture is directed at checking the violence of men and redirecting it into socially constructive activity. The first great work of the Western tradition, *The Iliad*, focuses on war, and the havoc that results when the most powerful warrior of all loses control of himself. The story's ultimate concern is with how order is restored. The central rite of Australian Aboriginal tribes was male initiation, in which the elders waged a systematic assault over months on the bodies of boys at puberty, to teach them obedience and channel their anarchic instincts into religious activity. Virtually all crime in modern Western societies, and in particular violent crime, as in all societies, is committed by men, and mainly by young men

between the ages of 15 and 30. One factor is biceps, that on average young men are physically stronger than women and older men. It is the minor factor. The major one is also biological: men are more aggressive. Their drive to perpetuate violence is stronger. Scientifically, this may be attributed to the male sex hormone: certainly it seems that women who have been injected with testosterone not only develop secondary male sexual characteristics but also become more aggressive, and men injected with female hormones less aggressive. The greater aggressivity of the males of the species, on average, may be observed at all stages of the life cycle, starting with young children at play.

The aggressive drive is linked to a need for power, or "will to power" in Nietzsche's phrase. Freud isolated the distinctive male fear as "castration anxiety", by which he meant a fear of impotency, or more diffusely, of powerlessness. Men who are thwarted or humiliated tend to hit out, pick fights, insult women and attempt to seduce them, drive cars fast and recklessly, or wreck things. They are striving to assert themselves, to find power, to show that they are strong. The most contemptuous jokes among men about each other invariably allude to effeminacy and emasculation, in short to weakness and lack of potency.

Power may be explicit, as in the warrior; the captain of industry, the owner of a harem, or the fiercely patriarchal family head. Or it may be sublimated, into some type of inner poise and gravity. As the traditional metaphor puts it, the lion never has to use his strength to prove his power.

The social threat is not with the lions, but with the aspirants and the threatened. When a culture weakens, and with it the will to maintain order, there is the risk that gangs of rampaging young males will take over the streets, with temptations to ransack property, assault men who resist, and abduct and rape women. This is the

human jungle, against which it is a main task of any culture to fight.

There are two age-old methods of taming male aggression. The first is family. The necessary Western form is the stable monogamous marriage, with the man having responsibility for the physical and economic protection of home, wife and children. Typically at marriage the new husband transfers his primary loyalty from the male gang to the family. Modern crime statistics show that it is *single* men who commit the vast majority of crimes. Marriage changes their ways. There are a number of reasons for this. There is pride taken in being the provider, both in being the breadwinner and supporting the family home, especially if it is owned, the private territory in which all are secure from the storms of the public world. Men take a different attitude to the work they do – which more often than not is routine and tedious – if it is to help their family, rather than their own self-centred pleasures. Work gains an extra significance and dignity. Altogether life becomes more stable for the man, taking into account that work is the main modern form for the sublimation of male aggression.

Family also constrains a sexual promiscuity that is native to men. The nomadic quality of male eros, when unchecked, is illustrated by the tendency of those with wealth and power in pre-modern societies to have many women, whether in harems, as multiple wives or mistresses. There are some affinities with the stallion with its brood of mares, the stag with its deer, or the male gorilla with its clan of females. Thus the human male accepts some renunciation of instinct in return for the benefits of family. He submits to the moral law of the wider community and also to a type of unconscious moral authority carried by his wife. Male jokes about being "tied to the apron strings" reveal a more serious dimension, that men need the restraint embodied in the powerful ethical centre which is "home", with

the wife-mother as its heart. John Ford made the point lightly in his film *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon*, showing six men under orders to arrest Sgt Quincannon all being flattened in a fury of drunken punching by the huge Irish NCO, before the wife of the Commanding Officer arrives and calmly asks him to go the guard-house. He marches off in instant obedience.

There are signs in the late twentieth century of deteriorating relations between the sexes. If there has been an increase in male violence against women, which in the circumstances is likely, then the main contributing factor is the growing instability of the family. It is in the interest of women, whether as individuals in danger of becoming sexual prey, or as mothers, to keep men tied to their positions, as practising fathers and husbands, in all but the most personally intolerable situations. Indeed, feminism in helping weaken the ethos of the traditional marriage has contributed to an increasing violence against women. As an Irish wit put it, women voting for a relaxation of the divorce laws is like turkeys voting for Christmas.

The second of the age-old checks on male aggression is the male group. As George Gilder has noted in his book *Men and Marriage* (1984), the closest relations between humans are between mothers and their children, the second closest between adult males. Of course, there are exceptions, and especially in the Western middle class, which has attempted to foster companionship between husband and wife, and with some success. When there has been success it has been in spite of the experience of most human cultures, in which it is recognised that it is not a good idea for men and women to spend much time together.

The all-male group may take the form of a warrior band, a priestly caste, a club or fraternity, a football team or even a ruling élite. Its prototype is the band of blood brothers. When it works it develops a strong collective conscience and *esprit de corps*. The keystone in the arch is valour. Members of a modern football team enjoy a mateship and camaraderie that depend upon the display of a

number of virtues on the playing field: courage in physically dangerous encounters, selflessness for the higher good of the team, cheerfulness and resilience in bad times, and a dedication to doing one's best, to excellence, which in turn depends on disciplined training. Altogether these qualities constitute an ethic – valour. It is the morally guided use of power. It may require aggression, even violence. At the end of the day, when the trial is over and the limbs are weary, especially when the day has been hard, but things ended well in spite of adversity, then there is a closeness among the men, an intimacy and warmth. It is under the star of valour.

If there has been an increase in male violence against women... then the main contributing factor is the growing instability of the family.

Valour in the male horde has as one of its elements a chivalrous regard for women. There may well be ribaldries in private, even alluring paintings on the walls of clubrooms, but there must be rigorous separation of private from public, of inner sanctum from square or street. Here is the classic play of morality, temptations permitted and even stimulated within strict private limits, only to be chained outside those bounds. In *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* Quincannon tells the troops, at one point when they are to patrol accompanied by some ladies, that they must watch their language. He knows the necessary proprieties.

Of course this does not mean bad behaviour does not occur. In conquering armies chivalry has often broken down, with enemy women rationalised as legitimate booty, a remission from the code. Nevertheless, there is special admiration for

victorious troops who keep their discipline, like Cromwell's Model Army. A radical change will occur if modern armies include women in the front line – compromising the traditional soldier ethic of mercy towards women after victory. Valour is linked to honour, and any band of warriors will hold in contempt an enemy that puts its women in the firing line; it is much less likely to respect those women.

One type of horde is the male kin, whose principal task is to defend the honour of the extended family, preserve its "name". Such groups illustrate another vital function of valour, to tie the present generation to its ancestors and to its descendants. The link through the generations is forged. The eyes of the worthy forefathers look down from their portraits – real or imaginary – on the walls, with stern eyes beneath furrowed brows, judging. Are you worthy, they ask? You are responsible for your children, and your children's children, on into the future. In good sporting clubs a similar spirit prevails, the honour boards, trophies and photographs all around, and a strong drive in the older members to teach the juniors.

There is a third and peculiarly modern form of control over male aggression. It is largely malign, and results from the family controls having gone wrong. That is psychological repression. The typical pathology of the middle-class male in relation to women is not overt aggression, but indifference, or at least surface indifference. Its symptoms are depressive, with desire weak or non-existent. With aggression blocked, the other, erotic instinct, is also inhibited. The cause is often a family background in which the mother was dominant and the father either absent or weak, making it difficult for the son to develop a strong male persona, and implanting in him a fear of women as all-powerful. The normal boyhood sublimations of aggression, such as sport, are distorted, leaving few outlets and a particular nervousness in relation to women. The result may well be sissy and paranoid men; if they are attracted to women it is to dominating ones who punish them.

In other words when it comes to the control of male aggression there is a delicate balance between too little and too much. Achieving that balance is a central task for any culture, and quite an art. The golden rule is that the taming requires cultural sublimations that convert aggression into a sense of power which does not need violent demonstrations to prove itself. For this, aggression must come under the law of valour. The three-tier hierarchy is the key. Culture fails on either side, of too little control leading to violent and anarchic brutes, or at the other extreme, repression without sublimation producing nervous and ineffectual males, afraid of women and with an enervated detachment from life.

The female principle is centred on nurture and the hearth. In it the biological and the ethical are much closer to each other, with the ethical amplifying the biological, and also anchoring it, rather than functioning as an opposing force, as in the male case. A minor part only of the role of the female ethic is to check wayward impulses in women themselves. In addition, it serves as a public force controlling men and, more generally, constraining the egoistic in favour of the communal.

Both principle and ethic are centred on the mother. The biological basis is fertility and the nurture and protection of children. The constitutive female anxiety is of "inner barrenness", of being infertile, with further projective associations of dried up, withered, cold. The fairytale image of bad femininity is the witch, who is old, gnarled and brittle, with the explicit logic that barrenness makes her evil, out of resentment, with a special hatred of children: she kills and eats them, sometimes after having cooked them in her oven, an obvious reference to the blighted womb. Stereotypes of the spinster and the old maid carry the same associations in milder form. Such peculiarly female phobias as of mice and spiders draw their psychological sustenance from fears of dirtying and contaminating the inside. Moreover, many of the universal traits of female beauty are sublimations of generativity and nurture: the soft, smooth, silky,

fresh, lush, opulent, warm, curvaceous, inwardly at ease and sufficient.

In the Western tradition the female ethic has found its most compelling representation in Christian art. It has three distinct manifestations, illustrated respectively by the Annunciation, the Madonna and Child, and the Pieta, the three ethical stages of motherhood. The Annunciation shows the angel visiting Mary to tell her she is pregnant, and who the child shall be. The Virgin is usually portrayed in this moment with head bowed, awed by the momentousness of what she hears. A mood of reverence prevails. Mary represents all women after conception, how they should feel. The message is that new life is sacred, motherhood a holy mission. She has been blessed. The law is that any mother's relationship to her pregnancy should in essence be that of Mary. If it is not, then she transgresses, and she will be stricken down with guilt. The woman for whom pregnancy is unwanted, or merely a profane biological event, breaks the first universal law of motherhood.

The image of Madonna and Child is most famously represented by Raphael. *The Grand Duke Madonna*, for instance, shows the mother so intensely concentrated on the infant, she is physically and spiritually focused in tender nurture, that the baby becomes as if weightless in her arms. The two are complete, and serene. Like all true works of culture this painting is morally coercive, pointing a finger at all women who take it in, commanding, be like me, or else. It says that if your relation to your child is not in essence like mine to Jesus, then you are committing one of the greatest transgressions, and you will suffer. If you choose not to become a mother, then you are renouncing a main part of every woman's vocation, and you will have to bear not only the psychological burden, but also the ethical. You may so choose, but do so knowing there will be a price in guilt. The Madonna and Child also asserts a law for men: keep your distance, for here is a charged sacred space into which you may not intrude. If you are husband and father, then part of your task is to protect.

You are the frame of the painting.

The third image, the Pieta, has Mary the mother cradling the dead body of her son. She is grieving. She is also caring for the dead. At the completion of the cycle of life she has the principal role, as she did at the start. The Pieta belongs to the central symbolism of Christianity, the crucifixion, the transcendence of the tragic end of human life in death. One part of that transcendence is the immortality of the soul. The other is that in the heart of tragedy man is not alone: tended by his mother, supported by her in spite of her own debilitating grief, he does not depart life as a cold and forsaken corpse. There is some parallel in the classical Greek figure of Antigone, burying the body of her brother in flagrant disobedience of the law of the state. She decides that the will of the nether gods has precedence. What Antigone obeys is higher than the male law of politics, and it requires her to tend to the bodies of dead kin, that they receive fitting burial.

Women are thus the guardians of charity, of love as a theological virtue, for its prototype on earth is mother love. The virtues of home and the hearth emanate from the same source, as at a further remove do those other aspects of charity, care for the sick and dying, and mourning for the dead.

The well-being of any society depends on the prevalence and vitality of both the male and the female ethics. For individual men and women who transgress them there will be guilt. This does not mean that the basic patterns of human life must remain forever in traditional grooves. In any case those grooves have twisted and turned over time. We live in a period in which more and more women choose to work, some of them in careers, and the wider society makes this possible. Moreover, modernity does not look like returning to the traditional mode of women remaining entirely within the domain of the household. It is important, then, to make adaptations that do not violate the first principles of male and female to such a degree that the lives of individuals come under intolerable strain. There are signs that this is

precisely what has happened in the twentieth century.

The first principles warn us of a number of pitfalls. They mainly concern the consequences of the weakening of family bonds, as indicated in the rapidly increasing divorce rates in Western societies after 1970. Many factors lie behind the weakening of the family: the decline of religion which had reinforced the marriage oath, the decline of paternal authority within the family, increasing prosperity making separation economically possible, and a trend to consumerism and its own egoistic pleasure principle. Whatever the combination of causes, it is the consequences that are at issue here.

Considering first of all the family, and its members, there are four costs that have been imposed by the emancipation of women from their traditional domestic domain. The first is the freeing of men as husbands and fathers from their home ties. Men whose marriages break down often become bitter and insecure. It is an enduring statistic that after separation or divorce men are much more likely to commit suicide than women. They are more likely to become violent towards women, and revert to the nomadic style of casual affairs, or repeated restless marriages. They frequently abandon both their ethical and their economic responsibilities as fathers.

The second cost is to strengthen the modern trend, especially in Anglo-Celtic societies, to mother-dominated families. These are families in which the father is either absent or lacking authority, and in which the mother plays both the nurturing and the commanding role. Such families place strain on the adults, with the frustration for the mother of not having a man she admires, and of her home having less stability. They also place strain on the children. For boys, the shift to male-sex identification is difficult without the steady presence of an adult male of some substance. Such families are prone to producing boys who are fearful of women and who, in adulthood, tend to various forms of perversion including homosexuality. They tend to produce girls who are con-

temptuous of men. In either case stable heterosexual relations will be the exception. Mother-dominated families are likely to set going a self-perpetuating vicious circle over the generations.

The third cost is that mothers are driven, by economic circumstances or by unchecked inclination, to creche their children out in their early years. This breaks the psychic-spiritual umbilical cord that children depend on in their first five years for the sustenance of their characters and their imagination. Unless they have inherited a very strong character, this condemns them forever to the nagging sense that they were rejected in the formative time of their lives, that they are essentially unlovable. It also compromises the greatest of all joys for adults, that is their own children. The black clouds in this particular sky gather because of transgression of the second law of

Without living exemplars of the male ethic it will be difficult to teach boys the laws of civility and courtesy, teach them ways of acting in the world which defend their culture.

motherhood, that represented by Madonna and Child.

It would be unfair to lay blame for the third cost singly on mothers. It is virtually impossible to pursue a career and be a mother concurrently, certainly when it is as a mother of young children. A career requires too much concentration of mind, energy and time, unless it is followed in a slovenly manner, which brings its own guilt, for transgressing the law of vocation. The signs are that in the cases of the

mother who works part-time, but not as a career, and for whom family remains the abiding passion, the children do not suffer markedly. Of course, there were bad mothers in traditional societies and there are career mothers who manage the impossible, but these are the exceptions, and do not soften the bite of the first principles.

The fourth cost is frustrated eros in the women, the parallel to unharnessed or repressed eros in the men. It is a cost that follows more generally from deteriorating relations between the sexes. It was well known to the ancient Greeks, especially those of fifth-century BC Athens. In their greater honesty they gave dramatic form to the effects of a male escape into the public world combined with mother-dominated child-rearing. Euripides' *Medea* is an example of the berserk rage of a woman whose injured pride, and jealousy at betrayal by her weak and bad husband, drives her to murder her own sons. *The Bacchae* has women out of frustration taking to Dionysian revelling together. In a fit of orgiastic hallucination the mother of the king – himself weak, stupid and perverted – takes him for a lion, kills him, cuts off his head and dances around with it. Orpheus is torn apart by crazed Thracian maidens, whom he has aroused with his music.

As there are burdens for the individual, male or female, of trying to live at too great a distance from universals, so there are costs at the wider social level. Where will be the knights of valour? Without living exemplars of the male ethic it will be difficult to teach boys the laws of civility and courtesy, teach them ways of acting in the world which defend their culture. It is principally in the presence of authoritative adults that each new generation is shamed into obedience. Furthermore, where will be the havens of nurture? To the degree that the home is turned into a utilitarian centre for consumption, with the mother as chief organiser, it loses the security and cosiness that are the necessary balance, for both adults and children, to the harsher and colder realities of the public world. Home is not consumption. It is the walled garden, the closed front door, the hearth, the rocking

chair by the fire, and the old and familiar objects around the room.

There is also the question of what, in a sexually-mixed public world, will check power. Politics, without an ethic higher than the personal ambitions of its individual actors, degenerates into a swirl of secret deals, squarings off and corruption. The same is true for all institutions. Where there are careers there is the pursuit of power. It is not easy to imagine an equivalent to the male club, with its check on the bad behaviour of members. Without that equivalent, there is danger that public life will be degraded into the squabbling of the ambitious for their own wealth, power and prestige. The society as a whole will suffer, and be forced into more and more government regulation, a bureaucratically cumbersome and generally inefficient means for

controlling individual behaviour.

Aphrodite married Ares and they produced a daughter named Harmony. The male and female erotic is gratified, metamorphosed into the ethical union of marriage, short-term pleasure sublimated into enduring companionship, and a child is born, opening the way to the joyfulness of parenthood. The story is simple and right. It does not take account of the tarnished human reality, the flaws of character, the fickleness and deviousness of desire, the trials of fate, and the vagaries of conception which determine the nature of the child, all of which may frustrate the achievement of the ideal. It does not acknowledge the hardship and misery that many have experienced within all types of family during the span of human history, what led the Preacher to exclaim:

I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit.

This simple story does, nevertheless, stake out the universal terrain, within the contours of which we have to live if it is going to be possible to defy the pessimism of the Preacher, and gain a sense of achievement and gratification in life, a sense that we belong on earth, under the sun, at home in spirit.

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Escape from Tyranny?

R J Barrett calls for true Tories to back electoral reform.

I could not disagree more with the sentiments expressed by William Norton in his essay, nor even with the comments upon it made by your estimable editor.

All parliamentary systems, not simply those that employ Proportional Representation, "exalt parties over people" to use Mr Norton's memorable but sadly misdirected phrase. However, the difference between the first-past-the-post system as practised by Westminster in 1992 and the various forms of PR in use abroad is that although under both regimes, the individual citizen has little chance of making political headway on his own, the Westminster system effectively prevents even substantially-sized combinations of politically-motivated citizens from taking any significant part in the political process, thus excluding from political power and influence all who stand outside the party machines.

At the same time our system enshrines, virtually as a fixed feature of the British constitution, the twin monolithic institutions of the Conservative and Labour Parties. These factions, who answer to nobody but

In few other western nations governed by the parliamentary method can the system of control through the bullying and cajolery of party whips have been perfected to the degree we find in our own country.

themselves, are enabled to exercise -- and do exercise -- arbitrary and absolute control over those of their members who participate, or seek to participate in the government of their country at

national or local level. This is a truly appalling state of affairs which makes a total mockery of our purportedly democratic order.

It is no defence against this shattering indictment of our own political system to argue that something more-or-less similar goes on in many other civilized nations. No doubt it does. But in few other western nations governed by the parliamentary method can the system of control through the bullying and cajolery of party whips have been perfected to the degree we find in our own country.

The truth is that in Britain today we have a political system that is oligarchical, not democratic. It is true that our oligarchy is subject to modification by the veto of a disgusted populace, much as the despotism of Imperial Russia was tempered by assassination. That, however, is no argument against reform, and it is worth observing that while the methods of our ever-so-secret secret police may be preferable to those of an out-and-out tyranny the stench of hypocrisy in the genteel corridors of Westminster is arguably worse than any unsavoury odours that ever pervaded the Winter Palace.

Under our system, dominated by two all-powerful parties (or perhaps these days we should say one and a half parties – an even more indefensible arrangement) membership of, and approval by either the Conservative or the Labour Party, is the *sine qua non* of a political career. As a result the careers of *all* would-be politicians are firmly under the arbitrary control of one or other of these organisations, which answer to nobody but their own self-perpetuating elites.

Under our existing order, therefore, the power of political patronage exercised through the Government Whips Office is the greatest and most iniquitous power in the land. It is a corrosive poison that, by destroying the independence of the citizen *qua* politician over a period of many years, has rotted away the very fabric of civic life in this country to the extent that civic life has finally been replaced in its entirety by the dead hand of party control.

It may be argued that some men and women of independent mind and high calibre, such as Margaret Thatcher or Enoch Powell, have reached high office. However, a brief glance at the careers of these and other worthwhile politicians will show that during the early stage of their careers they tended to avoid such controversies as might have tended to put them in bad odour with the party whips. Those who followed a more maverick course, such as (to take a notable recent example) Nicholas Winterton, have had their careers ruthlessly stifled. Moreover, for every Winterton who made it into parliament there are scores of talented hopefuls who have been prevented by the Conservative Party even from making it onto the Approved Candidates List. I daresay a similar state of affairs prevails within the Labour Party also.

PR doubtless suffers from many of the faults ascribed to it by Mr. Norton, and of course it is by no means immune to the human selfishness and arrogance which exploit and disgrace the present system. However electoral reform could open the way for new groupings of talented and independently-minded men and women to combine and to secure access to the political arena. Because it would also be open to established politicians alienated by the established parties to cleave to such

new groupings, a reformed electoral system would also tend to circumscribe the power exercised by the Tory and Labour Party whips.

Moreover, the necessity for the principal parties, still large and important but with their overweening power crucially reduced, to reach external accommodations and compromises with other parties within the body politic, would also tend to erode the power of party leaders and Whips.

If the resultant publicly-displayed wheeling and dealing as seen, for example, in Italian politics, may appear unedifying to some weak political stomachs, it is markedly preferable to the arrogance and bullying, usually kept well hidden behind the scenes, that is such a distinctive and disgrace-

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ful feature of Britain's whip-ridden political system.

It is of course usually members of the British Conservative party – those who have most to lose – who regularly bleat on about the “instability” and “weakness” of government by coalition. Moreover, regardless of what Mr Norton may think, it is these same people who constantly and consistently exalt party above human personality. What is it proper for a party to be, after all, other than a collection of human beings with a shared purpose? Human nature dictates that the chief driving force in politics is a desire to secure power and hold on to it for as long as possible. Nevertheless in most parts of the civilised world political parties at least *pretend* to be united (or divided)

by ideology. Only the English Conservative party has the brass nerve to proclaim in its own publications, repeatedly, “the chief reason for the Party's existence is to fight and win elections”. I find nothing refreshing about such a mind-blowingly cynical piece of “honesty”. Even Hypocrisy is not without its positive aspects for, as de Rochefoucauld observed, it is “the tribute vice pays to virtue”.

In fulsome support of Mr Norton, your editor descends from Olympia to declare that “PR would put an end to the assumption that a Member of Parliament represents his constituents (regardless of how they voted)”. The word “assumption” is well chosen. What he says might have applied within the lifetimes of some of us to certain of the old Tory squirearchy and also to a few select independents such as J.B. Morton, but those men are gone for ever. Indeed in our age of mass standardisation where the banalities of herd or “pop” culture are beamed into every home by the baleful eye of television, the old bonds of local patriotism and independence that underpinned the more forthright parliamentarians of former days have been all but obliterated. It is now impossible that the existing system, under which the majority of votes literally do go to waste, could ever return any significant number of independent or at least independently-minded members. The few that we have are a bonus and they, like Winterton and others before him, suffer virtual persecution by their party whips.

The fact is that in matters of crucial national importance (and a large number of matters which most would judge insignificant) today's MP serves neither his constituents nor (as Burke insisted...and how many times has the Conservative Party hierarchy dragged *that* old chestnut out in opposition to Tory Populism) his own tender conscience. He serves the Whips, purely and simply, and they in turn receive their orders from the party leadership.

A former Government Minister, no less, recently told me how disgusted he was by the “stormtrooper-like” tactics employed by the Tory Whips during the Maastricht debate. That is the ugly and acceptable face, not only of today's Conservative Party, but of British politics itself. That a severe problem

exists there is no doubt.... and it is a problem that must be addressed.

How the system should be reformed, and whether we should adopt one of the numerous forms of PR, the S.T.V. system (which I would favour) as proposed by the Electoral Reform Society and by the Liberal Democratic Party, the French two-round system (which for all its faults is marginally fairer than our own) or even a U.S. style Primary system, must be a question held open for vigorous debate. Those with vested interests, such as the Prime Minister, will of course deny the need even to discuss the possibility of reform and keep their heads firmly buried in the sand.

The "local roots" argument, which the Germans have attempted to address with their own clumsy hybrid electoral system, in truth now carries precious little real weight in practice. The electors vote for political *parties*, and except in a dwindling number of cases the personality and outlook of the candidate himself is of relatively little significance (and in the most obvious cases that spring to mind *negative* significance!)

This, of course, is exactly as one would anticipate in modern politics, and it is very unlikely that a great deal can be done to reverse that particular trend, although electoral reform would help to some degree. The problem, accentuated in any "safe" seat (and remember that there is no such thing as a safe seat under S.T.V.) is that the candidate, and hence the M.P., is actually chosen by a selection committee of perhaps twenty people, appointed by a tiny and politically biased fraction of the electorate (the A.G.M. of the local Association). In the case of the Conservative Party this committee's room for manoeuvre is restricted to those party activists whose names have been placed on the "approved list" by the arbitrary decision of select cliques made up of a mixture of favoured M.P.s and Central Office hirelings. If that's democracy at work I'm a Dutchman. Mind you, if I were a Dutchman I wouldn't have to put up with the quasi-feudal system of candidate selection we still continue to tolerate in this country.

For the old and truly feudal Conservative Party, there might indeed have been something to be said. At

one time, after all, constituency selection committees would have chosen local landowners, businessmen or politicians of the Alderman Foodbotham school, firmly ensconced in their local communities and likely to show at least a modicum of independence when returned to parliament. Today's committees, largely composed of female geriatrics but with the odd hopeful yuppie thrown in are more likely to be offered, and to select a "political researcher", hailing from the opposite end of the country, who just happens to be the apple of someone or other's eye at Central Office.

Our current Prime Minister is exactly an example of this tendency, and so was the wretched "Chris" Patten, the loss of whose seat was by far the best news on election night. Both men seem to have had their hearts firmly set on political careers since before they were children, and worse still they have the gall to admit it. One wonders whether they have ever read Arthur Koestler's stricture "to go into politics is usually indicative of a personality disorder". At least Major actually once had a proper job (working for a bank). Many other such clones have never done an honest day's work in their lives.

These days a "good constituency M.P." is simply one who takes time out to deal with those parish pump issues and personal problems which are brought to his notice at his "surgeries". The term certainly does not signify any unusual degree of independence. If it did we could probably count the number of good constituency M.P.s on the fingers of two hands!

There is no reason whatsoever why the introduction of some form of P.R. should prevent M.P.s being specifically assigned to "constituencies". Since most of our M.P.s under the present system hold their seats by virtue of the votes of minorities of their electorates, any talk of special bonding between M.P.s and their constituents is pure humbug.

Under the Single Transferable Vote system, supported by the Electoral Reform Society and by the Liberal Democrats, and well worthy of support by thinking Tories, large constituencies would return multiple

members, and it would thus be open to constituents seeking parliamentary assistance to approach the M.P. of their choice, whether he be the most effective of the members or simply a member of the political party for which they voted. On such matters, of course, it would be open to all M.P.s in a particular constituency to collaborate with each other across party lines, to work together in the public interest. *That* cannot be a bad thing at all.

As for your editor's comment regarding the desirability of "Shadow Government", that in itself presupposes that it is actually desirable to have a political system where choice is effectively restricted between Tweedledum and Tweedledee – the system we actually possess. If such a system, as in the past, brought forth an endless procession of Tory squireens and watchchain-bedecked representatives of Town Hall and Trade Union greatness and goodness the benefits would be questionable enough. As the progenitor of today's brain dead Conservative Party and unspeakable Labour Party the system is worse than irretrievably flawed. It is a monstrosity.

If electoral reform allows many flowers to bloom, then the arguments in favour of some form of reform must be overwhelming. At present the true conservative, whose politics are based upon respect for the rights customs and privileges of humanity in general and his native race in particular, is systematically and shamelessly marginalised in the party that flaunts the name of "Conservative". With the grey man to end grey men at the helm only the most shameless party hack could continue to defend the status quo. Today's liberal Conservative Party bleats endlessly about "privatisation". Isn't it time they privatised politics?

The moment for change has come, and it is time for True Tories to head the vanguard of electoral reform.

R J Barrett is a freelance writer.

Happy Diwali

Roy Kerridge celebrates the Festival of Light

Diwali, the Hindu Festival of Light, is a great favourite with primary school head-teachers in England. There is a difference, however between School Diwali, a day of treats for everyone, and the way the ancient India festival is observed by true believers in “the gods”. Never more parochial (or “Eurocentric”) than when they are trying to be the opposite, teachers usually declare Diwali to be “the Indian Christmas”.

“Krishna’s birthday, is it?” an English workman enquired jocularly in a Diwali-decorated corner shop. Evidently he too believed in the “Christmas” theory.

In the East End of London, Cockney parents are less tolerant, and have been known to invade schools at Diwali-time, waving Union Jacks in protest.

“We are Christians!” such parents often shout, driven by hatred and bigotry to claim membership of a faith built on love and self-sacrifice.

A memory of ancient wars with the people of Ceylon, the Ram and Sita legend, is part of the Diwali story. Just as elements older than Christ can be discerned in Christmas, so there is another side to Diwali. The Festival of Lights occurs in the gap between the passing Old Year and the incoming New Year, when spirits walk and anything might happen. Diwali is not the Indian Christmas, but Halloween may well be the Celtic Diwali.

When I called at the home of my Gujerati neighbours, the Ghani family, I found the two girls Daksha and Mallisha (aged eleven and eight respectively) performing a rigorous Morris dance, clacking club-like “dandia sticks” together above their heads in complex patterns.

Then they launched into wails of Diwali song, eyes sparkling, a holiday

fever upon them. Normally their parents forbade Gujerati songs, and banned the language at home in an attempt to make the children English. At Diwali, all could revel in being Indian, to their great enjoyment.

It was time to take a bus to Southall, where Indians can be themselves in sticky-sweet-eating unselfconscious bliss. When I arrived, it was already dark, and fountains of moving red and gold lights poured in Piccadilly fashion from upper storeys of sari shops. A huge Zeppelin-shaped balloon hung tethered in the Southall sky, illuminated from within. “Happy Diwali”, the balloon-message proclaimed, together with the name of a popular restaurant.

I walked along a dark suburban street to the home of my friends the Palit family. A serious bespectacled man, Mr. Palit from the Punjab works as a baggage handler in Heathrow. Mrs. P., a short, friendly woman, is of the East African shop-keeping diaspora. Their twelve year old son Aditya is boyish in an eager nineteen fifties fashion long extinct among the white English. We had first met in a Hindu temple.

Welcomed into a spacious front room, I was offered amoeba-shaped potato cakes and a cup of tea—delicious! My hosts referred to the hot cakes as “chutney.” Pictures and figures of “the gods” stood among their ornaments on an open wall-cabinet. A portrait of the Palits’ personal guru, a man said to be the reincarnation of Jesus Christ and Krishna, stood over all. These were not Diwali decorations, but part of the normal furnishings.

Excitedly, young Aditya showed me seven boxes of fireworks, more than I had ever seen at a Guy Fawkes’ party. Most of the rockets, Roman candles and bangers had been made in Hong Kong.

“My father got them, off a friend, specially!” the happy boy exclaimed.

Before letting off the fireworks, Mr. Palit and Aditya made ready to visit the nearby temple, a few streets away. Mrs. Palit stayed in the kitchen, where great preparations were taking place.

“Happy Diwali!” called out the Cockney boys from next door, as we left the house.

Rockets screamed through the sky, each one admired by Aditya. His father seemed nervy and “on edge”, and kept urging Aditya to hurry up. Orange, red and yellow light bulbs twinkled all over the temple, like ripples of luminous tropical fruit. A bronze dancing goddess stood surrounded by light in an outside niche. Families, chattering happily, pushed their way through the doors into an Eastern god-filled fairyland. Copying the others, I removed my shoes and washed and dried my hands.

Inside the main hall, family parties sat all over the polished floor, enjoying modest picnics with beams of pleasure. Father and son led me to a brightly illuminated altar of wall-to-wall gaudily spangled gods and goddesses. We gave them money and purified our hands with washing gestures over sacred flames.

“That god’s riding on a tiger — you can just see its paws under its gown”, Aditya told me.

There was no need to whisper, for this was not a church service with lecture-like sermon and organised singing. Worshipers milled around, smiling and venerating the tableaux of life-size gods. We bowed before a priest who sat surrounded by sweetmeats. He poured some of them into our cupped hands.

“Some of the families will stay here all night”, Mr. Palit said approvingly.

We, however, made ready to return to the house. By the temple washbasin,

a grumpy attendant swept up the piles of shoes with a wide-headed broom.

“Other side only – shoes should not be left here” he grumbled.

I rescued my pair and we hurried out into the night.

“That priest should have poured holy water into our hands for us to drink” said Aditya, indignant at a break with tradition. “Not just banged sweets down like that!”

“There are three kinds of holy water — one for Life, one for Death and one for the Soul”, Mr. Palit said, thoughtfully. “In India, our New Year is about to begin. All shops and banks stay shut, and the money-lenders settle up all their accounts. All debts should be settled now. Stupid people sit up all night gambling, as they say this is a lucky time. People do black magic, as this time, between the old year and the new, is special for dark forces and witchcraft. They leave potions on the ground that work evil when you step on them.”

“There’s one — be careful, step over” Aditya commanded, pointing at a damp patch on the pavement. When there were no fireworks to distract him, he took care where he put his feet. Bright sparkling lights kept the dark forces away. Small candles flickering on suburban doorsteps resembled illuminated milk bottles.

Safe at the house once more, Aditya and his father produced armfuls of candles and little pink night lights, which they lit in the front garden, placing them in rows. The expensive night lights shone from the window ledges, while tall candles stood sentinel by the door and on both sides of the front path, like tulips.

“One year, the candles reached right up to our gate”, Aditya reminisced.

Joined by Mrs. Palit, we hurried upstairs into a small “box room” where a shrine had been erected on top of a ship’s trunk. A mirror-spangled cloth had been laid over the lid of the case, and on this the gods reposed in picture-form, red, gold or blue, surrounded by candle wicks ablaze in bowls of oil. Sweets and food had been placed before the gods.

We all kneeled, while the two elder Palits crooned hymns from illustrated song sheets. They looked immensely

serious, and bestowed beseeching glances on Lakshmi, goddess of wealth, and also on yet another portrait of their materialistic-looking guru. Aditya kneeled without singing, but looked respectful in an English kind of way. Afterwards, both his parents smeared food on the mouths of the gods.

Hopping down the stairs in ecstasy, Aditya ran to the kitchen and out into the back garden where his fireworks lay ready for lighting. A bulb on a cable hung over the open door of the garden shed, so he could see to place the rockets in far-flung milk bottles.

Supervised by his anxious and sometimes irritable father, Aditya lit all the fireworks himself, bouncing around in joy. One disobedient rocket burst the milk bottle, but Mr. Palit fetched another bottle at once. To him,

“There are three kinds of holy water — one for Life, one for Death and one for the Soul”.

fireworks were a serious business. Perhaps he believed (or half-believed) that the lights were frightening away evil forces, or beckoning to his deceased ancestors. Meanwhile, Aditya was thoroughly enjoying himself, crying out in delight as each rocket traced a screaming path through the polar sky.

In a hundred other backyards, similar scenes must have been taking place, for fiery rockets crisscrossed the sky in all directions. The Cockney boys from next door hung on the fence and complimented Aditya on the display. Red and green stars flew up from Roman candles like fairy traffic lights, and Golden Rain (my own childhood favourite) flung nuggets of white hot lava upwards in rapidly dissolving cascades. Finally, with the air of saving the best treat for last, Aditya produced three boxes packed with bangers. He planted several of these miniature dynamite sticks in rows and lit them one after the other. The noise

was fearful, and his mother left her cooking for a moment to bestow a glance of horror on the proceedings.

When the smoke of the last firework had begun to clear away, a great calm came over Mr. Palit. At last his features seemed to relax. Explanations for Diwali differ from place to place all over India, so I could not be sure exactly what the day had meant to him. The gratitude and delight of his young son must have been a reward in itself. However, the day was slightly marred by the discovery that somebody had stolen all the pink night lights from the front of the house.

“English people did this”, said Mr. Palit gravely. “Maybe it was those very same boys from next door.”

We all cheered up as Mrs. Palit placed a delicious hot vegetarian meal in sundry dishes on the front room coffee table. A friend of Mr. Palit called, a fellow worker from Heathrow who had not been to Southall before. He was given a meal and, afterwards, a guided tour of the house.

“I am Tamil, but I have spent most of my life in Malaya”, the elderly Pickwickian visitor told me, beaming through benign spectacles.

It was now my turn for gratitude, as the Tamil offered to drive me back to Southall railway station, and I made my farewells to the hospitable Palit family. Another Diwali had come and gone.

Roy Kerridge is a freelance writer.

Has History Come Full Circle?

Mervyn Hiskett on the thoughts of Dr Siddiqui

Dr Kalim Siddiqui, the pro-Iranian Director of the London Muslim Institute became a byword when his pronouncements set the cat among the pigeons at the height of the Salman Rushdie affair. Many conservatives agreed with his condemnation of Rushdie; though his advocacy of the Ayatollah's death penalty and his general stridency went too far. Moreover, the unbridled behaviour of the Muslim community in Britain, responding to Siddiqui, was less than admirable. His subsequent sponsorship of the Muslim 'parliament' has kept him in the lime-light ever since. Yet this ardent Muslim fundamentalist, now safely ensconced in the soft liberal democracy he so openly affects to despise, has been diligently propagating somewhat startling ideas that have gone largely unnoticed in the West, at least since 1972. What is the message he seeks to convey to his fellow Muslims? How should the British Right, that must necessarily feel some sympathy with Islam's traditionalist outlook and its innate conservatism, react to it? The following quotations, which illustrate Siddiqui's message, are all taken from his contributions to M. Ghayasuddin (ed.), *The impact of nationalism on the Muslim world*, London, 1986 and Kalim Siddiqui (ed.), *Issues in the Islamic movement*, London, 1985.

For Siddiqui Britain seems to be but one entity in a worldwide plan. He is the moving spirit of an international Islamic tendency known as "The Islamic Movement", that takes its inspiration from the Iranian Revolution, and especially from the Imam Khomeini. Its aims are set out as follows:

to eliminate all authority other than Allah and His Prophet;
to eliminate nationalism in all its shapes and forms, in particular the nation-State;
to unite all Islamic movements

into a single global Islamic movement to establish the Islamic State;
to re-establish a dominant and global Islamic civilization based on the concept of *Tawheed* [the unity of Allah].

Nationalism, the nation-state and democracy as seen by Siddiqui, represent *kufir*, literally "infidelity" but equivalent in a modern context to "atheism". Thus:

The greatest political *kufir* in the modern world is nationalism, followed closely by democracy ('sovereignty of the people'), socialism ('dictatorship of the proletariat'), capitalism and 'free will'.

And "modern *kufir* has disguised itself as science, philosophy, technology, democracy and 'progress'". Indeed, it cannot be argued "that because there is *shura* [consultation] in Islam, modern democracy is 'Islamic'". On the contrary, "the political party framework as found in western 'democracies' is divisive of the society and therefore does not suit the *Ummah* [the worldwide Islamic community]". He concludes that "one *Ummah* must mean one Islamic movement, leading to one global Islamic State under one Imam/Khalifa [Caliph].

For Siddiqui "there is no compatibility whatsoever between Islam and the west" and the Islamic Movement "regards the west as totally incompatible with Islam". The notion that a Muslim may live under the government of a non-Islamic nation-state and still practise his Islam as a personal belief system is apparently unacceptable to Siddiqui, for: "A Muslim can neither live the 'good life' on his own nor pursue 'personal *taqwa*' [faithfulness to Allah] in isolation". Furthermore:

It is almost impossible to be a Muslim without either living in an Islamic State or being engaged in a struggle to establish an Islamic State,

a sentiment that surely throws light on the real aim of the Muslim parliament! Moreover, "a global confrontation between Islam and *kufir* is in the end inevitable" and "the Islamic movement boldly declares that the established order and its belief systems are evil and must be destroyed". It is noteworthy that it was at the insistence of the man who uttered this sentiment that John Major recently made concessions that in effect, allow the British Muslims to take over certain state schools—an ineptitude that surely recalls the foolish cow who helped the butcher sharpen his knives!

The achievement of Siddiqui's aims certainly does not exclude armed force:

Lightly-armed *muttaqi* [faithful to Allah] soldiers who go out to fight and die for Islam are more powerful than the heavily-armed professional soldiers who fear death.

Moreover, the odds are in Islam's favour for, "With a population of almost one billion and with infinite sources of wealth, you can defeat all the powers". It is therefore possible for the Muslims to bring about "the total transformation of the world".

He is particularly scornful of "the compromisers who have been trying to prove that Islam is compatible with their secular ambitions and western preferences" and contemptuous of those who seek to set up "a liberal and democratic nation-State with a few cosmetic 'Islamic' features".

It is significant that he calls for Arabic to become the international language of the global *ummah* and urges all Muslims to learn it. It is clear from this that he and his colleagues

understand well the essential link between Islam and the sacerdotal literacy in Arabic upon which it depends; and that they realise the threat posed to it by secular anglophone literacy. This no doubt accounts in part for the insistent demand, recently conceded, for state-funded Islamic education in Britain, that has been a central demand of the Muslim parliament.

Dr. Siddiqui concludes one of his published essays with the following rallying cry, addressed to his fellow Muslims among whom, one must assume, are those in Britain:

Just as the power and influence of *kufir* in the modern world is global, so are the bonds of faith and destiny of the Muslim *Ummah*. History has come full circle. The global power of *kufir* waits to be challenged and defeated by the global power of Islam. This is the unfinished business of history, so let us go ahead and finish it.

In the light of such utterances it is difficult to believe that this man and his so-called 'parliament' are anything other than deeply hostile to the host society in which they have chosen to live. No amount of conservative fellow feeling should obscure that. All the same, it is not possible simply to disregard his ideas. I personally find that, while I recoil from the notion that the wholly alien culture and religion of Islam may gain ground against even the residual, post-Christian heritage of Britain, I am nonetheless unable to dismiss Siddiqui out of hand. For instance, what fair-minded person can deny that nationalism can often be an evil and destructive force? And as for democracy, in the third world it has been, more often than not, the antechamber to corruption and military coups. Nigeria, for example, one of the earliest third-world "Westminster-style" would-be democracies, has suffered eight military coups — successful and unsuccessful — since independence; while the record of corruption in its short-lived civilian administrations beggars belief. Moreover, those who experienced the last British General Election, with its "War of Jennifer's Ear" and its

Sheffield Jamboree, to say nothing of the more recent Mellor affair, may well conclude that even in its western-European expression, popular democracy is little more than an obscenity. It is therefore difficult not to empathise in some measure with Siddiqui's fiercely articulate attacks upon these institutions. Yet despite the response from the right-wing conscience that some aspects of the Muslim reaction against the licence of pluralism certainly elicit, conservatives

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should surely think very carefully before associating themselves in any way, and however marginally, with what is undoubtedly an attempt to set up the unitary Islamic Imam/Caliphate in its place. It may well be that there are better alternatives to Britain's morally bankrupt, media-ridden, tabloid-corrupted version of democracy. Islamic theocracy is not one of them.

In the field of sexual morality, too, Muslim attitudes and those of the British Right seem to converge at certain points. The admirable Campaign for Real Education (CRE) in its September *Newsletter*, contains a comment on "Aids and Sex Education". It quotes *Islamia*, the national Muslim education periodical, which has deplored "the debased and anti-religious form of sex education now being imparted in schools". CRE comments, "We entirely agree..." So, I imagine, do most readers of this journal. All colours agree in the dark. But turn on the light and what the Muslims want emerges as a somewhat

alarming alternative. For the Muslim answer to current sexual permissiveness is not a return to the somewhat stricter morality of the 1930s; or even the Victorian era. It is, as their *imams* constantly assert from mosque pulpits, inter-faith seminars and any other platform from which they can gain a hearing, the adoption of the Islamic *Shari'a*. The effect of this archaic legal code is to deny women the right to divorce, which in Islam is the sole prerogative of husbands; it affords them no protection against physical chastisement by the husband, provided only that this does not break bones or draw blood (except in one only of the four orthodox legal rites, which does offer some theoretical protection); it limits their right to inherit property to a derisory low level; it denies them the custody of their children on divorce; it forces them to submit to arranged marriages and to tolerate the husband's right to contract additional polygamous marriages without consulting them or obtaining their consent, and in general subjects them to the total domination of the Muslim extended-family male hierarchy. One need not grieve too sorely if Nemesis overtakes the feminists—but this goes too far! It would be unfair to suggest that all Muslim men necessarily avail themselves in an extreme manner of all the liberties the *Shari'a* allows them. It is also true that certain post-Islamic modernists such as Nasser, Saddam Husayn and Siad Barre have, to their credit, attempted to reform the *Shari'a*. On the other hand, the Iranian ayatollahs, the darlings of Kalim Siddiqui and his fellow "parliamentarians", have insisted on applying it with enhanced rigour; and the present trend throughout the Islamic world is to reaffirm the appropriateness of the *Shari'a* in its full medieval severity.

Sympathy for the Muslim, disgust at permissive sex education, multiculturalism and the whole perverse gamut of progressivism are very understandable. Nonetheless, conservatives who incline on this ground, to sup with the Muslims, had better do so with a very long spoon.

Mervyn Hiskett's forthcoming book, Some to Mecca Turn to Pray will be published by the Claridge Press.

Maid in Taiwan

Andrew Roberts goes East with the Iron Lady

Margaret Thatcher hit Taiwan on the same day as Typhoon Polly, and with no less force. Her schedule seemed designed to test her rhinocerine constitution and its famous immunity to jet-lag. After an 18 hour working flight via Tokyo – where she had a long meeting with Britain’s new Ambassador – she took a twenty minute cat nap before launching into a series of meetings all afternoon, culminating in a dinner with senior Taiwanese businessmen and her Citibank hosts which lasted until nearly midnight. More Citibank directors arrived for breakfast at 7:45 a.m. the next day, after which she was questioned for one hour by Taiwanese students.

It is clear that the Taiwanese were a little bemused about how to deal with the Thatcher phenomenon. I have lost count of the number of times I was told that Taiwan had never seen anything like her before. After answering “How do you balance your political and domestic lives?” for what must be the seventeen thousandth time in her life, but not betraying in any way the idea that she might have been asked it before, Lady Thatcher swept off to change her clothes for the second of five times that day, and was driven in a vast motorcade to a lunch in the Hyatt hotel for six hundred Taiwanese “leaders”.

Diplomatically Taiwan is a virtual pariah nation – its long stand against the Communist regime in Peking (they only made peace in 1987) has left the island with official recognition from only 29 countries. Fear of irritating Red China as Hong Kong’s 1997 approaches has meant that Britain has

never allowed a member of the Royal Family or even a Cabinet minister to visit. This is despite the fact that at 3.2 billion dollars last year, Britain’s trade with Taiwan is twice that with the Chinese mainland. So a visit from the only British politician the Taiwanese have ever heard of guarantees the sort of red carpet treatment usually reserved only for American Presidential visits. And with Sir Denis, a chief of staff, a political secretary, hairdresser, another secretary and Special Branch detectives in attendance, Lady Thatcher’s entourage verges on the regal.

Inevitably, the British Press’s coverage of the visit was couched entirely in that language of envy in which it leads the world. Despite the fact that, after refusing pay rises for eleven years as Prime Minister, Lady Thatcher was at last putting into practice the ‘*enrichesiez vous*’ philosophy she had long preached, she came under green-eyed criticism for the amounts her speech-making earned her in Taiwan. Despite a decade of Thatcherism there can be no doubt that the culture of resentment against success still pervades Britain in a way it simply does not in far more materialistic Taiwan.

The Foreign Office’s pusillanimity over our relations with Taiwan – though it comes as no surprise to students of that weird mix of Realpolitik and naiveté which tends to make up British foreign policy – does surprise and pain the inhabitants of this dynamic little island. Ever since Dr. Cantlie, the British friend of Sun Yat Sen, saved his life in 1896 we have been popular there. Yet despite the huge advantages of closer links with Taiwan which are exploited to the full

by our European competitors (now called partners), Britain still treats that doughty anti-communist bastion as a diplomatic embarrassment.

Yet both centres are small, overcrowded inventive islands full of born traders situated just offshore the land masses of what could well turn out to be the two greatest pillars of the world economy in the next century. When Euro-sceptics, like me, argue that Britain should be at the heart of a world trading system rather than just an adjunct to a European bloc it is precisely such places as Taiwan to which we refer. Yet when British Aerospace signs a huge deal with Taiwan carping questions are asked in the Commons and when the question arises of a serving minister above the rank of Under Secretary actually visiting the country our Foreign Office begins earnestly looking towards its appeasement policy towards Peking. The Bush Administration took this to its logical conclusion last August when it apologised for selling 150 fighter aircraft to Taiwan, reversing the decision not to, solely because of its effect on American jobs. On its merits, though, the sale was totally justified as mainland China has posed a direct military threat for 39 out of the 44 years of Taiwan’s existence. Taiwan can hardly be supposed to threaten a Red China fifty times its size. Yet still the West considers its links to a vicious illegitimate Communist regime as more important.

The industrialists, bankers and managers were visibly thrilled at the prospect Lady Thatcher held out to them of their Asia-Pacific region becoming “The world’s economic

centre of gravity well into the next century." After a half century occupation by Japan, and still smarting from their period under the yoke of the so-called "Great East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere", the audience tangibly enjoyed the prediction that along with Hong Kong and Southern China, Taiwan would soon be presenting a very serious "challenge to Japan's present pre-eminence".

But it was not all praise and punditry: on the issue of trade restrictions the Taiwan government felt a sharp swipe of the handbag. Lady Thatcher's castigations of, amongst others, the tariffs on Scotch whisky which makes Johnnie Walker Blue Label cost £500 a bottle here, had Sir Denis nodding vigorously. British critics of her globe trotting ought to remember how she promotes our interests: her expounding of British merchant banks' expertise at privatization had the Taiwanese in fits of laughter at the discomfiture of her Citibank hosts on top table, who were all busy consulting their finger nails or the ceiling.

Over the next four years Taiwan will be spending \$303 billion i.e. six times Britain's defence budget – on its infrastructure. The opportunities for British industry alone ought to have got Taiwan's President Lee an invitation to Buckingham Palace. However, instead this gallant band of compulsive achievers is shunned by Britain. Taiwan's representative in London – the Foreign Office will not call him "Ambassador" – Mr. Raymond Tai, a confirmed Anglophile, is ignored instead of feted. This is largely out of funk that the Red Chinese – whose population is 55 times that of Taiwan while its GNP is half – might prove difficult over Hong Kong after 1997. Not for the first time, the Foreign Office is putting appeasement before Britain's best interests. Lady Thatcher would have none of this; going out of her way several times to praise 'the indefatigable Mr. Tai'.

Taipei is not an attractive looking city. Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist refugees built it after their expulsion from the mainland in the late 1940's,

at a time when they always half expected to return. It is only quite recently, after the death of Chiang's successor in January 1988, that the Taiwanese have started to concentrate on architectural merit and build consciously for the long term. Eyebrows were raised when Lady Thatcher referred, in a speech to 2000 luminaries in the massive Sun-Yat-Sen memorial hall to "the prison house

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which was Communism" as their vicious Goliath of a neighbour, is very much a present threat to them. She received a standing ovation, however, on holding out the hope that, through an economic reverse takeover of the mainland, the eventual democratisation and reunification of China may not be too far off.

Taiwan has had the loneliest and toughest time of all the "Asian tigers" and although they are putting a brave face on it they feel badly let down by South Korea's recent decision to recognise the Peking regime. Unlike Tiannamen Square which had been expected here, Seoul's reversal of policy came as an unwelcome surprise.

The Hyatt luncheon, sponsored by Citibank, was told that "Thatcherism is clearly alive, well and living in Taiwan!". They lapped it up, becoming more and more enthusiastic as praise was lavished on their economic

miracle. From a defeated, starving island with no national resources and under immediate threat of invasion, Taiwan has in forty years by unremitting effort turned itself into a regional economic superpower. They burst with pride at the thought of it and adore being praised.

Statistics fascinate the Chinese people, and the fact that Taiwan has no debt or unemployment but the largest foreign reserves in the world – \$89 billion at the last count – is a source of enormous pride. Even the taxi drivers will pronounce on Taiwan's position in the league table of trading nations (thirteenth and rising), as they pelt suicidally through Taipei's distinctly laissez-faire traffic system.

As Lady Thatcher ended her peroration on the "Seven principles of Thatcherism" cutting a blue swathe through the neatly dressed Taiwanese businessmen, her shoulder pads at their head height, and looking like Good Queen Bess, a Taiwanese beside me enquired politely why the British people had ever sacked her? I told him that they never had, and was about to explain about the Poll Tax, Sir Geoffrey Howe and the vagaries of the Tory leadership voting system, but thought better of it. After that electrifying speech of Themistoclean foresight all three seemed very far away and utterly insignificant.

***Andrew Roberts is an historian
and journalist***

Of Pundits and Partisans

Norman Stone explodes some military myths

The British Army is a very good army. Not many others could have brought off a miracle like the Falklands campaign – fought, against a superior enemy, eight thousand miles away in appalling conditions. The Gulf War, too, was a miracle of organization, whatever the technical deficiencies of this or that part of our and the Allied forces. Strange, therefore, it is to find senior military men now telling us that a NATO intervention to stop the Balkan horrors would be dreadfully difficult. For that is their refrain, with none too many exceptions. Can the *Serbian* army really be so much of a challenge?

One and all (and not just the military men) will point to the Second World War and say: in Yugoslavia, the Partisans pinned down a great number of German army divisions. The figure, here, is rather vague. Douglas Hurd mentioned twenty; I have read twenty-six, here and there; and Norman Macrae mentioned thirty-six. A full-strength division, by the way, would contain about 12,000 rifles and around eighty pieces of artillery, together with support-personnel. To transport a single one, took at least fifty full trains (what the Germans called *Hundertachser*). Clearly, if in the terrain of Bosnia – mountainous and marshy – could allow guerrilla fighters to pin down so many of the forces of the most powerful army in Europe, then intervention, there, is something to shy away from.

Yugoslavia was attacked by Germany in April, 1941, and collapsed after about ten days. There was some fighting south of Belgrade, and there was a bit more around Sarajevo, but that was that. The German army lost 166 men in occupying the whole country, and the whole of their Balkan campaign at that time, including their attack on the Greeks and the British,

cost them 1,100 men (and 378 ‘missing’). The Germans then set up two puppet-states, one in Serbia, and one in Croatia, to which they also assigned Bosnia. In 1941, resistance began, and our question is: how many German troops did it pin down?

It is quite difficult to turn up the proper information on this, and after quite a lengthy search in various libraries here, I decided to try Germany. The main German military archive – *Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt* in Freiburg-im-Breisgau – has been assembling an extraordinarily thorough history of *Das Deutsche Reich im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, of which an eighth volume is pending. I am very grateful to Major Schoenherr for the following information, taken from the War Diary of the German Command in the South-East. The source, which I ought to pin-point clearly, is the *schematische Kriegsgliederung des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht*, which should know what it was talking about. The Partisan War in Yugoslavia in August 1943 pinned down six German divisions. Of these, two were manned by Croats, with German officers. Of the others, three contained elderly territorials – *Landsturm* – and there was one really serious division, the *SS. Prinz Eugen*. So can we please hear no more of the supposedly vast force, pinned down by ‘the Partisans’?

The issue is muddled in various ways. In the first place, there were Italian troops, scattered about the Dalmatian coast, which they occupied. There were various auxiliaries, including a Bosnian SS division, named *Handzar* (after some wicked Turkish instrument). Most of it deserted, despite blandishments from the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. But the heart of the matter remains: very few *real* German divisions, most of them understrength, and consisting of wheezing Dad’s army

types, dragging beer bellies up hill and down dale in the fierce Balkan August.

There is one final complication. The German army occupied Greece, and had to hold down the Aegean Islands (*Guns of Navarone* and all that). When the Russians crashed into the Balkans in summer 1944, the German troops in the southern Balkans – Army Group ‘E’ – had to organize a complicated retreat, guarding its Adriatic flank against a possible Anglo-American invasion. In December 1944, it contained fifteen divisions, pulling out towards the north. As these were engaged in fighting the British and the Russians, we may conclude that their activities against ‘the Partisans’ were rather secondary.

There is more. We heard from Lord Carrington (and others) that ‘the Serbs’ had pinned down these German divisions. Here is the list of troops in Serbia in October 1943 – taken from the *Kriegstagebuch 1A des Kommandierenden Generals und Oberbefehlshabers in Serbien: 704th Infantry Division* (when you reached such a high number, you were dealing with Dad’s Army); the ‘Russian Corps’ (emigrés, without heavy equipment such as artillery); the ‘First Royal Bulgarian Occupation Corps’; the ‘German Danube Flotilla’; a battalion of the *Reich* labour service; and a company of the 804th Infantry Regiment (Brandenburg). The fact is that Serbia was quite quiet during most of the War. Almost all of the Jews in Serbia were massacred early on (whereas between a quarter and a third of Jews in Croatia escaped). There was a collaborationist government, under a General Nedic, which supplied a volunteer-corps against the Partisans. So: forget ‘the Serbs’, at any rate in Serbia proper, at any rate for most of the time.

What happened in Bosnia and

Croatia is another matter. Everything about it is contested. As with Vichy France, there was a Fascist regime in Croatia, which then included Bosnia. As with Vichy France, much of its territory was occupied (by Italians, and then Germans). As with Vichy France, a rather inchoate resistance developed – some Communist, some not. Again and again we have been hearing from the Serbian side in the present war that ‘the Croats’ were ‘Fascist’. This is not the case. The Resistance in Yugoslavia was (I am sorry to rub in the parallel, but it is important) a Croatian civil war, just as was the Resistance in Vichy France. There were two resistance-movements. The Croatian Fascists persecuted the Serbian minority, and it was defended by a Serbian nationalist, royalist and Orthodox force, the Chetniks. Some Croats now claim that these Chetniks started the persecuting, as soon as Yugoslavia fell apart in 1941, but we can let that pass.

Serbs in Croatia, on the receiving end of persecution, sometimes turned towards the Chetniks. Others turned towards the Communists, under Tito, who started up as soon as Hitler attacked Stalin. The Communist Partisans claimed to be above the quarrel of nationalities, and recruited widely -- Tito himself half-Croat, half-Slovene; his lieutenants being Pijade, a Serbian Jew; Velebit, the son of a Croatian general in the Habsburg army; Djilas, a Montenegrin intellectual of genius. In Croatia and Bosnia, *some* Serbs were Orthodox and nationalist, hating Croats and Moslems. *Other* Serbs got along rather well with Croats and Moslems, depending upon the region (by and large, on the Dalmatian coast, relations were good). Tito could therefore recruit Serbs. How many ?

As to this, figures are necessarily imprecise. How could a guerrilla command really work out how many people were working with it? And could anyone really take a census of the nationality of the people working with it? As the Partisans grew in strength, inevitably they took in people who had previously been fighting as Chetniks, and so on, and so forth. For the record, I advance a figure that I owe to Dr Mirko Valentic, of the Institute of

History in Zagreb, who has studied these matters for years, and whose own record is impeccable: in 1943, 125,000 Partisans, of which a quarter Serb and a small percentage, Moslem. In other words, Partisans mainly Croat. I am quite prepared to concede that this figure may be wrong, but if any of my correspondents wish to challenge it, would they make clear what their grounds are?

In due course, the Chetniks found themselves opposing, not just Fascist Croatia, but also Communist Partisans. The British were asked to support the Chetniks, who, after all, were

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ideologically ‘on their side’. Military missions went to both Chetniks and Partisans, and the officers in each were vastly impressed. In spring, 1943, Churchill decided to support the Partisans. Later on, people of weight and seriousness in this country suggested that this decision was quite wrong; that there had been Communist infiltration of the British decision-

making system (notably, another of those Trinity College, Cambridge ‘moles’ in Cairo). However, we *could* check what was said by our men on the spot, because we could, by an extraordinary manifestation of the British (and Polish) genius, read the Germans’ coded signals. And the Germans said two things. One was that Tito was their main enemy. The other was that they got help from the Chetniks -- maybe not from their commander, General Mihailovitch, but certainly from some of his lieutenants in the field. So anxious were they to do down Communists and Croats that they took up common cause with the Italians, who also had it in for the Croats. Oddly enough, Tito himself approached the Germans later on, with a view to common action if the British decided to land in the Adriatic: but we can let that pass, too.

The burden of what I have to say is this. When next you hear that ‘the Serbs’ in a ‘guerrilla war’ in ‘Bosnia’ tied down ‘thirty-six’ divisions of the German Army, think again. There may be arguments against an Allied intervention, on humanitarian grounds, to stop what is now happening in that poor part of the world. This is not one.

I wish to record a particular debt of gratitude to Dr Wilhelm Deist of the German Military-Historical Research Office for his help in this complicated business.

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Are our Schools and Colleges Hotbeds of Racial Bullying?

Ray Honeyford exposes another half-truth of the CRE

The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) has been very active in seeking to persuade the public, and, more particularly, local education authorities, to accept its view of race relations in educational institutions. Its efforts have been largely successful. There is a widespread acceptance, reflected by the media, of the belief that schools and colleges are the scene of regular and systematic racial bullying. Many local education authorities routinely impose documents reflecting the CRE view on their schools and colleges. To judge from its literature the CRE has always insisted that there is a covert conspiracy against black and Asian students. In order to provide empirical support for its view, the CRE published in February 1988 a report entitled, *Learning in Terror: A Survey of Racial Harassment in Schools and Colleges*. According to the CRE's 1989 Annual Report this survey, "received favourable and widespread media coverage, and there is a continuing demand for it. Four successful regional seminars were held in London, Bristol, Birmingham and Glasgow". *The Times Educational Supplement* – taken in a very large number of our 36,000 schools – ran a large picture story headed, "The race bigots who don't wear jack boots". The survey was not simply an exercise to illustrate the perennial CRE theme that Britain is a racist society. The whole point of it was to pressurise local education authorities to effect developments in policy along lines acceptable to the CRE. There are no fewer than thirty-eight detailed recommendations.

It is important to bear in mind that the CRE survey is concerned with alleged racial bullying in schools and colleges. That racial minorities suffer from the hostility of white racial thugs in society at large is beyond dispute. However, the CRE is here alleging

that the situation outside schools is mirrored within them. "Racial harassment is widespread and persistent "Moreover, the perpetrators are not simply the lunatic fringe. "They include pupils, students, teachers, lecturers and parents." These are very grave allegations. They concern an extremely emotional issue. Any suggestion of bullying is a deeply serious matter. Bullying not only injures the victim; it damages the perpetrator. It can put children off education for life. Its presence in schools and colleges can poison the whole atmosphere; and its persistence can destroy the reputation of the institution which tolerates it. Moreover, bullying can have particularly damaging consequences when associated with the explosive subject of race.

Allegations therefore, need to be based on impeccable research procedures, particularly with regard to sampling. Now no one knows how many ethnic minority pupils and students we have. However, information supplied to me by the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, and the Home Office Statistical Division suggests that there are about half a million children and young people of Afro-Caribbean and Asian origin in our schools and colleges. In total there are 36,000 schools, with 540,000 teachers and 9.5 million pupils. There are 39 tertiary colleges, 40 colleges of further education, 55 colleges and institutes of higher education, and 23 voluntary colleges. (See *The Education Fact File*, Hodder and Stoughton, 1989, pp 58, 74.) This must mean that, in the course of a single day, there are literally millions of cross-racial inter-actions between pupils and teachers, and within the student body. In order to reflect this immense and complex human situation there would have to be a large, representative sample involved, if valid and reliable conclusions were to be attempted. In fact the CRE study is

based on just eighteen case studies, though they claim to have more. Despite this minuscule, and purely anecdotal, research base, the authors claim their work can be understood as, "a survey of the incidence of racial harassment in educational institutions in England, Scotland and Wales".

There are other weaknesses. Sixty one out of a hundred Community Relations Councils did not bother to reply to requests for information. And of seventeen "monitoring groups" only three thought the subject sufficiently serious to respond. Moreover, there are no comparisons made with the nature and incidence of bullying directed at the ethnic majority, i.e., white, pupils – so there is no way of knowing if minority pupils suffer more, the same, or less bullying than their majority classmates.

This slipshod and cavalier approach to the canons of research is echoed in the author's attitude to the relevant literature. There are two important sources, both of which were available to the CRE researchers. Each is ignored in their report. One is from the CRE's predecessor, the Community Relations Commission (*The Education of Ethnic Minority Children*, 1977). This survey did attempt to create a representative sample – eight local education authorities, forty six headteachers and teachers in multi-racial schools, and 700 multi-racial parents. The evidence adduced suggests that about 6% of ethnic minority children had experienced bullying. In relation to the evidence we have of bullying in general, this figure is on the low level. Moreover, regarding all problems connected with race in schools, "Only a small minority of parents believed this constituted a problem for the child."

This rather optimistic conclusion was confirmed in 1983, in a study carried out at Manchester University. This covered ten multi-racial

comprehensive schools, and 5,219 pupils, (*Five Thousand Adolescents*, Manchester University Press.) The authors of this report were emphatic that the sort of tendentious negativism favoured by the CRE is ill-founded, "In particular, there is little support for the suppositions made about "racism" in schools, negative teacher attitudes..... of low expectations."

This positive view was reinforced in the most detailed and wide-ranging study of multi-racial schools so far attempted. (*The School Effect*, Policy Studies Institute, 1989.) The authors of this report followed the careers of children who transferred to twenty multi-racial comprehensive schools at the age of eleven. The schools, all urban, were located in four local education authorities in different parts of England. The proportion of racial minority pupils in the schools ranged from twelve to eighty-nine per cent. There were 3,000 pupils involved. That is, the authors of the report did respect the key requirement of survey research – the need for a proper, representative sample.

Their discovery regarding racial bullying is pretty convincing, ".... there is no evidence that racial hostility at school is an important factor for 12 and 13 year old children. This is strongly confirmed by the views of their parents, parents rarely mentioned racial prejudice or hostility of any kind. Just one per cent of parents mentioned racial attacks, or that black and white children don't get on. Eight out of 2,075 parents mentioned racial prejudice among teachers. The present findings are not in conflict with any substantial body of evidence from elsewhere."

The inappropriateness of the CRE view is, again, challenged in the most recent research. According to a paper published in *Educational Research* last year, by Irene Whitney and Professor P.K. Smith of Sheffield University, there was no evidence in their sample – 24 schools and 6,000 pupils – to support the notion that bullying in schools is linked to race. "Ethnic mix, taken as a proportion of non-white pupils, varied from 0 per

cent to 63 per cent for junior and middle schools, and from 0 per cent to 40 per cent for secondary schools. None of the eight correlations between bullying behaviour and ethnic mix approached significance we did not find that school size to be a variable in this. Nor, reassuringly, was ethnic mix". That is, a child – whatever its skin colour – is no more likely to be bullied when attending a multi-racial school than when attending any other sort of school. Readily available and reliable research makes it clear that the state of race relations in our schools is encouragingly tranquil.

In short, the picture presented by the CRE in *Learning in Terror* is seriously misleading. That has not, of course, prevented it from becoming a central tract in the sociology of race relations in this country propagated by the statutory body whose key responsibility is to tell the truth about race relations.

Ray Honeyford's most recent book Race and Free Speech was published by the Claridge Press.

Great Danes or German Shepherds?

David Marsland explains the folly of European political integration

It seems to me that in the political circumstances which prevailed in 1991, and given the powerful developments in the direction of European political integration which had already occurred, the Maastricht agreement was not at all a bad one from the point of view of a Euro-sceptic like myself.

It has kept Britain on the inside of European debate and development without yielding further on any of Britain's vital interests. It has demonstrated to the media and to the British people the acuity and toughness of the Prime Minister and his negotiating team. It has confused the Euro-federalists by obliging them to accept Britain's continuing involvement along with our continuing reservations.

The agreement had two especially

valuable consequences. First, on the European front of the electoral struggle in Britain, it dished the Labour Party. Their approach has been exposed as an incoherent combination of opportunism, vacillation, and ill-considered adventurism. Their spokesmen are revealed for the poorly-briefed, incautious, and over-optimistic amateurs they are. It is now obvious to most people that Labour cannot be trusted with Britain's international destiny.

Secondly, on the wider front of discussion and debate throughout Europe, the agreement has set down a marker which only the most self-deluded of Euro-fanatics in Brussels, Bonn, or Cowley Street could fail to recognise of the depth and seriousness of Britain's reservations about

European political unification. Precisely by avoiding the use of our veto, by staying on the inside, with our counter-federalist perspective intact and the scope for our countervailing influence preserved, we have secured for Europe, by what we have achieved at Maastricht, an opportunity for fundamental re-consideration of the prevailing trend towards the creation of a United States of Europe.

If this opportunity is to be used fruitfully, we have to initiate a serious discussion about fundamental principles and about real practicalities in which parties and publics throughout the Twelve join actively. We have to ensure that here in Britain the principle issues and practical problems are addressed honestly and thoroughly by the leaders of our political parties,

instead of being swept casually under the carpet of public apathy.

Certainly we should continue to resist the extension of Community competence into the sphere of social policy. It would cripple all the European nations in the face of American and Japanese economic competition. Certainly we should encourage scepticism about the supposedly self-evident benefits of economic unification and a single currency. Neither the mark, nor the yen, nor even the dollar owe whatever strength they have to the scale of their utilisation as the condition of the rouble and the collapse of the Soviet economy more than sufficiently demonstrate. Certainly we should continue to insist that co-operation in foreign and defence policy should be handled by the Council of Ministers rather than by the Commission and the European Parliament.

But none of this would challenge the general trend towards political unification. At best it would slow it down. What we need, I suggest, if we are to avoid the disaster of a Euro-political fate, is a radical change of direction. This will entail a reversal of many earlier decisions in Europe and the cancellation and replacement of many of the Twelve's established commitments. An alternative vision of Europe is essential. Maastricht permits it: the Danish people's vote and British Euro-scepticism demand it.

Towards a co-operative commonwealth

Let us be in no doubt. The founding fathers of the European Community were driven by the vision of a United States of Europe. Mr Delors and his cohorts in the Commission are intent on political unification. Mr Kohl and the Germans are unabashedly aiming at rapid political integration, with fundamental power shifting from national states to an evolving federal centre. British Europhiliacs – including MEPs of all parties, the Liberal Democrats officially and unconditionally, the Labour Party with the dogmatic fervour of recent converts, many Conservatives, and powerful forces in the media, the trade unions,

business, and academia – are active supporters of the notion of a European political state entity. The EEC itself is already firmly committed by institutional developments over many

Only the most self-deluded of Eurofanatics in Brussels, Bonn, or Cowley Street could fail to recognise of the depth and seriousness of Britain's reservations about European political unification.

years, through the preamble of the Single Act and even more strongly through the Maastricht agreement – to real political unification.

The reality and the power of this commitment to transmuting a voluntary alliance of free peoples into a permanent, unified, all-purpose state is revealed unambiguously by concepts like “the slow lane”, “the European escalator”, and “European progress” – all of which imply that only one direction in the development of Europe is feasible, proper, or even imaginable: towards a United States of Europe.

The pseudo-debate about “federalism” has served merely to mystify and obfuscate this fact, and to distract us from honest debate about the range of choices actually available to us.

Of course a federal state is less powerfully unified than a centralist state. But by the same token a federal state is more powerfully unified than a confederal state, and a state of any sort – centralist, federalist, or confederalist – is after all a state. Whatever the particularities of its mode of internal organisation, a state is a sovereign political body with responsibilities for its external and internal affairs which – if it is to remain a state – it simply cannot derogate by allowing them to be controlled by either superordinate

or subordinate powers.

We are on the brink in Europe of establishing, in one form or another, just such an entity. Indeed, the existence of a European Parliament, however modest its powers at present, is evidence that such an entity has, in shadow form, already been established.

The choice before Britain, as before all of the other peoples currently linked in the EEC, is whether or not we wish to abandon our independent nationhood and state-hood for the sake of economic and political advantages which will supposedly result from, and result only from, our political incorporation into a United States of Europe. In my view continuance along the road to political unification in a USE would be gravely damaging to the interests of the United Kingdom and of all the peoples of Europe. We must turn aside onto another road towards a quite different European future.

Arguments against a USE

- One of the arguments most commonly used in support of continued “progress” towards political unification consists of the specious claim that “there is no going back”. Unification is supposedly the “natural direction of development” which only reactionaries could contemplate resisting.
- This is no more of an argument than the widespread assumption of the 1930s and 1940s, which now seems perfectly absurd, that socialism represented the irresistible tide of history. Now, as then, there are choices.
- Similarly specious is the contention that economic unification requires political integration. This has never been demonstrated, or even coherently argued. It is usually simply asserted, and even if it were demonstrated, it would constitute just as powerful an argument for avoiding economic unification as for supporting political integration. A high level of free trade and economic co-operation is certainly feasible without economic and monetary

union. Short of monetary union close economic integration is perfectly feasible without any political integration at all.

- The economic arguments *against* political integration are themselves powerful. A United States of Europe is highly unlikely to allow the genuinely free trade with the USA, Japan, and the rest of the world such as will benefit all mankind. The internal economic policies of a USE are likely to be much more dirigiste and interventionist than British experience suggests is sensible, productive, or politically tolerable. Moreover, the Community's established social policies are likely to be strengthened – that is to say shifted even further in a re-distributionist, collectivist, and statist direction – in a USE, with disastrous consequences for economic growth, inflation, and unemployment.
- The political arguments against a USE are even more powerful. We would be trapped in a corporatist concept of the state which is alien to British institutions and incompatible with the democratic individualism which is the primary Anglo-American contribution to political culture. We would be yielding control of foreign, including especially defence, policy to an unpredictable and irresponsible Franco-German hegemony. We would be implicating ourselves in collaboration with a deepening continental anti-Americanism and depriving ourselves of any scope for independent alliance with the USA, with Japan, or with Russia. Our capacity to act independently as a major military force would have to be abandoned, and we might easily find ourselves trapped into involvement in dubious German adventurism towards the East.
- There is also the specific question of what exactly Germany is up to. No nation will ever willingly yield up its independence and sovereignty except for some commensurate return. So why are the German

Government and the German parties – though not, it seems from opinion polls, the German people – so enthusiastically ready to sink Germany's identity and to dilute its sovereignty in a USE?

Neither guilt nor idealism are plausible answers. Nicholas Ridley was perhaps a little unkind in calling the EEC “a German racket” – but certainly it does seem at least plausible, to put it no more boldly, that the German leadership believes that Germany's power would be strengthened in a USE – with the unpredictable independence of spirit of France and the worldwide British repertoire of alliances at long last subjugated by a stronger and more reliable power than military conquest – the power, that is to say, of state incorporation and legalised bureaucratic rule.

- Again, can we really trust a unified European state to defend Britain as part of Europe against terrorism, uncontrolled immigration, and naive internationalist third-worldism? Are we not perhaps safer in the face of these increasingly dangerous threats as an independent off-shore island – as we were earlier in the face of Nazism, and before that Napoleonic French imperialism?
- And finally there is simple sovereignty. Why on earth *should* we surrender it for no very obvious return? No amount of casuistry about the allegedly inherent limitations on sovereignty of the complexities of the modern world, or about the supposedly unavoidable political implications of economic interdependence can challenge the reality or refute the critical importance of sovereign independence – whether of individual persons or of individual nations and states. Our identity and our freedom rest on it. Ask the Croatians, ask the people of Ukraine.

Fight for Freedom

My involvement on the Croatian side in the Yugoslav crisis has exposed me to a continuous battery of pro-Serbian

propaganda. One letter I had included this sentence:

“The idea of these silly little bits and pieces of countries now sweeping over Europe is absurd”.

This expresses perfectly the crass prejudice against the nation state and against nationalism which provides the primary motivation behind support for a United States of Europe. Throughout Europe – and not least here in Britain this prejudice against the nation involves a betrayal of our identity, a cavalier rejection of our traditions and values, and a naively rationalistic dismissal of our whole history and culture for the sake of involvement in an artificial, bureaucratic, trans-national mish-mash.

The nations of Europe are not – certainly Britain is not “silly little bits and pieces of countries”. Yet that is precisely what a United States of Europe would define us as. We must resist it, and find some better alternative.

If we are to scotch the USE and develop a free commonwealth of independent European nations instead, we must try to persuade our European partners along the following lines:

- The Parliament should be phased out. European co-operation should be handled by the Council of Ministers operating by consensus.
- The Commission should be brought back under tight control by the Council, and restricted to executing the decisions of the Council.
- Free trade within Europe and with the rest of the world should be the fundamental, principled commitment of the European Commonwealth.
- Commitment to anti-collectivist individualism should be expected of all members.
- A halt should be called both to economic and to political integration, and the moves already made in this direction should be gradually reversed.

We should spell this programme out in

detail, announce our intention of campaigning for it vigorously, and formally enunciate our intention of withdrawing from European institutions altogether if substantial progress in this direction had not been made at the end of ten years.

We should of course also get ahead immediately with making contingency plans in case of failure. Indeed, it seems to me it has been a gross dereliction of duty by governments and senior civil servants over the past twenty years that we have not made such

plans already. In particular, detailed plans for economic relations and for defence – involving the USA, Japan, Russia, and other nations – should be ready now.

Maastricht has served usefully to expose the real intentions of supporters of European political unification. With or without the F word, they intend the creation in the near future of a United States of Europe. If we are to resist the damage this would inevitably cause – to Britain and to all the other nations of Europe – it is not

enough to temporise and hope for the best. We must state our opposition clearly, argue our case positively, and either win it or find some alternative international arrangements against the day when Europe comes to its senses.

David Marsland is Director of the Centre for Evaluation Research. His new book Understanding Youth is to be published shortly by the Claridge Press.

Splendid Remembrances

Tristan Jones sails down the Red Danube

It's said that when you drown all your life passes before you. I don't know, although I've been very close to drowning often in years of sail-voyaging in small craft. What I do know now though, as in my fading my life passes before me in slower motion than perhaps at a drowning, is that the three most splendid things I ever did were not done under sail at all — not even done at sea.

The first splendid thing was to pierce the Iron Curtain on *May 1st*, 1985, in my ocean-trimaran "Outward Leg" on the river Danube. I'd spent the previous winter in thick ice on the river Main, fighting German bureaucracy, which in the end side-tracked me to Ingolstadt; then I'd wended downstream on the Upper Danube to Vienna and waited there for three weeks. The waiting was no pain. I couldn't afford the Opera but I had invitations to dinners, while being entranced (courtesy of the Oberbürgermeister) at Vienna Boys' Choir concerts it was like hearing the salute of angels.

On the river Danube itself, apart from two patrol-boats manned by rather handsome but perplexed-looking, Kalishnikov-waving, youths in green sailor's hats and collars, there

was little sign of the Iron Curtain. Ashore were watchtowers, of course, and barbed-wire fading away over distant hills.

Inside Czechoslovakia, the first sign of May-Day was the loom beyond a distant bend, through misty rain, of a huge Ferris-wheel. As we neared I saw that it was moving slowly and had a big red star at its axle, slowly revolving.

I'd acquired "Outward Leg" in San Diego, California, where she was registered, so astern she wore, of course, her U.S. ensign. Amidships, over my head, she wore my British Red Duster. Both ensigns were about as big as king-size bed-sheets. She wore also a big Red-Dragon flag of Wales and a small black-and-yellow pennant of Bavaria, for my German crew Thomas Ettenhuber (may he rest in peace!). There's sound reason in this (to non-river-folk) poncy-seeming flag-flaunting: on heavily-trafficked rivers, crews in other vessels notice you quicker. Underway on bendy rivers I played over a tape loudspeaker, as loud as possible, airs on Scottish bagpipes. Again with good reason: anyone in a rowing boat will hear and, if they've any sense, get out of the way. In any case, I like bagpipes; I wouldn't sail with a crew who don't, so on the

ocean they bother no-one else. All in all, with her mast down on deck, her ensigns bristling, her bagpipes blasting, "Outward Leg" with her three low hulls must have looked like some praying-mantis strayed from a jubilee-party.

Through drizzle, we rounded a wide bend of the Danube. Over the far, shallow, river-bank, hovered ancient, elegant houses and palaces, ugly factories and workers' tower-flats all jumbled together. On our side, where the deep channel was, only inches away from my boat as she passed at about five-knots, spread a big city park. Its fun-fair was crowded, mostly by uniformed soldiers, Soviet and Czechoslovak. There were thousands of them. Soviets were by far in the majority.

Even as we passed under the main Bratislava city road bridge I saw that the shadows beneath the bridge were crowded with senior officers sheltering from the rain. There were a good hundred of them, mostly Soviet; majors, colonels, generals, you name it. On the narrow pavement above the riverbank, in dank gloom they were lined up, grimly, as if on a podium for a Red Square review. "Outward Leg" passed them by—an egregious symbol

of individual freedom – and she left each one of them, one by one, astern; their shoes polished, pants baggy, epaulettes exhausted, medals adroop, jaws agape, eyes apop; astounded was hardly the word for it.

Astonishment had struck the air like a whiplash: I'd looked right into eyes as we passed and sensed: *one lone leaf was drifting along a gutter—a hundred-thousand leaves would break it*. Imagine: it had been as if an albatross had glided very low over Wormwood Scrubs.

When we emerged from under that bridge the Ferris wheel was still, its red star faded in the rain.

The KGB were never slow. Next day's events indicate that they probably tried, through the river-police, to arrange the sinking of "Outward Leg" — but that's another story.

My second splendid thing happened a few days later, on May 8th 1985. It was VE Day and my birthday. Hungarian police had chased me up and down the Danube for four days. Worn-out, they finally allowed "Outward Leg", to the waves and blown-kisses of thousands ashore, to moor right alongside the Ministry of the Interior (read, then: "secret police") on Roosevelt Square hard by the beautiful (but copied) English Adam Clarke chain-bridge.

I stayed there (all flags flying) for three weeks. In those twenty-one days, if one person made the "V" sign to me, a hundred-thousand did. In Budapest I played the bagpipes low, for myself and maybe for what was bound to happen.

In Budapest on May 10th 1985 I reported the arrival of "Outward Leg" to the U.S Consulate. I was almost thrown out in the staff's haste to avoid "awkward incidents".

My third splendid remembrance is of the end of my Danube voyage, in the Romanian Black Sea port of Constanta. I'd seen at very close quarters, right through Ceausescu's domain, everything that the West now knows about it — and a lot more besides. I'd seen enough aged folk forced to fish for hours in rain on soggy river-banks and turn in a catch before they might eat; enough half-starved, barefoot, kids

stealing scraps of awful grub in filthy "Workers' Restaurants"; enough forced-labour on the Black Sea Canal ("re-creation"); enough sacrifice to build a useless shipping port on sand.

On July 6th 1985, at the Terazza Cafe, in Port Tomis, then a haunt of Constanta Communist Party officials, I stood and, in my very best French, so they would understand, told 300 of them that Nicolai Ceausescu — and they — were bloody-handed oligarchs, and that they would not prevail.

I was thrown out of Romania, of course. But in 1990 I was invited back — as Commodore of a projected Constanta yacht-marina. It didn't take long for me to realise that the old gang — with all its corruption — was still in charge. So I left Romania again — but this time of my own volition.

My book "*The Improbable Voyage*" (Bodley Head) came out in 1987. My ten previous voyaging books must have been (although unconsciously) politically "correct", especially after my run-ins with Boer bullies in '70. But for "*The Improbable Voyage*" there were hardly any notices in the UK press. A couple of critics snarled that I had been "looking for trouble so I could write about it". Later, Rod Heikell, a "yacht-guide" hack, who'd been wafted down the Danube in Soviet ferries in '85, and who obviously doesn't know Marx from Donald Duck, wrote that I had exaggerated the obstacles on my Danube voyage and that I had been provocative, by for instance wearing my boat's national ensign and my own flag through five communist countries (on an international waterway). I wonder: did these poor wretches never know the joy of cocking a snook at bullies from the safety of their father's shadow? Of course I provoked bullies. Of course I cocked a snook at them. But, to paraphrase Winston Churchill — and surely no exaggeration: *some bullies — some cock — some snook!*

Tristan Jones is now outfitting a Trimaran for a voyage with disabled protégés to the Andaman Islands, recently a Soviet rocket base

Sophist's Corner

Lord Pearson of Rannoch (letter September 24) in arguing for a referendum on the Maastricht treaty asserts that "our parliamentary democracy has already betrayed the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament to Brussels".

This strange, archaic way of formulating the political case against European integration — involving ruritanian constitutional notions of threats to "sovereignty" and "the Queen in Parliament" — is still all too prevalent in the British debate about Europe. The real issue surrounding the proposed European union is not that it will, thankfully, consign the vestiges of our domestic *ancien régime* (including the residual composites of Crown and Lords) to history, but, rather, how it can best secure democracy and accountability for the peoples of Europe.

Of course, I understand the difficulty faced by many British politicians in raising the democracy issue. Proclamations issuing forth from the unelected House of Lords about the dangers posed to democracy by European integration are farcical. As are calls for a referendum on Maastricht by members of the House of Commons (where a "majority" is derived from only 42 per cent of the vote). As are lectures on the superiority of British democracy ("Mother of Parliaments" et al) from members of a polity in which basic rights are not entrenched and civilised Western concepts like the separation of powers and the separation of church and state are resisted.

Until we put our own democratic house in order attacks upon the European union, and calls for the retention of "sovereignty", will seem little more than special pleading — on behalf of domestic privileged interests threatened with extinction.

Letter to *The Times* from Professor Stephen Haseler

Has Sovietology a Future?

Mervyn Matthews remembers its past

The collapse of the Soviet Union has profound implications for the discipline which interpreted events in that unhappy conglomerate. Not surprisingly, many former "sovietologists" are now in a state of intellectual shock: not only did they (like poor Mikhail Gorbachev) fail to anticipate the extent of the current transformation, but they find that many of the techniques traditionally used for collecting and analysing information about Russia are no longer appropriate.

Yet study of Russia and its now independent neighbours has to continue. There is an ever greater need for the public to be informed about what goes on – if only by way of explanation for the proposed foreign aid programmes. Our decision-makers will, of course, continue to make mistakes, but we at least must try to make their errors a little less crass. If Russian studies are to be effective, they need to be re-orientated and rid of past shortcomings.

"Sovietology" was always a very broad field embracing virtually all known social disciplines. Its roots go back to the newspaper reports and *émigré* writing of the immediate post-revolutionary years. The Bolshevik take-over and its aftermath were regarded by many as disastrous events, and public interest was acute. Study of Russia languished in the late 1920s and 1930s under the combined weight of Soviet propaganda, left-wing idealism, difficulties of access to the USSR, and growing public indifference: anyway there was too much happening in Western Europe.

The onset of the "Cold War" and the realisation that the Soviet bloc represented a massive threat to European civilisation really brought sovietology into being. Arguably the kernel lay in "kremlinology", and was fairly easy to conceptualise: but the discipline embraced, at the margin, political thought, Soviet foreign policy, the problems of the Soviet bloc as a whole,

and various comparative dimensions. If anything lent sovietology cohesion, it was perhaps the sense that a Soviet-style, Marxist-Leninist administration both made a specific imprint on society, and imposed its own constraints on analysis.

Given the breadth of intellectual endeavour, it is not surprising that a large number of institutions should have been involved. Most large universities throughout the world still offer courses in Russian, other relevant languages and CIS-orientated disciplines. The American Association for the Advancement of Soviet Studies, the largest such body in the world, recently identified about 250 instruction programmes in US higher education alone, with more than 7,000 related courses. The International Council for Soviet and East European Studies has 18 national affiliates and a newsletter of which 7,000 copies circulate.

Institutional support for Soviet studies has tended to be the prerogative of the richer, industrialised nations with tolerant political systems, with little sovietology in South East Asia, South America, or Black Africa (not to mention East Europe itself). The curious lack of interest in Italy was said to be a consequence of communist influences in local politics. China has an outwardly strong sovietological base, but much of the work seems to be derivative, crudely Marxist-Leninist, and for internal use.

The Moscow phone book shows that in 1990 the capital alone housed 117 diplomatic missions, 238 foreign correspondents' offices, 259 foreign business centres, over 80 foreign banking, air and travel offices. Most of these had some research backing at home.

The discipline served the "free" world relatively well. British sovietology certainly played its part. Sovietology allowed the public abroad (and Soviet listeners to foreign radio stations) to learn something close to

the truth about the Soviet Union, and neutralised a great deal of fallacious pro-Soviet propaganda. Public understanding would no doubt have been diminished without it. Yet it suffered from several major weaknesses – quite apart from a lack of proper access to the area of study, and unjust suspicion aroused by constant Soviet denigration.

A remarkable number of practitioners were reluctant to tell the whole truth. Few indulged in deliberate distortion but all too many avoided unpalatable facts. All scholars should have the right to remain silent, and any discipline may gain from intellectual stresses, but silence in this case was all too often indistinguishable from intellectual dishonesty. And although academic sovietology remained a fairly amicable activity, lacking in personal acrimony, its overall performance undoubtedly suffered. The matter was considered to be sensitive, and rarely discussed in print, presumably to avoid offending prominent individuals.

There are two permissible explanations. The first involved personal ideological conviction, an unwillingness to admit the failure of a "socialist" system, to jettison youthful ideals, and be seen as "anti-soviet". That many young people should wish to study the USSR seriously because it appeared to fit socialistic preconceptions was understandable: a mature refusal to admit that disaster had occurred was, given overwhelming evidence, scarcely pardonable.

The second explanation was entirely practical, and involved the delicate matter of Soviet entry visas. Officials of the Soviet Embassy (read, KGB) tried to categorise us precisely by ideological acceptability, to exclude effective critics. Before Mikhail Sergeevich's attempts at *perestroika*, the KGB encouraged pro-Soviet utterance, or at least silence, by the judicious issue or refusal of these documents. (Silence was valued in so far as the uninformed public could take it to

mean that nothing was wrong in the Soviet Union). Although the boundaries of ideological rectitude changed from time to time, and sovietologists shifted positions (moving, typically, to the right), there was a fairly clear divide between sovietologists who could travel to the USSR and those who could not.

Professional circles in Soviet society suffered from exclusion in a reverse form. Chances to travel abroad on subsidised state trips, or in tourist "delegations" were manipulated by the authorities to ensure a show, at least, of ideological rectitude. In extreme cases (involving, for example, performing artists) exit visas were refused. Those who could get out were expected to observe rigid rules of conduct, and preserve extreme discretion when talking about the situation at home.

After three years' residence in Russia, and some acquaintanceship with political oppression, I became overtly anti-Soviet, was ultimately declared *persona non grata*, and doomed to long years of intellectual exile. In the Soviet media we were described as bourgeois falsifiers, while left-wingers resident in freer lands regarded us as cold-warriors, given to crude, "totalitarian" analysis. But exiled, too, were assorted revisionists, reform communists and Trotskyists whose Marxism was not of an acceptable hue. Sometimes Soviet officialdom made hilarious mistakes, and excluded for years individuals who had done their very best to paint the Homeland in attractive colours.

The "ideologically acceptable" sovietologists, some intellectually impressive, eschewed reference to, or minimised, the nastiest facets of Soviet reality – the labour camps, the censorship, the all-pervasive KGB. The USSR Supreme Soviet, which in the course of thirty years' activity, saw not a single negative vote, or even abstention, evoked no ridicule amongst them. Economic failure, poverty, slums, public ignorance, crime, etc, were ignored, underestimated, or presented as passing phenomena. Inadequate analysis was the custom of many eminent souls, but here I shall make kindly mention of but two, in so far as they have now apparently been graced with clearer vision. Thus Professor Alec Nove, whose writings

on the Soviet economy brought him a certain amount of justified acclaim, never really told us that the whole system was rotten. That thankless task was left to Mr. Keith Bush of Radio Liberty, and others: we should be grateful that they fulfilled it so well. Professor David Lane's earlier book on politics (sic) and society in the USSR, reprinted several times, was untarnished by discussion of the role of the secret police or the presence of rather odious forms of privilege. The fact that the KGB was a keystone of political control, that such privilege was endemic, and that both were universally hated, was not passed on to the hapless reader.

Many of the left-wing sovietologists travelled frequently to the USSR, (thus enjoying, whether they liked it or not, KGB clearance) worked in Soviet libraries, had official "contacts", and submitted without protest to the rule of an arrogant bureaucracy. Unlike dear old Sydney and Beatrice Webb, who were well-intentioned but naive, many later-day apologists had a good idea of what was going on, but preferred not to elaborate on it.

One might mischievously pin-point other typical characteristics of the clan: avoidance of contact with critical emigres and certain radio stations, a profound reluctance to appear "anti-Soviet" in public, a propensity for friendships of convenience (the slippery Mr. Fedor Burlatski's company being particularly treasured in this respect). Sometimes their arguments required the USSR and the West to be regarded as equal partners in a none-too-honest game, indigenous Soviet dissidence to be downgraded or ignored, and discussion conducted on a theoretical rather than factual level. The Soviet seizure of half of Europe was taken for granted, and ethnic problems in the USSR were said to be solved.

Some of these observers seemed to believe that the idea of personal freedom was foreign to Soviet "political culture", and that the Soviet people did not really aspire to it. Maintaining contact with the USSR was held to be advantageous to everyone, and welcomed by well-meaning Russians. This alone was worth a good deal of compromise. In any case, anyone who was interested in critical comment could get it aplenty from the cold warriors,

whose harmful activities needed to be balanced by more benign interpretation. Beyond that, the banner of Soviet socialism, even if a little tattered, demanded respect.

Given the prevalence of such ambivalent attitudes, it is not surprising to find them in most, if not all, of our university centres of Soviet studies. It was commonly held, for example, that in the 1950s the School of Slavonic and East European Studies had to be rid of the baleful influence of Marxists like Andrew Rothstein, by the nomination of a new director. At Cambridge the shadow of E. H. Carr, whose Leninist proclivities spoil what could have been a fine if partial, history of the USSR, can still be discerned. The Centre for Russian and East European Studies at Birmingham has had curious pro-Soviet leanings since it was founded some three decades ago, reflecting perhaps the thinking of Professor R.W. Davies, who completed E.H. Carr's monumental work.

The decline of Soviet studies at St. Antony's College, Oxford, into limp mediocrity is a matter for particular regret, given its former pre-eminence. The decline followed the untimely death of the outstanding literary scholar Max Hayward, and the departure of two fine Russian historians, G. M. Katkov and S. V. Utechin. Soviet studies at Glasgow University were launched in the 1940s by (amongst others) Rudolph Schlesinger, who would have nothing bad said of Stalin, with whose wife, Allelueva, he had once apparently worked. Subsequently Glasgow was known for its soft Menshevik, and hard Trotskyist tendencies. Two smaller university centres, Bradford and my own Surrey, were staffed or directed by people with unconcealed sympathy for the USSR.

British sovietology was saved by two factors: we were lucky in having a tradition of good scholarship, epitomised by people like Professors Hugh Seton Watson and Leonard Schapiro. Outstanding in the next generation was Peter Reddaway, who exposed the abuses of Soviet psychiatry, Professor Philip Hanson, who has always written a lot of common sense about the Soviet economy, and Professor Geoffrey Hosking, whose Reith Lectures were well balanced. We must

hope that this branch of our tradition will not wilt. Some of the bland, if not pro-Soviet, writing contained elements of value: the fact that certain learned academics failed to say all that they should have, did not invalidate their entire output.

British sovietology suffered from two other shortcomings which were not of its own making. The first being inadequate and uneven financing. The facilities available even in the best centres were therefore far from satisfactory. The great volume of Soviet published material and the need for geographical distribution of resources to suit scattered users meant that research materials were often unavailable when needed. Gaps in holdings of books and periodicals, and a lack of institutional coordination presented real problems. There was a slight tendency for centres to over-rate their own capabilities and contribution.

Thus even in London, researchers frequently failed to find essential documents. At the British Library, the legislation approved by the Supreme Soviets of both Latvia and Lithuania throughout the years of Soviet rule was unavailable: for some reason, only the Estonian series were received. On the other hand, scholars granted entry visas to the USSR faced massive bureaucratic obstacles, poor bibliographic equipment, and all the stringency of the Soviet censorship. They were also cut off from outside scholarship while they were there.

Sovietologists were, in my view, badly let down by the Western security services. Given the problems of information and access, these services could have been much more helpful and informative, without involving us in their noble endeavours. Soviet territory was photographed regularly from the air, yet our geographers were never, to my knowledge, given updated maps, nor did our economists get useful details of large industrial complexes. The same goes for the location of prison camps, which must have been known, together with estimates of their occupancy. Sovietologists (and consequently the public) were needlessly deprived of a great deal of useful information. Mention of any such co-operation often evoked consternation even among anti-soviet sovietologists, in so far as it made them vulnerable to

left-wing charges of prejudice, or blackmail while in the USSR. Few of us had diplomatic immunity. But these fears could have been dissipated, had some mechanism been devised for open access to older intelligence data.

Until the advent of *perestroika* Soviet sources of information on virtually all social, political and economic matters were exceedingly poor. Only about 800 newspapers and magazines were available. This might sound a lot, but only a few dozen were of real relevance to sovietology, and many tended to be uninformative, misleading or overly specialist. Some 9,000 local Soviet periodicals were simply not available outside the USSR.

The current flood of information is virtually overwhelming. In August, 1990 censorship was miraculously, to a large degree, abolished, and the former communist press, struggling for survival, became much more informative. New national periodicals appeared, claiming independence and matching in their treatment of news the more serious newspapers of West Europe. If the future of some of them is at present uncertain, it is for commercial, rather than political reasons. The ban on exporting local papers has evidently been removed.

The problems of procuring and analysing even the more interesting items are daunting. Many periodicals are expensive or do not have reliable subscription arrangements; some appear irregularly, or have to be obtained from distant locations.

By far the best press-reading and analysing service in the West is located at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in Munich, the former Research Section having now been turned into a research institute. Additionally, RL has plans to open a monitoring post in Moscow. But the new tasks of analysis are way beyond the capabilities of a single such institution with a small staff. Another problem lies in the copious output of the new Russian TV and radio stations, and information agencies.

As for statistics and published legislation, the upsurge is likely to be more manageable. Despite the economic collapse, or indeed as a result of it, a much wider range of statistics is being published – and in an ordered fashion. Legislative acts and official

instructions have become more revealing not only through relaxed censorship, but also because they address broader social issues. The Russian government has embarked on a massive programme of new legislation, together with a revision of many old laws. The 1958/1959 laws which disgracefully allowed “non-normative” acts to remain unpublished have been repealed.

Some problems connected with the information explosion may solve themselves, as the sources fail. Apart from this, Russia has a tradition of censorship which may reassert itself; the Russian Supreme Soviet, under the chairmanship of the redoubtable Ruslan Khazbulatov, has already shown a clear distaste for critical journalism. Boris Yeltsin himself closed pro-coup papers after the failure of the take-over in August, 1991, but has more recently defended press freedoms against conservative pressures.

The Russian visa system no longer serves as a sieve to prevent the entry of critical sovietologists, or departure of the more interesting Russian scholars on research trips abroad. The influence of the secret police seems to have receded, and the barriers to travel are now are of a more economic or petty administrative character. Critical observers find that Russian citizens are not only ready, but eager to associate and talk. Foreigners can now actually stay in private dwellings. Political surveillance has abated or ceased. Archives are being opened. It is now possible to meet authoritative officials merely by ringing them up and asking for an appointment.

The opening of Russia presents great opportunities, but whether they can be fully grasped is doubtful. Russia is still not easily accessible. The rigmarole of getting an entry visa, finding accommodation and reasonable meals still requires much effort. Communications are very poor. It is still much harder to work in Russia than in Western Europe or the USA; Russian studies will always remain a difficult activity.

One of the effects of de-stalinisation in the mid-1950s was the appearance of some objective analysis of Soviet society by a few of the bolder indigenous scholars. Most of us can look back and name some worthwhile studies, especially in the decade which

followed.

It is interesting to compare the problems of Soviet scholars in those "grey" years with what we faced abroad. Recently I sat down with a Soviet colleague to compare notes on survey work among Soviet citizens on the one hand and *émigrés* on the other. Soviet investigators had immediate access to respondents, and a better knowledge of the minutiae of Soviet reality. There were, however, spheres which they could not enter, and questions which they could not ask.

In the West we had the problem of seeking out respondents, paying over the odds for "Soviet experience", and correcting possible emigre distortion. We could not claim to have the detailed insights of Soviet investigators, and publication of our results usually depended on a publisher's commercial judgement.

Following the rebirth of true investigative journalism in the USSR, and the collapse of censorship under Mikhail Sergeevich, we are now seeing the emergence of a genuine, abundant *Russian* sovietology. In my own sphere – social structure – the absurd Marxist-Leninist trammels are no more, and research is comparatively uninhibited.

I believe we already face fierce competitors; academic standards in some Russian institutions may be abysmal, especially in the provinces, but many leading scholars deserve unhesitating international recognition: their knowledge of their own society can scarcely be rivalled; and as older cadres are shed one could expect an improvement in average quality. We may have much to teach them in terms of methodology, techniques of analysis, and possibly fund-raising. We can equip them with historical knowledge which was denied to three generations. But these are surely not long-term functions.

Deteriorating economic conditions may encourage more Russian social scientists to seek employment in the West. Our centres may gain from their presence, but the newcomers may displace our own trainees. The appearance of indigenous Russian studies must, in the longer term, mean some retraction of the discipline here. For an interim period a mutually advantageous *modus vivendi* may be possible.

But sovietology as we have known it benefitted from having no Soviet counterpart.

Although the USSR has ceased to exist as a unified political entity, we do not know what relationships will ultimately emerge between former republics (or bits of them). Common development will be disrupted, and some separate monitoring will become essential.

No less disruptive of traditional sovietology are the new internal market forces, and increased opportunities for international commerce. If a Western-type market does develop, there will be a sharp increase in the need for commercial, and consumer-related information, both by local and foreign firms; a demand for paid, business-related academic services, including market research; and a rise of cooperatives offering near-academic consultation. There may be a fall in the need for defence-related research in the west.

The Economist Intelligence Unit has established its own joint venture, "Business USSR" in Moscow, an "International Centre for Economic Reform" having joint Soviet and Western sponsors and operating purely commercially. A number of Russian financial periodicals of apparently respectable quality have appeared. The British Council has modified its long-standing cultural exchange agreements to accommodate consumer-orientated research.

It is clear that those of us who practice the current version of "sovietology" must think carefully about its future. The successes of the past do not guarantee success in new circumstances; past weaknesses must be overcome. The great socialist ideal is in ruins, and the entry visa game is over. Some of our more socialistically minded colleagues seem to have realised that they were wrong. The discipline would undoubtedly benefit from less fettered scholarship on their part: and all involved may now aspire to a closer analysis, with a finer, and in some cases more sympathetic understanding of Russian reality. No one would claim that the Cold Warriors understood everything, and always got it right.

The struggle within the discipline is not yet over, as may be demonstrated

by one final, sorry instance. The contribution made by Mr. Robert Conquest to public knowledge of the purges and suppression of nationalities surely makes him a king amongst us, and his work is now published in Russia. Yet he was recently described in the *Guardian* (by Mr. Seuman Milne) as a "doyen of cold war ... historians" who "decamped to the Hoover Institution". Mr. Milne approvingly quoted Dr. Margot Light, of the London School of Economics as saying: "Soviet studies grew up in the cold war and had a distinct ideological role to perform. [!] They always had far less pretence to objectivity than other regional studies." Presumably, Dr. Light wished to imply that sovietological criticism of the Land of the Soviets was reprehensible without actually saying so, (veiled utterance being typical of the clan). Thus are our efforts still adjudged.

Our financial problems remain. In 1989 the worsening situation prompted an investigation by a working party under the chairmanship of Norman Wooding. Russian studies, an intrinsically non-profit-making activity, did badly in the privatisation of British universities. In its (July, 1989) report the working party proposed that "a degree of priority should be given to Soviet and East European studies to arrest their decline and re-establish them at a more acceptable level." The response of the government was disappointing, and fell short of several modest proposals for monitoring, extra funds and teaching support. None of the other political parties seem to take much interest, either.

If a history of Western sovietology is ever written for the unfortunate people who bore the brunt of Soviet-style socialism, they will find they owe British sovietology a debt of gratitude. There is also little doubt about whom they will admire most, the scholars who tried to speak the truth, or those who left it to someone else.

Mervyn Matthews is Lecturer in Russian Studies at the University of Surrey.

Editorial

Conservatives may wish to blame President Bush and Mr Major for the visible disarray of their parties. There must be *some* explanation, after all, for the sudden collapse of the conservative cause in politics. The blame, however, lies not with the figures at the top, but with the entire party structure. In both Britain and the United States, conservative parties have ignored the problem of succession, and been content to accept a concept of leadership that is in fact alien to the conservative vision of politics.

The acceptance of the leadership idea means not only that the Cabinet is the creature of a single person; it also means that the whole party revolves around that person, and renounces every attempt to find a philosophy, a programme, and an organisation that can endure beyond a change at the top. Moreover, there is no pressure on the leader to find a suitable successor, and the party machine, over-borne by its fascination with the passing tenant of power, would not presume to look for one. Thus it was that the Tory Party, having foolishly jettisoned its greatest leader since Churchill, found itself with no obvious successor to her. She herself, unconstrained by those beneath her, had felt no need to think beyond her term of office; while the party, mesmerized by her energy and decisiveness, lost all will of its own. Mr Major stepped into the vacant position only so as to keep it vacant. His very vacuousness recommended him, since it deferred the time for a real decision. But a party can no more find itself when led by a ghost than when stirred by a hero. It requires a settled

philosophy, and an enduring process of appointment and discussion, through which to discover those who should occupy its highest offices.

The case of the Republican Party is even more striking. Having led his country to war against Saddam Hussein, President Bush found himself more popular than any President since 1945. Here at last was the opportunity that all Americans had longed for, to vindicate their country's honour, and to teach a lasting lesson to the petty despots who constantly humiliate the American people. The President withdrew from the conflict at the very moment when he might have achieved a total victory. At once his popularity declined, the American people returned to their former state of anxious disaffection with the political process, and — predictably — Mr Bush was blamed for the entire state of American society. It was madness of the Republican Party to choose such a man to run again for President. But the White House had mesmerised the Party as thoroughly as Downing Street mesmerizes the Tories. The whole Party machine looked to Bush for its orders; wherever people turned they found someone who owed his office, his influence or his job to Bush. And the only person able to challenge the President — Patrick Buchanan — stood alone on the platform, unsupported by the network of researchers and advisers whose one set of instructions issued from Mr Bush. In short, there was no provision for a successor, and no philosophy or procedure for discovering him.

In such circumstances, a party is

bound to go out of office as soon as the leader proves unelectable. Indeed, electoral defeat becomes the sole way in which the leadership can change. It is the one remaining educative experience which — however briefly — revives the party's instinct for self-government, and spurs it to inquiry and debate. Mrs Thatcher's success did not depend only on her amazing personality; it derived from the foundations laid during those years of opposition in the seventies, when the Tory Party discovered a philosophy with which to confront the socialist culture of Britain. The Tory Party ceased thinking sometime during her first term of office, and has not exercised its intellectual faculties since. Nor will it do so until it loses the next election, and the problem of succession is at last addressed.

The Republican Party now has a few years of meditation ahead of it. It has a hard task, in a country whose every institution has been politicised, and whose education system is in ruins. If it is to recover from Mr Bush, it too must solve the problem of succession. And it must return to first principles, namely: choose as your leader someone who is decisive when decisions are required, who is able to confess to his mistakes and learn from those who correct him, and who is able, when required, to step down with dignity and make way for his successor. Most important of all, choose someone who is motivated by principles which you too approve of, and who has some other interest than to advance and perpetuate his power.

Letters

Sir,

I refer to the review of David Pryce-Jones's Occasional Paper, 'At War with Modernity:' by Mervyn Hiskett, which appears in your September Issue; I give an extract; "but glosses over the gross injustice done to the Palestinians by Israel's seizure of the Occupied Territories in 1967; and her subsequent obdurate retention of them".

The response given by the Russians when asked to return East Prussia and other former German Territories seized during the 1939-1945 hostilities (and from which had been expelled or 'ethnically cleansed' some twelve million civilians) is an appropriate response to Mr. Hiskett's remarks.

"A People that has been attacked, has defended itself and wins the War, is bound in sacred duty to establish in perpetuity a political situation that will ensure the liquidation of the sources of aggression. A Nation that has obtained security at the cost of numerous victims will never agree to restoration of previous borders as long as the danger of aggression still prevails". (Pravda, September 1964.) That this principle conforms with morality, common sense and the natural right of self-preservation given to all nations, has never been doubted. Nor has there ever been any demand for the former inhabitants of the seized territories to be returned.

It is therefore difficult to understand why, other than by reason of prejudice or stupidity, Israel should be expected to behave otherwise in dealing with the Occupied Territories.

Jack Davis
Antwerp, Belgium

Sir,

How right Mr. Curteis is (SR June 1992) about the offence, indeed anger, caused by the broadcasting the media's frequent recourse to obscene language on the pretext of injecting realism into drama. His arguments can, of course, be extended to the sounds and scenes of sexual intimacy that producers find so fascinating.

Apparently BBC producers have long persuaded themselves that unless some sexual garnishing is imparted to a play or reading, it will lack authenticity and, therefore popular appeal. Does it ever occur to these eager young impresarios that this simple recipe for a modern television or radio play has become counterproductive. Moreover a substantial proportion of the British public continues to resent being treated by the media as if it suffers from arrested

adolescence -- a condition referred to as "adult" by sex shops and pornocrats.

From frequent communication with BBC apologists I know that the invariable retort to such complaints is that drama "has to reflect life as it is". However, art and literature do not capture or comprehend reality: they are essentially selective. What is happening today is that life is reflecting art and literature since these influence both the character and behaviour of people for better or worse -- usually worse.

The gratuitous obtrusion of scenes and sounds of copulative performances actually weakens the grip of the drama on our attention. The jolt to the senses from exposure to erotic explorings is physical not emotional. Even where the viewer is not offended by his being transformed into voyeur, his emotional involvement in the unfolding drama is displaced by a *visceral* or carnal involvement. The spell of the narrative is shattered.

E.J. Mishan
London

Sir,

Dr Anthony Kubek wrote in *How the Far East was Lost* (1971) that as the actions of Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Lauchlin Currie and Owen Lattimore are reviewed, "it becomes obvious that their interest in Soviet expansion was not merely academic". Now Brian Crozier assures us that Harry Hopkins himself was "a paid agent of the NKVD". President Eisenhower described him as one of the "most loyal" Americans he had ever known, while Molotov reportedly stated that Hopkins was "completely on our side and may be trusted absolutely" (*Human Events*, 1 April 1953).

Perhaps the documentation published by the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, much of that issued by Senator McCarthy or even by the John Birch Society, despite their self-seeking exaggerations, comes closer to the truth about policy subversion and foreign espionage in the USA than all the older "liberal" or newer-left propaganda about "witch-hunting" or the "cold war". One especially misleading example of this in this ignorant island was the three-part BBC-2 Timewatch "documentary" *The Un-Americans* in September 1992.

Most would disagree with a great deal of the ideas and activities of the Birch Society are appreciative of its republication of James Burnham's

important little masterpiece *Web of Subversion* and its informative volumes such as the *Biographical Dictionary of the Left*. They would have regarded the essay that Mr Crozier penned for *Encounter* as a typical "liberal hatchet-job" in tone, irrelevance and inaccuracy, but we are all no doubt grateful for your contributor's subsequent first-rate work in opposition not only to marxism but also to some degree against late "liberalism", the most insidious and persistent danger to western culture.

Titania Mason
Woodford Green, Essex.

Sir

Stewart Deuchar in his 'Professionalism in Education' (June 1992) remarks that "The ideologues are so well placed and so dug in that they have no difficulty in sabotaging or hijacking the government's reforms". But Deuchar does not go on to ask who put these people in positions to sabotage and hijack. The answers are: a Conservative Minister of State at the DES; and, presumably, because he simply endorsed nominations made by his officials.

The result has been that all the bodies responsible for implementing the 1988 Education Reform Act have been and still are dominated by precisely the people who have throughout their careers been labouring to produce the catastrophe which that Act was introduced to remedy. It is, surely, inconceivable that a council sincerely committed to discovering what and how effectively seven year olds had been taught would have produced what SEAC actually produced for year one? For that was an inordinately time-consuming and complex system of wholly subjective appraisals, to be administered not independently but by the very teachers who had been (the ideologues would hope nondidactically) teaching the children supposedly being tested?

Yet it was only with the arrival of Kenneth Clarke at the DES, and his appointment to SEAC of Dr. John Marks, that any Conservative minister called upon the assistance of any of those who have for years been campaigning for radical educational reform. There will be little if any educational improvement unless John Patten proceeds to make lots more such appointments, thus ending the domination of the entrenched ideologues.

Antony Flew
Reading

Reviews

The Southern Idea *Esmond Wright*

Against the Barbarians: and Other Reflections on Familiar Themes. M.E. Bradford, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri, London. \$37.50 1992.

The Professor of English at the University of Dallas is a brave spirit. He reprints here 25 essays that have already appeared in print, preceded by his title essay, first delivered as an address at Macalester College in St Paul, Minnesota, in March 1989, and then published in *Humanitas*. For other themes he raids also the pages of *Chronicles*, *The Sewanee Review* and *The South Review*. As this provenance suggests, he admits that his topics are familiar. But he does not limit his comments to those of a literature don. He passes also as historian – 14 of the 25 essays are mini-biographies of some of the Founding Fathers, drawn from the leading figures in the state ratifying conventions, and additions to the set of political biographies gathered in his *A Worthy Company: Brief Lives of the Framers of the United States Constitution*. There are also critical comments on Abraham Lincoln and Lyndon B. Johnson. Correction: where L.B.J. is concerned “critical” is not as appropriate as “savage” and “scathing”.

“As the life of Lyndon Johnson demonstrates, the whole enterprise of liberal politics – *effective liberal politics* – tends in most instances to be poisoned at its source: tends to be about Power and little else.”

That the emphasis is on the familiar is praise, not blame. The address at Macalester College was an attack on all the forces he sees as animated by hatred of humane learning – there are many, it seems, in American universities these days. He sees them as a product of the “new wave” of Marxism, of feminism, of sociology and of black studies; a new list of

“classics” is now required reading with the “right political implications”. Indeed, in the light of the recent debate in this country over Jacques Derrida’s honorary degree at Cambridge, perhaps we can pretend to be familiar with Professor Bradford’s references not only to Derrida but to Paul de Man, J. Hillis Miller, Roland Barthes, Jonathan Culler, Frank Lentricchia; we may even grasp the meaning of deconstructionism, structuralism, and semiology. Professor Bradford identifies those he sees as barbarians even if not even all philosophers will agree with his list or his analysis. He does, however, recognize that there is a danger: the dismemberment of the university as we have known it into a set of professional courses; “the life of the mind as we have known it for 2500 years dispenses into little sectarian seminaries: establishments like those frequented by disciples of the Ayatollah near Qom. Soon, thereafter, all conversation comes to a conclusion, leaving intact only a little scope for shouting imprecations and threats”.

This suggests an angry book: it is the reverse. On the Fugitive School in Nashville, Professor Bradford writes with special warmth, especially of Donald Davidson and Andrew Lytle. He evokes Davidson’s affection for William Gilmore Simms’s home, the Woodlands Plantation, near Bamberg, South Carolina – from which came not only an architectural restoration as tribute, but a poem in the great house tradition that for him recalls Ben Jonson (“To Penshurst”), W.B. Yeats (“Coole Park 1929”) and John Crowe Ransom’s “Old Mansion”. His interest is in literature, and the circumstances

that encouraged it, whether in Vanderbilt University in Nashville, or at the Breadloaf Summer School. Many of them drew on Civil War topics for their material, as Lytle did for his biography of Bedford Forrest, as Simms a century before had drawn on the War of Independence and conflicts with the Indians. He might have added that the Fugitives group included and influenced historians as well as poets and novelists – witness Frank Owsley’s contribution (“The Irrepressible Conflict”) to what was the symposium plus declaration of faith of the group the essays by Twelve Southerners entitled *I’ll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition*, published in 1930. It is good to have this salute to Donald Davidson and to Andrew Lytle, two of the least Reconstructed of the “Young Confederates”. It is a testament to Bradford’s recognition – as also in his essays on Faulkner – that good writing owes much to “a certain terrain, a certain history a certain inherited way of living”, to use John Crowe Ransom’s words.

The major portion of this book (150 pages of the 250) is devoted, however, to an analysis of the Ratification debates on the Constitution and to the studies of 14 of the “Fathers”. Bradford sketches short but vivid portraits of those who saw the constitutional battle fought not in Philadelphia in 1787 but in what he recognises as the front-line: the debate over ratification state by state. They are a remarkably varied collection, from his heroes Patrick Henry and “Light Horse Harry”, Lee Duone and Josiah Bartlett, to one for whom he cannot find a kind word,

Samuel Adams. He describes him as "the Baleful Comet of Boston". He could with equal truth call him The Man Who Caused The War of American Independence. By his role as mob-organiser in the crucial decade before 1776 Samuel Adams did more to cause political and social unrest than anyone else – and with no saving graces as philosopher, statesman or soldier, for he was none of those. There are brilliant vignettes of the real heroes of 1787-88.

His final piece, "Lincoln and the Language of Hate and Fear", he clearly sees as his most original and he supports it with a thorough array of footnotes. It is certainly the most controversial. He sees Lincoln as a calculating and ambitious politician on which thesis there would now be little argument. He analyses his Peoria speech of October 16, 1854, at a time when Lincoln was still officially a disciple of Henry Clay, and not yet a Republican. But 1854 was an early stage in the long and confused argument over slavery; it was but four years since the last great Compromise; and few politicians except the more

extreme abolitionists would have advocated or expected emancipation. Lincoln, like many others, saw the new lands as the homes of free white people, many of whom in the 1850s were coming in from Europe and did not understand American, and particularly Southern, history or politics. Lincoln, like his colleagues, was manoeuvring, and shared the prevailing view that if Blacks got their freedom it would require their going into exile. In 1854 Lincoln was not yet the Emancipator. That had 8 years to wait. It seems a harsh verdict, in judging the man of 1854, to say "It is at our peril that we continue to reverence his name." But he does give a subtitle to his essays A View From the South. After all in 1861, because many Southerners saw Lincoln in equally critical fashion, they seceded from the Union. And that is still the most controversial theme in American history. Damned Yankees and the Politically Correct alike will find Professor Bradford's essays stirring reading. He will not expect agreement nor testimonials except from those living south of the Mason-Dixon Line.

every public appearance becomes occasion for hostile and often violent demonstrations.

Roger Pearson's book is an examination of such uproar, its background, motivation and policy implications. An Author's Preface is followed by a long Introduction. This is Hans Eysenck's account, not included in his autobiography, of the consequences for himself and his family of publishing *Race, Intelligence and Education*. (Among many other things he was induced to change his name by deed poll in order to protect his children from persecution by radical teachers.)

The first three chapters are on 'How it all began', 'The Legacy of Marx, Mannheim and Lysenko', and 'Scientific Luddites and Neo-Lysenkoists'. In the second we read that one (named) Professor at the Open University appealed to Soviet Germany for the suppression of future publications by a geneticist whose work was embarrassing British Lysenkoists. The Stasi of course responded at once to this appeal from a brother party. Open University papers please copy!

The next three chapters deal with the cases of, respectively, Arthur Jensen, William Shockley and Philippe Rushton. The third of these is both the latest and, in several ways, the most outrageous. For Rushton was subjected to protracted investigation by the provincial police before they eventually admitted they could not make a case; and, whereas Jensen and Shockley were supported by their institutions, the University of Western Ontario responded to the then (Liberal) Premier's call to sack Rushton by taking what were in effect the first steps on that road — steps reversed only in reluctant response to an international torrent of protests. The titles of the remaining four chapters are: 'The Case of Barry Mehler', 'Other Prominent Scholar-Victims', 'Academe, the Media and Public Policy', and 'Conclusion'.

This is a valuable book, and one which ought to secure far wider and closer attention than it is likely to receive. Yet it suffers very seriously from the lack of a chapter clarifying the crucial concepts and making the necessary fundamental distinctions.

Sense and Censorship

Antony Flew

Race, Intelligence and Bias in Academe, Roger Pearson. Scott-Townsend: Washington, D.C., 1991. Pb \$25.00

In his 1977 Presidential Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science Sir Andrew Huxley recognised and deplored the presence even among professional scientists of many who 'regard the assumption of equal inherited ability as something which does not require experimental evidence ... and which it is positively wicked to question.... There is in fact a taboo on open-minded investigation ... at least as strong as the resistance in Darwin's day to questioning the authority of the Bible.'

Certainly there is such a taboo. But, so long as those who break it confine

their investigations to differences between individuals, then, although they must not expect accurate reporting or adequate discussion of their unwelcome findings, they need not in general fear anything worse than the disapproval of politically correct colleagues. The real uproar breaks out when someone dares to study and to report genetically determined differences in talent or temperament between different social, ethnic or racial sets. It is then that these audacious heretics are denounced as racists and fascists, attempts are made to secure their dismissal, and their

That might perhaps have taken the place of the first chapter, which is somewhat less surefooted than its successors.

Here the first need is to deploy a definition adequate to answering the question 'Why should we abominate racists?', as well as 'What is racism?' Suppose we define 'racism' as advantaging or disadvantaging people for no other and better reason than that they are members of this particular racial set and not that. Then we may argue that racism is evidently wrong because evidently unjust. But that will not suit the persecutors of any of the heretical academics whose cases are presented and discussed in Pearson's book. Tacitly they are construing 'racist' as a term of abuse for anyone daring to contradict a revelation vouchsafed to and promulgated by the US Department of Labor in 1965: "Intelligence is distributed among Negro infants in the same proportion and pattern as among Icelanders or Chinese, or any other group....There is absolutely no question of any genetic differential."

But it does not suit the persecutors to be explicit about either of these two alternatives. For none of the people whom they want to silence could even be plausibly accused, much less justly convicted of racist behaviour. On the

other hand the persecutors do not want it to be too obvious that they are assailing heretical beliefs rather than wicked behaviour. It is, for instance, significant that when the National Union of Students first resolved to employ all means to prevent racists and fascists securing platforms on campus it was, as it remains, careful to leave it to local militants to decide, at their absolute discretion and uninhibited by any restrictive definition, who is to be so silenced.

The next most necessary conceptual task is distinguishing different ideals of equality, and showing how these ideals are or are not related to would-be factual propositions. You may, for instance, be opposed to racism, in the first understanding, and hence be accounted a believer in racial equality, in a corresponding understanding, without being thereby committed to accepting such statements as that from the US Department of Labor quoted earlier. Again, if you are committed to equality of opportunity, traditionally construed not as equal but as fair and open competition for scarce opportunities, then you not merely may, but must, accept inequalities of outcome. For whatever is the point of a competition in which everyone is to get not merely a prize but the same prize!

characterised by violence, for the manifold grievances of much of the population were expressed by the only means available, riot and disorder, to which the governing elite responded with legalised brutality.

The image of a harsh, cruel and unequal society that is portrayed by this well researched book is partial but persuasive. That Gilmour's world represents an important aspect of eighteenth century England cannot be doubted. Violence was a constant element in a society in which popular culture had its three "B"s of blood, beer and betting, while relations within social strata and between the sexes could be as brutal as those between authority and its opponents. It is not surprising in such a context that physical force was nakedly evident as a prime means of social control.

We are confronted with an exhaustive and impressive list of riots: political riots, food riots, religious riots and riots against militia ballots and the press gang. It is not so much the great set pieces, the Jacobite rebellions and the Irish rising of 1798 or the Wilkes and Gordon riots, that press home the image of a society pervaded by violence but the regular round of smaller disturbances occasioned by the price of bread, the activities of the press gang and the often arbitrary enforcement of the law with its draconian penalties.

Gilmour follows other recent studies in seeing the regimes of the first two Georges as narrowly based and lacking either legitimacy or tacit acceptance. Political or religious discontent, robbed by royal patronage and the manipulations of the Whig oligarchy of electoral impact, had in riot one of its few means of expression. So bereft of popular support were the Whigs in the early Hanoverian period that they had to pay for their own rent-a-mobs. The authorities, aware of constant Jacobite plotting and with their experience of the rebellions or attempted counter revolutions of 1715 and the forty-five, feared constantly that riot would develop into rising and reacted ferociously or timorously as occasion demanded.

Industrial relations were as violent.

Nasty, British and Short *A. W. Purdue*

Riot, Risings and Revolution. Governance and Violence in Eighteenth-Century England Ian Gilmour, Hutchinson, 1992, £25.

Just how violent was eighteenth century English society? The cynic's answer might well be that there are as many eighteenth century Englands as there are historians to create them: an elegant and tasteful aristocratic century, a society of polite and

commercial people or a world at once harsh, unjust and violent. With his three "R"s, Sir Ian Gilmour depicts, graphically and remorselessly, a brutal and riotous eighteenth century England. The relations between governed and governors were

“Industrial workers who did not like the wages or the conditions of work on offer had,” Gilmour argues, “three choices: submission, a strike or a strike reinforced by violence.” If a residual paternalism co-existed uneasily with the developing free market economy, making public opinion and even magistrates or army officers sometimes sympathize with food rioters or strikers, Gilmour comes to a bleak conclusion: “In practice, of course, they lost their protection while retaining their poverty”.

As a backdrop to the violent manifestations of discontent Gilmour provides us with a picture of an administrative and legal framework designed for the convenience of a corrupt ruling elite. A harsh code of law with its game laws and the Waltham Black Act, which by itself encoded almost two hundred capital offences, was enforced without the assistance of a police force because such a body would have interfered with the local power bases of the landed gentry. Without any certainty that offences would be brought to justice, sentences had to be harsh indeed. It is questionable, however, whether the bloody retribution exacted from highwaymen or even poachers, provided, in an insensitive age, the deterrent it was supposed to. The author asserts that, not only did the bloody code survive because its victims were almost entirely from the lower orders, but that the great theatre of punishment at Tyburn became, “more a festival of defiance than a ceremony of deterrence”.

Sir Ian Gilmour is a paternalistic Tory and as a historian he finds himself, like some latter day Oastler, close to the viewpoint of the left and in particular to historians like E.P. Thompson and Douglas Hay. He finds it easy to sympathise, not just with Jacobite squires, aghast at the corruption and self aggrandizement of Walpole’s Robinocracy, but with weavers and outworkers in the grip of an encroaching capitalism, and with poachers, bread rioters and the victims of the press gang. Like Thompson, he has sympathy with the notion of the moral economy appealed to by the English crowd. Thus a brand of Tory

history tunes in with the socialist historian’s dislike of the emergent liberal and free market society and shares a common nostalgia for a supposedly more paternalistic and less individualist economic and social order.

A reader who picks up *Riot, Risings and Revolutions* having recently read Paul Langford’s much acclaimed *A Polite and Commercial People. England 1727-1783* (1989) can be forgiven some disorientation. Can Langford and Gilmour really be describing the same country in the same century? The difference is of course that Gilmour almost entirely ignores the positive aspects of eighteenth century England, the increasing prosperity, however unequally shared, the very real prospects of social mobility for a minority and, most importantly, the existence of the middle orders in a society that had a larger and more influential middle than any contemporary European society.

All historians and all histories are selective and it would be unfair to criticise a book that sets out to describe riot and violence for not dealing with polite society, the movement to reform manners, the growth of sentiment or the increasing humanitarianism that found expression in the hospital movement. The prosperity, born of agriculture but furthered by the manufacturing that catered to new consumer demands, is arguably necessarily, off stage as not within Gilmour’s theme; thus turnpikes come in as a cause of riots rather than as a means to economic development. Yet the really important question may well be how the violent and brutal aspects of eighteenth century England coexisted with or fitted in with that other England with its polite and prosperous inhabitants.

Generations of undergraduates have puzzled over how, given widespread discontent, the harshness of the law combined with the shortage of law enforcers and the enormous inequalities between rich and poor, eighteenth century England managed to hold together, to avoid revolution and to thrive. Sir Ian makes it clear that part of the explanation lies in the brutal use of

force, upon which government, law and order and the protection of property depended, but he recognises that this was never enough by itself and that Britain’s comparative imperviousness to the blandishments of revolutionaries in the ‘nineties rested also upon a patriotism and an acceptance of authority, which had much to do with a belief in the Englishman’s liberties and a notion of equality before the law that had just enough truth in it to be credible. One needs, however, to consider other factors. The social order was maintained by the vertical connections that mutual interest, patronage and deference forged between a chain of superiors and inferiors, as much as by Riot Act, executions and transportations. Increased prosperity may have been shared most inequitably and have faltered in the latter half of the century but, by contemporary European standards, a society in which two out of five families had incomes over forty pounds a year was a phenomenon indeed.

Riot, Risings and Revolution effectively depicts violent and often brutal society. Such violence and brutality need, however, to be set against the material and social improvements and the growing humanitarianism that were part of the same age. Assembly rooms and the press gang, the Lunar Society and wife-selling, Tyburn and lending libraries, need to be reconciled.

Witness to the Indian Mutiny

George Chowdharay-Best

Letters from the Indian Mutiny 1857-1859, John Chalmers, presented and edited by Richard Terrell. Michael Russell, Norwich, 1992. £14.95.

This book is divided about equally between introduction and letters. The former contains one of the best short accounts of the Mutiny that I have read. Richard Terrell's style is judicious, if not judicial, as befits the son of a former Chief Justice of Bihar, and I could find little to fault in his factual treatment of the background to the Mutiny, though in my view his assessment of the underlying causes over-emphasizes the religious elements on both sides.

The letters of John Chalmers, most of which are here reprinted for the first time since 1904, reveal a powerful personality, a born leader, and withal an entertaining character useful in a tight corner. He was a civil engineer in the Punjab at the time of the outbreak, and after it had been nipped in the bud there by resolute and timely action, he was able to play great part in the recapture of Delhi and other places from the rebels.

The Indian Mutiny, sometimes also called a rebellion, and by many Indian writers a war of independence, was not, as Disraeli pointed out (27 July 1857) solely an 'affair of greased cartridges'. By that he meant that it was not solely the supposed affront to their religion which was upsetting the sepoys and which led whole provinces to revolt. Religious causes were important, but they were not the whole story.

Disraeli's view was that whilst the threatened use of animal fat to grease the cartridges of the Bengal army may have been the immediate spark, the most important underlying cause was the annexation of Oudh, a large area centred on Lucknow which now constitutes much of Uttar Pradesh, a state of the Union of India formerly called the United Provinces (of Agra and Oudh).

This was taken over by the East India Company under its then Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, as from February 1856, and its 'King' (a title granted earlier in the century by the Company against the wishes of the Emperor in Delhi) deposed.

A recent Indian authority on the Mutiny, Rudrangshu Mukherjee, in his *Awadh in Revolt* (1984) has pointed out that the first British revenue prescriptions in Oudh (Awadh) dispossessed talukdars (landlords) and exposed the tenants to over-assessment of land revenue. Following annexation, 'the traditional rural world of Awadh was disrupted and the foundations laid for extensive disaffection'. Disraeli's point was that, the Bengal army being very largely recruited from Oudh, the effect of the annexation was that the soldiers of this army lost status in their native districts. To which we may add that it must have felt a little like the poll tax or community charge felt in England in 1990, uniting all classes for once in dislike, just as the greased cartridges united both religions, because the fat could equally have come from cattle, sacred to Hindus, and from pork, defiling to Muslims.

There was, too, another factor not mentioned by Richard Terrell, nor apparently by Disraeli nor our latter-day academics, though Mukherjee in an article in *Past and Present* (August 1990) quotes the loyal sepoy (soldier) Sitaram asserting that 'our learned men... told us that the Company's rule would come to an end in 1857, since — this was 100 years after the Company's first great battle'. He was of course referring to the Battle of Plassey in 1757, which had established the East India Company's primacy among the various forces at that time

struggling for power in India. It is a country where numbers are seen as very significant. Not for nothing has it produced some of the world's great mathematicians, invented the so-called Arabic numerals, including the symbol for zero and the game of chess to boot; and this may well have played its part.

What is undeniable is that at a purely political and formal level, the Company had over the hundred years to 1857, gradually, from the Indian point of view, usurped the power of the Great Mughal, whilst continuing for most of that period ostensibly to act in his name. Not until 1835 did the current coin of India cease to bear the Mughal Emperor's superscription; and although from 1803 he had lived in his great palace at Delhi (the Red Fort) under British protection, he exercised full sovereign rights there, and revenues were assigned to him. He was to receive 'all the forms of respect due to the Emperors of Hindustan'. Although in 1813 the sovereignty of the British Crown over the Company's territories in India had been asserted by Act of Parliament and the then Governor-General, Lord Hastings, discarded from his official seal all mention of Mughal supremacy, the situation remained ambiguous. The last-but-one Mughal Emperor, Akbar II (reigned 1806-37) refused to receive Hastings because the latter would not observe ceremonial acknowledging Mughal supremacy, and in 1830 went further by appointing his own emissary in England, Ram Mohan Roy (1774-1833) the well-known religious reformer, who campaigned in support of the abolition of suttee, a subject somewhat emphasized in Richard Terrell's account, but with no mention of the native, as well as European

attempts to abolish this barbarous ritual. By then Akbar II's superior rank had been acknowledged at a meeting with the then Governor-General, Lord Amherst, although no tributary gifts (*nazars*) passed. And, as was inevitable, the Company refused to recognize Ram Mohan Roy's appointment to London and the title of Rajah which the Emperor conferred upon him, though this did not prevent him being presented to King William IV.

Thus, at the time of the Mutiny, there was still, however shadowy, a rival focus of authority and even of legitimacy in India to the British. The advent of Dalhousie as Governor-General threatened this, as it had threatened the position of the King of Oudh. For early in the 1850s he urged that the line should not be recognized after the death of Bahadur Shah II, who had succeeded in 1837 to the throne of Delhi. The Directors of the company urged him to reconsider and he finally agreed that the then heir-apparent, Fakr-ud-din, should retain the title 'if he vacated the palace which was desired as the ideal site for a military depot and undertook to treat the Governor-General as an equal. But with Fakr-ud-din's death in 1856 the matter was once again in the melting-pot at the outbreak of the Mutiny. Indians who retained a

residual loyalty to the Mughals may well have felt that the final underpinning of that loyalty risked being swept away. After the mutiny Bahadur Shah II was tried and formally deposed.

John Chalmers was not particularly well-treated either. At the age of 38 he was only a Lieutenant, and had to wait until retirement in 1883 to reach the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Typical of his style is this, written from Lucknow, 20 March 1858:

Last night we fired the last shot at Lucknow, which is now entirely in our hands, and I have just returned from a long ride through the city. Days ago we had the palaces and all the entrenchments, but the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Colin Campbell) is rather a slow old gentleman, and objects to take any place unless it is taken for him by some straggling party walking into it by mistake or something of that sort.

Such sallies were not likely to endear him to those in authority, and, as Richard Terrell rightly concludes, may well have played their part in his failure to achieve recognition. Yet he was not, ultimately, an embittered man. He had a sense of humour.

Alfred Dreyfus's confession, returned several times to search the Dreyfus apartment, and bullied her unmercifully in an attempt to make her admit that her husband was anything but totally innocent. At no point did the French military authorities ever spontaneously accept that Dreyfus was a competent, hard-working officer, totally devoted to the interests of France and with an unshakeable faith in the civilising mission of the first European country to give the Jews full rights as citizens. He was, you see, a Jew.

In January 1944, Alfred Dreyfus's grand-daughter, Madeleine Dreyfus Levy, died of typhus in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Officially, she had been working for the Secours National, the general welfare organisation which the Vichy government funded, in part, through the liquidation of Jewish property. This had in fact been a cover for her membership of the resistance network *Combat*, the one to which Camus had belonged, and she might have escaped detection had it not been for her denunciation as a Jewess in an anti-semitic newspaper in Toulouse. The du Paty de Clams of this world, like the Edouard Drumont whose newspaper *La Libre Parole* had been in the forefront of the campaign against Dreyfus in the 1890s, and like the Charles Maurras whose last word, on being condemned in January 1945 for "intelligence with the enemy" was to be: "It's Dreyfus's revenge", had done the work well. In the spring of 1942, another anti-semitic newspaper, *Au Pilon*, laid the blame for the death of 1.3 million French soldiers in the 1914-1918 war on "the race of Christ-killers". By 1944, 40,000 French Jews had been sent to die in the camps, helped on their way — with a few hon-ourable exceptions — by the French police, the children included on the express instructions of Pierre Laval; the commando team which loaded the victims into the train at Drancy assisted by French personnel from du Paty de Clam's and Darquier de Pellepoix's Commissariat for Jewish Affairs.

It is not Michael Burns's intention to highlight the role of French anti-semitism in the Dreyfus case, or to

More French than the Marshal?

Philip Thody

Dreyfus: A Family Affair 1789-1945, Michael Burns. Chatto & Windus 1991, £20.

The Commissariat for Jewish Affairs, created by the Vichy government in 1941 with, as Michel Burns puts it in this splendid book, "little or no prompting from the Germans", was headed at one stage in its existence by a Charles Mercier du Paty de Clam. To

anyone with any knowledge of French anti-semitism, it had a familiar ring. For the name of the officer who came to see Lucie Dreyfus on the morning of 15 October 1894 to tell her that her husband had been arrested was Mercier du Paty de Clam. He lied to her about

present yet another indictment of the yobbo ethics of the French Right. It is not until page 420, when he compares Maurras's *Action Française* to "other forms of pornography" that he uses any loaded terms at all. All he needs to do, to make the reader feel the indignation produced by any act of such gross and systematic injustice as the treatment of Alfred Dreyfus between 1894 and 1899, is simply to say what happened. This he does, as his title indicates, by setting the story of Dreyfus's four and a half years on Devil's Island for a crime he did not commit against the background of his family. The narrative, as compulsive a read as *Buddenbrooks* or *The Forsyte Saga*, takes the reader from Abraham Israel Dreyfuss, Kosher butcher born in Rixheim, in Alsace, in 1749, through to 1945. Abraham's son, Jacob, became a peddler. He prospered, and in 1835 moved to what is now the city of Mulhouse, a traditional refuge for the persecuted. His son Raphael, father of nine children of whom Alfred was the youngest, worked in the rag trade and bought property. In 1862, at the height of the cotton crisis caused by the American civil war, he borrowed money at a fixed rate of 5% over eleven years to set up his own cotton mill, and changed his name to Dreyfus. Like the other Protestant and Jewish manufacturers whose habits of thrift and hard work played an honourably disproportionate role in creating the prosperity of nineteenth century France, Raphael became very rich. There was no question of Alfred, eleven years old when Alsace was ceded to the Second Reich after the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1, having to work for a living. His marriage in 1890 to Lucie Eugenie Hadamard made him even richer. She brought him 160,000 francs in cash, interest at 3% on 35,000, and a trousseau valued at 20,000. She was in line for an inheritance of 500,000, and the money certainly came in very useful. Mathieu Dreyfus, the brother whose drive and determination were the crucial factors in enabling Alfred to prove his innocence, calculated that the *affaire* cost the family one million francs.

A photograph of the edition of *La Libre Parole* proclaiming "Le Traître

condamné" after the re-trial at Rennes in September 1899 shows the price of the paper at 5 centimes. A French newspaper today costs a hundred times that, giving the cost as some ten million pounds in modern English money. What would have happened if Dreyfus had been poor? The socialist leader Jean Jaures, who initially refused to involve himself on behalf of "a rich Jew", might have joined the fray earlier, but it is unlikely that he would have shown the persistence which Mathieu Dreyfus needed to overcome the anti-semitic prejudice, military bureaucracy, and concern not to rock the political boat which were the main factors which dragged the affair on for so long. Raphael Dreyfus, leaving his eldest son Jacques to salvage what he could of the family business in German occupied Alsace, had chosen in 1872 to come to live in France. He did not want Mathieu and Alfred to wear the spiked helmet of the German army into which they would be forcibly conscripted, or to suffer from the anti-semitism which was already so marked a characteristic of the newly unified Germany. He trusted in France to keep the promise of emancipation made to the Jews by the revolution of 1789, and no member of the Dreyfus family wavered for a moment in their faith in the justice of the Republic. In the end, they were proved right. Twelve years after the morning of his arrest, Dreyfus was formally acquitted, reintegrated into the army, and decorated with the *Legion d'honneur*. The Republic won, and the forces of reaction — the Army, the aristocracy, the monarchists, large sections of the Roman Catholic Church — lost. Roger Martin du Gard was right to make one of the characters in his 1913 novel *Jean Barois* say that "it was a wonderful century, which began with the Revolution and ended with the Affair".

No account of the time which Dreyfus spent on Devil's Island can make anything but a harrowing read. In September 1896, when a report in the *Daily Chronicle* alleged that he had escaped, the authorities clamped an iron bar over Dreyfus's legs every night. He suffered from malaria and dysentery, was kept under constant guard, by warders who were forbidden

to speak to him, had a thick fence built in front of his hut to prevent him from seeing the sea, and could hear a heavy Hotchkiss machine gun being fired from a tower to warn away any ships that might draw near. But he could receive food parcels from home, and he was, most important of all, allowed to read and to write. He learnt enough English to read Shakespeare in the original, studied Montaigne and Ibsen, and kept up with his mathematics. If the charges against him, and the evidence on which he was initially convicted, have a Kafkaesque quality to them, and if Hannah Arendt was right to call the affair a "dress rehearsal" for the totalitarian abominations of the twentieth century, the fact that Dreyfus was allowed to keep himself sane by exercising his mind shows that not even French bureaucracy and anti-semitism were capable, in the nineteenth century at any rate, of total inhumanity.

Michael Burns is not a speculative historian. Like everyone who has written about the affair, he offers no answer to the central question of why it was Dreyfus who was accused of having written the *bordereau* listing the secret items which somebody in the French War Ministry was prepared to sell to the Germans. One of the most dramatic moments in his narrative comes when Michael Burns tells how Mathieu Dreyfus discovered the name of the real culprit, Major Waldin-Esterhazy. A stock-broker, de Castro, had happened to buy one of the reproductions of the *bordereau* which Mathieu had had printed and distributed throughout Paris. He glanced at it, and recognised the handwriting as that of a former client, the totally unreliable, dishonest and bogus Count. Although the French military authorities insisted to the end in their refusal to recognise the handwriting as that of Esterhazy, and not of Dreyfus, it was the decisive breakthrough. But apart from a mention of how General Bonnefond had tried to block Dreyfus's promotion to the General Staff, and came out against him in a statement to the newspapers shortly after the accusation that he was a traitor had been made public, there is no suggestion in Michael Burns's book of why it should

have been Dreyfus who was singled out. He was rich, which made people jealous, and rather reserved. But he was a model officer in every way, clearly in no need of money, and obviously sincere in his desire to serve France. Was it all du Paty de Clam's doing, the action of a man presented by Michael Burns as unbalanced to the point of insanity, who acted as a kind of sorcerer's apprentice, setting off a train of events which divided France into the two main camps whose opposition to each other dominated French politics from the 1890s to the ending of the Algerian war in 1962?

If that was indeed the case, it is a remarkable example of the Cleopatra's nose theory of history. Had du Paty de Clam not been such a lunatic (transvestism was one of his minor peculiarities), there would have been no Dreyfus case, no separation of Church and State in 1905, no *Action Française* and, perhaps, not even a Vichy government. For without a catalyst, liquids can remain in

suspension for a very long time. Without the Dreyfus case, perhaps even the poison of French anti-semitism might have eventually been harmlessly absorbed into the body politic of an increasingly stable Republic, in which families like the Dreyfuses were welcomed and honoured for the immense benefits they brought to France. Of their loyalty to the country whose republican ideology had freed them from the shackles still imposed on Jews by the Christianity of the *ancien régime* there can be no doubt. When the Vichy government put on one of its propaganda photographs of Marshal Petain the rhetorical question "Etes-vous plus français que lui?", there was one family which could reply "Oui" in absolute confidence of their right to do so: the Dreyfuses. They, unlike Petain, never gave up defending the values of tolerance, humanity and equality before the law that the Victor of Verdun surrendered in 1940 with such apparent indifference.

novelist concerned with the ephemera of personalities and events than a true historian engaged in the difficult process of understanding one hundred years and more of social change — of the rise of the middle class, or of the gentry, or of the crisis of the aristocracy or the decline of the Renaissance court — anyway of *something* profound which had led England to the verge of major social catastrophe in 1640.

All this is worth recounting because Conrad Russell has now written a thoroughly contemporary, unambiguously professional and subtly argued book which comes to many of the same conclusions, albeit rather differently expressed, as Miss Wedgwood did a generation and more ago. This is not to accuse Professor Russell of stealing Miss Wedgwood's thunder. On the contrary, *The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642* is a work of deeply original thought, profound scholarship and lucid presentation. Still less is it to suggest that he has not properly acknowledged a neglected pioneer. He has done his own prodigious re-researches and come to his own persuasive conclusions. It is only to remark upon how professional prejudices change; no such book would (or indeed could) have been written by a 'professional' historian in the 1950s; and also perhaps to observe how they change more under the influence of wider cultural currents than the professionals themselves (perhaps indeed Russell himself) would be happy to acknowledge.

For *The Fall of the British Monarchies* is, in many ways, a curiously representative book for the last decade of the twentieth century. It is the account of a so-called 'revolution' which refuses to take that revolution at its own, inflated, value. It is a study of a monumental change which does not presume the necessity, still less the sufficiency, of grandiose thematic structures in order to explain that change. It is a work which establishes — through rigorous professional scholarship — the rather vigorous — commonsensical — notion that, even for major upheavals with profound consequences, personalities and events really do matter. It is about a king who mattered: an intelligent, forthright,

Bad King Charles

S J D Green

The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637-1642. Conrad Russell. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, £40.

Nearly forty years ago, Miss (as she then was) C.V. Wedgwood published the first of a two volume narrative account of what most of her contemporaries had learned to call the 'English Revolution'. The term 'revolution', it seems, did not much appeal to Miss Wedgwood. So she entitled the first volume of her work *The King's Peace, 1637-1641*. A second volume, *The King's War, 1641-7*, followed a few years afterwards. These books were greeted with a certain knowing applause by Miss Wedgwood's more self-consciously professional colleagues. Indeed, the more self-consciously professional they were, the more knowing and the more superficially approbatory

was their response. Naturally, they admired her prose. Of course, they were impressed by her enriching detail. Some even affected to be moved by her depiction of the character of Charles I. But when it came to her analysis of the big event, their erstwhile words of praise failed them. For Miss Wedgwood seemed to offer no more of an explanation for the English revolution than a political narrative of the events of 1637 to 1641. And when Miss Wedgwood went further, to suggest that until 1637, the kingdom had been a relatively peaceful and prosperous place, a commonwealth anything but on the edge of a precipice, then they knew she was wrong; more of a

curiously honourable if unquestionably petty and difficult man who wanted his way, and in a terribly ironic sense got what he wanted. It is also about how contemporary politics mattered: about how the day-to-day administration of the realm and the degree to which that administration did, or did not, integrate the political nation into daily loyalty within the realm had profound and unsettling consequences. Finally, it is about how at a critical juncture in the evolution of the British monarchy, the development (or otherwise) of that office became dependent upon the relations of British people with each other, about how happenings in Scotland and Ireland, and the way in which the English perceived what was happening in Scotland and Ireland, were fundamental to the way in which the subjects of the British crown dealt with their British monarch.

In the course of his analysis, Russell demolishes many a long-term cause – especially of the amorphous ‘social’ type once favoured by professional historians – through the impeccable logic of observing that the war broke out outside England but in countries whose social and economic structure was very similar to that of England. He also dismisses many supposed short-term causes of the war: court and country, ‘Anglican’ and ‘Puritan’. He notes the number of men who (in our

terms, not theirs) ‘changed sides’, remained undecided or, simply confused. He succeeds in writing a book which emphasizes the importance of contingency and confusion and downplays the significance of structure and doctrine.

To Russell, of course, these were all very specifically mid-seventeenth century causes and consequences. They embody no timeless truths. They are not material for prognosis about the future. He is too much of a contemporary, professional, historian to have any truck with such unprofessional fancies. But to a less self-consciously ‘professional’ eye they spoke volumes about the historic significance of the political achievement of union in the United Kingdom, and of the relationship between the political achievement of union and the religious system of comprehensive unity. For the fall of the British monarchies was an event which originated in its geographical periphery, was inspired by religious differences; triggered by a religiously intransigent monarch. Yet the British people found in the haste of Charles’ removal and the execution that, their disunity having been caused by the actions of one monarch, none the less the only cause which actually united them at all was their profound desire to express loyalty to a monarch. That is, perhaps, a lesson worth remembering.

liars” who deceive the public – and not only in France? In this, her twenty-fourth book, she defines the masochistic lie in a characteristic passage:

... the lie conceived by the liar, not for his personal profit and to the detriment of his enemies... but the lie that benefits the enemy to the detriment of his country and of the values which the liar pretends to cherish. In politics the masochistic lie is a modern perversion specific to democratic regimes. It has spread itself on earth to support communism, that implacable enemy of our free and civilised society to which the masochistic liar belongs.

Her first example is André Malraux’s famous book, *La Condition Humaine* (mistranslated English title: *Man’s Fate*). In a disturbing passage, Malraux described how Chiang Kai-shek burned captured communists alive by having them thrown into locomotive furnaces. Having discovered on a trip to Hong Kong that nothing of the sort had happened, Labin wrote to the author to ask where he had found his evidence. In a tortuous reply, the great novelist; and (many years later) cleaner of the Parisian monuments, admitted that what he had written was fictitious. She goes a bit too far when she blames this passage for the US decision to cut off aid to Nationalist China, but it must have played a part.

Turning to America’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Labin fingers the *New York Times* and its liberal fans for perverting the meaning of a purely defensive device by dubbing it; “Star Wars”: a splendid and unsolicited propaganda for the Soviet side which desperately wanted President Reagan to drop the SDI because the collapsed Soviet economy could no longer bear the burden of high-tech military competition.

Never one to mince words, Suzanne Labin goes on to lambast Western apologists for the Khmers Rouges and Ho Chi Minh, for Iran’s ayatollahs and Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, as well as the calumniators of the Shah, Pinochet and Argentina’s President

Salute to a Warrior

Brian Crozier

Des Menteurs Masochistes vous Trompent Suzanne Labin, (Autoedition, 3 rue de Thiers, 75007 Paris, 80F); **Revolution or Reconciliation: the Struggle in the Church in South Africa** Rachel Tingle, (Christian Studies £5.99).

For well over four decades Suzanne Labin has fearlessly exposed the horrors of communism. Her first book, *Staline le Terrible* (1949), anticipated Solzhenitsyn’s revelations about the

gulag and the great terror by some twenty-five years. As a warrior for freedom, she is in a class of her own, and I am happy to salute her.

Who then are those “masochistic

Menem (denounced for his amnesty of the generals and denied praise for reprieving many terrorists, including Mario Firmenich, leader of the murderous Montoneros gang). President Mitterrand comes in for his share of lambasting for praising "Franco-Cuban friendship in the service of Human Rights" while ignoring the sufferings of the tens of thousands in Fidel Castro's tropical gulag.

She is at her clear-headed best when exposing the Selective indignation of Western leaders and "intellectuals" about the sufferings caused by apartheid while mutely ignoring the horrors of Mengistu's regime in Ethiopia and the ethnic massacres in Nigeria (Biafrans), Burundi (Hutus), Zimbabwe (Ndebeles), Uganda (various), and elsewhere.

A kindred spirit to Suzanne Labin is Rachel Tingle, whose "Pulpit Watch" column in *Freedom Today* has long cast a critical eye on the penetration and subversion of Christian churches by anti-Christian forces. In her new book, *Revolution or Reconciliation*, she casts an erudite eye on the Church organisations which have done much to legitimise political violence in South

Africa, on condition that the perpetrators are supporters of Nelson Mandela's communist-controlled ANC.

Rachel Tingle denounces apartheid and does not exonerate Afrikaner leaders from responsibility for the tensions and injustices that have led to inter-racial violence. What she has done is to examine the claim by John Kane-Berman, executive director of the even-handed South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) that the Christian leadership in South Africa "has helped to legitimate violence as an instrument of liberation", sowing the whirlwind now being reaped by the black people in the townships.

Mandela's "Spear of the Nation" terrorists were trained in the Soviet Union until detente and economic collapse caused Moscow to drop out. President F.W. De Klerk's attempt to dismantle apartheid is now severely handicapped by the prevailing climate of violence, fanned by the World Council of Churches and its "contextual theology". This is an important study of a tragic situation made worse by misguided "Christian" churches.

workings of the constitution. They have emphasised the central institutions of government at the expense of intermediate institutions, and practice has tended to follow their findings. In the present circumstances, then, "having over-simplified, we need to recomplicate" (p.80).

This pluralistic concern is an admirable one. For successive governments, the doctrine that parliament can do no wrong has offered certain attractions, but its pernicious effects on the rest of us cannot be denied without a proper system of checks and balances, the citizen feels defenceless against the state; he begins to agree with Rousseau that freedom only ever arrives at election-time. The feeling of impotence causes abstinence from political activity by all but the over-committed. The parliamentary pastime of bullying local government is a dreadful example of what can happen; as power is stripped away ordinary voters lose interest and extremists grab control; the ensuing decline in local politics tempts the central government to interfere again, and thus the process continues (p.205).

Mount's proposed remedies to our present difficulties do not represent a scramble for novelties. For the most part, his ideas are firmly grounded in existing practices and trends. In order to perform their function of restraining the executive, certain institutions need to be reinforced. The House of Lords should be prudently reformed, and the judiciary granted more independence. The increasing tendency for the Royal Family to speak on political matters is noted with enthusiasm. In the Commons, the Select Committee system holds out promise that a proper scrutinizing function can be performed by back-benchers. If government business is slowed down by more informed criticism, this would be no bad thing. As a further impediment to parliamentary hyperactivism, legislation of constitutional import should be "entrenched"-invulnerable to change without special majorities. Fixed-term parliaments, rather than proportional representation, seen as a further useful limit on executive power.

Many of these proposals seem both moderate and necessary. It is the

Mounting the Lion

Mark Garnett

The British Constitution Now, Ferdinand Mount; Heinemann, 1992, £18.50.

According to Ferdinand Mount, "constitutional theorists who wish to hold our attention must charm as well as instruct" (p.65). *The British Constitution Now* certainly holds the attention. The author's various accomplishments as novelist, editor and political researcher are well known; this happy combination has produced an essay which is eloquent, concise and thought-provoking.

Concern about the constitution has not been confined to the predictable malcontents in recent years. The

impact of Europe, demands for Scottish and Welsh devolution, and misgivings over the diminished status of local government have coincided to lift the constitution back into prominence. According to Mount, these developments have occurred after a century in which constitutional thinking has declined. The few important contributors since the time of Bagehot suffered from undue party bias, and because of their excessive concentration upon the location of power they have over-simplified the

question of Europe, however, which probably inspired the book, and here Mount's views are rather surprising in view of his old association with Mrs. Thatcher. Once again he suggests that traditional constitutional thinking is the culprit for many misunderstandings. If the idea of indivisible sovereignty is a distortion, as the author claims, then a federal union loses much of its terror. Since our courts are already taking the European Convention on Human Rights into consideration, would it not be better to adapt the Convention to the British constitution, possibly by means of legislative "entrenchment"? This would prevent the expense and delay of appeals to European courts, and enhance the standing of British judges. In order to deliver a pre-emptive blow against the likely critics of these views, Mount suggests that "the prime allegiance of many *Brugeistes* is to national sovereignty rather than to free trade", since the exchange-rate stability provided within the EMS is a prerequisite of a flourishing free-trade system. Since national sovereignty has been portrayed as largely a sham, this says very little for the penetration of the "*Brugeiste*" (p.243).

This interesting point is not quite so effective as it seems at first sight. It would be odd to place allegiance to an abstract idea such as free-market liberalism above patriotic feeling; the *Brugeiste* might be wrong to think that national well-being depends upon the retention of "sovereignty", but not more obviously wrong than Mount, who thinks that national well-being is guaranteed by the operation of free markets. The situation is not improved when the author explains his support for managed exchange-rates. He notes that instability often arises from irresponsible speculation, and this seriously hampers trade. Nevertheless, his point seems to be that it is quite proper to interfere in the free market for the sake of the free market; clearly belief in "national sovereignty" is not the only incoherent position in the world.

Mount provides some entertaining reasons for treating Bagehot, Dicey and Ivor Jennings with caution; above all, their private political concerns

drove them away from "scholarly impartiality" (p.71). *The British Constitution Now* is an emollient book, but it is scarcely free from bias. Some of Dicey's opinions seem ludicrous today, but before the echo of our laughter dies away we may find that others have begun to chuckle at our own speculations. For instance, the author complains that "The D.E.Swas for a period of years, not only suspicious of but appeared quite baffled by the concept of state schools opting out of local authority control" (p.155). We cannot yet be sure that the DES was so very wrong to take this obstructive approach, but even if they were wrong it is odd for a writer who advocates greater delay in the passage of legislation to chastise them for their caution. His dismissal of unemployment as "a highly misleading policy guide" (p.150) reflects an attitude which might not be fashionable for ever. He mischievously tinkers with Burke, implying that he talked of government as a *mere* contrivance for satisfying human wants (p.78). Finally, his connection with Margaret Thatcher may have led him to downplay the menace of Prime Ministerial powers. Certainly these cannot be measured by counting the staff at the Prime Minister's disposal, as Mount suggests. The example of the Poll Tax shows that the amount of havoc a minister can cause is not related to the number of researchers at his disposal.

The British Constitution Now is not free from moments of controversy, but if anything this will add to its beneficial effects. Even if none of Mount's proposals are enacted, the book has aroused discussion and there is an obvious need for debate on the subject. Mount has provided a further welcome service, in reminding us that a wide range of conclusions can be drawn from conservative premises. However our constitution develops under the present strains, we should be thankful if the various arguments are rehearsed with the clarity and elegance of Ferdinand Mount.

Notes on Reviewers

George Chowdharay-Best does research for the Oxford Dictionaries.

Brian Crozier's *Gorbachev Phenomenon* (Claridge Press, 1990) correctly predicted subsequent events in Russia.

Antony Flew is Distinguished Research Fellow at the Social Philosophy and Policy Centre of Bowling Green State University, Ohio.

Mark Garnett is Lecturer in Politics at Durham University.

S J D Green is Lecturer in History at Leeds University.

A W Purdue is Lecturer in History at the Open University.

Philip Thody is Professor of French at Leeds University.

Esmond Wright is Emeritus Professor of American History at London University.

In Short

Wild Swans Jung Chang. Harper Collins. £16.99, 1991.

This book tells in almost unbearable detail just what it was like even for high ranking members of the Communist party to live through the Cultural Revolution and other madneses generated by Mao Tse Tung. This was a society in which hardly anybody dared to laugh, still less think. The author's father, a high-minded idealist who was also a capable guerilla leader and administrator, was broken and humiliated by the very party which he had served. Apart from the human story, there are remarkable insights into how Mao's China worked or more often – didn't work. Everything was done through the party, which took its cues from Mao's off the cuff pronouncements. There was no legal code; this enormous country was governed down to grass roots level by elaborate but arbitrary regulations and procedures. People's relationships were, and still are, determined by 'family background'. Most were brutalized beyond any sense of right and wrong; those who were not often committed suicide.

Can we afford to take a detached view? I was constantly struck by the parallels with our own country. Mao was preoccupied with power and doctrine regardless of results; so is the mafia which has controlled education in Britain for so many years. Its madneses could well be described as Maoist. (SD).

Painting, Power and Patronage. The Rise of the Professional Artist in Renaissance Italy. Bram Kempers. Allen Lane, the Penguin Press. £25.00.

The rise of professionalism in any walk of life is a fascinating subject. Professionalism is solely due to the pressure of demand. This stimulus, and its predictable constancy in the

foreseeable future, builds up discipline and method indivisible from a properly organised undertaking. In another expanded thesis Bram Kempers, the present professor of the Sociology of Art at the University of Amsterdam, pioneers new research by undertaking, for the first time, the accurate charting of the practical circumstances of art patronage in 13th and 14th century Siena. The furnishing of cogent images in church was one of the most pressing needs of the early Renaissance. These were called upon to parallel visibly the homiletic skills of the mendicant orders, and Professor Kempers is expert in demonstrating the Mendicants' requirements and the practical steps they took to realise them.

It is a fascinating story treated in an interesting and helpful way, but the book becomes less convincing and secure as the author deals with 14th and 15th century Florence. This enquiry is then extended into a further chapter dealing with patronage and professionalism in 15th and 16th century Rome, Milan, Urbino and Venice, but the treatment is more and more hurried and summary.

Finally, there is a chapter, Part V, on art patronage up to, and including, the 20th century. The ending of a serious book on the rise of the professional artist in the Renaissance in such an inappropriate and almost frivolous manner is particularly infuriating. (PR)

The Wealth of Giving. Every one in his inheritance. Barry Bracewell-Milnes. IEA 1989. £6

Just before the election John Major mentioned that he was in favour of abolishing inheritance tax. His remark makes Barry Bracewell-Milnes' booklet peculiarly topical. It reflects a lifetime's study of taxation problems and demonstrates brilliantly with clear detail and excellent mathematical diagrams how inheritance tax, far from

creating wealth, actually destroys it. A list of manor houses and modest family firms and shops which have disappeared since the war would make depressing reading. The very rich are generally unaffected as they can make special arrangements which are not open to 'middle income' estates. The recent inflation in house prices has highlighted this problem. Wealth created by giving is a public good and an unsuitable base for taxation. The case for abolition is even stronger for family business than for general assets.

(MC)

Suffer the Little Children D.H.S. Reid, Medical Institute for Research into Child Cruelty, The Orkney MIRIC Series, 1992, £15.

Dr Reid highlights the vulnerability of nine children taken, in a raid by the police and social workers, from their homes on a quiet Orkney island, incarcerated in foster homes on the mainland and denied access to members of their families.

No lawyer was present as they were questioned repeatedly about lurid allegations of ritualistic sexual abuse. No adults were charged and all are presumed (but not proved) innocent. Lord Clyde's *Report of the Inquiry into the Removal of the Children* published in October 1992, was highly critical of the removal, but had no brief to examine the allegations.

Dr Reid, a consultant paediatrician who had been involved in the Cleveland Affair, travelled to Orkney to investigate and concluded that the adults were innocent. Whatever the truth, as Dr Reid points out in his very detailed, but rather rambling book, the trauma suffered by the children who found themselves snatched in raids by strangers, is unforgivable. If they had been criminals Rentamob would have been on the streets demanding the release of the "Orkney Nine".

(BR)

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