


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The Salisbury Review

The quarterly magazine of conservative thought



The Third Marquess of Salisbury
1830 - 1903

Lord Acton

Russell Kirk

Tales of the Dependency Culture

David Marsland

England's Deadliest Sin

Raymond Tong

Down with the Feminazis!

Patricia Lança

The New Euro-Fascists

Rodney Atkinson

Serbia's Mafia-ridden Society

Chandler Rosenberger

The Claridge Press

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Conservative Journal *Proglas*

Produced in Brno, Moravia, under the editorship of a team headed by Petr Fiala and František Mikš, *Proglas* is now in its fifth year of publication, and is the most solidly conservative intellectual journal in the Czech Republic. It is named from the old Slavonic word for prologue (used by Sts Cyril and Methodius for their introduction to the Slavonic Bible), and is Christian in culture, although at the same time Catholic in the true sense of the word. Its contributors range widely over the older and younger generations of Czech and Moravian writers, and it makes a serious attempt to mingle current affairs with philosophical discussions inspired by the conservative worldview. *Proglas* is noteworthy too for its attempt to provide the intellectual equipment of which the new Czech Republic most stands in need: articles from *The Salisbury Review*, which it carries usually in every issue, and which are much appreciated by Czech intellectuals.

The second issue for 1994 contains translations of

Jacques Maritain (on antisemitism), John Carroll (on masculine and feminine translated from the *Salisbury Review*), and J. Budziszewski (on the illusion of moral neutrality, from *First Things*). There is an obituary of Dietrich von Hildebrand, and articles on Natural Law, Eric Voegelin and the Czech religious writer Klement Bochorák. Reviews extend to theatre as well as the written word, and by no means the least interesting item is an interview with the French priest Etienne Richter, who has worked so tirelessly to mend relations between Christians and Jews. Other issues have presented Conservative Thinkers from our pages, while endeavouring to keep abreast of political and cultural developments in Britain, France and Germany.

In the new conditions it is difficult for Czech journals to survive. All those with a reading knowledge of Czech are invited to take out a subscription, at 90 DM per annum for six issues. Address: Mendlovo nám., 1a, 60300 Brno.

The Salisbury Review

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We are familiar with the irresponsibility of leftists: their eager assaults on power and authority, regardless of the effect on national interest and social survival. But the same irresponsibility can be observed on the right. For many months the conservative press in America has been hounding President Clinton, whose mediocre character and unprincipled world-view leaves him with few moral resources in his hour of need. Yet he is accused of nothing more than the peccadilloes that are required in order to rise to the top of the Democratic Party. Meanwhile, his hands are tied by scandal, the White House devotes all its time and energy to this trivial domestic issue, the burning questions of foreign policy remain undiscussed, and the world's greatest country drifts rudderless down the stream of time, awaiting the iceberg that will sink it.

The effects of this assault on President Clinton, which is really an assault on the office that he occupies, can be seen in the Balkans, where the Serbs, whose mafia-ridden society is described here by Chandler Rosenberger, are close to achieving the Greater Serbia that will bring permanent instability to the region. No clear signal has come from the American Presidency, even though, when all is said and done, no other institution has the power to defeat the Serbian aims. Nor has America woken up, as yet, to the dangerous turn of events in Russia and the Ukraine, or to the catastrophe of Burundi and Rwanda. For the first time we are being provided with a glimpse of what the world would be like without American leadership.

Some might welcome such a world. After all, America may have made the world safe (for a while) for democracy; but it also made the world safe for feminism, and the escalating misery that stems from it. As Patricia Lança points out, there is nothing in the feminist ideology that could conceivably command the assent of a rational being, and the only result of its propagation is the destruction of love between the sexes.

However, some might welcome *that* result as well: after all, it is love between the sexes that produces the overpopulation of which Raymond Tong complains. The problem is that feminists who lose their love for the other sex, do not necessarily lose their desire for children, and

modern technology will leap to their aid, glad of an opportunity to by-pass the family in the production of new human life. The result is a new kind of virgin birth: but not one in which virginity is a virtue.

Feminism is one result of social breakdown, and of America's loss of belief in itself, and in the spontaneous order of the family. The same kind of breakdown can be witnessed elsewhere in the Christian world, and nowhere in more spectacular form than in our once proud colonies, which have now declined to a state of pathological wimpishness that must be directly experienced if it is to be credited.

For those unable to make the journey, however, William Peters has described the pathetic case of Australia, poignantly contrasting the Queen's recent visit with that of thirty years ago, and showing the roots of today's republicanism in the decline of a national idea. Contemplating the picture that he paints, one turns almost with relief to our own familiar shores, and the unending story of the welfare culture, told once again by David Marsland. Of course it is, in the end, the same story — the story of a society pulverised by its dependence on the state. And the methods used by the bureaucrats to maintain their privileges (methods discussed here by Vivian Linacre) are doubtless the same in Australia as they are at home. Nevertheless, it is hard to see the point of our former colonies, if they cannot set us an example. Should they continue to ape our degeneracy, we might have to forget them altogether.

Forgetfulness is, however, the greatest threat to our future. Those who take decisions on our behalf seem unable to remember who we are, what we have been, and what we aspire to be. Our politicians look at the prospect of European union, and fail to remember that the nations of Europe (with the exception of Britain and Portugal) were shaped by the recent experience of defeat and occupation. Their impetuous rush towards union is the result of a moral panic that we do not share. And yet our politicians press onwards with the herd, forgetting not only history, but also the simple truths that Rodney Atkinson here places before us. It is hard to discover, in the history of our nation, a parallel instance of willed amnesia.

Life During Wartime

Chandler Rosenberger looks at Serbia's mafia-ridden society

Crime feeds the war, the war feeds crime. Every brutal rape in Bosnia prompts retaliation, prolongs the war. Every new week of the war blurs the line between a smuggler and a hero, a patriot and a gangster. In Serbia today it is sometimes hard to know whether the crimes are used to prosecute the war or the war to cover up the crimes.

On Terazije, a cobblestone pedestrian zone in downtown Belgrade, haggard men stand, shoulders slumped, muttering "*devise, devise*" at passers by, occasionally catching a customer. The curbs of the "Boulevard of the Revolution" are strewn with casually parked but carefully polished Mitsubishi Pajero Jeeps, the status symbol of Serbia's new sharp-suited breed of businessman. Every few days one of their drivers is gunned down in broad daylight outside a fashionable restaurant. If you didn't know better, you would think that the Serbs were addicted to heroin and besieged by battling gangs of druglords.

The truth is darker still. The Serbs are addicted, but to hard currency (*devise*), not hard drugs. Hyperinflation sends them running wild-eyed to money changers each day, either to change their meager Yugoslav-dinar salaries into Deutschmarks or to swap some stashed dollars for food. With contracts as meaningless as the dinars they promise, bigger deals are done at the point of a Zastava pistol.

History never promised the Serbs anything else. Under the Ottoman empire they maintained a civil society beyond Constantinople's control in part by leaving it up to bandits to maintain public order. These *klepts* were then so glorified by folklore and ballads that in the recent Serbian elections one well-known war criminal campaigned for office in December by trying, Nazi-

style, to blend his criminal career into that part of the national identity. Committing crimes in defence of the nation, implied Zelko Raznjatovic (better known as Arkan) was a noble Serbian tradition.

But Arkan, then already a member of the Serbian parliament, could not claim his share of Serbia's dominant ideology of national socialism by promoting its nationalist angle. His party actually lost ground as the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the political machine of President Slobodan Milosevic, increased its share of the 250 member parliament from 101 to 123 seats. While almost every party contesting the elections, including the opposition parties, tried to portray themselves as ferocious defenders of "Greater Serbia," Milosevic quietly stood above, showing himself on television only as the quiet apparatchik plodding away in pursuit of the nation's aims. The Milosevic machine knew better than to try to sell potent nationalism to a public raised on grey communism. Although Serbia has plumbed depths of political and economic depravity not known since Hitler's Germany, Milosevic has brought the country to National Socialism from the socialist side.

And to the victor shall go the spoils. Belgrade's street battles are merely for the crumbs, such as crumpled Western bills, that fall from the feast that members of the SPS enjoy. Serbia's hyperinflation, which in the month of the elections hit 250,000 per cent per month, is in fact a vacuum cleaner that the SPS is using to suck the nation's hard currency into its pockets, according to leading independent Belgrade economists. Although Milosevic tells the Serbs that they are suffering because of the sanctions the West has imposed, his government's response

has been far deadlier than the measures themselves. Often accused of war crimes, Milosevic seems rather to have committed a crime-war.

The noble bandits

Sometimes Serbia's folk legacy of noble warrior-bandits appears to have come to life in a nightmare form. Take for example the strange case of the mild-mannered Montenegrin actor Jarkula Lausavic. Halfway through his run portraying Caruga, a sort of nineteenth-century Serb Robin Hood, Lausavic shot dead some young toughs from his home town who were hassling his brother in a bar. He said it was the first time he had ever used a gun.

"In Belgrade today", says Duska Jovanic, a stylish journalist specialising in the mafia, "you can't tell the difference between the end of literature and the beginning of life".

The historic character Lausavic portrayed is only one of a number glorified in Serbian literature and folk music. After their medieval state had fallen to Ottoman rule, Serbs established provincial governments under the umbrella of the Orthodox church. Officially the provinces were to be defended by *armatoles*, militias sanctioned by the local church. But in practice the provinces were barely governable and plagued by renegade Ottoman soldiers. Church leaders were forced to form alliances with *klepts*, bandits who ran private armies. The *klepts* were glorified in folksongs as "individuals who alone or with a close band of faithful comrades fought fiercely and bravely against the odds". Vuk Karadzic, codifier of the Serbian language, avidly collected such songs.

Today the songs are still lustily sung at gatherings such as *Slavas*, Thanksgiving-like feasts that Serbs hold on an Orthodox Church saint's day. I spent

the evening of election day sipping vodka and humming along as a friend and his relatives begged a guest playing the accordion to come up with folksong after folksong. It was a heady mix of religion and adventurism, a holiday that seemed to sanction the divine destiny of the Serbs literally to steal their way to freedom.

Wrap such a culture in sanctions, and smugglers will hear their praises sung. Dejan Lucic, a real estate dealer in Belgrade, said he approved of some of the criminal gangs operating outside his office on Terazije. "The embargo produced them," he said, "because they are simply providing what is necessary for life. To me these people are heroes".

Fascism (in its purest form) fails

If the Fascist technique is to use a nation's symbols in a fury of self-pity and a promise of renewal, then Arkan gets 10 out of 10 for form. Rallies for his "Serbian Party of Unity" took all the images whipped in living rooms during *Slavas* and bent them through a prism of high technology and public relations hype. In sports halls across the country, Arkan ushered the disenfranchised into their own Slavic Nuremberg.

The Belgrade basketball stadium where I saw Arkan "perform" was draped with banners emblazoned with the Serbian cross, ordinary but for the four "C"s curving up along the cross-sections. The "C"s stand (in Cyrillic characters) for "Sano Sloga Srbina Spasava" — Only Unity can save the Serbs". As the crowd wandered in, piles of black Peavey speakers repeatedly blasted a simple tune written for Arkan's campaign by Marina Tucakovic, one of Serbia's leading folk musicians and a candidate for the party.

When the stage curtain rose, the court became a church. On stage was a fifteen-piece orchestra to accompany a choir whose members stood as if in stalls on either side of the brightly lit Serbian cross. Electric prayer candles flickered at their feet. Arkan was nowhere to be seen. Instead, an MC introduced folk star after folk star to perform their hits. Ceca Velickovic sang turned

out in a long white dress rather than her usual jeans. Under the cross and backed up by the choir she looked like the bride of the nation.

Nazi strategy, according to George L. Mosse, a leading scholar, was to litter Germany with "sacred spaces" — festival meadows, monuments — for the practice of the political liturgy. "The new politics can be regarded as one successful way in which the sacred space was filled: with parades, marches, gymnastics exercises and dances, as well as ritual speeches."

We had had the games, now it was time for the speeches. The MC returned to introduce some of the party's local candidates, then announced the entrance of the "man whose enemies fear him". Out strode Arkan only to stand stiff while a trumpeteer in World War One dress uniform led the crowd through the (unofficial) Serbian na-

Hyperinflation is the vacuum cleaner that the party élite uses to suck hard currency savings out of the Yugoslav population

tional anthem. Then Arkan approached the mike and let loose with his theme — unity, unity, unity.

"The foundation of the Serbian state", he ranted "is Serbian unity. We must forget the past, that some of us were Communists." An appropriate message for a man who, according to an Oxford historian, travelled through the 1980's on a diplomatic passport, doing the Communists' dirty work. "We are an Orthodox people, we believe in God and Serbia", Arkan shouted, his voice cracking. "Serbia! Serbia! Serbia!" The words of Mosse applied equally well here. "This was not just a movement of protest reacting to specific grievances", he wrote:

but was rather a form of mass politics which appealed to more permanent longings and which tried to hypostatize these through myth, symbol and aesthetic politics. The new political style

attempted to take the place of mediating institutions, such as representative parliamentary government which links governors to governed.

Back on the streets of Belgrade art, life and history again passed images like batons in a reckless relay race. At the Yugoslav Dramatic Theatre, Alisa Stojanovic was directing a sold-out run of "Cabaret". She had decided, she said, not to highlight the comparisons between Nazi Berlin and contemporary Belgrade too much. "The parallels are so obvious", she said, "that there was no reason to exaggerate them."

As all the world became a stage it was difficult to tell where playing left off and life began. In Stojanovic's production, a fresh-faced Anglo-Serbian singer named Ana Sofrenovic played her role with wordly disdain. But on the platform of an opposition rally later in the week she stopped a few hearts (mine, anyway) with her clear soprano, moaning "Why Did you Leave Me?" Although Arkan's singers were required on his stage to match his coarse naive nationalism, in their own clubs they carried on as usual. One, "Baby Doll", strutted around the mafiosi bar "Tabou" in Spandex tights and a sequined blouse pinching 1940's hits with her Minnie Mouse voice. Every time the green spot lights caught the dark roots of her peroxide blond hair I thought she did more to bring Berlin back than Ana ever could.

But for all the similarities to 1930's Berlin, Arkan failed at the ballot box, losing half his seats. Although there were signs that the votes in his home province had been tampered with, Arkan had clearly made no impact on the nation. The party with real electoral pull proved to be the one that appealed to a sense of more recent Serbian history

The Social-Nationalists

"Your typical SPS voter", one wag wrote, "is like a penguin. He likes the cold, he likes to stand in line and he likes to clap." Part of Milosevic's success at the ballot box lies in stuffing it, but another part in his approach of National Socialism from its Socialist

side. In the period of upheaval that he helped to create, Milosevic portrays himself as a calm Communist pursuing a careful plan. While nationalists pursue divine destiny, Milosevic marches to a Marxist beat, walking, not running, down history's pre-ordained path.

No wonder it is effective. Like many post-Communist countries, Serbia is largely secular. *Slavas* are for drinking not praying. And like many post-communist populations, the Serbs are passive, expecting no more than their official posts and wages, no matter how worthless. If anyone were going to replace parliamentary institutions with a party machine, he would have to appeal to a longing for the stability of socialism.

Over coffee with Olivera Patić, a student in Prague home for the vacation, I wondered aloud why hyperinflation had not driven the Serbs to rebellion. Inflation of merely 12 per cent, I said, had driven Americans to Ronald Reagan in droves, since they feared its effect on their savings and therefore their plans.

"But it's not like that here", Olivera protested. "People never made their own plans for their own savings."

"Take my parents, she continued. "They graduated from university and went straight into state jobs. They never depended on their own savings, they didn't make plans around them. They expected everything to come from the state. They never cared how high inflation was, just as long as they got their salaries." Olivera complained bitterly that her friends' parents sat out the storm slumped in front of the television.

During the campaign neither Milosevic nor any leading SPS figure appeared to debate with candidates on television. True, Milosevic, as president, was not running in the parliamentary elections. But since the election was a referendum on his record, one might have thought he would spar with opposition figures. That is not to say that Milosevic never appeared on state TV. The cameras lingered lovingly over his every act as head of state. A home movie filmed by

his mother could not have spent more time recording his every gesture when, for example, Milosevic met a Russian delegation to discuss a new oil pipeline. First a look at this map. Then, wait, then this map. Hmm yes. Interesting. What was that on that other map? Hmm, yes I see.

Since the director of state television was a candidate on the SPS list for parliament, it is fair to assume that this portrait of Milosevic as prudent father of the nation was intentional. It certainly accords with his own contempt for open democracy. "Not without reason" Sabrina P. Ramet, an American scholar, notes, "did he (Milosevic) confess to a French journalist in July 1989 that he was hostile to the multi-party system, and actually preferred a system without parties. In a nonparty system, the people place their trust directly in their leader, who therefore embodies the will of the people."

Levy on the masses

According to independent economists in Belgrade SPS members have good reason to applaud their leader. Although Milosevic has blamed his country's record breaking inflation on international sanctions, his government has in fact printed money willy-nilly as part of a scheme to suck hard-currency savings out from under mattresses and into his political and war machine. At a time when ordinary workers receive as little as one DM a month, Milosevic has made his party members very rich.

As Daniel Cveticanin, an economist at the University of Belgrade, points out, Milosevic's response to sanctions has been far more deadly than the sanctions themselves. By inflating thousands of times faster than wages can possibly rise. Milosevic has essentially imposed a 99.99 per cent income tax on all Serb workers.

Hyperinflation is the vacuum cleaner that the party élite uses to suck hard currency savings out of the Yugoslav population, Cveticanin said. Several "chain letter" schemes pretending to be banks, such as Yugoskandic and Daffinament, made headlines in the Western press when they drew Serbs in

with promises of high-interest hard currency savings. Theoretically this money is still in their accounts. Practically it is gone.

But how has the government got at money under the mattresses or from the relatives living abroad who send some money home? Through a variety of new schemes. Take for example, a certain type of bank loan available only to friends of the party. With the right connections, one can give a state bank hard currency collateral for a loan in Yugoslav dinars that can be paid back in Yugoslav dinars, Cveticanin explained.

The recipient of such a loan can turn a quick profit on the street. Say I give Beobanka \$5,000 collateral for a loan of 1 billion dinars at 100 per cent monthly interest. I will have to pay 2 billion dinars back at the end of the month. Fine. I then go to the money-changers that have been selling dinars all day for hard currency and give them a new batch. By the time I've unloaded my billion dinars on them I have come up with only \$4,000 dollars. Am I in trouble?

No. I wait until the end of the month, during which time inflation has run far ahead of the rate of my loan. I can now get 2 billion dinars for \$100. I buy the dinars off the street (perhaps from the employees of someone just starting on such a loan?) and pay off my debt. I'm \$3,900 richer. Of course if I want to get such a loan again I'll have to make a donation to a "worthy cause" - say, the Socialist Party of Serbia or one of the Bosnian Serb irregular forces. But I need not fear that the interest on my loan, no matter how high, will be higher than the rate of inflation.

The only loser in this scheme is the poor soul who does not have such connections, earns a paltry Yugoslav wage and is pulling his hard currency out from under the mattress in order to keep up with prices. But since state television has been telling him that inflation is a product of sanctions, he is not likely to rebel.

The one-party economy

In a normal economy the beneficiaries of such schemes would have to fear the

wrath of the unions, who might insist that wages be indexed to keep up with inflation. But thanks to Yugoslavia's enduring Communist legacy, union leaders are not elected but appointed by the SPS, inheritor of the former League of Communists of Serbia. Instead of pressing for indexing, union leaders "negotiate" with the Economic Chamber of Serbia representatives of managements.

"They make these farcical negotiations every day", Dusan Mitrovic, head of Serbia's only true independent (and therefore impotent) union said. "But any decision is meaningless if you have 3 per cent inflation an hour. And they will not index wages to inflation. Inflation is in their interest — they live on it".

The Yugoslav legacy of "self-management" means that there is little chance of a Lech Walesa rising to challenge the establishment, according to labour expert Mihail Arandarenko. Since workers were theoretically represented in the management of their factories, no union ever represented the workers of more than one factory. This virtual guild system has allowed the SPS to play one factory off against others in a game of divide and rule. "Each enterprise has its own interest," Arandarenko said. "Workers from one factory are only concerned with conditions at that factory." Union leaders are reduced, he said to scrounging state reserves for truckloads of goods such as laundry, detergent and chocolate.

But as Yugoslavia "privatizes", the SPS has scrapped "self management" in favour of schemes that give management up to 200 times more shares in industry per head than workers, according to law professor Dragon Hiber. Such shares are worthless in an economy so shattered that the major steel manufacturer now cans wild mushrooms. But they could prove valuable once sanctions are lifted.

In the meantime SPS affiliates have moved quickly into the property market as those without savings sell their apartments for food. One of Belgrade's most successful real estate agencies, "Elita", is run by a former journalist

purged for writing a book about the Communist mafia. Many of his former targets, Dejan Lucic said, are now his clients. Ten or twelve of Belgrade's richest investors bought most of the property often using other names, Lucic said. "And the people who are really rich are very close to the old Communist elite."

Indeed Milosevic's SPS had been built on the ashes of the former Communist League of Serbia as a revanchist revolt against the erosion of party privileges, according to Bozol Jovanovic, an economist who had served in the former Yugoslavia's last federal government. That government had incurred communist wrath, Jovanovic said, by pursuing economic reforms such as free trade and a convertible currency. Milosevic took advantage of the "elasticity" of the federal constitution to subvert reform within Serbia by gathering extraparlimentary political support.

***"This is happening,"
she said, "because we
didn't have the
strength to get rid of
Communism."***

"The main difference between law in socialist countries and law in capitalist ones", Jovanovic said, "is that in a capitalist country, the law is as it is written. In a socialist one, the law is what the comrades decide is the law. Some laws are written but then the comrades decide: the situation has changed; we'll do it a different way. Decisions are made by the strength of the forces in the conflict, not by the law."

Jovanovic usually cheerful, grew glum as he looked over the day's newspaper to try to calculate the worth of his dinars. That morning the rate appeared to be 5 billion dinars to the Deutschmark, although it was bound to change by the hour. He took off his glasses and sighed. "For the whole

year of our government," he said, "it was seven dinars to the mark. Seven."

Peeking behind the curtain

SPS corruption was not a major issue in the 1992 elections, largely because then there was enough money in government coffers to buy off pensioners and state employees. But as inflation corroded even the most generous pay rises, ordinary Serbs began to ask what was happening. Some continued to blame international sanctions but others, such as a pensioner I spoke to while she waited for bread, looked closer to home. "This is happening," she said, "because we didn't have the strength to get rid of Communism."

Small-time criminals, Jovanovic, the journalist, said, are also disillusioned by the speed with which the communists have taken over their trade. They say: "When we were robbing banks in the west, we were taking money from here back to Switzerland."

In the 1993 election SPS corruption was the issue. Indeed the elections only happened because disgust with SPS abuse drove the ultranationalist Serbian Radical party out of a coalition with the SPS and into the opposition. With his dream of "Greater Serbia" virtually achieved, Radical leader Vojislav Seselj returned to his original agenda — ferocious anti-Communism — and vowed to join the DEPOS party, led by dissident writer Vuk Draskovic, in removing Milosevic.

The anti-corruption campaign partially paid off for DEPOS and the Democrats. Despite abuse of state television and other irregularities, the DEPOS increased its share of parliamentary seats from 41 to 50. The Democrats leapt from 7 to 33. DEPOS spokesman Ivan Kovacevic attributed their gains in part to the good cooperation DEPOS had from the Radicals in monitoring the elections. But even those gains could not make up for the body-blow the SPS landed on its erstwhile allies, the Radicals. The 1993 elections, designed to get rid of them, nearly did just that. Savaged by state television, Seselj's party fell from 75 to 33 seats in parliament.

Democracy in the streets?

Having also stolen yet another Serbian election, the SPS machine is on the verge of consolidating its grip on Bosnia. If Milosevic can get a peace deal that both maintains his power over Serb held parts of Bosnia and lifts sanctions, economists say, the mafia running the SPS will be ready to take their "earnings" into the fledgling legitimate businesses in the rest of Central Europe. Milosevic will then be master both of "Greater Serbia" and its highly concentrated finances.

But it will be a close run thing. Milosevic must now hurry for a peace deal in Bosnia that will encourage the West to lift its sanctions. Party hacks at the unions might soon side with the workers for a change and rural communities, long able to remain immune to inflation by bartering food, might refuse to feed the cities.

Milosevic's two reliable bastions of popular support — pensioners dependent on state handouts and rural communities able to barter their way round inflation — might also soon abandon him.

Pensions have not been able to keep up with inflation, leaving the retired to line up every Saturday for half a mile to receive bread and beans from a charity run by Draskovic's wife, Danica. One woman, who said she was dying of cancer, had been standing under Kneza Mihaila Street's cast-iron lampposts since 4 a.m. She did not blame sanctions for her troubles. "Life was hard here even before the sanctions", she said. "This country is being robbed. We have no leadership, no state, no economy." She looked mournfully as she waited for her last words to be translated. "I feel like I am living on the very edge."

Rural Serbia, out of the reach of Belgrade's independent television station, has traditionally supported Milosevic staunchly. But its farmers have shown signs of bolshiness too. When the Serb government tried last July to impose price controls on food, shops emptied. If the dinar economy in the cities breaks down completely, Arandarenko, the labour expert said, Milosevic may be forced to use the

army to bring food in from the farms. State officials in charge of emergency reserves have already slipped them illegally onto the black market, according to Cveticanin.

With panic spreading, some of Milosevic's SPS loyalists are starting to jump ship. Zoran Andelic, an SPS textiles mogul, was apparently not convinced that he would ever be able to reap the rewards of sticking with Milosevic until sanctions were lifted. He fled the country and claimed the money in an off-shore account in Cyprus under his name, according to Hiber.

But others are literally banking on Milosevic getting a deal in time for them to invest in legitimate enterprises once sanctions are lifted. "This class of war-profiteers and members of the old nomenklatura", Hiber said, "are planning to become big players in the official European markets. They will start their official businesses with the money they have gained in these two or three unfortunate years."

Knowing he cannot afford to disappoint the party faithful or let Serbia fall into anarchy, Milosevic may therefore make some surprising concessions at the peace talks. Do not be surprised, for example, if Arkan, having proved so ineffective in the elections, suddenly turns up in chains at the Hague to be prosecuted as a war criminal.

The Crimean War

That would be the ultimate manifestation of Milosevic's Machiavellian ways and a bitter pill for anti-Milosevic activists to swallow. The SPS could hand over a flagrant criminal, perhaps even accuse him of neo-Nazi "war crimes", and continue quietly pursuing their grey Social Nationalist ways. Those ways haven't changed. Days before the election, Slavojub Filipovic, a member of DEPOS who investigates the secret police, was called into a police station for a session he later described as "psychological terror". The authorities wanted to get the names of his contacts.

Filipovic chuckled bitterly at the thought that while murders were being committed in broad daylight the police

had time to harass him. "To think differently is a much worse criminal act than to commit a real crime," he said. "They will forgive you everything that you have ever done in your life if you are a member."

"Besides", he added, "there is no difference between the criminals and the leading members of the government. The leaders are the mafia and the mafia are our leaders."

My host for the week in Belgrade had spent the summer of 1991 sleeping on a different couch every night one step ahead of the Yugoslav Army conscription officials. Perhaps that is how he acquired his manic habit of starting the day with a blast of "wake up" music during breakfast. On the last morning I was in Belgrade he danced out of his bedroom to the nerve-rattling guitars of a Talking Heads song, "Life during Wartime." We sang along over Turkish coffee, revelling in the black humour of it all.

Heard of van that's loaded with weapons,
packed up and ready to go
Heard of some gravesites out by the highway,
a place where nobody knows.
The sound of gunfire off in the distance,
I'm getting used to it now.
Lived in the ghetto, lived in a brownstone
I've lived all over this town.

This ain't no party, this ain't no disco
This ain't no fooling around,
This ain't no dancing, or lovey-dovey,
I ain't got time for that now.

Or as a rather more ancient songwriter put it:

I see violence and strife in the city.
Day and night they go round it on its walls;
and mischief and trouble are within it,
ruin is in its midst;
oppression and fraud
do not depart from its market place.

Chandler Rosenberg is a Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs. A shorter version of this report appeared in *National Review*.

Lord Acton on Revolution

Russell Kirk examines Acton's changing views

On the face of the matter, it may seem an insane conjunction to link with the name of John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, first Baron Acton, with the revolutions of the past three centuries. Acton was a man of archives and books, sometimes called the most erudite scholar of his century. Born to great estate, he was the near kinsman of cardinals, cabinet ministers, and dukes. By station and residence he was protected against the violent events of his time. At his great country house of Aldenham in Shropshire, at his Bavarian estate of Herrnsheim near Worms, at his father's Neapolitan palace, or at his Tegernsee retreat, he saw nothing of social disorder or the rough side of life; unlike many young Englishmen of his station, he had no acquaintance with military life.

Indeed, his only encounter with the nationalist and socialist violence of the nineteenth century occurred at Rome in 1870, when Italian troops occupied the city while Acton was a hostile observer there of the proceedings of the Vatican Council. Yet Acton repeatedly commends Revolution in his notes, literary fragments, and correspondence; five of his major essays and reviews are concerned directly with Revolution, as is one of his two completed volumes of lectures, *Lectures on the French Revolution*, published after his death. Gertrude Himmelfarb, in her biography of this great scholar, goes so far as to entitle one section of her eighth chapter "The Philosopher as Revolutionist". So it may be worthwhile to trace the reflections of this eminent Liberal, friend of Gladstone, on those upheavals we call revolutions.

Now sometimes, in employing the word "revolution", Acton merely means a revolution in the history of

ideas, his chosen discipline: in the realm of thought, as in the political realm, he endeavoured to recognize both the need for continuity and the necessity, at certain times, for an eruption of the new. But also he sanctioned certain violent political revolutions that had occurred in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries — the Puritan Revolution, the English Revolution (of 1688), two American Revolutions (did you not know that two such occurred?), and even the French Revolution in some degree.

How then did Acton come from time to time to commend Revolution? Because he thought of political revolutions as bringing about, usually, an increase of Freedom

This tolerance of Revolution occurred during the latter part of his life. The revolutions — or rather, the risings — of 1830 in the Continent had occurred four years before his birth at Naples; he had been a schoolboy at Oscott during the socialist and nationalist outbreaks of 1848; as he grew to manhood, made a journey to the United States in 1853, and presently studied with Dr. Dollinger, he became suspicious of democratic movements and hostile toward nationalism. He was greatly shocked by the atrocities of the Parisian Communards, who murdered the Archbishop of Paris on the barricades in 1871, instructing his children to pray daily for the soul of the good

Archbishop Darboy. Through studying with Dollinger, and through his own historical and political reading in so many books, he came to venerate Edmund Burke, who had set his face against the "antagonist world" of revolutionary destruction. One might make an interesting pamphlet of Acton's many praises of Burke, especially early in Acton's achievement: he called Burke "the teacher of mankind", and remarked that Burke's speeches from 1790 to 1795 were "the law and the prophets". He agreed with Burke that the French Revolution had been "the enemy of liberty".

How then did Acton come from time to time to commend Revolution? Because he thought of political revolutions as bringing about, usually, an increase of Freedom. Here we need to inquire what Acton meant by this Freedom or Liberty which was the great subject of his study, lecturing, and writing. He meant Ciceronian and Christian concepts of liberty — ordered freedom, governed by conscience. He understood, of course, Cicero's distinction between *voluntas* and *libido*: the first is willed freedom, the freedom of the high old Roman virtue; the second is lust, the freedom of unhalloed appetites.

And Acton knew, of course, the Pauline truth that "the service of God is perfect freedom." Acton understood that power is the ability to do unto other people as one wishes, whether those others so wish or not; while freedom is the ability to withstand arbitrary power. Thus true freedom is the opportunity to make moral choices, and to do one's moral duty here below. Lord Acton — who never throughout his life suffered under any arbitrary power — detested the absolutist political regimes of earlier centuries and those that remained during his own

age. Part of what he meant by freedom may be gathered from the following two brief fragments extracted from his unpublished manuscripts.

"Definition of Liberty: (1) Security for minorities; (2) Reason reigning over reason, not will over will; (3) Duty to God unhindered by man; (4) Reason before will; (5) Right above might."

"Liberty is the condition of duty, the guardian of conscience. It grows as conscience grows. The domains of both grow together. Liberty is safety from all hindrances, even sin. So that Liberty ends by being Free Will."

Liberty of conscience and religious toleration were Acton's highest concerns in the pursuit of personal and civil liberty; these preoccupations made him a Liberal Catholic, opposed to the doctrine of papal infallibility and to much else that resulted from the Vatican Council.

But perhaps we are proceeding too rapidly in describing the development of Acton's views. In his early writings, Acton denounced revolutions as "a malady, a frenzy, an interruption of the nation's growth, sometimes fatal to its existence, often to its independence." How his views gradually changed, we may ascertain by some examination of his successive essays on political revolutions.

The earliest of these, entitled "Political Causes of the American Revolution", was published in Acton's periodical *The Rambler*, May, 1861; it was not reprinted until included in Douglas Woodruff's edition of select Acton *Essays on Church and State*, in 1952. It begins with references to Athenian democracy, and continues: "The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the sovereignty of the people, depends on the choices it makes between these opposite principles, absolute power on the one hand, and on the other the restraints of legality and the authority of tradition." Acton then proceeds — saying nothing whatever about the violent events of the years 1775-1786 in America — to examine the Constitution drawn up in 1787. "Far from being the product of a democratic revolution," he writes, "and of an opposition to English institu-

tions, the constitution of the United States was the result of a powerful reaction against democracy, and in favour of the traditions of the mother country."

In this remarkably percipient essay, written when Sir John Acton was twenty-seven years old and a member of Parliament, he explained the success of America's federal system of government as a guarantor of liberty, restraining national democracy, averting the domination of a temporary numerical majority. He found that Thomas Jefferson with his contempt for social and political continuity, his doctrine that "the dead have no rights" and his trust in the people en masse, "subverted the republicanism of America, and consequently the Republic itself."

Acton, over and over again, expressed his confidence that the universal growth of conscience would end in perfect, or nearly perfect, universal liberty. This is to ignore the Christian dogma of original sin

In a dozen printed pages, Acton discussed the general conservatism of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, whose opinions he had studied closely. His views are very like those expressed in recent years by American scholars as M. E. Bradford, Forrest McDonald, Daniel Boorstin, Clinton Rossiter, and myself. Twenty-eight years later, in his lengthy review of Bryce's book *The American Commonwealth*, Acton would come to very different judgments.

All this about the Constitutional Convention of 1787? Well enough. But what about the American Revolution, an account of which is promised by the title of this major essay? Why, the Revolution that Sir John Acton

wrote about in this essay did not commence in 1775? No, it commenced in 1861; and nowadays we call it the American Civil War, or the War between the States.

For the secession of the Southern states, Acton argued in the following portion of his essay, was a revolution justified by resistance to the looming oppression of South by North; by the attempt of the voracious Northern industrial interest, the fanatic Abolitionists, and the consolidators of national power, to subject the South to an unconstitutional domination of a central government, repudiating true constitutional federalism. The tyranny of a democratic majority over a sectional minority, or of one economic interest over other economic interests, could become intolerable, and the Southerners did well to rebel against democratic despotism (as Tocqueville had called such a condition).

"It is simply the spurious democracy of the French Revolution that has destroyed the Union," Acton wrote in 1861, "by disintegrating the remnants of English traditions and institutions." All the great controversies — on the embargo, restriction, internal improvements, the Bank-Charter Act, the formation of new States, the acquisition of new territory, abolition — are phases of this mighty change, steps in the passage from a constitution framed on an English model to a system imitating that of France. The secession of the Southern states," Acton concluded, "... is chiefly important in a political light as a protest and reaction against revolutionary doctrines, and as a move in an opposite direction to that which prevails in Europe." The Confederate revolution, he judged, was a rising meant to secure liberty; the French Revolution had turned out, with its successor risings in Europe, to be the road to a hideous tyranny.

Sir John Acton, M.P., quoted John C. Calhoun with high respect and at great length on concurrent majorities; he agreed in such matters with Orestes Brownson, "the most influential journalist in America"; he cited Alexis de Tocqueville for authority. He exposed the injustice of protective tariffs levied — by the Northern industrial interest;

he assailed the Abolitionists for exhibiting "the same abstract, ideal absolutism, which is equally hostile with the Catholic and the English spirit." This essay of his presents the best case for the Confederate cause made by any observer abroad, a thoroughly conservative judgment in the line of Burke and Tocqueville.

But by 1889, a radical change had occurred in Acton's judgment about the convictions and the assumptions of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, as he had described those constitutional origins in his essay on "Political Causes of the American Revolution" in 1861. Then he had emphasized the freedom of the Framers from abstract doctrine and theoretic dogma; he had declared that the Framers were governed by respect for English institutions, custom, convention, and prescription. Yet in his criticisms of James Bryce's book *The American Commonwealth*, published in the *English Historical Review*, 1889, on finding that Bryce entertained the very judgments about the conservative attachment of the delegates of 1787 to custom, convention, and English institutions which Acton had published eighteen years early — why, Acton proceeded to contradict his eminent Liberal colleague Bryce, and to contradict himself.

For now he declared the American Revolution to have been "the supreme manifestation of the law of resistance, as the abstract revolution in its purest and most perfect shape." Ignoring the judgments of Burke, Gentz, and other analysts of the American War of Independence, Acton now insists that the Americans fought not for constitutional rights, what Burke had called "the chartered rights of Englishmen", but for abstract Liberty. Why should they have counted the cost, and why should we? For the American Revolution taught that "men ought to be in arms even against a remote and constructive danger to their freedom; that even if the cloud is no bigger than a man's hand, it is their right and duty to stake the national existence, to sacrifice lives and fortunes, to cover the country with a lake of blood, to shatter crowns and sceptres and fling parlia-

ments into the sea. On this principle of subversion they erected their commonwealth, and by its virtue lifted the world out of its orbit and assigned a new course to history. Here or nowhere we have the broken chain, the rejected past, precedent and statute superseded by unwritten law, sons wiser than their fathers, ideas rooted in the future, reason cutting as clean as Atropos."

Fine rhetoric. But this exhortation to "sound, sound the clarion, fill the fife", and for other men to wade through lakes of blood in the promotion of abstract principle, seems a trifle false, coming from the country house of a middle-aged nobleman who never struck a blow, dwelling in the security of Victorian England or Hohenzollern Germany. Acton had read Marx, and had urged his great friend Gladstone to do so. In this rhetoric about the American Revolution, do we hear an echo of Marx's doctrine of massive bloodletting to achieve the final Revolution?

Some of us are wiser in our youth than in our middle years; so it seems to have been with Acton. Perhaps there had been growing in Acton's imagination an infatuation with Revolution — and not merely with revolution in the realm of ideas. For it was his assumption, which seems naive to us nowadays, that all revolutions against established and complacent authority would lead, at least in the long run, toward greater genuine freedom for every man.

That postulate runs through Acton's *Lectures on Modern History*, delivered at Cambridge at the turn of the century. He approved the bloodshed of the Puritan Revolution — that is, the English Civil Wars — because it brought down Stuart absolutism, even if it raised up Cromwell; he approved the English Revolution (of 1688), even though it dethroned a Catholic king and began struggles that lasted until 1745. For despite faults, the Act of Settlement, Acton said, "is the greatest thing done by the English nation", establishing Parliamentary supremacy in administration as well as in legislation. Acton's lecture approving the American Revolution (this time, really about the fighting that began in 1775) is more temperate, consistent with Bure's

speeches from 1765 to 1775. Acton points out, however, that the British in North America had suffered no oppression: "There was no tyranny to be resented. The colonists were in many ways more completely their own masters than Englishmen at home." But he seems to glory in Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill.

This acceptance or even enthusiastic approbation of revolutionary violence did not well consist with Acton's subscription to the principle that the means are not justified by the end, or with his condemnation of murder as the worst of sins. Ralph Waldo Emerson (despised by Acton) instructs us that "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds"; to which I add that a fatuous optimism frequently is the damnation of expansive minds. Acton, over and over again, expressed his confidence that the universal growth of conscience would end in perfect, or nearly perfect, universal liberty. This is to ignore the Christian dogma of original sin. In the interest of making progress on the road to that Zion of conscience, Acton was prepared to excuse considerable slaughter.

Consider his uneasy judgement of the judicial murder of Charles I, Archbishop Laud, and Lord Strafford by Cromwell's regicide Parliament. "We cannot avoid the question," Acton wrote, "whether the three great victims deserved their fate. It is certain that they were put to death illegally, and therefore unjustly.... But we have no thread through the enormous intricacy and complexity of modern politics except the idea of progress towards more perfect and assured freedom, and the divine right of free men. Judged by that test, the three culprits must be condemned. That is a principle which cuts very deep, and reaches far, and we must be prepared to see how it applies in thousands of other instances, in other countries, and in other times, especially the times in which we live."

Do we not find in Acton's preceding sentence the implication that men and women so foolish as to stand in the way, wittingly or unwittingly, of some

grand principle of liberty, say — must be thrust aside, or “liquidated”, as the ideologues of the twentieth century would put it? There comes to mind Madame Roland’s lamentation, “O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name”. At the time of his lecture on the Puritan Revolution, Acton was deep in preparation for his succeeding lectures on the French Revolution. Were Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and thousands of others in other countries, among culprits providentially condemned? And Madame Roland, too? King Charles, Strafford, and Laud had been no enthusiasts for a vague universal liberty, attained through perfection of conscience; therefore their heads had to be taken off, if illegally and unjustly — noble paradox.

Near the end of his life, Lord Acton seemingly had come to relish abstract doctrine and theoretic dogma, which he abjured in his essay on the Political Causes of the American Revolution nearly two decades earlier. Had the slogan “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” awakened something inconsistent and injudicious in him, abhorrent to him though the consequences — the immediate terrors of the French Revolution — were? In his lecture on the Puritan Revolution, is there some suggestion of Marx’s inexorable divinized or personified History, along whose juggernaut path reactionaries must be crushed to death? Acton thought that in history he discerned the march of Providence. Yet it may be perilous to confound Providence with History. And may not Providence be retributory, as well as beneficent?

In his Inaugural lecture as Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge (1895) Acton contended that History reveals the March of Providence toward greater freedom. He hoped “that history will aid you to see that the action of Christ who is risen on mankind whom he redeemeth fails not, but increases; that the wisdom of divine rule appears not in the perfection but in the improvement of the world; and that achieved liberty is the one ethical result that rests on the converging and combined conditions of advancing civilization. Then you will understand what a famous phi-

losopher said, that History is the true demonstration of Religion.” (Here Acton refers to Leibniz.)

But later in this same famous Inaugural Lecture, the Regius Professor experienced misgivings. Is it not violent revolution, rather than historical reflection and the increasing reign of conscience, that causes great changes for the better in mankind’s liberty? Was he not contradicting himself?

“If the supreme conquests of society are won more often by violence than by lenient arts,” Lord Acton told his audience, “if the time and drift of things is toward convulsions and catastrophes, if the world owes religious liberty to the Dutch Revolution, constitutional government to the English, federal republicanism to the American, political equality to the French and its successors, what is to become of us, docile and attentive students of the absorbing Past? The triumph of the Revolutionist annuls the historian. By its authentic exponents, the Revolution of the last century repudiates history. Their followers renounced acquaintance with it, and were ready to destroy its records and to abolish its inoffensive professors.”

Might Acton himself, after a fashion, be renouncing history in his late years? He had begun to distance himself from Burke. For Burke was the champion of custom, convention, prescription, precedent; and therefore dwelt in the dead past; while he, Acton, thrusting aside custom and convention, flinging off that dead hand of the past, was the champion of present and future, guiding himself not by past experience of mankind, but by truthful principle, which would work wonders. He had begun to sound like Thomas Jefferson, muttering “The dead have no rights.”

Answering his own question concerning what might become of “docile and attentive students of the fascinating Past”, Acton observed, somewhat lamely, that Revolutionary events, however violent, had worked some healthy reaction in the minds of the more intelligent, stimulating afresh their interest in history. Conservative and Liberal schools of historical interpretation had sprung up during the

nineteenth century. Vastly important archives had been opened to the scholarly historian; it had become possible to make nearer approaches to historical truth. Conscience was at work, tutored conscience, not merely the confused conscience of private judgment. Be of good cheer as the nineteenth century draws to its close. Is not Liberalism in the ascendent?

At last we come to Lord Acton’s *Lectures on the French Revolution*, delivered for the fourth time at Cambridge three years before his death, and published in *University* (1910). The book is lucid and accurate, reflecting Acton’s thoroughness of method and immense reading and investigation of documents; it remains worthy to stand alongside the volumes on the French Revolution by Tocqueville, Taine, and Carlyle; it is supplemented, but not displaced by Simon Schama’s impressive *Citizens: a Chronicle of the French Revolution* (1989). Acton knew that some revolution in French affairs was needed; but the revolution which arrived was the pulverizing of freedom. It seemed in its violence to refute Acton’s premise that successive revolutions would forever put an end to the arbitrary state.

“By a series of violent shocks the nations in succession have struggled to shake off the Past, to reverse the action of Time and the verdict of success, and to rescue the world from the reign of the dead,” Acton had said in his lecture on the beginning of the modern state, in his series on Modern History. Had indeed the French Revolution been a work of rescue? Somehow things had gone wrong from the first, in 1789, and Acton recognized that unpleasant truth. The Declaration of the Rights of Man was founded upon fallacies, Acton perceived. Amazingly, Gertrude Himmelfarb, in her biography of Acton, endeavours to persuade her readers that “Acton had nothing but praise” for that Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. Are we to regard as *praise* the following passage from his Seventh Lecture on the Revolution?

"The Declaration passed by August 6, after a hurried debate, and with no further resistance. The Assembly, which had abolished the past at the beginning of the month, attempted, at its end, to institute and regulate the future. These are its abiding works, and the perpetual heritage of the Revolution. With them a new era dawned upon mankind. And yet this single page of print, which outweighs libraries, and is stronger than all the armies of Napoleon, is not the work of superior minds, and bears no mark of the lion's claw. The stamp of Cartesian clearness is upon it, but without the logic, the precision, the thoroughness of French thought. There is no indication in it that Liberty is the goal, and not the starting-point, that it is a faculty to be acquired, not a capital to invest, or that it depends on the union of innumerable conditions, which embrace the entire life of man. Therefore it is justly arraigned by those who say that it is defective, and that its defects have been a peril and a snare."

From this Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the road of the French led with swiftly increasing violence to catastrophe, the Revolution soon devouring its own children — which terrible story Acton relates unsparingly. The passion for Liberty trampled out Order and Justice; and tolerable societies require the reality of all three principles.

The Jacobin cry for Liberty devastated the European continent, and was prevented from working the ruin of civilization only by force and a master. "I have laid the fell spirit of Innovation that was striding over all the world," Napoleon Bonaparte boasted.

Of course this Jacobin notion of Liberty was not what Acton desired; nor did he applaud at all the notion of equality, and the only fraternity he acknowledged was *Christian* brotherhood. The Liberty of his imagination was very much a British liberty, developed over seven centuries by much continuity of belief and institution, with merely an occasional revolution — of limited scope — to accelerate progress somewhat. He and his friend Gladstone shared the Victorian expectation of universal progress; they might even be called

meliorists, were it not for that doctrine of Revolution as a goad.

A dozen years after Lord Acton's death in 1902, the world entered upon what Arnold Toynbee called a time of troubles — a time which, if we may believe another distinguished historian, Fernand Braudel, may end with the arrival of the twenty-first century. The cry 'Liberty' has been heard in nearly every country since 1914; but what has been attained in most of the world is Tyranny. Revolution of the most violent character has reduced most of Africa and Asia to misery; eastern Europe only now begins to hope for some restoration of order.

***The expectation of
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Latin America, or much of it, remains in convulsions. The expectation of Acton that Revolution would be an instrument of progress and emancipation has been exploded. On the contrary, in the twentieth century the word Revolution has come to signify an occasion for the proletariat to loot the quarters of the prosperous; and perhaps to slit their throats. As Burke declared, at the end of every Revolutionary vista stands the guillotine.

In a recent essay, entitled "This Terrible Century", in *The Intercollegiate Review*, Gerhart Niemeyer writes as follows: "To us who are enjoying a life in relative wealth, the educational and artistic offerings of a flourishing culture, and, yes, *in peace*, this century may appear to provide full reason for self-congratulation. To the future historian, however, it may rank as one of the worst centuries of human history. That is, it may so appear to an historian who can discern between good and evil spirits, who is sensitive to the needs of the soul, and skilful in reading between the lines of official texts.... He

may wonder again at the phenomenon of totalitarianism ... a novelty in history, and at government by ideology that produced *general* slavery, while formerly private slavery had occurred."

Lord Acton was eminent among those historians who distinguish between good and evil spirits, are sensitive to the needs of the soul, and are skilful in interpreting archives. With what horror Acton would look upon the closing decade of our twentieth century! The demand for greater liberty still is heard upon every hand: but the demand in this country is for "life-style liberty", the freedom of the libido, not the freedom of *voluntas*. The inhabitants of Bosnia are set free to slaughter one another. An alleged freedom is being conferred just now upon the Bantu in South Africa that may repeat the horror of the emancipated Congo three decades past. In what country do we encounter that happy increase of the influence of conscience which Acton preaches?

Freedom cannot endure except upon the footing of a healthy order — order in the soul, and order in the commonwealth. Revolution, after all, is the disruption of order, and therefore extreme medicine. For that reason, the serious student of history today will do well to rank such historians as Eric Voegelin and Christopher Dawson — historians of order — higher than Acton. Nevertheless, I continue to take great pleasure in reading Acton's essays on liberty. Lord Acton, now a member of the community of souls, you and all the dead do have rights, Jefferson notwithstanding; for you are one of those souls now in eternity who give energy to us the living; and I pray that you may continue to be read in a revolutionary age oppressed by Giant Ideology.

Russell Kirk, widely considered the father of the American conservative movement, died on April 29th. He delivered this lecture at the Acton Institute, Michigan, in January this year.

The Use and Abuse of State Welfare

*David Marsland presents the Tales of the
Dependency Culture*

Welfare reform is firmly on the agenda at last, as media and political reactions to the Adam Smith Institute's new book ("The End of the Welfare State") unambiguously demonstrate. The grave deficiencies of state welfare — long denied, even longer ignored — are becoming widely acknowledged, even on the left of British politics. Even indeed among academic social policy analysts, whose stock in trade has for decades consisted of unthinking apologia for the Welfare State and the collectivist values which it enshrines, there are faint signs of recognition that reform is unavoidable.

We should not, however, count our welfare reform chickens before they are hatched. *Soi-disant* social affairs experts in the universities and the media remain at heart bitter opponents of the principles which underpin any genuine alternative to state welfare. They are implacable enemies of self-reliance, of the family, of competition, and of traditional British concepts of respectability, pride and shame, and right and wrong. The Labour Party remains, despite current pragmatic adjustments shaped by electoral considerations, as prejudiced against the market as ever, and just as much committed as it was before 1979 to collectivist remedies for every problem.

If reform is to be clinched, we need to extend and strengthen the critique of state welfare and to prepare detailed, practical plans for a liberal alternative which is more appropriate to a free society in the twenty first century. A sound basis for the second of these objectives — practical planning for the future — is provided in "The End

of the Welfare State", particularly about the priority problem of pensions. Although the intellectual argument against state welfare has been won, there remains a good deal of public persuasion to be done in many circles before an adequate political consensus can be achieved.

Reasons for reforms

The Welfare State is not the pinnacle of modern civilisation, as the Catholicism of Hampstead and the Gospel according to the *Guardian* would have us believe. On the contrary, it is outmoded, ineffective, and destructive. There are five principle reasons why radical reform is essential.

***"It [the Welfare State]
is turning
neighbourhoods and
estates all over Britain
into factories of crime
and arbitrary
violence"***

Firstly: The whole concept is confused. It means all things to all people, and nothing coherent or sensible to anyone. The Welfare State is a contradiction in terms as vacuous as "socialist markets" or "law-abiding criminals".

Secondly: We do not need it. The standard of living of the whole population has improved out of all recognition since Beveridge, let alone since Lloyd George. Relative poverty is absolute affluence.

Thirdly: We cannot afford it. The ever-

expanding Welfare State is bankrupting Britain and other countries right across Western Europe. Public expenditure must be radically reduced and focused on essentials rather than wasteful luxuries. Welfare expenditure is not investment: it is conspicuous consumption designed merely to demonstrate the virility of the philanthropic conscience.

Fourthly: It does not work. Like other state bureaucracies, it is hopelessly inefficient compared with private and voluntary agencies at even the simplest of its tasks. It has routinely failed to provide effective help for those who genuinely need it. The more the state intervenes, the less welfare results.

Finally and worst of all: It harms rather than helps its clients by creating welfare dependency and sustaining a self-excluding underclass of subjugated yet anarchic state serfs. In the most quoted sentence I have ever written — in the *Guardian*, the *Times*, the *Sun*, the *Morning Star*, and the *Kentish News*, just by way of example — "It [the Welfare State] is turning neighbourhoods and estates all over Britain into factories of crime and arbitrary violence".

A reform strategy

Since the Welfare State is philosophically incoherent, unnecessary, extravagantly costly, ineffective, and positively harmful, we need to transform it out of all recognition, not to say scrap it, urgently. This brings me to my second main preliminary point, concerning the strategy for welfare reform. This has been dealt with in practical detail in "The End of the Welfare State". I can therefore limit myself here to emphasising the need for a twin-track strategy.

Firstly we must ensure the liberation of the prosperous majority from state welfare by encouraging widespread transfer into private and voluntary provision — for health insurance, education, pensions, unemployment and income protection, housing, and all the rest of what we have been deceitfully schooled by socialists and other collectivists to think of as “welfare”.

Secondly a radical change is required in the structure and provision for the small and changing minority of people temporarily incapable of self-reliance. The system should be called the Special Assistance Programme to indicate its mission — rapid restoration of its clients to normal self-provisioning.

Open secrets

I turn next to some examples of what Digby Anderson has called “open secrets” — well-known facts about abuses and idiocies in the Welfare State which are routinely suppressed or politely hushed up. Some are “Tales from the Underclass”, but I begin with what one might call “Anecdotes of Respectable Deception”.

Middle class scroungers

My first example demonstrates that this is no new problem. In his critical account of the beginnings of state welfare in Britain, Herbert Spencer, author of that splendid sociological classic *The Man versus the State*, reports on a free health care scheme introduced in London in the 1880s. It was restricted to specific geographical areas characterised by poverty and deprivation. Nonetheless, he tells us, the prosperous middle class were found to be making use of it in large numbers.

They simply lied about their addresses, and easily won credibility as a result of their eloquent plausibility, their authoritative confidence, and their skills in self-presentation. No doubt there was also collusion between these prototype scroungers and the first-generation social workers they had to deal with.

Make *anything* free and everyone will want some, whether or not they need it, whether or not they have a legitimate right to it — and moreover

they will somehow get hold of it.

Upper class dependency

My second example concerns a retired judge, his wife, and health care reform. I met him recently with his wife at a social occasion. We fell to discussing reform of the NHS, and it very quickly became apparent that despite their otherwise consistently conservative opinions, they were ferociously antagonistic to health care reform, especially to the closure of a certain well known hospital close to their home. Debate flowed furiously, but with little rational effect.

Despite their general political stance, they believed as absolutely as any Islamic fundamentalist in the preservation of the sacred and unimprovable purity of an unreformed NHS. Despite their income — a judge’s pension is about five times the national average salary, and I imagine they had capital too — they had never taken out private health insurance, and saw no reason why they should have done. As far as they were concerned, they were being robbed by a hard-hearted and incompetent government of their inalienable rights.

Moral: why bother to look after yourself if the Government promises, however implausibly, to do it for you?

Autistic undergraduates

With this sardonically intended concept, I am referring to the tendency of the well-heeled, Conservative-voting, middle classes to resist their obligation to support their children’s involvement in higher education. Already annoyed by being forced to pay for part of their maintenance, they are currently up in arms at the prospect of having to pay tuition fees as well.

But why? A large proportion of young people go to university only because they think they should. They have no idea of why they are studying, and little commitment to the discipline involved. Many of them are following courses in spurious or instrumentally useless subjects. They lend themselves by default to bizarre campaigning by their unions on behalf of collectivist missions which would make it even

more difficult for their fathers to afford to educate them.

Why not change the whole system? Let parents who wish to do so pay for their own children’s education (in the Sixth Form as well as at college), with state and private scholarships available on a meritocratic, competitive basis to those whose ability and effort justify them.

The child benefit scandal

I can see no reason why anyone except possibly the very poorest should expect to be paid for the privilege of having children. Whether or not it is taxed, child benefit is an absurdity which only the logical dialectics of the Welfare State could justify. Yet Conservative Ministers who so much as suggest getting rid of it are labelled by the media as cruel monsters.

I was encouraged by the finding reported in a recent ICM national survey that currently a larger proportion, at 50 per cent, believe child benefit should be restricted to low income families than insist on universal payment regardless of need. But support for the welfare status quo is as much as 43 per cent, and only marginally lower than this at 42 per cent among the higher social classes. Before long, no doubt, we should expect a campaign in the Home Counties for dog and pony benefits.

Entertainment on the rates

One might have dealt next with the escalation of public expenditure on legal aid, and the whining demands of the more litigiously inclined among the middle classes to have their barristers’ fees paid by you and me and by those with less money and more sense than themselves. This is a large and complex issue, however, which is better left to be analyzed fully and in its own right. Instead I turn, for my last example of shameless abuse of state welfare by those who should know better, to libraries.

I spoke recently to a meeting of the Royal Society of Literature about the future of public libraries. Mr Yeltsin could hardly meet a more dogmatically close-minded response from his

die-hard Stalinist enemies than I found in an audience of London litterati challenged to contemplate the ultimate capitalist threat of— library charges!

Yet the libraries are increasingly in the entertainment business. Why should we not expect those who can afford it — the large majority of the population and the huge majority of library users — to rely on privatised commercial libraries? Why should the poor pay from their taxes and their improved benefits foregone for the well-heeled to have free access to detective stories, thrillers, science fiction, travel and cookery books, down-market audiocassettes, and Hollywood videos?

Indeed, even the proper and traditional business of public libraries — education, scholarship, art, high literature, and science — could also be handled perfectly well, and more efficiently, on an entirely commercial basis—a niche-market in quality reading.

The real cost of both the artistic and the entertainment functions of the libraries should be carried by those who benefit from them. A free library service is at one and the same time a guarantee that standards will be diluted, and a calculated insult by the over-privileged to those among the disadvantaged who might prefer their money spent in other ways.

Modern tales from the lower depths

The Welfare State has thus gradually but inexorably corrupted the whole nation, the prosperous majority included. Its destructive influence is at its worst, however, on precisely those it is intended to help — the poor, the weak, and the unfortunate.

Unemployment benefit

Benefit fraud of £5 billion per annum has been officially identified. We can be confident there is at least as much again going unnoticed, much of it in unemployment benefit. Just walk around any council estate, any inner city area. Criminal fraud is wholesale. Yet the supporters of state welfare respond with the trite and irrelevant claim that tax fraud is even worse.

If unemployment support were han-

dled on a local basis, officials would know who the half to three quarters of a million professional criminals and prostitutes who claim benefit were, and stop them. They would know which feckless families routinely swing the lead, and stop them too. The unemployed should surely not have time or energy to work as well as claim. Workfare should be introduced immediately.

Invalidity benefit

Fraud and waste are probably almost as bad in this sphere as in unemployment. As we get healthier and live longer as a nation, we apparently have more and more chronic invalids! This nonsense is perpetuated by socialist and sentimental doctors who, despite their scientific training, fail to recognise the sociological law demonstrated unequivocally in Holland and Scandinavia: the uptake of invalidity benefit and the prevalence of sickness absence from work is a function of the accessibility and generosity of benefits, entirely regardless of the objective condition of the population.

Perhaps organisations such as local authorities, British Rail, and London Transport, should be required to produce sickness absence data on a league table basis.

We outlawed slavery and stopped it. Now we must liberate the new serfs of welfare dependency

Education squandered

According to the same recent ICM national survey I mentioned earlier, barely half of parents check that their children have done their homework; not many more than this claim to listen to them reading when they are young and learning; and only about four in ten control their television viewing — barely a quarter in social classes D and E. Less than half insist on a set bedtime for young children.

Would they squander a costly investment in their children's education if they were paying for it directly themselves? Can we imagine that those hundreds of thousands of the poorest in England who paid for their children's education out of their own pockets in the decades before education was nationalised in 1870 by the Forster Act, can we imagine that *they* would have been so irresponsible? I rather think not, and nor would they have tolerated routine truancy.

Housing benefit

There are still absurdly too many people living in council houses — the tied cottages of socialism. But there is not much point keeping up the pressure for a shift to Housing Associations and the private sector if we tolerate an escalation in parallel of housing benefit.

So much is this largesse taken for granted in recent years, that people are allowed to complain about their supposedly inadequate benefit support without being challenged to admit they are having their rent paid as well. We are supposed to sympathise with people who prefer to run a car, take a holiday, smoke, and drink to paying their own rent. The concept of housing rights, which is ludicrous in principle, becomes lunatic when it is carried to its contemporary extreme: meaning the right to demand exactly the sort of residence in precisely the place that one would ideally wish for. It will be thatched cottages all round "on the rates" before long.

By the same token, I fail to understand how we can tolerate the absurd sentimentality about the so-called homeless which is paraded daily on our television screens. A large proportion are mentally ill and handicapped people who were much better and more economically served in asylums. Others are young people who have left home inappropriately and unnecessarily in the expectation that the state will provide what their own prudence has not. Many more than is officially admitted are illegal immigrants and fraudulent refugees. We should attend to this matter urgently, making maximum possible use of a liberalised hous-

ing market, to the causes of homelessness, instead of allowing ourselves to be distracted by superficial symptoms.

Lone parents

Apparently we have to rely on a Democratic President of the United States for honesty about young lone parents and welfare. "We will say to teenagers", Mr Clinton said recently, "if you have a child out of wedlock, we will no longer give you a cheque to set up a separate household We want families to stay together People who bring children into the world cannot and must not walk away from them".

Britain, by contrast, has become so much a haven of fraudulent welfare-speak that even allegedly right-wing Ministers respond to the shameless, bitchy demands of Lone Parents Incorporated in the fawning, honeyed tones of ideological surrender. In yielding cravenly to the campaigning bluster of collectivist ideologues, we are denying common-sense, betraying rational political principles, and subverting the family.

Young lone parents need a home: but they are better off in a supervised institution in the countryside than in a flat of their own in the inner city. They need money: but the father of their child or children should be paying up, as should their current boyfriends — who trade in their tens of thousands on the credulity of social workers to obtain free lodging. They need above all wise adult support and training: but of this we provide, out of deference to their spurious rights, almost nothing.

These are victims — who are the villains?

I have spoken less than tenderly about some of these denizens of the underclass habitat. I make no apology for that. If we want to help them, it is truth we are short of. But they are in part victims of something larger and worse than their own saddening inadequacies. There are villains who are victimising them. I conclude by listing them, and leave an analysis of their villainy for another day:

Opposition politicians who defend

the welfare status quo at all costs.

Academic social affairs experts, so-called, and social researchers, who ignore what they do not want to see, and at the taxpayers' expense draw a completely phoney picture of social conditions in Britain.

Collectivist ideologues in the corrupted voluntary organisations, which have given up their great tradition of service for a place on the Welfare State gravy train.

Journalists and television pundits who prefer embarrassing a Minister to pursuing the truth, and are so much lacking in common-sense that they could as much tell a train driver from a train robber as they can distinguish a genuine plea for help from the charm and bullying of professional welfare conmen.

As I write, the latest in a long line of tragic social work scandals is breaking in the news. A man and his wife, both of modest capacity and supposedly under the tender care of Social Services, have been found guilty of the manslaughter of their infant child, neglected and starved to a cruel death in conditions not fit for pigs. Yet the house had been specially provided for them and their innumerable offspring by the authorities of the caring Welfare State, and totally refurbished and refitted at a cost of more than a hundred thousand pounds!

This is a sadly typical case of Welfare State intervention in the lives of vulnerable people. It is typical in three senses. First, extravagant public expenditure has been squandered. Second, extreme harm to an innocent victim has not been prevented — and may even have been facilitated. And third, the real needs of the primary clients have been neglected as a result of two characteristic features of state welfare agencies: their bureaucratic inefficiency, and their domination by outlandish, unrealistic theories inimical to practical common-sense.

There will be more such cases unless we begin radical reform of the Welfare State. Until reform is carried through, the size of the underclass and the scale of hopeless vulnerability in the population will continue to increase. They

are increasing daily as state welfare works at its practised art of creating and re-enforcing incompetent dependency.

I recall a recent television documentary which provided a perfect icon of the peasant fatalism anachronistically resurrected in modern society by the malign influence of state welfare. One of those all too typical programmes about alleged cuts in public expenditure featured an interview with a council tenant whose sitting room was being damaged by damp percolating from the floor above. "Look", he said plaintively, pointing to some extremely modest damage to his ceiling, "I can't use that room any more, and I've been waiting months for them to fix it". Schooled to helpless dependency by the great State "Them", his natural capacity for a bit of DIY well within his available resources had been completely paralysed. We outlawed slavery and stopped it. Now we must liberate the new serfs of welfare dependency.

David Marsland's latest book Understanding Youth is published by the Claridge Press.

***Of all
human
follies
there's
none could
be greater
than trying
to render
our fellow
men better***

Molière

England's Deadliest Sin

Raymond Tong finds overpopulation the worst problem of our time

Konrad Lorenz, the distinguished Austrian ethologist and a former head of the Max Planck Institute, became widely known during his lifetime for a series of books combining often controversial theories with vivid descriptions of animal behaviour. However, it was not until 1973, when he was seventy years of age, that he published a book entirely concerned with the human animal and with the dangers threatening humanity. It was entitled "Civilized Man's Eight Deadly Sins" and in spite of the enormous significance and urgency of what Lorenz had to say, or possibly because of it, the book has been out of print for many years. Today we are becoming more aware of Man's obvious sins: the wrecking of the environment, the death of feeling, the abuse of inventive powers. Certainly Lorenz was well ahead of his time in arriving at his pessimistic conclusions. In his efforts to compel his reader to face the most fundamental questions of human existence, he did not hesitate to invade the narrowly defined boundaries of many individual branches of science.

As Konrad Lorenz informs us in his introductory chapter "ethology may be defined as that branch of science which arose when comparative methods, obligatory since Darwin in all other biological disciplines, were also applied to research into animal and human behaviour." Having spent a great many years studying behaviour patterns and survival functions in animals, he applied the question "What for?" to certain regularly observable behaviour patterns of civilized human beings. For example, what is the use to humanity of its measureless multiplication, its mad competitive haste, and the progressive deterioration of urban liv-

ing? In answering such questions he concluded that these malfunctions are disorders of certain special behaviour mechanisms originally possessing survival value. As he surveyed the vast disorders facing mankind he came to accept that they are pathological. It became evident that Man is escaping from the Darwinian laws of selection and adaptation with disastrous and destructive results. The only hope for salvation at this late stage lies in a self-conscious effort to compensate for this.

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Lorenz analyses the causally connected processes that are threatening to destroy not only our civilization, but mankind as a species. Each of "Civilized Man's Eight Deadly Sins" forms a chapter of the book and each indicates the huge problems that Man has evolved for himself. They are briefly as follows:

1. Overpopulation of the earth which, because of the superabundance of social contacts, forces every one of us to shut himself off in an essentially "in-human" way, and which because of the crowding of many individuals into a small space, elicits aggression.
2. The devastation of our natural environment, with destruction not only of our surroundings but also of Man's

reverential awe for the beauty and greatness of creation.

3. Man's race against himself, which pushes the development of technology to an even faster pace, blinding people to all real values and robbing them of time for the genuinely human activity of reflection.

4. The waning of all strong feelings and emotion, caused by self-indulgence. The progress of technology and pharmacology furthers an increasing intolerance of everything inducing the least displeasure.

5. Genetic decay. In our modern civilisation there are very few factors that still exert a selection pressure tending to preserve instinctive norms of social behaviour.

6. The break in tradition. A critical point is often reached at which the younger generation is no longer able to communicate with the older one, still less to identify with it. Thus the continuance of tradition is threatened.

7. The increased indoctrinability of mankind. The increase in numbers of people within a single cultural group, together with the perfection of technical means, lead to the possibility of manoeuvring public opinion into a uniformity unprecedented in human history.

8. The arming of mankind with nuclear weapons. This constitutes a threat easier to avert than the seven other developments described above.

Whatever one's reaction to the book as a whole, very few people today would disagree with Lorenz in putting overpopulation of the earth at the head of his list as Man's deadliest sin. The media have long provided us with scenes of extreme poverty in many countries, where a much too rapidly growing population often finds it diffi-

cult to sustain even a low level of subsistence. Most people would also agree that in terms of causal connection the first deadly sin must inevitably lead to the second. The appalling prospect of the devastation of our natural environment is usually most apparent in areas of considerable population density. However, in such areas overpopulation is not only destructive of the environment. It is equally destructive of the people living there.

When we apply such thinking to the world around us, we will experience a few unpleasant surprises. For example, England would appear to be one of the countries most likely to experience the Nemesis produced by civilized man's deadliest sin. It is a disturbing fact, often soft-pedalled by politicians, sociologists, and even ecologists, that England, with a population density of 3.54 persons per hectare, is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. England (50,085 sq. miles) has roughly the same area as New York State (47,377 sq. miles), the most densely populated state in the U.S.A. However, according to the 1990 statistics England, with a population of 47,838,000, has over two and a half times the population of New York State, which has a population of 17,990,000. Equally, although Japan is quite rightly thought of as a very densely populated country its density of population is about 15 per cent less than that of England. Of course, neither Wales nor Scotland has the problem of overpopulation. Wales, with an area of 7,968 sq. miles has a population of 2,881,000, while Scotland is even more comfortably placed, with an area of 29,767 sq. miles and a population of only 5,102,000.

If one tried to estimate the optimum population for England today, having regard to area, the present stage of economic and social development, as well as other relevant factors, it is probable that one would arrive at something like 27,000,000, the present population of Canada, with its vast land area of 3,849,653 sq. miles. Certainly, in a world where a country's economic growth and prosperity will increasingly depend on the scientific, technological and other high-level skills of well-educated and adaptable

people, a much smaller population would clearly be very advantageous. This being so, it seems likely that the optimum population for England was passed over a century ago. Yet even in 1883, when the population was indeed about the same as that of Canada today, Henry James found it appropriate to comment that every English person "is a tight fit in his place" and that "it is not an inferential but a palpable fact that England is a crowded country".

During the past hundred years the population of England has continued to grow steadily with each succeeding decade. Environmental problems were already becoming manifest before World War II, but since 1945, augmented by very considerable immigration, these problems have gradually become even more serious. As affluence continues to increase and more of everything is demanded, the pressures caused by population density will continue to grow.

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Much thought and action is already being expended on such matters as pollution, sewage, toxic waste, wild life preservation, inner cities and overcrowded roads. Nearly everybody is aware of the dangers of further engulfing an already tense countryside in bricks and concrete. Yet whenever any subject related to immigration is debated in the House of Commons, there is still refusal, among every shape of opinion, to accept that the cause of England's environmental problems lies in overpopulation. Indeed, whenever such a debate

takes place, it is only among hard-pressed members of the general public, interviewed on television, that the argument of pressure on available space is forcibly expressed. This being so, it seems likely that the population figures will continue to drift gradually upwards, as they have gone in the past, and that the pessimists will prove to be right. Perhaps, as Philip Larkin suggested in his poem, "Going, Going", commissioned by the Department of the Environment in 1972, already the "greeds and garbage are too thick-strewn to be swept up now".

It may seem incredible that the easy-going English people, as well as the politicians they elect to Parliament, should so rarely refer to population density as the source of the increasing pressures being experienced in their country. After all, most of them encounter some aspect of overcrowding in their everyday lives, whether they live in an urban or a rural area, and they can scarcely fail to be aware of the constant barrage of environmental problems discussed by the media. However the English rarely think purely in terms of England but usually of Britain as a whole. Since historically the British state is largely their own creation, and since they are only too aware of the dominant nature of the English majority in Britain, they have always tended to understate England and Englishness and to emphasise instead Britain and Britishness. While the Scots, the Welsh and the Irish have continued to assert their own national and cultural identities, the English have always been prepared to make concessions of their national identity in order to maintain the synthetic British identity.

This abnegation of authentic national identity, which to some extent is now a matter of institutions and habit, undoubtedly helps to achieve cooperation and unity within Britain. Unfortunately it also has a number of disadvantages from an English point of view. Not least of these is the fact that the English people, like the British Parliament, usually consider Britain as a whole when thinking about area and population. Considering population density from a purely British standpoint they are seemingly deflected away from the obvious fact that Scotland and Wales together have a

little less than 8,000,000 people enjoying a total area of 37,735 sq.miles. Whereas England, with only 12,350 sq.miles more than the total for Wales and Scotland, has almost six times their total population. If the Parliament had remained an English Parliament, and if the English had not ceased to hear the authentic cadence of their essential being, they would have realised many decades ago, even before World War II, that their country was extremely overpopulated.

For similar reasons the English have continued to be entangled, in the long, meaningless imperial hangover. Following the slow, agonizing evolution of the Empire into the Commonwealth, Britain has retained a central role in this nebulous association of completely unrelated states. It is unfortunate that, even though British foreign policy is largely pre-occupied with Europe and the global relationship of the main Western economies, Britain still continues to maintain an unjustifiably inflated sense of Commonwealth obligation. This inflated sense of obligation, combined with an unnecessarily tender national subconscious, has caused successive British governments to allow large-scale immigration into an already very overcrowded country. Ever since World War II the words "a British responsibility" have been repeatedly used in Parliament and elsewhere by ministers defending such immigration, and have doubtless been used innumerable times by M.P.s replying to their constituents on the subject. However, it should be quite clear to any unbiased observer that the British entirely relinquished all responsibility each time a British colony became an independent sovereign state. It is obviously not possible for one independent sovereign state to be responsible for the people of another independent sovereign state. And this being so, it is evident that "British responsibility" has now happily disappeared almost entirely.

A considerable effort will be necessary over many years to contain and gradually to put right some of the ravages of what Konrad Lorenz rightly describes as civilized man's second

deadly sin, the devastation of our natural environment. As the urban sprawl extends farther and farther into an ever diminishing English countryside, as the number of cars doubles, as every rainless summer fortnight almost immediately produces a drought, as the garbage and the sewage goes on increasing, the political parties will compete with one another, even more than at present, in demonstrating that they are the most environment-conscious. Whenever they are so it is fairly certain that they will receive a good response from the electorate, who have already shown themselves to be all too aware of the scale of the environmental problems facing them.

***We should remember
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We should remember that the devastation of the natural environment has been largely caused by overpopulation. Since England will remain considerably overpopulated no matter the degree of success in dealing with the "greeds and garbage", the pressures produced by overcrowding will continue. Such pressures are particularly damaging to the quality of life and the moral outlook of people living in the densely populated districts of large cities. Neighbourliness is diluted by a surfeit of neighbours. The individual tends to avoid recognition and at best to concentrate on a small number of friends. The greater the overcrowding the more it seems desirable to screen oneself off from unnecessary human contacts and not to be unduly concerned about the people round about. Robbery with violence, and even murder, can then be committed in broad daylight and in busy streets without the intervention of any passer-by. This deplorable situation does not always reflect a lack of courage among the

witnesses of such crimes, but rather their fervent desire not to become involved.

Konrad Lorenz was right in believing that "the general unfriendliness evident in all large cities is clearly proportional to the density of human masses". The more overcrowded the environment the less likely becomes the possibility of a friendly atmosphere. This might be bearable for many people, except for the fact that in many densely populated areas indifference sometimes becomes exhausted and all too often boils over into obvious hostility. Moreover, at some point, the hostility may intensify and be expressed as actual aggression. There can be little doubt that Lorenz's analysis possesses the chilling truth for many millions of people throughout the world. Indeed, in large cities today, and often in the somewhat urbanised countryside, crimes of violence, robbery and vandalism have increased to such an extent that even the murder of an unarmed policeman, of an appointed guardian of the law, no longer produces the angry indignation and the ruthless determination it deserves. The confidence in the law, which is one of our most precious heritages, has been eroded, and another vital part of the English settlement put at risk.

The presence of such aggression can be decidedly menacing, particularly so when combined with differences of race, culture and religion in densely populated areas with large ethnic communities. From the evidence in a number of countries, where there are such differences the possibilities for violent expression are greatly increased. The clashing of race, culture and religion can destroy democratic values. Those people who have in recent years challenged the wisdom of allowing further immigration into an already overcrowded country are surely vindicated.


Raymond Tong's Selected Poems will be published by Robert Hale in July.

Down with the Feminazis!

Patricia Lança describes the illusions and dangers of militant feminism

The extraordinary increase in the numbers of women in higher education since the Second World War has brought it about that, today, in many western countries the number of women university students now exceeds that of men. If, with the education of men, more has meant worse, in the case of women more must have certainly meant much worse because the starting point was in general terms so much higher and had therefore further to fall. As everybody knows, but as some require to be reminded, entry to Oxbridge for women was at one time only for the outstanding few. Entry to medical schools for women was often limited to a small percentage and then they had to be doctors' daughters. And so on down the line until, because of the growing demands of the labour market in teaching and the social services, we reach what were in effect less discriminatory conditions in the arts subjects and in social science (i.e. where more exacting standards than for men were not the rule). As has so often been pointed out by both the old and the new feminists, to succeed in a man's world women had to be, and knew they had to be, just that much better in their qualifications and at their jobs. In many areas this continues to be the case. However, one instance where it is not so is that of entry to and continuance at university. If the quality of male students at entry and the quality of post-graduate males and male dons is likely today to be generally lower than it was three or four decades ago, the general quality of their female counterparts is, for the reasons adduced above, certainly very much lower than it used to be. But it is in the academic world that the feminist lobby is the most strident and the most

effective. Today, to succeed in that world, a woman no longer needs to be 'just that much better than a man'; she needs to be more aggressive, more accusatory and fully equipped with the weapons taken from the modern armoury of militant feminism. Woe to those women who rely on the first criterion and eschew the second! They are likely to be favoured neither by the men nor the women.



The rise of militant feminism and its elaboration of ideological trappings and political strategies deriving directly from Marxism, coincides to a remarkable degree with the growth in numbers of women at all levels in the universities. This said, however, let it be quite clear that what follows is not a simplistic *post hoc propter hoc* argument. More did not necessarily have to mean worse, nor did more women students have to mean worse women students. Had the process of expansion in higher education been carried out with greater forethought, there is nothing in principle to indicate that standards had to deteriorate. And it might have occurred to all those involved that not

everybody was likely to benefit from higher education. What is apparent, however, is that the crude ahistorical verbiage that passes for feminist thought could never have encountered the audience it today enjoys without a very large number of 'educated' women, and men, who possess very deficient instruction in biology, developmental psychology and social history. One consequence of this state of affairs is that today's young and even middle-aged adults frequently have very hazy ideas about what daily life was like for most of mankind during most of its history. Ignorance has always provided a fertile seed-bed for the proliferation of revolutionary doctrines. Modern feminist ideology is no exception. It crudely transposes to the domain of the family and relations between the sexes concepts borrowed from theories of class warfare. Oppression, exploitation, conspiracy, false consciousness are taken wholesale from the Marxist lexicon and applied arbitrarily to the history of women and the family throughout the ages. The villain in the historical drama is now no longer simply capitalism but also, and mainly, the male — and, of course, the 'bourgeois family' through which he exercises his tyranny. Like all revolutionary doctrines, feminism is highly fissionable and abounds in factions, heresies and excommunications. It has soft and hard forms. At its most extreme it regards the male as expendable and lesbianism as the logical conclusion. Such esoteric aspects need not concern us. What is of importance is to pinpoint and examine the five basic premises which make feminism's tenets persuasive for the uninformed young.

The first is that women's historic

exclusion from public life and confinement to the domestic tasks of wife and mother constituted a deprivation of rights, and were imposed by men on their unwilling female victims through a process of discrimination and violence.

Secondly, the subordination of women to a *paterfamilias* and her secondary status before the law were simply the juridical formalization of the male tendency to oppress and exploit.

Thirdly, insistence on premarital virginity in the female was a taboo developed by and in the interest of the male sex as part of its view of women as procreative chattels whose generative capacities must remain within the strict control of the male so that men might be certain about the paternity of their heirs.

Fourthly, in order to ensure female acceptance of life-long minority, male-dominated society has developed an almost infinite array of stratagems by which to indoctrinate woman in her 'gender role', i.e. to cause her to accept her inferior status.

Finally, and the crowning offence of the male against the female, is the alleged exclusion of women from history.

The first three points mentioned above were elaborated explicitly by Friedrich Engels in what came to be one of the great Marxist classics. Although Engels based himself on the long discredited findings of the American anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan, his conclusions continued to form part of the Marxist canon and it was here that the radical feminists came to drink the first heady draughts of revolutionary theory: 'The overthrow of mother-right was the defeat of the female sex, an event affecting the history of the world. The man seized the reins in the house also, the woman was degraded, enslaved, the slave of the man's lust, a mere instrument for breeding children.' That is how Engels describes the allegedly universal move from a matriarchal to a patriarchal society, which, it is held, we find celebrated in classical drama in the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus.

And if anyone should still be in doubt about the 'class-character' of the relation between the sexes, Engels quotes

from a work by himself and Marx written in 1845-46: "The first division of labour is that between man and woman for child-breeding. And today I can add: the first class antagonism which appears in history coincides with the development of the antagonism between man and woman in monogamian marriage and the first class oppression with that of the female sex by the male."

To apply the term 'division of labour', a category appertaining to economics, to the sexual method of reproduction which belongs to the realm of biology, makes as much sense as to look for class conflict in monogamic or any other kind of marriage. However, the incoherence of Engels's thought and its paranoid preoccupation with conflict is not a characteristic only of Marxism generally but also of its sub-product, modern radical feminism.

Points four, the concept of 'gender role', and five, the exclusion of women from history, each act as artifices to shore up the theory enunciated in the first three premises. If women have been excluded from history by a male conspiracy to denigrate them, then there is no point in the opponent of feminism going to history for arguments. Equally, if there are women (or, indeed, men) who oppose feminism, their arguments can safely be ignored because they are the consequences of indoctrination into a gender role. Here we have two prime examples of what characterizes non-scientific theories, as explained by Sir Karl Popper: they are theories formulated in such a way that they cannot be falsified.

'Gender', once a word used exclusively in a grammatical sense, is much favoured by feminists of both sexes, but controversy rages about its significance and scope. There are those who believe that apart from a little extra tissue here and there, there is no essential difference between male and female that an improper education will not correct; on the other hand, more and more feminists hold that the female is essentially different from and superior to the male and that this is the liberated gender role she should assume. The whole concept of 'gender

roles into which a person is indoctrinated' requires examination: it is in fact inseparable from the other four tenets of feminist thought and necessary in order to hold them together.

The theoretical structures developed by the radical feminists are unoriginal and derive from the delirious productions of the New Left and the so-called Literary Theorists. Whether early human societies were matriarchal, and what can be meant by that term, is of as little relevance to modern social problems as what cannibalism among primitive peoples may have to tell us about contemporary diet. What is deserving of our attention is the way in which radical feminists, like other revolutionaries, seek refuge in esoteric argument in order to avoid confronting quite clear questions which are much closer to home. What radical feminists, like other marxists, try to do is first to declare war on moral discourse by an appeal to cultural relativism and then to recoup for themselves a monopoly of moral concern by finding an enemy against whom to direct moral indignation. This is the classical process so well described by Polanyi as 'dynamo-objective coupling.'

Alleged scientific assertions, which are accepted as such because they satisfy moral passions, will excite these passions further, and thus lend increased convincing power to the scientific affirmations in question — and so on, indefinitely. Any criticism of its scientific part is rebutted by the moral passions behind it, while any moral objections to it are coldly brushed aside by invoking the inexorable verdict of its scientific findings. Each of the two components, the dynamic and the objective, takes it in turn to draw attention away from the other when it is under attack.

Not long ago in Lisbon a gathering of learned doctors of law at the Institute of Juridical Studies was addressed by a lady university teacher (whose feminist doctoral thesis last year was itself a subject of controversy). In her address she made it her business to criticize Portugal's new penal code. The focus of her criticism was that the new code's specification of punishment for anal rape was milder than that for vaginal rape. This discrimination, de-

clared the lady, was unwarranted and stemmed from a typically 'male chauvinist' sexual taboo: that concerning premarital virginity in the female! This astonishing affirmation amazes in more ways than one. Had the legislator penalized anal rape more heavily than the other kind he would no doubt have been accused of undervaluing female right to vaginal integrity. What in this case never crossed the mind of the learned lady of laws was that repulsive though either kind of rape may be, there happens to be only one kind that is liable to have pregnancy as a consequence. And here is where we arrive at the nub of feminist obtuseness.

Feminist discourse as we have heard it over the last four decades proceeds as though modern technology, modern medicine and the modern labour market had existed from time immemorial instead of being achievements of the last 200 years. The feminists seize upon the epiphenomena consequent upon the age-old female tie to the household and make these the central points at issue, stating quite explicitly that men have subjugated women against their will throughout the ages simply and solely out of a perverse drive for power, (sometimes called phallo-centricity) in the same way that they have indulged in enslavement of subject peoples and in the capitalist exploitation of the working class. In much feminist talk about men vs. women, parallels are drawn with white vs. black, capitalist vs. worker, as though there were some equivalence between these pairs. What finally emerges is a demonization of the male and his identification with the exploiter, while women are sanctified as victims and martyrs.

That most of this is a farrago of nonsense is reasonably obvious to a balanced mind; but it is equally evident that it is in fact taking in a lot of people. The Clinton regime in the U.S., and its sympathizers in Britain and elsewhere, have nailed the magic words 'quotas' and 'positive discrimination' to their masts, and the European Parliament's women's organizations follow suit. It seems, therefore that this is one area, at least, in which the call for a 'back to basics' approach is appropriate:

1. It cannot be too often repeated that it is an immensely long human infancy and childhood which has made possible the development of human language, intellect, personality and, in the long run, society itself. Helpless young humans required their mothers' presence even more in the past than is the case now. Nursing mothers, in charge often of several children, were hardly in a position to defend themselves, let alone engage in warfare or hunting. They *needed* men to defend them against other men and wild beasts. This 'division of labour' referred to by the founding fathers of Marxism, and which might better be described as a division of social function, is to be encountered today among many animal species. The heavier, more robust build of the male animal and his frequently protective behaviour to females and young, can hardly be ascribed to some mysterious indoctrination into a gender role.

2. Some animal species are monogamous; some are promiscuous. Only the human female is sexually available at all times. How this came about and what family arrangements prevailed among the various branches of the human race in the long pre-history of *homo sapiens* up to ten thousand years ago, we do not at present know, and no theory about the family can be based on what amounts to mere conjecture.

3. In pre-industrial economies with rudimentary technology the only productive work women could engage in that was compatible with child-bearing and rearing was, with few exceptions, in the home and the fields around the home.

4. The glory-associated activities of hunting and war were dangerous and required superior physical strength and the development of special skills and characteristics. Only a group bent on tribal suicide would send its mothers into battle, or permit them to roam far afield.

5. Had the pre-marital virginity taboo not been virtually universal, young females could not have been protected from predatory and irresponsible males.

What is also conveniently forgotten is that it is only in the present century that the world faces the danger of over-

population, and it was only in the beginning of the nineteenth that Malthus drew attention to that possibility. Before that time the human race often faced serious threats to its very survival. Have feminists not heard of the extermination of populations caused by the plague in the late Middle Ages? With manual labour the only means of production, it is hardly surprising that there should have developed not only taboos against homicide (the sanctity of human life), but also against all forms of infanticide including abortion. Indeed it is precisely in the Christian West that these taboos have been most highly developed.

But need we really go back as far as primitive, ancient or medieval society to recognize the fallacies in feminist arguments? All we need do is contemplate the lot of women in, say, Jane Austen's time, before the advent of the much-traduced Victorian age. Rubber had not yet been discovered in Brazil and, though Pepys speaks of leather articles, condoms and other contraceptives were not generally available. A healthy, fertile, sexually-active woman was likely to have a pregnancy in each year — if she did not die in childbirth, of miscarriage or any of the other multiple ills that beset people before medicine began to make its spectacular progresses. Let us be anachronistic for a moment and imagine the lot of a girl of any class who 'dropped out' of the accepted pattern. If parents accepted a pregnant, unmarried daughter they would have extra mouths to feed instead of the prospect of a son-in-law. If they turned her out, where could she go except on the streets? It was therefore perfectly natural that families should regard an extra-marital pregnancy as an unmitigated disaster and regard premarital virginity as the only safeguard available: hence the taboo inculcated into the young of both sexes, a taboo that for evident reasons was not symmetrical in its application. Dependent as they were, the immense majority were in no position to question the taboo. There were few employment possibilities for women outside domestic service. Indeed, what is strikingly absent from feminist thought

is the awareness that until the advent of a modern economy, employment possibilities off the land were precious few for anybody, women or men, and hence dependence on the family as an economic unit was almost total. Work available for the male sex was rough, dirty and often dangerous. Always it meant long hours usually at subsistence-level pay. Life for most was nasty, brutish and short. Is it surprising that chastity for an unmarried woman was regarded as a safeguard rather than a burden? Or any less surprising that life in a convent often presented itself as a haven of refuge from a hostile world?

Moreover there was the universal dread of sickness. Puritanism followed hard on the heels of syphilis in Europe — Northern Europe, let it be stressed, where the manifestations of this disease were more virulent than in the south as were the manifestations of puritanism. Far from being the malefic invention of frustrated or perverted clerics, as fashionable orthodoxy would have it, or of possessive males as the feminists pretend, pre-marital chastity for both sexes and fidelity in marriage were, quite literally, the only guarantees of immunity from a disease, then untreatable, whose course was quite as horrific as that of AIDS.

Seen against the background of real history, and not of some imagined idyll, the confinement of women to the home — a general feature of every civilization until this century — seems to have been a necessary state of affairs if the family and human culture were to flourish, and such confinement would tend to be accentuated the higher the social level. Women were a 'protected species' and this protection was necessarily paid for in economic dependence. Apart from the very lowest classes in society, the life of women was immeasurably less dangerous and more secure than that of men. These were the ones who had to go to war to defend hearth and home. They were the warriors, the navigators, the adventurers and necessarily so. The cult of honour and glory provided a stimulus to manliness, and cowardice was regarded as a womanish weakness. In these circumstances it is hardly sur-

prising that the public life of politics or art, both requiring single-minded dedication, should have been largely monopolized by men. Nor is it surprising that the images men and women cultivated of themselves and of each other should have developed so as to reinforce functions seen as necessary for society's survival.

In classical antiquity it was generally felt that the greatest misfortune, one that could befall anybody, was to become a slave. By contrast, although it was felt that although no man could possibly want to be a woman, this was something that could not be changed and was in the nature of things. A freeman might be enslaved and a slave be freed but one's sex could not be changed.

Slavery, though not morally defensible, was regarded as a necessary evil without which the civilized life of cities such as Athens was not possible. A person's sex did not fall into the same category. It was simply a fact of nature from which a number of ineluctable consequences flowed.

It was when slavery no longer appeared necessary that it was possible to apply a moral standpoint and support its abolition. Only third worldists attempt to make part of humanity feel guilty about the role some of their ancestors may have played in slavery. Anybody with a knowledge of human history is well aware that the enslavement of other human beings has been practised at one time or another by every nation and race.

It would, perhaps, be helpful to take a similar attitude to the woman question. Just as the ancients could not envisage a world so technologically altered as to make slavery both unnecessary and undesirable, neither could they envisage a world in which the survival of society did not depend upon the protection of women by men. They could imagine an individual's circumstances changing in such a way that he became a slave or a freedman because they did not look on slavery as natural, but as necessary. The woman question fell into a different category. A woman's position was subordinate by nature not only by necessity.

In our world, that of western civiliza-

tion, that natural state of affairs which, as we have seen, necessitated the subordination of women has changed out of all recognition. For good or ill, sexual intercourse is no longer inevitably tied to procreation. Labour conditions and relations make it possible for women to do most jobs that were previously restricted to men. The expansion of market economies has caused women to emerge from the home and with that emergence they have claimed and been granted the full rights of citizenship. Justice demanded the change. Radical feminists, however, need to be reminded that when this process became incipient in the last century, the first to support female emancipation were men; as with slavery whose abolition was first demanded by the vilified white anglo-saxon protestants.

None of the foregoing is news. But it requires re-affirming because the present virulence of feminist militancy, at a time when the process of female emancipation has largely been completed (at least in the much-maligned West), raises questions vital for the future of free society. In spite of the fact that the resurgence of sexually transmitted disease and especially the appearance of AIDS, might give us cause to reflect upon the wisdom for today of a number of traditional puritan values, we find that instead the feminist lobby is intensifying its attack on the family and precisely those traditional values.

Sociologists, when discussing the family, identify a number of its functions: the sexual, the reproductive, the economic and the socialization function as well as that of caring for the sick and aged. However, any realistic appraisal of the family in late industrial societies shows that all these functions are now freely exercised outside the family. The only economic function that continues inside the family is that of consumption, not production. Even socialization and education have been taken over increasingly by agencies outside the family, to an extent where, indeed, there are families who have to fight against the social services for their continued existence. And yet there are more and more serious sociological studies available which show that

many of society's current ills are directly attributable to the breakdown of the family.

When feminists, instead of supporting the protection of the family, and the restoration of some of its traditional functions, campaign for its further destruction, they are helping to bring about the totalitarianism with which we are threatened by the expansion of the various socialist subsystems in Western society. Every one of the radical feminists' demands: quotas, unrealistic measures against discrimination and sexual harassment,

institutionalized care of children, favouring the single parent—all these, if put into practice, will result in an immense extension of the 'nanny state' and its stranglehold on every sphere of life. This bureaucratic nightmare looms even closer with the threats presented by European federalism and the powerful feminist lobbies that exist in Brussels and Strasbourg. Those who yearn for totalitarianism and mourn its breakdown in Eastern Europe are, of course, quite right in aiming their attack in this direction. It was, after all, the family which proved to be at the heart

of resistance to the tyranny of 'real socialism'. Perhaps this was so because the Soviets and their allies failed to take up the radical feminist agenda first mooted by Engels. The Left-Liberal Establishment of the 90's, however, seems set on correcting this failing, and its success in doing so constitutes a very real threat to a free society.

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Gobbledebook of the Decade

Vivian Linacre gives the Scottish Office a special award

Maximising the linkages for delivery mechanisms" was all I had written on my notepad at the end of the seminar, without being sure that I had even got that right. For by then I was utterly bemused.

The speakers were all patricians from The Scottish Office and public sector agencies, impressing the audience of serfs like me from the private sector with their enormous success in spending vast sums of our money; largely on their own administration but ostensibly on urban renewal. In the absence of English translations, however, it was a wasted afternoon.

Delegates were given a glossy booklet of 64 large pages, newly published by The Scottish Office, entitled *Progress in Partnership—a consultation paper on the future of urban regeneration policy in Scotland*, which is entirely composed in the same 'quangorrhoeia': a barbarous hybrid of civil service mandarin, computer-speak and the hyperbole of P.R. brochures. Even the lengthy foreword, signed by the Secretary of State, is a slab of the same flab, that could never have been written by such a cultured

erson as Ian Lang.

The text attributed to him refers to "a key role" and "a key ingredient", whilst on the facing page, headed "Executive Summary and Key Consultation Issues", the epithet "key" appears five more times, as it does on average about twice on every other page. He is also credited with "the co-ordinated, comprehensive approach", which the facing page caps with "a comprehensive, co-ordinated, long-term, strategic approach", page 31 with "the comprehensive multi-agency approach, involving co-ordinated activity behind an agreed strategy", and so forth. Indeed, there are more "approaches" than "keys". Page 28 states: "... this approach is entirely in keeping with one of the fundamental principles of the Partnership approach. This approach is not based..." Elsewhere on page 31, it appears that "This is essentially the Partnership model and some of the other major initiatives...are already implementing this type of approach". How on earth can an initiative implement an approach?

Again, page 26 gives us "integrated approaches to addressing the needs of disadvantaged areas..." Note that there

is no question of *meeting* the needs; nor even *addressing* them. For if anything were actually *done*, all these officials would be redundant! The trick is to talk only in obscure abstractions and stay at least one remove from doing anything: no closer than "approaches". "Approaches to addressing the needs" is better still, for that is two removes away. Hence likewise the constant emphasis on "strategies" and "initiatives": on forever preparing to start something rather than getting on with it. Just as concentrating on "keys" avoids having to open doors, so this preoccupation with "approaches" avoids the risk of direct contact with the job to be done.

Another buzz-word is "objective" which appears in the foreword and more than once on most pages; for that too refers to some goal or aspiration at a safe distance ahead. The vital distinction between "object" meaning purpose or intention, and "objective" meaning what it is hoped to achieve, is ignored: "objective" is longer and so is always used for both meanings, although "object" is frequently all that is actually meant. So mere intentions are presented as if they were results to be

accomplished.

The reason why the booklet is very largely couched in impenetrable jargon is because its few attempts at plain English are so disastrous. Thus: "While much of the Partnership effort has been directed at the needs of the wider labour market, they have not ignored opportunities closer to home", and "None of these models is, of course, mutually exclusive".

The anonymous, robotic team of authors are far safer sticking to "the importance of having a dedicated and adequately resourced local implementation team to drive the regeneration process forward and devise innovative solutions to problems", which presumably means hiring the best people to get the job done; except that driving the process forward does not necessarily mean getting anything done at all.

"Resourcing" — spending as much public money as possible in order to justify the employment of even more officials, self-appointed "representatives" and miscellaneous hangers-on — is the real theme of the publication. Thus: "The Partnerships have recognised that resourcing community organisations, particularly those involved directly in representing the community in Partnership structures, is essential..." Again: "The resources involved are relatively modest and are used to meet some of the core running costs of the Partnership implementation teams and to make some provision for funding key consultancies..." And: "Such funding might be used both to support the running costs of local initiative implementation teams and to provide project funding which might be used, flexibly, in initiative areas to supplement mainstream funding sources." Note that the lion's share always goes towards administration, while the work itself gets the left-overs. Yet again: "One model would be a joint leadership approach in which a board of key partner representatives would offer strategic guidance to a specially recruited local implementation team which would service the board and drive the implementation process forward." Note the order of priorities in this cosy hierarchy. Similarly, "central government assistance in a number of ways" is ranked as follows: "funding to aid the formulation

of a local comprehensive regeneration strategy; funding towards the running costs of a local implementation team; a modest annual budget for projects to supplement resources pledged by the agencies participating in the initiative."

Note also the emphasis throughout on partnerships and teams and structures; wholly designed to ensure that no individual or one body is ever responsible for anything. None of them risks a hanging if they all hang together! So the only motive is to perpetuate and expand the system, for the benefit of all those engaged in it.

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But, one might well wonder, what is this publication *about*: what are these people supposed to be *doing*? To answer briefly: council housing in Scotland developed on a massive scale in the 1960's and '70's, under the absolute control of central and local government, with almost unlimited land and money at their disposal, with the inevitable consequence that it proved an economic and social catastrophe. Among the many vast estates of ruin and misery that the politicians and officials created around our cities, which by the mid-80's the Scottish Office recognized it would have to be seen to be doing something to remedy, four were selected for high-profile treatment. These were by no means the biggest or the worst, but they served the purpose of a P.R. blitz. Hence the publication of *New Life for Urban Scotland* in 1988, which led to the setting up of 'Partnerships' to deal with each of the four. Of course, the people chosen to run these outfits are of the very same pedigree as those who had caused the devastation in the first place: from one generation of local political activists and public parasites to the next!

Now the ostensible purpose of this latest publication is to take stock of "progress" in the targeted areas during these last five years and to propose appropriate adjustments in policy. But, predictably, what has appeared is merely an exercise in self-justification, even self-glorification. Although there is precious little to show for the hundreds of millions of pounds spent, the prescription now offered is 'more of the same'.

There are no comparative statistics relating to housing conditions, unemployment, crime, health or education in these townships, and, of course, no Partnership accounts. There are the usual smart photographs of housing improvement schemes; 'before' taken in the gloom under grey skies and 'after' taken in brilliant sunshine. But to conceal the lack of achievement in these five years we are treated to statements such as: "It has always been recognised that the transformation of the partnership areas would be a long-term process and that measuring the full impact of these initiatives is not straightforward. It is therefore not yet possible to set out a fully quantified impact assessment in this consultation paper." Why not? What a breath-taking admission! No indication is given as to *when* any such "assessment" might become available.

Consider these further reflections on "progress" to date: "While the Partnerships have a collective, shared vision for the future of their areas, embodied in the agreed regeneration strategies, these documents do not aim to be detailed blueprints or action plans for regeneration. The voluntary approach inevitably means that progress has to be negotiated on a step by step basis and there is no question of partners simply being able to 'sit back and let the implementation team get on with it'." If these "agreed strategies" are not "action plans", what the hell are they?

Then again: "Partnership experience has convinced The Scottish Office of the value of a core element in locally based teams which is dedicated to the overall process of regeneration. Their remit, under the direction of the Partnership Board, should be to oversee

and monitor progress, to negotiate the next steps, to look for new innovative opportunities to promote regeneration, to be aware of the need for flexibility in modifying objectives and activities in the light of experience and, at the appropriate stage, to consider an exit strategy for the initiative." *What* "initiative"? Is the "exit strategy" a scheme for the demise of the Partnership Board, the "core element", or The Scottish Office? It is impossible to tell from this turgid passage. And if that is the remit of the "core element", then what precisely do their superiors the Partnership Board do, or for that matter their subordinates the "implementation team"?

These needs for "flexibility in modifying objectives", for a "step by step basis" and for an "exit strategy", invalidate any "agreed comprehensive long-term regeneration strategy". So what "progress", if any, does all this add up to? There is an outright confession of failure in regard to cooperation with the private sector. "The Partnerships have not sought directly to attract new commercial or industrial employers to their areas on any significant scale." Why not, other than because of sheer incompetence?

Again: "The retail sector provides the major example of private sector economic activity within the boundaries of the Partnership areas but there has been less success in securing investment in this field and there are problems with shopping provision in all of the areas." What an understatement! Yet, this section ends with the ringing declaration that: "With the Government's backing, the Partnerships will continue their efforts to attract private investment to these important local facilities" — without, of course, revealing *what* efforts, or *how* they will be continued. Another section ends with an equally desperate clarion call that is likewise merely empty rhetoric: "The Government has confidence that the private sector will respond to the challenge which these areas, and those with similar problems, present." Oh, good: so that's all right then!

Perhaps the entire volume's most comical passage in style, yet the saddest in content, is in this same connection:

"there is also a dynamic aspect to this with improvements in the economic fortunes of residents critical to progress on other aspects of the Partnerships' strategies. At the root of this is the role of residents as consumers with the ability, in terms of purchasing power, to make informed choices over important aspects of their lives. Increasing this purchasing power will, over time, help to create a sustainable private sector housing market in the areas and is central to the creation and viability of attractive local retail facilities." The revolutionary proposition advanced here is that shops need customers who can spend; or (if this is not too difficult) that poor people cannot afford good shops.

But that last quotation has deeper implications. For it suggests that the Partnerships can achieve very little until the people are much better off; yet if the people were much better off there would be no justification for the Partnerships! I almost wonder: is this whole publication a spoof?

For there are many other equally shattering illuminations. How about: "The Partnerships learned that there were very close links between labour market status and low educational attainment." And: "Poor health and the lifestyle factors which are related to it (such as bad diet, smoking and alcohol abuse) are more common in areas of deprivation than elsewhere." They learnt all of this in only five years! Who could begrudge them their multi-million pound budgets if they can produce research findings of such dazzling originality!

For the recurring theme is a plea for yet more money, in order that "the comprehensive, strategic, area-based approach to urban deprivation pursued by the 4 Partnerships might be extended to a wider range of areas", on the irrefutable grounds that "Within the context of existing public sector resources, this will require a greater concentration of resources on selected priority areas. The corollary of this is that there may be deprived areas whose needs will not be addressed through the efforts of comprehensive regeneration initiatives." You bet there are! Indeed, all the evidence presented here proves that, while this *approach* might address the uni-

versal needs of the entire populace, it will not actually remedy any of them — least of all in the subject areas into which such colossal sums have already been poured.

The few improvements that have taken place in these five years — mainly in housing — could and no doubt would have been effected in any event under the existing grant regimes. Ample funds are available from the Scottish Office under its Urban Programme, through the local authorities, Local Enterprise Companies, Scottish Homes, and from the European Community's Structural Funds (both the Regional Development and Social Funds). An excessive proportion of the funds deployed by all these organisations, of course, goes on administration, but the net product from all of them (even the European!) is relatively far greater than from these Partnerships, which serve merely to clog the already unwieldy apparatus of urban aid, adding to the administrative burden of those funds on whose resources they entirely depend.

Among the many issues raised by this publication, to which The Scottish Office Industry Department invited formal responses, is the future method of funding the Partnerships. Only two choices are offered: one is to continue with the existing arrangements, the other to increase "the targeting of Scottish Office financial support on area-based urban regeneration initiatives beyond the 4 Partnerships." But there is a third choice, which is to scrap them altogether.

'Progress in Partnership' must win every award as "**The Gobbledebook of the Decade**". It epitomizes not only the debasement of our language by officialdom but also the waste of resources by the public sector which is ruining our economy. Taking a leaf out of it, may I call for "a key initiative with the objective of addressing the needs for a comprehensive, co-ordinated, integrated approach to the implementation of an exit strategy" ...but short-term, if they know what that means!

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The New Euro-Fascists

Rodney Atkinson finds history repeating itself

Few in the United Kingdom will forget the words of a "European" civil servant called Jacques Delors when, frustrated in his usual quest to dictate to elected representatives what their policies should be, he declared "I will precipitate a crisis". He spoke with the true voice of the fascist state, now experiencing the kind of European comeback which must make Hitler and Mussolini laugh in their graves.

Too many hear the term "fascist" either from the mouth of a young socialist as he lambasts those with whom he disagrees or in the specific historical context of the second world war. It is assumed by most that a fascist is either a loud mouthed German with a small moustache and funny salute or a bull necked Italian with more arrogance than power. But fascism is far more subtle and insidious than that and it did not start in 1939 or finish in 1945.

Fascism is the theory that an ordered, efficient and happy society can be arranged by scientific planning at the centre by a central party and strong state, dispensing power and privileges to corporate bodies. Those bodies can be corporations, associations of many corporations, trade unions or a congress of trade unions, professional associations or any other collective body which believes that collective will is important, not individual freedom and responsibility. In both left and right wing versions of fascism the producer dominates the consumer, whether the product is political or economic.

Such a Fascist society encourages the establishment of committees, parties, collectives, state industrial and investment organisations and a system of imposition of authority from the top down. Such systems are typical of state socialism or communism and also of

national socialism or fascism. Both types of statist authoritarianism are the enemy of true democrats, liberals, libertarians and (non statist) Conservatives, all of whom promote the freedom and concomitant responsibility of the individual, the family, the community, the nation, the rule of law (as opposed to the rule of the party) and the market economy (as opposed to the diktat of the economic State and its corporate acolytes).

Fascist societies tend to appeal to the socially weak and economically insecure who see in collective protectionism the rewards which they could never justify in free competition with their fellow citizens. The planner and corporate organiser also welcome fascist societies since they believe that the whole of society (in all its complexity and constant change) can be planned, ordered, cajoled and run by wise men (they mean themselves) with wide ranging powers.

Fascist societies cannot tolerate freedom at home and so must outlaw the freedom to trade responsibly abroad. It is just such protectionism and "mercantilism" which have traditionally characterised France and Germany, who have always put the interests of the home market above the liberal internationalist notions of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Indeed it was just such a common approach which allowed those two countries to construct, after the fall of France, the National Socialist "Co-prosperity Zone" based on the ordered division of industrial and agricultural production between France and Germany.

Nazi theorists recognised that they were imposing a system completely different from "the English system" as they called it; and it is just such an anti-British system of state imposition, regulation and "ordered" trade which ema-

nates from the European Commission, dominated as it is by German and French civil servants. It is just such an approach which, during the recent GATT negotiations, nearly brought the world to the edge of a disastrous trade war.

One of the distinctive characteristics of this system is that laws are imposed from the top at the behest of business and trade union collectives, designed to enhance their political power and economic wealth, at the cost of the freedom and self-sufficiency of the individual, who has nothing more than his (totally emasculated) vote at infrequent elections.

There have been many examples of statist and fascist behaviour in the United Kingdom in recent years. One of the most insidious of fascist practices is the imposition of retrospective law, that is laws which allow the dispossession or prosecution of people for doing what, at the time of their action, was perfectly legal. By passing the infamous "leasehold reform" legislation the Conservative Government in 1993 was guilty of such a practice. Indeed by requiring that property owners (freeholders) sell to their leaseholders on demand, the "Conservative" government has come close to marxist principles. The right to private property, the right to the protection of contract and the right to be protected from retrospective legislation were all infringed by this act of a so-called "democratic" party.

During the same parliamentary session the Speaker of the House of Commons took it upon herself to threaten the law courts who were considering the legality of the Maastricht Treaty (the Rees-Mogg case). Our judges have a vital constitutional role in a free, society. It is not they who threaten democracy but the Parliament which

gives away the powers of the people without consulting them and a government which signs away 800 years of Parliamentary statute under "royal prerogative".

When, at the Conservative Party conference in 1992, a group of Young Conservatives organised an anti-Maastricht meeting, a group of pro-Maastricht members of the "Tory Reform Group" appeared at the back of the hall to hurl abuse. At the end of the meeting this group of some 10 men stood still in their serried ranks, partly obstructing the only exit from the room. Similarly physical violence and abuse was used within the House of Commons against anti-Maastricht MPs as they tried to vote. (See in particular the book by Teresa Gorman MP, *Bastards*.) These are indeed excellent physical demonstrations of the statist, collectivist, anti-individual logic which permeates the entire Euro-federalist crusade. They coerce individuals with physical acts just as the embryo Eurostate coerces the nation states of Europe, and just as the British government coerced the British people when refusing a vote on Maastricht. Such violent petulance is the mirror image of the abusive words hurled by Eurofanatics like Jacques Delors, Edward Heath and Hugh Dykes MP.

Typical of statist and fascist policies within the European Community are the shutting of the most advanced steel works in Europe (operated by responsible free-trading British steel companies) and a £28m fine on British Steel, while billions of pounds are granted in subsidies to State-owned steel in France, Italy and Germany (the three centres of economic fascism in the last war). As British Coal shuts mines producing at £45 per ton, Germany employs 5 times as many miners producing at £112 per ton, and refuses to import British coal.

The entire French economy is a massive interconnecting labyrinth of state ownership, state subsidy or funding by state-owned or -dominated banks. This is the kind of logic which has destroyed hundreds of thousands of British jobs in airlines, computers, coal and steel, and it is the logic prevalent around the table of the Council of

Ministers which daily prevents the Commission imposing free-trading policies on the industries of the EC.

It is also evident that Britain, by being increasingly locked into the grotesque trading and fiscal systems of Europe, now loses out threefold. Firstly jobs and profits are lost as other operators in the EC market get unfair subsidies, secondly it is our money (as the EC's second biggest financier) which is being used to subsidise European companies and destroy our industries, and thirdly our markets in third countries suffer from competition from state-manipulated European companies and welfare and taxation burdens imposed on British companies from Brussels.

Every day that passes, the constitutional outrage of the Maastricht Treaty is becoming clearer. Recently the British Government has been ordered (by an alien power, over which the British voter has no control) to give part time workers the same privileges as full time workers, and British companies have been ordered to consult workers on matters of business ownership; despite previous agreements maximum working hours are to be imposed by the EC and companies must pay higher maternity benefits (at the cost of the single, childless and old).

The governing party in the United Kingdom mentioned no such policies in its manifesto, the Government actually opposes these policies and Parliament has passed no such legislation. And yet the British people have had these laws imposed upon them.

Whether these laws are reasonable or desirable is irrelevant to the fact that they are palpably not OUR laws. In the not too distant future laws emanating from a Europe dominated by communists or fascists (National Front in France, Fascist Party in Italy or Republicans in Germany) could be imposed upon the British people, using the same "European" legislation.


British politicians seem to have no idea of why we went to war against Hitler and his regime. It was not because he was a Nazi, nor because he persecuted his own people nor even because he practised genocide (we did not know this in 1939). It was because he tried to impose his rule on the

nation states of Europe. Despite his military aggression and the slaughter of millions Hitler never succeeded in making or suspending our laws as the "European" Court now does almost daily, nor did he ever control who could enter, reside in and vote in our country. Even his bombs did not decimate our steel, coal and car industries as the European Community has done.

These latest cases of foreign domination of our country expose the fraudulent nature of the British "opt out" from the social chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. They also contradict absolutely the "subsidiarity" principle of the Maastricht Treaty which, according to John Major, was to give us more control over our own legislation. The Maastricht Treaty in fact accelerated the daily destruction of our democratic rights and the national sovereignty for which so much British (and Commonwealth) blood was so recently spilt.

This Government and the Parliament which has destroyed our nation and our democracy will live in infamy. The British people will not rest until they have regained their country, their Parliamentary sovereignty and their right to self government.

Rodney Atkinson is a businessman and author. This article is extracted from his forthcoming book (with Norris McWhirter) *Treason at Maastricht, the Destruction of the British Constitution*.



*The love of
liberty is the
love of others;
the love of
power is the
love of
ourselves*

William Hazlitt

A Tale of Two Countries

William Peters laments a family break up

If you drive a nation to adopt processes which run counter to its instincts you weaken, and may destroy the motive force of its action. I am speaking of the frequent suggestion that the United Kingdom should join a federation on the continent of Europe. This is something we cannot do. Sir Anthony Eden 1952

If Britain were weakened to a point where she became a sick and ineffective country the loss would be, in a direct sense, hers; but it would be ours also because from the Australian point of view, not only in trade and commerce but in the more impalpable things of the mind and the spirit, a strong Britain is essential. Sir Robert Menzies 1970

"The Southern Cross has vanished in the dawn. Over the city of Sydney the brilliance of a summer's day has broken. It is the 3rd of February 1954: a day of high summer, and of high history for Australia. There'll be no work done today in Sydney. a million of us are on the move swarming into the streets like bees in the sun. A city, and a continent, are waiting...."

So begins *The Queen In Australia*, the Interior Department's official film of her two month progress in 1954. It is implicit in the commentary throughout, as in the image of the bees, that in the relationship between this people and its Sovereign the parts are at one with the whole and by their mutual though different solicitudes, and their mutual though different deferences, each is exalted and inspired.

In his earlier premiership, Robert Menzies had informed Australians immediately after Chamberlain's broadcast in 1939 that "Great Britain has declared war upon Germany, and that, as a result Australia is at war." He had thereby "expressed the overwhelming sentiment of the Australian people...they would have been shocked

to be confronted by formalities and delay." In his last years he wrote: "I love Britain because I love Australia, and like to think I have done her some service. I cannot go anywhere in Australia without being reminded of our British inheritance." He explained to those who called him an anglophile "apparently under the impression that they are using a derogatory expression", that to have no love for the source of that inheritance would be "a miserable act of ingratitude". The monarchy was "a spiritual and emotional conception, more enduring and significant than any balance sheet" and "the whole essence is that the Crown represents the history of centuries; that it is no new invention, but something about which our history has long revolved...." Nevertheless Menzies continues to be regarded by some Australians as one seduced by the blandishments of the British Establishment: a vain betrayer of the true, independent destiny and egalitarian aspirations of his own people.

During her 1954 tour two thirds of all Australians saw the Queen in person. The literary record made under the same auspices as the film concludes: "In two short and crowded months as a cherished guest, the Queen aroused for herself and her ancient office such a tumult of approval as rang around the earth. Australia succumbed wholeheartedly to its young Queen." She herself, noted that "this country offers wonderful opportunities for men and women from the Old World; and to those in the United Kingdom who seek wider scope for their talents and resources, Australia may well seem the Promised Land".

At the end of the war, Australia, save for a fair measure of 'Protestant-Catholic animosity and the ethnic diversity' which obtained thereto, had been a cohesive country of some eight

million people, 98% of whose ancestors had come from the British Isles. Immigration in the previous eighty five years had increased by only one million and four hundred thousand. The government then began an immigration programme (in Menzies words) "designed in substance to build up a homogenous population", to strengthen a sparsely-settled continent against the peril of invasion, in which British migrants were reluctantly augmented with others from 'the Old World', dubbed 'New Australians'. The immigration programme gradually, in some respects absurdly, became less discriminating. Its nature since the seventies, drawing from ever more diverse sources, may be understood from such terms as 'multi-cultural' and 'this great experiment'. An author of *The Oxford History of Australia* expresses a typical attitude: "If... Australia were to be more than a provincial outpost of British culture it would have to shift from its overwhelmingly British ethnicity." Multiculturalism is indeed pursued as a means of dissolving Australia's erstwhile character; also in the belief that thereby Asians, indeed the world, will look favourably upon Australia; while for some multiculturalism is its own reward, a global village cult found everywhere with its own collectivist inner meaning.

There has long been an 'ethnic' television network, its logo a fragmented map of the continent. There is also a *Directory of Ethnic Community Organisations in Australia* with a hundred and forty ethnic groups from Afghan to Zoroastrian. Amid Bolivian and Cypriot are even Cornish, Welsh, Manx, Scottish and of course Irish: but not Australian (nor English). Australia is envisaged as a kind of culturally-neutral suspension in which all the other particles are sustained. In the

recent election, at which voting was compulsory, over a million illiterates took part; voting cards appeared in a variety of scripts and languages and the voter was allowed an assistant so that those who were ignorant of the country's language and institutions might at least be able to vote on its destiny — and preponderantly for the Labour Party. In various dresses and hats or paints a great congregation — later emulated by 'the arts' — paid homage to the Prime Minister shortly before polling. It is the policy of the local forms of the left-liberal nomenclatura which rules, guides and administers what was Christendom, to encourage people to maintain their heritage and traditions, even those of the most diluted aboriginal blood who may thereby claim 'aboriginality' and a privileged status in law.

In 1956 the people of Victoria voted to retain the six o'clock curfew on liquor sales which then prevailed in most states, and in the same year Australia's Immigration minister, Harold Holt, observed: "We Australians are proud of our British origins and of the British way of life, which are the bases of our own." In his chronicle of "the psychic epidemic which swept through English life," however, which culminated in the 'What's Wrong with Britain' cult and in which the glittering vision of Europe began to loom as the solution to all Britain's economic troubles, Christopher Booker discerns 'the watershed of 1956'. In *Biography of a Nation*, Enoch Powell and Angus Maude commented that in the history of the years from 1950 to 1966 "the turning point is situated in about the year 1957." For Michael Wharton "the year 1957 was almost the precise turning point towards the permissive age, when every sort of impudent posture began to flourish as never before." Harold Macmillan became Prime Minister in 1957; the Treaty of Rome was signed.

A newsreel of some five years later reveals, as in a play, a stage and what seems the actors: an imposing squad of men that includes Harold Macmillan and Lord Home. They are explaining to the people of Australia the British government's decision to join the Common Market. Beyond them sits Robert

Menzies, obviously moved but with head propped on hand as one bored and indifferent. Macmillan, deploying his customary aplomb with some discomfort, exclaims with blustering enthusiasm: "We would like you to remain a British country, and we will do all we can to help you!"

Multiculturalism is indeed pursued as a means of dissolving Australia's erstwhile character; also in the belief that thereby Asians, indeed the world, will look favourably upon Australia

Shortly before the signing of the Treaty of Rome C.G. Jung had written: "if the individual, overwhelmed by the sense of his own impotence, should feel that his life has lost its meaning — which, after all, is not identical with public welfare and higher standards of living — then he is already on the road to state slavery....that is just what is happening today: we are all fascinated and overawed by statistical truths and large numbers and are daily apprised of the nullity and futility of the individual personality..." These are the terms in which Britain's relationship to what was 'the Common Market' may be understood: as rather a matter of morale than of matter. It explains why Israel, no bigger than Yorkshire and surrounded by mortal enemies, is determined to lead its own life. The same fundamental faithlessness lay behind Edward Heath's words: "He (De Gaulle) could have gone down as the man who created the real unity of Europe, which has been the endeavour of so many throughout the ages, which has existed since Charlemagne and now was going to be the most potent power in the world to come". The yearnings of many in our age, numinous and otherwise, are like goslings following a dog, and find only so mun-

dane an object, as 'Europe' to attach themselves to. To Heath's barbarous prayer they assent 'Amen'.

Without spurious leadership at a critical point this loss of nerve might never have happened. Then as now, however, in the led as in the leader, the English instinct was either sleeping or dead. At Llandudno a week later, Macmillan finally won over the majority of his own party to the most radical step they had ever undertaken. Many of the delegates supported him like zombies in a dreamworld, wearing lapel buttons bearing the one word 'Yes', as if to re-emphasize their desperate unanimity.

"Bob Menzies thought we were traitors, and New Zealand did too...he gave great hell, you know, to Harold, and partly to me, and we decided it wasn't much worth going on", recalled R.A. Butler of the 1962 Commonwealth Conference. However Menzies, deferential in economic matters, was compelled to agree, faced with arguments about 'political influence and industrial strength'. Macmillan said he would not wish "to injure the special links between Britain and the old Dominions," but that many, especially the young were "impatient of old disputes and intolerant of what seem to them obsolete conceptions" seeing in Europe not a 'protective wall' but an outpost of the future from which they can advance confidently beyond the confines of the present towards the frontiers of the future. He opined that "with the development of the European idea, *Europe is once more seeing a great Renaissance*."

How 'the intelligentsia' regarded the 'European idea' at that time is well documented in a hundred and ten of their contributions to 'Going into Europe' in *Encounter* — of which only seventeen were against. The first batch appeared in December 1962 as Britain's application was considered. W.H. Auden was one 'instinctively' in favour, setting himself apart from those with whom he had least in common, including the Dominions where the relatives of 'the Low Brows' lived, "speaking English, eating English food, wearing English clothes and play-

ing English games". Twenty years earlier as Auden was writing from his famous 'dive', George Orwell had noted that "England is perhaps the only great country whose intellectuals are ashamed of their own nationality. In left-wing circles it is always felt that there is something slightly disgraceful in being an Englishman and that it is a duty to snigger at every English institution.....If the English people suffered for several years a real weakening of morale....the intellectual sabotage from the Left was partly responsible." Even in the first year of the century Alfred Milner had written: "We not only want a majority of British, we want a fair margin because of the large proportion of cranks that we British generate who take particular pleasure in going against their own people".

In October 1962, while the intelligentsia were busy with their pieces for *Encounter*, Menzies reported to the Australian Parliament on the recent Conference. To James Killen "the look on his face and the gestures all told their own tale". At the same time his successor Harold Holt — whose speech on 'the British way of life' was made only six years before — hailed Europe as 'this great adventure'. Killen spoke for those whose instincts were affronted: "I would be ashamed to think that any person nurtured in the British tradition would be prepared for one moment to contemplate embracing this bureaucratic mechanism", he declared. " ... I remain supremely confident that the people of the United Kingdom will survive the vagaries and the weaknesses that come from the utter confusion and the wretched duplicity that presently are inflicted upon that great and historic land". Following his retirement in 1983 Sir James Killen wrote: "No political issue in my life consumed my total being as did the Common Market..."

In 1964, as Harold Wilson first took office, my family followed a million others who had left Britain for Australia since the war. Their numbers had increased as England had watched the arrival of its own commonwealth immigrants. A chance windfall; a chance brick through a window; the

notion of opportunity, convinced some that sound instinct was in retreat in Britain and that "England has always been run for the benefit of foreigners." It was the decision of 'a middle aged, quite ordinary working man' like that controversial constituent of Mr. Powell, 'a decent, ordinary fellow Englishman': one who, unlike Auden, had volunteered immediately in September 1939, being patriotic in that deep native way that outsiders find hard to understand.

Australia was neither 'the Promised Land' nor so 'English' as perhaps Auden supposed. Nevertheless the day of our arrival was celebrated (but is no more) with customary fireworks and bonfires, just as in England. The currency was pounds, shillings and pence; measurement was imperial; telephone and pillar boxes were red and the mail royal and under the Post Master General; milk bottles stood on the doorsteps; imperial statues in the squares. Australian-made British cars travelled the streets, not Japanese, and the ABC was like its British model in its heyday: moral, polite and well-spoken (as it is no more). There was a magazine programme called 'This Week in Britain' to keep in touch.

Our new life began in a new town in South Australia named after the Queen following her tour of ten years before. In the austere well-run schools of the day, drums still governed the assemblies, at which once a week the flag was raised and the National Anthem sung (until 1974 God save the Queen; then Advance Australia Fair; overturned for God save the Queen in 1976; reinstated 1977; purged of sexism 1984) and each, whatever his origin, pledged his allegiance. I heard for the first time and almost the last, during the week of Churchill's obsequies, 'home' used for England by one who had never been there.

An era of stability and puritan restraint was now ending; and of unchanging, almost static governments: in New South Wales of over twenty years; in Tasmania over thirty; likewise in South Australia where — a record in the British world — Sir Thomas Playford, fruit farmer and Premier, had shrewdly ruled with his

small cabinet for almost twenty seven years. In a distinct and pregnant echo of *Encounter*, it was said that people were "tired of the dreary stability of the Playford era". Supplanted in 1965 by a new generation of a less certain sound, and as though for the long quarantine the *Zeitgeist* were the more virulent, soon a hard-won civic and moral inheritance would be swept away and in its place would rise the now familiar profligate government with client agencies and bureaucracies collectivising and multiplying their dependents. Forbearance and independence would be assailed by assertiveness and rights, though the idea of state creches and female colonels would be still regarded with ridicule and contempt.

Sir Robert Menzies relinquished office in 1966, weeks before the pound was scrapped for the more logical — and efficient, easier for our children, and of course more American — dollars and cents. In the same year married women were first permitted in the Public Service. Australia also demurred to Mr Healey's request for a contribution to the cost of the British presence in South East Asia and the Indian Ocean because it would, in Mr. Holt's words, "be at the expense of the present growth rate."

A month before Britain 'entered Europe', it was also decided to scrap the ancient heirlooms of measurement, for the clumsy jargon of the metric system. In those years of revolt and 'counter culture', the nursery years of the present when so many were "intolerant of what seemed to them obsolete conceptions", these changes in measurement coincided with the change in 'values' whereby virtues, pieties and customs like any measure, were exposed as arbitrary or 'obsolete'.

The children of Australia whom the Queen addressed as those who would "guard its safety and guide its destiny" now do so. One is its Prime Minister. In saying that "Australia must cross the Rubicon into the Asia-Pacific region" and become "culturally stripped down to do business with them", he would outclass even British politicians in self-emasculation. He told a St. Patrick's Day crowd, however, that "the Irish have always been in the

vanguard of Australian nationalism", and has mused that as a republic the Australian identity would be "as clear as day". He has been obsequious in Indonesia and punctiliously respectful of the Emperor of that most monocultural of peoples, the Japanese, whose Emperor Hirohito, Australia mourned with its flag at half mast: a flag the Prime Minister disdains to use.


Although the Prime Minister may be deplored by some for his effrontery and ignorance, it is significant that such people may now be elected to the office. His republicanism was not at issue in the election; some Liberals have said that a republic is inevitable. Only the National Party, largely the

independent-minded rural heirs of Australia's erstwhile character, stands united to uphold the Constitutional Monarchy. Since their voted assent would be necessary, the people are to be educated. Meanwhile such forms as are vulnerable are contemptuously erased without courtesy; the Queen not being Japanese. Until 1964 Australians travelled with a British passport. On receiving their latest renewal they find that the Royal Coat of Arms has gone. The British people discover the same.

In 1992 the Queen was presented with a copy of *The Queen in Australia* by the Mayor of Sydney whose predecessor had first welcomed her on be-

half of her 'loyal and dutiful subjects'. One wonders what feelings Her Majesty might have if she relived that journey. Its last ceremonial moments, like the first, were passed on a crowded and decorated shore and the film conveys all of that 'sweet sorrow' of parting that each may recognise. For these solemn words were in fact true: "and then, suddenly, the splendour and the circumstance dissolved and it became: a family farewell."

William Peters is a freelance writer alternating between England and Australia.



I was visiting a friend in the country. The woman next door was not so old, but she leaned on the garden fence and asked me if I would like to marry her daughter. I could have the house as well. She explained that her husband had died the previous year and she felt it was time to join him. It was clear she would feel happier if her daughter's future was assured.

Thus it is that death and renewal have their place in Poland. As everywhere in the world, children are a joy, but death too has its place. On All Souls' Day the cemeteries shimmer with candles as people visit their family graves.

The church and its festivals still inform a large part of life; it remains astonishing to see the churches full and not just with old women. If one drives through the country on a Sunday, one comes across country roads thronged with people on their way to or from church. There are parts of

Poland where one would no more think of building a home without a niche for the Virgin Mary than without a chimney.

In recent decades the church drew part of its strength from its resistance to communism. It sometimes seems that the one achievement of "progressive thought" in this part of Europe was to stop the clock of history and thus, inadvertently, preserve some of the common decencies of daily life which are rapidly disappearing from the West. With their iron curtain, it is as though the Communists erected a barrier which allowed certain traditional values to flourish while they themselves obligingly stepped into the role of the devil incarnate. Young people wanting to rebel might be drawn to the church but certainly not to Marxism. The church, the education system and the traditions of Polish culture must take the credit for the survival of traditional values.

Even the language lends a hand. Polish retains a polite third-person form which enshrines a formal respect between the old and the young. The strong sexual division of the language conserves and reflects a greater distance between the sexes which permits a more old fashioned balance and stability compared to the sexual warfare which has broken out in the West. And Poland is a monoculture where everyone you meet is likely to be Polish and, more than likely, born and bred in the place where they live.

Thus it was that the Communist system imposed a kind of morality play where everyone had to make moral choices about how to live with the evil and the absurd. The fall of Communism has swept away this obvious evil and there can be no doubt that this is beneficial. However, only a fool believes that we are ever going to live in a perfect world. The perplexing feature about the post-communist world is that

the enemy is less evident; it hides behind shelves of consumer goods and nobody is quite sure what it is.

Since the fall of communism the church itself has made institutional gains. It has succeeded in getting religious education introduced into schools and abortion outlawed in all but the most extreme circumstances. But it now faces this more shadowy enemy; a new kind of modernism, a different kind of economic model of man imported from the West.

The benefits of the recent changes in Poland cannot be denied. Freedom of speech is perhaps the most important. No longer do Poles have to endure the bare-faced lies of their masters accompanied by a panoply of state repression. However, a new and more subtle form of lying has been introduced in the form of advertising. The Poles are alternately as amused and sceptical about it as people are in the West. This new form of propaganda has had some effect in creating false needs and a new vision of life where, for example, ageing is something to be avoided and death is unmentionable.

The shops are now full of goods and queues and shortages have disappeared. One should not rush to criticise, but not everyone can afford these goods. Whereas prices approach international levels, the average wage is about two thousand pounds a year, the basic pension is a quarter of this and unemployment benefit runs out after a year. Incomes therefore, have fallen in real terms. One sees pensioners picking through the rubbish and counting what for others would be small change. Unemployment stands at 11 per cent and in parts of Poland there is no hope for the young. This is why the Poles voted the former Communists back into power.

In the old days both production and distribution were inefficient and the first words a foreigner learnt were "nie ma", the two syllables in Polish meaning "there isn't any". Now under-capitalised and poorly-managed Polish firms are faced with interest rates of 50 per cent as well as competition from the West. Sometimes it is hard to find Polish goods on the shelves. Western and Far Eastern companies operate

with marginal production costs and therefore have spare money to establish a market share. It remains to be seen whether Poles will be able to rise to this challenge.

And yet the Poles remain a happy people. Officially, the church's teaching only allows drinking on special occasions. But there is always a name-day or a birthday and the church calendar is littered with occasions for celebration.

However, as belts are tightened, Poles find it harder to retain their traditional hospitality. They forget about the queues and shortages and look back with nostalgia to the times when no one had much, but everyone had something, children had subsidised holidays and everyone had some sort of job and some sort of security. Now they are thrown back on their own resources. Not surprisingly, this situation provides a field day for the devious as well as the honest entrepreneurs. The private sector now employs 45 per cent of the workforce and is to be encouraged.

What lies ahead for Poland? Having been placed in hock by previous Communist governments and being in need of international credit to dig itself out of the mire, the new "communist" government is obedient to its new masters, the international bankers. Thus it is continuing the same policies as its post-communist predecessors under the guiding hand of the IMF. Having broken old shackles, Poland is anxious to join the Western commonality of nations so as to avoid the slippery slope presented by her neighbours to the east. In terms of security, Poland has no big statements to make; she has to watch her neighbours and brace herself for whatever history may bring.

Intellectual life has always been more vigorous here than in defiantly philistine England. Journalism is a serious profession and even sociologists are listened to with respect. The Poles may well have something to teach us as they face this new challenge of modernity.

Robert Mellors is English language consultant to Poland's major educational publisher.

Sophist's Corner

After 1945 and the defeat of Germany many countries chose, or found themselves being made to choose, the Bolshevik model for modernizing backward agrarian economies by planned industrial evolution. It was therefore never relevant to what is now the Czech Republic and to what was until 1989 the German Democratic Republic, but it was relevant to most of the region, including the USSR. I do not have to tell you about the economic deficiencies and flaws of the system, which eventually led to its breakdown, and still less about the intolerable political systems it imposed on Central and Eastern Europe. Still less do I have to remind you of the incredible sufferings it imposed on the peoples of the former USSR, particularly in the iron age of Joseph Stalin.

And yet I must say [although many of you will not welcome my saying so] that up to a point it worked better than anything since the break-up of the monarchies in 1918. For the common citizens of the more backward countries in the region — say Slovakia and much of the Balkan peninsula, it was probably the best period in their history. It broke down because economically the system became increasingly rigid and unworkable, and especially because it proved virtually incapable of generating or making economic use of innovation, quite apart from stifling intellectual originality. Moreover, it became impossible to hide the fact from the local populations that other countries had made far more material progress than the socialist ones.

Eric Hobsbawm *Open Society News*, Soros Foundation.

Community Hysteria West of the Dnestr

Gaspar Biro describes the problems of the Hungarian minority

The international public, together with Romanian and Hungarian public opinion, has up to now been informed of the alleged Hungarian territorial claims against Romania after 1947 solely through the Romanian press and diplomacy. Since December 1989 an ever increasing number of detailed descriptions and reports have been published in Romania, describing a world-wide plot and the activities of Hungarian lobbies abroad. The subject of 'Hungarian irredentism' had already been kept before the eyes of the Romanian public; but it had never attracted so much publicity as after the December 1989 events. One can precisely pinpoint a date when this latest Romanian political hysteria broke out, focusing on 'this dangerous activity which is capable of destabilising the whole of Europe'. It was 22nd August 1968. On the 21st of August, Nicolae Ceausescu, the first man of Romania, openly refused to take part in the invasion against Czechoslovakia and strongly condemned it. At the popular meeting held in front of the Palace of the Republic, Ceausescu declared that party and state leaders would call for a national uprising should Romania be invaded. The events that followed saw the beginning of the phenomenon described as 'community hysteria' by Istvan Bibo, a twentieth-century Hungarian political scientist.

After 30th August 1968 until his death Ceausescu never openly talked about the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Romania's role at the time. Only a few people know that the Romanian intelligence service passed two important pieces of information to Ceausescu on the night of 21 August 1968: first, that Moscow intended to use Hungarian poli-

ticians in Romania to destabilise the internal political situation there; and second, that his own life was in danger. According to the scenario which had supposedly been worked out in Moscow, the first phase of destabilization would have taken place by instigating a revolt in Seklerland, an area inhabited by ethnic Hungarians. The pretext of Hungarian grievances, and atrocities committed against the Hungarians, would have been used to back an appeal to the Soviet Union by unnamed senior Hungarian politicians in Romania, asking for Soviet intervention. Ceausescu immediately reacted to the two pieces of information. He ordered that a special department be organized within the state security department, the notorious Securitate at the interior ministry, so that the Hungarian minority could be kept under surveillance. Furthermore, he ordered that similar special units be set up at the county departments. They were meant to deal with so-called 'Hungarian irredentism'.

At the same time a unit of bodyguards for the personal safety of the president was set up with the code number UM0920A. From that day on, Hungarian members of the opposition were simply branded as nationalists, irredentists and chauvinists in secret classified papers.

Events like the joint meeting of the councils of ethnic Hungarian and German workers on the 13th and 14th March 1978, and the heated debate that followed the publication of *A History of Transylvania*, by a group of Hungarian historians, all contributed to the enhancement of this 'community hysteria'. The feeling of Hungarian danger increasingly permeated Romanian publicity and public thinking. Bearing in mind such anteced-

ents, those who were acquainted with the situation were not surprised by the eruption of the anti-Hungarian attitude which followed the televised speech of President Iliescu on 25th January 1990, in which he accused the Hungarians in Transylvania for the first time of separatist intentions.

Today the Romanian government is demanding that Hungary should renounce territorial claims, show no interest in minority affairs and stop asking for permission to open a consulate in Transylvania. It is apparent that the Romanian demand is directly concerned with territorial issues, which have never been raised on the Hungarians' part. The Romanians reject all constructive Hungarian proposals and demands, insisting on all the conditions above, prescribing them as preconditions for any worthwhile interstate relations. At least that is how the unwritten rules of the game of diplomacy work. If I want you to abandon your position, I will make it clear in advance that your demands are invalid.

After the signing of the Ukrainian-Hungarian treaty, the Romanians took the clause on territorial issues as a precedent whereby the signatory parties declare that they have no territorial claims and will not have any at all. We cannot discuss the complexities of this issue here. Nevertheless it is worth looking at what kind of results could come from the Ukrainian clause as far as Romanian-Hungarian relations are concerned. Hungary would give up the 'intention' of annexing Transylvania, something the Romanians complained about after 1947. By doing so Hungary would admit that it had designs to separate Transylvania from Romania, especially after 1975. In plain words, Hungary would be tricked, because it

is not clear what is meant by the territory of 'Transylvania'. Is it defined as the historical Transylvania, or the geographic, the pre-1848, or the one between 1940 and 1944? There are some further variations, too; but the question remains, what would Romania be willing to concede?

Let us go further back. On 17th August 1916, I.C. Bratianu, prime minister of Romania, and the representatives of the four allied states, S.P. Koziel of Russia, Count Saint Aulaire of France, Sir George Barclay of Great Britain, and Baron Fasciotti of Italy, signed the Treaty of Bucharest. In this secret document, the Allies promised no less than the possibility of annexing the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy where Romanians lived, in return for Romania's entry into the war. A quotation from *From Padova to Trianon* by Maria Ormos illustrates what this actually meant:

In accordance with the treaty the Romanian government undertook the obligation of entering into the war and, accordingly, the allied states recognised its territorial integrity and its claims for the territories listed in Clause 4. This clause defined the post-war borders of Romania. It recognised the existing Romanian-Russian borders in the east. Then the borderline followed the borders of Galicia and Bukovina, and those of Galicia and Hungary. It crossed the line of the River Tisza at a point four kilometres east of Debrecen. Crossing the River Koros three kilometres westward at the mouths of the rivers White Koros and Swift Koros, it reached the Tisza again north of Szeged. It ran along the Tisza down to the Danube, to the then existing borders of Romania. In this way Romania was promised

Bukovina, Transylvania, Partium, the eastern parts of the Hungarian Plain, and the Banat (the Southern parts of the Hungarian Plain). The signatories promised not to make a separate peace, let alone a general peace, unless simultaneously and unanimously. The allied states hinted at granting Romania equal status at the peace conference.

Although things turned out differently, certain aspects need to be explained. No senior Romanian politician or public figure has as yet declared the contents of this treaty null and void in relation to the territories between the River Tisza and the present borders. Romania has just once referred to this text: it was at the opening of the peace conference in 1919 when, on the basis of the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, and not on the basis of national self-determination, it demanded that the secret Bucharest Treaty be completely observed by the great powers. Contrary to diplomatic rules, the Romanian delegation had the treaty published in the 15th January issue of *Le Matin*. A book published by the Romanian Academy of Sciences in 1987, a compilation of the history of Romanian law, emphasizes that Romania was in a very disadvantageous position at the peace talks. This book declared references to the complete text of the 1916 treaty legitimate and absolutely justified.

Since 1989 efforts have been made to prove that 1.5 million Romanians were forcibly assimilated in Hungary, and that Greek Catholics in Hungary are exclusively Romanians. These have been articulated not only by the press, led by *Vatra Romaneasca*, an extreme nationalist organ, but by similar publi-

cations which have been distributed at international events with the help of Romanian diplomacy. The slogan "If it is necessary we shall march to Budapest the third time" was not just Ceausescu's favourite saying. Similar threats have openly or covertly been voiced in all prominent Romanian newspapers since 1989. The motto of a weekly published by the Greater Romania Party bearing the same name as its party, quotes a Romanian historical figure: "We shall again be what once we were or even more".

The idea of Romania spanning the River Dneestr to the River Tisza is the dream of a handful of extremists today. Yet the Romanian government should be more careful about its pronouncements in a country where symbols and metaphors carry formidable implications: the scandal of the treaty signed with the Soviet Union on eternal friendship, which was never ratified, the *de facto* renunciation of Bessarabia by the Romanians, as well as the ambiguous stance of the Romanian government on the status of Northern Bukovina in Ukraine, do have some meaningful implications. Let these renunciations be proclaimed by the Romanian government itself. As it is, the pro-government press of Bucharest, such as *Adevarul*, is prepared to consider the effects of such renunciations only in connection with the territories east of the Tisza: that is, the territory of Hungary.

Gaspar Biro is a minority rights expert and an adviser to the UN.

Notes on Reviewers

Edward Chaney is an historian who specializes in the history of Anglo-Italian cultural relations. His books include *The Grand Tour*.

Ian Crowther is our Literary Editor.

Angela Ellis-Jones is writing a book about law and public opinion in England in the twentieth century.

Robert Grant is Lecturer in English at the University of Glasgow and the author of *Oakeshott* published by Claridge Press.

A.W. Purdue is a Lecturer at the Open University.

Martin Tyrrell is a freelance writer and researcher.

The Ukrainian Elections Observed

Jessica Douglas Home

During the recent Ukrainian parliamentary elections representatives from various democratic bodies in the west were invited by the Ukrainian Government to observe proceedings in the polling stations and confirm the validity of the election results. The first thing that must be said is that, even if the polling had been completely free and fair the observers could not justifiably have endorsed it because they were too few in number for such a vast country — only 137 of the 43000 stations could be covered in the first round, and three quarters of the observers failed to turn up for the second round.

As to what they did observe, once one has said that systematic fraud was not evident, it is difficult to say much more that is favourable. The electoral regulations themselves were far from satisfactory, since Ukrainian election law allows numerous opportunities for the results to be influenced by cheating or incompetence or both.

Moreover, although flouting of the regulations was not systematic it was by no means non-existent. Multiple voting, for instance was widespread. A more serious problem was the lack of control of the mobile urns, which could be stuffed with many more voting papers than those of the ill and disabled for which they were exclusively designated. The polling station at which I as an observer was No. 4 and in the No 1 constituency in the centre of Kiev, and if there was one constituency in the Ukraine where fraud would have been seen to be “necessary” it was here. The contest was between the former Defence Minister Konstantin Morosov and the leader of the lawyers’ union Viktor Medvedchuk, and the result would be regarded as a key indicator, since they represent very different standpoints on the issue of Ukraine’s defence and foreign policies.

Morosov, who had resigned last No-

vember rather than approve the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia, was the candidate who represented Ukrainian aspirations. But Medvedchuk, a strong proponent of the policy over which Morosov resigned, had his own methods of trying to ensure his election. It was credibly alleged that a demographic survey of the district had been made available to him and that, on discovering its population to be predominantly elderly, he had issued food parcels to them and promised them Life Insurance Policies. It was widely accepted that he had bribed the polling station commission.

I myself saw examples of serious irregularities at that station. When I arrived with two colleagues, two of the station commissioners became angry and a great deal of intimidatory shouting ensued. Eventually we were admitted; but as I walked to the table to watch the count, I was grabbed and violently shaken by the Chairman of the commission. Before our arrival, the local Ukrainian observers had been ordered to sit along the wall farthest from the table, making it impossible for them to see the count taking place.

The general haphazardness of the count that I witnessed was disturbing enough; even more so were decisions taken to invalidate more and more ballot papers at each successive count and recount. Moreover two local observers, a professor of philosophy and an engineer, described to us a grave irregularity with the mobile urn.

The urn had been taken by the deputy chairman to an Isolator (Remand Centre), but observers had been denied the right to watch the voting inside the building. According to the Commission, 105 remand prisoners voted. When the poll closed, the commission refused to count the mobile urn separately but deposited its contents into one of the two main ballot boxes, making it impossible to ascertain how many ballots were in

the urn. During the count 38 individual ballots were invalidated on the grounds that pencil rather than ink had been used to mark the names. It seems that the same strokework had been used on each of these ballots. The members of the commission were unco-operative and refused to explain any of the discrepancies noticed. Given that only 14 votes divided the two candidates in this crucially important polling station, every single vote was significant. Add to all this the well-established fact that many “independent” candidates (who gained well over a third of the parliamentary seats) had achieved their success with pre-election bribery, and it is not surprising that cynicism and apathy are evident in cities like Kiev.

“In spite of the risk I take for my future, I am determined to prevent a man such as Medvedchuk from entering parliament to pass laws for the people”, the professor of philosophy said to me. This attitude seems to be rare amongst the population in general, who believe the elections to be rigged and who have no faith in them. The Ukrainian Central Election Commission lacks the moral authority to reassure the people. In the event, votes cast at station No. 1 were deemed invalid. Neither Medvedchuk nor Morosov had reached the 50 per cent threshold. Perhaps the fuss made by the observers in their report the morning after the election, combined with the British Ambassador’s visit to the head of the electoral commission to complain, explained the surprising result. This situation, however, is not to be welcomed, for it provides the opportunity to vote again at station No. 1 at a time when international observers are likely not to be there to watch fair play.

Jessica Douglas Home is Chairman of the Mihai Eminescu Trust.

Editorial

We live in troubling times for the conservative conscience. The West is adrift without leadership, anarchy is spreading through Asia and Africa, while the political process in Europe has been absorbed by the fantasy of European union. Almost everywhere in the civilised world we encounter the signs of social decay: the decline in religious observance; the dwindling of local customs and social life; the rise of crime and violence; the pornocratic culture of the mass media; the desecration of love and marriage; the collapse of education and the retreat of the individual into his private pleasure dome. These things threaten to populate the world with a new species of human being — cold-hearted, disloyal, promiscuous, uncultured and godless — whose sole pursuit is present pleasure, and who looks on the sufferings of others with indifference or delight. In the face of this prospect those of us who were brought up in the old dispensation might be tempted to despair — and the more so when we see how many of our own generation are prepared to accept or justify the reigning trivialities, and to preach the forward-looking gospel that sees nothing to be criticised in women priests, Sir Richard Rogers or the new Radio 3.

Cultural despair has been with us, however, for many decades, and writers who have no other message, or who seek to comfort us with fantasies of a life outside civilisation, merely illustrate what they condemn. The exasperated writings of men like Leavis and Lawrence are, when it comes to the point, also exasperating. We live only once and that once is *now*. The choice lies before us, as it has lain before every human being in history, to live well or badly, to be virtuous or vicious, to love

or to hate. And this is an *individual* choice, which depends on cultural conditions only obliquely, and which no other person can make in our stead.

If our culture is demoralised, it is in part for want of good examples. A good neighbour, loving parent, conscientious teacher, loyal friend or faithful spouse is an object not only of admiration, but of emulation too. Nobody likes, still less admires, coldness, idleness or infidelity, even when he finds these qualities in himself. It is in our nature as social and moral beings to be drawn to virtue and repelled by vice, and society can never degenerate to the point where vice alone has a following. By living well we help others to live well, and this is a source of joy for us and for them.

Indeed, if we were to view the matter *sub specie aeternitatis*, we might be persuaded that it is good to have been born in this time of decay. Our generation was granted a privilege which future generations may never know — a view of Western civilisation in its totality, and a knowledge of its inner meaning. We were given the pure truths of the Christian religion, and the morality of sacrifice which turns renunciation to a secret triumph, and suffering to a secret joy. We also had the chance to see what will happen, should we lose these gifts. We had an opportunity to work on their behalf which no previous generation has been granted, and no future generation may desire.

If our political leaders disappoint us, it is either because they have no inkling of this opportunity, or because they regard it with the kind of bored cynicism that prevents them from setting an example. But there is more to life than politics, and even those who lack the

deep restfulness that comes from true religion may find themselves, in these unhappy times, surprised by joy. For consider what has *not* been destroyed: music, poetry and art; the sacred texts and the secular knowledge which derives from them; the impulse to love and to learn, which will vanish only with the human species; the still warm habit of association and institution-building, into which all our better impulses may feed. These are the counters to despair, and the source of hope in any age. Society depends upon the saints and heroes who can once again place these things before us and show us their worth. This is not a task for the politician, whose proper role is not to create a society, but rather to represent it. It is a task for the educator, the priest, and the ordinary citizen whose public spirit is aroused on behalf of his neighbours.

Such people are reluctant to come forward, largely because the mass media, dominated by trivialising materialists and sarcastic cynics, will cover them with ridicule. But the great merit of our civilisation, and of the Christian religion upon which it is founded, is that it teaches us to accept ridicule, to know that the best is always mocked by that which feels condemned by it, and to take comfort in handing on knowledge to *one* person, regardless of the scorn of those who could never receive it in any case. Of course, it is hard to feel the full confidence which those teachings require. But they are addressed to each of us individually, and their validity is not affected by what others think or do. We have within ourselves the source of our salvation: all that is needed is to summon it, and to go out into the world.

Letters

Sir,

In his article "The Ideology of Sensitivity" (SR March 1994) Mr Charles Sykes correctly identifies the importance of naked egotism in this aspect of victim culture. However, the article fails to address the question of why this base aspect of human nature, which has always been with us, should suddenly gain such dominance. Therefore, Mr Sykes fails to reveal the ultimate culprit.

The latter half of the twentieth century has seen a rapid acceleration in the move away from the traditional Christian world view which holds the existence of absolute Truth, as revealed supremely in the person of Jesus, to homocentric humanism. To the humanist, man becomes the centre and therefore sole arbiter of truth and reality. In this new paradigm there can be no absolute truth. With no absolute standards to be his guide it is inevitable that man's feelings become the final arbiter of reality and all that remains for discussion is "whose feelings have primacy?"

By identifying the superficial resemblance of "Sensitivity" to Christian charity, Mr Sykes touches upon possibly the most dangerous aspect of this ideology, plausibility. For in its homocentric relativism "Sensitivity" is, truly, the very antithesis of the Christian belief that God is Truth.

P J Payne
Stafford.

Sir,

I am sorry to see a piece such as Ray Honeyford's "Homosexuality — the truth of it" in *The Salisbury Review*. The book which he purports to review — Stephen Green's "The Sexual Dead End" — is a farrago of ignorant prejudice and hatred dressed up as an "open minded study". Far from being "well documented", the author misquotes and vilifies numerous people, (includ-

ing myself) without having sought our comments or obtained copyright permission for his quotations, many of which are abused by being taken entirely out of context.

It is easy to make facile generalisations about groups of people, but I question whether Stephen Green, Ray Honeyford or Roger Scruton can establish any validity for their sweeping assertions such as that "sex, for homosexuals, has no meaning beyond itself" and is "a shallow and meaningless fling" (Honeyford), or that homosexual love is not a valid possibility (Scruton -- *the Guardian*, 21 March 1994). What sort of academic integrity is this? How can people with no personal knowledge of these matters so airily discount the life experiences of many others, my own included?

I would have more respect for the politics of *The Salisbury*'s contributors (even when I differ from them) if they were a few jots less arrogant in parading their prejudices as "factual wisdom" when they are no such thing.

Antony Grey
London

Sir,

I agree with Mark Haverland's incisive letter on the dilemmas faced by Anglican Catholics (SR, March 1994 issue) in every respect save one.

This is his implication that the Anglican Catholic Church is the only possible Church for 'continuing' Anglicans. As I am sure he knows, the Anglican Catholic Church has refused to join the much larger Traditional Catholic Communion, which consists of continuing Churches in America, Canada, Australia, India, Ireland, South Africa and now England and which represents mainstream continuing Anglicanism. This division within the continuing Church originated in America and now threatens to spread further. If the Anglican Catholic Church really wishes to see a valid

alternative to Rome or Canterbury for faithful Anglicans it should settle its differences with the Traditional Anglican Communion immediately.

John Chilver
Shaftesbury

Sir,

I note, through *The Salisbury Review*, that there is to be a conference on June 11th to discuss a right wing manifesto and "the suitability of the present Conservative Party to implement such a manifesto". I am not clear about the role of the *Review* in promoting — or publicising — the forthcoming conference, but I welcome its action.

There is a potentially very strong right wing movement throughout the country, but it is largely powerless due to an already existing, allegedly Conservative Party which ignores or rejects many basic conservative tenets, and is generally inefficient. The right wing needs a focus, if for no other reason than to show to itself its own strength. One way to do this would be for an appropriate candidate with a traditional right wing program to contest a Parliamentary by election. Particularly if he were the representative of a new right wing Party, which might emerge from this conference.

Some action of this sort now seems to me to be essential. While the *Review* has the admirable and legitimate purpose of presenting a forum of right wing views, I do, in my bleaker moments, find some resemblance to a group sitting on an active time bomb who are having an absolutely fascinating discussion on the molecular nature of the fuse.

Although, like most people, I have an instinctive revulsion to being involved in politics I would actively support any genuine right wing Party that might result from this conference.

C S Morris
Cromer

Reviews

America's Religious Roots

A.W. Purdue

The Language of Liberty 1660-1832. Political discourse and social dynamics in the Anglo-American world
J.C.D. Clark. £35 h/b, £13.95 p/b Cambridge 1993.

The American Revolution is conventionally portrayed either as a democratic revolution or as a national war of independence. Both interpretations suggest that it was a "modern" and a secular phenomenon. As we have come to accept the United States as the acme of modernity, the view that the revolution was to a great extent a religious civil war is revisionist indeed. Jonathan Clark analyses the political discourse of the colonists and concludes that the revolution can only be understood within a transatlantic framework that emphasises differences over law and religion. In *the Language of Liberty* this most provocative and stimulating of contemporary historians successfully challenges the established view of the American Revolution. The language of liberty, he argues, was not a secular tongue nor was it new.

Two quotations from Clark sum up the consensus between the colonists and British society in the mid-eighteenth century and the reason for its dissolution:

By the mid-eighteenth century, Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic proclaimed their faith in liberty: they appealed to a common constitutional tradition even as they disputed its ownership and application.

... while less than a tenth of Englishmen in 1776 were Dissenters, more than three quarters of Americans were enlisted in other denominations.

Liberty is indeed the key word and the concept of liberty is not to be confused with that of democracy. As Clark argues, the notion that democracy was the essence of the American Revolution was the invention of a post-revolutionary era. But what was this liberty that Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic believed they possessed? It was a particular rather than a universal liberty, a question of the rights of the free-born Englishman rather than of the rights of man. It was a liberty founded on the practice and achievements of the past rather than upon abstract principle. It was also, however, a concept which was interpreted through law and which was intimately connected to religion. What drove apart Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic were the legal and religious disputes which marked the contesting of a common tradition.

National identity, prior to modern nationalism, was based largely upon allegiance to a monarch and upon religion. The Henrician Reformation had made England an "empire" in which secular and religious authority both belonged to the monarch, and loyalty to sovereign and a common Protestantism were central to English identity, as they were to become in the course of the eighteenth century, the basis of the sense of being British (see Linda Colley, *Britons*, 1992). After 1688 the unified sovereign created by England's unique constitutional and religious development was the king in parliament which in a confessional

state exercised absolute power by the common law and had also divine authority. Law and religion were thus closely related.

Protestant Dissenters, though excluded from the full rights in political and civic life enjoyed by Anglicans, were ambivalent about the Anglican hegemony incorporated in the constitution: it was at least Protestant, and dissenting sects could applaud the deliverance from Catholicism in 1688 and give allegiance to a Protestant monarchy; but to some, in the absence of Popery itself, high-church Anglicans could seem distinctly Popish. The enormous success of the Anglican church after the Restoration is too little remarked upon. Until the 1660s, Dissent had hoped to control the national church; afterwards, although the Church of England was far from homogeneous, the sects were legally excluded by the demands of the Act of Uniformity. During the first half of the eighteenth century the Anglican Church improved and consolidated its position in England while even in the American colonies it made considerable progress.

What occurred in the colonies in the 1760s and 1770s, according to Clark, was a revolt of natural law against the common law and a rebellion of Dissent against Anglican hegemony. These were not merely linked but were the same movement against the common enemy of the king in parliament which headed the Anglican ascendancy. It

was given impetus by the growth of heterodoxy as Arianism, Socinianism and Deism gained increasing converts and challenged the quietism that had characterised Dissent for much of the century. This was not purely an American development but one common to the English-speaking world; what made it so influential in the colonies was that, whereas in England Dissenters were a small minority, in the colonies they were the majority.

Jonathan Clark does not seek to replace the standard teleology by which colonial assemblies became more assertive, resisted imperial taxation and then moved to demanding legislative autonomy and nationhood but rather puts such development in the contemporary context of warring sectarianism and opposition to the Anglican establishment.

What is revealed is a civil war, with much of the character of a war of religion. Although the broad divisions are clear enough, the social constitu-

encies for rebellion were complex and confused. Each colony exhibited an individual pattern and, whereas most Episcopalians tended to be loyalists and most Dissenters eventually moved towards accepting the cause of independence, there were divisions within and between the denominations. The Presbyterians were divided, while the Congregationalists were united in their support for the revolutionary cause and many Baptists were neutral or even loyalists. Whether colonists came of English stock or whether they were of Scottish or Scottish-Irish descent made a considerable difference. In fact it seems clear that the changing ethnic composition of the colonies, especially the large number of Scots-Irish immigrants, had much to do with their discontent. As one Hessian officer put it:

Call this war ... by whatsoever name you may, only call it not an American rebellion, it is nothing more nor less

than an Irish-Scottish Presbyterian rebellion.

It was certainly not an American rebellion. As Clark demonstrates, an American identity emerged from the war; it did not cause it. Nor was the conflict a struggle for representation and for secular democracy. The American Revolution's religious impulse was increasingly obscured after independence by the separation of church and state and the utopian millennial expectations of that impulse found a new focus in the idealisation of democracy. The loyalist and Anglican contribution to what had been a civil war was quickly forgotten, while until the twentieth century the Puritan contribution to the ethos of America continued to be acknowledged. In a United States which, after successive waves of immigration, has ceased to resemble the overwhelmingly Protestant colonies which made the revolution, public mythology finds secular democratic origins more palatable.

The Unentered Debate

Martin Tyrrell

From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic Calculation, David Ramsay Steele
Open Court, 3 Henrietta Street. Covent Garden, 1993.

We seek it here,
We seek it there,
We critics seek it everywhere:
Or is it phantasm?
That demned [sic] elusive
Socialism.

Thus Arthur Seldon, (his poetry is not his most distinguished output). Critics of socialism know all too well how it can be as distant and uncatchable as Zeno's tortoise. As the downside of one socialism begins to show, socialists decide that it was not socialism after all. This week's Utopia gives way to next's and critics must begin afresh. More than a few sceptics have wearied of the chase. Turning from

the particular to the general, they have given up on questioning specific socialism and proposed, instead, that socialism falls down on its own, inherent impossibility.

David Ramsay Steele begins his book with the bold claim that the Austrian economist Ludwig Von Mises (1881-1973) advanced the strongest case of this kind; a case so overwhelming it has never been refuted despite a lengthy and continuing controversy. *From Marx to Mises* surveys this controversy and provides a lucid introduction not only to the Mises argument itself, but also to the Marxism it set out to answer.

Mises' principal works criticising socialism date from the 1920's. This was a time when socialism was still unambiguously taken to mean a system capable of producing such a great quantity of goods — perhaps even a superabundance — that concepts like the market, trade, profit and private property would become redundant. Under socialism, it was envisaged that all, or nearly all, things could be offered free for all and all for free. Under socialism, socialists claimed, production would be for use only, not, as under capitalism, for use and profit. This is what Marx understood by socialism and this was what the

Bolsheviks attempted to establish in the period immediately following the Russian Revolution. It is to the good of Mises' case that these pristine socialist ideals of free access and common ownership have now all but vanished from everyday politics. They survive in the pamphlets of the Socialist Party of Great Britain and show up, from time to time, in some of the more naive works of popular culture: the John Lennon song *Imagine*, say, or the thoughts and deeds of the comic-book superhero *Miracleman*.

From David Ramsay Steele's outline, the basics of Mises' critique of socialism — the "economic calculation argument" — are not difficult to grasp. Mises argued that without a market — actual buying and selling — an advanced economy is impossible. At the very least, he contended, there must be a market for labour, raw materials and other "inputs", "resources" or "factors of production". To support this position, Mises went back to the concepts "scarcity" and "cost". When economists say that a particular resource is scarce, they mean that our supplies of the good in question are less than the potential situations in which these might be used. Put simply, there are uses for more of any resource than there are units of that resource. Because a resource is scarce, using some or all of it for one purpose will almost always rule out its being used for any other purpose. Hence, however much of the resource we have, it will never be enough to cover every possible want and need — for wants and needs are infinite whereas resource supplies are not.

In practice, then, every resource is scarce and scarcity is here to stay. Because our available resources are always limited, we cannot simply go ahead and apply them everywhere we want or need to. We have to choose carefully between rival applications. Applications show allocative efficiency to the extent that the ensuing benefits are maximised and costs minimised. This is what is meant by "economising".

Steele shows how, in industry, economising involves trying to find the least wasteful method of using resources to

create a product that satisfies consumers. Realistically, he says, there will always be a variety of methods of production for any given purpose. Although these methods might differ in terms of the mix of resources that they require, the resultant products will often be quite similar or even indistinguishable once they reach their eventual consumers. As *From Marx to Mises* makes clear, the problem for industrial managers, be they capitalist, socialist or Non-Subscribing Presbyterian, is always one of deciding which method of production and mix of resources to adopt.

Under a market system, however imperfect, Mises felt that this problem would always be soluble. In a market economy, every scarce resource is priced and every price reflects the dynamic process whereby the resource in question is constantly being valued and re-valued by hundreds of millions of human beings each with their own subjective preferences, wants and needs. The money prices that arise in a market system translate all resources into common units and thereby render these comparable. Production methods which use different mixes of resources to achieve the same end become amounts of money which can then be readily compared. The most efficient method is that which incurs the lowest cost. It is this method which wastes the fewest resource. Since all socialists aspire, ultimately, to replace the market with a free access economy in which buying and selling no longer takes place (and in which money itself will no longer be required), Mises invited them either to suggest a way around the scarcity problem or, failing that, to specify a method for choosing between rival methods of production which does not require money prices. On the evidence of *From Marx to Mises*, that invitation still holds.

A common way of answering Mises has been to devise a socialism that draws upon some of the features of a market economy. But here indeed be dragons. From Steele's exhaustive account, most socialisms of this kind either fail to allow in enough of the market to be credible or let in too much of it to be considered socialism. To

Oskar Lange we owe a socialism of the first sort. Lange envisaged a system in which planners could use the existing levels of any given resource to fix a "shadow" price for it. For Lange, these pseudo prices would function as a kind of rationing mechanism with high prices warning off factory bosses and low ones attracting them. But this is not quite how prices operate in a real market. As Steele notes, the pseudo prices in Lange's simulated market are static whereas, in a real market prices reflect the dynamic interaction of resource scarcity, on the one hand, and the subjective values and preferences of resource users on the other. Lange, claims Steele, saw only the *motivational* dimension to prices; but Mises' view was that prices had a *knowledge* dimension as well. It is the knowledge dimension that we would most miss under socialism, even "heretical" forms of it like Lange's. For prices do not merely help us ration scarce resources; more importantly, they allow us to make the most of them.

More commonplace in the twentieth century than either orthodox Marxist adventures or compromise systems for the Lange variety have been "market" socialisms in which many, most or all enterprises are placed under common (ie state) ownership. Steele argues that, in practice, market socialist enterprises will rarely differ from conventional private businesses, since only a relative handful of people — managers, government officials — can expect to have any real knowledge of, or interest or say in, the affairs of a firm supposedly owned and controlled by all. Regardless of the legal fiction of common ownership, effective rights in a communal business will always be as limited as those in a private firm. In Steele's view, this is the paradox of market socialist systems. *De jure* planning exists side by side with *ade facto* capitalism, so that market socialist systems tend to be less socialist and more market.

Given the centrality of the concept of scarcity to the strength of Mises' case, some socialists have continued to argue, either that scarcity can be beaten, or that the scarcity problem is not a problem at all. It seems unlikely,

however, that scarcity is ephemeral. Steele's account leaves us in no doubt that human needs and wants grow faster than the means with which to meet them and that this is a pattern that will continue. Twelve months down the line and that four figure pay rise barely makes ends meet; what counts as rich today will be average tomorrow. Faced with this kind of argument, some socialists have proposed instead that scarcity is often an artifact of capitalist ideology. Wants and needs, they say, would settle down were it not for the false consumerist passions built up by the advertising industry. Against this, Steele prefers to hold that people make their own consumerist choices on the basis of

many different strands of information of which the output of the advertising industry is but one. Besides, he argues, if advertising were indeed the magic the likes of J.K. Galbraith, Vance Packard and G.A. Cohen often make it out to be, then why do firms bother with research and development or opinion surveys? Why do they waste effort finding out what consumers want if they already have the power to make wants out of air? And why, come to think of it, do any products fail? In the end, no amount of advertising conspiracy theories will allow us to dispense with the concept of scarcity.

A discussion of Mises' critique of socialism occupies only part of *From Marx to Mises*. Steele also discusses

the claims of Marx whilst his fourteenth chapter is a fascinating examination of co-operatives, leaving the reader in no doubt that not even here is there hope for a practicable socialism. Elsewhere, Steele puts forward arguments in favour of stock and money markets and offers reasons why volunteer labour will tend to be less efficient than salaried employees. All in all, then, this is possibly the most sustained and unanswerable critique of socialism since Mises' own. In turns stimulating, engrossing and entertaining, *From Marx to Mises* is never inaccessible. If, as its author insists, Mises' greatest popularity is still to come, then his own book will play no small part in securing that result.

The Unknown Oakeshott

Robert Grant

Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (New and Expanded Edition) Michael Oakeshott, ed. Timothy Fuller, Liberty Press, 1991, £12.00 and £4.00.

Religion, Politics and the Moral Life Michael Oakeshott, ed. Timothy Fuller, Yale University Press, 1993, £18.95.

Morality and Politics in Modern Europe: the Harvard Lectures Michael Oakeshott, ed. Shirley Robin Letwin, introd. Kenneth Minogue, Yale University Press, 1993, £18.95.

The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott ed. Jesse Norman, Duckworth, 1993, £20.00.

Even before Michael Oakeshott's death just over three years ago the Oakeshott industry amounted to more than a trickle, and, if these books are anything to go by, we may expect shortly to see a sizeable stream. How far Oakeshott would have approved is doubtful, for he was a modest, self-effacing thinker, withholding far more than he ever published, and never reprinting many excellent but scattered and otherwise inaccessible pieces. Some of this unknown Oakeshott is now put before us in the first three works listed above. The fourth is largely a collective memorial tribute.

Oakeshott should need little introduction to readers of the *Salisbury Review*. What they will want to know is whether these books contain anything new or surprising, and if so,

whether it was worth exhuming. The answer in both cases is yes, though some material will be mostly of scholarly interest. In the two Yale volumes, not only some of the ideas, but frequently also pages-long swathes of text turn out to be first versions, often verbatim, of familiar Oakeshott themes and passages.

Judging by its year of publication, it is conceivable that this 'new and expanded' edition of *Rationalism in Politics* had the author's imprimatur. If it did, one can obviously raise no objection on principle to Professor Fuller's additions and rearrangements. The first edition (1962) collected in rough chronological order all but one (now included) of Oakeshott's longer essays from 1947 to 1961. It had no index and was full of printer's errors, which in

some cases had simply been carried over from the original source (*The Cambridge Journal*, as often as not). Other minor irritants were unattributed references and quotations.

The first thing to say about the additions is that one is obviously glad to have them, though not necessarily where they are. I think it would have been better simply to reissue the original *Rationalism in Politics*, corrected, with notes and index (the new index, by the way, is excellent). The extra material could then have been inserted at the appropriate chronological intervals, or as a lengthy appendix, or (preferably) in a separate volume, to which the contents of *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life* (a miscellany in any case) could have been added. Of course, with two different publishers inter-

ested, none of this may ever have been an option.

As Oakeshott himself observed in his 1961 preface, the original ten essays were homogeneous in theme and style. They marked a definite, self-contained epoch in his thinking. To my mind the additions, especially those from the 1970's (one in the rebarbative idiom of *On Human Conduct*), disturb this pleasing, unplanned coherence. Then there is the division into sections. Of course, publishers nowadays insist on this sort of thing, as though readers were too stupid to find their own way about. However, obscured along with the chronology is the subtle, leisurely evolution of Oakeshott's thought, which is simultaneously a slow rotation around a central complex of interrelated ideas.

Since nearly all of those feature at some level in every essay, almost any thematic division would look plausible, and Professor Fuller's is no exception. However, there seems no reason why the famous essay on historiography should appear under 'Dissecting Rationalism', when the title essay (which does exactly that) does not. 'The Tower of Babel' follows hard upon 'Rationalism in Politics' in both date (1948) and subject-matter. It could as easily have been called 'Rationalism in Morals'. Yet it now appears, its only companion being Oakeshott's single contribution to aesthetic theory, in a section called 'On the Human Condition'.

These particular bracketings do make a kind of sense. For instance, Oakeshott makes his aesthetic theory emerge from a more general theory of experience, so one could say that 'The Voice of Poetry' does after all deal with the human condition. (Much the same is true, however of 'The Activity of Being an Historian'. And so it is, more generally, of all Oakeshott's writings, which is why he is now the object of serious study.) But the fact is that the whole taxonomic exercise is more or less superfluous. It might have been done differently with equal justice and plausibility, and something worth keeping would as surely have been lost. 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it,' is the Oakeshottian moral.

What really cried out for fixing was

the text. As Russell Price notes in *The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott*, Oakeshott was a remarkably slapdash editor, albeit only of his own work. Here, I am afraid, Professor Fuller has followed him to the letter. In the new *Rationalism in Politics* the old misprints, cruxes and obscurities flourish unabated. On p. 33 we have *anquels* for *auxquels*, unchanged since the *Cambridge Journal*. On p. 414 *omnes eodem cogemure* survives from 1962; Oakeshott certainly knew that, not least for metrical reasons, it should be *cogimur* (see below). On p. 7 (p. 3, 1962) 'a training in a technique of analysis' is suspect since the last two words pervert the sense (Oakeshott is talking about the Rationalist's worship of technique, generally any technique). They never appeared in the *Cambridge Journal* version, and are obviously inadvertently carried up from the phrase 'with no thought of analysis' two sentences later. (For another possible dittographic error, see 'pieties are fleeting, loyalties evanescent': pp. 174 and 177 in the 1962 edition, pp. 414 and 417 here.) Among the new material, I suspect that 'the idea itself served from the grounds and reasons ... in the mind of the thinker' (p. 147, 'The New Bentham') should read *sieved* (I have not checked the original).

These things are trivial, of course, but it is depressing to remake the acquaintance of so many hardy perennials. Some annotation would have been welcome, too. Textual variations are few but worth recording. (Oakeshott's revisions were often rather turgid.) Oakeshott was an exceptionally cultivated man, and many readers will have been both baffled and fascinated by his allusions. Surely today it would not be too insulting, having first given it correctly, to footnote *omnes eodem cogimur* as being Horace (*Odes*, III, iii), and even (possibly) to remark that the whole stanza is quoted in one of Oakeshott's favourite pieces of Montaigne (*Essays*, I, xix; inaccurately referenced in *On Human Conduct*). *Apartam nactus es; hanc exorna* (p. 60) is one of Erasmus's *Adages*, but what was Erasmus's source? Is the cricket writer 'N.A. Swanson' (p. 68)

really E.W. Swanton, as Russell Price suggests and I have long suspected?

I do not say we have to know these things, but it would be pleasant, even useful, if we did. So would it to know who the writers were whom Oakeshott habitually quotes, at length but anonymously, as typical of this or that mode of thinking. (The author, for example, of the Owen Falls passage on p. 499, which has now resurfaced in an earlier piece, to be found in *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life*.) For anyone, such as Professor Fuller, with access to Oakeshott's papers, the information should be easy enough to come by, since for seven decades Oakeshott (so he told me) entered such passages into his commonplace books.

However, I can whole-heartedly recommend Professor Fuller's introduction to *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life*. Until now, a few *obiter dicta* have been our sole clue to Oakeshott's religious outlook. *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life* contains three essays on religion, all dated from the 1920s. They throw a revealing light on Oakeshott's youthful ideas, and indeed on all his later intellectual career.

Many of Oakeshott's earliest writings appeared in a journal called *The Modern Churchman*. According to Dr Fagan in Evelyn Waugh's *Decline and Fall*, the 'modern churchman' is apparently 'a species of person ... who draws the full salary of a beneficed clergyman and need not commit himself to any religious belief'. But on the evidence before us, 'modern churchmanship' was a serious and sustainable position, and, in Oakeshott's case, clearly of a piece with his anti-rationalist politics. It seems simply to have been modernism in religion.

This statement will surprise many who think of Oakeshott as traditionalist. So indeed he was, but not in any nostalgic or backward-looking sense. The traditions which Oakeshott prizes are essentially practices, customary, shared and above all current ways of doing, acting, feeling and thinking, unselfconsciously available for use here and now. Religious 'belief', by contrast, involves self-conscious intellec-

tual assent to certain objective historical and metaphysical claims. This lays it open (unlike religious practice) not only to refutation, but also to anti-rationalist criticism, such as Oakeshott's in 'The Tower of Babel'. There he implicitly laments the early Christian transition from 'faith in a person' to 'belief in a set of abstract propositions, a creed' (*Rationalism in Politics*, p. 484). This change, he says, had its counterpart in the supersession of 'a habit of moral behaviour' by a 'pursuit of moral ideals'. (The modern political equivalent will be obvious.)

Oakeshott's religious thinking stops short of Bultmann's 'demythologization'. As Fuller notes, there is no attempt to extract the hidden *kerygma* (substance, message) from its putative outward husk of myth and dogma. Oakeshott would doubtless have thought such a dichotomy arbitrary and rationalist. For him there is no Feuerbachian 'essence of Christianity', no 'core' Christian experience, nor even any defining historical belief on which to hang it. There is simply (a foretaste of *On History*) the complex, endlessly mutating continuum of belief and practice, the Heideggerian 'thing itself'. (Heidegger, like Bultmann, was lecturing at Marburg when Oakeshott was there as a graduate student.)

Religion for Oakeshott amounts in the end to a man's pious, uncalculating self-commitment to life, to the historic moral present. It is not a set of doctrines, still less a promise of ultimate salvation (all that being actually the worst kind of worldliness), but a dimension of experience which is also experience at its fullest, a certain posture or voluntary disposition of the soul. To adopt it is to be 'saved' here and now, delivered from the treadmill of egoism and the Faustian tyranny of 'achievement' which in another idiom (especially when collective and compulsory) has been the bane of European politics. As we later discover in *On Human Conduct*, real religion is akin to 'poetry' (aesthetic experience).

Especially in his earliest writings, Oakeshott seems to have agreed with Hegel and the British idealists that both the self and its freedom were

inconceivable outside society. In 'The Nature and Meaning of Sociality', written when Oakeshott was 24 and now in *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life*, religion and (at least in a loose sense) politics are pretty well coterminous. Subscription to a society's highest goods is tantamount, as in Bradley, to the experience of 'God', and also (less improbably) to patriotism. Since Oakeshott describes the latter as 'impulsive love of country' and distinguishes it from nationalism and the like, he evidently has customary or traditional loyalties in mind.

Nevertheless, we find him even as early as 'The Tower of Babel' detecting a certain 'hollowness of moral character' in 'peoples whose morality is predominantly one of custom'. In his later writings Oakeshott rejects, not tradition as such, but forms of life hostile to the modern 'morality of individuality' which, he claims, had emerged even before Renaissance times to challenge the customary order. The thesis is familiar, not only from Burckhardt, but also from Oakeshott's various expositions of it from the later 1950s onwards.

There are two key points in Oakeshott's version, especially as it appears in *Morality and Politics in Modern Europe* (1958) and 'The Masses in Representative Democracy' (1957, now in *Rationalism in Politics*). The first is that it was the new centralizing, modernizing 'sovereignities' which freed aspiring individuals from feudal loyalties and local constraints. (Shades of Mrs Thatcher and the 'right to buy' your council house?)

The second is that individuality, merely by being visible, convicted of inadequacy those who had failed to rise to its challenge. Such people found 'leaders' ready to exploit their insecurity by offering them, in exchange for their obedience, collective redemption in either theocracies (Calvin's Geneva), or productivist utopias (Bacon, Owen, St. Simon), or egalitarian socialist welfare-dispensaries. Possibly influenced by J. L. Talmon and Norman Cohn, Oakeshott draws graphic parallels between seventeenth-century millenarianism, Jacobinism and Marxism.

These are interesting pages, but even 17 years later, in *On Human Conduct*, Oakeshott's substantially unchanged account seems excessively condensed and schematic. It is rather as though *The Communist Manifesto* had been recast to dignify the bourgeois instead of the proletarian. Nothing wrong with that, perhaps, but how would one defend it against the charge of being essentially that Oakeshottian bugbear, Whig history or retrospective politics?

One might point out that merely to chart the emergence of something currently esteemed is not the same as to write it into a teleological saga or dignify it with a providential sanction. Even so, some of Oakeshott's accompanying sketches of 'individualist' thinkers in *Morality and Politics* can be highly tendentious. Oakeshott had once seen Locke as a harmless ideologue who distilled English political practice into abstract principles by which to justify James II's deposition. But Locke now reappears as (what indeed he was) an apostle of individualism, who surprisingly anticipated Oakeshott's 'ruler as umpire' in 'On Being Conservative' (1956). (This essay and Oakeshott's lecture share several paragraphs almost word for word.) Bentham, exposed as a naive rationalist in 'The New Bentham' (1932, in the expanded *Rationalism in Politics*), is now implicitly commended for his atomic individualism, since it is at least anti-collectivist.

On Burke, finally, Oakeshott is demonstrably wrong. 'Burke', he says, 'finds the notion of a contract or agreement ... a useful notion with which to indicate that associations are not imposed upon men but are products of human choice, and that they are unions of individuals, each with his own right and propensity to make choices for himself' (pp. 70-71). Burke certainly thought of some associations in contractual terms, but not when it came to the most permanent, family and country. Here, he says in *An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, we have no choice whatever, either as to our membership, or as to the 'natural' duties it entails. And he also spoke in the *Reflections* of a society where such quasi-sacred duties had ceased to be

honoured as one prone to dissolve into 'the dust and powder of individuality'.

Both Yale volumes reinforce the impression that Oakeshott grew progressively more 'individualist'. His aversion to collectivism seems to have led him eventually to believe, with Mrs Thatcher, that 'there is no such thing as society'. Yet he was neither an 'abstract' individualist nor a philosophical egoist. His political ideal was 'civil association', a thing defined by a common recognition of the authority of law, and held together by the mutual respect said to flow from the citizen's awareness that others share his recognition.

We are not told whence law itself derives its authority, nor what its content is likely to be. But might not its authority derive from 'society'? Is not political society ordinarily held together by its members' instinctive sympathy for those who share its deepest

values, among them a belief in its own unique worth? In sharing them, are the members not 'of one mind', and *pro tanto* properly to be hypostatized? And will not the law, in embodying and protecting those values (which may well include Oakeshott's conviction that the law should not moralise), be perceived to possess *amoral* authority? In 'The Claims of Politics', a brilliant pre-war essay reprinted in *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life*, Oakeshott saw politics as ideally the servant and guardian of culture. Something similar might be the case with law.

Such questions (which I have tried not to beg) are impossible to settle here. It is because Oakeshott's work constantly provokes them, that his work, both inside and outside political philosophy, seems likely to achieve classic status, if indeed it has not already done so.

The Achievement of Michael Oakeshott needs only a few words. Its contents vary from personal reminiscence to serious exposition. Lee Auspitz combines both. Noël O'Sullivan's obituary from the *Independent* is perhaps, relative to its length, the best thing ever written on Oakeshott. Along with his scholarship I would commend Russell Price's pleasingly quirky observation. There are good essays by Kenneth Minogue and Timothy Fuller, and a charming memoir by John Casey.

The most self-effacing contribution of all is John Liddington's epic 36-page bibliography of Oakeshott and Oakeshottiana. I cannot see how its first section, Oakeshott's publications to 1991, will ever be superseded. Even if the rest of the book had been worthless, Dr Liddington's efforts would have made it indispensable to anyone seriously interested in its subject.

A Film for our Times

Edward Chaney

The Piano, Director Jane Campion

In the preface to their book of the film (*The Piano*), Jane Campion and Kate Pullinger write that "there was something irresistible in the story that made it popular to all." In the Oscar ceremony compered by the excruciating 'Whoopi' Goldberg, self-congratulatory luvvies awarded each other bronzed statuettes for films about the Holocaust and Aids, but reserved three for Jane Campion's more subtle essay in discrimination and enlightenment. In this our hero is not a rich Nazi with a heart of gold nor a lawyer whose sex life has proved fatal, but a mute Scots-Zealandress whose heart, though also warmed in the course of the story, remains relatively inscrutable and, to one watcher at least, unsympathetic. For the film also features two men who become

enthralled, their lives dominated and transformed, by this perverse woman. Her stubborn, self-centred demands, only marginally attributable to her muteness (which the book blames on her father) drive both men to the edge of insanity.

She is finally attacked by the first of these men, the husband her father had arranged for her, and completes her abandonment of him for the second. The latter, starting out as a noble savage of sorts (albeit unrealistically 'civilised' even at this stage) is subdued, via 'piano lessons', into becoming a new husband of the kind acceptable to any 1990s feminist; not entirely emasculated but certainly subordinate. The tolerance towards the heroine (and her spoiled single-parented daughter) shown by both men during most of the

film, is the most obvious of many failures to sustain period realism. Although there is often a ludicrous insistence on a kind of realism, not least in its Battle of the Somme style setting, aslosh with yard-deep mud, perpetually smoking trees and menacing Maoris, the film begins and ends in unreal female fantasy. After a night on the beach, our heroine discovers her beloved piano has been placed within range of the tide and yet, when she fails to persuade her husband and the Maoris to include the piano in the first consignment of her goods to be carried to her new home, no-one, not even she or her more articulate daughter, suggests that if it must be left behind, it might at least be protected from impending storms. Perhaps such practical details irritate the unreconstructed male more

than the fantasizing female. But even politically-correct new males (with whom I occasionally communicate) agree to a degree of scepticism about such items as the multiple-saturated yet perfectly-tuned piano and the choice of metal in preference to a less noisy material for the false, piano-playing finger which replaces the one hacked off by a demented husband.

There is no doubting the quality of the film and the care which has gone into its making. It is, however, suffused with the spirit of our times, (aided by Michael Nyman's anachronistic music) rather than of the more vigorous period it purports to portray. That spirit is ever more disturbingly provocative. In life as in film, Woman is now the centre of attention in a way that man, *pace* the ahistorical feminist myth, never quite was. Statistics, so often misused in the cause of positive discrimination, need no such manipulation to demonstrate that women are outliving men to an ever greater extent and that male suicides rates have increased dramatically. In the 16-24 age group men are now six times more likely to kill themselves than their female contemporaries. In the same group the employment rates of women

are overtaking men, yet Lady Howe the "Conservative feminist" calls for still more children-abandoning women to be given "top jobs in TV". Female social workers and paediatricians aggravate the increase in male suicides by unsubstantiated allegations of child abuse while feminist students harass a shrinking number of healthy males with accusations of 'date rape'. For the first time in history, husbands can be accused of raping their wives. In retaliation for our crimes, the cover of *Cosmopolitan* tells its huge, conformist readership to "Treat your man like a Dog".

The Piano's writer, director and star no doubt find some men potentially acceptable, even likeable. As in the film after elaborately prescribed preliminary trials, a select male might even be granted access to a woman's bed. Once there, however, as Mrs Bobbitt complained when arrested for amputating something even more vital than her husband's fictional finger, woman-centred standards have got to be maintained, otherwise danger-free, post-coital relaxation can no longer be guaranteed. Only later, after taking legal advice, did Mrs Bobbitt allege that she had been beaten, abused and raped.

From the point of view of that minority of males concerned to retain their integrity, *The Piano*, for all that it affects fair-minded realism, might be interpreted as yet more exploitation of art in the interests of the new 'sensitising' education, a parable of the new (Western) world order where relations between the sexes are concerned. The story of Patient Griselda was a parable written in an age when woman had no vote and minimal rights. Dr. Johnson considered that the law very wisely gave women little power because nature had given them so much. Even in Boccaccio and Chaucer's day, partly because of her femininity (that quality which, along with the capacity to serve others, women seem to be losing), Griselda possessed considerably more *de facto* power than feminist historians allow. Meanwhile, the victim-culture school of history ignores the Wife of Bath. Today men are becoming Patient Griseldas with inferior legal as well as *de facto* power. If pushed too far, whether overtly, by those who champion the penis-amputating Mrs Bobbitt, or more subtly by the creatrix of *The Piano* and its retrospective book, some men will respond in ways which will be counterproductive for all.

Sources of Order

Ian Crowther

The Measure of Man: Incursions in Philosophical and Political Anthropology, David J. Levy, Claridge Press, 1993.

Even this misbegotten Conservative administration has occasionally, if awkwardly given expression to conservative instincts, for example in enunciating its 'Back to Basics' policy. The subsequent, embarrassing retreat from this policy reflected not so much the failure of some government ministers to enact it in their personal lives as the failure of others, notably the Prime

Minister, to summon sufficiently convincing arguments in its defence. However much some modern Conservatives may recoil instinctively from liberal fundamentalism, intellectually they seem ill-equipped to challenge its central dogma, according to which there is no such thing as a national or moral community in whose name governments may sometimes act to en-

force norms and, consequently, to reinforce social cohesion.

David Levy has devoted much of his scholarly life to answering the challenge of radical historicism, not by denying the historical element in the human condition, but by placing alongside it the no less significant element of trans-historical constancy or permanence in man's being. Levy's onto-

logical *Realism* (the title incidentally of his first book) takes as its object the elucidation of our experience of abiding form in the midst of flux. This does not entail some biophysical belief that we are utterly determined by nature, though it most certainly does entail the understanding of man as the microcosm, whose consciousness is based upon all the levels of being, animalic, vegetative and inorganic, that are present already in the cosmos. But clearly the creative accomplishments of human beings and the cultures they form are products of man's character as the being who, uniquely, continually interprets and reinterprets his world. Even so, though indeed an hermeneutic being who always expresses itself historically, man "is the precondition and not the product of history". The point upon which Levy repeatedly insists is that the epistemological universality of hermeneutics in our knowledge of man is no proof of its ontological priority: "life and death, consciousness and creativity provoke interpretation at all times and places precisely because, alongside the no less inevitable facts of human physiology, they are not themselves creatures of the interpretive process." In other words, what we glimpse through the variety of historically given forms of self-understanding is the constancy of human nature, and this "belies the idea that the identity of man is ever a matter of interpretation alone".

It also of course belies the guiding assumption of the modern world that there are no limits to what man can do to satisfy his desires, because there is no pre-existing, supra-historical context of being within which human order and disorder can ultimately be understood. For Levy, as for the Biblical prophets and the first philosophers of Greece, reflection is motivated by the need to discover "what we are already and irremediably constituted as being", so that we can then address how political order can best take account of universal human nature mediated through (and not, like a thin residue, abstracted from) particular historical and cultural realities. Hence the deliberately ironic title of this book, *The Measure of Man*, which neatly

inverts the Protagorean dictum that "man is the measure of all things". Levy's realism does not allow him to view philosophical enquiry merely as what Richard Rorty calls "edifying discourse": a means of clarifying the variety of available world-views, without, however, presuming to judge some as more attuned to the needs of human nature than others.

Of all the influences on Levy, including such diverse thinkers as Max Scheler, Arnold Gehlen and Hans-Georg Gadamer, none has been more formative than Eric Voegelin, whose own philosophical quest for order led him to discover in the record of man's history "the truths of man's being across the barriers of language, time and place". But what is this truth? "It is" as Levy summarises it, "that the term *man* not only designates a ... being ... open to the various possibilities of earthly being but, ultimately also, to an experience, or, perhaps, to multiple experiences, of transcendence which even the plenitude of the world cannot fulfil. Man, in other words, is a being in whom the life of order consists, not in submission to what is experienced as a given order of biological or historical life, but in the struggle to attune the conduct of life to divine truth." No more than his revered mentor, Voegelin, is Levy content to remain only on this level of intellectual abstraction. He devotes several chapters of this book to documenting how, in the Hebrew Kingdoms of Israel and Judah, in the Greece of Plato and Aristotle, in ancient Persia as well as in Christian Europe, there surfaces again and again the same tension between the temporal and the transcendent, between the pragmatic imperatives of political survival and the experienced pull of divine-transcendent order.

Modern man has sought to resolve this tension by settling single-mindedly for the mundane goal of comfortable self-preservation. Our age's refusal to recognize in human nature anything not scientifically ascertainable brings with it an equivalent refusal to recognize its full potentialities. There is what Voegelin called an "eclipse of reality" when man loses sight of the world-transcendent element of spirit

in his nature; when consequently he regards his nature as something he just flatly has (as subjective desires and appetites) rather than "as a potentiality which requires actualization in the process of life". Responsive only to external and internal natural stimuli we encounter only rarely, if at all, the ideal demands on our nature. This is what Voegelin, borrowing Dante's famous phrase, called the "great refusal" of modernity: the polar opposite of Dante's "great refusal" of the world for salvation's sake. As a result of our modern refusal to be measured by an objective reality not of our own making, we become, not more human, but less; this, because when all we have to guide us is instinct and desire, we lose that real autonomy which derives from having objective reasons for our conduct.

Levy points to another danger in our contemporary insistence upon unfettered autonomy, namely unfettered technology. To the extent that we treat our desires as reasons, all of them will appear equally reasonable, and hence equally deserving of satisfaction by whatever techniques are currently available to us. In other words, there is no intervening room for rational-moral reflection between what is desirable and what is possible, since we have no use for our reason other than as the servant of our desires. But, as Levy cogently argues in a chapter on the 'Responsibility of Intellectuals', at a time when rapid technological progress has vastly extended the range of what is possible, a purely instrumental rationality cannot safely be relied upon to guide even the most narrowly technological activity. Levy is careful to distinguish his own concerns on this point from those voiced by the latter-day Rousseaus who inhabit the fringes of the ecological movement. Unlike the latter, Levy is far from arguing that it is technology *per se* which sets us moderns apart from our human ancestors. On the contrary: he reminds us, drawing upon Arnold Gehlen's picture of man as instinctually and physically "deficient", that necessity has always driven humans to mould the world to their own purposes. There is nothing inherently wrong with that,

and there is no going back to some pre-lapsarian state of harmony with nature. Man is naturally artificial: his natural element is culture and an environment transformed and rendered habitable by tools and techniques.

No, what gives our 'technological age' its unprecedented character is less the immense technical powers now placed in man's hands than the lack of any moral (as opposed to purely instrumental) reasoning about their use, or what might constrain their use. In man's dealings with nature the exclusive criterion of practical effectiveness has in the past posed no great existential threat; rather, it has coincided with the imperatives of human survival. But the transformed dynamic of modern technology, and its emancipation from any constraints that are foreign to it, have given rise to a novel situation

in which our very survival seems to depend on the application of criteria other than those of technical efficiency. "The source of such criteria," writes Levy, "which are required to provide a logic of self-limitation, are only to be found by recourse to spheres of life and thought in which, in contrast to the sphere of *techne*, human action had always been shaped by awareness that the conditions conducive to the good life, and perhaps to life itself, were themselves dependent on human conservation and care. That is, from the traditions of practical, prudential reasoning about the moral and political dimensions of human life — pre-ideological traditions that embodied an assertion of the primacy of conservation over transformation, and which recognized that, in politics at least, the fundamental imperative is not to

change the world but to conserve it."

But where, in the now triumphant liberal democracies of the West, in societies predicated on the indefinite multiplication of goods, and the indefinite satisfaction of human desires, is an ethic of self-limitation to be found? Such an ethic is devilishly hard to evoke at a time when the sovereignty alike of the people and of untutored individual desire are held, as never before to be equally sacrosanct. Self-gratification, not self-limitation, is the prevailing ethic of modern culture. Still, the process of learning anew an ethic of self-limitation must begin somewhere; and for those disposed to serious, sustained thought, there can be few more intellectually rewarding places to begin than with David Levy's profound meditations on the ultimate sources of human order.

Et In Arcadia Ego

Angela Ellis-Jones

The Middle Classes by Alan A Jackson. David St John Thomas Publisher, price £22.50, 353pp.

Lytton Strachey once said that the history of the Victorian Age would never be written because there were too many people around who knew a lot about it. Fortunately, he was wrong, but until Alan A Jackson published *The Middle Classes 1900-50*, it looked as if such a fate might have overtaken the subject of his study.

The book provides an exhaustive account of all aspects of middle class life during the period 1900-1950: houses and contents, servants, cars, meals, clothes, pastimes, employment, courting, children, education, shopping, holidays, entertainments and religion. The author also gives a very perceptive portrait of the ethos of the middle class:

... they were distinguishable from the working class not so much by their level

of income but by a characteristic life-style, with common attitudes, habits and tastes, principally founded on prospects of a stable long-term career of non-manual work. From this there emerged as dominant characteristics a rigid adherence to the concept of 'respectability' and a lifelong quest for stability and security. With these went a very real sense of belonging and contributing to what was perceived as the steady progress and beneficial development of society and the nation. Allied to this and underlying it, was a strong belief in the importance of family and home as the only true source of personal contentment and fulfilment as well as a necessary element for the success and stability of society as a whole.

If anyone wants to understand the steady drift of British society since the mid 1950s into anarchy, he might well like to consider the effect of the con-

stant denigration to which these values have been subject. Aristotle recognised that if a society was to flourish, political power should rest with a middle class, who provide mental and moral leadership, entrepreneurial drive, good manners, and a sense of sobriety, thrift and responsibility -- in short, civic values. During the years of middle class hegemony in Britain, the working classes were encouraged to aspire to middle class standards, to the benefit of the whole society; since the era of working class hegemony, many members of middle classes show every sign of imitating some of the worst aspects of proletarian behaviour.

In the age of the video nasty and the X-rated film, and the vulgarities to be seen on television and in the theatre, it is salutary to be reminded that this country has seen a more civilised way

of life. There actually was a time in this century (during the period covered by this book, apart from a lapse in the 1920s) when censorship of the theatre was firmly in the hands of the middle classes. Similarly with the cinema:

Thus it was that right to the end of the 1940s, the middle classes, along with the rest of the nation, saw their social norms, patterns of behaviour and general expectations from life faithfully reflected and confirmed each time they visited the cinema ... the film ... encouraged and supported a general tendency, noticed elsewhere in this book, for middle class culture and individuality to be seen by those washing up against its lower slopes as the desirable, attainable ideal.

I have two criticisms of this otherwise excellent book. Firstly, the author is prone to making rather snide remarks about his subjects. Did he realise how lucky he was to grow up in a middle class family at this time? No style of life is perfect: middle class life could be dull, unimaginative and philistine, punctuated by what Masterman described as 'random and meaningless sociabilities'; but this is true of any life to which intellectual and cultural pursuits are not central. Yet when he makes passing reference to Lord Reith's

diet of improving radio programmes, the author cannot resist another snide remark. Copies of *The Listener*, obtainable for reference at many large libraries, attest to the very high quality of programmes broadcast by and to the middle classes during this period. Whatever the dullness of some middle class milieux, the fact remains that most of those who have contributed to cultural and scientific life in this century have been members of the middle class.

My second criticism is that the author does not devote enough space to analyzing the causes of the decline of middle class hegemony. What was the role of those members of the middle class who, oozing with guilt, saw their mission in life as the denigration and betrayal of their class? The author might have quoted a passage from Roy Lewis and Angus Maude on *The English Middle Classes* (1949), where they wrote of England after the Great War:

Middle class ideals were on the defensive. The work of middle-class Socialists and reformers before the war came now to fruition; it was almost a matter of course for the middle-class younger generation to be brought up on the misdeeds of the middle classes in the nineteenth century... Strong and potent

... grew the feeling that it was a reproach to be middle-class at all. The word bourgeois was upon the lips of the young; to be bourgeois withered joy in life ... It expressed a desire to recover the freedom and emotionalism which were supposed to characterise proletarian life ... This was not only a rejection of common sense; it amounted to a rejection of reason as well as intellect, of responsibility as well as leadership.

The process of middle-class self-destruction began in the 1920s, long before its results became painfully apparent in the 1960s; the whole story of this terrible *trahison des clercs* could form the subject of another, and sadder, book.

It is a sobering thought that middle class hegemony in Britain lasted barely 150 years, from the early nineteenth century to shortly after the middle of the twentieth. Those were the years when British power and prestige were at their height, when literary and artistic works of the highest order were produced. Yet it was undermined by an alliance of those who resented its privileges, and those who refused to accept them. The middle classes should recover their lost pride, and remember: that when the Middle Classes were on Top, Britain was on Top.

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In Short

Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917, Ann Geifman: Princeton University Press.

Nobody who seeks to understand communism and its legacy can afford to ignore the pre-history of the Russian Revolution in the campaigns of terror. In a country gripped by a sense of its own backwardness, the terrorist acquired a special significance: he was the man of action, the one who was at last *doing something*. By embracing what was most forbidden, he also endowed his motives with an aura of selfless daring. In the two decades covered by Anna Geifman's brilliant study, 17,000 people were killed or injured in terrorist attacks in the Russian Empire — carried out by anarchists, socialists or criminals attached to the revolutionary underground. Geifman's scrupulous research places before us the thoughts, actions and characters which bred this evil. We find a catalogue of murders, violence, 'political' robberies and expropriations: a new species of self-righteous crime, which ceased in 1917 only by becoming the official form of government.

We should not ignore the religious roots of this criminality, which was in many cases a way of masking the collapse of faith. The terrorist Ivan Kalinev wrote 'that we, the socialists, continue the work of Christ ... who died for the people as a political criminal.' And he was typical of the more Dostoyevskyan breed of revolutionary. At the same time, the real motor behind the violence was the amoral gangster, typified by 'Kamo', on whom Lenin relied for much of his finance in exile. It was Kamo who, on 12th June 1907, led the gang of Bolsheviks in a bombing attack in Tiflis which netted 250,000 rubles for Lenin, while leaving dozens of bystanders dead or mutilated.

As Geifman demonstrates, such tactics were essential to the schooling of the new revolutionary type: the cold-

blooded man of action, eager to kill, torture and rob for the sheer hell of it. Hell it was; and hell it remained for a century.

RS

Candles Behind the Wall, Barbara von der Heydt: Mowbray 1993. £12.99

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 Barbara von der Heydt started a private campaign to help refugees from Eastern Europe. Her account grew out of her experiences with them and is based on more than a hundred interviews with ordinary people like the ones who risked their lives on the streets of Leipzig in 1989 armed with nothing but candles. The fearlessness, high courage and deep faith of the men and women of Eastern Europe are interestingly described in individual stories and eye-witness accounts. The book will be particularly valuable in the future for students seeking to understand the nature of the collapse of political communism. Barbara von der Heydt highlights the most significant feature of the dramatic events which led to the end of Soviet communism and one often neglected by Western journalists: the contribution of the Christian churches. One of the supreme ironies of our times, surely, must be the fact that Christian traditional values have survived under Communism where they have disappeared in the materialistic West. As Walesa put it: "... our souls contain exactly the opposite of what they wanted. They wanted us not to believe in God, and our churches are full. They wanted us to be materialistic and incapable of sacrifice; we are anti-materialistic and capable of sacrifice." We must hope that Eastern Europe does not now become infected with our spiritual vacuity.

MC

Will America Drown? Edited by Humphrey Dalton, Washington: Scott-Townsend, 1993.

This is a collection of papers, most of which have been published previously in the (US) *Conservative Review*, about (US) 'Immigration and the Third World Population Explosion'. As so often, what is even now happening in and to the USA foreshadows what is all too likely to be the shape of things to come in the UK. For all the tendencies which are there approaching formidable fulfilment are, albeit in forms which are by comparison only embryonic, found here.

Will America Drown? provides all the available statistics as well as relevant legal information. For instance: to the 1.2 million legal and mainly Third World immigrants of 1992 must be added an unknown but certainly comparable number of almost exclusively Third World illegals. And the Supreme Court has ruled that, whether legal or illegal, all are equally entitled to every Welfare State benefit. In consequence nearly a quarter of California's enormous health, education and welfare budget is spent on services for illegal immigrants. [In 1992 the State was reduced to paying employees in IOUs.]

Before World War I, during the first mass immigration, there was no Welfare State handing out free benefits greater than most immigrants could have hoped to earn in their home countries. Then the US public school system served as a very effective instrument for making Americans. Now a powerful lobby labours to promote apartness [*apartheid*] through 'native' (i.e. foreign) language education. Opponents are by those systematically confounding race with culture denounced as racists. Illegal as well as legal immigrants from such now privileged racial or ethnic sets as hispanics or blacks enjoy all manner of preferences as against American-born members of unprivileged sets; and all, of course, in the name of 'equality' and 'anti-racism'.

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