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20 YEAR ANNIVERSARY

Victory or Lost Illusions?
Vaclav Klaus

Capitalism
Norman Barry

The Mafia & the Marxilogues
Dennis O'Keeffe

Balkan Drug Smuggling
Neil Barnett

Corpus Juris
Dennis Morris

The End of Economics
Tim Congdon

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CONTENTS

Articles

Post-Communism
4 Vaclav Klaus

Mafia & the Marxilogues
7 Dennis O'Keeffe

Balkan Drug Smuggling
11 Neil Barnett

Corpus Juris
15 Dennis Morris

Letter from Australia
18 Hal GP Colebatch

The End of Economics
20 Tim Congdon

Brussels – al-Qua'eda's capital
24 Paul Belien

Samuel Johnson & the Whigs
28 André Gushurst-Moore

Still making It Up in Brussels
32 Christopher Arkell

Capitalism Needs a Gordon Gekko
33 Norman Barry

Time to View Gibraltar
36 Christie Davies

CONSERVATIVE CLASSIC – 8
38 Macaulay's History of England

Book Reviews

40 **LETTERS**

Penelope Tremayne
42 On Patriotism

Alfred Sherman
43 On Islam

Frank Ellis
45 On Berlin 1945

Dennis O'Keeffe
46 On Two Humanists

Aidan Rankin
48 On Anti-Globalisation

Jeremy Black
49 On Simon Schama

John Macdonald
52 On Margaret Thatcher

Vivian Linacre
53 On the History of the Metre

Richard West
55 On Roy Kerridge

57 **ETERNAL LIFE**
Peter Mullen

58 **IN SHORT**

THE UNGRATEFUL PEOPLE

Imagine how frustrating it must be to be a guardianista in 2002; or a member of the left-leaning modern establishment in general. Here they are, with the people's best interests at heart, speaking for the people, who, sad to say, often cannot articulate their real interests, and naturally enough telling the people what those interests are. And what do the people do in return for such care and devotion? Ungratefully discard it all and insist on doing their own thing.

For years we have been told that the monarchy was a ridiculous hang-over from the past, loved and admired only by a few hundred die-hard reactionaries. Certainly, it means nothing in Scotland and Wales, or to the rest of the Commonwealth, or to the ethnic minorities, or to the young (apparently a social category all by itself). What happens? Two million people flood the Mall for the Jubilee. They come from all parts of the country, but mostly trendy London; they are of all ages, creeds, races, and social backgrounds. The rest of the country celebrates the Jubilee with pomp and circumstance but also in a homely fashion. Millions of people take part in various events. The Queen's visits to Wales, Scotland and the Commonwealth are successful beyond the wildest dreams of hard-line monarchists.

When the Queen Mother lay in state the same solemn instructions were given out: the monarchy is out of date, a privileged lady will not appeal to the modern public especially the ethnic minorities etc. Downing Street even suggested that the number of days set aside for the lying in state should be cut back. It would be embarrassing if nobody turned up. Instead, tens of thousands came to pay their respects, to remember and to take part. The lying in state had to be extended. To complete the triumph of the people over the establishment there was the spectacle of Black Rod, a representative of Old Britain in his role as chief pageant maker and his belief in truth and duty, staring down the Cool Britannia of spin, superficiality, and witless emotionalism. He found that despite – or because – sneering articles about him wearing stockings and breeches as part of his ceremonial dress, the people were on his side.

The third great event of the year was the Countryside March. Foxhunting, a supposedly outmoded sport of the toffs, became a touchstone and over 400,000 people marched through London in support of liberty and livelihood.

The three events had several things in common, apart from the huge numbers they attracted. The enthusiasm, whether happy, solemn or grim and triumphant, was genuine. It touched many different people, young and old, rich and poor, in town and in country. At the heart of each event was superb organization, led by members, past or present, of the services, with clear understanding of logistics and of the need to control huge crowds. Not for them the slapdash approach of the Dome's opening or the crassness of the Manchester Games. Not for them the artificially emotive approach of all New Labour, Cool Britannia, modern establishment events.

During his last days in the Berlin bunker Hitler is supposed to have lamented the fact that the German people had let him down. One wonders whether the Dear Leader Blair is beginning to worry about the British people letting him down.

Helen Szamuely

The Salisbury Review

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We are a voice crying in the wilderness – wrote a recent contributor to the Review – and must shout all the more loudly for that. We heed his injunction; we have much to say. Our plaints are as nearly original as can be hoped for in commentaries on human affairs, which change so much with time and place, and yet so little.

We do not confine ourselves to excoriation, but also warn of worse dangers just over the horizon. This issue of the Review carries an enhanced note of warning of new dangers for old. Vaclav Klaus, who steered the Czech Republic through five fateful years, argues that the ending of communist rule is not bringing his country membership of the open liberal European society whose dream had sustained them through the terrible years, but instead 'massive regulation and protectionism.., the increasing bureaucratisation of life... enhanced power of the judicial authorities.' As a small Central European country – he argues – the Czech Republic has no other choice but to enter the trap. Some fellow Czechs, mindful of sad fruits in the past of this fatalism, may choose to reject it. That is for them to decide. We in Britain are still in a position to resist the European Union steamroller, if we have the will.

This issue highlights several planned negations of our liberties by the European Union and its partisans. Dennis Morris demonstrates that the EU's proposals on *Corpus Juris* would undermine and remove basic rights enjoyed increasingly by Britons for centuries. Basic safeguards could be lost, suspects could be held indefinitely without charge, let alone trial. But it is not enough for readers to peruse it passively and shudder. They can act while there is time. Why not take it up with your MP and MEP? Discuss it with your legal representatives at home and work! A paradox is exposed by Christopher Arkell's 'Still making it up in Brussels', describing the fraudulence and wholesale robbery practised at the EU by our appointed representatives, failed politicians. The apparatus of the *Corpus Juris* was originally established to identify and root out fraud and waste in the EU's finances. It has now abandoned this necessary task in favour of organising the duplication of national criminal justice establishments, inter alia to persecute British and European 'xenophobes', Eurospeak for patriots.

The recent attacks on capitalism in the name of morality are discussed here by Norman Barry. He suggests that 'shareholder activism', rather than government regulation, would prevent future business scandals. Tim Congdon once warned well in advance, of the coming bout of inflation here in the mid-eighties. He now warns – with cogent statistical analysis – that the rise in taxation to fund current welfare policies here and in Europe threatens the survival of the modern European version of liberal democracy. This echoes Vaclav Klaus's warnings from another perspective.

Dennis O'Keeffe goes further in excoriation of Marxism, or Marxilogy, as he dubs it. Its Utopian pretensions – he argues – were merely camouflage, whereas its main motivation *ab initio* was power and destruction. 'Our trouble today in the free societies is that the antinomian aspects of this *zeitgeist* – its hatred of law and tradition, its envious suspicion of hierarchy – have in a real sense gone micro, working and worming their way into social work, teacher education, race relations, the probation service and media commentary. The population are exposed to the blandishments of this envy and suspicion almost throughout their working hours.' O'Keeffe's comparison of 'marxilogy' with the Mafia and description of the seamless transition from Soviet to Mafia rule in Russia provides a foretaste of a new range of dangers, viz Neil Barnett's terrifying description of the spread of the Albanian Mafia's networked depredations throughout Europe and North America. They include heroin trafficking, white slaving and massive control of prostitution in Europe, outdoing the Sicilians in Italy and the Maltese in London, courtesy of Washington's pro-Albanian offensives, protected by generous Albanian Mafia contributions to US politicians' campaign funds. An equally disturbing development is exposed by Paul Belien's 'Belgium – the Rotten Core of Europe; Brussels is also the al-Qa'eda's capital.' Over a quarter of a million Moslems, mainly from North Africa, are settled in Belgium, where some organise terror in Europe and Asia with impunity.

Such are our cries in the wilderness for Christmas 2002.

Post-Communism: Victory or lost Illusions?

Vaclav Klaus

Democracy has succeeded communism – but so has the power of the state, says the key architect of post-1989 Czech politics. As liberal ideas retreat before various 'new collectivisms', has the unification of Europe itself become a process to strangle, rather than enlarge, freedom?

Almost thirteen years have passed since the collapse of communism in the Czech Republic, as in other central and east European countries. No one can deny that we have succeeded rather rapidly in liquidating the formal structures and mechanisms of communist society, and establishing in their place the preliminary stages of a European version of parliamentary democracy and a market economy.

Up to a point, this is not a bad result. My question, however, is this: what exactly was it that we – at least some of us – really wanted to get out of this? Were we setting out to build a free society based on classical liberal principles? Or did we intend to venture up the blind alley of a regulated society, an unproductive welfare state, a brave new world of contemporary European social democracy, and an empty because artificial Europeanism (or internationalism, if you like)?

This past decade has been interesting, challenging, even rewarding for all of us. It has given us many important insights into what it means to build freedom, and free markets. We have learned some unforgettable lessons (especially regarding the organisation and sequencing of reform programmes); lessons that were not at all evident, clear, intuitively correct or indeed generally accepted, when we started dismantling communism.

We now understand more deeply its human aspects. But it was very difficult for the people of a country undergoing such a transition to understand the costs of systemic change and, particularly, the impossibility of catching up overnight with the current stage of development of countries that had not been put through a communist era.

We started with enthusiasm, but the original euphoria could not last. Pretty soon, we were confronted by impatience and disillusionment. This disappointment, however, was not at all the same thing as nostalgia for the old regime. Rather, this was the peculiar neurosis of a transition period, induced in us by our suddenly living in a world of radically increased uncertainty and risk.

Democracy is the winner

Already in 1996, Pascal Salin observed, in his presidential address to the Mont Pelerin Society, that the collapse of communism was not a 'return to classical liberalism, but a return to democracy'. This is a precise and well-judged formulation.

Eleven years ago, I was not so fortunate. I allowed a speech I gave in Sydney, Australia, to be entitled, 'Dismantling Socialism: a preliminary report.' These rather provocative words were premature. What after all have we got? Instead of dismantling socialism, we have a World Wide Web; worldwide terrorism; the European Union (EU) and the euro; new, ever more sophisticated, hidden and intensive methods of government intervention and regulation; an ever-increasing welfare state, both in size and in scope; multiculturalism and political correctness.

This is not a great victory. It would have been more appropriate, therefore, to speak of dismantling communism. Communism at least, we can say today, is over.

Some lessons of transition

It was relatively easy to change the political system – communism, more or less, collapsed. All that had to be done was to liberalise entry into the political market. New political parties sprang up almost instantaneously, establishing the much-needed political pluralism without further effort (or design). This was a spontaneous process. If there were efforts made to do it differently, these arose out of civil society or communitarian ambitions to go beyond parliamentary democracy and to effect a politics which was not dependent on political parties.

It was much more difficult to change the economic system. After forty years of pegged and centrally controlled prices, we had to liberalise prices and, also, foreign trade (abolishing state monopolies and opening up semi-autarchic, protected economies). We had to liberalise entry into the market for all types of enterprises, private as well as foreign. These steps were the necessary precondition for all subsequent development. I disagree with those, such as Joseph Stiglitz, who say that the gradual evolution of institutions and also of legislation, before the liberalisation of markets, is either possible or preferable.

To effect these changes was socially difficult, politically brave, but technically, relatively easy. Most of them simply needed to be announced. By contrast, it was the second stage of transition that asked for a positive and constructive input from the powers that be. This stage involved the transformation of the old and the

building of new institutions, all of which took time and required complex organisation and administration.

This was especially the case when it came to privatisation. It was quite out of the question to wait for the slow demise of the state-owned companies, which, in the former Czechoslovakia, represented a hundred per cent of the whole economy. These had to be privatised, wholesale, and on a massive scale; something Western countries have never experienced and cannot begin to imagine. Privatisation is hard, politically, technically and administratively. Whatever the government does, and however it does it, its politicians will be accused of one of two fatal flaws: either of favouritism – the inappropriate selection of the new owners – or of not getting the best available price.

Moreover, the short-term results are not always positive. With the benefit of hindsight, I venture to say that our privatisation was successful. It was certainly much more effective than its reputation suggested, under the dark shadow of the political disputes that followed.

The costs of transition

Both at home and abroad, many people had assumed that getting rid of communism could be cost-free, without winners and losers, tensions, ups and downs, or any significant loss of time.

They had assumed that change would bring about immediate benefits: positive economic growth and an increase in living standards. They were of course, wrong. Such dreams soon evaporated.

Nevertheless, it was an important learning process. People in those countries undergoing transition slowly and reluctantly came to accept the inevitability of what I used to refer to as the 'transformation shake-down': the huge loss of output, income and employment; the disappearance of price stability, of the old, familiar distribution of income and property, and of existing levels of social protection; the shift in the ratio of reward to effort and so forth.

many people had assumed that getting rid of communism could be cost-free, without winners and losers...They were of course, wrong.

That these types of cost would be exacted was finally understood. But this was not the end of the story. Not long after, further problems surfaced. In my country, in the middle of the 1990s, coinciding with the currency crises in the emerging markets of Asia and Latin America, and a growing external imbalance in the current account of our balance of payments, the Czech National Bank suddenly, unexpectedly, and without any consultation with the government, switched over to a very restrictive monetary policy. This move immediately destabilised the economy, undermining its banking sector, and making both its domestic economic actors and its foreign investors very nervous. It led first to an outflow of foreign capital, then to a small currency crisis, and finally to an economic recession, which left many of our banks and enterprises significantly weakened and vulnerable.

The Czech people were not expecting it. They had naively supposed that, in contrast to central planning and state ownership, the private market economy guaranteed success, almost automatically. They were not at all psychologically prepared for business failure, either at the micro or macro levels. Not surprisingly, they saw themselves as having been betrayed and cheated by those politicians who had sold them the idea of capitalism, free markets, liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation – without sufficient warning.

It was the government and its politicians who came in for the major part of the blame. It became fashionable to argue that these upheavals had been caused directly by

•unsuccessful privatisation (if not privatisation in itself)
•the inadequate legislative and institutional framework accompanying a new, inevitably fragile and shallow market economy
•the human deficiencies and immorality inevitable in a post-communist world.

These views were based on a lack of understanding of the transition process, its legislation, its enforcement, and the relationship between laws and informal rules. It was also based on a misunderstanding of human nature. People forgot that:

•there is no such thing as perfect legislation
•the formulation of the law must take time
•law comes about through an evolving process, not through anyone's diktat
•law comes about as a result of a complicated political process, not through some abstract process of rationalisation
•the precise form of legislation is influenced not only by political or ideological arguments, but by vested interests, lobbying activities and the seeking of patronage and place.

Our critics perhaps imagined that we were still running a totalitarian state, where the transition could be masterminded from above, and where the appropriate legislation could simply be summoned into existence. This was not true. Liberals at the time realised, as they know now, that such institutions are the endogenous, not exogenous components of a free society. Moreover, human beings also are as they are and the world is little improved by the ceaseless moralising of self-appointed philosopher-kings, or intellectuals.

Where are we now?

With all our problems, we now live in a totally different world from the one in the past. We live in a world of incremental changes, of regular political processes, of many imperfections – but with standard democratic mechanisms for dealing with them. A perfect society is a long way away – communism, even further.

What we do not see, however, either in my country or elsewhere, is the end of socialism. We may be closer to it now than we were ten to twelve years ago. Given their structural similarities, it is not surprising if the fall of communism, and with it, the attack on all its irrationalities, lawlessness and crime, also temporarily weakened socialism.

But unfortunately, one has to say, only temporarily. Because, it seems to us that the last decade did not at all see its termination. It brought us instead the victory of social democracy, of various alternative third ways, communitarianism, environmentalism, political correctness, human rights speak, Europeanism, corporatism, and the rise of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) – all of these capable of being designated as new collectivisms.

Ten years ago, the prevailing wisdom was 'deregulate, liberalise, privatise'. Now, the slogan has changed: 'Regulate, adjust to the standards of the most developed and the richest countries in the world (regardless of your own stage of development). Moreover, listen to the partial interests of your NGOs and follow them religiously. In short, get rid of your sovereignty, putting it into the hands of international institutions and organisations, etc.'

The intellectual climate has become increasingly hostile to liberal ideas. To win arguments in such an atmosphere – and I know something about this, especially after the last elections – is an extremely uphill effort. I sympathise, therefore, with Milton Friedman in *Two Lucky People*, when he says, 'I have learned how easy it is to be misunderstood, and how hard it is to be crystal clear.' Even more difficult is attracting people's attention in the first place, so that one might be seriously heard out.

As a small, central European country, we are part of Europe, and we have to participate in the European integration process. There is no other choice left open to us.

The impact of EU expansion

Our transition has been going on in parallel with the changes in Europe. We began in the era of the European Community, we have gone through most of them during the era of the EU, and we will finalise them under the European Monetary Union (if not the EPU or European Payments Union). As I see it, Europe is undergoing irrevocable changes, to which its uninvolved and uninterested majority of European citizens pay far too little care or attention.

What began as an act of intergovernmental cooperation between independent countries, aimed at removing the barriers to the movement of people, goods, money and ideas, has been, slowly but surely, converted into the formation of a supranational European state under their noses – one which it is intended should centralise power in Brussels, eliminate European nation states, and socialise Europe. Thanks to the trusting neglect of the majority of Europeans, a handful of pro-European activists and EU bureaucrats hold sway over these developments.

Many misunderstandings ensue. Some of us know, from our own personal experience, what it means to live in a closed, inward-looking society, where any form of contact with the outside world is prohibited (or at least made very difficult). We are unlikely to be against the opening up of societies, or the elimination of all those barriers to the free exchange of ideas, people, goods and services, or money – over the continent or the whole world. As a result, we have been dreaming of being part of a European open society for many years.

But the current European unification process is not only, or not primarily, about such an opening up. It is about introducing massive regulation and protectionism; about imposing uniformity, laws and policies; about weakening standard democratic procedures; about the increasing bureaucratisation of life; about the enhanced power of the judicial authorities. This is not what we wanted, is it?

We wanted to go 'back to Europe', to the freedom we did not have whilst living under communism. But we also understood that this was different from rushing into an EU which is currently the most visible and the most powerful embodiment of the ambition to create something else – something supposedly better than a free society. This is a different project.

As a small, central European country, we are part of Europe, and we have to participate in the European integration process. There is no other choice left open to us. It is, in addition, the only way we know to get international recognition and legitimation. Looked at this way, it is trap we do not either know how to break out of, or how to avoid.

Vaclav Klaus was Prime Minister of the Czech Republic from 1992-97. He gave this talk at Aix-en-Provence Summer University on 1 September 2002, and it was first published as part of an ongoing Europe series on the Global Forum website www.openDemocracy.net

The Mafia And The Marxilogues:
Evil, Unadorned or Theorised

Dennis O'Keeffe

This essay is concerned, initially, with two types of murderous immorality. That represented by the 'Mafia' speaks mostly for itself. It is to be hoped, however, that the reader will indulge the author's neologism, 'Marxilogue', designating the person who has dropped the revolutionary political agenda of Communism, but is still in thrall to the perhaps even more dangerous hatred and suspicion of the world which Marx played such a large part in fostering. Many contemporary Marxilogues (ideologues whose residual Marxism is expressed in the form of a deep suspicion of social existence, even or perhaps especially in its most emancipated forms) take it for granted that the world must be approached in a spirit of cynical disbelief. They insist that behind and beneath the innocent surface of things there lurk sinister and alien powers which are after our blood or our souls. Such powers are for the most part fictive; the real evil belongs to the misanthropic imagination which gives birth to them.

That misanthropy is mingled with envy. Marx's basic sociological theory is economism, the reductionist doctrine which makes humans slaves of the economic order, establishing production as the infrastructure which drives human thought and action. This reduction Marxists always appealed to whilst disingenuously pretending to reject it. The theory is strictly speaking nonsense and, indeed, a clever secondary school pupil could see through it. Perhaps that is what Paul Johnson or David Marsland mean when they opine that Marx was a mediocrity. Some opponents, however, object to Marxism in primarily psychological or moral terms. When Isaiah Berlin told Lewis Namier in the 1930s that he was writing a book on Marx, Namier, horror-struck, asked him why he should waste his time on such a poor scholar, one so blinded with hatred. In fact the whole point, the secret of Marx's success, is that his crusade was driven by base emotions. The fact that economism is false has never at the theoretical level much inhibited the doctrine, which inspirationally at least, is a piece of Satanic genius, appealing greatly to our darkest instincts, to envy, to revenge and to the lust for power. Indeed, it can gather to itself an infinity of paranoiac sentiments, for which it provides theoretical camouflage.

Camus on Ancient, Unadorned Evil and the New Theorised Kind

It is in his inspired if inchoate sense of all this that Albert Camus was remarkable. It is not unusual in intellectual history for long-dead writers to be found casting a light on events and circumstances they could by definition have known nothing of directly. This is perhaps especially true in relation to evil happenings. Camus, identifying one of modernity's less attractive aspects, observes that certain novel modes of thought introduce novel dangers. He takes this to be notably true of philosophy. Certainly he remarks in his great political treatise, *The Rebel*, that modern philosophy has proved itself capable even of turning murderers into judges. We should be wary, perhaps, as to what, precisely, the French are prepared to understand by the word 'philosophy'. Camus might have been better advised to use the term 'ideology' in its sense of 'world-view' or 'fundamental outlook'. If we bear in mind this restriction on his meaning, however, he seems amply justified, given what is in fact an embarrassment of contemporary examples. The world is already well used to the propitiation, even the political advancement of murderers and those who support them, often by way of copious, sycophantic writings in this or that theory of revolution, or nationalism or liberation.

This trend looks set to continue. We are likely to see more Gerry Adamses and Yasser Arafats, more Robert Mugabes, before we see fewer, and more rather than fewer fanatical intelligences of the Sartre or Fanon kind, disposed to 'theorise' justifications for them. There will be more Marxilogues to justify Sinn Fein or Palestinian nihilism or al-Qu'eda.

The danger is not diminished by the contradictory character of Marxilogical moral thought, in which relativism and objectivity clash as the Judaeo-Christian ethical corpus (or a secular version thereof) is simultaneously characterised as objectively evil (absolutely and incontrovertibly so) because it is 'oppressive' of women, blacks or the non-West, and at the same time as non-binding or without true meaning because it is no more than the subjective and self-interested work of men, or whites, or the West etc., that is to say it is entirely relative. How do those who make these accusations establish their charges as true, unlike the contentions of those they accuse? This contradiction one might call 'having one's indispensable and objective moral cake and eating it'. Such thinking was invented by self-mutilating intellectuals in Britain, America and France, but the political despots and assassins of the Third World have eagerly adopted it.

Functionally this twisted reasoning has proved very useful to powerful enemies of civilisation both within and without the free societies. If, moreover, debased thinking can produce criminal adjustments at the higher levels of society, if it can produce Hitlers and Stalins, why should its power to do so at the lower be disputed? In the event, the other theme to be stressed, along with the important differences between Mafia and Marxilogical criminality, is that the two are today in a kind of cahoots, generating between them a third criminal category, a criminality of the gutter, in which the ignorant and the vicious, learning hatred and envy from Marxilogical preaching and greed for the property of others from the likes of the Mafia, seek financial gain and/or social revenge in dope-peddling, pimping, brutal theft or assault.

Wickedness of the Mafia kind is merely the modern face of an age-old criminality of gain. Camus identifies the other ill we are considering, the convergence of evil and cerebration, as in the main a twentieth century development. It is a modern phenomenon in the purely mechanical sense of having come on to the scene only recently. In its consequences, however, such a corruption of thought represents an atavism in matters political, a loss of recent moral advances. Where in the eighteenth century a Voltaire had found political cruelty and religious intolerance obscene and insufferable, and openly campaigned against them, we find in the 1940s Sartre and other Soviet sympathisers camouflaging the appalling Soviet reality with a forest of jargon and double talk. We do not find such hypocritical obfuscation much in the thought of the early Enlightenment. In the West the themes of the earlier stages of the new thinking helped to generate a period of unprecedented religious and political emancipation, a hopeful and admirable caesura in the ancient story of cruelty visited routinely on those with whom their persecutors disagree in the things which matter most.

Before that time, men were often savagely punished for departure from orthodoxy, usually religious orthodoxy. While political control, too, was often managed with hideous cruelty, it was not, however, much intellectualised. The early Enlightenment thus brought us some respite from ancient cruelty, religious or secular, as well as from intellectual bigotry, an emancipation which continues to this day in the better parts of the world, those in particular which are securely within the Pax Americana.

The mainstream Enlightenment itself, sad to say, soon ran into difficulties in its native Europe. Camus himself makes much of the irrationalism which arose in opposition to it. What Camus does *not* do is fully to identify the internal flaws in Enlightenment, its own inner irrationalism, which makes Camus' distinction between Communism as rational terror and Nazism as irrational terror very suspect, though even here it must be said that Camus is already partly on the case. He rightly calls Marx 'the prophet of justice without mercy', clearly aware, at least inchoately, of the profound irrationality of pushing one good, justice, to irrational extremes. He also spots what we might now call the difference between Anglo-American atheism, which is merely the belief that no God exists, and the type of atheism favoured by continental gurus, in which denial of the Deity flows from a furious envy that any being should dare to be greater than Marx (Sartre, or Foucault or Derrida). Camus wisely says of Marx in this regard that he rests by mistake in the unbelievers' plot at Highgate Cemetery.

Enlightenment threw too much weight onto reason, thus generating its own irrationality. In the event, the fanatical theorising of class and class-conflict is as insane in its inspiration and its results as the deliberate embrace of race-war. Moreover it was the politics of class which first established the totalitarian agenda. In the late eighteenth century the French Revolution, and from the mid-nineteenth century, the teachings of Marx, together set the pattern, this time on an unprecedented scale, for the renewed intellectual closure and political criminality which were to characterise so much of the world in the twentieth century.

Inspiring and sustaining, as well as swept along in, this renewed and fatal tide of persecution, the politically powerful ideologues of the twentieth century – with Lenin the first major figure – now deliberately abandoned even token genuflexion in the direction of tolerance, assuming a new posture of messianic and suspicious intolerance in the service of pseudo-politics and bogus religion, as the confused but implacable *zeitgeist* of totalitarianism worked its way through Communist, Fascist, Nazi and National Liberationist incarnations. Our trouble today in the free societies is that the antinomian aspects of this *zeitgeist* – its hatred of law and tradition, its envious suspicion of hierarchy – have in a real sense gone 'micro', working and worming their way into social work, teacher education, race relations, the probation service and media commentary. The population are exposed to the blandishments of this envy and suspicion almost throughout their waking hours. Often at school, at college of education, on social work training, in many instances during study for a degree in English, and probably always in the case of Media Studies, people spend immense amounts of time being subjected to Political Correctness.

As has more than once been said, it is a perverse kind of intellection which makes criminals of victims and victims of criminals. It is such perversity which Camus had in mind in his initial discussion, though the main thrust of his case was aimed at those who comforted the Soviet Union, an almost vanished breed today, given history's remaindering of the object of their misplaced love. What makes Camus so prescient is the scale on which 'philosophising' has now misled minds. He could not have foreseen such extensive application, but nevertheless his insight casts great light on the phenomenon.

Outside ancient religious intolerance, wickedness in pre-modern Europe was for the most part old-fashioned infraction of the Ten Commandments. Modern society is on the contrary threatened to its very foundations by the justificatory intellectualisation to which immorality of all kinds has now been subject. Millions of people now regard marriage as a trivial or unnecessary exercise. Children's waywardness is celebrated in the family, in the primary schools and in teacher training. Homosexuals no longer ask for tolerance; they demand that the world endorse them, reversing millennia of moral conviction. University teachers can even be found who are willing to say that black people are justified if they mug whites, because of the racism in white society.

Straightforward Wickedness

There will always be wickedness. What we now see is a growth in the old-fashioned, naked kind, accompanied by a swelling tide of the theorised sort. Overall this represents a loss of innocence as well as of clarity. Camus cites as a literary example of uncomplicated pre-'philosophical' wickedness, despite its nineteenth century provenance, Heathcliffe in *Wuth-ering Heights*. This, says Camus, is a man who would perform any act of wickedness imaginable if it would win Cathie for him. What he would not do, however, is devise a theory for his ferocity.

Long John Silver, in *Treasure Island*, furnishes an even better example of this ruthless, non-ideological disposition, more useful because it is financial and economic, not amorous, and thus speaks more centrally to the politics and scarcities of the world. Silver does appalling things in pursuit of money. The reader watches his hypocrisy, his falsity, his lying, his betraying, his murderous disposal of those in his way. Perhaps worst of all is the way he abuses his great gifts of outstanding intelligence and unflinching courage, the terrible sin Gerald Frost has called 'Misdirected Virtue'. Silver would not, however, wish to construct a treatise eulogising the contribution to humanity promised or achieved by this immorality. Silver harbours no animus against the world. He has nothing in common with the Marxilogue. He is on the contrary the type and patron of the Mafioso. The only person against whom he expresses an animus is Squire Trelawney and even this vicious dislike is purely personal. He wants, when he has achieved his fell purposes, to ride to Parliament in his carriage. In his own wicked way he is the complete conservative. The envy and hatred informing modern political correctness would be quite incomprehensible to him, as indeed would any type of radical politics.

The Spell of Nominalism and the 'Death' of Marxism as a Case in Point

When the late Christopher Lasch pronounced Marxism 'dead' intellectually, he was jumping the gun rather. Were he wholly right, the title of the present essay would be meaningless. Admittedly, while we certainly still have the Mafia, and in several new versions, often worse than the Sicilian original, we no longer have the Communists to contend with. Lasch was right insofar as, and only insofar as, no one we listen to now proclaims himself a Marxist, Marxism having failed utterly as a politico-economic paradigm for revolution. This point the argument has already conceded. It must be reiterated, nevertheless, that the enduring secret of Marxism is that its dispositional impact, so far from being reversed in the arts and social science wing of academia, lives on there, stronger than ever. What deceived Lasch and others is that a nominal shift has occurred. The Marxist name is very rarely invoked and Marxism as a paradigm of political economy is indeed shattered beyond repair. As a paradigm for suspicion of the world, however, it has succeeded beyond measure. Look not, all you young students and aspiring academics, at the love or decency or kindness or neutral efficiency confronting your gaze when you consider the societies of the liberal capitalist order, but rather at the hatred and darkness which the gnosis tells you are lurking behind or below these deceiving indices.

It matters nothing that the gnosis has mutated into forms which Marx would not have accepted, such as the belief that no civilisation is better than any other, or indeed that civilisation and barbarism are meaningless categories. It is reflex suspicion of the way things are which defines the gnostic paradigm.

The Poor were rarely taken in by either of Marx's Paradigms

Neither of these paradigms of Marx ever fooled the poor, anywhere really, except as low level dupes. Both were an afflatus of the alienated rich. Sometimes they fooled the rich in poor countries; most surprising of all was their fooling of some of the rich in rich countries, a list which has for long included America, Britain and especially France, with her misanthropic intellectuals and Marxisant troublemakers. Now we must add another rich country, Saudi Arabia, homeland of a new breed of fantastical revolutionary, part millionaire playboy, part fanatical Wahabi bigot. In the debased consciousness of al-Qa'eda there are merged, hatred of Christianity and the West with a paranoic, conspiratorial and paradoxically Marxilogical view of American capitalism.

The Death of the Marxist Political Prospectus and the Triumph of Marxisant Suspiciousness

The immiseration of the Communist world, in administrative circumstances so faithful to Marxist prescriptions that the earthly paradise should have arrived long before, had by the 1980s empirically overwhelmed the positive Marxian paradigm – the political prospectus. But intellectual suspicion, a refusal to take the world, *grosso modo*, on trust, gained ground extraordinarily and precisely in that decade. It now lives on, in hypertrophied form, in the imperatives of Political Correctness. Who but the habitually suspicious, those convinced through a kind of studied misanthropy, that things are not what they appear but always something else, could extract from the affluence and tolerance of

modernity, the view that the world is all oppression – take your pick of whom: blacks, women, homosexuals or non-European cultures?

Allan Bloom, in his *The Closing of the American Mind*, sought the origins of the philistine relativism of so many American university students in nineteenth century German philosophising. He singled out Nietzsche as a seminal inspiration. Of course the kind of relativisation of values which much of modern academia so treasures could be extracted from Nietzsche as easily as from Marx, and indeed the former's twist on the case is more interesting, Nietzsche seeing morality as tethering the strong, while the Marxilogical view is that it hobbles and oppresses the weak. The relativism itself has been in the air for nearly two centuries. The question is which of its sources is most to be identified as the author of our present woes. Despite his insistence on a realist epistemology and therefore his admiration for bourgeois or aristocratic science proper, Marx, with the exception of his own political economy and its demonstrable intellectual ancestry, cast an anathema on bourgeois social science, denying it any explanatory force. And it is the emphasis on the innocence of the alleged weak and oppressed which we find in deconstruction and post-modernism etc. which seal the matter. It is Marx's shade, not Nietzsche's, which most haunts these tortuous byways in human thinking. What constitutes the 'radical' mentality of American and British academia now is a kind of scrambled mishmash of Marxian phenomenology and the world-suspicious meanderings of Foucault and Derrida.

A mantel of suspicion is draped over the world. Everything is different from what it seems. We are not really history's darlings, rich and free, indeed not even autonomous subjects but mere assemblages of intersecting power-lines. We cannot legitimately murmur in wonder that Shakespeare has so compendiously caught the endless tale of the wrongs people suffer at the hands of others, in his 'spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes'. This line is so beautiful and lovingly perceptive that it even palliates in some measure the heart-breaking injustice it uncovers. Shakespeare is no more, however, so the Ivy League pundits and their soul-mate debunkers will tell us, than the power conduit of the dead white males he exemplifies.

This misanthropic ideology is not only a world outlook but also a gnosis, in other words it corresponds to what Kenneth Minogue has detected as the most crucial meaning of 'ideology', namely the conviction some hold that they are privy, unlike the common herd of men, to the existence of some deeper reality beneath the surface flux of things.

To Be or Not to Be Suspicious

Had such ingrained scepticism of our ancestral and recent achievements obtained in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, the bourgeois revolution would never have happened. The world would have continued to subsist in its poverty. And the reader might note that even eighteenth century Britain, the richest, freest society the world had ever known, would seem a wretched place to people in the modern rich countries. The thing about suspicion is that it is not creative or only invidiously so. This addiction to suspicion is the key to understanding why the Marxilogue is worse than the Mafioso. It is because he lives by doubting, spurning and subverting the real world, in a sense aimlessly since he no longer has an explicit political agenda for it. The Mafioso by contrast lives by moral realism. The Marxilogue holds that most people outside his ideological côterie are damned unless they belong to marginal and 'oppressed' groups or to the patrons of these groups. His aim is to convince all the oppressed and some of the oppressors of the oppression which links them and of the perceptiveness owed to him for detecting it.

The Mafioso by contrast harbours no suspicion of the world. Central to his evil and predatory life is his knowledge that the people he battens on are morally superior to him. He wants to plunder them, but not too hard. He realises, more cannily than the antirealist Marxilogue, that if one is fond of golden eggs one should steer clear of anything which might kill the geese which lay them. He will kill you if he finds you in his way. Not finding you there he will readily take a drink with you or attend your child's christening.

The Marxilogue, feeding in a different way on the pastures of freedom, cannot while the society remains law-bound, do as his counterparts in the totalitarian societies did, namely murder those he hates or excoriates. He would like to, often holding that this would diminish some greater evil, graspable through his gnostic powers. He would like to but he cannot. He will revile them as publicly and consistently as he can. He will block their promotions given any chance and if they are writers he will seek to prevent or try to bury their publications. And for the most part, lest anyone misunderstand what is being said about this world of murder frustrated and ideological suspicion rampant, let it also be said that such an ambience is often more typical of life within universities in the free societies than in the world outside. Outside on the streets of London or San Francisco or wherever, people are still free. It is in the hothouse suspiciousness of all too many university departments that paranoid closure reigns.

Outright and mercenary criminality are not, by definition, unaffected by the Marxilogues. The new Russian criminal constituency, often analogously termed a 'Mafia', are worse by far than anything inscribed in the old Sicilian template. Who could be surprised that they are worse? They are the risen to the surface scum of seventy years of the politics of suspicion. Would we, furthermore, expect the black organised criminals of America and Britain to be free of all influence of the 'wicked white man' ideology that Africanism, revivalist Islam and Political Correctness have been pumping out for decades? The shocking callousness and disdain for

life, even their own, of the black drug-gangs in America and the Yardies in Britain, also suggests that some of the nihilism which in the end is integral to all relativist doctrines has rubbed off on them.

The fruits of intellectual suspicion and misanthropy in the United States or Britain are likely to be as bad in their way as those produced by the corrupt kleptocracies of Latin America. Indeed one senses that rapid economic development would hugely and swiftly soften the awfulness of the latter. After all, the Latin American peasant who strives through cruelty and wickedness to rise in the dope cartels is not suspicious of the world. He has its measure all too well. He knows that his own society is corrupt and coercive. He is not like the black criminal of New York or London, living in a free and open society, yet often persuaded by the endless repetitions of the race-relations industry that his society is not really a free one and that he has no honest access to the wealth that surrounds him, oblivious to the fact that most American and British blacks do have access to it, and profit from that access, through that old-fashioned activity known as 'work'. The Columbian peasant-criminal knows only too well the brutal prerogatives of untutored wealth and power, with their captive governments or factional private armies and sometimes complicit churchmen.

The Columbian don too is a realist. When he seeks to spread his poison to rich countries this is not to win hearts and minds, only to tap the generalised wealth of an economy which he knows his own corrupt society, unreformed, could never generate. The Marxilogical drip, drip, drip of suspicion, eroding human fellowship and trust, is worse by far than this naked Mafia criminality. Obviously we would rather have neither; but the Mafia infringe a moral code in which they believe. The Marxilogues, more terrifying by far, deny that the code is binding in the first place. Worst of all, the unplanned dialectic between these two immoralities has engendered a third kind, which subsumes the worst of both of them and menaces the daily lives of millions of good and innocent people. When I was child in the 1940s, the streets of West London were mostly grey and safe. Now they are no longer grey and they are far from safe. Now greed, envy and malice stalk these once friendly streets, especially at night, in mocking salutation of their freedom and affluence.

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Balkan Drug Smuggling

Neil Barnett

A British Army officer who was among the first to enter Kosovo in 1999 told me recently that an old Kosovo Serb man had warned him that Britain and the other NATO countries that had intervened would come to regret their actions. 'We know the Albanians' he had said, 'they'll come to your countries and cause chaos'. This might have been easy enough to dismiss as sectarian slander, had the prophecy not already come to pass.

Within the Balkans, the most important illicit business is the trafficking of Turkish-refined heroin into Europe. Almost all heroin bound for Europe is refined and distributed by Turkish groups that then send an estimated 80% of it into Europe through the south Balkans. According to intelligence sources, the safe and efficient maintenance of these routes is a highly significant factor in nationalist activity. One police officer in Pristina said: 'Discussing Albanian politics without considering narcotics trafficking is like discussing Saudi politics without considering oil.' Albanian organized crime is arguably the most ruthless and organized in the world, springing from tough mountain clans, long obsessed with blood feuds and weapons, and having scant respect for external authority. In Germany, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, Scandinavia and much of Central and Eastern Europe Albanian gangs have become formidable criminal organizations over the last decade. For Britain the problem has accelerated since 1998-99, when Kosovar Albanian refugees started arriving in the country, but is still in its infancy compared to other European countries. According to David Bolt, deputy director of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), this may not be the case much longer. In January 2002, NCIS completed a threat assessment report, 'The Threat to the UK from Ethnic Albanian Organised Crime'. According to Bolt, 'We brought forward the timing of the report in response to interest in and anxiety about the threat, and in order to put it into context.' The report concludes that Albanian organised crime is at present a low-level threat in the UK, but based on experiences elsewhere in Europe, its potential to grow remains high. The potential trajectory of the threat can be seen in places such as the Scandinavian countries; Albanian organized crime in theory has the potential to expand quickly, accompanied by significant levels of violence.

Although they are involved in bringing heroin into the

UK, Albanian groups are likely to face problems accessing markets. At the street level, other groups already control the business and are keen to retain this control. Jamaican groups, which have been successful in establishing themselves very rapidly in recent years, had the advantage of selling crack cocaine, a new product that was not already in the hands of established competitors. Entrants to the heroin business lack such an advantage. Still, NCIS believes that one reliable indicator of forthcoming organised crime activity is the level of ordinary street crime being committed by a certain group. In the case of ethnic Albanians, there are signs in several parts of the UK of rising street crime. Moreover, ethnic Albanians are also working in relatively junior capacities for established criminal groups, in something akin to apprentice roles. This may presage – as seen in other countries – an eventual bid to oust these groups and take over illicit businesses, especially heroin distribution down to street level. It will not be a pleasant process for British society.

Ethnic Albanian groups have made faster progress in prostitution. In London they have near-complete control of 'offstreet' prostitution – including the 'massage parlours' that advertise their services on unambiguous calling cards plastered over phone boxes; in Soho the distinctive sound of the Albanian language is common, just as in Pristina English is often spoken with a strong Cockney accent. The police find it difficult to ascertain whether girls are working against their will, but it is clear that violence and intimidation by pimps is common. There have been cases of girls seeking asylum who have said they were brought to the UK unwillingly. Many of the girls police have come into contact with who work under ethnic Albanians are themselves ethnic Albanians, although it can be difficult to establish their actual nationality in some cases. From the Balkans, there is no doubt that Albanian gangs are trafficking women from Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and other countries in eastern Europe. Some of these women end up facing an uncertain future in London.

Ethnic Albanian groups... in London have near-complete control of 'offstreet' prostitution – including the 'massage parlours' that advertise their services on unambiguous calling cards plastered over phone boxes;


The trade in counterfeit and contraband cigarettes, many of which are made in Bulgaria and Macedonia, then smuggled via Italy, is another area in which ethnic Albanian gangs have made inroads. In Dover, gangs have been engaged in turf wars with existing groups over the illicit cigarette trade. While this might be regarded as principally an economic crime (and one unnecessarily provoked by Gordon Brown), there is the possibility that more serious crimes may emerge. Bolt says that 'Criminals do not make distinctions between commodities, other than on the basis of opportunity, profit and assessment of risk. Therefore, an organised crime group might smuggle cigarettes one week, heroin the next week, and people the week after that.'

Clearly, Albanian organised crime is on the rise in western Europe, but its grip on the Balkans, and its wider effect on Europe through heroin trafficking and the trade in human beings, verges on incalculable. For as long as Balkan history has been recorded, nationalism and banditry have been so close as to be indistinguishable; the Serbo-Croat word *hajduk* covers both without distinction. The problem now is that Albanian nationalist-criminal groups in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia are working to create chronic political instability and insecurity in order to run criminal enterprises more freely. For them, chaos means power and money. In March, Michael Steiner, the new head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), said that 'Should joint efforts to stabilise the province prove unsuccessful, Kosovo could become a nest of organised crime and the Afghan peril would be imported into Europe', the Madrid newspaper, *El Pais*, reported. Steiner is well aware of the situation – in December his predecessor Hans Hakkerup resigned before the end of his term after Albanian criminals threatened to kill his family. According to UNMIK spokesman Susan Manuel, 'Now that the political situation has stabilised, we see organised crime as the main challenge in Kosovo.' The problem is that the links between ethnic Albanian politics and organised crime are so intimate, as is West's engagement with the Albanians, that rooting out crime carries serious political and security risks.

Whatever the laudable aims of the UN administrators, the decisions of NATO leaders tell another story. At present NATO's response is to withdraw troops wholesale from Kosovo, a policy strongly reminiscent of Pontius Pilate; the irony of abandoning Kosovo at the very same moment that *mea culpas* over disengagement from Afghanistan are the order of the day, appears lost on the policymakers of the West. As a headteacher's report summary might note, Blair, Schroder *et al* are weak in history, suffer from a weak attention span, and are fixated by playground popularity at the expense of future success. To speed this happy end, criminal-nationalistic groups in Kosovo are slowly ratcheting up pressure on the international bodies in the province – as well as to register displeasure at restrictions on their criminal businesses. In December 2001, UNMIK police arrested three influential and criminally-connected ethnic Albanians, the 'Podujevo three' on charges of committing war crimes against other Albanians in 1998 and 1999. The arrests of Latif Gashi, Nazif Mehmeti and Naim Kadriu, former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA – Ushtria Climitare e Kosovoes – UCK), were met with unprecedented displays of anti-KFOR/UN sentiment, including demonstrations in

Pristina and Podujevo during which agents provocateurs provoked clashes with the security forces. The reaction to the 'Podujevo three' arrests is regarded by sources within KFOR and UNMIK police as a direct indication that attempts to disrupt organised crime activities will result in a deterioration of the general political and security situation. Certainly, it seems that the powerful '15 families' of Kosovo feel threatened by the arrests and by UNMIK's more uncompromising stance. The Nis Express bus bombing in February 2001, in which 11 Serb civilians died, was as much a warning signal to KFOR as an act of intimidation against Serbs; the culvert bomb that destroyed the bus could have been detonated seconds earlier or later and destroyed one of the Swedish military escorts.

Given the initial need to stabilise the province and ensure order, UNMIK and KFOR were at first slow to target organised crime. This was as much due to unwillingness at the political level to risk losing the co-operation of Albanian leaders as to a lack of resources and judicial tools at the police level. Now that UNMIK is starting in earnest to tackle Albanian organised crime, this accommodation has a limited shelf life. As Syrian troops who entered Lebanon to assist the Christians in the civil war, or British troops who went into Ulster in 1969 to protect Catholics will tell you, a warm welcome can cool off pretty quickly.



One of the thorniest problems is that Albanian criminals and nationalists in Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia and Albania itself regard the borders and boundaries that were established following the break-up of Yugoslavia as foreign impositions that carry no legitimacy. So there can be no containment – as shown by the eruption of communal violence in previously peaceful Macedonia following the Kosovo war. By the same logic, Albanian organised crime groups work seamlessly across these borders. As nationalists seek to unite Albanian-majority territories into a greater Kosovo (and possibly a greater Albania), the border instability created makes life infinitely easier for those trafficking in narcotics, human beings, weapons and cigarettes.

There's no shortage of opportunities to perpetuate border instability. The largely technical February 2001 Belgrade-Skopje agreement formalised the previously sketchy Kosovo-Macedonia border, paving the way for Belgrade and Skopje to improve border security – which would of course hinder trafficking activities. So undermining the Belgrade-Skopje agreement is a major objective of Albanian nationalists: on 5 March the new Kosovo prime minister, the ex-UCK commander Bajram Rexhepi, said that his government 'naturally does not accept' the border. The mountains north and west of Tetevo in Macedonia, are the centre of gravity of this criminal-nationalist activity. According to last year's EU/NATO-brokered Ohrid agreement, Albanian insurgents are implicitly allowed to run a fief in these mountains, far from the gaze of the Skopje government – the beginning of the end of a sovereign Macedonia. Here the conduct of Macedonia's ethnic Albanian insurgent group, the National Liberation Army (NLA – Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare – UCK), led by Ali Ahmeti, can be seen as a classic example of deliberate perpetuation of instability as an end in itself. Cooperation with NATO's mainly symbolic Operation 'Essential Harvest' weapons collection programme, and sporadic co-operation with police 're-entry' to some areas, has prevented decisive action against Albanian-held areas and built political credibility. At the same time, sporadic attacks on the security forces, often claimed by the more radical Albanian National Army (ANA – Armaj Kombetare Shiqitare – AKSh), preclude normalisation. The sum effect of political and armed action since March 2001, in terms of trafficking, is that strategic swathes of the border remain in the hands of the rebels.

Intelligence sources suggest that in addition to smuggling, other associated criminal industries are also flourishing in rebel-held areas, including production laboratories for amphetamines and methamphetamines and some refining of raw opium. Again, the welter of associated smuggling businesses follows in the wake of opium. Shipments come through Bulgaria into Macedonia, from which point Albanian groups move it into Kosovo or southern Serbia into Hungary and onwards to European markets. There are two main routes: the Italian route, through Tetovo into Kosovo; and the Central European route into southern Serbia and Kosovo.

The Central European route

The Presevo valley in southern Serbia is important, as the Skopje-Nis-Belgrade road that runs through it is a traditional smuggling route. The area has a large Albanian population. From 1999 until March 2001, NATO declared the valley a Ground Safety Zone (GSZ), a 5km wide demilitarised zone designed to prevent clashes between KFOR and the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavij – VJ).

Within this buffer, a KLA offshoot, the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovic (Ushtria Clirimitore e Presevo, Medvedja, Bujanovic – UCPMB), was able to operate against the VJ with relative freedom. The insurgency in the Presevo valley was intended to expand Kosovo's borders, but also served two further purposes: it allowed hardline factions to maintain political pressure on the international community, and allowed unmolested narcotics trafficking. When Belgrade agreed with NATO to close the GSZ in March 2001, Yugoslav security forces were able to move back into the zone, severely restricting the UCPMB's freedom of action, and threatening trafficking operations. In the same month, experienced UCPMB fighters moved into Macedonia, where they recruited disaffected local ethnic Albanians. They planned to destabilise the country for the same reasons they had done so in the Presevo valley – expansion of the borders of Kosovo, political leverage and trafficking. It is unclear to what extent this area is still a major route, since there are now an estimated 5,000 Serb forces in the former GSZ. It is probable that gangs now favour moving material through Kosovo, in particular through the town of Podujevo, home to a large number of rich and influential Kosovars. From Kosovo the route continues to Serbia, with non-Albanian couriers carrying narcotics onwards to markets throughout Europe.

The Italian route

The Albanian fief in the Sar mountains north and west of Tetovo keeps this sector of the Macedonia-Kosovo border relatively porous and unstable, forming the heart of the Italian route. Although Tetovo itself is officially government controlled, the situation on the ground is lawless and volatile. The police generally do not stop vehicles without registration plates and with blackened windows (a favourite of local criminals), and acts of violence in the streets are common. There is a 11pm curfew in the town, but it is only patchily enforced. Gun battles between the police and the rebels are a nightly attraction. The route continues across the Kosovo border, which KFOR endeavours to secure, with limited success; it simply does not have the manpower to stop crossborder movement in mountainous, heavily wooded terrain, mostly by mule, moving on pre-set routes known well to the smugglers. The route takes a dogleg towards the Adriatic through Kosovo, rather than going directly from Macedonia intoAlbania, because closely-related Kosovar Albanian and northern Albanian clans dominate the business, and naturally they operate on their own territory. In addition to fighters who moved into the country from the Presevo valley, Kosovar Albanians also remain in the Tetovo area, making for close clan co-operation across the border. The towns of Pec and Prizren in western Kosovo are bases for trafficking gangs, who then move shipments west over the Albanian border, into the lawless Tropoje area centring on the town of Bajram Curri, six miles west of the Kosovo border. On the Albanian side, the Haklaj clan is dominant; on the Kosovo side the Thaci and Haradinaj clans are allegedly central to the trade in the Drenica and Pec areas respectively. The situation has been exacerbated by erratic security in the Pec sector of the border. The Morina crossing point, for example, was not manned by KFOR until mid-2000. Once in Albania, shipments then pass onwards to the port towns of Vlore, Sarande and Durres, to be moved across the Adriatic into Italy, mostly in speedboats.

Against this background, the inexplicable Albanian bias of the 'international community' continues unabated. Now that withdrawal of NATO forces is gathering pace, the ground is being prepared for a handover of sovereignty to the Kosovo Albanian government. On 22 June the foreign ministry in Belgrade publicly rebuked Erhard Busek, who heads the EU-led Balkan Stability Pact, after he said it was only a matter of time before some solution emerges aimed at independence for Kosovo. The Yugoslavs correctly reminded Busek that only the UN Security Council is legally in a position to deal with the status of Kosovo. But then legality and accountability have never been fortes of the EU, and when its officials wield the 'human rights' cudgel, who's to argue? After all, who could possibly be opposed to human rights, and the actions of those who act in its name?

Whichever way the situation in the southern Balkans develops in the coming months, the interests of heroin smugglers will be a significant factor perpetuating instability and conflict. And the dismally naïve leaders of the West will be doing their bidding as they have since 1999. Perhaps in another ten years NATO will again intervene in the southern Balkans, this time to eradicate rampant narcotics smuggling and unmolested trading in ever more sinister and dangerous weapons. Again politicians will pompously declaim order and human rights, and the mass media will bombard voters with emotionally-charged images that will make them clamour for action. But for now, the best one can do is watch with resignation as the Serbs are vilified yet further, and the drones of the EU move the goalposts to create an independent kleptocracy in Kosovo and oversee the disintegration of Macedonia.

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Thoughts on the EU's Proposed Corpus Juris

Dennis Morris

In his article Justice: European Style (SR Spring 2002), Sir Richard Body reminded us how the prerogative writ of *habeas corpus* underpins our liberty. And Dean Cartwright, in his horrific account of his Spanish experiences, demonstrated the dangers inherent in any legal system under which authority cannot readily be called to account. Sir Richard also mentioned Brussels' proposals to replace the common law's rules of evidence [in cases in which a *Corpus Juris* (the CJ) currently being prepared by the EU's Commission would apply]. And this, in turn, prompts the question; What of (a) the prosecution's obligation to prove its criminal allegations against an accused 'beyond a reasonable doubt' – Article 31(1) is silent on this – and (b) though the presumption of innocence appears to be covered (Article 31(1)), under the proposed system is a prisoner in the dock to be given the benefit of a doubt? If the proposed *Corpus Juris* is introduced, will the nature of at least some serious criminal proceedings in an English, Welsh or Irish (North or South) court change from adversarial to inquisitorial? If jury trial is abolished or restricted, will the prosecution have a right of appeal against an acquittal? – yes if the CJ retains its present form.

If so, it follows that, as indeed the CJ confirms, an appelate court, in dealing with an appeal from a non-jury criminal trial, will be given power to substitute a verdict of guilty for an acquittal and to impose a penalty. Indeed such a power to substitute would probably be eventually given in all criminal trials should the CJ turn out to be 'the embryo of a future European Criminal Code' – a wish expressly stated in a resolution of the EU's Parliament.

Furthermore, The House of Lords European Communities Select Committee ('the Committee'), in the report (May 1999) on its inquiry into the CJ, opined that the proposal (in its 1997 form) would produce 'an inherently incoherent system throughout the EU'. So if the EU's court at Luxembourg is not to be given, or of its own motion to assume, a new criminal jurisdiction, which in my view Article 29(1) of the present CJ does not rule out, how could a uniform interpretation and application of the EU's new criminal code in states as different as, say, Spain and Sweden be ensured? Also, in the jurisdiction where *habeas corpus* exists, is it to be partly, or eventually wholly, abolished or to be replaced by something else? For England, Wales and all Ireland, and also Scotland (except for *habeas corpus*), these questions point to some of the changes which Brussels, or even the EU's court at Luxembourg, could perhaps effect in those jurisdictions were a new body of EU law analogous to the *Corpus Juris* implemented. And lastly, what of the protection against self-incrimination the common law affords? At first blush Article 31(1) seems to provide for this but on close scrutiny it leaves fundamental questions unanswered.

However, the CJ in its present form is only a discussion document or, as the Committee's report describes it – 'a (very) green paper'. More important is the progress of an EU (general) criminal code. The original proposal, though introduced at a EU-sponsored seminar in April 1997 solely for the protection of the EU's financial interests, was also stated to be the embryo of such an EU code. Because the EU failed to agree on a standard electric plug we should not be lulled into complacency. The concept of a common EU plug is easily understood whereas that of a common code of law is not. Experience shows that people are more inclined to oppose a concept they understand than one they do not. The usual cause of this inclination is a belief that those selling the idea know better. Of course fraud of any kind is difficult to prosecute successfully but as the Committee implied, what is needed is a more efficient means of investigation, not turning the whole system of UK (or Irish) criminal prosecution and trial upside-down. Not that I regard jury trial as the universally most effective; it has serious defects as Judge Andrew Geddes showed recently in the *Spectator*. But this is no reason for its abolition as distinct from providing that, say, trial shall be by a judge and assessors in certain types of criminal cases.

Assuming an EU criminal code is introduced, whatever its initial scope, if one can judge from the Committee's report, it will probably have the following characteristics; (a) there will be a single criminal jurisdiction covering the entire EU; (b) trials of alleged breaches of it will have no jury; (c) there will be a single EU Public Prosecutor who will be unaccountable and who will not only prosecute but also conduct the relevant investigation; and (d) the code will enable persons to be detained in custody without charge for long periods. The Committee was very critical of the two last mentioned features. The law of evidence, for example, will not be the same throughout the EU; evidence gathered by the

EUPP could well be sufficient to get a conviction in, Spain but not in Ireland. So as Article 26 gives the EUPP considerable power to pick and choose, assuming something like it is eventually included, surely it would almost certainly plump for the jurisdiction in which a conviction would be more likely.

Each of these possible changes are matters which should be fully and openly discussed both within and outside Parliament, whether in Westminster or Dublin. They are not matters to be decided after a short superficial discussion in the EU Parliament. Such a code's general principles will be finally disposed of in a document likely to have been cobbled together during the last hours of a week-end EU prime ministerial/presidential conference of fifteen states, bickering, and by then also weary, delegations, some of whose members may have also eaten or drunk too well. Judging by newspaper accounts, the final draft of the still unratified EU Treaty of Nice was like this. For even a relatively minor piece of criminal legislation can raise complex questions. Anyone can soon appreciate the complex questions that such a Bill can raise and see how a government, after critical examination and close analysis in debate, has had to retreat from what is at that stage seen to have been a policy which was either anomalous or, more often, less than fully thought out, usually due to political impatience.

Of course statutory or other presumptions of fact or law probably operate in every legal system and those of the UK or the Republic of Ireland are no different. Where these presumptions arise under the criminal law they relieve, to some extent, the burden of proof which otherwise rests on the prosecution throughout a criminal trial. Further, such presumptions weaken the presumption of innocence of an accused and, unhappily, increasingly appear in Acts due to supine parliamentarians. But despite this and the occasionally questionable statutory creation of presumptions failing to be rebutted by a defendant, in criminal trials in Great Britain or (because of its constitution more so) in Ireland the prosecution is required to prove the important elements of an offence beyond reasonable doubt. Where, for certain offences, the UK or Irish parliaments have imposed on defendants a burden of establishing or rebutting, on the balance of probabilities, a particular fact, proviso or exemption, such impositions are seen to be reasonable. But will this position endure should a CJ be established?

In the White Paper entitled Legal and Constitutional Implications of United Kingdom Membership of the European Communities which appeared in 1967 it is stated at paragraph 25; 'Nothing in Community law would, for example, materially affect the general principles of our criminal law....'. And in 1973 Lord (Geoffrey) Howe, who had steered the Bill for the European Communities Act 1972 through the House of Commons, wrote in *International Affairs* that the EEC Treaties had not by that Act been 'incorporated into or made identical with our domestic law'. Our courts are simply required to give direct effect to Community law according to its own nature. Thus immediately (but without any change or alteration in its separate legal nature) Community law is to be treated as a legal system which our courts are required to apply.' Surprisingly the question of conflict between the two legal systems was dealt with neither in the lengthy Parliamentary debates on the EEC Bill nor in Lord Howe's article. But of course it must have been considered at length in Whitehall. As late as 1976 there were judicial *obiter dicta* doubting whether Community law would prevail over that of the UK, notably that of Lord Denning in the *Felixstowe* case.

But all this was to change in 1978 when, although it had given indications as early as 1964, the EU Court declared (in *Simmenthal*) that Community law overrules national law. This decision was very probably the catalyst which started the EU process of integration which has already stood the White Paper's statement on its head. 'Integration' seems the *mot juste*; 'federalism', at any rate in its Anglo-Saxon sense, is not. For in the United States, Canada or Australia, the relationship between the states or provinces and the federal, dominion or commonwealth governments has been established by a written constitution. These instruments date from 1787-89, 1867 and 1900, respectively. And while there have been amendments, the basic relationships between the legislative, executive or judicial branches of states or provinces, and those of the U.S., Canadian or Australian central authorities have each remained very largely intact. In contrast, the EU has no analogous constitutional relationships. In spite of its occasional genuflections to the principles of 'subsidiarity' and 'proportionality', rather like expanding an empire, the EU Commission has steadily accrued ever wider powers at the expense of the legislatures and executives of the EU's member states. In other words, there being no *vires* principle, its powers can be expanded *ad hoc*.

The CJ was originally intended to deal only with EU fraud. Because of this a clause was included in the Treaty of Amsterdam which probably would have enabled any EU state, for example Ireland, needing 'constitutional clearance' by referendum to implement the CJ once such clearance had been obtained. But things have moved on, as it has now been agreed that the CJ, whatever its final form, will apply to acts of terrorism. So rung No. 2 on the ladder to a comprehensive EU criminal code has been reached. However this has the advantage that, because of Amsterdam's limitations, a new EU treaty *ceding* further powers to Brussels will be required. Whatever the form of the *Corpus Juris* to be incorporated in this treaty, to secure the code's implementation throughout the EU, one might ask what influence the UK or Irish electorates will have on that implementation? The positions could hardly present a greater contrast.

Up to now the UK government, unlike the Irish, has made its opposition to the introduction of a CJ clear. But should it waver, as the UK does not have a written constitution, eventually the matter will be one for Parliament, and Parliament only. In that case there would probably be many three-line whips in the House of Commons and talk about gaining 'influence' at Brussels. So all could well depend on the opposition, be it Conservative or Labour. However, it looks unlikely that, should it be Conservative, the opposition would have the power, or perhaps even the will, to successfully oppose the relevant Bill in the Commons. The position seems likely to be the same in the reformed House of Lords.

In the Irish Dáil and Senate, things could prove to be not that much different to those at Westminster. But there is a unique Irish dimension; both the right to trial by jury and the prerogative of *habeas corpus* are entrenched by the Irish Constitution. Thus, apart from any other reason, a referendum would be required to amend that constitution, enabling the Irish Government to ratify the new EU treaty. It would be both constitutionally and politically prudent to expressly refer to them in the question put at such an Irish referendum. Although the average Irish voter's understanding of what *habeas corpus* means is probably no clearer than, say, his English counterpart's, many a man in the street will either have served as a juryman himself or, if not, know someone who has. If such an Irish referendum took place, a significant portion of the electorate would be aware of what limiting or abolishing trial by jury implies, and might reject it. At the time of the first Nice referendum the Irish thought that too much had already been conceded to Brussels.

The concept of a common EU plug is easily understood whereas that of a common code of law is not. Experience shows that people are more inclined to oppose a concept they understand than one they do not.

In late February last, Lord Howe was reported as having described the UK's retention of yards, pints and pounds as a 'national disgrace', thus putting it on a par with the parlous state of the railways, schools and health service. His observation tends to confirm the already common impression that the UK's Europhiles share Brussels's desire to prohibit or otherwise regulate or control everybody and everything between the North Cape and the Straits of Gibraltar. Let's hope the Irish electorate frustrates their plan to replace the UK and Irish systems of criminal law.

The common law's greatest gift to criminal jurisprudence is the right it accords a defendant, through cross-examination or producing rebutting evidence, to test the worth of the prosecution's case. Of course, no more than any other, the common law's criminal jurisprudence is powerless to counter the determined perjurer, an unfair judge or prejudiced criminal jury, or, far more likely, a judge or jury unconsciously influenced by the cruelty of the alleged crime or other pressure of events. Despite any such judicial or jury failings, cross-examination greatly facilitates a defence in adducing evidence for consideration by an appellate court.

The French system of inquisitorial investigation and trial, on which at least some of the EU's CJ proposals are based, is still much the same as that devised by the French Crown in the 18th century to meet the situation it faced when the mediaeval system of judicial torture was abandoned. Unlike in the UK, in the conduct of a French criminal trial a defendant is circumscribed as to testing the value of evidence tendered by a prosecutor or the credibility of his witnesses. The French claim that, as compared with a common law criminal trial, their system is more 'efficient' because about 90% are 'sent down' (as compared with virtually 100% when confessions due to torture were admissible!). If committing a person to prison is criminal justice's primary object, then I suppose the French claim is justified. But to me a figure of 90%, as compared with the English 50-60%, rather suggests that the common law's largely unfettered right to cross-examine is a real safeguard against injustice. Although there are consequential concessions to be made to the prosecution should specific lines of cross-examination be taken on a defendant's behalf, an defendant's common law right also very largely ensures that, should he even be an alleged terrorist, he will not find himself finally behind bars because, at his trial, it was proved, not beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the alleged offence, but rather that he probably, or indeed only may have committed it. Even if cross-examination cannot unmask a cool and clever perjurer, nonetheless it has (inter alia) revealed time out of number that witnesses in criminal (or civil) trials, while having no perjurious intent, often either convince themselves of the truth of matters as they wish, or perhaps have been induced, to see them or are prone to giving very different accounts of the same event. Thus the common law right of an accused in court to scrutinise the case made against him is crucial in protecting not alone him, but all of us, against most, if probably not every, possible form of State authoritarianism or tyranny.

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Letter from Australia

Hal GP Colebatch



Since their humiliating rout in the Republic Referendum of November, 1999, and the landslide re-election of the Howard Government two years later, the progressivist elite in the Australian media/commentariat world have lapsed into an obsessive hatred of Prime Minister John Howard which becomes more and more cognitively dissonant.

The Howard Government is continually portrayed as tottering under a succession of 'crises', each one of which seems more trivial than the one before it. Each is forgotten after a few weeks.

First, there was the so-called 'Children Overboard' affair. Like the other 'crises' it needs to be set out for its full Lilliputian triviality to become apparent: shortly before September 11, with the November, 2001, Australian election coming up, a Royal Australian Navy warship intercepted an illegal immigrant boat at sea. The illegal immigrants were of middle eastern origin and there were children on board. To force the warship to take them to Australia some adults on the boat held children up as if to throw them overboard and then sabotaged the boat, causing it to sink. The warship's crew rescued the illegal immigrants, including the children, from the water.

The report which reached the Defence Department and the Cabinet was apparently slightly garbled: it said children had been thrown overboard before the boat was scuttled. Howard and others referred to this during the election campaign, but not directly in the context of the election.

There was little obvious electoral mileage from falsely claiming the children had been thrown overboard in such circumstances, or if there was, it would actually have favoured the Labor opposition, assuming a sort of sub-text message along the lines of: 'People who do these things are bad. Vote for us and we will keep them out.' Labor had a policy on illegal immigrants actually more hard-line than the Government's. It was Labor, not the Government, that wanted to set up a dedicated coast-guard force to intercept illegal immigrants at sea.

Given that the rescue, particularly of adults who were evidently hostile and obstructive, was a difficult task, some confusion of detail in the report is at least under standable. What is beyond doubt is that, whether they were thrown overboard or not, the children ended up in the water, and at risk, as the result of actions by adults on board the boat.

(It could almost be a good-news, bad-news joke: 'The good news is I am not going to throw you overboard, the bad news is I have scuttled the boat!').

When it emerged that there was some doubt whether the children had gone into the water before or after the boat was sunk, this absolutely insignificant discrepancy of detail was seized on by the commentariat as proof that the re-election of the government was illegitimate. Among countless others the Age of 21 February, 2002, headlined: 'Buck stops with the man who leads a nation deceived' and followed this with a sub-head: 'The Australian people were knowingly misled on the children-overboard story.' However the story that followed produced no evidence of deliberate deception. Almost incredibly, entire books have been written about the matter and rushed into print. (The adversary culture's apparently unlimited access to instant printing and publishing facilities remains one of the minor mysteries of Australian culture).

Commentator Hugh MacKay, a guru of what some have unkindly called the bed-wetting left, leapt in to claim in a chain of national newspapers that a Parliamentary convention exists that, if it turns out the Prime Minister or the Minister for Immigration misled Parliament on this, they 'must resign. It matters not one whit whether their false statements were made inadvertently, carelessly, or deliberately; they simply must go.'

This statement, whether made inadvertently, carelessly, or deliberately, is bilgewater: there is no such convention. Unintentionally misleading Parliament is dealt with by a Ministerial or personal explanation and is not uncommon. Perhaps a columnist who misleads readers on a fundamental matter of fact should also resign?

Howard's predecessor as Liberal Leader, Malcolm Fraser, now apparently filled with Heath-Thatcher-like resentment towards Howard and a convert of all manner of left-wing causes (He likened Peking's threats of war against Taiwan to Abraham Lincoln's determination to preserve the American Union, apparently unaware of a moral difference between extending slavery and abolishing it), has been suggesting Australian policies are racist and xenophobic, a clever tactic to deploy at the

very time when Howard, as chairman of the Commonwealth committee on Zimbabwe, faced the monumentally difficult task of trying to persuade the African Commonwealth leaders to take meaningful action on Mugabe.

The next 'crisis' was the Hollingworth affair. Peter Hollingworth, an Anglican prelate concerned with social justice issues, was appointed Governor-General by the Queen on Howard's recommendation. If it was an attempt by Howard to buy off the progressives it was vain. Allegations emerged after Hollingworth's appointment that he had been remiss in reporting cases of sexual abuse by clergymen in his diocese years before. It did in fact appear that he had been inept and naive in handling a situation for which he had had no real training and was not very smart in dealing with a vulpine media, but there was not the slightest suggestion that he was personally guilty of anything beyond that. Howard had no involvement whatsoever, apart from the fact Hollingworth was his appointee, and that he stated there were no grounds to dismiss him. Again, this trivial affair was beaten up into an alleged threat to the life of the government. Major republican campaigners suddenly became concerned about the dignity of the vice-regal office which they wanted abolished anyway. Again, the community at large showed considerably more sense than the commentariat. The affair excited minimal public interest and was eventually dropped.

The alleged crises became more bizarre. The next was the Heffernan-Kirby Affair. Senator William Heffernan, with a relatively junior government position, falsely accused a High Court Judge, Michael Kirby, of picking up young male prostitutes in Sydney, and, moreover, using a government car to do so. His 'evidence' was the purported logs of the government car Kirby was alleged to have been using. When it emerged that the charges were false and the logs were forged, Heffernan apologised fully to Kirby, who accepted the apology with some graciousness. Heffernan resigned his position, thus probably ending his political career and losing a good deal of income. It was a high price for Heffernan to pay, but by making serious accusations without properly checking out the evidence he showed a lack of judgement which made resignation the appropriate course. There is no evidence Heffernan knowingly made a false accusation: the whole thing was a somewhat sad aberration, and might kindly be called an excess of zeal on Heffernan's part. The commentariat, which had been attacking Howard in the Hollingworth affair for, by proxy, allegedly covering up allegations of sex abuse, now attacked Howard for, by proxy, making allegations of sex abuse. The far more significant story of who set Heffernan up by planting the false log-books which sent him off the deep end – obviously prima facie a deliberate criminal conspiracy – was ignored, and in mountains of indignant words written on the subject I have seen only one reference to this question.

The latest in this squalid procession of pseudo-crises is the Pell affair. Archbishop George Pell, the newly-appointed Roman Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, is a conservative (apart from supporting a republic) and thus another proxy-Howard target, though also a major target in his own right. Pell, as one paper put it 'took on the arts community' in his previous appointment as Archbishop of Melbourne by campaigning to get Andre Serrano's artistic work "Piss Christ banned", and took on the feminist lobby by opposing IVF for single women and lesbians. He also aroused the wrath of the homosexualist lobby for refusing the demands of the homosexualist Rainbow Sash Movement to receive communion (He instead gave them a blessing, saying, 'I cannot help you, peace be with you.').

Soon after he was appointed to Sydney, accusations surfaced that he had previously paid hush money to silence complaints by victims of paedophile priests and brothers. In fact it was Pell who had established an idependant commission, chaired by a Non-Catholic QC to investigate such complaints. Veteran Australian journalist and former leading New York editor Frank Devine commented: 'what followed was an outburst of malice and foolishness that calls for a novelist's attention... It is reasonable to speculate that the attacks on Pell originated in the various constituencies of resentment that Pell has created by his conservative theology, and such stances as his insistence on the sinfulness of homosexual practice and his opposition to the ordination of women, to abortion and to no-fault divorce. Probably only very meek, not to say inert, archbishops stay free of such enemies.' Pell has since been completely exonorated.

However it was *after* Devine had written this that the big gun came out. An anonymous accuser with a criminal record claimed (privately, not to the police) that Pell himself had sexually abused him – when Pell was a trainee priest more than 40 years before!

Normally one would think an anonymous denunciation made by someone who waited more than 40 years to complain, unsupported by a shred of evidence, would be ignored. It is, instead, the latest 'crisis'. Pell, possibly being over-sensitive, has stepped down pending the result of an inquiry, but again Howard is being bagged for supporting him and expressing faith in his innocence. One waits with less than bated breath to see what the next trivial, squalid and ephemeral 'crisis' will be beaten up.

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The End of Economics

Tim Congdon

The modern welfare state is an historical aberration. By the phrase 'the modern welfare state' is to be understood the set of political arrangements by which governments raise taxes and spend over 40 per cent of their nations' output in order to provide social security and so-called 'public services' (mostly health and education). This set of arrangements has existed in much of Europe for over a generation and in a milder form (in which tax and government spending were roughly equal to or exceeded 30 per cent of output) for over two generations. But before the middle of the 20th century very few nations had experience of a government role on this scale, except in wartime. Until the late 1940s an almost universal pattern had been for the state to restrict peacetime taxation to less than a quarter of national output.

Indeed, the constitutional and institutional structures associated with tax of over 40 per cent of output could be seen as distinctively European, and 'the modern welfare state' might be equated with 'the modern European state'. As some rich countries in other continents also have a large government sector, this may appear misleading. However, the political debate in these countries (notably in the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) is more equivocal about the benefits of big government than is typical in Europe. Tax and government spending above 40 per cent – and sometimes exceeding half – of national output may be characterised as particularly 'European'. (Note that in the newly developing countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa it is also unusual for the government sector to represent 40 per cent or more of national output. This is true of members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development from the three continents – such as Mexico and South Korea – as well as their poorer neighbours.)

The modern European state is widely regarded as a success. The late 20th century was a period of economic prosperity, political stability and social harmony in Western Europe, as it was in the rest of the industrial world. Fukuyama has claimed that the model of liberal democracy is so convincing that it constitutes 'the universal and homogenous state that appears at the end of history'. Further, this sort of state can be seen – in Fukuyama's words – 'as resting on the twin pillars of economics and recognition'. In his view, it both endorses the individualistic pursuit of material well-being in the English-speaking Lockean tradition and fulfils citizens' need for mutual appreciation in a cohesive society according to the continental Hegelian ideal. The central argument of this paper is more cautious. Indeed, if the modern European state with its heavy tax burden and obtrusive government is taken as the archetype of Fukuyama's 'liberal democracy', its pretensions to being 'the end of history' must be rejected. The modern European state is inefficient and may prove unsustainable when it has to cope with the challenges of the early 21st century. Some of the most serious challenges will come from Europe's changing demographics, which – ironically – Fukuyama has himself discussed in his book, *The Great Disruption*.

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The tax levels imposed in European welfare states both now and over the last 50 years are remarkably onerous by long-term historical standards. The question immediately arises, 'if so, why did these 50 years see such spectacular prosperity?'. The conjunction of heavy taxation and continuous growth seems to refute traditional concerns about the adverse effects of taxation on work effort, allocative efficiency and the level of savings. In the 1960s and 1970s numerous articles were published in professional economics journals denying a negative relationship between taxation and work effort, and indeed between taxation and economic progress more generally. Most economists accepted that the relationship between the ratio of tax to gross domestic product and the rate of economic growth was unclear and that such a relationship might not even exist.

More recently, views have changed, with an expanding body of empirical work demonstrating that high taxes have important disincentive effects and are relevant to understanding the relative economic performance of different nations. This work applies both on a large scale in comparisons of nations over periods of several decades, and on a small scale in the analysis of tax effects on individuals' and companies' motivation. On a large scale, there is an undoubted contrast between the high growth enjoyed by Europe's economies in the 1950s and 1960s, when taxes were typically under 35 per

cent of national output, and the slower growth recorded since the early 1970s, when taxes have often been above 45 per cent of national output. Further, in the 1990s the relatively high taxation in Europe compared with the United States of America may have been one reason for the slower growth of both productivity and output.

An important study of the effects of taxation on growth was published last year by the OECD. The study tried – among other things – to estimate by econometric methods the effect of the ratio of tax to output on the level of output, using a sample of nations in the period 1971 - 98. The outcome depended on the specification adopted and provided no simple rule of thumb. (The effect of the tax ratio depended – for example – on whether the level of government spending was also an independent variable in the calculation.) But – no matter the specification – the higher the tax ratio, the lower the level of national output. In the most ambitious case, where the tax ratio was allowed to affect investment and, at a further remove, national output, a rise in the tax ratio of 1% reduced national output by 0.7 %.

This is a striking, even astonishing result. Taken at face value, it means that nations with a tax ratio of 52 per cent rather than 30 per cent are losing 15 per cent (almost a sixth) of national output because of the extra fiscal burden. The growth of government expenditure is often motivated by politicians' concerns about unsatisfactory provision of education and health services. As the supply of such services in the modern welfare state is predominantly in the state's hands, higher public spending and more tax can be presented as essential if the services are to be improved. (The big increases in the British Government's health and education spending announced in the 2002 Budget were justified in these terms.) But health and education combined rarely take up more than a sixth of national output. So the loss of output implied by extensive public sector provision and the associated high taxation is equal to the total level of resources required, in most nations, by the most conspicuous types of public service provision. There could hardly be a more damning demonstration of the inefficiency of the over-taxed and over-extended modern European state.

High taxation weakens incentives in many ways. Not only does it discourage hard work by those in employment, but also it affects career choice, influences the location of employment and deters people from being employed at all. In the 1950s and 1960s the tax ratio in Europe was similar to that in the USA, and so also was the proportion of the working-age population actually in work. Since the early 1970s the rise in taxation in Europe has been most obvious in the employment area. There is now a big difference between most European nations and the USA in the burden of payroll taxation; there is also a marked contrast in the proportion of working-age people who have a job. It is difficult not to believe that these two patterns are related. Smaller-scale studies of payroll taxation and employment generally confirm important incentive effects. Although they are far from uniform in reaching this conclusion, it would be remarkable if the price of labour has no impact on the equilibrium quantity of labour demanded by employers or supplied by workers. The high taxation characteristic of the modern European state seriously undermines the efficiency of the labour market and so of the economy as a whole.

In retrospect, Europe's immediate post-war boom can be attributed to a combination of favourable influences so powerful that they swept aside the disincentive effects of high taxation. Europe's economies benefited from the reduction in trade barriers and increased economies of scale made possible by the post-war liberalisation of the world economy. Their ability to deliver high growth rates, which so impressed economists in the more slow-moving English-speaking nations, also stemmed from their relative backwardness in the late 1940s. A wave of new technologies (the telephone, radio, manned flight, the combustion engine, the typewriter) was discovered between 1870 and 1920. The USA had substantially exploited these new technologies commercially between 1920 and 1950, and in 1950 had levels of income per head which were two to four times those in Europe. Between 1950 and 1975 Europe copied the new technologies and raised its output over three times, and its living standards began to catch up with the USA's. The economic dynamism of Europe in the 1950s and 1960s did not show that the level of taxation was irrelevant to growth; it demonstrated instead the immensely benign effects of trade liberalisation and technological catch-up in the post-war international economy.

The combination of high growth and a moderately high tax burden in the 1960s deceived Europe's governments. It made them think that continued high growth was inevitable regardless of the level of taxes. In the early 1970s they projected high growth rates into the indefinite future and made their welfare systems more generous than before, with – for example – significant increases in unemployment assistance and state pension benefits. Thereafter they were subject to what has been termed the 'tyranny' of their own past commitments. The result was a steep rise in the ratio of social security transfers to GDP and an associated increase in tax burdens. According to Tanzi and Schuknecht in their study *Public Spending in the 20th Century: a Global Perspective*, 'In the European Union social expenditure more than doubled between 1960 and 1980 as a share of GDP from 10% to over 20%, and continued to grow more slowly thereafter.'

In the 1980s Europe's economic performance remained satisfactory by its own past standards and relative to those of the USA. It was only in the 1990s that a rethink began. The existence of a prudent upper bound to the overall tax burden was implicit in two developments in these years. First, year after year several nations had tax ratios of over 40% and a few had tax ratios above 50%, but none had any long-term experience of a tax

ratio above 60%. In Sweden the ratio of public expenditure to GDP went above 60% for a few years in the early 1990s, but the expenditure was covered by borrowing as well as taxes. The highest tax ratio for any OECD country in recent decades was, unsurprisingly, in Sweden. It occurred in 1989 when the figure was exactly 60.0%.

Secondly, large cuts in top rates of taxation (notably the top rate of income tax) were announced in many industrial countries even as public expenditure absorbed an increasing share of GDP. Plainly, governments had become worried about the damage that high rates of personal income tax might do to senior management incentives. They were particularly vulnerable to corporate decisions to shift headquarters operations, with all their expertise and highly-paid staff (and indeed their politically valuable tax payments), to low-tax jurisdictions. (Sweden's large companies – notably Ericsson – routinely warn their government that they will emigrate unless taxes are kept down to an acceptable figure.)

In short, the modern European state is not only an historical aberration; it is also an inefficient historical aberration. There is persuasive evidence that a tax ratio above 60% is unacceptable. (There are no nations where tax has exceeded 60% of GDP.) Given this 60% barrier, it would require a remarkably implausible discontinuity in the effort-reward relationship for a tax ratio of 50% not to be more harmful than one of 40% and for a tax ratio of 40% not to be more harmful than one of 30%. As Lord Robbins pointed out, can people who claim that a tax rate of 83% has no effect on behaviour say the same about a tax rate of 100%?

High taxation weakens incentives in many ways. Not only does it discourage hard work by those in employment, but also it affects career choice, influences the location of employment and deters people from being employed at all.

In his book *The Liberal Economy* Adair Turner, the former Director-General of the Confederation of British Industry, defended the tax burden found in most of Europe today. He made the well-known objection that taxes have two effects on behaviour, the 'substitution effect' and the 'income effect'. The 'substitution effect' refers to the impact of tax on the relative attractions of work and leisure, assuming income is unchanged. There is no doubt that the higher are taxes, the less attractive is work. According to the substitution effect, the response to higher taxes is therefore unambiguously negative. By contrast, the income effect emphasizes that an increase in taxes lowers post-tax income. People may react to this drop by working less or by working more. If they react by working more (because, for example, they have a fairly stable target standard of living) the income effect to a tax rise is positive. Further, if a positive income effect outweighs a negative substitution effect, an increase in taxes might be accompanied by extra work effort! This possibility – which, although paradoxical and surprising, could be found in the real world – heartens advocates of the big state and high taxes.

Turner cited a number of empirical studies on this question and summarized the results as showing a generally 'rather small' negative effect of tax on work effort. However, the body of empirical work under review begs as many questions as it answers. All the studies suffer from the short-term and limited context in which they are set. Once people are in a particular job, differences in the tax rate may have only a modest impact on their hours of work and the intensity of their work input. But the proviso 'once people are in a particular job' is crucial. Tax also affects whether they want to work at all, their selection of career and the location of their workplace. Over the last 15 years governments have reduced the top rate of income tax in nearly all industrial countries. The uniformity of the pattern suggests that governments have learned that there is a maximum sensible top rate of income tax, which is – almost certainly – under 50%.

If high taxes do their damage by discouraging employment, by dissuading people from choosing high-productivity, high-income careers and by provoking the emigration of talented people, their effects are likely to take decades to be felt. As a tax ratio of over 40% has prevailed now in the EU since 1975, it may have been one reason for the slowdown in economic growth since the 1970s. In *Public Spending in the 20th Century* Tanzi and Schuknecht note that economic growth slowed across the industrial world from about 4% a year in the 1960s to around 2.5% in the 1986 – 1994 period. But they continue, '[t]he decline in economic growth has been most pronounced...in countries with big governments where growth rates fell from 4.1% to only 2%.' The countries with big government are those where public spending exceeds 50% of GDP. They are all in Europe.

The unwise promises on pension and social security made by Europe's governments in the early 1970s may have begun to reduce employment by the late 1970s and 1980s, but output growth continued. It was only in the 1990s that serious concern was expressed about the sustainability of welfare commitments. In the early decades of the 21st century high-spending European governments will face challenges of even greater severity, with demographic developments being of particular importance. Over the next few decades the number of people of working age will start falling across Europe. From 2010 the typical annual rate of decline will be 1% a year, but – according to the World Bank – in some countries in some five-year periods it will be almost 2%. It is this demographic prospect which threatens the sustainability of the modern European state.

A realistic conjecture is that economic growth and the accompanying rises in living standards are necessary to

the political viability of the modern European state. People resist cuts in post-tax incomes from an unchanged work input, as there is a sense of injustice in getting less from the same amount of effort. (National emergencies – as in wartime – may provide an exception.) Over the next 40 or 50 years government spending will increase in real terms all over Western Europe, because of the welfare commitments that have already been made. In particular, rising numbers of old people will be entitled to extra pensions and can reasonably expect health care on the same cost basis per head as the elderly today. Unless national output increases, the taxes needed to finance the extra expenditure will erode the post-tax incomes of those in work. To repeat, economic growth is necessary to the political viability of the modern European state. In Daniel Bell's words, 'Economic growth has become the secular religion of advancing industrial societies: the source of individual motivation, the basis of political solidarity, the ground for the mobilization of society for a common purpose.'

The growth rate of national output is equal to the sum of the growth rates of productivity (output per person employed) and employment. Productivity growth has declined in Europe since the 1960s, with – for example – the members of the Euro-zone currency bloc recording increases in output per head of only 1% a year in the six years to 2001. If employment were stable, productivity growth of only 1% a year would imply growth of national output also of only 1% a year. Unfortunately, from 2010 the decline in the population of working age – and probably in employment – would cancel the 1%-a-year productivity growth. Economic growth would come to an end.

How would Europe's societies cope with the disappearance of their key 'source of individual motivation' and their 'basis of political solidarity'? How, in particular, would the population of working age react to declines in post-tax income which reflect the interaction of stagnating total output and the increasing claims of elderly dependents? It is legitimate to speculate on the risk of a downward spiral of decline, in which high tax rates reduce the proportion of the working-age population actually in a job, the fall in employment cuts output and erodes the tax base, the erosion of the tax base has to be countered by a rise in tax rates, which reduces the proportion of the working-age population in a job, and so on. A downward spiral of this sort would obviously be unsustainable. The basic assumptions of the social and political arrangements responsible for it would have to be re-examined.

Much would depend on the ratio of tax to national output. At present the ratio of the dependent age groups (i.e., those of 19 and under, and of 60 and over) to people of working age in the European Union is about 80%. By 2040 the ratio is expected to exceed 120%. With government expenditure on pensions, health and education typically over a quarter of national output in Europe today, the rise in dependency implies additional expenditure and tax of about 15% of national output. (Of course, the situation varies from country to country. It is much worse than the average in Italy and Germany.) As taxation is already in the range of 40 to 50% of output today, the consequence would be tax-to-GDP ratios of over 60%. But it has already been shown that no nation has previously had a tax to GDP ratio of over 60% for an extended period in peacetime.

The demographic prospect in the early 21st century may undermine and eventually invalidate the modern European state. The average European woman stopped having two or more children in the mid-1970s; in the late 1990s she was typically having 1.5 children. Plainly, if women have 1.5 children (rather than the replacement level of two) for a generation, the number of people under the age of 25 at the end of that generation is about a quarter lower than at the end of the previous generation. A big fall in the number of people of working-age now seems unavoidable in the opening decades of the 21st century, with the accompanying danger of total economic stagnation. Even if women were now to be actively encouraged (perhaps by public policy) to have more children, their offspring would not immediately join the workforce. On the contrary, in a transitional period the costs of educating the young would increase and add to the taxes paid by the working-age population.

One answer would be for Europe's citizens and politicians to restrict the size of the state. Given that the ratio of welfare recipients to the total population is certain to rise for demographic reasons, the obvious step would seem to be a deliberate reduction in the value of benefits to each recipient. This may sound unkind, but in fact several European nations have already lowered pension or other benefits in order to balance budgets without raising tax. They have done so without revolution or even particularly marked civil strife. For example, a pension reform package in 1995 went some way to curb the Italian state's long-term pension liabilities and has been followed by a decline in the ratio of government spending to GDP. The collapse of the modern European state is not inevitable. Tax may hover between 40 and 60 % of GDP decade after decade, as governments fend off the adverse fiscal consequences of demographic trends by piecemeal retrenchment and tactical economies. Although pensioners may be worse off in 2020 or 2030 than their counterparts to day, they will not be destitute.

But – at best – the long-term outlook for the modern European state, with its extraordinarily high taxes and all-encompassing welfare spending, is unappealing. It is true that welfare cutbacks have so far proved politically acceptable, but that has been in association with continued, if slow, output growth. The difficult period will be in 2010s, 2020s and 2030s when the demographics become particularly hostile and output growth may cease. The threat to Europe's image of economic success and technological superiority may then be compounded by

faster output growth and a catch-up of living standards in such nations as South Korea and Taiwan, and perhaps even Mexico and Chile. (All four of these nations have a lower ratio of tax to national output than the European average, as well as more modest social security systems and far greater reliance on private sector provision of health and education.) Even if the modern European state remains sustainable, its inefficiency may become so patent that the case for reform cannot be resisted.

Fukuyama may be right that 'liberal democracy' is the best form of government that can be devised. *The End of History* made a compelling argument that the free market and private ownership of assets are necessary for full economic maturity, and set out strong grounds for believing that advancing industrialization should produce liberal democracy. But when Fukuyama claimed that, '[a]lmost all countries that have succeeded in achieving a high level of economic development have... come to look increasingly similar to one another', he went too far. He overlooked a basic feature – perhaps the most basic feature – that differentiates modern industrial societies. Is a 'democracy' still liberal, does it still allow sufficiently extensive free choice, when tax exceeds 60% of national output? Or is the ratio necessary to ensure the 'liberalism' of a 'liberal democracy' some lower figure? And, even if a democracy can be classified as economically liberal with a tax ratio of over 40%, is such a democracy likely to be as economically efficient as one with a tax ratio of 10, 20 or 30%?

In chapter 12 of *The End of History* Fukuyama, invoking Hegel at length, remarked that, 'if people living in liberal democracies express no radical discontent with their lives', then '[t]he historicist philosopher would be compelled to accept liberal democracy's own claims to superiority and finality'. But it is far from clear that people living in Europe's liberal democracies will continue to accept the economic outcomes of these societies. Locke and Hegel may not be so glibly reconciled. If the demographic pressures of the next few decades curtail or even halt economic growth, if the stagnation of output is accompanied by intense strains in the distribution of national product and if the resulting conflicts are not successfully mediated by the political process, the modern European version of liberal democracy – in which taxes represent over 40% of national output – may be just another staging post on the way to a new and as yet undefined order.

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Brussels – Al-Qa'eda's Capital

Paul Belien

On 9 September 2001, two days before the attacks by al-Qa'eda terrorists on the WTC-towers in New York and the Pentagon, Ahmad Shah Massoud was murdered by a Belgian suicide bomber. General Massoud was the charismatic leader of the Northern Alliance, the main Afghan resistance group against the Taliban rulers in Kabul. The murderers intended his death as 'a gift' to Osama bin Laden, head of al-Qa'eda and the most prominent protégé of the Taliban regime.

The murder had been organised by Tarek ben Habib Maaroufi. Until 1991, Maaroufi, a naturalised Belgian born in Tunisia in 1965, worked for el-Watan, an Arab radio station in Brussels. The station catered for the many North African muslim immigrants that had settled in Belgium from the late 1960s onwards. Most of these immigrants were of Moroccan origin, but there were also Tunisians and Algerians. In the early 1990s, Tarek Maaroufi became the Brussels contact of the major North African terrorist groups. By 2000, he had become one of the most prominent al-Qa'eda agents in Europe.

Twice, in 1992 and 1996, the Tunisian government asked the Belgian government to extradite Maaroufi because Tunis suspected him to be a member of Ennahda, a revolutionary movement fighting for the establishment of an islamic theocracy in Tunisia. As Maaroufi had become a Belgian citizen, Brussels turned both requests down. Maaroufi was also a member of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) aiming to turn Algeria into a fundamentalist islamic state. In March 1995, when the Belgian authorities arrested twelve GIA members suspected of planning terror assaults in Europe, Maaroufi was one of them. However, by September 1997, the twelve had all been set free, though Maaroufi (released in December 1996) was condemned by a Belgian judge to three years' probation. The unwillingness of the Belgian authorities to effectively imprison some of the most dangerous terrorists, prompted Charles Pasqua, the then French Interior Minister, to criticise Belgium for its lack of resolve in the fight against international Islamic terrorism. France had been a main target of GIA and Ennahda attacks, including the GIA bombing of the Parisian Saint-Michel metro station on 25 July 1995 which killed seven people and wounded 117.

The Belgian authorities have always categorically denied it, but it was rumoured at the time that Brussels had made a deal with the terrorists, agreeing to turn a blind eye to conspiracies hatched on Belgian soil in exchange for immunity from attack. In a GIA statement, addressing the Belgian King Albert II but posted to the French embassy in Brussels in June 1999, the Algerian terror movement explicitly referred to such a deal in the summer of 1996. In any case, Belgium became known as a safe haven for terrorists, and if they were caught, it was the place where they preferred most to be brought to court. (Britain had already experienced this in November 1988, when Belgium set free Patrick Ryan, an IRA arms-supplier who had been arrested in Brussels and who the British government had asked to be extradited to London. Although a Belgian court recommended that the government comply with Britain's request, the Belgian Cabinet gave orders to let him go.)

In the late 1990s, Tarek Maaroufi began to recruit young men from Brussels mosques for the islamic Jihad (Holy War) in the breakaway Russian autonomous region of Chechnia as well as in Afghanistan. In 1999, Maaroufi and Abdesattar Dahmane, another Belgian of Tunisian descent, organised an exhibition about the Chechnian war in the Brussels suburb of Molenbeek, a formerly Flemish but now predominantly North African neighbourhood. Here due to the massive immigration of people of Moroccan descent since the 1970s and 1980s, the official language of the Flemings, Dutch, had within less than one generation been replaced by Arabic and French.

The Chechnian exhibition was a cover to recruit volunteers for the Jihad in the Russian region. Maaroufi's companion Dahmane belonged to the Brussels section of Takfir wa al-Hijra, a fundamentalist organisation advocating the rejection of all non-Muslim influences. The organisation committed many attacks on Western journalists in Egypt in the late 1990s. Abdesattar Dahmane, born in 1962, had settled in Belgium in 1987. He became a Belgian citizen through his marriage to a Belgian girl of Moroccan descent. The marriage had been arranged by the Centre Islamique Belge (CIB), an organisation which specialises in matchmaking activities aimed at helping islamic fundamentalists to obtain Belgian citizenship, but which is also said to have been a recruiting base for Jihad volunteers. Until 2000, Dahmane earned a modest living by teaching the Koran to children in Brussels mosques. Then he decided to join the Jihad himself and volunteered for a suicide mission.

In January 2001, the American secret services discovered an al-Qa'eda plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Rome. The embassy was temporarily closed down. According to the CIA, the attack was planned by the Tunisian branch of al-Qa'eda, led by Sayfallah ben Hacine, commonly known as Abu Ayad. One of the latter's contacts was Tarek Maaroufi, who with his Belgian identity card could travel freely throughout the 15 countries of the Schengen group. In late 2000, Maaroufi also paid a visit to Afghanistan. The CIA informed the Belgian authorities that it would like to question him, but Belgium did not comply. In April 2001, the Italian anti-terror squad Divisione Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali (DIGOS) rounded up an al-Qa'eda cell in Milan. The Milanese cell had been in regular contact with Maaroufi. On 18 April, the Italian authorities asked Belgium to arrest and extradite Maaroufi. Again, Brussels refused, arguing that it did not extradite Belgian citizens.

Meanwhile, Abu Ayad had decided to 'donate a gift' to his friend Osama bin Laden. In Belgium, Maaroufi recruited two men who were prepared to murder General Massoud, the main opponent of the Afghan Taliban regime. One of this pair was Abdesattar Dahmane, the Brussels Koran teacher; the other, a certain Rachid, presumably a Moroccan or a Tunisian in his late twenties who was living in Belgium illegally. After receiving a paramilitary training as suicide bombers, they flew to London under the assumed names of Karim Toussani and Hassim Bakkali and the assumed identities of Belgian journalists of Moroccan origin. They carried Belgian passports that came from a stock of blank passports which had been stolen from the Belgian consulate in Strasbourg and the Belgian embassy in The Hague in 1999. The passports had been provided by the network of Nizar Trabelsi, the head of the Belgian section of Takfir wa al-Hijra. Trabelsi, a professional football player, was also a Belgian citizen of Tunisian descent.

From London, the two terrorists flew to Pakistan. They travelled to Afghanistan and spent some time in Jalalabad with an al-Qa'eda colony made up of Jihad volunteers from Belgium. On 12 August 2001, they left for Tadzhikistan before entering the Afghan territory held by Massoud's Northern Alliance. Posing as Belgian journalists, they applied for an interview with the 48 year old 'Lion of the Panshir.' At their meeting with the General on 9 September, at his base of Khodja Bahauddin in Takhar province, they detonated the explosives which they carried on their persons, killing Massoud and his spokesman Azim Suhail. Since Dahmane's death as a 'martyr,' the Brussels CIB provides for his widow. A CIB spokesman, Abdallah Bastin, a Belgian convert to Islam, defended the murder of Massoud in the Belgian press: 'He was a puppet of the Americans. In a war it is only normal that such a man gets killed.'

The murder of Massoud preceded the 11 September attacks that stunned the world. The United States pressured Belgium to join the West in the fight against terrorism. The fact that many Muslim terrorists, such as the Algerian al-Qa'eda activist Ahmed Ressam who had been arrested by the FBI in 1999 when he planned to bomb Los Angeles Airport, were found to carry Belgian passports, disturbed the Americans. During the 1990s, thousands of Belgian passports had either been sold by corrupt Belgian officials to the mafia or been stolen from town halls, consulates and embassies. A spokesman of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

admitted in November last year that Belgian passports do, indeed, 'circulate in terrorist organisations.' The New York Times of 10 February 2002 spoke of a staggering 19,050 blank Belgian passports 'lost' by the Belgian authorities since 1990, compared to only 50 blank U.S. passports. The Belgian documents can be purchased on the black market for $ 1,500 to $ 7,500. Washington threatened to reintroduce the obligation for Belgian tourists to carry a visa.

The Americans have also criticised Belgium for its so-called 'Quick Citizenship Bill.' Introduced in May 2000, shortly after Belgium regularised the presence on Belgian territory of 52,000 illegal immigrants, the 'Quick Citizenship Bill' grants hassle-free Belgian citizenship virtually upon demand to every individual who has lived in the country for three (in some cases only two) years. Each month there are some 5,000 requests for citizenship. The Bill allows the Belgian judiciary, the police and the intelligence services a period of only one month to formulate a caution with regard to a request for citizenship. The Naturalisation Commission of the Belgian House of Representatives, that has the final word about all applications, does not have to take the negative recommendations into consideration. In February 2001, Jan Mortelmans, a Vlaams Blok parliamentarian, objected to the commission's policy of granting citizenship to criminals and extremists. Claude Eerdekens, the commission's chairman and a leading Walloon Socialist, replied that it was only normal that the 'racist' Flemish separatists should object, given that 99 % of the applications made in Brussels are filed in French. 'Our commission does more for the frenchification of Brussels than the Flemings can ever do to prevent it,' Eerdekens boasted. In Antwerp, too, the Socialist Mayor Leona Detiège defends the policy of granting citizenship (and the subsequent right to participate in the elections) to as many immigrants as possible, on the grounds that 'the Vlaams Blok is currently over-represented as the immigrants are not allowed to vote.' This line of reasoning was taken up by the Muslim fundamentalist Dyab Abu Jahjah, a Belgian citizen born in Lebanon in 1971, who organised a violent anti-Semite demonstration in Antwerp on 3 April 2002. 'Some say that I am not loyal to Belgium. Have I ever burned the Belgian flag or demanded that the country be split, like the Vlaams Blok does?' Jahjah asked.

Equally 'loyal to Belgium' were the 260 criminals who became Belgian citizens by paying half a million Belgian francs ($ 12,500) to Abraham Melikov, a godfather of the Georgian mafia in Belgium. Melikov, who despite ten years of criminal activities in the country, had had no difficulty in becoming a Belgian citizen himself, bribed a public servant working for the Naturalisation Commission – and probably also some members of the Commission, though the Belgian judiciary was not able to discover who they were. According to the Belgian press, 'the entire leadership of the Russian mafia in Belgium' acquired Belgian citizenship in this fashion. The same civil servant also helped to speed up the procedure which turned foreign soccer players into Belgians. 'One can also look at it this way,' Herman De Croo, the speaker of the House of Representatives, commented: 'While some Flemings despise their Belgian nationality, other people are prepared to pay millions for it.'

One professional football player turned Belgian was Nizar Trabelsi of Takfir wa al-Hijra. His network provided Massoud's murderers with their passports. Trabelsi, born in Tunisia in 1970, was arrested in Brussels on 13 September 2001, after the Dutch secret services had discovered stolen blank Belgian passports in the possession of some of his friends in the Netherlands. The Dutch suspected Trabelsi of planning a bomb attack on the American embassy in Paris. Indeed, on 23 October, the Belgian police raided the Egyptian restaurant 'Le Nil' in Brussels and discovered 100 kgs of chemicals for explosives to blow up the embassy. It was also discovered by the Dutch that al-Qa'eda and the Trabelsi network had been involved in an armed robbery a year earlier, on 31 October 2000, when precious diamonds were stolen from a Lufthansa plane on the tarmac of Brussels Airport. An airport official by the name of Hassan had helped the robbers. Hassan had been in touch with al-Qa'eda members in the Netherlands. Trabelsi is also suspected of providing the explosives to Richard Reid, the so-called 'shoe bomber,' a 28 year old British terrorist, for the attempted bombing of American Airlines Flight 63 between Paris and Miami on 22 December 2001.

Trabelsi's arrest led to a new row between Brussels and Washington, as it took the Belgians two weeks to provide the U.S. with information obtained from the terrorist. According to the Americans, the Belgian attitude and their insistence on doing everything by the book contrasted sharply with the assistance provided by countries such as the Netherlands. 'The Belgians have not taken up the other models of cooperation. This has hurt us,' an American official declared in *The New York Times* of 17 October 2001. Washington and Rome also kept pressuring Brussels for the arrest of Tarek Maaroufi, whom they wanted to question about his involvement in the plans to bomb the American embassy in Rome and in the murder of General Massoud. The Belgian police replied that judicial procedures had to be followed and that it could not initiate an investigation for crimes committed abroad. Brussels angered the Americans even more by declaring that even if Osama bin Laden were ever arrested in Belgium, he would not be extradited to the U.S., as Belgium does not extradite prisoners to countries that have not abolished the death penalty. Brussels had previously refused to extradite the GIA terrorist Ahmed Zaoui to Algeria and the Turkish terrorist Fehriye Erdal to Turkey for exactly the same reason. Adding insult to injury, the Belgian Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Louis Michel, compared Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi with the Taliban during a broadcast on Belgian television. Finally, however, on 18 December 2001, the Belgian police arrested Maaroufi on the basis of a 1979 law forbidding the recruitment in Belgium for foreign armies and the trade in false documents.

On 5 June 2002, Godelieve Timmermans, the head of the Belgian secret service, resigned. The resignation of the 49 year old Mrs. Timmermans, a Francophone Liberal who as Administrator-General of the Sûreté de l'Etat had barely completed two years of her five year term, came less than a week after the government was questioned in Parliament about a report of an inquiry ordered by a parliamentary commission to ascertain what the Belgian secret service had done to screen Islamic extremists in Belgium and what it had known about the murderers of General Massoud. The report, which the government ordered to be kept confidential, states not only that Belgium has become a recruiting base for Islamic extremists and a launch pad for terrorist attacks abroad, but also that the Belgian Sûreté d'Etat has remained passive in the past because there were no indications that the terrorists would attack Belgian targets. Furthermore, the report suggests, the Sûreté feared 'to discredit certain authorities or politicians, under the pretext that these would consider the information of the Sûreté de l'Etat in these fields to be a confirmation of a "racist or xenophobic" attitude towards immigrants or Muslims.'

Moreover, the Belgian secret service had other priorities: it has traditionally devoted most of its attention to Flemings advocating the dissolution of Belgium and the establishment of an independent Republic of Flanders. Ironically, it was an MP for the separatist Vlaams Blok, Filip De Man, who first questioned the government about the unsettling report that led to Timmermans' resignation. According to the report, the Belgian Muslim community, numbering over 350,000 members, of which more than 200,000 Moroccans, almost 100,000 Turks and 13,000 Algerians, has been heavily infiltrated by fundamentalist extremists since the mid-1980s.

Thirty of Belgium's 300 mosques, the report says, are run by fundamentalist clerics and have become radical centres. Candidates for the Jihad are being recruited amongst Muslims in schools, prisons, hospitals and sports centres. The Belgian authorities have naively boosted the fundamentalist cause by allowing Muslim clerics, including extremists, to freely visit Belgian gaols where they can indoctrinate prisoners. Belgium has also officially recognised the Muslim religion and consequently subsidises Islamic clerics and teachers. The latter have free access to Belgian primary and secondary schools. Again the authorities fail to control what these people are propagating. The report warns that the fundamentalist Saudi-backed Salafi movement is creating a religious state within the Belgian state. The biggest mosque in Belgium, the Great Mosque of Brussels, built in the Cinquantenaire Park with Saudi money on a piece of land donated by the late King Baudouin to Saudi King Faisal in 1967, is controlled by the Saudi Wahabite sect. It is the headquarters of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Belgium. This institution employs 600 Muslim teachers whose wages are paid by the Belgian state. According to the report, the Centre operates its own 'Islamic police,' supervising certain Brussels neighbourhoods with a large concentration of Muslims. It even organises paramilitary training. The report refers to sermons at the Great Mosque calling Brussels 'the capital of the infidels,' rejoicing in the attacks of 11 September, openly supporting Osama bin Laden, and admonishing the faithful to prepare for the Jihad.

According to the report, Brussels has become an ideal logistics centre for international terrorist groups, because of Belgium's open-door immigration policy, the deliberate 'hands-off' policy of the authorities towards the mosques and Islamic centres, the geographical position of Belgium and the fact that French is an official language in Brussels, which makes the city attractive to North Africans. A number of Belgian mosques are also run by Milli Görüs, a radical Turkish organisation that opposes the Turkish secular state. This organisation also runs a boarding school for girls and holds regular mass meetings in Antwerp, which are attended by up to 25,000 people. There are also two Moroccan mosques of radical Shiite sects with Iranian affiliations.

The report constituted a second indication of the widespread presence of Islamic extremists in Belgium. A first indication came in December 1998 when the Belgian authorities installed the so-called Muslim Executive. Its 68 members were appointed after elections amongst all Belgian Muslims. However, the Sûreté felt compelled to veto the appointment of 29 of the 68 members, because they were known to belong to fundamentalist groups. It is to be feared that if 43% of the Belgian Muslims vote for the extremists, some 150,000 of Belgium's 350,000 Muslims sympathise with Islamic radicals. This is a huge figure in a nation of only 10 million inhabitants.

Godelieve Timmermans resigned after details of the report had been leaked to the press. She indicated that the Sûreté d'Etat was powerless to do anything about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. The report admits that the Sûreté has been understaffed for over a decade, that it does not receive adequate funding and that many retiring officers are not being replaced. Even after 11 September, in February 2002, the Belgian government refused to allow the Sûreté to fill up vacant positions. As Charles Pasqua said six years ago, Brussels lacks the resolve to fight international Islamic terrorism. It is an unreliable ally of the Western democracies, confident that in keeping a low profile Belgium will not become a victim of the terrorists, who, unlike the Flemings, will never question the existence of the Belgian state that is so good to them.

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'Of Man's First Disobedience':
Samuel Johnson and the Whigs

André Gushurst-Moore

Tory: One who adheres to the ancient constitution of the state, and the apostolical hierarchy of the Church of England, opposed to a Whig.
Whig: The name of a faction.

(Samuel Johnson, Dictionary, 1755)

One of the ironies of literary history is that its most compelling and authoritative symbol of common sense – of the strong, imaginative grasp of concrete reality – should have begun his adult life, at the age of twenty, in a state of such intense anxiety and bewildered despair that, at least from his own point of view, it seemed the onset of insanity.

(Walter Jackson Bate, The Achievement of Samuel Johnson, 1955)

Dr. Johnson would seem to many of us to be the embodiment – large, bullish, and sturdily independent – of conservative, English common sense. In Boswell, we read about the secure confidence of personal judgment with which, for instance, he dismissed Bishop Berkeley's theory of the insubstantiality of matter, by kicking a stone and saying, 'I refute it thus', and the vignette seems to sum up much of the Johnsonian *oeuvre*: the indication of the four-square reality of human life, upon which only are we able to erect a sound humane discourse in philosophy, politics or letters. It amused the whiggish Macaulay to see this aspect of Johnson in terms of Fielding's caricature of the Tory squire: Johnson's 'rants... in everything but the diction, resembled those of Squire Western'. Macaulay sees in Johnson the kind of clever stupidity, the kind that Orwell saw in Swift and in 'Conservatives of our own day – people like Sir Alan Herbert, Professor G. M. Young, Lord Elton, the Tory Reform Committee or the long line of Catholic apologists from W. H. Mallock onwards'. What Orwell – of all people – should have seen in Swift, and what Macaulay refuses to see in Johnson, is the attempt to integrate the intellect with the whole personality, and in doing so oppose intellectualism.

The mind of Johnson, so penetrating and unencumbered by the sentimental or the subjective, is as substantial as was his physical frame. But his substantiality and compass obscure the extraordinary vicissitudes, both mental and physical, of Johnson's life, against which his firmly orthodox and authoritative outlook should be measured. The tensions within Johnson: between powerful activity and guilty sloth; between external authority and personal responsibility; between imagined perfection and ugly reality, all made him aware of the need for order, patterns and rules, all which Walter Jackson Bate has shown. The formality of the Johnsonian persona, the lapidary firmness of his speech and writing, the submission to the order of church and state even when their legitimacy was highly compromised, provide a necessary bulwark for him against the inherent tendency of both individual and society towards decay. Within the structures of human life, whether they be personal habits, religious observance or (by analogy) the edifice of state and government, the free human being may, by God's grace, constantly remake himself.

Johnson is profoundly sceptical of any forms of determinism that would compromise the freedom of the individual will to overcome, mainly through religious observance, the affliction of a human state wherein there is 'little to be enjoyed and much to be endured'. His conclusive conviction that, 'we know our will is free, and there's an end on it' underpins all his religious and political principles.

Against the background of his essentially religious cast of mind, it is mainly as poet, critic, and lexicographer that Johnson's conservatism is, perhaps, best evinced. However, it would be a mistake to think that Johnson was little interested in politics, even if he was primarily a religious thinker, and his guiding philosophy moral rather than political. His political writings are not inconsiderable either in quantity or quality, and Johnson frequently makes allusions to politics even when is writing primarily of letters. Certainly, Johnson was sceptical of general schemes and visions of political amelioration:

Boswell: 'So Sir, you laugh at schemes of political improvement' Johnson: . 'Why, Sir, most schemes of political improvement are very laughable things.'

This and other like observations arise from prudence rather than cynicism, and quite possibly concealed what had necessarily to be hidden in Johnson's positive political beliefs, although in this we can only speculate. His Jacobite sympathies, however deep they may have been at different times in his life, could have been at no point openly discussed, either in conversation or in print. The terms of his political discourse had to be the settled and established divergences of opinion set between the poles of government or opposition, Whig or Tory. But

Johnson's Toryism, as expressed for instance in the *Dictionary* definition, is broad and inclusive, resting on the inherited constitution of church and state, and the 'apostolical' authority of the Church of England, rather than any narrow adherence to party, which is his definition of a Whig. Within this broad outline, however, may be discerned a sympathy for Catholicism (broadly defined so as to include the Anglican branch), an abhorrence of licentious or ignorant criticism of established authorities (including the Church of Rome), and personalism. This last entails a respect for the principle of authority acting within the personal freedom and responsibility of, for example, kings and bishops, an authority of persons rather than ideas. Johnson's scepticism for the 'visionary' is connected with his consistent opposition to cant, in the *Dictionary* definition a species of chatter. His deflation of the cant of 'patriotism' anticipates Burke's later and more developed antagonism to 'the rights of man', and proceeds from a similar grasp of a 'good' made specious by its deracination from nature.

Johnson's vigorous adherence to the principle of monarchy has been taken as evidence of an absolutist view of kingship. Yet the divine right of kings he condemned as 'all stuff', despite his devotion to the House of Stuart, and he had no high view of the Hanoverians, thinking them, successively, 'a robber...a fool...and... an idiot'. Nonetheless, for Johnson the principle of subordination persisted. When he conversed privately with George III, he said, memorably, 'it was not for me to bandy civilities with my sovereign'. The questionable legitimacy of the Hanoverians did not dissolve the claims of authority; the reasons, apart from the moral, were constitutional. As a Tory, according to Johnson's own definition, the authoritative claims on him were historical rather than abstract, proceeding from, firstly, the constitution and, secondly, the established church. He could no more give his allegiance to a speculative theory of the divine right of kings than he could to any other abstract scheme of government. James II was 'a very good king', and King William, 'one of the most worthless scoundrels that ever existed', but James went 'too far'- presumably farther than the constitution allowed him, and the claims of the Church of England had to be accommodated within the constitution that also housed the monarchy. Johnson found things more satisfactory in the reign of Charles II, principally in ecclesiastical matters.

The other part of Johnson's definition of 'Tory' is 'opposed to a Whig'. Whiggery, or 'whiggism' in Johnson's usage, involves fracturing the constitutional framework, and departing from the authority of revealed religious doctrine. Johnson once paid, according to Boswell, the 'great compliment' of calling a young lady, in her Tory uncle's hearing, a Jacobite – much to the uncle's offence. Johnson, we might suppose with harmless if rather mischievous humor, explained himself thus:

> *A Jacobite, Sir, believes in the divine right of Kings. He that believes in the divine right of Kings believes in a Divinity. A Jacobite believes in the divine right of Bishops. He that believes in the divine right of Bishops believes in the divine authority of the Christian religion.*
>
> *Therefore, Sir, a Jacobite is neither an Atheist nor a Deist. That cannot be said of a Whig; for Whiggism is a negation of all principle [emphasises.]*

On another more considered occasion, Johnson observed, however, that

> *A wise Tory and a wise Whig, I believe, will agree. Their principles are the same, though their modes of thinking are different. A high Tory makes government unintelligible: it is lost in the clouds. A violent Whig makes it impracticable: he is for allowing so much liberty to every man that there is not power enough to govern any man. The prejudice of the Tory is for establishment; the prejudice of the Whig is for innovation. A Tory does not wish to give more real power to Government; but that Government should have more reverence. Then they differ as to the church. The Tory is not for giving more legal power to the Clergy, but wishes they should have a more considerable influence, founded on the opinion of mankind: the Whig is for limiting and watching them with a narrow jealousy.*

It is principally against cant that the best of Johnson's political writings are directed, whether it is the cry of 'liberty' by the supporters of Wilkes; of 'patriotism' by every disgruntled group of political opposition; of 'no taxation without representation' by the American colonists;

Johnson's own views may be distinguished from the 'high Tory', but should be identified with the rest of the description above. But in what 'principles' are a wise Tory and a wise Whig identical? If we take, as examples, a wise Tory and a wise Whig to be Johnson and Burke respectively, we would say that they both see the constitution as according with nature, and providing the framework within which political life continues from age to age. Their modes of thinking might be different; they might differ on particular issues; they might disagree over matters of fact; they might emphasize one thing more than another. But within the bounds of their similar principles, they remain sane. Johnson and Burke did not agree over the scope of Crown influence, or on the rights of the American colonists; there is more emphasis on expediency and prudence in Burke the practical politician, more on scepticism and authority in Johnson the critic. But when we compare them with any of their contemporaries who advocated disintegration within the Empire or within Europe, we can see that they are more alike than different. It is intriguing to think what Johnson, who died in 1784, would have made of the French

Revolution, and Burke's Reflections upon it, but it cannot be reasonably imagined that Johnson would have dissented from any of Burke's essential conclusions.

> *Boswell reported Johnson's conversation, in 1772, with Sir Adam Ferguson, during his Scottish tour: Sir Adam 'But, Sir, in the British constitution it is surely of importance to keep up a spirit in the people, so as to preserve a balance against the crown.' Johnson 'Sir, I perceive you are a vile Whig. – Why all this childish jealousy of the power of the crown? The crown has not power enough. When I say that all governments are alike, I consider that in no government power can be abused long. Mankind will not bear it. If a sovereign oppresses his people to a great degree, they will rise and cut off his head. There is a remedy in human nature against tyranny, that will keep us safe under every form of government.*



The appeal to nature here is the last resort through which the balanced constitution corrects itself, and shows that Johnson presumes the existence of some capacity for a general and settled communal judgment, which would act in rare, extreme situations as the final authority in the state. 'The opinion of mankind' as we have seen, also has its place in the religious establishment. But these are not circumstances that Johnson expects to see. Normally, authority acts through established means, through personal agents. In Johnson's judgment of the state of the balance of powers, the crown is too weak, presumably because it was locked into the Whig oligarchy concerned only for its own power, hiding its self-interest beneath a fog of cant.

It is principally against cant that the best of Johnson's political writings are directed, whether it is the cry of 'liberty' by the supporters of Wilkes; of 'patriotism' by every disgruntled group of political opposition; of 'no taxation without representation' by the American colonists; of 'national honour' by the opposition to Lord North's government in the matter of the Falkland Islands in 1770. The prevailing tone is polemical, and the common underlying theme is of the pretence of principled motives acting for the good of the whole country, which Johnson seeks to reveal as narrowly partisan efforts to set different parts of the political whole at one another's throats. In *The Patriot* (1774), Johnson attacks the disconnection between words and actions, of 'patriotic' rhetoric used to help opposition politicians to a place, and then forgotten. Allusions to Milton are significant. The epigraph to *The Patriot*, from a sonnet Milton wrote against his detractors, and a not uncommon text in eighteenth century pamphlets, is particularly appropriate, however, to Johnson's outlook:

> They bawl for freedom in their senseless mood
> Yet still revolt when truth would set them free
> License they mean, when they cry liberty,
> For who loves that must first be wise and good.

The resonance of the concluding paragraph of the piece is also capped with a return to Milton, this time to *Paradise Lost*, and a comparison of the 'patriots' to the anti-hero of the poem. They are, like Satan, 'raised by merit to this bad eminence', [and] arrogate to themselves the name of Patriots'. Milton's great epic picture of how pride distorts language and politics, particularly in Books I and II of *Paradise Lost*, evidently resonates deeply in Johnson's mind. The lines to which he alludes come at the beginning of Book II:

> High on a throne of royal state that far
> Outshone the wealth of Ormus and of Ind,
> Or where the gorgeous East with richest hand
> Show'rs on her kings barbaric pearl and gold,
> Satan exalted sat, by merit raised
> To that bad eminence.

This parody of monarchy opens the debate in Pandemonium, the infernal city, to consider what action the fallen angels should take, like idealistic revolutionaries, against the 'throne and monarchy of God', after their expulsion from heaven. The conclusion is decided already by Satan, the debate merely a show of discussion, and the reasoning of the speakers partial, as it is bound to be in those who have separated themselves from the Reason (Logos) of the created order. The mock-debate, like Satan's temptation of Eve later in the poem, provides a classical example of political and moral cant.

Johnson could make use of such allusions because he would not have disagreed with the Christian premises of Milton's poem, a fact that makes a reading of Johnson's later *Life of Milton* particularly interesting. Johnson abhorred all that Milton defended in the Parliamentarian cause, and yet, like the wise Tory and the wise Whig, they could agree about first principles: the chain of meaning proceeding from God, through reason and nature, to angels and men. Johnson could also agree with Milton on the fatal consequences for the individual and society when meaning is vitiated by pride – the first sin, both in history and in theology, the primeval fault

from which all evil proceeds. Johnson's understanding of nature and reason may be closely identified with Milton's, even though the political conclusions they drew from that understanding were so widely divergent. The idea of nature in Hobbes and Locke failed to make any impression on Johnson's traditional, Christian conception derived from the Scholastics and Aristotle.

For Johnson, the devil was the first Whig. Faction is, at bottom, a refusal to occupy a creative, positive role in the social order that conforms to nature, and involves humility and obedience. The appeal to nature had become highly problematical once the idea had become confused by Hobbes and Locke, and all sides could make easy appeals to an increasingly nebulous idea, but Johnson does not eschew the word altogether. He refers to nature at the beginning of *Taxation No Tyranny*:

> *In all the parts of human knowledge, whether terminating in science merely speculative, or operating upon life private or civil, are admitted some fundamental principles or common axioms, which being generally received are little doubted, and being little doubted have been rarely proved.*
>
> *Of these gratuitous and acknowledged truths it is often the fate to become less evident by endeavours to explain them, however necessary such endeavours may be made by the misapprehensions of absurdity or the sophistries of interest.*

Here also is the problem of specifying principles, and why we more often remember Johnson for his conclusions: common sense begins in some preverbal norms of the human mind that the reason does not entirely illuminate. It is easier to agree or disagree than say why we do so. It has always been believed that love of country is a good thing, says Johnson, and here he concurs in the feeling of patriotism if not the cant. But there are many who believe that Britain has no right to tax the colonies against their will, colonies that are a part of one political community. Again, Johnson argues from nature:

> *These antipatriotic prejudices [of those who support the colonists] are the abortion of Folly impregnated by Faction, which being produced against the standing order of Nature, have not strength sufficient for long life.*

He takes up an idea from a speech by Chatham, and looks at all the American colonists as Whigs:

> *... the continent of North America contains three millions, not of men merely, but of Whigs, of Whigs fierce for liberty, and disdainful of dominion; that they multiply with the fecundity of their own rattlesnakes, so that every quarter of a century doubles their numbers.*

The comparison with snakes dimly echoes the metamorphosis of the fallen angels in Book X of *Paradise Lost*. In breaking from the mother country, Johnson sees the rebel colonists as rupturing the whole to which they belong by nature, for the sake of pride, greed and selfishness. When the colonists and their supporters appeal to 'The laws of Nature, the rights of humanity, the faith of charters, the encroachments of usurpation', they are abusing reason, lost in 'The madness of independence'.

Johnson's real antipathy towards the Americans turns on this cardinal point: his moral objection of the hypocrisy of their cries for liberty. Not all laws are well made; sometimes they must be revised, and their revision does not depend on the consent of every individual subject, or group. When legal 'rights' support unnatural liberties, they have no meaning, no justice, and no unalterable character – all which depend on conformity to natural law. Johnson doubted whether the Americans were in a position to warn Englishmen that their rights were threatened by the encroachments of the crown:

> *We are told, that the subjection of Americans may tend to the diminution of our own liberties: an event which none buy the most perspicacious politicians are able to foresee. If slavery be thus fatally contagious, how is it that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?*

Johnson detested slavery, and saw it as being against the natural law: he 'doubted whether [it] can ever be supposed the natural condition of man'. Boswell relates that

> *When in company with some very grave men at Oxford, his toast was, 'Here's to the next insurrection of the negroes in the West Indies'.*

Thus, the 'rights' of slave owners are as meaningless as is the 'right' to abortion nowadays. Laws cannot be legitimate when they violate the foundation of law itself. Johnson was sceptical, cynical and contemptuous of those who used the language of rights and liberties, secured by power against authority, for their own selfish and inordinate gain.

Johnson understood, partly from the hard school of personal tribulation, that the health of the individual person and the whole community required the vigorous exercise of free powers within an order sanctioned by God and nature. The immense authority that Johnson himself personifies illustrates the creative tension that comes from a free act of obedience to an authority conformed to the natural order. Johnson's own authority is highly personal, and occasionally idiosyncratic, despite his attempts to 'avoid all singularity'. His sense of free will and personal responsibility, extending from himself to others, was derived from a profound sense of a sovereign order outside himself, and under which true freedom abides. In a similar way, and for similar reasons, personal experience taught Johnson what G.K.Chesterton also learned and conveyed: that orthodoxy is the last best hope for the free man, and sanity, as well as freedom, is the consequence of orthodoxy.

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Still Making It Up In Brussels

Christopher Arkell

You couldn't make it up!' as Richard Littlejohn would say. The European Commission is an organisation which oversees some £60bn of expenditure raised largely from the taxpayers of Member States. It wields the ultimate authority over the euro, a currency now imposed on 250 million Western Europeans. It already operates EU customs levies to the exclusion of the Member States; it supervises VAT across the EU; and it has its sights firmly set on national income taxes. Yet it keeps books of account which, if used in Britain, would get the merest self-employed trader a two year jail sentence for wilful negligence and cheating the taxman.

This is the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence uncovered in the latest accounting scandal to shame the European Commission. Once again, one of its own employees has had the courage to make public the fraudulent chaos which passes for accounting at the heart of Europe. And once again, the Eurocrats are blaming the whistleblower rather than themselves for bringing their organisation into further disrepute.

Through the goodwill of British MEP Jeffrey Titford and others, I have had sight of the internal reports and e-mails which underpin this article. They reveal a state of affairs as disgraceful as that which brought down the discredited Santer regime three years ago. Ms. Andreasen was appointed by the European Commission as a senior accountant at the beginning of 2002. She immediately became alarmed at the scope for error and fraud she uncovered. Essentials, such as a register of all fixed assets, were missing. Advances of money against future receipts were recorded as expenses rather than as debtors receivable – in the UK this is considered a tax fraud. She raised doubts over the bank reconciliations. Worst of all, she found that there was no coherent double-entry book-keeping system in place. As she wrote in her report to her superiors in the Commission (page5), 'The non-use of debit /credit entries has led to earlier data being overwritten, without an audit link being created that is easy to use, so that it is impossible to reconstruct the earlier state of an item of data at a given point in time'. Though the European Commission admits to employing 4,000 accountants, Ms. Andreasen, an accountant trained in the tough world of commerce, regards many of them as 'unfamiliar with the practice of accountancy and the potential of financial reporting.' Not only does the Commission not employ the right people for the job, but Commissioners have known for years that the very design of their systems was unacceptable. 'In constructing the system, no account [was] taken of generally accepted accounting principles, mainly double-entry book-keeping, [even though it] was possible [to do so].'

It breaks all international and national accounting standards to have part of the records on double-entry and part not. Double-entry must apply to all financial records comprising a ledger of accounts. Though double-entry need not be used for supporting schedules, those schedules must, nevertheless, be reconciled to the ledger accounts. Failure to comply with these basic requirements renders any set of accounts unauditable and would, in the UK, invite the taxman to take the offending to trader to court faster that he could say 'Commissioner Kinnock'.

Ms. Andreasen has shown that the accounts of the European Commission are worse than Enron's or WorldCom's. Those companies at least had sound systems which were bent by crooked employees. The European Commission's systems don't pass even that fundamental test. They are dishonest in their very design. No figures whatsoever produced by the European Commission can be relied on in any respect, if tested by rules which apply to every tax-paying businessman and citizen in Britain and the rest of the European Union.

Not surprisingly, Ms. Andreasen refused to accept the books as they were presented to her by her predecessor. He had the audacity to send them to her, unsigned, 17 days after they should have been adopted by the European Commission, pending scrutiny by the European Court of Auditors and European Parliament. According to the Commission's standards, that was perfectly acceptable; according to Ms. Andreasen's, it most certainly was not.

The European Commission doesn't see things Ms. Andreasen's way at all. Instead of thanking her for her diligence and European public spiritedness, she has been suspended from her job and a whispering campaign started against her. Commissioner Kinnock was at full blast on Radio Five a few weeks ago, dismissing her concerns. He subsequently claimed, in a letter published by the *Sunday Telegraph* on 15 September, that the Commission's accounting systems 'fully comply with the cash based accounting standards used for the majority of OECD countries.' This is grossly misleading. While cash accounting is a system which applies across the world in government accounts, failures of double-entry book-keeping do not prevail. It is this failing which Ms. Andreasen wishes to draw public attention to, and it is this point which Kinnock and his Eurocrats cannot rebut.

The European Commission is very rattled by this latest

scandal. That is why Commissioner Kinnock and the European Court of Auditors are so loudly asserting the 'reliability' of the Commission's accounts. The usual backroom pressure is being exerted on the European Parliament, which is legally obliged to examine the accounts. The European Liberal Democrats in the European Parliament have prepared a document in which they consider whether to call Ms. Andreasen for a public hearing in front of the EP Budgetary Control Committee. At the end of this document, there is a peculiar section giving reasons why she should not appear. 'If [a public hearing] goes ahead, whatever the result, Commission and Parliament may not emerge in a favourable light, it will make little difference to the progress of reform and will be used by some to denigrate Europe once more.' This is very strange; as if a prosecution brief to counsel were turned on its head to become the defence's plea to the judge. It also shows clearly that the Eurocrats care only for their reputation, and not a jot for the waste, fraud and theft that seems the only activity effectively carried on in Euroland.

You couldn't make it up? Well, the Eurocrats can, and intend to continue to do so. It will not be until 2005, at the earliest, that a new computer system is planned to replace the current one. That will be seven years after their own Court of Auditors warned them of the mess the accounts were in. And even this replacement is criticised by Ms. Andreasen for opening up yet more opportunities for fraud and bad accounting.

Why should we in Britain continue to put up with this nonsense? The European Commission's 'system' of accounts can never comply with Internationally Accepted Accounting Standards. If such a 'system' were used in Britain by UK taxpayers, the Revenue would have them prosecuted for cheating the public revenue. The European Community is clearly not a fit and proper body to receive any further public funds from the UK, or any other Member State. Payments of bribes and other 'illegal payments' are now non-deductible for tax purposes in the UK, and are also being made specific criminal offences in the UK. Any further payments from the UK to the European Communities may well be considered to fall into these categories.

Each of these conclusions has been put to an eminent QC, well versed in European Constitutional law. In his view a UK taxpayer could bring a case against the government requiring it to withhold all further payments to the European Union until the Commission has put its accounting house in order. Such a case would not please Mr. Blair and his Euro-cronies. It would, however, encourage the majority of the UK's 30 million taxpayers to hope that we will recover our independence – constitutional as well as financial – from the crooked administocracy that controls Britain from across the Channel. Then we can all stop making the pretence that we're good Europeans, and they're honest civil servants.

You couldn't make it up? One day, perhaps, no one will have to any more.

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Capitalism Needs a Gordon Gekko

Norman Barry

As the manifest failures of socialism become obvious even to the most ideologically blinkered Oxford or Harvard PhD student, the anti-capitalists have discovered a new way of attacking the market / private property system, which has brought prosperity and freedom everywhere it has been tried. They have hit upon morality, the very thing proper Marxists had always despised. Morality, like 'rights', is the last refuge of the intellectually bankrupt: after all, unlike serious economic arguments, you can never be wrong on ethical questions and those who win such disputes are those with the loudest voices or the most pious of public images. So we are told that although capitalism might work it does so at a cost to morality, i.e. the ethics of Oxbridge, the Ivy League and the LSE.

Isn't it about time somebody spoke out for the lower human motivations like greed, which has done so much to power the economic system? There is a paradox of private vice and public benefits here, which was first celebrated by Bernard Mandeville in his *Fable of the Bees*, in the early eighteenth century, and it bothers intellectuals just as much today. In his metaphorical and comic poem, Mandeville noticed that prosperity was a product of the less desirable motives. When the bees abandoned notions of doing social good, eschewed altruism and dedicated themselves solely to the pursuit of self-interest they developed individualism, the division of labour, free trade and all the other 'virtues' of commercial society. 'Millions endeavouring to supply/ Each other's lust and vanity' unintentionally promoted the public good. Individual greed and selfishness, which are features of all human action, are thus to be valued. In his view, all public displays of benevolence were not genuine but no more than hypocrisy and moral vanity. Altruism was socially undesirable but also impossible given the mainsprings of human action. Of course, when the bees finally achieved morality, illusory though that was, they became disputatious and unproductive: 'Without great vices, is a vain / Eutopia seated in the brain'.

Notice that Mandeville is not saying that all vices lead

to the public good, only that the latter is a consequence of the cultivation of certain kind of immorality, i.e. that which countered the contemporary moral fervour. He always stressed the distinction between useful and harmful vices: the former were antithetical to the pious moralising of his time (of all time?) while the latter were the uncomplicated notions of right and wrong which everybody could understand. Let us look at some contemporary business ethics. Adam Smith sanitised much of what Mandeville had to say but he retained the basic point, especially his dismissal of benevolence as a satisfactory moral incentive: 'It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest'.

Today's Business Ethics

We have gone through at least two waves of moralising about capitalism; the 1980s and the early years of the twenty first century. Both eras are condemned, by the meretricious allure of contemporary morality, for their 'greed'. Yet the appropriate Mandevillian analysis should concentrate on the role that a ubiquitous self-interest plays in human affairs and the socially valuable role that greed has. In the 1980s, as always, personal self-advancement played an essential role in the allocation of economic resources and in the much-needed economic reorganisation of economic society. It advanced shareholder value, from which everybody gained, and led to a wider spread of share ownership. In the early twentyfirst century, however, the same motivation badly damaged shareholder interests and the market insiders (mainly corporate executives) turned legitimate self-interest into exploitation. They were not guilty of a breach of contemporary business ethics, an arcane, bogus, subject which few understand, but of the violation of conventional moral practices which everyone can grasp. Today's business ethics is all about, for example, hiring the right number of ethnic minorities and women, zealously protecting the environment and building swimming pools for deprived children and has little to do with conventional notions of right and wrong. But all the malefactors in today's business and accounting standards breached conventional notions of a prudent morality. The schemes they concocted were complex but their ultimate dishonesty, simple: basically deceiving investors by fixing the share price.

The Decade of Greed – the 1980s

The 1980s is normally lambasted as the decade of greed and it was excoriated by leftist critics and Hollywood movies alike. Yet it not only nicely presaged the prosperity of the 1990s, it was also an era in which business probity was at an all-time high. Except Ivan Boesky, there were no real villains in that era. The primary legal and moral duty of company executives, to advance the interests of the shareholders, was followed sedulously. Despite decades of anti-capitalist depredations by the state that obligation remains in all common law countries. People form companies to make money and the executives are hired to do that, not to advance the community's interests or to promote the latest moral fad. And they are not supposed to pursue self-interest beyond earning salary and bonuses, which can, of course, be very high. All this was done in the 1980s and it coincided with great prosperity. Some people earned vast amounts of money not by cheating the shareholders but by acting in their interests. Their high incomes were determined by an objective market.

But there had to be a revolution in shareholder / management relationships first. In the 1960s and 1970s company executives were not acting exclusively for the shareholders. Instead of returning profits to them in the form of higher dividends they embarked on costly expansionary activities, just like bureaucrats in a government organisation do. They created vast, unwieldy conglomerates that rapidly became detached from the original, core activity of the enterprise. Even Hollywood got this right. Remember that wonderful scene in *Wall Street* in which Gordon Gekko (played by Michael Douglas) turned magnificently against the managerial fat cats at a shareholders' meeting and eloquently humiliated them for shamelessly neglecting shareholders' interests?

The real life corporate raiders, led by the much-maligned financial innovator Michael Milken, ended all this. They offered shareholders a premium on their stock, took over companies, fired parasitic top managements and realised vast amounts of shareholder value. Of course, they were universally despised and harried unmercifully by regulatory and criminal authorities. Milken in particular was persecuted by New York's current hero, Rudolph Guliani. He was US Attorney there in the 1980s and became the Witchfinder General of the sinners of Wall Street. But what Milken did was to strike fear into the boardrooms of big companies. And all on behalf of the shareholder. We have needed this in the past five years. Yet people like Milken were castigated and the perpetrators of the problem, the executives of companies, escaped all moral and legal criticism. Indeed, with halos shining, they worked on the legislators of the fifty states in America to get laws changed so as to make takeovers more difficult. Apparently this was not a result of greed and a desire to protect their jobs against corporate raiders, but was the disinterested ambition to serve the community's interest. How Mandeville would have loved this hypocrisy.

Business Morality Today

What we are seeing now is another version of the same problem. How to establish accountability of corporate managers and restore the power of shareholders, or at least protect them against cheats? However, there does not seem to be another Milken, who pioneered the junk bond, or a T. Boone Pickens (who engineered many of the most spectacular takeovers of the 1980s). Indeed, the current state of the stock market makes it unlikely that there will be a wave of corporate restructuring. Though eventually it will happen because in Anglo-Saxon, individualistic, economies it is the most efficient method of re-establishing the rights of ownership. Just as the shareholders were the victims of managerial incompetence and avarice

before Milken so they are today in the face of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco; and in our own country, Marconi.

Enron officials were not in breach of fashionable business ethics but they unquestionably violated conventional and uncontroversial standards of right and wrong. They were encouraging low level employees to invest in the company's pension scheme and buy company stock when they knew it was in desperate trouble. They themselves were unloading shares at the then high prices. WorldCom embarked on wild expansion schemes, burdened the firm with debt and used all sorts of criminal methods to keep the share price high. Most of the firms and executives in recent scandals had very high moral profiles, like Dennis Kozlowski, formerly chief of Tyco, who gave over $100m of shareholders' money to educational institutions, regularly lectured on the importance of 'conscience' and advised students to 'do the right thing, not the easy thing'. All the time he was taking over $200m of company money for his personal consumption. The once phenomenally successful Tyco has recently seen a dramatic fall in its share price and Kozlowski faces criminal charges for tax evasion, though not for mismanagement of the firm. Bernie Ebbers, the founder of WorldCom, is a conspicuous churchgoer, yet that did not stop him 'borrowing' over $300m from the company while leading it to its present near-bankrupt state. All the players of the late 1990s were very hot on business ethics but they were cool and indifferent to right and wrong.

It is probably wrong to accuse Marconi executives of a breach of conventional ethical standards but obvious questions can be asked about their financial competence and irresponsibility. They inherited a company (General Electric) with a cash pile of over £2bn and a number of successful and well-managed, if unglamorous, enterprises. In an extravagant spending spree they ran down the inherited cash, left the company with billions of pounds worth of debt and facing bankruptcy. The executives departed with handsome severance and pension arrangements. In the current restructuring the original shareholders will be left with a mere 0.5% of the company.

What is required to avert future business scandals is not business ethics, least of all more government regulation, but shareholder activism to hold managers to account. Capitalism is a self-correcting economic organisation. The trouble is that in recent years, anti-business agitators have been the main activists. They buy a few shares in the company, attend general meetings and do their best to divert it from its moral and legal duty of maximising owner value. Nowadays, serious shareholders should similarly harass managers, scrutinise employment contracts that permit massive pay-outs for incompetence, and ensure that expansion programmes are for the good of the shareholder and not the executives.

One thing they can do is to reform the audit system. The auditor is supposed to protect the shareholders but can he act objectively if he is also the beneficiary of commercial contracts from the company he is supposed to be auditing? A further improvement would be to end share option schemes, which give a massive incentive to executives to keep share price artificially high. All of this is to ensure that executives perform their primary economic and moral duties.

Of course, all shareholders face a 'collective action problem'; the difference one person's efforts make is insignificant, so he has a great incentive to be passive. But as business scandals occur more frequently that should be less of a problem. Institutional investors should take a bigger role in running the company, they hold large amounts of stock so they can make a difference. If capitalism does not reform itself the government will and that will make everybody worse off.

What Must Be Done

We need a new Gordon Gekko to promote shareholder interests, make sure that executives know their place and fulfil their legal and moral duties. A new round of corporate raids does not look likely in the immediate future but it will surely come and only then will the power of the executives be curbed. The best cure for the ills of capitalism is more capitalism. Unlike government it is an efficient self-correcting system.

Conventional business ethics has very little to contribute to the solution of these problems. In direct contradiction to the lessons of Mandeville, it is too concerned with moralising business executives and encouraging the fulfilment of social and political goals. Their responsibility should be to the business. But anyway, human nature is immutable and resistant to the blandishments of politicians, priests and professors of moral philosophy. All we can do is devise institutional arrangements and incentive structures so that that enduring, and not necessarily harmful, feature of human nature, a universal self-interest, can be channelled towards the public good. As David Hume said: 'As it is impossible to change or correct anything material in our nature, the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances and situation and render the observance of the laws of justice our nearest interest and their violation the most remote'.

Let us not despair of Anglo-American capitalism. Its more communitarian rivals, especially Germany and Japan, have just as many scandals and examples of rampant greed. The companies of these countries are much more secretive and are subject to weaker disclosure rules than those of America and Britain. German companies that listed in New York were very surprised to discover that they had to reveal so much to shareholders. In Japan in 1990 the Nekkei measured 40000, it is now less than 10000. Included in the victims of this meltdown were all those Japanese housewives who had gambled the family income on the market. The big players, including criminals, were not as badly affected, if at all. The small shareholder is kept out of business, which is still dominated by conspiracies between top managers and bankers.

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Time to View Gibraltar
from a Spanish Point of View
Christie Davies

The attempts by New Labour to hand over Gibraltar and its unwilling inhabitants to Spain have rekindled the old British prejudices against Spain. The Spanish zeal to take over a long established community of British citizens has rightly enraged those among us who remain patriotic. Yet who can blame the Spaniards? Faced with a government so feeble in the defence of its people, whether defined by citizenship or ancestry, as New Labour, who would not try and reactivate an old claim? It is wrong to take advantage of those rendered weak by adversity but those who are weak by choice and conviction are fair game. The blame lies not with the Spaniards but with those who are soft on crime, soft on immigration, soft on Mugabe, soft on Europe and who can be expected to be soft on Gibraltar if put under pressure. Rather let us look sympathetically at why the Spaniards feel vulnerable at home and are demanding Gibraltar as a way of restoring the unity and pride of their own country.

In recent years several thousand Spaniards have been killed by Basque terrorists demanding independence not just for the small area in which they are a majority but for a united Basquedom including territories long since settled by people from other parts of Spain drawn in by the early industrialization of the Basque country. The extremists cannot win sufficient votes even in the existing autonomous Basque area to give their cause a semblance of democratic legitimacy but the more moderate Basque party that holds power in the region is equivocal in its support of the Spanish government efforts to stamp out terrorism. In the meantime ordinary Spaniards are shot or blown up in the streets by the terrorists and there is a systematic bombing campaign aimed at harming the tourist trade and thus the Spanish economy. The terrorists receive arms, money and advice from abroad and indeed probably from within the United Kingdom given our laxity in dealing with international terrorism. It would be possible to crush the terrorists by force and most Spaniards want this but public opinion among the snivelling middle classes of the rest of the EU will not permit it.

Imagine how you would feel if Britain were in this position and Irish terrorists were able to carry out a campaign of bombings in London or Manchester or Birmingham with a British government unable and unwilling to take sufficiently strong measures against them for fear of foreign criticism. Imagine how a Spaniard must feel if told by British New Labourists that the only way forward is to make further uncalled for concessions to the terrorists that are demeaning to other Spaniards and which will not deflect them from their aim of seceding altogether and the driving out by force those who remain loyal to Spain.

Spain was united by the marriage of the rulers of Aragon and Castile in much the same way that that descendant of Henry VI, James Stuart, came to be both James V of Scotland and James I of England. The newly united Spain became the most powerful nation in Europe and acquired a huge empire in Latin America making the language of Castile a major world language. So long as the prerequisites of empire were available everyone was loyal to Spain and keen to speak standard Castilian Spanish. Then with a great deal of British meddling and encouragement the Spanish settled lands of Latin America became independent and broke off their ties with Spain. Britain encouraged the creation of these foolish new republics which have never flourished in order to create new markets for British goods. Investors such as Disraeli promptly ruined themselves trying to revive mining operations in Mexico ruined by the wars of independence. Spain has every reason to resent a British imperialism that toppled Spanish rule to make way for British economic domination.

As soon as the imperial Spanish gravy train was lost those in the peripheral provinces of Spain began to lose both their enthusiasm for Spain and for the Spanish language, and conflicts arose that culminated in the Spanish Civil War. Today the disunity of Spain is further encouraged by the EC policy of divide and rule that will end only when Spain has been reduced to a mere feeble aggregate of Catalano, Gallegos, Leperos etc. No wonder the Spaniards are seeking to restore a sense of Spanish unity and glory by demanding Gibraltar. How would we in Britain feel if the weasel Scots and the ferret Welsh who did so well out of the British Empire were, after its demise, to seek to loosen their ties with the United Kingdom, to encourage the use of local languages and dialects to rival English and even to conspire directly with corrupt men of Brussels? How would we feel if the EC were to deliberately create regional divisions within England itself in order to undermine our nation? Let us try and see the Spanish point of view.

The birth rate in Spain is far lower than in Britain and the Spanish population is ageing fast. There is no reason why the Spanish economy should not adjust to this

or to suppose that the Spanish birth rate is bound to remain low. Nonetheless an alliance of left-wing ideologues and unscrupulous employers wanting cheap labour would like to flood the whole of Spain with Moroccans. Already a fair part of the agricultural labour force in Southern Spain and on building sites in towns is Moroccan. Given that Spain has an unemployment rate of 20% it is very difficult to see why any more people should be needed either now or in the future.

Ordinary Spaniards do not want to see their country swamped by North African Muslims whose customs and ways of life are alien to them. Despite the differences that exist between the regions of Spain they do share a reasonably homogeneous culture that sets them apart and which they value. Why should it be taken away from the Spanish people? Why should they have an unwelcome diversity inflicted on them? No wonder the Spaniards are willing to defend the sovereignty of Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves of Morocco, with a degree of resolution quite absent from the British government's assessment of Gibraltar.

Once again it is vital to try and see the world from the ordinary Spaniard's point of view. How would we feel if our own government were to fail to control an influx into Britain of unskilled labourers from poor and backward Islamic countries? How would we feel if mendacious demographers and economists in our midst were to try to persuade us that we should permit an ever greater influx of such people to mitigate the consequences of an a low birth rate and a relatively elderly population? The Spaniards feel demographically challenged, surrounded and hemmed in and the Gibraltar issue is from their point of view just one more aspect of a threatening world.

Understanding and sympathizing with the Spaniards does not mean making concessions to them over Gibraltar. On the contrary when I praise the resolution of the Spaniards I seek merely to honour them by calling for an equal and opposite resolution on our side to yield not a single millimetre of territory, not a single euro's worth of land, not a third of a metre note to a treaty. I am merely saying that we should regard them as a people just like ourselves faced with the same internal and external threats and with similar sneering traitors and flinching cowards in high places. We should though make major changes in our perceptions of the Spaniards, abandoning the negative assessment of their history, culture and society far too widely held among our own people.

The first British prejudices to be discarded must be the myth of the Spanish armada. It was not a wanton unprovoked attempt to invade and conquer Britain. Philip II's main concern was not to intervene in Britain's internal affairs but to stop Britain from supporting the Dutch rebellion in the Low Countries which were his territories by right. By sending the armada against Britain he was establishing the vital moral principle that any country that supports a rebellion in the territories of another lays itself open to direct reprisals. Britain had no business being involved in the wars in the Netherlands. When threatened with invasion Queen Elizabeth should have abandoned the Dutch and hanged Sir Francis Drake for piracy. The early elimination of the Dutch as commercial rivals would have allowed Britain to establish her dominant position in international trade much earlier and without the troublesome naval wars with Holland. The Dutch not the Spanish were to prove our real enemies. The Spaniards have very good reason to resent Britain's past encouragement of Dutch and Latin American independence which reduced Spain to a poor and backward country on the periphery of Europe. How would we have felt if more powerful nations had treated Britain in the same way?

The Spanish invasion of Britain by sea never took place but there was a British naval invasion of Spain that did wreck the Spanish economy and empire. Napoleon was not defeated at Waterloo nor even in Russia but by the Duke of Wellington's army in the peninsular war. A country can experience few worse fates than to be liberated from an oppressive foreign occupier by the army of another foreign power. Not only do they fight in your homeland and ruin it but if the occupying power is as ruthless and oppressive as Napoleonic France it leads to guerrilla warfare and the taking of hostages, reprisals and massacres ably depicted by Goya. Badajoz, Salamanca and Vittoria are battle honours for the British but stages in the destruction of Spain, a destruction that permitted the disintegration of their three hundred year old empire in Latin America.

The Spanish Empire had been acquired no more and no less brutally than any other at that time. Certainly the Spaniards behaved no worse than the Turks and the Moghuls and considerably better than the Mongols or Timur. There is no point in judging it by standards shaped by the Enlightenment or Evangelical Protestantism. We must abandon altogether the big lie that the Spaniards killed off the Indians in Latin America. They did not. The Spaniards wanted a labour force to work for them, not genocide. What wiped out the Indians in Mexico in particular was the arrival of new diseases such as small pox to which they had no resistance. To blame the Spaniards for small pox makes about as much sense as blaming the Africans for AIDS. The Spaniards never actively tried to spread small pox among the Indians the way the American colonists in New England did. On contrary the Spaniards took Indian mistresses and interbred with the local people to produce a hardy mixture resistant to both Old and New World diseases. It is a far more edifying story than that of Anglo-Saxon America where interfering uppity English colonial wives restrained their men folk from breeding up a race of *mestizos* or *métis* and where the Indians were herded into sad alcoholic reservations. It was the American Andrew Jackson who was the real

persecutor of the Indians, not Herman Cortés. It is the United States not Spanish America that is built on genocide and the ruthless pursuit of *lebensraum*. It is time to abandon the myths of Spanish cruelty. They merely brought a virus with them by accident much as the Americans brought the potato blight to Ireland that caused the Great Famine.

The third British prejudice that has to be eliminated is the myth of the cruelty of the bullfight. In a bullfight a single animal is killed after enduring far less suffering in its life time than animals and birds processed by factory farmed to provide rubber meat for food outlets or the victims of the worthless testing of new chemicals by order of EC legislation by stuffing a hundred years human consumption in a small mammal in the course of a week. The bullring is a test of true courage for the matador deliberately risks his life in every fight. Outside the bullring in Madrid there is a statue of Sir Alexander Fleming, the inventor of penicillin, who reduced the risk of death from being gored. What modern abstract statue would they put outside a British football ground? A shin guard or the cast of the bump on Beckham's foot? What the enemies of the bullfight really hate about it is that it is rooted in a distinctive national tradition. It has its own customs and costumes, colour and music, its own orderliness. Those who want to abolish it want to destroy Spain and indeed to destroy the past. Those who mutter about the cruelty of the Spaniards should ask themselves how they would feel if foxhunting were abolished in England.

The conflict over Gibraltar is likely to continue for some time but we should not allow it to poison our perception of the Spaniards. Rather we should try and understand their point of view and sympathise with the people to whom we most adamantly must make no concession. Patriotism is not enough. It is also necessary to refrain from hating those whose own patriotism sets them against us. If we are to hate anyone let us hate New Labour who lack the very sense of honour we admire in the Spanish.

Christie Davies has travelled extensively in Spain and Latin America. He was at the centre of the television documentary The Silver Road to Guanajato *about his Hispanic ancestor Dafydd Williams.*

Conservative Classic: - 8

Macaulay's History of England

Sean Gabb

Essayist, historian, philosopher, poet, cabinet minister, parliamentary speaker, drafter of the Indian penal code, Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800-59) was among the most eminent of the early Victorians. The first volume of his great *History of England* came out in 1848, the last completed volume after his death. It was an immediate classic. It sold in large and steady numbers into the 1930s. For style alone, the History deserved its status. Perhaps no other English writer has combined such clarity with such overpowering force. He demands his reader's attention. Open the History – indeed, any of his works – at any page, and read for a while, and thean try to look away: it needs great effort. But his achievement was more than style alone. Above all what he provides in the History is a compelling vision of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 – of its immediate causes and progress and consequences, and of its significance in the history of the human race.

His thesis is briefly stated. Alone among the great nations of Europe, England had preserved into the 17th century a free constitution from the Middle Ages. Elsewhere, the needs of defence had allowed the executive to raise large military forces, which had then been used to nullify every regular check on power. But our island status has never justified a standing army, and even the most despotic kings had been required to govern by consent according to the ancient forms. These forms came under threat by the early Stuart kings. The threat had been overcome, though with much bloodshed and the temporary loss of the Constitution. But the Restoration in 1660 had brought back not only the ancient monarchy, but the also the ancient forms. The struggle began again – the claims of absolute monarchy on one side, of limited government on the other. For much of his reign, Charles II had been on the defensive, tacitly or openly surrendering the claims of his father and grandfather. But a combination of judgement and luck allowed him to end his reign in much the position his grandfather had desired – easy finances and an irresponsible administration.

With his death in 1685, the struggle began in earnest. His brother James II was an avowed Catholic and admirer of France. His policy was to pack the administration with creatures dependent on him alone, and to procure the definite repeal of every safeguard that prevented him from having his will legally enacted and legally enforced. Granted success, he would have reigned over a nation enslaved to him, and have been himself enslaved to France.

But he failed in his policy. He moved too fast, and with

too little regard to the opinion even of those whom it suited him for the moment to try conciliating. In his blind self-confidence, he raised a formidable coalition of forces against himself - a coalition of those who had hated each other with settled feeling during five generations. At last, he overreached himself. His leading enemies took advantage of his folly and set in motion a train of events that ended is his dying an embittered exile and the triumph of liberty in England. And the triumph of liberty in England meant its eventual spread to other parts of the world.

This was the Glorious Revolution. But what for Macaulay made it so glorious was its conservative nature. The Revolution brought profound changes in the practice of government in England. Parliament became the dominant force in the Constitution, nothing being possible without its consent, no government possible but by its preferred leaders. At the same time, justice was depoliticised, the courts made into the sure refuge of oppressed innocence. But considered in terms of outward appearance, the Revolution changed nothing. The expulsion of James was declared an abdication. William and Mary became joint monarchs not as leaders of a successful coup, but as the next in line of succession. The same offices, the same forms of action and address, the same impressions of legitimacy, were carried forward from one reign to another. The fact that a revolution stood between those reigns was, by general agreement, overlooked.

Macaulay's status as a conservative is frequently denied. He was a Whig and a reformer. He denounced the Tories and Conservatives alike. In the loose party structures of Parliament in the 1830s, it was his eloquence that almost measurably produced the Commons majorities for the Reform Bills. But he was undeniably a conservative. He was as much in love with the English past as any of his opponents. But his was a rational love. The glory of our Constitution for him was that it had for many centuries reconciled liberty with order. *Habeas corpus* and trial by jury and freedom of the press were mingled with the picturesque survivals of the Constitution. The latter protected the former, and the former sanctified the latter. As a politician, he approached the crises of the early 1830 in exactly the same manner as he wrote the history of the 1680s. Despite its general excellence, the Constitution had its defects. Some of these might always have existed. But, with recent changes in the size and balance of economy and population, and with the growth of a more fastidious public opinion, they were no longer so lightly tolerated as they had been. For him, the question was not whether the Constitution ought to be reformed, but the manner in which reform should be made. 'Reform that you may preserve' he told the House of Commons in 1831 'Accept reform now, while all else in the Constitution retains its hold on the public mind, and so can survive. Or see it imposed later by radicals whose haste and ignorance of the true facts of human nature will involve freedom and tradition in a common ruin.'

Reform proved in the end less stable than the settlement of 1689. It was the prelude to a slow, destructive remodelling of the Constitution – a remodelling that has still to reach its end. We may not yet see the final shape of the new order that awaits us, but we can be sure that the faint outlines now visible would have utterly revolted Macaulay. He was the last and perhaps the greatest of the Whig writers, but he was a true conservative.

CONSERVATIVE HISTORY GROUP

The Conservative History Group was launched in the autumn of 2002.
It will promote debate, knowledge and discussion of Conservative Party politics through the ages.
The Group will meet in London, at the House of Commons and Conservative Central Office, and organise fringe events at the Party Conference.
A bi-annual Conservative History Journal will also be published, with specially commissioned articles on famous and not so famous Conservative figures of recent and distant times.
Membership will cost £15 per annum, including an invitation to all events and a subscription to the journal. Membership is open to all Conservatives and those interested in Conservative Party history.

If you would like to join, register for our e-mail list or help to run the group, please get in touch at
register@conservativehistory.org.uk
OR
9 The Mead, Camden Park, Tunbridge Wells, TN2 5DX

LETTERS

Sir,

Tom Burkard and Dennis O'Keefe's examination of declining educational standards, (Summer, 2002) claims that 'Blair's policy of social inclusion is having exactly the opposite effect of what was intended,' in terms of poor educational outcomes. I suggest that it is in fact having exactly the effect that is intended, at one level at least.

Put at its starkest, bad education tends to produce Labour voters by locking a large part of the electorate into poverty. It also tends to produce, in an unemployable underclass, the clientele group of other Labour voters in the caring professions. While at one level, and in part of its collective mind, the Government wants good education, there are large and significant elements of the Government and its associated Nomenklatura that have a vested interest in bad education. This is the only explanation for education policies that seem deliberately designed to produce the worst possible outcomes in terms of academic performance and employability.

One reason for the failure of Marxism in Western Europe, Britain and the Anglomorph societies was that in the 19th and 20th Centuries good education allowed the working class upward social mobility. There are many on the Left who are determined that this will not happen again: an ill-educated and unemployable lumpenproletariat is an Army that cannot desert to the middle-class and the blue rosette. It is kept in a state of permanent economic deprivation translating into permanent political resentment. This fits neatly with Labour's announced overarching objective of destroying the 'forces of conservatism' and the Prime Minister's stated intention to: 'make it a century of progressive politics after one dominated by conservatives'.

This in not particularly new: Jack London in *The Iron Heel*, Hitler in his plans for Poland, Huxley in *Brave New World*, Orwell in *1984* and innumerable other dystopic and science-fiction stories foresaw bad education as a means of social control.

Education is not the only area where Government failure to deliver happens to suit Labour in Britain's culture war. A rotten rail and public transport system just happens to punish and, in the long term, help depopulate the rural country, a major holdout of cultural conservatism. So did the government's otherwise inexplicable failure to take competent action to combat the foot-and-mouth epidemic (which was easily contained elsewhere in Europe). Similarly, bad public health and ineffective crime-control policies help promote a lumpenproletariat rather than a bourgeois culture.

To paraphrase Orwell, from Labour's point of view bad education is good education and bad government is good government. What is happening is at some level deliberate. Britain at present does not merely have an unusually incompetent and dishonest Government but also an administration influenced at various levels by intellectuals and ideologues committed to permanently transforming its culture (from our point of view, downward). Present education policies are part of this.

HAL GP COLEBATCH, NEDLANDS, WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Sir

In his review of Joseph Pearce's study of Roy Campbell (Summer 2002), Michael Wharton states that Campbell assaulted Geoffrey Grigson outside Broadcasting House for calling Edith Sitwell an old sardine tin. To my knowledge, Miss Sitwell was never described as such by Grigson. However, Campbell was incensed by Grigson's lack of gallantry at an Oxford Union debate in 1949 where he attacked Sitwell for writing on motherhood as a childless woman. The 'sardine tin' image came from a ferocious New Verse assault on Day Lewis in May 1937 in which Grigson declared that because the avowed Communist had been seduced into joining the committee of the Book Society, he 'and his Legend are now liquidated; the liquid has flowed to its oily shape and low level in the old sardine tin of Respectability'.

RM HEALEY

Sir,

In the Summer issue Roger Scruton writes 'We should consider the extraordinary fact that Oxford University, which granted an honorary degree to Bill Clinton on the grounds that he once hung about its precincts, refused the same honour to Margaret Thatcher, its most distinguished post-war graduate, and Britain's first woman Prime Minister.'

There is a reference to the same University in one of Macaulay's essays during another period of English history: 'It is hardly necessary to say that in this hot

competition of bigots and slaves the University of Oxford had the unquestioned pre-eminence. The glory of being further behind than any other portion of the British people, is one that learned body acquired early, and has never lost.'

Times, Fashions and Causes change, but Oxford Dons seem evermore to be cast from the same mould.
JACK DAVIS, ANTWERP

Sir,

Peter Goodchild makes many good and valid points about the need to articulate more clearly the nation's inherent resistance to the concept of being controlled by foreigners (SR Autumn 2002). However I fear that his practical suggestions remain too easily susceptible to being crudely smeared as 'little Englander' xenophobia by the media. Focusing on aggressive bureaucracy instead of 'foreignness' might be a less logically elegant or politically pure alternative, but it is one with greater potential to sway the popular vote. It is far more difficult for a media commentator to distort and discredit this line – jumping to the defence of an arrogant, unelected élite requires courage, something in short supply among the chatterati.

Our dealings with bureaucracy are, in comparison with citizens of other EU member states, fleeting, and, for many, revolve around battles with schools, the NHS or the benefits system. This is one of the reasons why the recent push towards self-assessment of taxes has run into trouble, reinforcing existing latent hostility towards the intrusive and bossy nature of officialdom among the upper-middle classes who are being dragged into direct contact with the Byzantine workings of the Inland Revenue. We sometimes forget what citizens in for instance France and Belgium contend with, day to day: the compulsory renewal of identity cards in person at a police station, compulsory civil marriage ceremony, queuing at the mairie with official documents and so on.

We can be sure that the Government's pro-Euro campaign will be pitched at a local level, stressing various alleged benefits for Britain and the ordinary person – there will be little mention of the mechanics of administration of the EU or the Euro. The EU's astonishingly successful advance has been largely effected by stealth, through the tireless efforts of a small, intellectually gifted bureaucracy, grinding away in helpful obscurity, far from the gaze of the vast mass of the despised general public. Surely a better way of tapping into the unease felt about the loss of sovereignty that the Euro would entail lies in the use of reverse psychology?

Citizens of the UK are stubborn and do not like being told what to do. Why not drag the EU into the open by creating a campaigning group, which adopts a rabidly evangelical and bulling approach in favour of a 'Yes' vote in any referendum? Imagine yourself sitting in stationary traffic, late, hungry and angry, looking at large slogans: 'Vote as you are told!'; 'Shut up, pay your taxes and vote as instructed'; 'Voting "No" is useless – you will only have to do it again.' 'These elite bureaucrats believe you should vote "Yes" – Trust them', 'The EU's worked wonders for them – they earn around [£150,000] – Vote "Yes"'.
PAUL FULBECK, LONDON SW1

Sir,

I was interested to read Roger Scruton's article on the progress of the *Salisbury Review* in Central Europe (Autumn 2002). Unfortunately glasnost has not yet reached the London Borough of Sutton. Here the local Liberal Democrat Council have refused to stock the magazine in the Central Library.
JOHN EVERS, WORCESTER PARK SURREY

Sir,

While I thoroughly liked everything in your anniversary issue, the reprinted talk by Bukovsky is spectacular. Bukovsky got it right; Blairism, Schröderism and the EU are all attempts to fuse managerial socialism with Political Correctness. The only point on which I would disagree is that Bukovsky may be excessively optimistic about this enterprise giving way in the face of opposition. On the contrary: the regime will soon be filling jails, as it already does in Germany, with enemies of the system, who will be jailed as 'fascists' and 'anti-semites'. I was impressed by Alfred Sherman's attempt to breath life back into Christianity. It seems that Jews are necessary to jump-start a religion that they put together in the first place. As my friend Robert Weissberg points out, 'Christianity is too valuable a piece of property to leave to the goyim.'
PAUL GOTTFRIED, ELIZABETHTOWN, PA, USA

BOOK REVIEWS

Per Ardua ad Patriae?

Penelope Tremayne

Patriots: National identity in Britain 1940 - 2000,
Richard Weight, Macmillan, 2002
£25.00

It is no small achievement to sustain a reader's interest through 800 pages on a serious subject; Dr Weight is to be congratulated.

The chronological order he has chosen is a great help, for it keeps us on track through a huge and intricate maze. It may possibly (though it should not) discourage some of his older readers at the start, for he necessarily begins with World War II; and, intelligent and diligent as he is, his analysis of our thoughts and motives during that time doesn't quite ring true, in the way that the book as a whole does. For instance 'The Battle of Britain and the Blitz were a convenient base for the English to construct a patriotic legend which foregrounded themselves. Like a bossy father who shoves himself to the foreground of a family photo... the English created an image which annoyed the Scots and Welsh...' Were those two episodes seen as a 'convenient base' for anything but bringing down German aircraft? And who was the 'bossy father'? Not Churchill nor the National Government: their minds were on the war, not on 'English self-aggrandisement'. Still less the King, who never 'created an image' in his life. Churchill, who insisted that 'Britain' and 'British' be spoken of rather than 'England' and 'English', was well aware of the massive effort made by German political warfare to split the United Kingdom into its components. And it is as a propaganda asset, the 'legend' as it is called in the book, of 'the Few', that the Battle of Britain is mentioned. Was it legend? Or history measured in lives given, lives taken, tons of steel and masonry and HE? (No-one speaks of Dresden's fate, or Berlin's, as a legend.) Weight knows these things himself and, for example, goes on to show that the great majority in Scotland and Wales were not swayed by nationalist agitators, their loyalty to Britain stayed good as anyone's. But here and there he seems to slip into a modernist view, that history is or becomes what is said about it; that it is made not by men and events but by interpreters and commentators.

So who are his Patriots? I may have been misreading him, but he seems to be saying that most of the population of Britain fought the last war for social democracy. This is certainly not the impression I had at the time. He is admirably fair and dispassionate in his choice of examples and sources; for instance he quotes the Dean of St Paul's who studied public opinion on the question and was told, by people whom he asked, that they were not fighting for democracy at all. When he asked further, 'What, then, are you fighting for?' they replied simply 'England'. It might have been Scotland, Christmas Island, the Isle of Dogs, as the case might be . Real events bring out real answers. It is in conclusions drawn, with the thoughts and feelings of the time less clearly in mind than the sensibilities of ours, that here and there give this book an effect of disconnection. A well-deserved tribute is paid to Asian, African, and West Indian volunteers who joined up 'not only to fight fascism' but from patriotic feeling. Was fascism in many of their minds at all? It is, I suppose hard for those who have grown up in today's 90% politicised world to understand that only one lifetime ago ordinary Britons (of whatever provenance) were hardly politicised at all.


> *I knew no harm of Bonaparte, and plenty of the squire,*
> *And for to fight the Frenchmen I did not much desire,*
> *But I did bash their baggonets because they came arrayed*
> *To straighten out the crooked road an English drunkard made.*

Here perhaps is the nub of it. Patriotism (which we are daily told is either a Bad Thing or anyway a lost one) is not a creed, or an ideology, or a political doctrine. It is love of one's country. The main political forces of the last half-century have condemned it to death because it is grit in the wheels of world socialism: we must not only love our neighbour as ourself, we must love all our neighbours equally. (You try it mate.) But love is fundamental to the human spirit, and politics are not. No use to argue that one's country has become so repellant that to love it is simply impossible, Love is not love/That alters when it alteration finds; and we have only to look at some of the people and things we do love to know that that is true. But perhaps we only take it in when we are in very tight corners.

As its sub-title acknowledges, *Patriots* is actually about 'national identity' – which is something entirely different. Love of country is a gut feeling not susceptible to arguments or adjustments, it is what Shakespeare's Henry V evoked before Agincourt and Churchill spoke to after Dunkirk; what Coriolanus betrayed, and what kept the Few in their cockpits one after the other, and Russian soldiers in the craters of Stalingrad. National identity (if it actually exists, which I am not sure about) is an intellectual concept. If it ceases to give satisfaction or fit the facts we can change it: 'find a new role'. In other words, it is a suit of clothes, even a stage costume. It may need cleaning, but it wakes no loyalty and no-one is likely to die for it – which of course is widely seen today as its great merit. It touches no emotions: it is safe handle.

But the British are addicted to emotion, whatever outsiders may think; and, having been forbidden patriotism during the last half-century in the futile liberal-left pursuit of socialist peace, we now practise displays of hysteria. The worship of adolescence perhaps began it with the screaming rites of the teen-aged pop-idol culture, so like early Nazism. Then came the worship of football – which for all the flags displayed has nothing to do with love of country, only with love of mass-mayhem; and slowly adults have been colonised by means of the worship of grief, which as we all know reached its crescendo with the funeral of the media-sainted princess, but still, like the other two, has a lot of mileage left. Dr Weight (who by the way is inclined to take the football flag-exhibitionism as genuinely expressing a desire for national identity) has some clear-sighted perceptions about the popular thirst for things to get excited about, and what some of them may lead to – including for instance Mr Blair's naming of 'the People's Princess' at her funeral. That title itself divorced her from love of country, which has nothing to do with politics and, as Weight reminds us, powered the funerals of George VI and Churchill. Instead it presented her, in what I think later judges may see came perilously near to a charade, as a weapon in the class war – as which she has been assiduously wielded ever since. That the monarchy has survived it is perhaps a hopeful sign of class-was fatigue.

I think Dr Weight may be mistaken in his easy dismissal of the Rural Revolt now gathering momentum. It is grass-roots, not a product of image makers, it has everything to do with love of one's country, and may yet prove to be one of the tools for the re-igniting of Britain. Time will show how the Celtic response to it will go. The book's main concern throughout is of course the relation of Celt to Anglo-Saxon and The Rest. It succeeds in being well-balanced, well informed, and consistently interesting. Being Cornish by blood and domicile I should mention that the strength of separatism down here among the bogs and rocks seems overestimated. Yes, we are different from our eastern neighbours and have always known it. Historically we made the point perfectly clear with the Prayerbook Rebellion (what riled us was being compelled to have it in English, which few of us could read, instead of Latin, which a few could recite); and perhaps we were lucky in that we were not 'discovered' and proclaimed as a manifestation of Celtic nationalism until quite recently. The rash of postage-stamps and mock-passports of a few years ago, including pronouncements about the Stannary laws, were an unsuccessful scam whose organiser (not a Cornishman) disappeared abroad with whatever money he had made. The flags, tartans, and Kernow labellings on the other hand are good business for countless small shops, being beloved of tourists. But this is a very small thing to cavil at. *Patriots* is thoroughly worth reading and, thanks to its unaffected and direct style, easy to read, encouraging us to think on things worth thinking about. What I hope is that these will extend beyond nationalism, or citizenship, or status, or identity. For patriotism is love; all the others are just more pompous words for brand-image. Which would you rather have?



What went wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East,
Bernard Lewis, Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
£12.99, 2002.

Since *What went wrong?* is dubbed a *New York Times* bestseller, and Bernard Lewis is one of the world's leading orientalists as well as an old friend, it merits careful treatment. But one cannot escape a measure of disappointment, at least for what it fails to offer. The book, based on three academic lectures, was in page-proof when the events of September 11 occurred, and has not been updated. It therefore tends to leave us hanging in the air. The title, too, teases somewhat. We are told what went wrong, rather than why. Perhaps that would be too much to ask; historical science may have a long way to go yet before it can tell us much about the why's and wherefores, the really great questions of human history, among other things why some religions prosper and some decay, and how they affect human behaviour overall. So we must take the book for a sensitive record of Islam's greatness and decline.

Lewis writes with sympathy of Islam's early golden ages, when it outshone the Christian world in the arts, sciences, commerce, manufactures and warfare, and matched China's greatness. This lends verisimilitude to his description of Islam's decline side by side with

Christendom's, or 'the West's' progress. Why Islam underwent decline is not generally agreed. The Moslems conquered and inherited the East Roman and Persian Empires together with parts of Central and Southern Asia and the Far East. In the early centuries, the conquered peoples enjoyed considerable latitude and made great contributions to civilisation. Zoroastrianism, which had set the scene for millennia, virtually disappeared; Buddhism was marginalised; Christendom shrank to a fraction of its former self. Somewhere in the process – Lewis does not say where or why, and I do not presume to lay down the law – Islam lost its intellectual vitality and suppleness and gave way to sterile dogma. One symptom of this was its slowness in recognising and reacting to that fact. Recognition by Moslems eventually came as a function of successive military defeats, the fruit of technological backwardness. But the lessons were not learned, apart from Ataturk's bold reactions.

One contrast with the early days and golden ages was that in the early years a small minority of Moslem Arabs ruled vast numbers of non-Moslems and left them to their own devices provided they paid tax and touched their forelocks. But as the non-Moslems were converted, driven out or killed off, the major sources of creativity were destroyed. Apparently, Islam cannot cope alone. Calls for increased religious observance to offset decline may be all very well, but they have hindered rehabilitation. For as Lewis demonstrates, the causes of decline are closely bound up with religious orthodoxy as it has emerged, syndromes it shared with Christianity for centuries.

The author distinguishes between modernisation and Westernisation. In his usage, modernisation is widely supported, but, and a very large but, without changing the all-embracing religious character of society which inhibits change, and hence modernisation. As he writes, 'the emancipation of women, more than any other single issue, is the touchstone of the difference between modernisation and Westernisation. Even the most extreme and most anti-Western fundamentalists nowadays accept the need to modernise and indeed to make the fullest use of modem technology, especially the technologies of war and propaganda. This is seen as modernisation, and though the methods and even the artefacts come from the West, it is accepted as necessary and even as useful. The emancipation of women is Westernisation; both for traditional conservatives and radical fundamentalists it is neither necessary or useful but noxious, a betrayal of true Islamic values.'

This takes us into the realm of psychology. Why should Moslems wish to keep women subordinated and humiliated? There is a reason for everything, if only we can ascertain it. Execution or murder of women – some victims of rape – on charges of adultery in a growing number of Moslem countries, including some which formerly enjoyed the civilising benefits of British rule, tells us a good deal not only about these societies but also about human nature. Can we draw parallels with attitudes towards inter-racial sex in the USA? Why has the treatment of women undergone such changes in 'the West' and not elsewhere? Why has Islam retained the loyalty of its adherents in spite of its manifest shortcomings, a loyalty which has if anything increased in our own times?

What emerges strongly from the study is that the Moslem world, Turkey apart, not only resists Westernisation but is turning the clock back in many states. The economic basis for this syndrome is oil. A high proportion of the world's oil is in Moslem lands. Moslems believe that Allah placed it there for their benefit. But if so, it has proven a mixed blessing. Easily found wealth has corrupted, easy come easy go. Industrial and agricultural development and exports have been frozen out. Dependence on oil entails dependence on the State, the Moslem equivalent of socialism. As a result, there are few forces working for social and intellectual independence, dissent is confined mainly to militant religious radicals, whose recipe is much more of the same.

Worse still, the Moslem world is engaged in the hunt for scapegoats: Mongols, Turks, British, French, Americans and Jews. Their grievances may be plausible. But in the absence of self-critical thinking backwardness and humiliation will continue. Dependence on suicide bombing or its equivalent for emotional satisfaction is counterproductive.

'If the peoples of the Middle East continue on their present path, the suicide bomber may become a metaphor for the whole region, and there will be no escape from a downward spiral of hate and spite, rage and self-pity, poverty and oppression, culminating sooner or later in yet another alien domination; perhaps from a new Europe reverting to old ways; perhaps from a resurgent Russia, perhaps from some new, expanding superpower in the East. If they can abandon grievances and victimhood, settle their differences, and join talents, energies and resources in a common creative endeavour, then they can once again make the Middle East, in modern time as it was in antiquity and in the middle ages, a major source of civilisation. For the time being, the choice is their own.'

I can only respond: Insha Alah! That God should wish so!



Retribution

Frank Ellis

Berlin: The Downfall, 1945,
Antony Beevor, Viking,
2002, £25.00

Berlin: The Downfall 1945 owes a great debt to the work of two outstanding military historians, dspecifically, John Erickson's magisterial two volumes, *The Road to Stalingrad* (1983) and *The Road to Berlin* (1999) and Earl Ziemke's *Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East* and *The Battle for Berlin: The End of the Third Reich*. Beevor, to a much greater extent than his predecessors, concentrates on the raw brutality of war The result is a story, or rather many stories, of courage, despair, unbridled stupidity, megalomania and dreadful cruelty (especially towards women and children). *Berlin: The Downfall 1945* sums up the barbarism of the twentieth century horribly well. Regarding the treatment of the German people by the Red Army, especially the mass rape, a major theme of the book, Beevor lays much of the blame on Goebbels: 'Goebbels's propaganda', he argues, 'did not simply dehumanise Jews, commissars and the whole Slav people, it made the German people fear and hate them. Hitler, in these gigantic crimes, had managed to manacle the nation to him and the approaching violence of the Red Army was the self-fulfilment of their leader's prophecy.' There is something to this, but the Soviet propaganda apparatus had nothing to learn from Goebbels about how to dehumanise its opponents as a prelude to extermination. No dehumanisation campaign was ever organised by peasants, Volga Germans and other assorted 'enemies of the people' against the Soviet state, yet this did not save them from mass extermination, shootings, starvation, pillage and deportation on a much greater scale than that carried out by the Nazis.

Moreover, the Sovietization of the Baltic states by the NKVD and the murder of Polish officers, landowners and lawyers at Katyn and other sites, made possible by the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, underlined what class war meant. And if the Gestapo and SS made ready to execute prisoners that could not be transported to the rear areas because of the speed of the Soviet advance, then the NKVD did exactly the same thing in 1941. As the Red Army recaptured territory lost to the Germans – Ukraine, Belorussia, Baltics – so the ideologically-punitive measures taken by the NKVD and SMERSH reached new depths of sadism. The way in which the Red Army treated German civilians is not so much a self-fulfilling prophecy of German propaganda but a deliberate policy based on well established methods of terrorising occupied peoples into submission. For those who cared to read the signs this was a warning of what Germans could expect when the Red Army reached Germany. That these civilians were Germans made things all the more enjoyable for the professional sadists and those who had genuine cause to hate the Germans for what they had inflicted on Eastern Europe. Berlin, one suspects, was destined to be Europe's Nanking if the Red Army got there first.

Apart from the main account of the Soviet entry into Berlin, Beevor offers us a number of related and informative digressions which all add to a picture of confusion and violent mayhem as the end approaches: the fate of General Andrei Vlasov; the discovery of Auschwitz; the plight of the Poles; the frantic search for the remains of Hitler and Goebbels; Stalin's fascination with Hitler's secret bunkers; Stalin's attitude towards his generals; and the return of German communists from Soviet exile.

Historically interesting in themselves, many of Beevor's revelations do not substantially challenge established accounts of why Stalin wanted to beat the Western Allies to Berlin or what we know about the workings of the Soviet system at war. That Stalin humiliated Zhukov by keeping secret the discovery of Hitler's remains – Zhukov only found out about this some twenty years later – is precisely the sort of spiteful trick that one would expect from a leader who had some of his best military leaders judicially murdered in 1937. According to Beevor, a major consideration for Stalin was the seizure of German scientists and equipment in Berlin, especially where it concerned atomic weapons. If one assumes that Stalin and Beria had some idea as to the extent and success of German research, then this has a certain logic. Far more important than beating the Western Allies to Dahlem was the total penetration of the Manhattan Project by Klaus Fuchs and other Soviet agents. Had the Western Allies been aware of any significant advances in German atomic weapons research, the chances are that they would have made great efforts to forestall the Red Army either by pressing ahead to Berlin or by employing a Dresden-style raid on the research facilities.

For eye-witness accounts of Berlin's last days Beevor relies very heavily on Vasily Grossman's wartime diaries, which he tells us have not been published. This is not the case. One set of extracts was published in 1966, another as glasnost' got under way in 1987 (this includes most of the Berlin entries cited by Beevor), and the entire collection, or nearly all of it, in 1989. And one of Grossman's most important articles, 'On the Threshold of War and Peace' was published as early as 1958, though written in 1945. From the point of view of Beevor's theme, it is unfortunate that the Russian archivists did not draw his attention to this 1945 article,


in which Grossman records his impressions of Berlin immediately before and after the city fell. This highlights the dangers for a researcher who lacks the necessary expertise in Russian and is therefore obliged to rely on others to evaluate sources (something similar happened in Stalingrad).

The delayed publication is easily explained. Grossman's observations about the prosperity of German farms and the much higher quality of German infrastructure raised very difficult questions for Soviet propagandists who had been telling Soviet soldiers about the slavery and poverty of exploited Germans. Soviet soldiers could see with their own eyes that German farms and villages were no Potemkin structures, such as those that used to fool gullible Westerners visiting the Soviet Union during the Terror-Famine. They were living examples of thrift and industry, and, as such, an obvious reproach to the murderous and incompetent folly of Soviet collectivization in the early 1930s. Not only did this confrontation with reality expose the lies of Soviet propagandists, it also served to make Soviet soldiers uncomfortably aware that their own standard of living was wretched by comparison. This comes across clearly in Grossman's 1945 article. More alarmingly, for the German civilian population, it rammed home a sense of inferiority and aroused envy and hatred, making the destructive fury and rapine worse. Beevor, for example, notes the reaction of a political officer towards the ordered domesticity of German farms: 'I'd just love to smash my fist into all those neat rows of tins and bottles.'

Cross-checking the diary entries cited by Beevor with Grossman's material published in 1989 reveals something important. Cut from this material are three references to rape and the general treatment of women by the Red Army. So as late as 1989, the year in which Grossman's damning indictment of Lenin, *Forever Flowing*, was eventually published, and a year after the first Soviet publication of *Life and Fate*, we have evidence that Grossman's work was still being censored. Now this is of importance for the study of Russian literature and, especially, for the rape theme in *Berlin: The Downfall 1945* since it tends to support the Beevor view that rape is one of the blank spots in the Soviet-Russian memory of the war, despite what Russians say.

One other aspect of the Soviet war experience which, even now, may be far more wounding for Russian pride and perceptions of the Great Fatherland War than Beevor's graphic details of rape, is the role of General Andrei Vlasov who collaborated with the Germans. This can be appreciated by the bitter exchanges which took place in Russia after the publication of Georgy Vladimov's novel, *The General and His Army* in 1994 and the author's winning the Booker Prize. Vladimov rehabilitates Vlasov, presenting a study not of a traitor, but of a Russian patriot, who hoped to liberate Russia from Stalin.

Moving well between history and literature, without succumbing to the postmodernist fallacy that history and literature are one and the same thing, Beevor shows himself to be a competent craftsman. Even if the revelations in *Berlin: The Downfall: 1945* do not quite live up to what is promised, the final part of Beevor's own tale of two cities is compelling reading and deserves to be a commercial success.



Facing Up: Science and Its Cultural Adversaries,
Steven Weinberg, Harvard University Press, 2001, £17.95 hardback

Our Posthumous Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology,
Francis Fukuyama, Profile Books, 2002, £17.99

Steven Weinberg's book is a collection of essays. Francis Fukuyama's is a single, very well argued text. Both these interesting writers are humanists, but they give very different emphases to their humanism. Weinberg is a Nobel Laureate physicist who happens to be a humanist. Fukuyama is a deeply preoccupied humanist who happens to be a specialist in political economy. For Weinberg the cosmos, which, rather than man, is his first interest, is indifferent to humanity. Weinberg regards the universe as authorless and man by definition as having no special status in it. This is surely the right line for atheism. It is incomprehensible to me that belief in a Godless universe, as maintained by Buddhism, for example, should coexist with the solipsistic metaphysics of the latter.

Fukuyama, hugely well-informed in the life-sciences, while he does not opine as to man's place in any putative scheme of things, seeks a shelter for 'human nature' against the dangers of modern science. He maintains a frank admiration for the Aristotelian conception of what we are. Indeed, his notion of 'human nature,' that ancient given of Judeo-Christian metaphysics, with its Hebrew and its Greek antecedents, is perfectly consistent with an unreconstructed Catholicism, despite the absence of any tone of religious belief in Fukuyama's writings. Human nature is for Fukuyama the complex of human attributes built up by genetic and cultural evolution. He is a political egalitarian on the basis of what he sees as the empirical fact of a natural human equality.

Once you accept that being clever or rich or beautiful

does not make you matter more than those not so blessed, nor put you in a different relationship to law – always supposing the law in question is humane and impartial – it is hard to gainsay Fukuyama here. One of the best aspects of Western modernity is its insistence on legal equality, the only kind that matters really. Fukuyama's fear is that Huxley-style experimentation could generate a new caste-system which would shatter this natural equality and make our law inapplicable.

Thus, while Weinberg thinks science is moving apace towards the discovery of the bedrock laws of the cosmos,Fukuyama, more cautious than he, although celebrating with Weinberg the giant potential of science for human liberation, also insists that we try to direct and regulate its development, since if we do not retain our humanity, the future threatens to overwhelm us morally. He is anxious that we do not disturb our genetic code by way of modern medical science and transgress the boundaries our human nature has set for us. This leads him into a no-nonsense rejection of human cloning, though there are too many interests which are not listening to prevent this calamity. Frankly Fukuyama seems too optimistic about our ability to stop the scientistic horrors of experimentation. He himself points out that in Asia the deliberate abortion of female foetuses is already causing a sexual imbalance in the population. Again one must say that those Asian religions which are Godless, such as those of China and Japan, or those whose overall sense of divinity is crippled by polytheism, are much keener on the abortion of unborn female babies than is the case in the West. The dignity of life is protected much more where Christianity has helped to form the traditional consciousness.

Germ-line engineering, Fukuyama observes, will permit scientists to splice genetic systems. Designer babies and chimeras, such as ape-human crosses, all seem to him possible and to me to be on the cards. Biotechnology for all its many beneficial aspects in the battle against disease and misfortune, has some menacingly lethal aspects. It could shatter the species-unity of humanity.

Weinberg too cares about the human race, though he is anxious not to attribute too much significance to it. Whether his conceit of a definitive physics is hubristic or on the contrary fair comment from the available evidence, this reviewer is simply incompetent to say. The text is infused at times, however, by the prideful and giveaway 'yet' mood, in which vanity forces the author to claim or imply that this or that issue will soon be settled, though we do not know the answer yet. Elsewhere Weinberg corrects this impression by stressing how strange and difficult science is.

It is when he leaps into metaphysical big time – asking: what does science mean for man? – that Weinberg's argument seems limp and banal. The more physics advances, he says, the less plausible becomes the claim that we have any special place in the universe. 'There is no life-force' seems to be Weinberg's central ontological position. But surely to be the only known commentator in the universe, and the agency by which its fundamental laws are to be uncovered, is to occupy a stupendous status! Nor in fairness does Weinberg deny that there are deep metaphysical disagreements among scientists, some of whom, including certain of his distinguished friends, are religious believers of various kinds. I would add that outside the obvious case of the theologian, there is no mechanistic connection between a scholar's subject and his religious beliefs or lack of such. My experience, for example, has been that reflex atheism is more typical of social scientists than of scientists proper.

Weinberg is impressively cultured generally, quoting effortlessly and persuasively from Shakespeare, Milton, Whitman and Yeats. He is rightly praised by his readership for his elegant and virile prose. I must contrast him here with Fukuyama, who, despite his interesting, even compelling arguments, has rather shaky grammar. Weinberg is also, commendably, as anti-socialist as Fukuyama. Indeed I wish there were more scholars in my own trade of sociology, who realised, as does this physicist, that Nazism (National Socialism) was indeed the socialist phenomenon it claimed to be.

Fukuyama claims that the twentieth century was torn by two opposite evils, the biology-is-everything horror of Nazism and the biology-counts-for-nothing horror of Communism. There is clearly some core truth in this. It is not, however, the best way of conceptualising these two movements, which though by no means the same, were nevertheless united by far more than divided them. The key to their likeness is to be found in the hypertrophy of the state, which remains to this day the central threat to the human race. Fukuyama is right that at the intellectual level these two horrible forms of human governance, the worst in history, are the result of explanatory reductionism. Man does not reduce to any one single factor, biology, history or economics.

Fukuyama's text includes a very clever discussion as to whether the menace of the state in the future will be a Huxleyan or an Orwellian one. I suppose the difference between Huxley's and Orwell's grim visions is that the Huxleyan biotechnological night might be mediated entirely by free enterprise, while the Orwellian techno-surveillance darkness, which conception Fukuyama says has not stood the test of time so well, is entirely dependent on the state. Fukuyama is right that bureaucratic centralism is vulnerable to information technology. I personally look forward to the next twist in the story, which will be the end of the state's ability to pillage us all fiscally.

Weinberg seems to me off target, however, when he blames traditional Catholic anti-Semitism for the hideous crimes of the Nazis. Here it was pseudo-science which made the difference. Poland was the centre of world Jewry for 800 years. When the Nazis moved in there were 3 million Jews in that country. When Nazism

collapsed, half a decade later, there were virtually none. What we need to bear in mind also is that the mind-numbing scale of Communist murder was also the direct outcome of the pseudo-science of Marxism. This again brings us back to the inadequacy of Fukuyama's biology/non-biology distinction. The distinction he is making between these two evil modalities is not wrong as such; but it is also not enough, indeed not even the centre of the ghastly story. The central error is the worship of the state. Once again, moreover, for all the dark episodes in Christian history, it is the Christian imperative which is strongest against totalitarianism.

'The Lord thy God thou shalt adore; and Him only shalt thou serve.'

We sociologists should properly be humbled by the deftness of some of Weinberg's writings in sociology. Weinberg's critique of political utopias is very sound and his treatment of the sociology of knowledge is straightforwardly brilliant. There is a very fine discussion of the work of Thomas Kuhn and I also wish that every sociologist in Britain would read his exposé of the Sokal hoax. His account, without being at all rude or strident, ruthlessly exposes the pretentious and obfuscating scoundrels of post-modernism. These frauds have been conning and intimidating their colleagues and students for thirty years now. It is time we shut them down.

Some of the side arguments in Fukuyama's text are very praiseworthy. He holds that in time we will be able to make stronger inferences about genetic causation. This does indeed seem inevitable. He also makes it clear that the hereditarian case will not go away and although he takes care not to embrace it too enthusiastically, he points out in his compendious discussion of culture and heredity that the part played by the hereditarian quotient in our understanding of things is bound to rise. Fukuyama is also convincing in his account of the way the modern life-sciences have side-lined Freud. Marx and Freud, then, are mostly down and out. Let us hope that the blasts from Fukuyama and Weinberg and other enemies of obfuscation will one day take Foucault and Derrida down a few significant pegs too. The secret, in the battle against all this Gnostic suspicion of the world, will be to establish again a kind of scholarly innocence and open-mindedness. However mysterious the world, everything is what it is, and not some other thing.

Anti-Globalisation

Aidan Rankin

Marketing the Revolution: The New Anti-Capitalism And The Attack Upon Corporate Brands,
Michael Mosbacher, Social Affairs Unit, 2002, £9.95

This new monograph from Digby Anderson's Social Affairs Unit is a trenchant analysis of the 'anti-globalisation' movement. This is reflected in the now predictable May Day demonstrations, the mantra-like slogans and the cult status, within the 'movement', of individuals like Naomi Klein, Noam Chomsky and George Monbiot. Ironically like the protesters, Mosbacher lumps these writers together somewhat indiscriminately. Chomsky is a thinker and writer of great power, who often assumes positions unpopular with the politically correct (such as universal freedom of speech). Klein, at her best moments, breaks out of her ideological box to offer shrewd insight and political comment. Monbiot's writing, by contrast, consists in the main of a 'PC' fundamentalism, described by fellow left-winger David Aaronovitch (quoted by Mosbacher) as 'a Socialist Sunday School notion of how capitalism works ... too simple, even for Harry Potter'.

Despite this unfortunate, but probably inevitable, lumping together, Mosbacher provides an intellectually rigorous and well-researched study of the new political culture of protest. He is the right man for the job, too, as a specialist in British Communism during and after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Mosbacher's thesis is two-pronged. First, he argues that the radical left has lost the economic argument but retained its emotional fervour. The result is a continuing 'anti-system' fanaticism without a corresponding commitment to an alternative system. In the absence of a coherent socialist (or anarchist) model, much of the protest is as much psychological as political, and finds expression in nihilism, violence and grossly simplified rhetoric. From the old left, however, there persists a dualistic view of human society, a Manichean polarisation of light and darkness, exploiters and exploited, 'racists' and 'anti-racists'. Etc. Much of the 'movement' is directed towards maintaining this dualism, and with it the primitive urge to avenge and punish.

Mosbacher's second argument is that the targets of protest are not necessarily the 'bad guys', but the more 'ethical' capitalists – and green campaigners who seek compromise. As examples, he cites the London Greenpeace attacks on the Body Shop and George

Monbiot's petulant critique of Jonathan Porritt, Director of the pro-business Forum for the Future and former Green Party *éminence vert*. Cleverly, Mosbacher points out that Naomi Klein's iconic book *No Logo*, which attacks the power of brand names, was marketed after the fashion of a brand product. Citing many statistics, Mosbacher shows that many 'anti-capitalist' campaigns are sponsored by the very transnational corporations that the protesters condemn and sometimes physically attack: an exhibition of movement art – 'Protest and Survive' at London's Whitechapel Gallery – was sponsored by Michael Bloomberg.


This is a concise, tightly argued monograph that raises interesting questions. An unabashed pro-capitalist, Mosbacher is surprisingly inclined to accept on trust the monolithic definition of capitalism offered by most of the protesters. He does not draw the crucial distinction between a capitalism that is local or national in scope, and that which is actively engaged in breaking cultural boundaries. Nor does he distinguish between capitalism as practice, which 'works' because it is empirical and piecemeal, and capitalism as ideology, or more accurately the doctrine of neo-liberalism. The latter, described by capitalist George Soros as market fundamentalism, has many of the defects of Marxist theory. It becomes a dogma because (like Marxism) it places economics before all other areas of human activity, allowing for little if any local or individual variation.

Reading this interesting pamphlet, two passages stand out. The first is a quotation from Naomi Klein, the second from Mosbacher himself. Both refer to the rise of political correctness, or rather capitalism's ability to co-opt 'progressive' social issues – issues which in the absence of economic theory the left holds dear.

Klein: We have heard the refrain over and over again from Nike, Reebok, The Body Shop, Starbucks, Levis and The Gap: "Why are you picking on us? We're the good ones!" The answer is simple. They are singled out because the politics they have associated themselves with, which have made them rich – feminism, ecology, inner city empowerment – were not just random pieces of effective ad copy that their brand managers found lying around. They are complex, essential social ideas, for which many people have spent lifetimes fighting. That's what lends righteousness to the rage of activists campaigning against what they see as cynical distortions of those ideas.

Mosbacher: The 1960s critics of capitalism believed that by challenging racism, traditional gender roles, and conventional sexual behaviour, they were somehow challenging capitalism itself. Imagine the shock of the activists when they saw advertising that celebrated black empowerment, put powerful and independent women on a pedestal, and portrayed homosexuality as chic.

Here we are left with the impression of two highly intelligent people inching towards the same conclusion, but pulling back because their respective ideologies make it unpalatable. That conclusion is that the relationship between neo-liberalism and 'PC' is symbiotic. They share a radical hostility to rootedness and sense of place, to family and community, to any values that challenge their view of the human being as an interchangeable economic unit. Neo-liberalism and political correctness share the same obsession with 'progress', the same crudely reductionist view of human behaviour, the same impetus towards constant change or 'permanent revolution'. This is why the language of multi-national brands and the slogans of left-wing demonstrators echo each other in their destructive banality.



A History of Britain,
Simon Schama, BBC Publishing, 2002,
hardback 3 vols. (each) £25.00,
video (3 parts) £49.99 (complete set), £29.00 (each)

Schama's account is effective for those who know little, but unsatisfactory for those already interested in and knowledgeable about history; I'm referring not to 'historians', who Schama derides on a number of occasions, but to readers of this magazine and others who have an intelligent interest in the past.

If you don't know about the history of Britain (or rather of what became Britain), there is indeed much here to fire your excitement. This is one of the best produced historical series I have ever seen. A cynic might say, what do you expect at that cost, for the Dome showed that expenditure can equate with trash. Mention of the Dome is deliberate: there is an instructive contrast between the BBC's deliberate engagement with history, and a history made comprehensible for the millions, and the deliberate neglect of the past in the contents of the Dome, a monument to mediocrity as great as any that Alexander Pope derided in the Dunciad, his biting denunciation of a similarly corrupt system of beliefs.

With the BBC you get colour and sound, but, generally, to a purpose. For example, the artificial filling in of pre-Reformation art in Long Melford church in 'Burning Convictions', eloquently makes the point about the richness of pre-Reformation church decoration and the destructiveness of Reformation iconoclasm. The aerial shots, in particular in 'Beginnings', are superb and the carefully chosen backdrops for Schama offer a rich, varied and beautifully shot visual feast. That itself is of course misleading, and at times irrelevant – do we need footage of a leopard when Edward I

is mentioned? But drabness does not lend itself to television of this type. Some of the locations, for example Hythe Ossuary, are very striking. The music is good, interesting but not overly intrusive, and with particularly fine voices. All of this will help attract many, and that is excellent, but there is the issue of content. My first awareness of the French Revolution came from Kenneth Williams' Citizen Camembert in the *Carry On* saga, but he offered as little threat to my ignorance as he did to Joan Sims. And, stripped of the visuals, what is the content? Schama is a very clever man and a smooth television presenter with an attractive manner, but what he offers is unsatisfactory.

As with any media presentation, it is of course unclear who is responsible for much of what we see (and read in the accompanying book). Presenters are apt to be removed if they do not do what producers want, and much that is shot ends up on the cutting-room floor, with the presenter generally having little or any choice in the matter. It is, for example, unclear how far a desire for foreign sales drove content. Again, the executive producer, Martin Davidson, has said that the title was chosen more for television appeal than for accuracy, and that he started at Skara Brae as he wanted an opening sequence different to Stonehenge.

So, in criticising Schama, it is possible that I am doing him an injustice, for which I apologise. Yet, there are important clues in his writings to suggest that some of the characteristics which, to me, but clearly not the BBC, are limitations of this series, arise directly from him. Take for example one of the most serious flaws in the series, its sense of place. This is a series that tends to mean England when it refers to Britain. Yes, we do start in Skara Brae in the Orkneys and there is extensive discussion of Wales, Scotland and Ireland in 'Nations', but, on the whole, the geographical coverage is totally inadequate. 'Conquest' and 'Dynasty' are resolutely Anglocentric, as is 'King Death' and 'Burning Convictions'. This is misleading in a number of ways. In the *Times* of 28 September, Magnus Linklater pointed out that Schama's approach to Britishness 'blithely ignore[d] the entire canon of recent historical work'. There are other problems as well. Schama asks important questions, such as what were the consequences of the Black Death, and then answers them with reference only to England. It is not simply that in a history of the British Isles it is right to look at areas other than England, but also that these offer one a possibility of confirming or qualifying hypotheses, such as the role of force in the introduction of feudalism, which Schama handles in 'Conquest' without considering Scotland, or that of Henry VIII's family problems which might be used to explain the English Reformation, but are less helpful elsewhere. The clue to this can be found in *The Embarrassment of Riches*, Schama's brilliant discussion of Dutch culture, which overwhelmingly focuses on the province of Holland and does not give due weight to the eastern provinces.

Citizens, Schama's treatment of the French Revolution, offers another guideline. As with *A History of Britain*, this is resolutely narrative and very much a conflation of high politics and violence. This obviously makes for vivid television, and, at one level, is amply justified. High politics and warfare, the chances of dynastic success or favour, and the fate of battle, or of the murderer's knife, were all very important, and, whatever Schama's silly gibe about historians liking a quiet life and usually getting it, ably discussed. So also have been longer-term shifts in which Schama seems curiously uninterested. I am writing after seeing what is currently available – videos of the first six programmes and the first of the presumably two books – but what is striking is how the excellent presentation of Schama's high points of political narrative is not matched by a comparable attention to non-political history. This is a great pity as where there is such discussion it is evocative and fascinating. In 'King Death', the discussion of the impact of plague on the 'lousy, busy' towns is first rate: there is an effective mix of good research, fine presentation, clear science, and powerful visuals. But this only highlights the relatively limited space made available for non-political topics. The pre-Roman clearing of woodlands gets a mention, but where is any real discussion of environmental history, one of the most important areas of current research and reflection and one that urgently needs to be integrated into national histories? This is surprising from the author of *Landscape and Memory*. We also get occasional references to culture, for example 'the solid, economic elegance of the Perpendicular', but, so far in the series, it has been badly treated. Schama shows his great skills of analysis and communication in his discussion of Holy Trinity, Long Melford, or of the iconography of Richard II: 'The first self-conscious designer of a royal identity, Richard understood as none of his predecessors had done that ceremony was not just the dressing of royalty; it was at the heart of its mystery and the secret of its power to make men obey'.

However, on the whole, the cultural life of both elite and populace is neglected. This is a serious omission because Schama's story is in part about nation building, but there is far too little on the languages of the British Isles, especially on the development and fate of vernaculars. As with other topics, this is highlighted by episodic references. In 'Burning Convictions', Tyndale comes in and the camera shows us how printing presses work, but this is not the central topic. The master narrative is what is presented as 'the most extraordinary sexual drama of the age'.

Schama offers a counterpoint: 'So much has been written about the tragic soap opera of Anne Boleyn's life that "serious history" seems duty-bound to turn away from it to the weightier and less personal issues that we instinctively think ought to be behind so profound a change as the break with Rome'.

This was taken up in the anonymous review in The *Economist* on 30 September:

> *'This interest in narrative sets him apart from most of his colleagues who long ago succumbed to the allure of abstract theorising, of trying to detect those elusive "vast impersonal forces" of history in everything that they study... suited to television... runs the risk of reducing the history of Britain to little more than a soap opera of bloodthirsty warring kings, jealous siblings and revolting barons... risks the charge of banality'.*

Schama would, presumably, dismiss the last, but both presenter and reviewer seem to juxtapose a narrative that focuses on conjunctures defined and dominated by high politics and warfare with a misleading structuralism. This of course is to ignore much of the work produced over the last decade, as any reading of the articles published in this journal and the books reviewed in it will make abundantly clear, but there is a need for an informed linkage of high politics and warfare to other topics. It is clear from his perspective why so much space is devoted to crises in Schama's series. Indeed, the series proceeds from one to another, and this is highlighted with the violent start to each episode in what is visually and aurally a most striking opening sequence. Yet, this emphasis can be contested. It would take a rash non-medievalist to challenge the importance of 1066, but why devote more attention to Becket than to the conversion of the British Isles, or indeed to the economic impact of the Black Death in England rather than to the long-term development of agriculture and a managed landscape over the previous two millennia?

A fascination with violence is clearly an issue – the plague is more interesting as an explanation of socio-economic changes than less dramatic developments – and violence is important, but Schama's account is unbalanced and suffers from a failure to give due weight to a wider European and indeed global context. This is true in terms of the explanations Schama offers. In his discussion of the Reformation, Henry's affair with Anne Boleyn plays a major role but there is no attempt to offer comparisons and contrasts with the Continent. Schama does not record the wider global context in order to provide some relative assessment of developments within the British Isles. There is an English exceptionalism at play here which is distressingly dated and dull. Why not compare Roman Britain with non-Roman Germany (and Ireland and Highland Scotland), discuss how the conversion to Christianity compared with the contemporaneous expansion of Islam, or reveal how the mighty Angevin monarchy of Henry II looked somewhat less impressive from the perspective of China and India. Such comparisons, contrasts and points of reference do not lessen such a series being a history of Britain, but, instead, offer an instructive focus. It is not only that Britain's relations with the outside world were important, but also that her histories take on a greater depth of meaning if offered with a global perspective. Clearly only so much can be done, but television can rapidly offer visual contrasts that are instructive as well as, sometimes, misleading.

This review may be dismissed as academic griping and also failing to understand the needs and interests of viewers. Such comments are wrong. If you read what children are being offered at school you will know that it is this series that is limited. I was looking last week at a first rate discussion of enclosure in my 13-year-old son's schoolbook, with interesting accompanying homework asking the pupil to evaluate different contemporary responses. There is little of this sense of contrasting responses and different approaches in this series. Not only is that part of the fascination of history; it is also central to its civic importance. Understanding that there are valid different approaches is a fundamental reminder of the limitations of authoritarian 'discourses', whatever their political, or intellectual cultural background. It is a reminder that there is no one answer.

At one level, Schama accepts this, with his focus on turning points where, as he very ably shows, inevitability was not at play: 1066 and the Reformation providing two obvious examples. But, at the same time, the failure to give due weight to clashing contemporary and scholarly expositions is unfortunate.

This returns me to the review in the *Economist*. Is Schama's *History of Britain*, ably presented and very well produced as it is, an aspect of the so-called dumbing down of British culture? To say that many historians have written for the market – Gibbon and Robertson for example having been great successes in their day – is not an answer, because the nature and perception of the market, and the response of the writer, varies. Probably the BBC would have rejected what they would have seen as less digestible fare, although I suspect that there is a persistent tendency in the 'media' to underrate the intelligence and interest of viewers, listeners and readers. If you'd rather watch sport, you are not necessarily going to be attracted by an easily-accessible series. Instead, television should be seeking to respond to the enthusiasm of those who do switch on. They are entitled to a discussion of different approaches and competing analyses. They see it for politics, why not for history, or is the audience for the latter supposed to be less intelligent? Writers and presenters must be clear, but clarity is not the same as simplicity. That indeed is the challenge for those wishing to make such series. I urge everyone to watch Simon Schama's interesting series, but I cannot describe it as fascinating. The opportunity of offering a more controverted account that recognises very different expositions has been missed. So also is the range of British history. At least readers of *History Today* are being offered each month first-rate guides to British history that are more wide-ranging.

Triumph Of The Individual

John Macdonald

Statecraft: Strategies for a changing World, Margaret Thatcher, Harper Collins, 2002, £25.00

From the dragon herself here is a book that could revive our faith in conservative principles. In this era of naive idealism it has become fashionable to decry Thatcherism and all that Margaret Thatcher still stands for so resolutely. She is the pet dragon of socialists brought out from time to time to frighten the children, the errant backbencher and of course the electorate. Unfortunately, many timid conservatives have allowed themselves to become brainwashed into accepting this fashionable rewriting of history. In *Statecraft* Lady Thatcher argues cogently that in order to secure the future for our descendants we must follow our instincts and beliefs rather than mere fashion.

Unlike her previous books *Statecraft* is about the future rather than history, though it often uses the lessons of history to define the principles for the future. Freed from the necessity to recall endless documents or details the author here displays an easy to read style which is maintained throughout. However, this is not a 'quick read' with soundbite solutions for all the ills of the world. All 471 pages demand careful reading but the reader is amply rewarded for his attention.

The book is a series of distinct essays (though all are linked by the same practical principles) on the major issues facing the world. As she notes when comparing statecraft and statesmanship, 'the former has a more practical ring to it, emphasising activity rather than rhetoric, strategy not just diplomacy.' This also sums up the power of her arguments. Scorn is poured scorn on pious phrases such as 'ethical foreign policy' and the arrant nonsense of the idealistic left. In its place she provides a series of guidelines or practical actions, supported by logical argument, to tackle all the issues.

What used to be considered sound conservative principles permeate the whole of *Statecraft*. Some are explicit while others are implicit in the arguments advanced and the judgements made. The core principle is the eternal philosophical battle between Plato and Aristotle. Left wing ideologues (the followers of Plato) love to go into remote corners and in their isolated little world develop a new utopia (as for example modernisation) which is the answer to all our problems and must be implemented immediately. Aristotelian conservatives, who are not without their own plans for the future, pause for a moment of thought. They consider that not everything we did in the past was wrong; surely we have learnt something that is worth conserving. Of course it is not so immediately exciting as a new utopia but it is usually commonsense. Margaret Thatcher declares herself an optimist and she certainly has strong views about the future but she is not about to sacrifice our history for modernisation or other fashionable ideology. She pulls against the prevailing extreme and puts her mind to finding practical solutions.

For Margaret Thatcher Europe as a whole is fundamentally unreformable.' Her thoughts are addressed to those who are not fully party to the project and are 'thus not fatally compromised by it.' She draws a distinction between Western nations (who she believes are compromised) and the Eastern, Central and Balkan countries who are still trying to establish viable national institutions. The latter have recent memories of being part of a superstate and would thus be difficult partners for Brussels. Yet why are they working so hard to gain entry to the EU? Margaret Thatcher believes that their motivation is largely economic survival and the desire to get a share of the subsidies. Britain should encourage their entry as they would effectively destroy the present concept of a European superstate.

Statecraft contains many fascinating glimpses of the European Union in action and Lady Thatcher's own admission of error in signing the Single European Act. She castigates the Common Agricultural Policy and shows that it lies at the heart of what is wrong with the organisation. Her arguments make clear that the EU can never carry out a responsible international role or compete with the United States as some sort of world power. In conclusion she states that 'We in Britain should fundamentally reassess our relationship with the rest of the EU and renegotiate it in order to secure our national interests and sovereignty' and while considering joining NAFTA we must remember that 'We trade globally, and we must think globally – not confined within the bounds of a narrow Europe.' Perhaps the conclusions are not surprising but the arguments used to make her case deserve a wide readership.

The power and the process of the logic used in the book illustrate two other principles which are particularly strong in Margaret Thatcher's thinking. First she has a religious conviction but she recognises that politicians and scientists are not divinely inspired and do not have to be obeyed or even heeded with blind faith. She appears to welcome 'doubting Thomas's' in the sense that she always questions facile opinions like the arguments about climate change. Second she clearly recognises that logical thought depends for its efficacy on the premise upon which it is founded. Her reflections on the Cold War and her chapter on American achievements outlines the premise for most of the arguments in the rest of the book.

Those of us who view scepticism (on any subject) as evidence of demonstrating a desire to find the right,

rather than the quick answer will find Margaret Thatcher's strategies for a coming world a breath of fresh air. She explicitly defines two vital concepts for purposeful thinking about world affairs. First, remember that, 'the unexpected always happens'. Secondly, 'that action requires active individuals', and makes clear that she has little time for bureaucrats or time servers. Starting with Ronald Reagan, strong individuals pop up throughout *Statecraft*. From her amusing asides and stories about the people she has worked with or met, it is obvious that Lady Thatcher admires strong individuals and that she herself is one of the strongest and most individualistic of them all.


She recalls her relationship with Gorbachev and the collapse of communism but some of her most interesting observations come from her visits to Russia since her premiership. In his early days Boris Yeltsin was a powerful mover for change but he was eventually hamstrung by his illness, the old bureaucracy and organised crime. She seems less certain about President Putin and about current economic prospects. She found that everywhere one travels in Russia industry and commerce are back in the hands of the old communist bosses. However, 'Russia has an unique capacity to surprise.' Her visit to Nizhny Novgorod and its entrepreneurial Governor Boris Nemtsov and a private cheese shop made a big impact. 'No greater contrast with the drab uniformity of Moscow could be imagined.' If Putin really was able to trust and release the energies of the ordinary Russian people it could bring in a new era. But she warns: 'We dare not take Russia for granted; the seeds of danger are often planted in the soil of disaster, as the world has learned to its cost.'

Her admiration for Lee Kuan Yew 'the second founder of Singapore' shines from the page. 'He became the most trenchant, convincing and courageous opponent of left wing Third World nonsense' and later 'he is undoubtedly one of the twentieth century's most accomplished practitioners of statecraft'. She observes that there is a systemic problem in East Asian economies – with the notable exception of Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan – the pervasiveness of cronyism in the relationship between governments, business and banks, and an ethos of corruption. 'We should be fully aware of the historical legacy which distorts China's attitude towards us and never take all its indignant rhetoric at face value.' Her story about her meeting with Li Peng who went red with anger as she explained to him the problems with the cultural revolution is a classic and worth the price of the book alone.

Margaret Thatcher in the chapter 'Rogues, Religions and Terrorists' makes some perceptive points about terrorism. The concept of the rogue state contains some truth but suffers from imprecision. 'Rogue states never turn out to be quite the pariahs they are deemed,' and she explains that most could not exist without the covert support of one or more major powers. She provides guidelines for dealing with rogue states (North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Iran and Sudan). One of the difficulties is that the main opposition is no longer communist but rather Islamist. Muslims view political issues in a different way. 'Islam does not distinguish as clearly as does Christianity between the 'things that belong to Caesar' and the 'things that belong to God'. On the contrary Islam emphasises unity of life. Another issue for Islamic zealots; American support for Israel confirms the existence of a vast conspiracy against the Muslim world. For cynics, the Israeli-Palestine conflict provides a fail-safe opportunity to rally young Arabs everywhere to dubious causes. On all these issues Lady Thatcher provides a basic principle that 'the United States – not the United Nations or the Europeans – is the only credible outside peacemaker.

Two chapters 'Human Rights and Wrongs' and 'Capitalism and its Critics' deserve articles in their own right. Two points must suffice. She would strongly advise the United States 'To have nothing to do with the International Criminal Court and to exert maximum pressure on others to do likewise'. In dealing with the problems of the developing world 'Collective guilt, misplaced guilt at that, is a poor basis upon which to devise solutions to real problems' and she concludes the chapter on capitalism with 'We should celebrate the triumph of global free enterprise capitalism.'

Statecraft is about the practical application of power but perhaps the enduring message of the book will be that people matter. Her own conclusion is a strong evocation of that message. 'The demand that power be limited and accountable, the determination that force shall not override justice, the conviction that individual human beings have an absolute moral worth which government must respect – such things are uniquely imbedded in the political climate of the English-speaking peoples. They are the bedrock of civilised statecraft. They are our enduring legacy to the world.'



The Measure of All Things
Ken Alder, Little Brown, 2002
£15.99

In 1791 the French Academy of Sciences, on behalf of the National Assembly – intent on destruction not only of the monarchy and religion but also of traditional culture – resolved to establish a rational Utopia featuring a decimal clock, calendar, currency and system of weights

and measures. The 10-hour day and 100 minute clock were ignored by the public, could not be enforced by law and were abolished within two years; while the revolutionary calendar lasted from October 1793, the month after the start of The Terror, until January 1806. Only the franc and metric system survived to embark upon their chequered futures. Meanwhile, two leading advocates of metrication – respectively the Treasurer and Permanent Secretary of the Academy of Sciences – both died in May 1794; Lavoisier, one of the principal founders of modern chemistry, by the guillotine, while Condorcet committed suicide rather than meet the same fate. The metric system was baptised in blood and everywhere since then has fed on it.

The standard for the revolutionary new system of measurement was to represent precisely one ten-millionth part of the Earth's quadrant, the length of the meridian from the North Pole through Paris to the Equator. In order to create a universal system, it had to relate to measurement of the world itself. Calculations were based on extrapolation from direct physical measurement, by two teams of engineers and surveyors led respectively by the eminent astronomers Delambre and Méchain, of the segment of this meridian arc extending from Dunkerque to Barcelona, the former travelling north from the capital via Amiens while the latter traversed south via Bourges and Carcassonne. But modern satellite surveys show that this quadrant actually measures 10,002,290 metres. So the metre, the key to the whole new system of measurement, is over 0.2mm short. A discrepancy of this magnitude had been recognized over a hundred years ago. Yet no effort was ever made to correct it. On the contrary, every generation has used the latest technology to redefine and thereby perpetuate this error with ever-greater precision.

All that France needed, of course, was a new system of standard national measures, to take the place of the myriad local systems under the ancien régime, just as the British Weights and Measures Act of 1824 established the imperial system by eliminating regional variations. Indeed, Lalonde, the great astronomer and philosophe, the mentor of both Delambre and Méchain, advocated simply the national adoption of the local Paris system of units. As he feared, the expedition by his two protégés, planned to take seven months, took over six years, from June 1792 – the month that war broke out between France and Prussia – until November 1798, during Napoleon's Egyptian campaign.

As the meridian marathon dragged on, many savants and politicians – not to mention the citizenry – questioned the desirability of a natural standard. Nature is changeable and irregular: even the shape of the Earth itself might ultimately change – although, as Laplace, the leading mathematical physicist of the age, ironically remarked, 'Surely the measure of the meridian will not take that long to complete!' But if it had to be a universal system related to a measurement of the Earth, why not base it on the circumference of the equator, which is unique, circular and unchanging, rather than on an arbitrary portion of an elliptical meridian? Others again argued that if it had to be the meridian, why not make the standard unit to represent one hundred millionth of the total meridian, to equal roughly un pied (a foot), a more manageable size for daily use?

But no, it had to be the meridian through Paris – as opposed to Greenwich – and it had to be 1:10 millionth of the quadrant, in order to produce the metre – slightly larger than the yard. The Chauvinists defeated the aims of the Utopians. The metric system could so easily have become universal if only the French had not been so determined to impose it upon the world. Our Royal Society was in principle in favour of a global system but finally rejected the notion that '9 or 10 degrees of a meridian in France shall be adopted as the Universal standard'. Likewise, Thomas Jefferson, the USA's first Secretary of State, had urged Congress to adopt a metric system but later withdrew his support on learning that the French were to measure their own meridian, remarking: 'If other nations adopt this unit, they must take the word of the French mathematicians for its length... So there is an end to it.' (He had also become disillusioned on realizing that it was no use for marine navigation, because metric measurement of distance is incompatible with measurement of time – whereas in the customary system they are inter-changeable, since the nautical mile equals one minute of arc).

Ken Alder, a history lecturer at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, has written a stupendous book: an enthralling, immensely detailed narrative and an intellectual thriller, which reveals not only that Méchain had falsified vital data from the triangulation survey (relating to latitude calculations around Barcelona) and while enjoying national renown had concealed his shameful torment for the rest of his life, but also that Delambre, having discovered the secret scandal on examining his late partner's notes in the last months of 1805 – too late to stop publication of his first volume of the *Base du système métrique* in January 1806 – had agonizingly compromised in preparing the second volume, because (to quote the author): 'The lay public did not need to know that Méchain had fudged his data or lied to his colleagues. Too many savants already doubted the metre's precision. The metric system had enemies enough.' So Delambre was 'economical with l'actualité', and discreetly deposited the trunkful of original manuscripts from the meridian expedition in the National Observatory's archives, where the author unearthed them. Then, three years later, after publishing the third and final volume of the *Base*, he also deposited the entire private correspondence between himself and Méchain in the same archives, but carefully under seal. So the metric system is based on a deliberate, extensive deception – the cardinal sin in any scientific enterprise. (Could the author's name have another mean-

ing beyond the arboreal: might it also be the infinitive of a French verb, 'alder' – meaning 'to fudge' – cf. 'alter')?

As the author observes, 'Delambre had come to accept, as Méchain could not, the evanescence of earthly knowledge. So to the extent that he conspired in his colleague's cover-up, he did so for the opposite reason: because he realized that getting the perfect answer did not matter.' How much of the 0.2mm deficiency is due to Méchain's tampering and how much to natural imperfections remains unclear. However, in relation to something so remote from reality as the Earth's quadrant, what does the accuracy of the metre matter to anybody?

Any work of non-fiction, that is intended to be both authoritative and popular, may perhaps be judged by seven criteria: scholarship, original research, organization of material and quality of writing, technical and social interest, design and production, topicality of the subject, and price. This is that rarest of books that scores top marks on every count. If Dava Sobel's *Longitude* was a minor classic, this is a major one.

Beautifully edited, type-set, printed and bound, and copiously illustrated the apparatus includes a dramatis personae and prologue, a note on measures, acknowledgements, a note on sources, 68 pages of notes on the text (admirably arranged by direct reference to page numbers instead of conventionally lumped together by chapter), a chronological table, bibliography and index. My only two cavils are, first, that no information is given on Ken Alder's previous works, while the book-jacket's biographical note merely credits him with winning the 1998 Dexter Prize 'for the best book on the history of technology' without even mentioning the title. Little Brown advises, however, that it was *Engineering the Revolution: Arms and the Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815*. Second, he refers to 'the Anglo-American non-metric measures still in use in America today'. Evidently, he knows far more about France two centuries ago than he does about Britain today!

When The Empire came Home

Richard West

Subjects of the Queen,
Roy Kerridge, Duckworth, 2002
£12.99

Readers of the *Salisbury Review* and the *Spectator* will know Roy Kerridge, who specialises in reporting on the multi-racial world of North London gospel churches, Romany car dealers and Pakistani communities in the Outer Hebrides. Kerridge had worked for a time as a lavatory attendant, but otherwise lived a Bohemian existence in youth hostels and bed and breakfasts, taking his worldly goods about with him in a couple of plastic bags. When the *Spectator* bought him an air ticket to join in a Gospel rally in Mississippi, he reported back on how he had hitched a lift from the airport.

Kerridge remained a mystery even to those who had met him, like Michael Wharton, the *Daily Telegraph's* Peter Simple Columnist. Sometimes as he stood in the Kings and Keys pub with his brandy and soda, Wharton relates in his memoir *A Dubious Codicil*, 'a new friend, the strange diminutive genius Roy Kerridge, with his plastic bag and interest in many congenial matters from Celtic myths to what Borrow called "the affairs of Egypt" would materialise beside me and in the intervals of his wandering round the country, drink his moderate light and lime and set off on his wandering again'.

Gradually it emerged that Roy's interest in the black community developed when his mother, a Russian Jewish lady, married a second time an African, providing Roy with his glamorous half-sister Zenga Longmore, herself a sparkling writer on Afro-Caribbean life and culture.

It would be pleasant to hear that Roy Kerridge's novel of multi-racial Harrow and Notting Hill in the 1960's could enjoy the colossal sales and TV fame of Zadie Smith's *White Teeth* set in Willesden during the same era, but it is aimed at rather a different readership. Roy Kerridge was living in Notting Hill and fascinated by the diversity of the different peoples and races. This is a novel with a number of characters engaged in separate but interlocking dramas, all vividly described. Furthermore all the events and characters are taken from real life (names disguised). Sometimes it reads like a thriller as you want to know what happens next.

Although he enjoys multi-cultural London, Kerridge is very far from accepting the immigrants at their own estimation or that of the home-grown race relations industry. Even when he was writing for the *Spectator*, Kerridge often came under verbal and even physical attack from various black power demagogues. As is shown by his title, *Subjects of the Queen*, Kerridge regards the Commonwealth and the Empire from which it sprang, not as an instrument of oppression but as a civilising influence, offering law and justice to all the Queen's subjects, regardless of colour or creed. He is much more in tune with church-going and patriotic Afro-Caribbeans than with the peddlers of prejudice, grievance and drugs.

One of the villains of the book is Emmanuel Davis, a West African agitator who hails the Mau Mau as forerunners of Black Freedom. He finances his party by brow-beating West Indian immigrants with a list of their signatures and those of their wives, children and sweethearts, he presents himself at the Russian Embassy as head of a vast organisation in Africa, where the Russians

are hoping to gain a foothold.

During the Suez affair, Emmanuel had made thirty five pounds by telling the Egyptians the names of British gunboats leaving for Egypt. He had found out about the boats by reading the midday edition of the Evening Standard before the Egyptian Embassy officials. A Nigerian couple he knew had obtained two thousand pounds from the Chinese by representing an organisation with even less fancy note paper than his own, with a list of forged signatures. They used the money to travel back to Nigeria one jump ahead of the police. While they were at work, their two small children, left alone in a room with a paraffin stove, set the place on fire and perished. Several lodgers and passers-by tried with great bravery to break in and rescue the children but to no avail, as the fire had already done its deadly work. The parents claimed that the white people were responsible for letting the children die, and escaped in a huff.

The non-political characters in this book appear as feckless about their sexual partners and the resulting children. Even more culpable, in Kerridge's eyes, are the white people who from reasons of guilt or misguided idealism, condone and even encourage the fecklessness of the Afro-Caribbeans. These are epitomized by the social worker Mrs Brimmer, whose job it to find homes for immigrant children whose parents cannot or will not look after them. Mrs Brimmer is taken aback when a white couple ask to adopt a child in their care.

'Love and self-sacrifice had no place in her austere Welfare concept of the world. Although couples all over Britain pleaded to be allowed to adopt these wide-eyed little enchanters, the welfare line was stark refusal. This was on the grounds that white adoptive or even former parents would only like the children when they were small and would shrink with loathing from a coloured teenager.'

NOTES ON REVIEWERS

JEREMY BLACK IS PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT EXETER UNIVERSITY. HIS BOOKS INCLUDE *MODERN BRITISH HISTORY* (MACMILLAN) AND *A NEW HISTORY OF ENGLAND* (SUTTON)

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JOHN MACDONALD IS JOINT AUTHOR WITH SIR ANDREW BOWDEN OF *DARE WE TRUST THEM, A NEW VISION OF EUROPE* TO BE PUBLISHED SHORTLY

DENNIS O'KEEFFE IS RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BUCKINGHAM

AIDAN RANKIN'S *THE POLITICS OF THE FORKED TONGUE* IS PUBLISHED BY NEW EUROPEAN PUBLICATIONS

SIR ALFRED SHERMAN LIVED FOR SOME YEARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND STUDIED ARABIC AND ARAB NATIONALISM

PENELOPE TREMAYNE IS A WRITER ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUBJECTS

RICHARD WEST WROTE FOR *THE SPECTATOR* FOR MANY YEARS. HIS BOOKS INCLUDE *THE WHITE TRIBES OF AFRICA*

ETERNAL LIFE



We have had to put up with more than plenty of destructive bishops over the years, from John Robinson who said 'Our image of God must go' to David Jenkins who claimed to have discovered that the resurrection of Our Lord is not 'a conjuring trick with bones' – as if we ever thought it was. Then in the 1980s the whole bench of bishops declared themselves supporters of the Marxian sociology of the Synod's report Faith in the City. But for blasphemous drivel not one of the Right Reverend Gentlemen can hope to excel the latest iconoclasm of Richard Harries, Bishop of Oxford.

Harries says, 'People who are groping their way into Christianity can suddenly find themselves shocked and horrified at the sacrificial, cannibalistic language of the Eucharist. Christians do not take seriously enough people's sense of horror at going to a Eucharist or Mass and hearing the imagery of sacrifice and eating God'. He recommends that we use expressions such as 'the food of angels' and 'the bread of life' instead.

This would be to change the language which Christians have always known and loved for the cause of not sounding offensive to ignorant secularists. Well, the church has had an obsession these last forty years or so of scrupulousness in not saying anything that might sound uncongenial to the modern world whose fashions in language and music it follows with fanatical devotion. Besides not even the youngest child imagines for a minute that what goes on at the Holy Communion is cannibalism. The philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe once told of how she taught a little girl that Christ is really present in the Sacrament. Most movingly the child asked Anscombe when she came down from the altar rail, 'Is he in you now?' And when she replied, 'Yes', the little girl knelt down in front of her.

But the truly coruscating arrogance and impudence of Harries' statement is that it is a frank denial and rejection of the words of Christ himself. Christ did not say, 'Come and have a bit of angels' bread'. Nor did he use the expression 'bread of life' as if it were a slogan to persuade people of the value of healthy eating. In the same night that he was betrayed, Christ said, 'Take, eat, this is my body. This is my blood, drink ye all of this in remembrance of me.'. Therefore when the fastidious and squeamish Bishop of Oxford tells us not to use those phrases, he is by direct implication telling us that Christ ought not to have used them either. This is to claim that he knows better than Christ. That is blasphemy and the bishop should resign.

There can be no case for euphemising the dominical utterances in order to make them more acceptable to politically-correct modern secularists. Those words of Our Lord, spoken at his last supper, are at the very centre of the Christian faith. They have been said every day by Christian priests celebrating the Eucharist for 2000 years. As an indication of their solemnity and holiness – and yes, let say without equivocation, their truth – when the priest pronounces those words of consecration he genuflects and makes the sign of the cross. And in many churches a bell is sounded to draw attention to the extreme sacredness of what is going on.

What do the secularising bishops have next up their sleeve? Surely we shall be told to get rid of the crucifixes? I mean it's not nice is it to display and reverence such a bloody scene? But what if the crucifixion is, literally, crucial to the redemption of mankind? Once we get started on the road of modernising euphemism, what havoc we shall be obliged to play with the scriptures themselves. This is in fact nothing new. There are already passages in the Psalms which politically-correct clergymen omit. They leave out the Hebrews' curse on their Babylonian captors, 'Happy shall he be that taketh and dasheth thy little ones against the stones,' Thus Israel's experience of capture and exile is belittled.

The whole of Psalm fifty-eight is regularly missed out of the daily readings because it contains such offensive phrases as 'Break their teeth, O God, in their mouths. Let them consume away like a snail, and be like the untimely fruit of a woman.' But those words were expressions of extreme hurt. Moreover, they were recited regularly by Our Lord himself. But what is that to our secularising clergy?

If we follow Harries to a logical conclusion, we shall have to abolish the mystery plays and the Passion play at Oberammergau and to leave out the most sacred parts of the gospels such as, 'And when they were come to the place which is called Calvary, there they crucified him.' We can't have scenes of torture described, no not even to those for whom Christ died.

After forty years of debunking and denial there is precious little left of the faith once delivered to the saints. Harries and his sort seem determined to destroy even what remains.

Peter Mullen

IN SHORT

A Tribute to Peter Bauer

Institute of Economic Affairs, 2 Lord North Street, London SW1P 3LB, 2002, £10

Those of us, of whatever age, with long political memories can recall those breathtaking arguments a funny looking economist with a thick Hungarian accent had with the somewhat bovine but well meaning Judith Hart, Labour's overseas aid queen of the sixties and seventies. She would produce enormous amounts of hot air, then he would say with that inimitable accent that did not fade despite the many years of residence in Britain, 'I have only six points to make.' It was always six or eight or some other unexpected figure, never three or five. The points would be enumerated succinctly, brilliantly, with one finger hitting the other palm for emphasis. Judith Hart's waffly arguments would be destroyed and the clarity of Peter Bauer's vision would become clear to all. Well, not to politicians or the foreign aid industry, who have a vested interest in ignoring those searing warnings. Years have gone by and Peter Bauer has been proved absolutely right: foreign aid has helped to destroy the economy and political structures of Third World countries, impoverishing their population. But, while this is now acknowledged wisdom, the foreign aid industry grinds on, doing its worst in Africa and, even in the former Soviet Union. Bauer did, however, become a mainstream thinker. He was elevated to the House of Lords and was awarded the first Milton Friedman Prize for Advancing Liberty. Alas, he died before he could collect it, but his last days were brightened by this acknowledgement of his achievement. He would have loved the other acknowledgement, this slim volume put together by friends and colleagues. The pieces range from a characteristically entertaining account by Ralph Harris of Bauer's unexpected maiden speech in the Lords to serious analyses of his work, with touching vignettes of friendship in between. May his influence outlast him and increase with the years.

Helen Szamuely

Gone Hunting

Mary Staib, illus. Oliver Ellwood, Ragged Bears Publishing, 2002, £25.00
(£1 per copy goes the Countryside Alliance)

This is the best new book of its sort on hunting that has been published in recent times. It is a collection, made of stories sent to the compiler by more than 270 fox, hare and stag hunts, in England, Wales and Scotland. Each entry is accompanied by a thumbnail sketch-map showing how the hunt fits into the jigsaw with neighbouring packs; but there the uniformity ends. Mary Staib has wisely allowed hunts a free rein with their contributions, so that they vary widely in style, quality and length. Some hunts have delved into history, some on the quarry, many on hounds, a few on horses. There is some fine writing, and much simple, earthy prose. Together they make up a mosaic that I found magical.

Oliver Ellwood's illustrations, mostly completed whilst he was recovering from a crashing fall at a point-to-point, are a delight. His hound studies are masterly, fit to place beside those of Cecil Aldin. The dust jacket is cleverly devised. Chris Bowld leads his Sparkford Vale hounds round the corner of a Dorset lane into a winter landscape and the promise of a hunting day. The individual contributions in the book, each so characteristic, similarly take you into the very heart of hunting.

David Edelsten

The Anti-Jacobin Novel: British Conservatism and the French Revolution

MO Grenby, Cambridge UP, 2001, £40

'Between 1791 and 1805 as many as fifty overtly conservative novels were published in Britain. Others contained distinctly conservative elements. These were the anti-Jacobin novels. They were written in opposition to what their authors believed, or perhaps affected to believe, were the principles of the French Revolution... Their popularity and their tendency to reproduce the familiarly conventional, endow these novels with a representativeness which entitles them to be thought of as a vital key to the understanding of British society in an age of crisis and as perhaps the most meaningful literary response to the French Revolution and its aftermath'.

Grenby takes the sheer number of these productions as proof of their popularity, though few of them went to a second edition, just as few of the forty or so epic poems published in Britain in the 1790s and 1800s went to a second edition. The fact that people wanted to write these things is interesting but it is not proof that other people wanted to read them. One of the chapter headings of Goldsmith's *Vicar of Wakefield* was the inspiration for both title and theme of one of the best and most frequently

treprinted anti-Jacobin novels, George Walker's *The Vagabond*. The claim that the anti-Jacobin novel was 'the most historically meaningful literary response to the French Revolution' ignores contemporary poetry on the subject – including Alexander Watson's The *Anti-Jacobin: or Hudibrostic Poem*, in twenty-one cantos (1794) which makes the first recorded use of the term anti-Jacobin in English – and though Grenby refers several times to the periodical *The Anti-Jacobin* he seems not to have noticed that it was the commercial success of this magazine that was the main reason why there were more anti-Jacobin novels after 1798 than before 1797.

AD Harvey

A Little Overmatter

Nicholas Bagnall, Southover, 2002, £13.99

A future historian wanting to know what journalism was like in the second half of the twentieth century would do well to read this engaging and elegantly written memoir. Nicholas Bagnall was on the staff of both the *Daily* and *Sunday Telegraphs* for nearly fifty years in various capacities – educational correspondent, sub-editor, letters editor and literary editor. He also had spells on the *Church Times* and *The Teacher*. In the fifties methods of newspaper production were much the same as in Queen Victoria's day. The electronic revolution has transformed the habits and ethos of the newspaper world; of course financial discipline was necessary but much has been lost by the takeover of the marketing men.

There are many perceptive comments about the public figures he met. He recalls the abilities and characters of several Education Ministers David Eccles, the brightest, Tony Crosland, the arrogant, Edward Short, out of his depth, Margaret Thatcher who paradoxically approved more comprehensive schemes than any other Education Minister but who became disillusioned with education by the time she became the Iron Lady. His experiences as a Literary Editor prompt sensible observations on the changes in the book trade as well as witty vignettes of people like AL Rowse and Rebecca West, and I do wish I had seen his advice on how to behave at a literary party before. The whole book is punctuated by hilarious stories: the Editor of the *Church Times's* secretary was infatuated with Ted Heath; 'That man is going to be Prime Minister one day'. What on earth shall I do about this woman?' Heath implored me. 'Impossible', said Margaret Thatcher when Bagnall told her this story when he had indeed become Prime Minister, 'no one could love Ted Heath'.

Merrie Cave

Seeing Red: Hungarian Intellectuals in Exile and the Challenge of Communism

Lee Congdon, Northern Illinois UP, 2001, $40

In 1991 Congdon published *Exile and Social Thought* which dealt with those Hungarians who went into exile in 1918 but which stopped at 1933. This new volume continues up to the present with a secondary focus on those who came, directly or eventually, to Britain. The Hungarian emigrés in this book fall into three main groups: those who retained faith or allegiance to Communism like Lukacs, Karl Polanyi and Meszaros; those who abandoned Communism and turned against it like Koestler, Lakatos and Tibor Szamuely and those who had always opposed Communism like Michael Polanyi and Aurel Kolnai. The author skilfully weaves the episodes of their stories with the adventures of the other exiles and often a strong supporting cast of non-Hungarians with whom they co-operated or opposed. There are also illuminating accounts of local fellow-travellers like Bernal, Crowther, and Hogben and the work of the Council for Cultural Freedom. This is a rewarding study of a significant group of diverse people, and will be of especial value to those interested in Michael Polanyi, Koestler and Kolnai.

RT Allen

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