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The American Conservative

Last fall *The American Conservative* burst forth on the American political scene. Founded just one Metro stop away from our nation's capital by Pat Buchanan, Taki Theodoracopulos, and Scott McConnell, its backers both run and fund the magazine. McConnell, a French historian of New York bluestocking lineage, manages production with two able assistants, Kara Hopkins and Matthew Alexander; meanwhile Buchanan and the jet-setting Taki raise hackles by chewing out their enemies in each issue. The magazine, a fortnightly, features figures of the Old Right who have appeared in *Chronicles* and in the *Spectator* and such foreign policy hands as Arnaud de Borchgrave, Eric Margolis, and Martin Sieff. Stubborn resistance to the then impending war in Iraq and, more generally, to the Zionist Right, typified by Buchanan's widely publicized polemic in the March 24 issue, brought down upon the magazine accusations of (what else?) anti-Semitism. A particularly abrasive invective against the 'unpatriotic Right,' published in the *National Review*, (April 7) was by journalist David Frum. Frum helped the magazine's circulation by lashing out at its contributors. Subsequently other journalists were rash enough to follow in his footsteps.

Despite the apparent harmony between the foreign policy positions of the new publication and those of many left-of-center American journalists, it is unlikely that the limited cooperation between right and left that McConnell foresees will become a reality. The neocons have the advantage of sounding like the 'anti-fascist' left when talking about domestic questions like immigration and civil rights. By contrast, the genuine Right rails against the welfare state, anti-discrimination laws, government-backed immigration from Latin America, and anything smacking of social engineering. Although the neocons differ from our left, in calling for an intensive crusade for global democracy, in other respects they can hardly be distinguished from the liberal establishment. Note that liberals and neocons have joint control of the media, as debating partners and associates. Moreover, like the non-radical left, they exalt what now passes for American democracy. Both big government and massive Third World immigration, neither of which condition they wish to change, have contributed decisively to the current version of the American regime.

Because *TAC*, like *Chronicles* and the *Salisbury Review*, defends an honourable but thankless persuasion, it is important that it survives and does well. Neocon opinion-makers would thrive, as they are now, in the national press and on prime time TV, even if Rupert Murdoch were not pay-rolling a vast media empire. But if not for a handful of struggling magazines and websites, most paleos would go unnoticed. Because *TAC* provides a non-establishment forum of opinion on the right, both neocons and liberals rush to attack it for extremism. Even more alarmingly, its editors publish material that one would not expect to see in an advocate of the American Right: for example, an extended interview with Norman Mailer and a long brief against agribusiness and the mistreatment of animals bred for food. Since corporate capitalism is further on the Left, at the *Wall Street Journal*, *TAC* is not afraid to put forth an explicitly conservationist and immigration-reform perspective. May it continue to do so!

Paul Gottfried

(Editorial note) Some British readers may not be familiar with the American 'Conservative Wars'. Paleo-conservatives (Old Right) have traditional beliefs in the nation; some of them are even isolationist. Neo-conservatives, many of whom were leftists who 'turned' during the Cold War, regard the health of the free market as the most important political issue.

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Anyone who hoped that the fall of Communism would result in a humdrum normality and that the ship of humanity would henceforth enjoy plain sailing, must be by now sorely disappointed. Instead we find ourselves subject to that old Chinese curse. Lord Chalfont's review of Phillip Bobbitt's important book, *The Shield of Achilles*, lays out in graphic form the terrifying danger and uncertainties of the post-cold war era. The effectively continuous war which began in 1914 and ended in 1990 has been replaced by the unpredictable vicissitudes of the international market economy in which wars need not be initiated by states and savage aggression does not need any fixed locus. For Bobbitt the world now stands, therefore, on the edge of unprecedented horrors; Lord Chalfont believes that Bobbitt's nightmare can be proved false only by a vigorous and persistent defence of the nation state guided by exceptional statesmanship.

Political and economic uncertainties are probably responsible for the disease of Americaphobia, discussed here by Myles Harris. Nevertheless many people of impeccably conservative persuasions and certainly not anti-American may have some misgivings about the future political arrangements in Iraq – these concerns have been reflected in many serious newspaper articles. The British experience in Iraq after the first world war is not an inspiring precedent. Any American protectorate will have to ensure that Iraq's ethnic and religious tensions do not dissolve into civil war. The natural desire for revenge on Saddam's murderous regime must be curbed if the hysterical hatred of America among certain Arab factions is not to be further exacerbated.

The discerning will also deplore this government's failure to address the terrorist threat. Thanks to our sloppy asylum procedures a potential terrorist can slip in and out of this country virtually unhindered. Margaret Brown notes that the line between terrorism and crime is often blurred while the mechanisms of state protection are severely over-stretched – the damage that a suicide bomber can achieve is only too obvious. We could at least learn from our European 'partners'. In France an asylum seeker must come before a judge within four days.

Antony Flew in his survey of Islam's war against the West reminds us of that religion's uncompromising nature, witnessed in the recent history of Pakistan, Nigeria and the Sudan, and also apparent in the inability of some immigrant Muslims to come to terms with democratic pluralism. The West must develop new strategies to meet the Islamic challenge.

This short war has exposed the farcical impotence of the United Nations and the European Union. *The Salisbury Review* has always believed that we are an off-shore island whose economy, politics law and history are indissolubly bound to the English-speaking world. Indeed Roger Scruton reminds us that America is the last remaining country with a genuine conservative movement, expressed in politics, in grass-roots activities among ordinary people, and in many manifestly conservative intellectual journals. Its bigger population does not account wholly for this fact. Europe presents a woeful contrast with its economic stasis and its prying and predatory politics.

Britain must now make the definite choice that she has shirked for twenty years. Norman Barry hammers this message home in his discussion of the European constitution. Strict rules allocating the respective functions of the central European institutions and the member states will not guarantee liberty or a free market. Our Vicars of Bray must grasp above all that the abolition of Europe's nation states is a real live agenda. Jacques Chirac's blocking policy, described from a psychologist's view here by Linda Hall, may make joining the Euro less likely, as Sir Alan Peacock hopes, but there is no case for complacency. The Franco-German axis may further solidify and Mr Facing-both-Ways Blair may be convinced that the only way to regain influence in Europe is to join the single currency. The Europhiles in his own party will certainly want him to distance himself from Conservatives in Parliament and the 'Rightwing' papers which have supported his Iraq policy.

Above all, success in Iraq must not be prostituted in the interests of further *bien pensant* integration in Europe, or of fortification of the UN apparatus.

What is an American Conservative?

Roger Scruton

Here and there in the modern world you can find countries with conservative parties. Britain is one of them. But the United States is the last remaining country with a genuine conservative movement. This conservative movement is expressed in politics, in social initiatives among ordinary people, in the media, and in intellectual journals with an explicitly conservative message. True, political philosophy in the American academe has been dominated by liberals, and by the project to which the late John Rawls devoted his life, of producing a theory of justice that would vindicate the welfare state. Nevertheless, even in American universities, you can come across conservatives who are prepared to defend their beliefs.

In Britain there are very few academics who will publicly confess to conservative convictions. And we have only two noteworthy conservative journals: the weekly *Spectator*, and the quarterly *Salisbury Review*, whose small circulation is maintained almost exclusively by private subscription. In the United States, by contrast, conservative journals spring up constantly, find large and sympathetic readerships, and frequently attract funding from foundations and business. Yet another conservative journal has now appeared, and the high public profile of the journal's editor – Patrick Buchanan – will lead to much speculation about what is really meant by the journal's name: *American Conservative*. Maybe a British conservative can cast a little light on this.

It is a tautology to say that a conservative is a person who wants to conserve things: the question is what things? To this I think we can give a simple one-word answer, namely: us. At the heart of every conservative endeavour is the effort to conserve a historically given community. In any conflict the conservative is the one who sides with us against them – not knowing, but trusting. He is the one who looks for the good in the institutions, customs and habits that he has inherited. He is the one who seeks to defend and perpetuate an instinctive sense of loyalty, and who is therefore suspicious of all experiments and innovations that put loyalty at risk.

So defined, conservatism is less a philosophy than a temperament; but it is, I believe, a temperament that emerges naturally from the experience of society, and which is indeed necessary if societies are to endure. The conservative strives to diminish social entropy. The second law of thermodynamics implies that, in the long run, all conservatism must fail. But the same is true of life itself, and conservatism might equally be defined as the

social organism's 'will to live'.

Of course there are people without the conservative temperament. There are the radicals and innovators, who are impatient with the debris left by the dead; and their temperament, too, is a necessary ingredient in any healthy social mix. There are also the instinctive rebels of the Chomsky variety, who in every conflict side with them against us, who scoff at the ordinary loyalties of ordinary people, and who look primarily for what is bad in the institutions, customs and habits that define their historical community. Nevertheless by and large the future of any society depends upon the solid residue of conservative sentiment, which forms the ballast to every innovation, and the equilibrating process that makes innovation possible.

September 11th raised the question: who are we, that they should attack us, and what justifies our existence as a 'we'? American conservatism is an answer to that question. 'We the people', it says, constitute a nation, settled in a common territory under a common rule of law, bound by a single constitution and a common language and culture. Our primary loyalty is to this nation, and to the secular and territorially-based jurisdiction that makes it possible for our nation to endure. Our national loyalty is inclusive, and can be extended to newcomers: but only if they assume the duties and responsibilities, as well as the rights, of citizenship. And it is reinforced by customs and habits that have their origin in the Judaeo-Christian inheritance, and which must be constantly refreshed from that source if they are to endure. In the modern context, therefore, the American conservative is an opponent of 'multiculturalism', and of the liberal attempt to sever the constitution from the religious and cultural inheritance that first created it.

American conservatism welcomes enterprise, freedom and risk, and sees the bureaucratic state as the great corrupter of these goods. But its philosophy is not founded in economic theories. If conservatives favour the free market it is not because market solutions are the most efficient ways of distributing resources – although they are – but because they compel people to bear the costs of their own actions, and to become genuinely responsible citizens. Conservative reservations about the welfare state reflect the belief that welfare generates a dependency culture, in which responsibilities are drowned by rights.

The habit of claiming without earning is not confined only to the welfare machine. One of the most important conservative causes in America must surely be the reform of the jury system, which has allowed class actions and

frivolous claims – including claims by non-nationals – to sabotage the culture of honest reward, and to ensure that wealth, however honestly and diligently acquired, can at any moment be stolen from its producer to end up in the pocket of someone who has done nothing to deserve it.

It is one of the great merits of the conservative movement in America that it has seen the need to define its philosophy at the highest intellectual level. British conservatism has always been suspicious of ideas, and the only great modern conservative thinker in Britain who has tried to disseminate his ideas and theories through a journal – T.S. Eliot – was in fact an American. The title of Eliot's journal (*The Criterion*) was borrowed by Hilton Kramer, when he founded what is surely the only conservative journal in the contemporary world that is devoted entirely to ideas. Under the joint editorship of Hilton Kramer and Roger Kimball *The New Criterion* has bravely tried to break the cultural monopoly exerted by the left-liberal establishment, and is consequently read in our British universities with amazement, anger and (I like to think) self-doubt.

Eliot's influence has been spread in America by his disciple, Russell Kirk, who made clear to a whole generation that conservatism is not an economic but a cultural outlook, and that it would have no future if reduced merely to the philosophy of profit. Put bluntly, conservatism is not about profit but about loss: it survives and flourishes because people are in the habit of mourning their losses,

and resolving to safeguard against them.

This does not mean that conservatives are pessimists. In the American context they are the only true optimists, since they are the only ones with a clear vision of the future and a clear determination to bring that future into being. For the conservative temperament the future is the past. Hence, like the past, it is knowable and lovable. It follows that by studying the past of America – its traditions of enterprise, risk-taking, fortitude, piety and responsible citizenship – you can derive the best case for its future: a future in which the national loyalty will endure, holding things together, and providing all of us, liberals included, with our required sources of hope. This is the message that has been put across vividly by New York's *City Journal*, and it is interesting to compare its optimistic articles about the American underclass with the bleak vision of our English equivalent expressed in the same journal by Theodore Dalrymple.

September 11th was a wake-up call, through which liberals have managed to go on dreaming. American conservatives ought to seize the opportunity to utter those difficult and uncomfortable truths which have been censored out of recent debate: truths about national loyalty, about common culture and about the duties of citizenship. You never know, middle America might actually recognize itself at last, when addressed in this way.

Roger Scruton's latest book is The West and the Rest (Continuum and ISI Books, Wilmington DE)

Mote and Beam

Myles Harris

The English are not that keen on the Americans. America is feared, admired, hated and enjoyed all at the same time. Holidays in Florida are fine, we all use Visa, Madonna roars from our adolescents' bedrooms. But B52 bombers taking off from Brize Norton fill us all with dread. Are we in hock to a military superpower bent on world domination? Who will be next?

There will be a next. Large parts of the globe are now the equivalent of the rookeries of 19th century London. Gangster run slums ruled by political Fagins. Now the gangsters are beginning to spill on to our streets. 9/11 was a foretaste of what is in store.

But at least America is family. Most of us know that if we have to trust anybody then it might as well be those to whom we are most closely related. We certainly do not trust Europe. We have fought Germany twice in the last 100 years and France in its commercial and foreign relations with us seems bent on the pursuit of war by other means. For all its faults, America is a democracy like ours,

there are no concentration camps in its history, it has trial by jury, the people are sovereign. We have links which go back centuries. If the British had to choose a place of exile, America would certainly be most people's first choice.

But to the British intellectual left America is the supreme evil, a monument to greed and corruption, an empire set on dominating the world. The Soviet Gulags in which millions perished were nothing compared to the injustice of McCarthyism. Vietnam was far more wicked than the Soviet invasion of Hungary. There is nothing that America can do that is right. For the liberal middle classes America is Satan.

Such phobias are not new: Christians, Huguenots, Jews, Irish, Moslems have all in their time been the acolytes of what medieval man called the Great Adversary – the Devil. We need an enemy that is cunning yet stupid, powerful yet weak, who sees our every fault and preys on us. We need a figure we can blame for everything that goes wrong. It saves looking into the mirror.

A similar phenomenon exists on the right. In 1997 the Runnymede Trust became so concerned about right wing anti-Islamic prejudice it invented the word 'Islamophobia.' 'Islamophobia ...' announced the trust, 'has been coined because there is a new reality which needs naming – anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed so that it can be identified and acted against.' The trust suggested eight tests designed to find out if views on Islam were of an 'open' or 'closed' nature. 'Closed' views (the first part of each test) are Islamophobic. They are compared with 'open' views – part of legitimate political debate, the second section of each test.

The tests are:—1. Whether Islam is seen as monolithic and static, or as diverse and dynamic. 2. Whether Islam is seen as other and separate, or as similar and interdependent. 3. Whether Islam is seen as inferior, or as different but equal. 4. Whether Islam is seen as an aggressive enemy or as a cooperative partner. 5. Whether Muslims are seen as manipulative or as sincere. 6. Whether Muslim criticisms of 'the West' are rejected or debated. 7. Whether discriminatory behaviour against Muslims is defended or opposed. 8. Whether anti-Muslim discourse is seen as natural or as problematic.

Islamophobia rapidly entered the liberal dictionary. It had the added advantage of tripping easily off the tongue. It also suggested that the sufferer might be afflicted by a clinical condition and had lost touch with reality. Yet, while hastening to point out the mote of anti-Muslim prejudice in the eye of the political right, the left has failed to recognise the huge beam in its own eye, its pathological hatred of America. Replace the word Islam with America in the eight tests and there is nothing to choose between Islamophobia and Americanophobia.

Americanophobia like Islamophobia has all the characteristics of racism. Just as Nazi apologists suggested that the Jews must somehow have deserved their fate at the hands of Hitler, 'Why is it that the Jews never ask why they were so hated?' so after 9/11, apologists for anti-Americanism began asking what had America done to 'deserve' the attack. It became smart and caring to be openly anti-American, just as, one suspects, it was smart in Germany in 1938 to nod knowingly when the word 'Jew' was mentioned. If anything goes wrong you have not far to look.

Like any racist delusion there is nothing the victim can do that is right: America, phobics complain, has too much influence in the world. Its culture is everywhere. They accuse the US administration of having a negligible grasp of foreign cultures, an ignorance, they say, reflected in a population of whom only 20% hold a passport. Americans are naïve, ill educated, simplistic and isolationist. The news that Bush follows a religion which has him praying on his knees in the Oval Office each day was seized upon as evidence of this. It reinforced the idea that like Reagan – another quintessential American – he is not very bright. Only able to grasp very simple ideas he has turned to comforting certitudes of neo-conservative advisors who make

Dr Strangelove look like a multicultural outreach worker. The Iraqi war, the left was sure, was something America was going to lose.

'Once they go blundering into the Middle East 100,000 people will die.' No army in history captured so much territory so quickly for so little loss of life.

'They will be bogged down in the sands of Iraq, this is a Vietnam.' The American advance on Baghdad was so swift and surefooted the Iraqi troops broke and fled.

'Once they enter the city they will face another Stalingrad as the Republican guard (the BBC set much store by the Republican Guard) will fight US troops street by street to a standstill.' The city was taken in five days.

America now contemplates reconstructing a society that has endured thirty years of gangster rule. Saddam Hussein and his tribe were the Middle Eastern equivalent of the Sopranos or the Mafia, a criminal family who managed to seize control, not of a handful of protection rackets and brothels, but a whole country. As a result, nothing is left of its civil society. Iraq's police, judiciary and bureaucracy are all fatally tainted by gangsterism. Like the rebuilding of post-war Germany and Japan, a huge leap of political faith will be required.

The liberal left are not going to make that leap. Some aid agencies although perfectly happy to work with kleptocracies anywhere else in the world began by declaring their unwillingness to work with the Americans. Now they talk about having a 'space' in Iraq where they can work unhindered. If their record elsewhere is anything to go by this means creating an aid-dependent society which will never get off its knees. There are calls for the UN, a byword for misrule and fat cattery, to take over the government. Violent demonstrations have taken place in Athens against the US and British. What alternative are they rioting for? The return of the neo-Nazi Ba'ath Party? Less extreme liberal opinion wants both Russia and France, notwithstanding both were Hussein's quartermasters over two decades of murder and repression, to help 'reconstruct' Iraq.

Yet, if America were to succeed, in ten years Iraq would be a country in which every citizen could have a right to land tenure and a vote. And if the Americans applied the same enlightened vision to Iraq as they did to Japan it would also be the first country in the Middle East where church and state were separated. The genius of the American Revolution was not just to throw off a monarchy but to separate church and state. America is a secular society in which all religions can flourish. Arabia is a religious society in which only elites, blessed by the clergy, can flourish.

Why would anybody want to resist their overthrow? The intellectual middle classes in Europe have never been happy with democracy. We have a strong tradition that the poor are not to be trusted. It accounts for opposition to free markets, our dirigiste centralised states, the subtle class control exercised by our state broadcast media and our prolonged love affair with Marxism.

It is why American democracy has always been an affront. It means the rule of the ill-educated, the tasteless

and the loud. True class division in Europe is less visible than it was fifty years ago. Technology, often from America, has brought wealth. Wealth brings choice. If you do not like the BBC, you can buy a satellite dish and watch Sky. If you do not like state schools you can buy a private education. And you can leave. But in the third world there are no opportunities to escape. The poor remain poor and the rich get richer by the day. The rich know if they give an inch to the mob, they will find themselves on the nearest lamp post. The poor have to fail for them to survive. What better a diversion from the guilt and shame this engenders than to seek an external enemy in the United States?

It is hatred of the United States which links our radicalised middle classes and terrorism in the Middle East.

The anti-American rioters in Athens last week are only different from the twin towers bombers in their determination. Will they win? Not if we recognise anti-Americanism as racism and not politics. If we do not, fantastic delusions about American power and malign influence will gain ground in western Europe, until a day not so far off when we will find ourselves confronting America, perhaps over some US official we have arraigned before the International Criminal Court in the Hague, or a clash of the new European army with American troops somewhere in the third world. How will the British choose then?

Myles Harris is a practising doctor and the author of Tomorrow is another Country, what is wrong with the UK's Asylum policy? (Civitas) 2003, £5

Islam's War Against the West: Can It Abide a Secular State?

Antony Flew

The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. were 'profoundly religious acts'.

Why does anyone pretend that they were not when Osama bin Laden himself insists that they were? For the general public the main reason for this pretence is presumably an almost total ignorance of Islamic teachings. But any responsible politician in any of those Christian or post-Christian countries that since World War II have been subjected to substantial immigrations from Muslim countries must, whatever the extent of their knowledge of the teachings of Islam, feel a heavy duty to do all they can to spread the conviction – at least among the members and descendants of those immigrants – that Osama bin Laden's terrorist war against the United States and its allies is radically incompatible with the actual teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.

The truth is that whereas Christianity, for the first three centuries of its remarkable expansion in the face of successive persecutions, made all its converts by peaceful individual persuasion, Islam already during the later years of the prophet's own lifetime – from the time of the move from Mecca to Medina – was gaining most of its converts as a result of military victories. And after his death Islam soon showed itself to be – in post-Marxist terms – the uniting and justifying ideology of Arab imperialism. This beginning has had lasting consequences for the relations between Islam and all other religions.

When in 1920 Bertrand Russell visited the USSR – decades before the Politburo found it convenient to present itself as the protector of the Arabs – he discerned similarities between Bolshevism and Islam: 'Bolshevism combines the characteristics of the French Revolution with those of the rise of Islam'; and 'Marx

has taught that Communism is fatally predestined to come about; this produces a state of mind not unlike that of the early successors of Mahommet.' So Russell himself concluded: 'Mohammedanism and Bolshevism are practical, social, unspiritual, concerned to win the empire of this world... What Mohammedanism did for the Arabs, Bolshevism may do for the Russians.'

As a clear authoritative epitome of the totalitarian character of Islam, consider this manifesto issued in Leicester, England, on behalf of the Islamic Council of Europe:

The religion of Islam embodies the final and most complete word of God... Departmentalisation of life into different water-tight compartments, religious and secular, sacred and profane, spiritual and material is ruled out ... *Islam is not a religion in the Western understanding of the word. It is a faith and a way of life, a religion and a social order; a doctrine and a code of conduct, a set of values and principles, and a social movement to realise them in history* [emphasis supplied].

This is a statement that satisfactorily transcends all differences within and between various Muslim communities, such as those between Sunni and Shi'a, or between the so-called fundamentalists and their opponents. The term *fundamentalist* is anyway in the present case peculiarly inappropriate. It is derived from the title of a series of tracts – *The Fundamentals* – published in the United States in 1909; and it is defined as the belief that the Bible, as the Word of God, is wholly, literally, and infallibly true – a belief that, notoriously, commits fundamentalist Christians to defending the historicity of the accounts of Creation given in the first two chapters of Genesis. To rate as truly a Christian it is not necessary to be in this understanding fundamentalist. It is instead sufficient to accept

the Apostles' and/or the Nicene Creed wholeheartedly. But in order to be properly accounted a Muslim it is essential to be a fundamentalist about the Qur'an.

The Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, recognised the truth of those last two emphasized statements from the Islamic Council of Europe when he boldly declared in September 2001 'We must be aware of the superiority of our civilization, a system that has guaranteed the well-being, respect for human rights and – in contrast with Islamic countries – respect for religious and political rights.' Just as soon as they learned that Berlusconi had uttered these words, a bevy of European politicians rushed forward to denounce him. The Belgian prime minister, Guy Verhofstadt, said, 'I can hardly believe that the Italian prime minister made such statements.' The spokesman for the European Commission, Jean-Christophe Filori, added: 'We certainly do not share the views expressed by Signor Berlusconi.' Italy's centre-left opposition spokesman Giovanni Berlinguer called the words of Berlusconi 'eccentric and dangerous'. Within days he was effectively forced to withdraw those politically most incorrect words.

Islam and the State

One especially good way of revealing the practical consequences of Islam's not being 'a religion in the Western understanding of the word' but being instead 'a religion and a social order, a doctrine and ... a set of values and principles and a *social movement to realise them in history*' is by considering the history of the creation of Pakistan.

When in India during the 1920s M. A. Ansari was promoting the Nationalist Muslim Party, he believed that a future whole-continent state of independent India could be religiously neutral, to the extent of accommodating both Hindus and Muslims as equal citizens. But his party failed to win substantial Muslim support. Instead Muslims in India throughout that decade retreated from the original ideal of all-Indian nationalism towards the eventually realized ideal of the two separate communities of Hindus and Muslims forming two separate independent states.

The Muslims opted decisively for an exclusively religious rather than a secular pluralist identity. It proved impossible for Ansari or anyone else to overcome this Islamic predisposition and to persuade the majority of Indian Muslims to be willing to coexist with Indian Hindus in the secular nation state envisaged by Nehru, the leader of the Indian National Congress. Nehru had declared: 'There shall be no state religion ... nor shall the state either directly or indirectly endow any religion...' As early as April 1929 the Muslim League leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah had opposed that ideal with his Fourteen Points. In these he had insisted that state neutrality was not enough and that it was state support that Muslims demanded. This Muslim position had already been foreshadowed as early as 1870, when various *imams* in Northern India issued a famous fatwa to the effect that India was Dar-al-Islam – 'Islamic Territory' –

in virtue of the positive protection given to Islamic observance by the laws of the (British) Indian Empire.

When in 1906 the newly elected (classically) Liberal administration in London took some tentative steps towards the ultimate establishment of an independent, democratically self-governing nation state in India, it began to discover what it was extremely reluctant to learn, that a secular, pluralist state grounded in universal adult suffrage was unacceptable to Muslims. It was and is unacceptable because it is, apparently, contrary to the Islamic *dhimma*. This excluded all non-Muslims other than 'People of the Book' from any political rights whatever. 'People of the Book' – mainly if not solely Christians and Jews – are tolerated as tribute-paying citizens of an Islamic state, though without any form of franchise beyond their own religious community.

In the Indian case, the subsequent course of events is fairly well known. Muslims, having rejected the all-Indian nationalism espoused by Ansari, were unable to reconcile themselves to the prospect of citizenship in a secular, pluralist state. In 1940 the Muslim League, unwilling to tolerate the consequences of the wider franchise that this required, demanded and was given what amounted to a constitutional veto. The eventual independence agreement in 1947 resulted, after a huge amount of inter-communal slaughter, in the separation from India of the main overwhelmingly Muslim areas other than Kashmir, and the consequent emergence of East and West Pakistan. Kashmir was retained by India because its hereditary ruler was a Hindu and Nehru himself was a Kashmiri Brahmin. As for East Pakistan, it eventually became Bangladesh. Since then, whereas India has achieved an unblemished record of democratic self-government, becoming by far the most populous democracy in the world, Pakistan and the two other provinces of the former British Empire in which Muslims formed a very substantial majority have not. At the time of writing, a Pakistani academic was under prosecution for the capital offence of defection from Islam.

The first communal catastrophe in Nigeria after its independence was a civil war in which the Muslim and animist majority suppressed an independence revolt by the Christian Ibo. In the suppression of this revolt at least a million Ibo lost their lives. When later, in 1973, a military coup overthrew an administration that was said to have been outstandingly corrupt even by Nigerian standards, but which had been elected on an adult franchise that included Christian and animists as well as Muslims, students at Bayero, Kano, and other universities in the overwhelmingly Muslim part of the country, paraded carrying banners which proclaimed in Hausa, Arabic, and English: 'Democracy is unbelief: We do not want a constitution, We want government by the Qur'an alone.'

The second of those 'two other provinces of the former British Empire in which Muslims formed a very substantial majority' was what in the days of that Empire was called the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. This has become

by far the worst case of all. For many years, forces of different kinds from the overwhelmingly Muslim north have been striving by different methods and with different degrees of intensity to subjugate the equally overwhelmingly Christian and animist south. Most recently and most scandalously, the northern authorities have been permitting if not positively encouraging brown-skinned Muslims from the north to enslave Blacks, and particularly Christian Blacks in the south.

Transforming Societies – and the world

It has long been obvious that the same Islamic predispositions – an inability to come to terms with state secularism, religious pluralism, and universal adult suffrage, of which the mirror image is a visceral longing for the hermetic and exclusive theocracy of traditional Islam – have been forming the attitudes of the Muslim immigrant population of Western Europe, especially Britain, in much the same measure as they have those of Muslims elsewhere, confronted with democratic pluralism. A general statement of the Muslim position will be found in Sheikh Shabbir Akhtar's *Be Careful with Muhammad: the Salman Rushdie Affair*. This is far more than just a defense of the Muslim stand in that affair. Despite the author's protestations to the contrary, it is difficult to see it as other than an implicit justification of the Muslims' right to set up an Islamic theocracy in Britain as the only solution to the problem of the Muslim theocrat's irreconcilable confrontation with secularism. He says:

Yet one needs to rise above one's ethnocentricity to see what cultural memories the democracy evokes in the Muslim mind. For theocracy is as precious to Muslims as democracy is to Westerners....

I myself have no difficulty at all in understanding 'what cultural memories theocracy evokes in the Muslim mind'. But, as usual refusing to heed calls for political correctness, I insist on saying that I have myself no sympathy whatsoever for the egregious arrogance of this demand from recent immigrants and the descendants of recent immigrants into my native land. If they truly find life in a secular state intolerable, why do they not now return to the Islamic states from which they came rather than demanding that the host country make radical constitutional changes to accommodate them?

It is characteristic of a secular, pluralist democracy that all religious beliefs, are tolerated as long as they remain, within reason, a question of personal belief, and do not impinge unduly upon those who do not share those beliefs. Or, to put it another way, while religious beliefs are tolerated, religious practices and institutions may not necessarily be accorded the same freedom if they conflict with the law or constitution of the wider state. But this 'live and let live' approach is apparently unacceptable to many Muslim spokesmen, of whose attitudes the following quotation is typical: 'The implementation of Islam as a complete code of life cannot be limited to the home and to personal relationships. It is to be sought and achieved in society as a whole.'

Those words were preached from the *minbar* of Bradford, England's, mosque. A well-known *imam* in France is reported as preaching, 'There can be no government contrary to what God has revealed' (in the Qur'an). He concludes that it is the duty of every Muslim to overthrow every power 'which governs in contravention of that which God enjoins and (to bring about) the erection of the Islamic state'. In more moderate terms, but to the same effect, Sheikh Shabbir Akhtar says:

Our inherited (Islamic) understanding of religious freedom, of the nature and role of religion in society is in the last analysis being fundamentally challenged by the new religious pluralism in Britain.

Behind this, too, surely lies the plea articulated by Jinnah, that Islam must be protected from the consequences of democratic pluralism.

Perhaps the most direct expression of Muslim defiance of Western-style democracy is the following, uncompromising statement issued jointly by the two most representative Islamic organizations in Britain, the Islamic Academy of Cambridge, and the Islamic Cultural Centre of London. This statement insists that the Muslim community: 'cannot commit itself to follow all "current laws" however anti-religious these laws may become *through democratic means*' (emphasis supplied). Quotations are given to illustrate Muslim attitudes of discontent with state neutrality towards Islam; a visceral objection to living under pluralist dispensation; an inability to accept the authority of democratic decision-making when this conflicts with revelation; and a refusal to contemplate the possibility of Islam existing simply as a personal belief system, shorn of its political and social institutions. Such quotations could be multiplied indefinitely. They are clearly constants of the Muslim world outlook whether in the context of post-imperial India, Nigeria, the Sudan, or Muslim settlement in Western Europe.

The nature of this world outlook can be further elucidated by expounding the views of Dr. Kalim Siddiqui, director of the London Muslim Institute. He became notorious by publicly calling for Muslims to murder Salman Rushdie, author of *The Satanic Verses*, an indisputably criminal offence for which, since he was an Arab Muslim, he was of course neither arrested nor prosecuted. Siddiqui is the moving spirit of an international Islamic tendency inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini's Iranian Revolution. The aims of this tendency are set out as follows

to eliminate all authority other than Allah and His Prophet; to eliminate nationalism in all its shapes and forms, in particular the nation-State; to unite all Islamic movements into a single global Islamic movement to establish the Islamic State; to re-establish a dominant and global Islamic civilisation based on the concept of *Tawheed* [the unity of Allah].

Nationalism, the nation-state, and democracy for Siddiqui represent *Kufr*, literally infidelity but equivalent in a modern context to atheism. Thus the greatest political *Kufr* in the modern world is nationalism, followed

closely by democracy ('sovereignty of the people'), socialism ('dictatorship of the proletariat'), capitalism, and free elections. And 'modern kufr has disguised itself as science, philosophy, technology, democracy and "progress".' On the contrary, the 'political party framework as found in Western "democracies" is divisive of the society and therefore does not suit the *Ummah*' (the worldwide Islamic community). He concludes that 'one *Ummah* must mean one Islamic movement, leading to one global Islamic State under one Imam/Khalifa [Caliph]'.

For Siddiqui, 'there is no compatibility whatsoever between Islam and the west' and the Islamic Movement 'regards the west as totally incompatible with Islam'. The notion that a Muslim may live under the government of non-Islamic nation state and still practice his Islam as a personal belief system is apparently unacceptable to Siddiqui, for 'A Muslim can neither live the "good life" on his own nor pursue "personal *taqwa*" [faithfulness to Allah] in isolation'. Dr. Siddiqui concluded one of his published essays with the following rallying cry, addressed to his fellow Muslims among whom, one must assume, are those in Britain:

Just as the power and influence of *kufr* in the modern world is global, so are the bonds of faith and destiny of the Muslim *Ummah*. History has come full circle. The global power of *kufr* waits to be challenged and defeated by the global power of Islam. This is the unfinished business of history, so let us go ahead and finish it.

The achievement of Siddiqui's aims certainly does not exclude armed force: 'Lightly-armed *muttawi* [faithful to Allah] soldiers who go out to fight and die for Islam are more powerful than the heavily-armed professional soldiers who fear death.' Moreover, the odds are in Islam's favor: 'With a population of almost one billion and with infinite sources of wealth, you can defeat all the powers.' It is therefore possible for the Muslims to bring about 'the total transformation of the world'. Dr. Siddiqui is particularly scornful of the compromisers who have been trying to prove Islam compatible with their secular ambitions and Western preferences, and contemptuous of those who seek to set up 'a liberal and democratic nation-state with a few cosmetic "Islamic" features'.

Resistance to Reform

The moral from all that British material remains clear. If we are to understand the nature of Islam, and to meet and overcome the threat that it presents to the entire Western world, we have now to abandon assumptions that were sufficiently realistic when we were dealing with earlier threats to that world. Before World War II for instance, it was common to speak of the United States as a tri-faith country. During that war a popular song insisted that the 'Smiths and the Jones, the Kellys and Cohns' were all equally committed to the war effort of the U.S.A. That was their country as Americans, regardless of their present religious beliefs or the countries from which their parents or grandparents had originated. After that war, President Eisenhower made a remark that my theologian

father thought could only have been made by an American president: 'Everyone must have a religion, and I don't care what it is.' Such indifference was all very well, indeed properly presidential, at a time when the United States had very few Muslim citizens.

Certainly it is possible for people professedly committed to aggressively incompatible religious beliefs to live together in friendly toleration. But this is achieved only by the more or less conscious and explicit abandonment of those of their pretended beliefs that would make such friendly and tolerant cohabitation impossible. So the possibility of such cohabitation is irrelevant to the question of what the relevant teachings of the Qur'an actually are. But because of these possibilities of friendly cohabitation it was not preposterous for President Bill Clinton to say in 1994, in an address to the Jordanian Parliament:

After all, the chance to live in harmony with our neighbours and to build a better life for our children is the hope that binds us all together. Whether we worship in a mosque in Irbid, a Baptist church like my own in Little Rock, Arkansas, or a synagogue in Haifa, we are bound together by that hope.

It was not preposterous for President Clinton to say this in an address to the parliament of a country of which almost the entire population is Muslim. For Jordan – unlike, for instance, Iraq and Saudi Arabia – does have an effective parliament, and its king at that time was a man who had made peace with Israel and succeeded in defeating a terrorist offensive against his own country. But for an account of the actual teachings of the Qur'an and of their great and growing threat to Western civilization it will be instructive to note a warning from an earlier century.

Sir William Muir's *Life of Mahomet*, based on original Muslim sources, appeared in Edinburgh in four volumes between 1856 and 1861. Muir's judgement on the life, which was to be repeated over and over again by subsequent scholars, was based upon a distinction between its earlier Meccan and later Medinan period. In Mecca, Muhammad was a sincere, religiously motivated seeker after truth. In Medina, Muhammad the man showed his feet of clay, and was corrupted by power and by worldly ambitions. Muir maintained that so long as the Qur'an remained the standard of Islamic belief, certain evils would continue to flourish: 'Polygamy, divorce and slavery strike at the root of public morals, poison domestic life, and disorganise society; while the Veil removes the female sex from its just position and influence in the world ... Freedom of thought and private judgement are crushed and annihilated. Toleration is unknown, and the possibility of free and liberal institutions is foreclosed.' Muir's final judgement was: 'The sword of Mahomet and the Coran [the Qur'an] are the most stubborn enemies of Civilization, Liberty and Truth which the world has yet known.'

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Is Joining The Euro Inevitable ?

Alan Peacock

There are several attractions in using the Euro as a medium of exchange, and it is likely to become a parallel currency in the UK with those from the Continent using London and Channel Ports as convenient shopping centres. But this provides no reason for regarding this situation as a step towards joining the Eurosystem. That must mean becoming a member of a federal state endowed with economic controls, including fiscal, monetary and regulatory powers, which will further distance the apparatus of government from our citizens. This concentration of power will not simply result in a mere transfer of control of government taxation and expenditure to a federal authority. The necessary coordination of economic policy backed by the panoply of legal instruments designed to give it effect will require a further increase in government interference. For those who value freedom, this is too high a price to pay.

Much of the debate about whether or not to join a federal Europe must therefore involve value judgements. An intriguing matter is speculation about what will actually happen. Some simple economics might help here. Economists' analysis of human behaviour need not be confined to producers and consumers in the private sector, but can be developed in order to examine the actions of politicians and bureaucrats. This avoids a false dichotomy between supposedly mean sensual citizens and enlightened members of the legislatures and government officials many of whom claim to know better than we do where our interests lie. In this cynical age, one is not surprised at the obvious conclusion, confirmed by economic analysis, that politicians and bureaucrats, as individuals, have their own agenda. Power and prestige replace profit maximization in their personal aims, but always provided that these are accompanied by the prospect of generous emoluments and pension rights. These aims must be more substantially fulfilled as government interference and associated growth in public spending increases as would be the case in a Euro federation.

Consider politicians. A growing number appear to have limited experience of the world outside politics. They have a vested interest in holding on to their jobs in the House of Commons or in less prestigious legislatures including the European Parliament. The longer they serve, the more fringe benefits they acquire, pension rights included. Even if they lose their seats, a considerable proportion, notably those who have heeded the

Party Whips, will find employment directly as the result of the complications of modern governance. They can become advisers to firms negotiating government contracts, party officials or lobbyists for professional organizations battling with the ever-growing threat of regulation. The list is endless. In particular, let us not forget the patronage that ensures that more senior politicians who lose their seats and their Ministerial posts can be compensated by lucrative positions in international organizations in the gift of the government in power.

The list of professional groups benefiting from expansion of government is a long one – clear enough in the case of civil servants and the huge number of government agencies, notably those providing extended opportunities to regulate the economy. That very growth, which is meat and drink to the EC, must produce a 'hidden' civil service of accountants, lawyers, economists employed by or giving *ad hoc* advice to firms whose profitability increasingly depends on how they can influence or mitigate the impact of government policies covering everything from tax to environmental controls. The continuing centralization of educational and health services brings in its train the same problem of turning the interface with government into a huge bargaining arena, calling for an army of negotiators and 'facilitators'.

Having argued that a federal Europe calls for an expansion of government to meet the Eurosystem aims as set out in Maastricht, any incentive to avoid joining the system must be blunted by these implied employment opportunities. Our ambitious politicians can look for a wider stage on which to act as world leaders; likewise our senior bureaucrats whose status and, no doubt, emoluments will be improved. It is in the interests of political parties in the position to form governments to extend the fruits of patronage to their rivals for power, so that those who lose elections can be awarded consolation prizes of the Kinnock variety, that is to say some superior and prestigious form of sheltered housing. The judicial services can become poised to expand their activities as the complicated skein of Euro-federal legislation has to be unravelled. There are heaven-sent opportunities for state-financed academics to thrive on a giddy round of international committees and conferences in the name of international understanding. (Who could resist attending a European psycho-therapy conference where a lead paper is entitled: 'Training in goal-corrected empathic attunement: the process of affect regulation

within the instinctive systems of care-seeking and care-giving' (*University of York Magazine*, June 2002).

Very well, perhaps I exaggerate and am too much in the thrall of the economist's curse of extrapolation. 'Events, dear boy, events', as Harold Macmillan reminded us, have a curious habit of producing structural breaks in the evolution of society, which is why political prognosticators have to add caveats which absolve them from delineating the precise nature and timing of future events. In any case employing the economic analysis of public choice would not be complete without taking account of feedback effects. These could include a concomitant growth of tax avoidance and evasion, even a European-

wide tax revolt. This would be fostered by the 'alienation' of an electorate whose power would be further circumscribed in the centralised democracy that a grand design European state must entail. The single-minded pursuit of this grand design could also result in a period of considerable political instability. So this up-to-date version of a '*trahison des clercs*' could be scuppered by '*l'audace du peuple*'. The only way to avoid being troubled by potential social disasters of this kind is not to join in creating the conditions that could bring them about.

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A European Constitution?

Norman Barry

Talk of a European Constitution is in the air again. Believers in limited government and free markets are naturally predisposed towards legalism to protect individual liberty against the demands of an insatiable government. The objective judgements of the judiciary, compared to the febrile demands of the politicians driven by interest group pressures and the electoral timetable, are assumed to be efficient protectors of liberty and the market. All that is required is a body of strict rules that clearly allocates the respective roles of the central European institutions and the member states. There is a demand for 'transparency' in these respective functions. Isn't the United States a perfect example of constitutionalism?

The answer to all these questions is a resounding no. The history of Europe since 1957 has been an inexorable process of the centralisation of political and legal authority. What began as a free-trading area that preserved legal autonomy to the member states has become a nascent superstate whose rulers are determined to eliminate the last vestiges of jurisdictional competition. It has done this largely by judicial activism, by which the original meanings of treaties are distorted so as to advance the project of 'ever closer union'.

From its inception the original European Economic Community was designed to enforce the 'four freedoms', of goods, services, people and capital, and its legislation, passed by the Council of Ministers, was subject to unanimity, thanks to de Gaulle. The bulk of law and taxation was a matter for the member states who could compete with each other in offering a variety of legal and economic rules. But from its earliest days the European Court of Justice was determined to abolish jurisdictional competition in favour of uniformity. In 1964, the *ENEL v. Costa* case, it was decided that, in a

conflict, European law should take precedence over domestic law. There was not a shred of justification for this in the founding Treaty of Rome. This was soon followed by a ruling that allowed the direct applicability of Directives to member states (these, unlike Regulations, are supposed to be adjusted to local circumstances and may therefore vary across the continent).

The advance towards centralisation was achieved by the Single European Act (1986). Ironically this had good free market credentials. A number of member states had held up progress towards a genuine free market by making use of unanimity in the Council of Ministers. Some, for example, had restricted the free movement of capital right up to monetary union. The introduction of qualified majority voting was necessary therefore for a free market to be achieved. However, the Single European Act has introduced a mania for harmonisation. The Union is rapidly acquiring common welfare, labour and environmental laws; largely set by Germany and France who fear the competition from poorer countries prepared to offer less demanding standards in order to attract foreign capital. Acquiescence to the restrictive rules is bought by hand-outs from central European funds. One suspects that the passive British would only be aroused to action if the length of the cricket pitch were metricated in the name of harmonisation.

Britain has historically favoured jurisdictional competition but is losing the argument. Oddly enough, the most controversial example of judicial involvement, the famous *Factortame* (1990) case was legally acceptable. This ruling meant that the Merchant Shipping Act (1988), which effectively prevented Spanish fishermen landing their catches in British ports, was struck down as it was clearly in breach of the four freedoms adumbrated

in the Treaty of Rome. But later judicial activism had malign effects. In an employment case of 1994, a perfectly good statute, which allowed lower redundancy payments for part time workers, was invalidated because it was allegedly in breach of various European equality provisions. Apparently, this was so because most part time workers are women. The apogee of judicial activism was reached when the Working Time Directive was upheld in 1999 on the false ground that it was a Health and Safety measure, which does not require unanimity. The next step will be the abolition of tax competition. Ireland is already in trouble for offering extraordinary low corporation tax. Tax harmonisation means that taxes will go up.

The reason why courts and politicians are opposed to jurisdictional competition is that it would reduce their power and income. Most of their personnel earn economic 'rent', i.e. the excess over the income they would earn in a competitive labour market. Everybody is a self-interested utility maximiser (though utility functions might vary slightly they can be assumed to embrace money and power) and politicians are no different, despite their protestations that they are disinterested servants of the public. Just look at the salaries, expenses and tax advantages of European civil servants and politicians. As Adam Smith once said: 'I have never known much good done by he who affects to trade for the public good'. It is a mistake, then, to see the European Union as some sort of Franco-German conspiracy: it is truly international organisation of rent seekers. Proper jurisdictional competition would seriously reduce this.

America is no help. Its Constitution clearly delineates (under the Tenth Amendment) the respective roles for the federal government and the states but that has not held. Throughout the twentieth century an activist Supreme Court upheld a succession of Congressional measures that increased the power of the centre. In one case, *Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority* (1985), all constitutional protection of the state autonomy was abandoned. Federalism (i.e. jurisdictional competition) was apparently satisfied by the representation of the states in Congress. Now over 70 per cent of public spending is by Washington and only 7 per cent by the states. The exact reverse of 1900.

In fact, the founding of the US Constitution has relevance to the current state of Europe but its true significance has not been noted. The anti-federalists opposed the new system precisely because they (correctly) believed that it would destroy localism and liberty and lead to a centralised state. They were actually genuine federalists who believed in jurisdictional competition but the word was stolen by the advocates of the Constitution. In Europe the centralists are called federalists; but they stand for the exact reverse of what the word originally meant. The American anti-federalists correctly anticipated the behaviour of the so-called independent judiciary. How could it be neutral between the

centre and the states when it was a national body itself? It isn't neutral, it has struck down little more than 100 federal statutes yet thousands emanating from the states have been ruled unconstitutional. And won't the Supreme Court twist the meaning of the Constitution, asked the anti-federalists? It has. Judicial activists now talk about the 'living Constitution'.

Adherents of limited government must abandon the notion that liberty can ever be protected by a constitution. The European Court of Justice is not a common law court, honouring precedent and deciding cases non-politically: it is a tribunal with a mission. The only constitution in the world that has preserved some sort of liberty and genuine federalism is the Swiss. Despite the nationalisation of some things, including welfare, the cantons still spend more than the federal government and there is genuine competition between them. The Swiss have wisely resisted all blandishments, by their *national* leaders, to get entangled in European arrangements. They are, of course, helped in all this by referendums and citizens' initiative.

The last thing we need is an extension of European-wide *parliamentary* democracy. How can a population of 350 million keep the elite of politicians in check? Given the costs and benefits (derisory) of voting, the right response of the citizen is rational apathy and ignorance. For the sake of liberty and prosperity the 'democratic deficit' must be preserved. As was wisely observed about a hundred years ago; 'The citizen's liberty and prosperity are never in greater danger than when the legislature is in session'.

The only protection for liberty is competition – whether for soap, taxation or law. The only way Britain can preserve some semblance of jurisdictional competition is to exercise its veto, the potency of which has been inexorably reduced by Treaty. Still, we did manage to resist the 'withholding tax' on financial deals, a measure that would have adversely affected the City of London. But the future is not promising. The Eurofanatics want to abolish the veto and introduce straight majority voting in European institutions. There are no more efficient methods to increase power and income of European officials', elected or not. The final, and ultimately decisive, method of the centralists is to make secession extraordinarily difficult. It will apparently require a three quarters majority of the member states and a two thirds majority of the European Parliament. Fear of mass walk out is one of the few things that might restrain the centralising proclivities of the Eurofanatics. The right of secession must therefore be emasculated.

It took the intelligentsia and the political class decades to recognise the virtues of competition for the production of ordinary goods and services. They are unlikely to understand its value in tax and law. It is not in their interest to do so.

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France Discovers a Third Way

Linda Hall

The *Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of world order*, written by American political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, in 1996 was described by no less than Henry Kissinger as: 'One of the most important books to have emerged since the end of the cold war.' Since the atrocities of September 11th 2001 it has rightly acquired an almost biblical status. In it Huntington restates the conventional theory that declining states can only react to an ascending state in one of two ways: they can balance or they can bandwagon. Balancing involves forming alliances and agreements with neighbours to maintain some degree of international equilibrium. Bandwagoning, as our own Prime Minister puts it, means literally 'standing shoulder to shoulder'. Stephen P. Walt in his *Dominos and Bandwagons* of 1991 cautions: 'Bandwagoning is risky because it requires trust. It is safer to balance.' Currently, Turkey is a good example of a balancing power as the belly dancer of satirical cartoon tries to weigh the advantages of allowing entry to American troops against French sponsorship for a long-sought admittance to the European Union.

However, under Jacques Chirac France has discovered a third way; instead of bandwagoning or balancing it can block. Whether blocking is an irrational response or a deliberately anti-rational one does not matter; blocking is strong and people admire strength in their leaders. Last year I noticed a picture of Stalin hanging from the mirror in a Moscow taxicab. When I asked the young driver why he was displaying this image of the dread tyrant his answer boiled down to one word: 'Strong'. Similarly, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, Hitler, without any rational reason whatsoever, declared war upon the United States.

Hearing this his then young Armaments Minister, the famously intellectual Albert Speer, was lost in admiration. 'We were even proud,' he recalled to Gitta Sereny in 1978, 'that Hitler had stolen his (Roosevelt's) thunder.' Observing the negotiations at Versailles that ended the First World War, Harold Nicholson sadly commented:

'The factor of stupidity is inseparable from all human affairs. It is too often disregarded as an inevitable concomitant of human behaviour; it is too often employed merely as a term of personal affront.' What could be regarded as the present stupidity of Jacques Chirac may be frustrating and infuriating to foreign observers, but in the final analysis that is simply irrelevant: In a modern democratic sovereign state such stupidity wins votes.

What is the point of Chirac's continued, immediate, unthinking and sight-unseen blockings? However much sheer bloody-minded Gallic fun it all might be, we may

assume that there is some wider political objective. Three possible motives immediately spring to mind: Firstly, as a piece of old-fashioned balance of power politics, Chirac's blocking technique might help create a French-led Franco-Russo-German faction in the West to offset the emerging USA-UK-New Europe grouping. Secondly, blocking might be a piece of brinkmanship to gain an even better deal when blocking is eventually dropped in favour of bargaining. If this is the case, Chirac will have to move extremely quickly if he is not to miss the bus and Elf-Aquitaine and Fina-Total will be the losers. Thirdly, blocking may be just a cynical political device to assure Chirac's own job and his place in French history as a strong man.

Whatever the motive, blocking may in the end prove to be a more effective career move for Jacques Chirac than Tony Blair's bandwagoning with George W. Bush. Furthermore, if, without a quick victory and vindication, Blair should fall from office, then bandwagoning with the United States of America could become regarded as an elaborate form of political suicide. As Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, once observed more than 250 years ago: 'If an honest man knew with what little wisdom the world was governed, he would not sleep easy in his bed.'

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[Editors Note: This was written before the outcome of the war in Iraq was known]



Salus Populi Suprema Lex

Margaret Brown

In the Dark Ages each village supported a group of armed men controlled by a lord. Systems and titles differed but the basic set-up was the same. The peasants felt the burden of feeding them and housing them in fortified quarters but they had no choice. They feared the lord and his warriors – and they feared other lords and their warriors even more, to say nothing of dubious characters in their own village. Without armed protection the peasants would be threatened with robbery and violence by these other lords who would have no interest in keeping them alive. All societies have to be policed and protected. Lords and warriors have evolved into prime ministers, uniformed police forces and armies and become responsible for and to the group as a whole rather than tyrants over it. At least that is the ideal.

However our protectors are now over-stretched. There are not enough soldiers, police, prison officers, fire-fighters, paramedics etc. The lord is not making the peasants provide enough corn and wheat. The thin red and blue lines have been stretched too far. Indeed there are gaps which can only be closed by creating other holes elsewhere or after considerable delay. A call to the police in Reading might be answered in Oxford or Strathclyde. An ambulance might appear instead of a fire-engine, or vice versa. In some areas fear is so prevalent that citizens do not believe that the police can help or protect them. The judicial system intended to punish and deter crime has become slow, cumbersome and unreliable. The Night Courts set up to give speedy justice have been abandoned because they cost too much. Intimidation of juries has compelled the government to make it harder by allowing verdicts by majority vote. Our prisons have been described as ‘the universities of crime’ as they are seriously overcrowded and short staffed; the suicide rate there has risen sharply. The law protecting innocent people is failing in its purpose while the situation is aggravated by the activities of ‘liberals’ more concerned with alleged past wrongs suffered by the culprits than with proven present damage to the victims or the serious damage to the state.

It is against this background that the growing threats of crime and terrorism must be assessed. As the Prime Minister warned at the turn of the year, the line between

the two is blurred. Terrorism is often subsidised by crime and has been for well over a century, but it is now easy for one person or a small group to cause havoc. In North London a particularly energetic thief was described as ‘a one-man crime wave’. Terrorism tends to be on a larger scale. As early as the 1970’s the Weathermen in the US discovered that terrorists needed to explode only one sixth of the bombs about which they ‘phoned warnings to achieve the amount of dislocation possible if all the threats were carried out. The effectiveness of suicide bombing is horrifyingly obvious. The Washington Sniper, on the overlap of crime and terrorism, cost billions of dollars in precautions taken during his brief public career. Schools, as we have seen in the US, Britain and Germany, are easy targets. Hospitals, as in the Yemen, are another. In previous decades ships, airports

and tubes have been vulnerable – and still are. Aeroplanes are the most dramatically vulnerable of all, with the possible exception of theatres where a high concentration of people in the centre of a town provides maximum publicity on the ground for days. The

expanding empires of drug-trafficking and people-smuggling add massively to the general insecurity and drain on resources. Virtual no-go areas are appearing – holes in the social ozone layer.

The compound effect of these developments is to create foci of irresponsible power dangerous to the nation-state, or the market-state into which Philip Bobbitt claims that it is mutating. Colombia and Sicily are examples. The Eastern Marches of Europe are sliding into disorder. From Johannesburg to Jerusalem a citizen’s first thought is to protect himself or herself and loved ones. The question is: how will a return of the chaos that followed the slow collapse of the Roman Empire be avoided – assuming that it can be?

Certainly we need more ‘protectors’. They will have to be subject to frequent and thorough checking and paid enough to ensure efficiency and incorruptibility. There will be bus, train and boat marshals as well as sky ones. Schools, nurseries, hospitals, shopping centres and office blocks will all be patrolled far more vigorously than they are now. Degrees in Security Studies will be a lot more popular than Peace Studies. Research will provide lighter

The law protecting innocent people is failing in its purpose while the situation is aggravated by the activities of ‘liberals’ more concerned with alleged past wrongs suffered by the culprits than with proved present damage to the victims

and stronger armour. A large permanent army will be created and maintained for internal national use. All citizens will be expected to co-operate with it on request. They will be required to undergo training in enough of its techniques to serve as auxiliaries in emergencies. This Project Homeland or The Sparta Programme, as the approach could be called, will be hugely expensive and cost governments heavily in financial terms and citizens heavily in terms of working hours. After years of such strains Israel has just asked the US for help. The US will probably soon have similar problems, or rather more of them than it does already.

This force will be aided by, indeed dependent on, the electronic revolution. CCTV cameras will multiply, acquire sharper resolution and be reinforced with audio-surveillance. Reading's first murder recorded in this way has led to a conviction. As criminals, realising that towns are like goldfish bowls, move out, armies of cameras will follow them. 'No rest for the wicked' might acquire real substance. Already cameras 'recognise' and collate movements and assess the apparent intention of some of those they watch as well as if knots of people are a group or a random collection of individuals. The patchy and superficial nature of electronic surveillance will be superseded by universal and in-depth coverage, continuously analysed and recorded. Nations, and indeed the world, will consist of networks of electronically gated communities while the no-go areas will be gradually reconquered. Needless to say, identity cards containing the bearer's total history will be carried, possibly in a skin flap, at all times. Anyone without one will have to produce a good excuse. Possibly cameras will be able to carry out retinal scans and even differentiate blood groups which could be checked instantaneously against a global database. 'Descendants' of Asimo, the Japanese-built android, could make the initial approaches to a suspect, thus minimising losses to security personnel. One incidental result of all this would be an astronomic rise in data to be stored and utilised which would necessitate compression into smaller volumes of space. It would, as statesmen foresaw two years ago, swing national governments away from competition towards co-operation. Perhaps the supranational body in charge could be called the Committee of International Safety.

Returning to the human response to the threat, attitudes will change and harden. Between 11th September and the end of 2001 Broad St Mall was evacuated three or four

times. Similar scares and drills all over the world must have cost horrendous sums. Memory can be short. After a few months security was relaxed at the Mall. More important, journalists reported on the ease with which weapons could be smuggled onto planes. At Reading Station, however, the warning against leaving baggage unattended blares out at short intervals all day. Now that atrocities are becoming so common, security drills will be resumed. They will be frequent and compulsory and not relaxed. Checks will become as automatic as the first cup of tea of the day, 'please' and 'thank you'... All remotely suspicious mail will be checked while the present AOL e-mail scanning system will be refined. Citizens will be penalised for negligence, evasion or non-compliance, though the hostility of fellow-citizens endangered



by these failings will be a greater deterrent than official punishment. In *Urban Guerrillas* a householder does not know what to do about his suspicion that his neighbours might be terrorists. In future there will be no hesitation, for it will be a criminal offence not to report suspicions. The spirit of the wartime slogans 'Keep Mum' and 'Careless Talk Costs Lives' will be revived. Nowadays when someone runs amok and shoots half-a-dozen people, police investigations often reveal that the person was 'a loner', with no regular job, a small arsenal, and a history of peculiarities, sometimes including political extremism and militarist fantasies. In future police will act pre-emptively and check

these people out at short and irregular intervals. Surveillance will be woven into our lives.

Interactivity will be carried to its logical conclusion. Punishment will be moved towards the point of crime. In *2,000 A.D.* Judge Dredd's gun 'Lawgiver' and his motorbike 'Lawmaster' are primed to explode at an unauthorised touch. It is an extension of the mantrap method favoured by Victorian landowners anxious to stop poaching without employing dozens of keepers. The thought of steel teeth meeting through the thigh saved a lot of time and effort all round. The handles of car doors could be adapted to put out an incapacitating shock at the touch of an unrecognised hand. The police, of course, would have an override. We could not install oubliettes in houses but an unauthorised body might be trapped electronically until the arrival of the police. If it took them a couple of days, these could be subtracted from the eventual sentence. The principle behind tagging will be carried further. A hefty voltage could be put through a man harassing an ex-wife he had been forbidden to contact. This

could be extended to groups, or rather gangs. Three or four particular anklets in proximity could result in all their wearers receiving a shock. Prevention is better than cure.

The legal process will change. Bail will be much more sparingly allowed. Culprits will no longer get their first crime free. The '3-strikes-and-you're in' policy will spread. As in Northern Ireland the idea of judges without juries will gain ground as will majority verdicts. Pressure for uniformity of sentencing throughout the country will intensify and discipline within prisons will be improved with the segregation of notorious bullies and drug-traffickers and the use of remote Scottish islands for prisoners viewed as the human equivalent of nuclear waste.

Far from arousing revulsion and opposition, these policies will receive overwhelming public support, just as 16th Century Spain saw the Inquisition as its first line of defence. A year ago the *Mirror* conducted a phone poll on the American use of sensory deprivation on suspected Taleban prisoners. The response was clear. 'Serve Them Right!' During the recent police siege of a gunman's flat in Hackney neighbours whose lives were being disrupted complained bitterly that in any other country the police would have gone straight in. In future they will go in. Demands for the restoration of the death penalty will be come more insistent. Apart from anything else, the argument will go, it will save the expense of keeping murderers in prison for years. The same argument, incidentally, will be used to urge that prisoners should be made to work something like normal hours. The emphasis will shift from salvation and rehabilitation to, as it were, subordinating the criminals to the needs of the community. 'Human Rights' complaints about authoritarian government will be ignored and those who make them advised – perhaps compelled – to live among those they champion. Six months in Moss Side or Balsall Heath would have a strong effect on temporary exiles from Hampstead. The fringe of apologists for violence will shrink while the permeable layer between society and its disrupters will harden into an impenetrable barrier. People will support anything that makes them feel safe.

Public support will facilitate more drastic methods: in schools likely disrupters can be spotted at five, so they will be listed and subjected to extra surveillance. Persistent and dangerous recidivists will be subjected to surgical procedures. If aging can be arrested, it can also, presumably be accelerated. Chemical intervention could be employed to weaken the muscles and lower the testosterone levels of men whose aggressive natures endangered society. The unstable will be 'discouraged' from having children likely to repeat their parents' behaviour patterns. After two centuries the researches of Robert Bakewell and Gregor Mendel will be applied to human beings. Genetics and conditioning will be combined to provide a long-term solution to the security problem.

On the technical level it might be possible to make weapons effective on specific human targets, when their

DNA is on the database. It would be an adaptation of the 'clean bomb' principle and protect innocent bystanders. Computers activated by heartbeats or changes in their rhythm are a logical development of voice-activated ones. Fusing them with improved polygraphic mechanisms would make it possible to home in on meetings of undesirables and record not only what the participants said and consciously decided but how likely they were to carry out such decisions and how they felt about one another. With everyone's personal histories available, a fair guess at thoughts, associations and vacillations of intention could be ventured.

We will live in a permanent state of siege in a world dislocated by climate change and mass migration. We have no choice. Last century provided a terrible illustration of what can happen when terrorists and criminals undermine and succeed a legitimate government. The foci of destructive power should be dissolved before they can dissolve the world community. The financial cost of corn, meat and sharp swords for the garrison will be heavy and prying a great irritation to some. But the alternative is unimaginable. *Salus Populi Suprema Lex...*
Margaret Brown has been addicted to science fiction and finds some of it becoming fact

Sophist's Corner

Terrorism

Simple preventative steps

Terrorism is a crime like any other, so follow the same precautions you normally take to avoid being the victim of a crime.

Think about Terrorism

Take note of your surroundings on your journey to work, to the shops and the usual places you visit. Know who and what you expect to see each day within your neighbourhood and your workplace.

Sensible precautions

In any type of emergency, you could lose access to power, water, telephones, and roads. Therefore have on hand such items as:

Batteries

A battery powered torch

Some ready to eat food, e.g. tinned food

A few bottles of water

Blankets or duvets

From a Home Office website

Brotherhood and Scandal:

Trollope in the 21st Century

Derek Hawes

The late 20th Century was a good time for Anthony Trollope. Enthusiasm for the work of this most Victorian of novelists had never been higher, even in his own heyday. Since 1980 there have been four major biographies and a two-volume edition of the letters. Between 1981 and 2000, through the sponsorship of the Trollope Society, a uniform edition of all forty-seven novels and five volumes of short stories had been produced.

In 1991 the Dean of Westminster Abbey consented to a memorial to be placed in Poets' Corner alongside so many of his nineteenth century contemporaries; a long overdue accolade, in the view of enthusiasts. Television joined in with productions of his Barchester stories, the larger-scale Palliser novels and the monumental *The Way We Live Now*.

By the millennium therefore, it might have been thought that there was little more to be discovered even about so private a public person as Trollope. However, recently there have been two important revelations about the novelist and his social life which illuminate his world; both result from researches into archives which had escaped the notice of his literary biographers. First, the fact that Trollope was an active freemason and that he had spiced his novels with references to secret Masonic ritual enrich our understanding of the novels themselves and the private life of this most intriguing and clubbish of men.

Second, there emerged last year a rather darker, not to say sinister, allegation that Trollope was a corrupt public official who had betrayed the commercial secrets of the Post Office for whom he worked, to external business interests in return for money and largesse. It has been possible to disprove this calumny completely, demonstrating among other things that the researching of archive material is not a job for amateurs, but at the same time providing yet more understanding of the restless mid-Victorian world in which so many of his novels are set.

These unexpected new insights have caused some upset within the tranquil world of modern Trollope scholarship, at the same time offering explanations of the unstable beginnings of his life that are already in the public domain. They also help a modern readership to understand more of the hectic financial and commercial world in thrall to constant technological change, that formed the backdrop to many of his best stories. Indeed the great fascination for twenty-first century readers of Trollope's work, is that it presents as almost no other, the Victorian world in a loosely woven tapestry of good and evil, of

ingenuity and folly; the integrity and the hypocrisy, the eccentricity, the melancholy and the greatness of the English people at a very important moment in its development. Secret brotherhoods and commercial corruption were certainly phenomena which would have been part of the fabric of Trollope's world and that of the men and women who filled his novels.

Worshipful brother

Trollope's stories are sprinkled with both private and family jokes and with classical allusions and Latin tags. It has been argued that such devices had a clear cultural and social purpose, helping to perpetuate the ethos of the public school-educated gentleman – a means of signifying one's membership of that exclusive, morally superior world, at once clubbish, masculine and affirmative of 'belonging' within elite social networks. The problem for Trollope of course, was that he had not ever really belonged. At Harrow and at Winchester he was an outsider, desperately unhappy; encumbered with an unstable family who were financially insecure and a father who was falling rapidly into irrevocable mental breakdown. Victoria Glendinning characterised him at this stage as a 'marginalised Englishman' and one schoolfellow recalling him in later life, remembered a 'most uncouth, unkempt dirty boy' It would be possible to argue that the whole of his young life and early career was a battle to shake off that past and be accepted into the intellectual and social elite of literary London.

Historians of freemasonry have long claimed that authors who were freemasons have littered their work with allusions to Masonic ritual and belief. Writers from Petrarch and Boccaccio to those of the 20th Century are said to utilise such references which only the initiated would recognise, and the purpose of which was said to be partly to place signals perpetuating the 'insider' nature of the brotherhood and partly, when freemasonry was under attack – or even banned – to keep alive the secret beliefs of the movement. A recent writer on this topic has said that such signals were often well disguised and are especially evident in 19th century authors such as Wilkie Collins, Thackeray, Kipling and Conan Doyle. If this is true, could it perhaps explain a number of otherwise obscure passages in the novels of Trollope?

Now that we know that Trollope was a mason it is remarkable that there were no clues in correspondence or in the records. Not only was he a worshipful brother, he took his vows of secrecy, the ethos of lifelong loyalty to

the oaths of brotherhood, very seriously. It is only in the novels, with hindsight, that we detect the clues.

The Small House at Allington is a most appropriate novel to examine because it is full of private jokes and references to his experiences which would have resonated with friends and family. In chapter 32 John Eames has met the Lord de Guest at the Royal Agricultural Show where the earl has been showing his prize bull. They then make for Pawkins Hotel in Jermyn Street where they are to dine with Col. Dale, the earl's brother-in-law. There follows a hilarious passage describing the dullest of meals during which the two older men fall asleep. But it is arranged that Johnny, who confesses to the earl his love for Lily Dale, will be invited down to Guestwick Manor to see if the romance can be re-started. As they take leave of each other '... the earl gave his left hand to his guest, and looking somewhat grandly over the young man's head he tapped his own left breast thrice with his right hand. As he went through this little scene, John Eames felt that he was every inch an earl.'

In the next chapter there is an even more obscure reference. It is Christmas day and Squire Dale tells Lily, Mamma and Bernard that Eames is indeed staying up at Guestwick Manor. As the family sit at Christmas dinner Trollope describes how the family conversation is deliberately inhibited whilst the servants are present. 'But when close friends are together a little conscious reticence is practised till the door is tiled. At such a meeting as this, that conscious reticence was of service and created an effort which was salutary. When the door was tiled, and when the servants were gone, how could they be merry together? By what mirth could the beards be made to wag on that Christmas Day?'

Both these curious little episodes, of no great significance in themselves, could only have been written by someone knowledgeable about the ritual of freemasons. The handshake and touching of the breast three times is part of the process of closing the lodge meeting, when the Immediate Past Master says: 'Nothing now remains but according to ancient custom, to lock up our secrets in a safe repository...' all then present then say 'Fidelity, Fidelity, Fidelity', as they touch their breast and shake hands. The term 'tiling' is also direct from the ritual of opening a lodge meeting; an officer of the lodge is called 'The Tiler' who symbolically keeps strangers away. The Master says: 'What is the first care of every mason?' and the assembled members respond: 'to see that the lodge is properly tiled'. (That is to say, closed.) *The Shorter Oxford Dictionary* confirms that the word 'tile' is a Masonic term meaning to protect a lodge or meeting from interruption or intrusion: to bind to secrecy.

There are other indications, in *Phineas Finn*, which betray a familiarity with these secret practices and *The Last Chronicle of Barset* twice utilises the concept of the tiled door, in reference to private discussions between the archdeacon and Lady Lufton, in Chapter 56. We get a further clue as to Trollope's own understanding of the

Masonic ethic in *Barchester Towers* when in Chapter 28 he is describing Archdeacon Grantley's firm attachment to the high church party, threatened as it is by Mrs Proudie and Slope. He wished to be what he called 'safe' with all those whom he admitted to the penetralia of his house and heart. He could luxuriate in no society that was deficient in a certain feeling of faithful, staunch highchurchism, which, to him, was tantamount to freemasonry.

If these references are sufficient to confirm that Trollope was indeed a freemason, what significance should be placed upon the revelation; why should it matter? I suggest it is important because it throws more light upon the Victorian social world which he inhabited, it offers new interpretations of the novels themselves and it illuminates the complex psychology of the man and the somewhat unstable beginnings of his life. His own description of that despairing need to be valued, to be an insider, is better than anyone else could have expressed it: 'There had clung to me a feeling that I had been looked upon always as an evil, an encumbrance, a useless thing – as a creature of whom those connected with him had to be ashamed... I acknowledge the weakness of a strong desire to be loved... to be popular with my associates. No child, no boy, no young man, had ever been less so...' (From *Autobiography*)

In the 19th century freemasonry was a rather radical force; if not egalitarian then certainly a movement in which external rank and status counted for little. It is as likely that a butcher as an earl would be master of the lodge. Trollope, too, despite his desperate need to be part of the elite was also something of a free spirit and an egalitarian radical.

The records of the Grand Lodge of the Ancient, Free and Accepted Masons of Ireland show that Trollope first joined when, as a young Post Office clerk, he took up a post in the west of Ireland. In September 1841 he was despatched to Banagher, County Offaly, together with a very damaging reference from his London chief, Col. Maberley, and the feeling that his superiors were only too pleased to be rid of him; but carrying with him also, two or three letters of introduction 'from a brother clerk' (*Autobiography*). The Dublin archive records that within a month of taking up residence in Banagher, he had been proposed as a member and a month later was inducted as a master mason. More papers, which have now come to light in London, only in 1999, reveal that in the next three years he went on to be 'exalted' to the Royal Arch Chapter and later was installed as a Masonic Knight of Malta in the Knights Templar Order. Trollope's regalia, apron and ceremonial jewels are also extant and are in a private collection in London.

In those first months in Ireland, Trollope also joined the local hunt and was regularly to be seen reading the lesson in the local Anglican church; it is difficult not to retain the impression that he was a young man in a hurry to join what Victoria Glendinning has described as 'that vast army of British administrators, officials and army

who, with the landed Anglo-Irish, stood over the whole population'. And no doubt that letter of introduction from a 'brother' clerk opened a door which would otherwise have remained tiled.

Twenty years later, by then much nearer to becoming a distinguished novelist, he was back in London and as enthusiastic as ever to join institutions that, just like the masons, were male, exclusive and elite; but this time on a wider stage. He was elected to the Garrick Club, to the Athenaeum and the Cosmopolitan. On at least five occasions between 1861 and 1873 he was a prominent speaker at charitable dinners held at Freemasons' Hall, London and on one such night, in the presence of Mr Gladstone, the chairman referred to Trollope as 'a distinguished member of this brotherhood'. (*The Times*. 26th May 1873)

But was he a crook?

By coincidence, in the summer of 2000 the writer Antonia Swinson was researching for a new novel, in the Mitchell Memorial Library in Glasgow, and came across some papers of the ship-owning dynasty of the Lords Inverclyde. This was the Scottish family Burns who, starting with a small packet steamer in the 1820s were to rise rapidly to become owners of the Cunard Line and among the wealthiest businessmen of the 19th century. Like so many Victorian entrepreneurs, George Burns and his son John were religious, philanthropic, but quite ruthless in the pursuit of their business goals. A core feature of their early success in shipping was bound up with contracts to carry the UK mails –



Portrait of Trollope by Samuel Lawrence

from England to Dublin, from Glasgow to Belfast and later, as they expanded, to the United States and Europe. Anthony Trollope knew George Burns and later was to become a close friend of John, a fellow member of the 'Gaiter Club', a like-minded group of hill walkers. Not surprisingly the newly discovered family archive contains a number of references to Trollope and the published correspondence of the writer similarly includes some letters to John Burns.

Ms. Swinson utilises this previously unexplored archive to assert that this was a corrupt friendship and weaves the story into her novel, *The Love Child*, published in May 2000; by way of promoting the book she also wrote a number of newspaper articles accusing Trollope of betraying post office commercial secrets, thus allowing the Burns' to win lucrative contracts. Swinson's charges are direct, specific and unequivocal – Trollope was a corrupt public official who accepted money and largesse from a businessman who benefited

directly from the confidential information to which the author had access. What is more, she says, he gave false evidence to a parliamentary committee and this crooked partnership went on from at least 1854 until many years after Trollope had ceased to be in the Post Office.

Unfortunately she has, like one of the characters in her novel, 'added two and two and made thirty-five and three-quarters...' Where there are no hard facts she provides innuendo and where there are facts she has completely mistaken their relevance. Of all the charges that might have been brought against Trollope, corruption is the most grievous because not only in his fiction, but in many nonfiction writings, he inveighs against public immorality and the decline of standards in Victorian business intercourse. He would be not just corrupt, but the most egregious hypocrite to boot.

What is it precisely that Trollope was selling to the Burns' empire? What had he, a middle-grade civil servant working (at the time) in rural Southern Ireland got that was so valuable: something that kept him on the sleaze payroll for over thirty years? The closest Swinson comes to defining this is to say that it was information about postal practices, costs and commercial secrets which would have enabled Burns and the Cunard company to acquire contracts for carrying the mails.

In the 1840s the Post Office was virtually the only nationalised industry; as such it was (rather like the National Health Service today), constantly in the public eye, the subject of questions and complaints in Parliament, debates about its future and, through the secretary Rowland Hill, required to produce a detailed annual report to Parliament. Contracts were scrutinised in virtually every parliament from the early 1840s and any deviation from them was probed by a select committee. Treaties were negotiated with other countries and with various shipping lines and, much later in his career, Trollope would be called upon to negotiate their terms. These strategic matters were dealt with at the highest levels of government. The Foreign Office, the Board of Admiralty and the Treasury were the leading actors whilst the GPO as 'client', had relatively little input to policy.

Indeed, George Burns, who was a personal friend of Lord Palmerston, had no compunction in writing openly to the very top, when his interests were at stake. When in April 1855 the Cunard interests were threatened by a proposal for a railway amalgamation, he wrote directly to the Postmaster General, Lord Canning, to put his case.

Of this episode Swinson writes: ‘... fortunately Trollope was on hand as a witness. He spent four days testifying in Burns’ favour to a parliamentary committee. George Burns also testified and the Bill was defeated.’ In the *Sunday Times* she also claimed: ‘he accepted hospitality (from Burns) before doing him a favour that saved his business.’ This is simply erroneous and a total misunderstanding in which she has confused two quite separate events that occurred three months apart. Trollope did indeed give evidence to a select committee in July 1855, but it had nothing to do with shipping; it was not considering a Parliamentary Bill and George Burns did not testify. Indeed it had nothing whatsoever to do with Burns’ interests. And far from ‘saving their business’ this was a period of maximum expansion for Cunard who were producing new liners, faster, larger and more luxurious than at any other period in their history.

The select committee which examined Trollope was entitled ‘Postal Arrangements (Waterford) etc’ and was set up in response to considerable pressure from MPs representing Irish constituencies who were complaining bitterly about the poor quality of mail delivery in parts of the rural south; Trollope was called back to London and spent two weeks at GPO headquarters discussing the Post Office’s evidence in responding to these criticisms. Rowland Hill, the Secretary, gave evidence on strategic matters and Trollope was asked to deal with local arrangements. He spent four days under intensive questioning, a bravura performance in which he demonstrated complete mastery of small details of timing and frequency, costs and practicalities of the mail service across the south or Ireland.

Indeed, far from misleading the committee to which he gave evidence, Trollope was quick to make clear what were the limits of his expertise. Asked about contracts he replied: ‘I have no positive knowledge of my own as to the nature of the contracts entered into between the Post Office and the railway companies for carrying the trunk mails; it does not come under my notice or my surveillance at all.’ He received an accolade from his bosses for the comprehensiveness of his detailed knowledge of the Irish mails during this four-day grilling in which he effectively silenced the critics; so effectively that the committee decided to make no recommendations but simply to present the evidence to Parliament. Nothing further was heard of it.

Swinson confuses this event with one three months earlier, in April 1855, when another select committee, which had been set up to look at the continuing rush of new private Railways Bills, was meeting to consider a proposition which had everything to do with George Burns and his company’s role in shipping mails across the straits from Glasgow to Belfast; not a matter in which Trollope ever had any dealing. This was a matter more to do with the Board of Admiralty and the Treasury than with the GPO; it was an issue at the very heart of the conduct and direction of economic policy. Moreover it was an issue which illustrates the frenetic, chaotic pace of Victorian

entrepreneurship, invention and business initiative, at a moment of economic liberalism which typifies the period and which formed the background to so many of Trollope’s political novels.

The problem was that Burns, whose vessels sailed from Glasgow to Belfast every day, was faced with a threat from the owners of the Glasgow and SW Railway which carried the mails from London to the port; they wanted to buy up a rival shipping line and divert the freight and passengers to a quicker route from Ardrossan to Belfast, cutting many hours off the journey time. Burns, who had been carrying the mails free of charge, had no need of corruption, backstairs backhanders or deceit. Indeed, he could be entirely frank about his fears of monopoly if railways and shipping lines were allowed freely to amalgamate.

Having written to Viscount Canning, the PMG, he asked to be heard by the parliamentary committee and was able to argue his case successfully. His letter to Canning summarises his position: ‘I claim no exemption from ordinary competition by private traders like myself – I have been all my life accustomed to it, and in the most formidable shapes ... But if the railway company to Ardrossan obtain power to incorporate steam vessels with their land operations, the Caledonian Railway to Greenock are equally entitled to obtain power for a similar amalgamation – which, being consummated, there will be an end put to all private trading. It would be impolitic and injurious to public interests were (the Bill) be allowed to pass. It is not called for on grounds of necessity whatever...’ George Burns’ case had particular resonance for a government of free market liberals and it is not surprising that the select committee rejected the Bill; a little more surprising that the Earl of Eglinton, who was financing the rival bid, should admit under examination that Burns’ triumph was well deserved and that he ran the better service.

The issue was monopoly which, in the dogma of liberal capitalism of the time, was anathema as was public subsidy. Burns was opposing a Bill which would have allowed a railway company to buy up a shipping line and port facilities thus achieving virtual monopoly of both passenger and goods routes not only on the Scottish side of the straits but in Ireland too. In the Board of Trade report which was submitted to Parliament on the issue, they also rejected a number of other applicants for similar amalgamations.

This little parliamentary drama was not unique. In a time of frenzied railways development and massive technical innovation, Parliament was plagued with unthought out schemes supported by fragile financing and little hope of success; bankruptcies, amalgamations and scandals were endemic. Indeed, not unlike the ‘dot-com’ debacles on today’s stock markets, the birth of the 19th century’s own technology age was fraught with danger for unwary investors. But the crucial point is that nowhere in his four-hour debate with MPs had Burns said anything that could possibly have come from Anthony Trollope – or anyone else in the Post Office.

This episode provides great interest for understanding Trollope and illuminating the the world of such Trollopien characters as Augustus Melmotte and Ferdinand Lopez; of Victorian materialism and speculation. The world too, of hard-up aristocrats like Lord Nidderdale and his father, the Marquis of Auld Reekie, only too gullible in their desire to shore up fading family fortunes and with no understanding of the risks of an economy in the midst of a technological revolution so vividly portrayed in *The Way We Live Now*.

The assured touch with which Trollope painted the social and economic times of mid-Victorian Britain do not however lay him open to charges of personal corruption, and even a cursory examination of the Inverclyde archive will demonstrate that he was not a crooked public official. Trollope believed deeply in the importance of honesty in public life. Indeed it was a persistent theme in his novels at this period and one which nearly twenty years later he was to examine with a ruthless and clinical eye in *The Way We Live Now*. Like Mr Gladstone and the Queen herself, he was increasingly uncomfortable in a

world which had become 'luxurious, ignorant and self-indulgent' Long unknown archives do not sully the reputation of this arch-Victorian, but instead add enjoyable insights into the Trollopien world.

However, Trollopien enthusiasts will see parallels in this saga, between the unfounded accusations which Ms Swinson levels against Trollope and the equally tendentious charge which *The Jupiter* brought against the Rev. Septimus Harding, warden of Hiram's Hospital. Despite the passage of a hundred and fifty years, the misappropriation of charitable funds or the suggestion of corruption of a civil servant are likely to be good for selling a few more copies whether of a newspaper or a novel; no matter how thin the evidence or how damaging the outcome. But at least there would be no parallel at all between the reaction of Mr Harding – meekness and submission – and that which Mr Trollope would have produced were he here today. *Trollope v Swinson* would certainly have been a case to bring the best out of Mr Chaffinbrass!

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Traditional Education The Scientific Link To Good Behaviour Leonard.W.Irvine

Until now, the belief that boys who are subjected to a strictly disciplined form of basic education become well behaved youths, has relied only on anecdotal evidence and general observation. This general opinion is epitomised in W E.Forster's presentation of his Education Bill to parliament in 1870:

'Let us each think of our own homes, of the villages in which we have to live, of the towns in which it is our lot to be busy; and do we not know child after child – boys or girls – growing up to probable crime, to still more probable misery, because badly taught or utterly untaught? Do we then take on ourselves the responsibility of allowing ignorance and this weakness to continue one year longer than we can help?...'

These sentiments will strike a familiar chord with all sensible persons who not only care about the value of a high standard of basic education, but also about the high quality of youthful behaviour that this process seems to encourage. Forster's words will mean little, however, unless it is understood that the strict, formal and disciplined style of education of his time was the background against which his trenchant remarks were made. Although it is arguable that the modern style of teaching can produce a reasonable standard of education, it certainly does not appear to produce good behaviour in boys and youths. In primary education, the gradual abandonment of the traditional style of

teaching, in favour of a lax and more pupil-friendly style, has coincided with the period that took this country, in the second half of the 20th century, from one of the most lawful of western nations to one of the most violent and criminal of the present time. It seems utterly bizarre that the transition from a harsh system of teaching, where children sat in rows facing the front and dare not move or speak while taking lessons, to one where pupils are allowed to express their 'creativity' and to have a more informal way of learning, could result in mass criminal behaviour in boys and youths. There are those who voice their views in the media, among them a senior police officer with a degree in statistics, that there never was a 'golden age' when there was no crime. That is a valid statement but if the word 'no' is substituted by the word 'little' then that was a misleading statement for anyone to make.

As an indication of a country's lawfulness, the best yardstick is the prevalence of robbery. The offence entails the taking of property by the use of violence, or the threat of violence. These criteria have not changed since the Home Office started keeping crime statistics around 130 years ago. Had the incidence of robberies increased by a factor of just three or four times during that period, there would be little cause for concern. The figures actually show that there is great cause for alarm about the moral health of our nation. Whereas the figure for robberies

until the end of the first half of the 20th century bumps along at an average of around 250 per year, the figure is now a staggering 75,000 or so. These figures are based on the old method of recording that a string of crimes by one person reported at one time equals one crime. The Home Office are now taking each offence as a separate crime, although they continue for the time being to use both methods.

The incidence of robberies in 1950-2000 has not risen by just four or five times. It has risen by around three hundred times. The increase in robberies rose gently through the early 1950's. This can probably be ascribed to the effects of five years of war, blackouts, massive movement of evacuees from the cities and then back again, plus the very large number of young men in the forces being released back into civilian life from home and overseas duties. In the 1960's, however, the increase was extremely rapid and the graph grows ever steeper through to the present day. Any isolated periods when crime rates seemed to decrease, pale into insignificance when compared with the decade by decade figures. An overwhelming event must have occurred that made many more young men much more violent.

Various reasons have been put forward as to why crime is now so widespread. The 'permissive society', decline of the nuclear family and the rise of the number of single mothers, drugs etc. There is no basis for saying that any one, or all of these reasons could have produced the increase in crime. What must be looked for is a change that made young boys and youths less able to resist bad behaviour, less able to say no to the taking of drugs and less mindful of the consequences of their behaviour for themselves and others. It is not violent crime that we must combat but the thing that makes a person a violent criminal. Although fighting crime 'at the sharp end' must continue, this society is producing more criminally inclined boys and youths than its law enforcement structure can possibly deal with. Unless there is a radical change to the way we educate children, future measures reflecting the initiatives of the past four decades will not reverse the situation. The Home Office figures show that females commit only around 10% of crime. Although girls are committing more crimes, they are far behind boys. Their gentler and better behaved nature seems to be inherent in females world-wide.

Clearly, there is a fundamental difference in the behaviour of the *Homo sapiens* male and female, that is not found in any other species of predator. Over at least a million years of the development of *Homo sapiens* from his more primitive forms, the thin veneer of around 12,000 years of progressive civilisation has done little to alter the basic instincts acquired during that immense span of time. That development has set us apart from other species because of a radical biological difference that is obvious but nonetheless intriguing. A two year old tiger is a fearsome thing. A two year old child is virtually helpless. A boy does not reach physical maturity until eighteen or so

and there is no reason to suppose that this has altered much down the ages. This long apprenticeship to his parents meant that in the past the mother spent her whole life bearing and raising children and was unable to participate in the activity that usually meant the difference between life and death to primitive people – hunting and killing. Although the older family members may have helped her with her children, she probably spent little or no time hunting. Women therefore had more things to think about than men, where tracking, ambushing and killing for food was a sporadic and transitory adventure. Women had to look to the future of how they would care for their brood not in terms of days like the men but in terms of weeks, months and years. Women consequently came to think in a different way from men. Today, when their brain patterns are monitored against those of men who are performing the same tasks, they have a path of thought that shows more communication between the two halves of the brain than that of men's more focussed thinking.

The obvious outcome of the 'long apprenticeship' theory was that generations of people could pass on their skills and experience to younger generations. With the benefit of complex speech they eventually became far more intelligent and dominant than any other species, who were just not in the same class as *Homo sapiens*. We have never recognised ourselves as animals in that respect. The less obvious conclusion is that every boy is born a hunter-killer. The difference between the gentler nature of girls and the more aggressive nature of boys is evident even in early infancy. They are, in fact, so different that coeducation before the age of thirteen is not good educational practice. We have dealt with this difference in the past by subjecting boys to a far more strict regime of training than girls. Why should the disciplined upbringing of boys make them better behaved? The modern thinking is that such repressive methods could make a boy withdrawn and that corporal punishment would induce him to think that violence was acceptable. He, too, would then become a violent person. The paradox is that in the time up to the 1950's, discipline at home and at school was harsh. Then there was little crime. Today, with the 'child centred' style of education and the abolition of any form of smacking in school, children are more violent than they ever were. This is not a rash assumption but a fact borne out by 130 years of Home Office statistics. However, there is a logical, scientific explanation for this seeming paradox.

Long recognised as mental disorders in the USA, ADD and ADHD (attention deficit disorder and attention deficit with hyperactivity disorder), did not receive their first official summary in this country until 1996, when a jargon-laden booklet was published by the British Psychological Society. As with most pronouncements on the subject, there was no attempt to explain why, in modern times, that bad behaviour in children was so widespread. The link between antisocial behaviour and a short attention span is acknowledged by all professional bodies

concerned. The booklet made a brief reference to treatment by 'biofeedback' and dismissed it in favour of the cheaper and well-tried calming drugs such as Ritalin, the effects of which cease when the drug is withdrawn. The reference to 'biofeedback' was to the treatment of ADD patients by EEG Neurofeedback. EEG-Neurofeedback was pioneered in the 1960's in the USA by a Dr. Barry Stearman to treat epilepsy. Over the years, it was adapted to other uses, from the treatment of ADD to the enhancement of skills in athletes. The equipment consists of an EEG machine to register the electrical impulses from brainwaves, the output of which drives specially designed electronics. On production of the desired thought patterns by the subject, a simple computer game is made to go. The interaction between subject and the working of the game is the 'biofeedback' that enables him to reinforce the desired waves by keeping the screen icon in rapid motion. In order to become a practitioner of EEG Neurofeedback, any candidate for such must have the proper requisite qualifications in neuropsychology etc. Then there comes a long internship with an experienced practitioner before qualification is complete. In treating an ADD subject, the experienced practitioner first assesses that person as being medically fit for the treatment. This treatment may typically involve two or three sessions weekly of perhaps a half hour each, over a six month period. At first, the subject will be encouraged to develop the required brain output under close supervision, the goals being adjusted by the practitioner as progress is made. Increasingly, the subject will become adept at the task and require only a minimum of supervision. The results are usually spectacular and the patient acquires the normal brain patterns of someone of acceptable social behaviour. The treatment is painless and non-invasive. It also appears to be permanent. However, it is an expensive cure for a problem that need never occur in such a high percentage of young people.

In the treatment of ADD, impulsivity, distractibility and hyperactivity are reduced. Independent tests have shown an increase in IQ of 23 points in children treated for ADD. The really important point is that the treatment approximates to normal learning. This is what gives the scientific link to education, or more accurately to the traditional method of education. What the treatment does is to lengthen the attention span of the subject. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that an appropriate learning regime, from an early age, will have the same effect but over a longer period of time. The difference between EEG Neurofeedback and traditional teaching methods is that the first corrects the fault of a short attention span while contributing nothing to the subject's store of knowledge, although the improvement in cognitive ability will help in the acquisition of future learning. The second progressively improves the attention span to the optimum, for age and innate ability, within the process of educating a child. Attention spans are age related. At two years old, a child would not be expected to be able

to concentrate on a task for long. At four years, the attention span lengthens but is still short. A child's attention span should continue increasing with age until it emerges from adolescence and is able to adopt proper adult behaviour patterns. This is a natural progression but what is variable is the rate of that progression. A fifteen year old youth with the attention span of an eight year old is a recipe for trouble. Looking at all the evidence, it is certain that the traditional style of teaching practised in this country until the 1950's was the means by which children's attention spans were lengthened at the maximum rate consistent with their age and innate ability. The vague impression that a strictly disciplined form of education made responsible citizens can now be given substance.

What is still in doubt in the fight against crime (more correctly against producing youths with criminal tendencies) is how we can reverse it. The cure is a far harder problem for several reasons. Those who support modern methods of teaching appear to cling to their beliefs with a religious zealotry and will oppose any radical changes, especially those harking back to the 'dark days' of strict Victorian education. The concept that a teacher has failed if the pupils are bored is a highly dangerous one. The disciplined learning of the basic subjects in the old manner will rapidly lengthen attention spans and overcome boredom. The worst effects of substandard educational methods are seen in the 'sink' estates of towns and cities. Many pupils there have parents who themselves are blighted with poor education and lack of civic and moral responsibility. Thousands of educational administrators, probation officers, child psychologists etc. have proliferated over the last fifty years and few will be willing to accept that the system of which they have long been advocates, is now considered flawed. Such a loss of professional face would be sufficient reason alone to warrant their rejection of this theory, in spite of the unchallengeable logic of its validity.

Another major reason for not accepting the theory is that politicians will not be prepared to wait for perhaps five years before there is any noticeable improvement in child behaviour. To wait another ten years before the crime figures fall would be out of the question. Politicians need rapid results for their measures but only statesmen would have the courage to stake their careers on such a long term venture. In the face of the failure of any measures to fight crime at the sharp end, crime rates will continue to increase, as Mr. Blair is finding out to his embarrassment. The long term solution is not just an option however. It is the only course open to us.

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Liberalism – let's Spike it!

David Webb

Former members of the Living Marxism/Revolutionary Communist Party (LM/RCP) group are becoming increasingly prominent in the media, think-tanks and similar organizations. It was with some surprise that I noticed that Ann Furedi, a supporter of third-trimester abortion rights, was now the Communications Director of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA). If such people have wormed their way into the limelight, it is worth asking where they are coming from. Although the magazine *LM*, which succeeded *Living Marxism* after the RCP was wound up in 1996, was once hailed by *The Salisbury Review* (in Summer 2002) as a 'conservative' magazine, there are important differences between the *LM* outlook and that of either true-blue Toryism, or modern neo-conservatism. The group's opinions are hard to pin down on a straightforward left-right axis – although support for third-trimester abortions would seem to be well to the left of the current spectrum of mainstream political debate. Former members of the LM/RCP group have practiced a form of 'media entryism' since *LM* itself was wound up in 2000 after being successfully sued for libel over articles on ITN's coverage of the wars in Yugoslavia. In addition to Ann Furedi – the wife of the group's former chairman, the Hungarian-born Frank Furedi, a professor of sociology at the University of Kent – prominent members include the *Times* columnist, Mick Hume; the former *Independent* columnist and writer of several books on race, Kenan Malik; the co-ordinator of the Pro-Choice Forum, Ellie Lee; the writer and lecturer, James Heartfield; the director of the Institute of Ideas and writer on education policy, Claire Fox; the *Daily Telegraph* columnist, Jennie Bristow; and the author of books on pop culture, Andrew Calcutt. In the last years of the RCP, party members were encouraged to find their own ways of 'making a difference', rather than all selling *LM* on street corners. The result is a multiplicity of organizations linked in some way to the *LM* group. These are not 'front organizations'; the group no longer has the discipline of a 'democratic centralist' party structure, but it can be said even now to cohere around the group's current website at <http://www.spiked-online.com> and the Institute of Ideas, which regularly stages debates and discussions, often in concert with the Institute of Contemporary Arts. Both the website and the Institute of Ideas continue to operate out of *LM*'s old offices in Farringdon Road, London, and most of the people I have mentioned continue to contribute

articles to the website. I shall, therefore, continue to call them the *LM* group.

Emerging from the 1970s left

The group around Frank Furedi can be traced back to a fairly straightforward left-wing grouping within the International Socialists (IS) – an earlier incarnation of the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP). A series of arcane splits led in 1977 to the formation of the Revolutionary Communist Tendency (RCT), which ultimately became the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) under Frank Furedi, who used Frank Richards as his party name. The RCT, and then the RCP, began by championing the normal range of ultra-left-wing causes – British withdrawal from Ulster; anti-racism; trade-union militancy; and abortion rights – but even from an early stage showed a penchant for bucking the left-wing trend, for example, by supporting the Thatcherite sell-off of council houses on the grounds that it was a never-to-be-equalled opportunity for the working class. To the rest of the left it seemed as if the RCP tried to find distinctive, and in left-wing terms controversial, stances that prevented co-operation between the RCP and other groups. The RCP was always very ambitious, requiring supporters to pay £10 a month to the party, and requiring full members – who joined on an invitation-only basis – to pass 10% of their salaries/student grants to the party. By the late 1980s, the RCP was the third largest group on the far left, but still considerably smaller than the SWP or Militant Tendency.

One of the earliest signs of the party's move on to less traditional left-wing territory was its distinctive stance on the 'AIDS panic' from 1987 onwards. Whereas most left-wing groups were busy trying to counter the right-wing charge that the syndrome was a 'gay plague' by arguing that all were equally at risk, the RCP argued that AIDS was mainly an issue for those in high-risk groups, and that the AIDS issue was being used as a means of reimposing Victorian morality on the whole population. This stance of course straddled the left-right divide, as Tories would no doubt agree that AIDS is mainly confined to high-risk groups, but would welcome a society-wide return to Victorian values. *Living Marxism*, which was launched in 1988, poured scorn on the 'AIDS establishment', pointing out that it outnumbered sufferers from the AIDS syndrome. Other issues that indicated a change in focus for the party were global warming and counselling. Calling for a New Enlightenment, and for a revival in belief in progress and science generally, the party denied that global warming

was taking place, or, if it was, that it was a problem. In a 1994 article, 'The Counselling Con', *Living Marxism* moved onto explicitly cultural territory and for the remainder of its life argued that the collapse of the traditional left had led to a decline in 'subjectivity', a belief in man as the historical subject who could change the world around him. With the failure of the left-wing project of changing society, phenomena such as unemployment were now seen more as 'acts of God', but counselling could be provided to the people affected to enable them to adjust to reality.

By the late 1990s, *LM* was unrecognisable as a left-wing publication. The magazine focused mainly on cultural issues, frequently coming down on what seemed to be the conservative side of the debate. Its 'anti-imperialist' tradition was maintained throughout, as seen in its insistence that the Yugoslav wars were the result of Western intervention in the Balkans. However, even in this case, the *LM* analysis tended to coincide with that of conservatives opposed to 'humanitarian' and 'nation-building' interventions around the world.

The Left's victory in the Culture Wars is seen as negative

While the left clearly won the Culture Wars, the *LM* group is unique on the left in seeing that victory as a Pyrrhic one – according to them, the potential for changing society had been lost in the process. For this reason, the *LM* critique of the predominant culture today echoes many conservative themes, but *comes from a different angle*. As they see it, the failure of previous attempts to change society, such as Communism and the labour movement in the West, has undermined 'historical thinking', which emphasises man's ability to create history. The result is a morass of fundamentally negative ideas. Anti-globalism and environmentalism assume that all change, all progress, will inevitably have destructive consequences that we cannot foresee. The rise of speech codes, political correctness and other forms of official regulation of interpersonal behaviour are also seen by the *LM* group as a reflection of negative assumptions about humanity as a consequence of the loss of consciousness of man's history-making potential. All these cultural developments are therefore explained by the Furedi group as a function of the failure of alternatives to capitalism. In the words of Frank Furedi, the demise of historical thinking is 'simply a generalisation from the empirical recognition that, at present, there is no ideological alternative to liberal capitalism'.

This raises the question of the true orientation towards free-market capitalism of the *LM* group, who are highly regarded by the Adam Smith Institute. If according to the *LM* group the lack of opposition to capitalism lies behind negative cultural developments – the celebration of victimhood, the rise of irrational fears (sunbathing, eating beef, etc.) – then some will wonder whether former members of the RCP still see capitalism as the problem and seek to rebuild 'the historical subject' only in order then to readdress the transformation of the mode of production. However, although there may be some former mem-

bers of the party who might still wish that a violent revolution had taken place in the UK in the 1970s, most have probably moved on mentally and the argument that 'historical thinking' needs to be rediscovered also has an application within the confines of the capitalist system. From the *LM* point of view, pusillanimous capitalists are failing to take full advantage of the new technologies, which could form the basis of a new era of progress to rival the post-war boom. Instead, the business class seeks to justify its role through mission statements and anti-harassment codes, and can find no compelling arguments with which to confront anti-globalisation protesters.

Underlining all of this is the group's perception of an impasse in society at the ideological level, which prevents leaders of Western society, even in the absence of alternatives to capitalism, from inspiring modern-day populations. Frank Furedi's book, *Mythical Past, Elusive Future* – published in 1990 and required reading in the days of the RCP – argued that as a sense of pessimism gripped society, both left and right were engaged in a battle to 'plunder history', that is, to rewrite history, in order to find a tradition capable of cohering society in the present. Yet society is unable to find an agreed version of the past that allows it to feel good about itself in the present. This is postmodernism, the failure of all the meta-narratives.

Today, twelve years later, most people disbelieve the very idea of a meta-narrative, whether inspired by the right or the left. One could argue that what is worse than a failure to find a suitable metanarrative is the abandonment of the search for one – dropping as it does the goal of social coherence – and the championing of social fragmentation in the form of 'cultural diversity' and 'multiculturalism'. Multiculturalism places the stress on the smaller identities of communities and groups within society, identities that are proclaimed *against* society, preventing the emergence of a new society cohered around an agreed national identity. In either case, Professor Furedi argues that 'fixed identities rooted in the past represent the antithesis of historical thinking'. In other words, it is possible to envision a society that eschews the politics of identity, which are based on the past, and in the words of Karl Marx 'draws its poetry from the future'.

From the conservative point of view, of course, there is no such thing as a society that draws its poetry from the future. The *LM* group may eschew national identity and group identities alike, but a society with no sense of itself is not really a society. We cannot create a true *tabula rasa* of society, Blair's efforts notwithstanding, and a society that has a forward-looking approach to science and progress is just as much a product of its cultural baggage as is a society that sees technological progress as accompanied by unintended negative consequences. As individuals, we cannot operate on an identity-free level: our experiences condition our responses to life. So it is with societies.

'Historical thinking' – just as woolly as cultural diversity

It is ironic that when there was a strong metanarrative in British society, Great Britain was the workshop of the

world. A clear view of what Britain was, and a pride in her contributions to Western civilisation, underpinned rapid social and economic change. A conservative would argue that a country does not need to lose its culture and identity in order to progress; maybe it needs to step up its attempts to safeguard its culture through a period of rapid change in order to prevent dislocations that lead to disillusionment with technical progress. Professor Furedi's 'historical thinking' is therefore similar to Mr. Blair's attempts to redefine Britain as a 'young' country. The Furedi group may be more optimistic with respect to science and progress, but the message is still that the past is irrelevant to our future progress, or even that tradition and culture are inimical to economic and technical progress. But as *Last Magazine*, a final edition of *LM* in the summer of 2000 following defeat in the libel trial, argued with respect to New Labour, 'declaring war on the past is fine, but where do you go then?'

At times, *LM* seemed to come close to arguing the importance of the legacy of 2000 years of Western civilisation, favouring the study of Shakespeare and arguing for the superiority of classical music over 'pop'. Their approach mirrored that of the Caribbean Trotskyist, C L R James, who once wrote, 'I denounce European colonialism, but I respect the learning and profound discoveries of Western civilisation'. But the high points of Western civilisation were praised by *LM*, not as the heritage of Westerners, but as part of world civilisation in general, the heritage of mankind as a whole. I would argue that, just like *LM*, conservatives do not admire the achievements of Western civilisation merely because of their antiquity; we would welcome a *renaissance* or a new Elizabethan Age today. But if a nation were deemed capable of travelling light, with no cultural baggage, belonging to no civilisational tradition in particular, but leaving some members of society to pluck like a magpie what they saw as the best from the general pot of human civilisation, while the rest watched *Eastenders*, then a renewed period of high cultural creation would be unlikely. There might be a bit of Islamic calligraphy here, a few lessons on the Chinese *pipa* there, but no-one would be raised within a rich cultural tradition that represented the lifeblood of society. There would be no new church architecture to humble countless future generations; there would be no new symphonies or settings of the Mass worth talking about; and our own history would be forgotten. In other words, from a conservative point of view, we need not only to prize high culture, but to *develop the high cultural traditions of our own civilisation*. Frank Furedi argued that 'society's estrangement from the future undermines the capacity to generate ideas about what needs to be done', giving rise to political stasis. However, he forgot to add that society's estrangement from the future is a function of its estrangement from its past. The problem is therefore not one of a lack of 'historical thinking' as such, a lack of focus on the future or enthusiasm for progress, but the failure of Western lead-

ers to use the 2000 years of Western civilisation to articulate a positive vision of our societies.

This creation of a meta-narrative in society is the *sine qua non* of social leadership. Western leaders who do not believe in the value of our cultural heritage cannot cohere society, and cannot act coherently on the world stage in pursuit of the West's geopolitical interests. The *LM* group understands this, and so it was with a certain amount of disdain that it viewed the apologies of the Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, for his proffered opinion that Western civilisation was 'superior' to other cultures. The apology was remarkable even from a liberal standpoint, as the idea that all cultures are equal is in fact a rejection of the idea of progress. As the *LM* group's Dominic Standish argued, 'what does it say about Western societies and their leaders when they don't even feel they can express their superiority to societies that do not have universal suffrage or free elections? Surely it is legitimate to say that some societies, whatever their faults, are more democratic than others?'

Mick Hume recently argued that a lack of consensus within the US establishment on the need to attack Iraq was 'a consequence of the most important defeat that the American establishment has ever suffered: its defeat in the "Culture War" within the USA' and that a logical consequence of this was that '[President] Bush will not be able to summon the will to carry off any grandiose scheme of conquest'...

Although in the event the Iraqi regime was removed from power, the *LM* group continued to highlight the pusillanimous manner of the prosecution of the war. Coalition military planners appeared to hope that the initial bombing of regime targets would prompt the unravelling of the regime without any fighting at all. The patient approach of British forces to the taking of Basra appeared to be the result of indecision, the lack of any strategy at all, and the later fall of Baghdad came without the Americans' even having to take the city, allowing Mr Hume to proclaim a "hollow victory in the war that never was". The purpose of the war was never clearly spelled out. It seems likely that a nation that has gone through the Culture Wars and feels that it has to respond to the terrorist bombings of 11 September 2001 with an adopt-a-Muslim-penal scheme cannot clearly conceive of the possibility of a clash of civilisation.

Yet, contrary to what might seem to be the case, Mick Hume and the other former members of the RCP are not in fact arguing for a determined reversal of the victories of the left in the Culture Wars. They are glad that traditional conservatism has been kicked into touch, but they regret the *particular way* in which this was done. Coming from an anti-imperialist tradition, the *LM* group does not favour a return to imperialism, but seems to find the spectre of a Western establishment, sitting on a civilisation that has created the modern world and that has no genuine equals, but reluctant to admit the glories of its civilisation and act in the defence thereof, truly toe-curling. It is the pusillanimity of it all that bothers them. But this is as far as they go. Offering no alternative, they come

across as merely revelling in pointing out the ideological impasse in Western society. Ultimately, the *LM* group has built up a fascinating critique of the enervation of Western society, but fails to follow through with support for the re-creation of nation-states in the West.

Liberalism isn't working - and cannot work

One is left with the impression that the *LM* group recoils from the logical conclusions of its own arguments. Nevertheless, whatever conclusions they draw, their description of the ideological impasse in Western society is important. It highlights the fact that antinomianism, liberalism, multiculturalism and cultural diversity are an inadequate basis on which to found society anew. Unlike many initially destructive ideas, they can have no constructive side.

No society can run itself on economic growth alone, whatever the pretensions of 'historical thinking'. As Christianity and traditional morality are kicked out of the back door, a new set of values, a new morality, flies in through the front, justifying, however fatuously, the rule of the new elite. The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci saw that social stability in any society is underpinned by more than the threat of force alone: the bourgeois values of yesteryear allowed the old establishment to exercise a 'cultural hegemony' over the population as a whole, endowing its rule with moral legitimacy – and quite rightly so. By contrast, the new *ersatz* morality is made up of anti-racism, tolerance, 'gay' rights and respect for the environment. The key difference is of course that the operation of these new values within society is centrifugal, rather than centripetal: the new values are anti-social, because they keep society fragmented.

Conservative opposition to multiculturalism and liberalism therefore stems not from a truculent refusal to recognise changed realities, but from an awareness that the ideological replacement for conservatism is unstable and *does not work*. If a new coherent multiracial society were by now emerging from the ashes of the bad old days, then any attempt to stand in its way would be quixotic, as it could be relied upon eventually to restore a sense of community and recreate the inclusiveness of the nation-state on a new basis. However, if 35 years after the passage of the Race Relations Act society appears to be ill at ease with itself, with riots in northern towns and mounting opposition to immigration in this nation – as well as across Europe – it is because of the failure of the supposedly liberal ideas that have underpinned cultural change. The problems thrown up by diversity can be managed, but only at the expense of the freedom of speech and the freedom of association.

Similarly, liberalism has no real answer to the level of criminality in our society today. If the 1950s represent the *ancien régime* that preceded the Culture Wars, we can see that punishment was not relied upon in isolation to enforce social order; people were raised with absolute moral values reflecting the Christian ethos of society. By contrast today, we seem to have almost pathetically weak punishments for crime, but no set of positive values with

which to build characters. The *LM* group is right to point out that the fear of crime often takes on an irrational dimension today, but both fear of crime and the higher average level of criminality today suggest that society is operating in a dysfunctional way as the family, the media and the education system, which together should act to transmit society's values to the next generation, fail in that task – or do not even attempt it.

Furthermore, and most importantly, as a society loses its national identity, it becomes a ragbag of individuals, a population rather than a people. What Professor Furedi's 'historical thinking' shares with 'Blairism' is a desire to cancel out the past and move forward on that basis. Either way, there is then no *demos*, there is no society with a consciousness of itself. A society that is conscious only of the opportunities presented by science and technology in the future is not a nation (which by definition lives in the past, the present and the future simultaneously), and easily falls under the sway of a non-accountable technocratic élite.

Building an intellectual challenge

The various *LM*-associated groups clearly have a role to play in challenging many of the prevalent ideas, particularly as very few conservatives seem to be taking up the challenge. While Conservatives have nearly all thrown in the cultural towel, the *LM* group, loosely working around the Institute of Ideas and Sp!ked Online, is active on a wide range of fronts, deriding everything from capitalist caution to environmentalism, and from smoking bans to attempts to modernise the monarchy. However, as far as the *LM* group is concerned, any similarity between their views and those of the conservative right is coincidental. Not all of their causes are ours and there are still people around like Ann Furedi banging on about late-term abortion rights as if the 1970s were still with us.

If we wish to challenge the dominance of liberalism, we ourselves need to put in place an intellectual challenge to the fatuous ideas of the new élite. The *LM* group's cultural writings reflect the Gramscian view that the dominant ideas in a society do not only justify a social system to the broad mass of the population; they justify it to the ruling strata themselves too. This is in fact the more important moment. If this is right, then it means that we need to wear down liberals insidiously and relentlessly with a suspicion that the values that provide them with a moral purpose in life are in fact fundamentally corrosive of all decent society. In other words, we need to build an intellectual challenge capable of knocking the confidence of liberals by persistently showing that liberalism fails on its own terms. Given that the new moral codes of anti-racism and feminism are unable to cohere society, there is little point in conceding the game in the way that is currently being suggested within the Conservative Party, however reactionary and hidebound we are made to feel in the current intellectual climate. *Reactionaries of this land unite! We have nothing to lose – and a nation-state to win!*

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'The Way to Hell is paved with good intentions': This expression could have been specially written for the Church of England authors of a new report, *Cohabitation: A Christian Reflection*. There are only two problems with this report: it is not very Christian and it is not very reflective. All the buzz words of the deadly Christian liberalism present themselves - deadly because it is this thoughtless, emasculated, all-accommodating religion that has progressively emptied the churches for the last forty years. The authors do not want to be 'negative'. But these are the sort of folk who would say that God himself was being negative when he said 'Thou shalt not'. They don't seem to realise that if we can never say 'No' to anything, then our 'Yes' is worthless. They don't want to be 'judgmental' - and so forget that the Christian faith contains indelibly the idea of judgement; and indeed a life lived without making judgements is a life not worth living.

So what's up then? 'The public image of the church in matters of sex is frankly a disaster. Church people are seen and too often behave as Pharisees - dispensing rules, standards and judgements rather than understanding, constructive wisdom or love.' Well, can't you do both? Can't you - to be specific - say that here is marriage, an immutable standard and the moral paradigm for all sexual relationships - and then show the utmost compassion and love towards those who fall short of that standard? We all fall short of it, one way or another.

The modern church has forgotten the ancient wisdom that one must hate the sin but love the sinner. It thinks that the only way you can demonstrate love for the sinner is to pretend there is no such thing as sin. But that is not love or compassion; only sentimentality and neurosis. I don't know where the authors get their idea that the church is seen as censorious. Ever since 1963 and chapter six of Bishop Robinson's poisonous paperback *Honest To God*, most parsons have replaced 'Thou shalt not commit adultery' with 'Let it all hang out' and 'All You Need Is Love.'

Actually - and I speak as a priest with thirty-three years in the parish - the man in the street, the couple contemplating marriage, do not regard the church's traditional teaching as pharisaical or hypocritical: they want the church to be authoritative and lay down the ground-rules. If the church daren't be authoritative then God help us - so to speak. Since I came to my City of London parish five years ago, I have solemnised the marriages of twenty-two couples - not old fogies, but all in their twenties or thirties: brokers and bankers and solicitors; secular, largely unchurched men and women of the wine bars and acquainted with discos. And all the weddings were done according to the Book of Common Prayer (1662).

This is the book, you may recall, that contains all those unfashionable (but certainly not hypocritical) phrases about

marriage 'for a remedy against sin and to avoid fornication'; and that 'it is not to be enterprised nor taken in hand unadvisedly, lightly or wantonly to satisfy men's carnal lusts and appetites, like brute beasts that have no understanding'. And, in answer to those who complain about the church as too 'judgemental', the priest in the 1662 book declares to the couple unequivocally: 'I require and charge you both as ye will answer at the dreadful day of judgement when the secrets of all hearts shall be disclosed.'

All twenty-two of those couples I married, so far from being put off by traditional teaching, have stayed with the church and they are active and regular members of the Sunday congregation - travelling into the City from miles out in the suburbs and beyond to a church where we are not ashamed to confess the faith delivered to the saints.

The terrible lack of faith in the modern church is fully expressed in this silly report. It would have been a start at least if the modern Christians who wrote it hadn't striven so hard to be un-Pharisaical that they had ended up despising the great Fathers of the Church. Is it any wonder no-one bothers to attend the trendy churches when churchpeople write like this: 'Sadly Augustine in his old age, and in the heat of another controversy against the Pelagians, allowed his deep suspicion of sexual passion full rein, when he made the link between sexuality and original sin.' When a theologian can write that Augustine is in the wrong, and that that great spiritual genius's teachings are a cause for sadness, then you would be justified in thinking that the Church of England had resigned.

Well, if they have no time for St Augustine - the teacher alike of the great Catholic St Thomas Aquinas and the great Protestant Martin Luther - where, you might ask, do they go for their inspiration, these modern, non-judgemental Christians? Let them answer for themselves: 'Shere Hite, Michel Foucault and other writers about sex have expressed the view that sexual repertoires are historically and socially constructed.' Oh have they now? Anyone who prefers the jargon of frauds and ideologues such as Hite and Foucault to the language of St Paul and St Augustine ought to shave their heads and submit themselves for exorcism.

Let me not be too hard on them, lest I too am accused of being 'judgmental'. I have said it before and I'll say it again: they mean well. But listen to this from page 96: 'Two of the eight clergy I spoke to were unashamed supporters of the traditional teaching that sex should be restricted to marriage.' Now let's do our sums: that means six out of eight clergy were ashamed of the traditional teaching.

Now you know what's wrong with the Church of England.

Peter Mullen

Divorce as Revolution

Stephen Baskerville

For some thirty years now a quiet revolution has been waged throughout the Western world. Most people are now familiar with the social consequences of the divorce explosion: the growth of single-parent homes and massive increase in fatherless children. The Pandora's box of social problems this has released has also reached general awareness. Virtually every major personal and social pathology can be traced to fatherlessness more than to any other single factor: violent crime, substance abuse, unwed pregnancy, truancy, suicide, and more. Fatherlessness far surpasses both poverty and race as a predictor of social deviance.

These problems are alarming enough in themselves. What is seldom appreciated is that they are also responsible for a vast expansion in the power and reach of the state. In fact, so is divorce itself. In contrast to its social fallout, the political consequences of divorce are hardly understood at all, yet they may ultimately be the most destructive.

The result of three decades of unrestrained divorce is that huge numbers of people – many of them government officials – now have a vested professional and financial interest in encouraging it. Divorce today is not simply a phenomenon; it is a regime – a vast bureaucratic empire that permeates national and local governments, with hangers-on in the private sector. In the United States divorce and custody comprise over half of civil litigation, constituting the cash cow of the judiciary and bringing employment and earnings to a host of public and private officials, including judges, lawyers, psychotherapists, mediators, counsellors, social workers, child support enforcement agents, and others.

This growth industry derives from the impact of divorce on children. The divorce revolution has spawned a public-private industrial complex of legal, social service, and psychotherapeutic professionals devoted to the problems of children, and especially children in single-parent homes. Many are women with feminist leanings. Whatever pieties they may voice about the plight of fatherless, poor, and violent children, the fact remains that these practitioners have a vested interest in creating as many such children as possible. The way to do it is to remove the fathers.

It is commonplace today that fathers are disadvantaged in divorce courts everywhere when it comes to child custody. In today's political jargon we attribute this to 'discrimination' and 'gender bias'. But this does not convey the half of it. Divorce courts and their huge

entourage of personnel depend for their existence on broken, single-parent homes. The first principle of family court is therefore: remove the father. So long as fathers remain with their families, the divorce practitioners earn nothing. This is why the first thing a family court does when it summons a father on a divorce petition – even if he has done nothing wrong and not agreed to the divorce – is to strip him of custody of his children. While mothers also fall afoul of divorce courts, fathers are their principal rivals.

Once the father is eliminated, the state functionally replaces him as protector and provider. By removing the father, the state also creates a host of problems for itself to solve: child poverty, child abuse, juvenile crime, and other problems associated with single-parent homes. In this way, the divorce machinery is self-perpetuating and self-expanding. Involuntary divorce is a marvellous tool that allows for the infinite expansion of government power.

No-fault divorce is the middle-class equivalent of public assistance, creating single-parent homes among the affluent as welfare did among the poor. In the United States, where the trend began, all the major institutions of the divorce industry were originally created as ancillary to welfare: juvenile/family courts, child support enforcement, child protection services. No-fault divorce extended these 'services' to the middle class because that was where the money was, and with it political power.

Like welfare, divorce involving children is almost wholly female-driven. Though governments invariably claim that fathers 'abandon' their children, there is no evidence this is true, nor even that fathers agree to most divorces. Cautious scholars like Sanford Braver of Arizona State University consistently find that at least two-thirds of divorces are filed by women, usually with no legal grounds. Yet lawyers and feminists report much higher proportions. Shere Hite, the popular researcher on female sexuality, found 'ninety-one percent of women who have divorced say they made the decision to divorce, not their husbands.'

This is hardly surprising, given the almost irresistible emotional and financial incentives the industry offers mothers to divorce, including automatic custody plus windfall child support and other financial rewards, regardless of any fault on their part. A Canadian/American research team found that 'who gets the children is by far the most important component in deciding who files for divorce.' What we call 'divorce' has in effect become a

kind of legalised parental kidnapping.

Once the father loses custody, he becomes in many ways an outlaw and subject to plunder by a variety of officials. His contact with his own children becomes criminalised in that he can be arrested if he tries to see them outside of authorised times and places. Unlike anyone else, he can be arrested for running into his children in a public place such as the zoo or church. In the United States fathers are arrested for telephoning their children when they are not authorised or for sending them birthday cards. Fathers are routinely summoned to court and subjected to questioning about their private lives. Their personal papers, bank accounts, and homes must be opened and surrendered to government officials. Anything a father has said to his spouse or children can be used against him in court. His personal habits, movements, conversations, purchases, and his relationship with his own children are all subject to inquiry and control by the court.

Despite prohibitions on incarceration for debt, a father can be jailed without trial for failure to pay not only child support but the fees of lawyers and psychotherapists he has not hired. A judge can summon a legally unimpeachable citizen who is minding his own business and order him to turn over his earnings or go to jail.

As the logic of involuntary divorce plays itself out, divorce is forced on not only one parent but both. Mothers are not only enticed into divorce with financial incentives, in other words; they are being pressured into it by threats against their children. Last year, Heidi Howard was ordered by the Massachusetts Department of Social Services to divorce her husband or lose her children, although authorities acknowledged neither parent had been violent. When she refused, the social workers seized her children and attempted to terminate the couple's parental rights. *Massachusetts News* reporter Nev Moore says such cases are common in Massachusetts.

Family law is now criminalising rights as basic as free speech and freedom of the press. In many jurisdictions it is a crime to criticize family court judges or otherwise discuss family law cases publicly. Under the pretext of 'family privacy', parents are gagged from publicly disclosing how government officials have seized control of their children. In Australia it is a crime for a litigant to speak publicly concerning family courts, even without mentioning specific cases.

In Australia, the US, and Britain, family courts have closed web sites operated by fathers' groups. Britain, Australia, and Canada have all resurrected archaic laws prohibiting the criticism of judges in order to prosecute fathers' groups. In the United States judges cannot be sued, but they can sue citizens who criticize them. The confiscation of property can also be used to criminalise political opinions. Following his testimony to the US Congress critical of the family courts, Jim Wagner of the Georgia Council for Children's Rights was stripped of custody of his two children and ordered to pay \$6,000 in

the fees of attorneys he had not hired. When he could not pay, he was arrested.

The swelling hysteria over 'domestic violence' appears fomented largely for similar ends. 'All of this domestic violence industry is about trying to take children away from their fathers,' writes *Irish Times* columnist John Waters. 'When they've taken away the fathers, they'll take away the mothers.' Donna Laframboise of Canada's *National Post* investigated battered women's shelters and concluded they constituted 'one stop divorce shops', whose purpose was not to protect women but to promote divorce. These shelters, often federally funded, issue affidavits against fathers sight-unseen that are accepted without corroborating evidence by judges to justify removing their children. Special domestic violence courts in Canada can now remove fathers from their homes and seize their houses on a mere allegation of domestic violence.

Divorce, not violence, is also behind the explosion of restraining orders, which are routinely issued without evidence of wrongdoing, separating fathers from their children and homes. Almost 90% of judicial magistrates in New South Wales acknowledged that protective orders were used in divorce – often on the advice of a solicitor – to deprive fathers of access to their children. Elaine Epstein, former president of the Massachusetts Women's Bar Association, writes that restraining orders are doled out 'like candy.' 'Everyone knows that restraining orders and orders to vacate are granted to virtually all who apply,' and 'the facts have become irrelevant,' she reports.

Fathers are further criminalised through child-support burdens, which constitute the financial fuel of the divorce machinery, underwriting unilateral divorce and giving everyone involved further incentives to remove children from their fathers. Government claims of unpaid child support constitute one of the most dishonest and destructive hoaxes ever foisted on the public. In a US government-funded study, Sanford Braver discovered that most fathers pay fully and on time and that 'estimated' arrearages are derived not from official records but from surveys of mothers. Braver's findings have never been refuted by any official or scholar. Yet ever-more draconian 'crackdowns' and arrests continue.

Last summer *Liberty* magazine published documentary evidence that 'deadbeat dads' are largely the creation of civil servants and law-enforcement agents with an interest in giving themselves criminals to prosecute. In most jurisdictions, child support guidelines are set by enforcement personnel, the equivalent of the police making the laws. These officials can separate children from their fathers, impose impossible child support obligations, and then jail fathers who inevitably fail to pay.

Child support trials operate on a presumption of guilt, where 'the burden of proof may be shifted to the defendant,' according to the US National Conference of State Legislatures, which favours aggressive prosecutions. Contrary to Common Law and the US Constitution,

courts have ruled that 'not all child-support contempt proceedings classified as criminal are entitled to a jury trial,' and 'even indigent obligors are not necessarily entitled to a lawyer.' Thus impoverished parents who lose their children through literally 'no fault' of their own are the only defendants who must prove their innocence without counsel and without a jury of their peers.

Cases like Darrin White of British Columbia are the result. With no evidence of wrongdoing, White was denied all contact with his children, evicted from his home, and ordered to pay more than twice his income as child and spousal support, plus court costs for a divorce he never agreed to. White hanged himself from a tree. 'There is nothing unusual about this judgement,' said a British Columbia Supreme Court Judge, who pointed out that the judge applied standard support guidelines.

Fathers driven to suicide by family courts are acknowledged by officials in Canada, Australia, and Britain. A suicide epidemic has been documented by Augustine Kposowa of the University of California in the *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*. Kposowa attributes his finding directly to family court judgements, though media reports of his study emphasised fathers' lack of 'support networks'.

Why is so little opposition heard? Though the conservative media are waking up, the silence of conservative politicians is deafening, given that every prophecy about the dangers of judicial activism, bureaucratic aggrandizement, and ideological extremism is vindicated in the war on fathers. What is perhaps most diabolical about the divorce industry is its ability to co-opt so many people, including its critics. By creating problems to be solved – and then dispensing government money to solve them – the machine gives everyone an interest in fatherless children. Even critics develop a stake in having something to criticize.

In Canada and the US, domestic violence legislation dispenses a gravy train of federal money to the states/provinces and localities. This is often earmarked with appeals to 'law enforcement', though the effect is to divert it from the prosecution of criminals to the prosecution of fathers. Likewise, child support enforcement is propelled by federal payments rewarding local governments for each dollar collected, filling local coffers and giving officials an incentive to squeeze revenue from (after they have forced divorce on) as many fathers as they can find.

Especially questionable are government enterprises to 'promote fatherhood', which disperse grants to local governments and organizations ostensibly to 'reunite fathers with their children'. Yet they are premised on first separating them from one another. What is advertised as a programme to facilitate 'access and visitation' means supervised contact centers, where fathers must pay to see their children in institutions. 'Encouraging good fathering' means state-sponsored television advertisements with actors depicting fathers abandoning their children. One American state receives federal money to implement 'Five Principles of Fatherhood', including: 'give affection

to my children' and 'demonstrate respect at all times to the mother of my children'. One cannot help wondering what penalties the state will bring to bear on fathers who fail to show sufficient 'affection' and 'respect'.

Involuntary divorce is the instrument not simply of tyrannical judges, unscrupulous lawyers, and doctrinaire feminists, but of a new political class whose interest is to subject the private corners of life to state control. Two conservative scholars recently argued in the *Journal of Political Economy* that the vast expansion of governmental machinery during the twentieth century proceeded largely from women acquiring the vote. Women, far more than men, voted to create the welfare state. But: 'Why would men and women have differing political interests?' ask John Lott and Larry Kenny. 'If there were no divorces ... the interests of men and women would appear to be closely linked together.' The premise of their question invites the answer: 'As divorce or desertion rates rise, more women will be saddled with the costs of raising the children.' Conservatives have accepted the feminist argument that the arm of the state is a necessary defensive shield to protect women from the costs of divorce, attributed to male desertion. But male desertion is not a major cause of divorce. The welfare state and expansive government therefore are not defenses against divorce but preconditions for it. Divorce is a political weapon and an offensive one at that, promoted by the same bureaucratic and ideological interests that are undermining and politicising fatherhood and expanding the power and reach of the state to deal with the consequences.

What then can check the march of the unilateral divorce machine?

One theme of intellectuals who dissented from the ideological-bureaucratic dictatorships of eastern Europe was 'nonpolitical politics': to oppose ideology not with contrary ideology but with non-ideology, to resist politicisation by re-creating the ordinary business of 'civil society' and private life. If any group should adopt this philosophy today, it is fathers. For all the effort to 'restore fatherhood' through programmes like *Fathers Direct*, ultimately the only ones who can restore fatherhood are, of course, fathers themselves. Almost by definition, fathers alone can truly 'save the children' by re-creating the family with themselves in it.

In so doing, fathers may also hold the potential to start redeeming a political culture that for thirty years has been sinking into the mire of permanent rebellion. Their current plight indicates how far the divorce 'revolution' has brought us all into a brave new quasi-Freudian world where not only traditional institutions are attacked and brought low, but so now are private individuals, simply because they hold the most basic position of human authority, the head of a family. Whether they are up to the challenge remains to be seen.

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The Pension Crisis

Retiring in Disorder

Charles Cecil

It was only a short while ago that we were promised the longest holidays of our lives with early retirement on generous pensions. However, it can have escaped very few people during the course of the last year that the UK pension system is now beset by problems. All the broadsheets, all personal finance supplements as well as the tabloids have covered the matter. As the markets plunge, the hubbub rises. Perhaps it is less well known that many of the Continental European pension systems are in significantly worse trouble and the US is not immune either. Many of the underlying causes are the same as for the UK.

A discussion of pensions suffers from some serious disadvantages. In the first place, for most people it is a very boring topic. Secondly, in the UK in particular, the system – if it can be dignified by that name – is horrendously complicated; there are 8 different tax regimes for pensions for 20 different schemes. Thirdly the issues and the solutions are long-term and therefore do not always seem urgent (particularly now that attention spans of both politicians and private citizens are becoming shorter).

The first fundamental issue is age. This contributes to the problem in two ways. People are living longer and therefore need pensions for longer. For example, the proportion of over 75s in the UK was 6.8 per cent in 1990 and is forecast to rise to 10.8 per cent in 2030. In Germany the comparable figures are 7.2 per cent and 13 per cent.

The second factor of age is the greying of populations. There are fewer workers proportionate to pensioners and consequently the burden of pensions on the economically active population is growing significantly. Countries such as the US with high immigration and a younger average age are not so imminently at risk and the UK's profile is better than many other Western European countries. In 1990 there were 4.2 people in the UK labour force per pensioner and this is expected to fall to 2.6 by 2030. The comparable figures for Italy and Germany are 4.6 and 2.1.

The next fundamental issue is that of funding adequacy. The collapse of the equity markets and interest rates has raised questions about the ability of the non-state funded pension schemes to meet their liabilities. In countries like the UK and the US which rely more heavily on the private system, the burden falls more on the individuals and their employers. However in many countries which have largely state-funded pension provision, there is a much more serious threat to public as opposed to private finances.

To maintain the level of state-funded provision to 2050 at

the levels of 1995 would require Germany to devote 3.4 per cent more of its GDP each year, France 3.3 per cent, Italy 2.5 percent compared to 0.1 per cent for the UK and 0.8 per cent for the US. The figures for these three Continental countries imply, with unchanged systems, either unacceptable increases in taxation or deeply imprudent increases in public debt at a time when they are already showing an inability to cope with the rigours of the Monetary Union regime. More *schadenfreude* for the Euro-sceptics? Perhaps not if the UK – and the Danes and Swedes – are asked, perhaps after joining the Euro, to share the fruits of their relative prudence with the Foolish Virgins. In much of Europe, the immediate problems are faced by the state and they will be shifting as much of the burden as they can towards individuals and companies. For the UK (as for the US), the unpalatable choices are already faced by individuals and companies.

What needs to be done? The broad answers are (a) to contribute more to pensions, (b) to work longer, and (c) to provide lower pensions. All three will probably be required and the prospect is unattractive. Nevertheless, this is not a reason to panic. The depths of a bear market are bound to produce apocalyptic predictions of imminent doom. The position is serious, requires attention but not hasty, ill-thought-out action.

Turning specifically to the UK, there are serious problems arising from the structure of the pension system, the funding of the private sector provision and actions taken by the current government. The UK also holds certain advantages for public sector finances, one of which is the ungenerous provision of the state system. Currently the state contributes 60 per cent of pension provision in the UK and private schemes 40 per cent and the government is trying to reverse these proportions — with scant success so far. The maximum pension from April 2003 for a single person, topped up by the minimum income guarantee is £102.10 per week for a single person and £155.80 for a couple — hardly princely. (The additional second state pension is designed for low and moderate earners.) To put it another way, someone retiring on national average earnings would get around 30 per cent of that in state-provided pension in the UK compared to 40 per cent in Germany, nearly 50 per cent in France and over 90 per cent in Spain according to Chris Daykin, the Government Actuary.

The burden falls therefore on the private sector — either company schemes or individual provision or a combination

of the two. Here we begin to encounter problems. The UK pension system is extremely complicated and perhaps the only genuinely good point in the December 2002 Green Paper is an undertaking to simplify this radically. (Of course we cannot actually expect any simplification to be put in place before 2004 at the earliest.)

What are the problems facing the private provision of pensions? The key issues are set out below.

Company pension schemes have suffered seriously from the fall in markets and interest rates. A recent estimate by the consultants, Watson Wyatt, show under a controversial new accounting standard, FRS 17, the UK corporate pension fund deficit is £130 billion at the end of 2002 (or £65 billion even under the more traditional calculation methods). The local authority pension schemes, accounting for around 20 per cent of UK pension assets, are 10-15 per cent under-funded. This situation will require significant additional contributions to the extent markets do not recover – though more manageable if they do. This has implications for dividends to shareholders and capital investment, both of which might be cut back substantially, or increases in council tax in the case of local authorities. Just as many companies were able to take pension holidays when markets drove up the value of pension funds, so the reverse is the case in bad markets.

The government has been unhelpful, to say the least, in several ways:

Gordon Brown, in his first budget, raided the pension funds by abolishing tax relief on dividends, which is thought to amount to a grab of at least £5 billion a year – probably equating to a £125 billion reduction in the value of British pension funds. This was an opportunistic move in boom markets but a most improvident move in the medium term.

– it insisted on the creation of stakeholder pension schemes to provide cheap basic pensions for company employees – a triumph of gesture over usefulness since 90% have no members and only 9 per cent of employees contribute to such schemes.

– nothing in its period of office or in the December 2002 Green Paper gives any indication as to how they will encourage the lower paid to save more (especially given that these are the workers with least money available to save). Indeed it is probably currently more worth their while to spend their savings on property, school fees and other such useful investments and rely on the small state provision as they will not be able to put enough aside for a meaningful pension plan of their own.

The employers have responded to the shortfalls produced by the market downturns (with hindsight they had too much allocated to equities in the last three years), to the government raid and the prospects of having to make large contributions. 30 per cent of private employer schemes are closed to new entrants and the percentage is rising rapidly. (Employers will still have to make up shortfalls on the funds but the lack of new entrants to the funds will restrict the open-ended nature of the obligation.)

Additional benefits such as health insurance are being cut in many cases and this trend will probably grow. Some schemes are being closed down altogether. Contributions by employers to substitute schemes – money purchase – are running at less than half the level of the old schemes. In any event, the greater frequency with which people now change jobs accentuates the way that the corporate pension system penalises pre-retirement leavers.

One might expect that individuals would be taking up the slack by contributing to supplementary schemes and saving. This is clearly not the case as was seen when the government in July 2002 admitted that they had overstated the amounts being saved by £35 billion a year or 60 per cent – termed by some commentators as the biggest black-hole accounting error in British history. The Green Paper estimated that in the UK 3 million people will retire on income of less than half their earnings and a further 5 to 10 million are not saving enough to provide the pensions they want.

There is no quick fix solution to these problems. A number of alternative and supplementary schemes have been discussed (not least in a recent publication of *Civitas – Debating Pensions*) but we still appear to be debating fundamental and incompatible solutions.

It is worth looking briefly at the current state of financial markets and accounting rules to understand why the skies are not quite as pitch black as the doom merchants are saying. We should note that a lot of the apocalyptic figures given for the shortfalls in company pension schemes result from the application of the new FRS 17 accounting standard. By taking a snap-shot of the pension fund situation today when markets are heavily down, no account is taken of potential market recovery nor of the current (and prospective) levels of cash income available to meet current liabilities.

A revival in the equity markets would help but not, on its own, deal with the long-term issues and in any event cannot be relied on to bail us out entirely. As matters currently stand, we can expect that the retirement age will eventually be increased – possibly to 70. Those who can afford to save enough to create an adequate pension pot should do so (with the consequent drop in consumption); there is no reason why they should not take some responsibility for their own retirement. Those who cannot afford to save more will be thrown back on the rather limited state schemes. Pensions from all sources will almost certainly be significantly less than expected.

On the government side, they should reverse their tax policy on pension fund dividend income, they should introduce flexibility and simplicity as soon as possible (a forlorn hope as most of the Green Paper involves extended and comprehensive further consultation). They should abandon their obsession with social engineering which involves micro-management of the pension system, particularly at the top and at the bottom where they are diminishing incentives to save. Removing restrictions to growth, as particularly evident within the Eurozone,

and a reduction in red tape and unproductive jobs in both the UK and the rest of the EU will help. There would be a stimulus to the economies and a consequent improvement in the investment markets.

As the old song says 'By and by hard times come knocking at the door.'

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Humbug:

The Unending Character Assassination of Kurt Waldheim in America

John Leake

Kurt Waldheim (UN Secretary-General 1972-1982; President of Austria 1986-1992) has a tireless prosecutor in the U.S. House of Representatives. Like the witches in Macbeth, Representative Carolyn B. Maloney, a Democrat from New York, keeps stirring the cauldron of accusations against him. Since 1994, she has waged a two-phased 'crusade' (as she describes it). In the first phase, she attempted to gather evidence against him; in the second (which she is still waging despite the failure of the first) she is trying to punish him in any way she can. She claims she is now trying to terminate his UN pension.

I saw his name in the devil's book. To ruin a man in America, it is not necessary to prove he was a Nazi – it is enough to say that he was. Kurt Waldheim was not a member of the Nazi Party or any of its affiliations listed at the Berlin Document Center, the official NSDAP archive. The standard procedure of the U.S. government for determining if someone has a Nazi past is to check his name at this archive. During the era of denazification, such checks not only provided evidence, but also protected persons from being falsely denounced. If someone 'runs clean,' as Waldheim did, it is slanderous to call him a Nazi. Nevertheless, as recently as 2001, Maloney called him a 'known Nazi.' ('Maloney Legislation Sheds Light on Holocaust History,' April 26, 2001 Press Release). His accusers have pointed to his membership in nominal Nazi affiliations that are not proscribed by the BDC. Though he was a member of the National Socialist Student Union, he claims that he did not join it, and his American biographer, Professor Robert Herzstein, acknowledged that one of his teachers at the Consular Academy may have enrolled him in it. He joined an equestrian club at the Consular Academy that was incorporated into the SA. Though his accusers have made much of this, they never mention that every notable sports association in Nazi Germany was incorporated into the SA. Nor do they mention that Waldheim protested against Germany's annexation of Austria in 1938, and was beaten by Nazi youths while handing out leaflets on the street urging Austrians to vote against it. (Herzstein: *Waldheim: The Missing Years*, William Morrow, New York, 1988, p 52). In 1940, a Nazi regional office wrote that Waldheim was, 'like his father, a supporter of the

Schussnigg regime who gave proof of his spitefulness towards our movement by boasting.' (Letter from the NSDAP Gauleitung Niederdonau, August 2, 1940). I have not found a single American essay or editorial that mentions Lord Weidenfeld's testimony to the Austrian government that Waldheim was an anti-Nazi with definite anti-racial views. (Weidenfeld: *Remembering My Good Friends*, Harper Collins, London, 1995, pp. 62-64).

Maloney first targeted Waldheim in 1994 when she read a hypothesis in the *New York Times* that the CIA was withholding information about him. The *New York Times* editor A.M. Rosenthal reported the hypothesis, proposed by Robert Herzstein, that the CIA had always possessed information on Waldheim, but had kept it a secret in order to use him as an intelligence asset. (A.M. Rosenthal, 'On My Mind; Ms. Maloney and Mr. Waldheim,' June 25, 1996). After reading Rosenthal's editorial, she launched what became her 'seven-year crusade' to open the file. For Maloney, the CIA file presented an opportunity to wage a publicized legislative campaign against him. She introduced her bill to the House in 1994 without success and tried again in 1995. She wrote a letter to President Clinton in 1997 in which she claimed that the CIA files on Kurt Waldheim, Klaus Barbie, and Alois Brunner should be released in order 'to bring these individuals implicated into the commission of war crimes to justice.' Alois Brunner was tried in absentia by a French court in 1954 and sentenced to death. Klaus Barbie was tried and sentenced to life in prison in France in 1987 and died in 1992. Of the men that Maloney mentions, only Waldheim has not been tried. On the one hand, she calls him a 'known Nazi.' On the other, she states that the CIA file on him is needed to prove that is a Nazi. If she had enough evidence to justify calling him a Nazi and to imply that his crimes were of a Barbie and Brunner magnitude, why was his CIA file needed? With A.M. Rosenthal generating support with another editorial in the *New York Times*, the bill was passed as the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998. When the Waldheim file was disclosed on April 26, 2001, it revealed that he was neither a Nazi nor a war criminal. Fourteen years before the release of Waldheim's CIA file, the Office of Special Investigations (the Nazi

hunting organ of the U.S. Justice Department) announced that he had infringed the Holtzman Amendment to the Immigration Act, which established the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) to investigate anyone suspected of having 'ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of a person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion' on behalf of Nazi Germany or its allies. If the OSI makes a *prima facie* case that one is guilty of infringing the Holtzman Amendment, the Attorney General is authorized to deport him if he is a resident or citizen, and to bar him from entering the country if he is an alien. The OSI claimed that Waldheim had 'assisted or otherwise participated in' various acts of persecution committed by German military and police units in the Balkans in 1942-1945. On the grounds of alleged evidence, assembled in a secret memorandum, the OSI recommended that the then Attorney General Edwin Meese bar Waldheim from entering the United States by placing him on the Immigration and Naturalization Services 'Watch List' of undesirable aliens. Meese accepted the recommendation, and for the first time in U.S. history, the head of state of a friendly nation was declared *persona non grata*. President Waldheim was branded a 'Nazi criminal' for the world to revile.

What was the genesis of this unprecedented decision? Early in 1986, Waldheim was campaigning for president in Austria as the candidate of the conservative People's Party. More prominent than the Socialist candidate, he appeared likely to win. Reluctant to give up the office of the presidency, which they had held for decades, the Socialists tried to smear Waldheim by propagating a controversy about his military service. They reckoned that it would be most effective if it came from abroad, so they contacted the World Jewish Congress (WJC) in New York. Eli Rosenbaum, general counsel of the WJC, flew to Vienna to meet with an anonymous agent of the Socialist Party. A shady, vodka swilling character who said exactly what the excited Rosenbaum wanted to hear, he was reminded of Baron Kurtz in *The Third Man*. (Rosenbaum, *Betrayal*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993, pp. 18-19 and 48-49). Rosenbaum received a photograph from him of Waldheim in Wehrmacht uniform, standing among a group of German and Italian officers in Montenegro. He then flew back to New York, verified the authenticity of the photograph, and gave it to a contact at *The New York Times*, along with allegations that Waldheim had participated in war crimes. *The New York Times* printed the photograph and the WJC allegations on the front page of the March 4, 1986 edition. What does the photograph actually document? On May 23, 1943 the twenty-three year old Second Lieutenant Waldheim was an interpreter on the German/Italian liaison staff in Montenegro, attached to

Italian General Roncaglia (on Waldheim's right side – the left side of the photo). Waldheim's immediate superior in the photo, standing to his left, is the Wehrmacht liaison staff officer Colonel Joachim Macholz. The presence in the photo of the Waffen SS General Artur Phleps, who conversed with the Italian General Roncaglia that day, provided fodder for the myth that Waldheim served in the SS. The only thing the photograph documents is his service (as a conscript) in the Wehrmacht (the German regular army) as an interpreter on the liaison staff. Due to the widespread notion in America that all German soldiers were Nazis, the photograph created powerful notions of guilt in readers' minds.

Certainly the WJC would not have been able to make propaganda out of this photograph if Waldheim had not avoided talking or writing about his Wehrmacht service in the Balkans. After being wounded in Russia in 1941, he was relieved from combat duty. He returned to Vienna to convalesce and to study law at the University. However, when the army discovered that he could speak Italian, it assigned him to the German/Italian liaison staff in eastern Bosnia in 1942. He served as a junior staff officer in the Balkans, interspersed with study leave in Vienna. Nevertheless, when he was on duty in the Balkans, the Wehrmacht waged an atrocious war against the Yugoslav partisans.

At the end of the war, Waldheim was vetted by American military intelligence and discharged from the Wehrmacht. Shortly thereafter he applied for a job at the Austrian Foreign Ministry. He included his presence in the Balkans campaign on his CV

– the only time he was ever legally obliged to disclose this information – and was vetted by Fritz Molden, who had been an outstanding member of the underground resistance to the Nazi regime (for which he won the American Congressional Medal of Freedom). However, as Waldheim climbed the ranks of the Austrian Foreign Service, he realized that his political opponents might try to make propaganda out of his presence in the Balkans, even though he had done nothing wrong. And so he avoided talking or writing about it. Following the sensational *New York Times* story, the American media continued to report the WJC accusations with little or no critical analysis. The tabloid press showed no restraint. In covering a March 25, 1986 press conference at the WJC headquarters, *The New York Post* ran the headline, 'Papers Show Waldheim was SS Butcher.' Consequently, most Americans were prejudiced against him. But behind the inflammatory allegations, the WJC failed to produce any evidence, which caused its campaign in Austria to backfire. WJC director general Israel Singer threatened dire consequences for Austrian trade and tourism if Waldheim were elected. Many Austrians

The U.S. government should avoid indulging in such skullduggery because it sullies its own credibility, which is essential for America if it is to fulfill its mission of bringing peace and prosperity to the world – a mission for which it is far better equipped than the UN.

who would not have voted for him without outside pressure decided to do so because they believed that he and Austria were being unfairly attacked.

University of Salzburg Professor Thomas Chaimowicz stated that the officers of the WJC had so abused the principle of innocent until proven guilty that they should resign. The Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal stated that the actions of the WJC were not justified by evidence, and were rekindling anti-Semitic feelings in Austria. Lord Weidenfeld swore under oath that Waldheim was an anti-Nazi with definite anti-racist views. Chaimowicz, Wiesenthal, and Weidenfeld had all been victims of the Third Reich because of their Jewish ancestry, so their defence of Waldheim carried extra weight. (See Chaimowicz: 'Oesterreichisches Dilemma,' *Neue Kronenzeitung*, December 27, 1987 and Wiesenthal, *Justice, Not Vengeance*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1989, pp. 314-315). And so despite (or because of) the WJC campaign against him, he was elected President of Austria.

Following his election, the WJC collaborated with the Office of Special Investigations to get him placed on the Watch List. Before becoming general counsel of the WJC, Eli Rosenbaum had worked at the OSI, where he had become the close friend and protégé of its director, Neal Sher. Even though he was not an officer of the OSI in 1986 and '87, Rosenbaum revealed in his book *Betrayal* that he had collaborated with his friend and former boss in assembling the 'evidence' against Waldheim. He rejoined the OSI in 1988 and is now its Director.

Though the Justice Department accepted the OSI's 'evidence,' it refused to disclose it to the American public, claiming that it would prejudice future enforcement proceedings against Waldheim. Yet in the eyes of the American public, the Justice Department had approved the WJC accusations that were reported in the media, and the 'Watch List' decision seemed as good as a conviction. Most shocking was the Justice Department's refusal to show its 'evidence' to the government of Austria. In a remarkably abusive act to a friendly nation, the United States government said, in essence, to the government of Austria, 'We are branding your head of state a Nazi criminal, but we will not show you the evidence that prompted us to make this decision.' The Justice Department disclosed the OSI memorandum only after it lost a lawsuit to the retired CIA officer John Mapother. Mr. Mapother, who was an intelligence analyst in Austria in 1953-1958, doubted the Justice Department had evidence to justify the 'Watch List' decision. He asked to see the OSI memorandum in 1987 but was refused. He sued the Department and won the case of *Mapother v Dept of Justice* in 1993. The department appealed, but was forced to release the memorandum when Mapother's lawyer pointed out that the OSI had disclosed part of it to Eli Rosenbaum while he was still at the WJC. Why was an officer at the WJC – a private organization – given access to a Justice Department document that no other

American citizen was allowed to see?

After the release of the OSI memorandum on March 11, 1994, the *New York Times* and *The Washington Post* reported its assertions with little critical analysis, thereby giving the American public the impression that Waldheim really was guilty of Nazi crimes. Few Americans have read the memorandum, as it is obtainable only by request from the Office of Special Investigations. (*In the Matter of Kurt Waldheim*, Office of Special Investigations, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, April 9, 1987). A few quotations will illustrate its mendacity. Though the OSI repeatedly refers to 'Nuremberg Tribunal precedents,' it avoids mentioning that the two Chiefs of Staff under whom Waldheim served were acquitted at Nuremberg. Lieutenant-General Hermann Foertsch and Major-General Kurt von Geitner were the two Chiefs of Staff that were tried in the case of the Balkans generals. In this case, officially called *United States v. Wilhelm List* and better known as the 'Hostage Case', the Tribunal concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to convict these officers of war crimes. During his time in the Balkans, Waldheim was a member of the liaison staff under Chief of Staff von Geitner, and later an adjutant under Chief of Staff Foertsch. If they did not meet 'the foregoing requirements as to participation' in war crimes, how could Waldheim have met them? ('The Findings of the Tribunal' *United States v. Wilhelm List, United Nations War Crimes Commission Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals*. Volume VIII, 1949).

The OSI memorandum states that Waldheim held a 'key staff position.' In fact, he was a 23-26 year old, conscripted adjutant (*aide-de-camp*) with no command authority. Somehow the myth was propagated in the press that he was in the Greek port of Salonika when its large Jewish population was deported. Yet his Wehrmacht records show that he was on study leave in Vienna. Though the OSI did not try to link him with this crime, this oft-repeated myth has blackened his name more than any other.

The OSI describes the reprisal execution of Greek partisans and claims that Waldheim 'was at the very least fully aware of the application of anti-guerilla warfare policy by Army Group E,' yet it doesn't mention his written protest against Hitler's reprisal policy. Professor Herzstein acknowledged the significance of his protest: 'Indeed, in examining thousands of similar documents produced by the German forces in Greece, I have seen few stronger protests of the kind, and then only from the pens of far more powerful men, such as General Speidel or plenipotentiary Neubacher.' (Herzstein: *Waldheim, The Missing Years*, pp. 121-122). Why didn't the OSI mention Waldheim's written protest?

The centerpiece of the OSI report is the charge of direct responsibility for the reprisal execution of Yugoslav partisans. To substantiate this accusation, the OSI cited a war crimes charge that was fabricated by

Tito's regime in December of 1947 and filed with the United Nations War Crimes Commission in February of 1948. Professor Herzstein concluded 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that the Yugoslav charge was a fabrication, designed to discredit the Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber. (Herzstein, pp. 194, 197, 244-246). Waldheim was Gruber's assistant during a territorial dispute with Yugoslavia in 1947 and 1948. Why did the OSI cite the Yugoslav war-crimes charge to justify its watch list decision against Waldheim when a respected researcher had concluded that it is fraudulent? In reviewing *Waldheim: The Missing Years*, Professor Gerhard Weinberg acknowledged Herzstein's finding 'that the government of Yugoslavia put together charges against Waldheim for political and diplomatic purposes without regard for historical accuracy, and subsequently changed its attitude toward him.' (Weinberg: review of *Waldheim: The Missing Years*, Annual Report 7 of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, Los Angeles). Professor Weinberg is the chairman of the Historical Advisory Panel for the Interagency Working Group (IWG), which was established by a provision of Maloney's 'Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998.' The IWG is the official organization of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration for researching former Nazis. Why did the OSI dismiss Professor Herzstein's assessment of the Yugoslav charges when the chief historian of the IWG accepted it?

The OSI also claimed that Waldheim participated in the execution of captured British commandos. The British Ministry of Defence investigated this claim and concluded that he is innocent. (Ministry of Defence: 'Review of the results of investigations into the fate of British servicemen captured in Greece and the Greek islands between October 1943 and October 1994 and the involvement, if any, of the then Lieutenant Waldheim,' Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1989). The weakness of the OSI memorandum is further illustrated by the unofficial televised trial of Waldheim that was held in England. British Thames Television 'researched twenty-nine archives in a dozen countries for the televised proceedings of a 'Commission of Inquiry.' Former OSI Director Allan Ryan acted as prosecutor. Former British attorney general Lord Rawlinson defended, and a panel of distinguished retired judges from Britain, the U.S., Canada, Sweden, and Germany rendered a verdict. The Commission of Inquiry found Waldheim innocent of all charges. Lord Rawlinson likened the WJC/OSI campaign to a lynching party, and stated that on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecutor, 'no court would convict, no committal would be made by a magistrates' court, or, I would suggest, a grand jury. No law officer would launch a prosecution.' (British Thames Productions and Home Box Office: *Waldheim, A Commission of Inquiry*, June 5, 1988).

Professor Herzstein, A.M. Rosenthal, and Maloney recognized the lack of evidence in the OSI memorandum. Two months after it was released, Mr. Rosenthal

reported in the *New York Times* Herzstein's theory that the CIA was withholding information about Waldheim's military service. After reading Mr. Rosenthal's editorial, 'Representative Maloney quickly set to work on her bill to open those [CIA] files to Freedom of Information requests.' When the 'name file' on Waldheim was released, it revealed that the CIA had checked him at the Berlin Document Center and had found him clean. Why didn't the OSI do this? The CIA also possessed no information of criminal wrong-doing in Waldheim's military service. The Agency never used him as an intelligence source, and it found no indications that the Soviets had used him – a refutation of the OSI's speculation that the Soviets possessed compromising information about Waldheim's past and had blackmailed him with it. The CIA's assessment is consistent with KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin's notes on Waldheim. These indicate that, though the Soviets tried to court him while he was Secretary-General, they never succeeded. (Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin: *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archives*, Basic Books, New York, 1999. p. 207, note on p. 611). Maloney organized a press conference at the National Holocaust Museum to commemorate the release of the Waldheim file, as well as the files of Adolf Hitler, Klaus Barbie, Adolf Eichman, Josef Mengele, and Heinrich Mueller, which were released at the same time. The disclosure of top Nazi files along with Waldheim's file was both a smear and a red herring. In her remarks at the press conference, Maloney congratulated herself for her contribution to the Freedom of Information. She said nothing about the contents of the Waldheim file other than the misleading remark that 'apparently we didn't know much about Waldheim – after all.' The absence of dirt in the CIA file has not stopped Maloney from continuing the second phase of her campaign. In 1997, she introduced a resolution to the House of Representatives to terminate the US contribution to Waldheim's UN pension, but did not get enough votes to pass it. The only newspaper that has covered her latest effort is the tabloid *New York Daily News*. In October 2002, it printed a large photo of Waldheim in Wehrmacht uniform on the front page, and then stated the lie that he was guilty of 'participating or otherwise assisting in the execution of Jews.' The article then quotes Rep. Maloney talking about her 'crusade' against him. The timing of the report had more to do with Maloney's re-election bid than with any news about Waldheim. The following month she was re-elected with seventy-five percent of the vote.

Even if we lament Waldheim's friendliness to the Arabs and his occasional harsh criticism of Israel while he was Secretary-General of the UN, we must condemn the calumnious campaign that has been waged against him in America since 1986. By disregarding the principle of innocent until proven guilty, the Justice Department has committed an act of injustice against Kurt Waldheim. If the American press has any important

duty, surely it is to discipline the Justice Department when it behaves unjustly for the sake of partisan politics. Yet those who have tried to tell the truth about Waldheim, such as Fritz Molden, John Mapother, the American lawyer Harold Tittmann, and the senior *New York Times* correspondent David Binder, have been ignored by the editors of America's newspapers and magazines. Can anyone blame the UN for doubting the credibility of the U.S. government when it recently claimed before the General Assembly that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction? Probably every delegate knows that a former Secretary-General was the victim of U.S. government and media propaganda. The U.S. government should avoid indulging in such skulduggery because it sullies its own credibility, which is essential for America if it is to fulfill its mission of bringing peace and prosperity to the world – a mission for which it is far better equipped than the UN.

After the release of Waldheim's CIA file in 2001, Austria's foreign minister requested that the U.S. government remove him from the 'Watch List'. The U.S. State Department denied the request without explanation. A few months later, the President of the United States welcomed his 'friend', the former KGB officer Vladimir Putin, to his family home in Texas. Vladimir Putin willingly joined and had a flourishing career in the chief apparatus of Soviet perfidy in East Germany – an organization just as devious, ruthless, and lawless as the Gestapo. Why – when Nazi-hunting is pursued with such zeal that it unfairly extends to a conscripted junior staff officer in the Wehrmacht – is there no effort to bring the ranking officers of the Soviet totalitarian state to account?

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In and Out of Town

Andrew Lambirth

Although there are increasing numbers of fine exhibitions organized in the provinces (while regional museums have long held a deservedly high record of excellence), the British art world remains to an unhealthy extent London-fixated. It's easy to see why. The poor overworked art critic will visit the nearest gallery to obtain his copy, only willingly venturing further afield when there's a prospect of a junket in Paris or Venice with all expenses paid. Why waste a day going to Newcastle or Birmingham when to visit Dulwich Picture Gallery (for its excellent John Piper exhibition, travelling to Nottingham's Djanogly Art Gallery in July) in South London seems excursion enough with the capital's transport systems in disarray? Yet for the enterprising, and for those with a little free time on their hands, there are several exhibitions (current or forthcoming) outside London which merit attention. And chief amongst these is a touring show of the paintings and drawings of Richard Eurich (1903-92).

The Bradford-born Eurich, who trained at the local School of Arts and Crafts (1922-4) before coming south for a second period of study at the Slade in London (1924-6), was a draughtsman of the highest order, who could draw equally well from life or from the imagination. His early work was distinguished by its meticulous detail (something in the tradition of Durer and Stanley Spencer), but he was advised to give up this approach because of the damage it did to his eyes. With these beautiful and mysterious drawings Eurich enjoyed some

success at the age of 26 with his first solo exhibition at the Goupil Gallery in Mayfair, before turning to painting to earn his living. The steady sale of his works gave him enough confidence to set up house within easy reach of the London market. In 1934 he and his wife Mavis moved to Dibden Purlieu, on the edge of the New Forest, which was to be their home for the rest of their lives.

From the property Eurich could watch the shipping in the Solent, which was to form a large part of his subject matter. Principally a landscape painter with a passion for the sea, Eurich also painted people with the utmost skill and conviction. He was a traditional realist painter who enjoyed what he called a 'free fancy and humour' which led him towards more imaginative subjects beloved of children. His gentle humour and sense of wonder prevented these images from becoming too surrealist in mood, while his own temperament precluded the joining of any art movement. During the Second World War he was appointed an official War Artist to the Admiralty, and many consider the vast intricate vistas of sea battles he then produced to be among his finest work. His postwar work generally has a more relaxed seaside air, interspersed with strange disquieting images of clowns or scarecrows.

The retrospective exhibition of Eurich's work, organized by the Southampton Institute where it was first shown, is touring to the Russell-Cotes Art Gallery and Museum in Bournemouth (until 22 June), and then comes to the Fine Art Society in London (14 July – 8 August). It is accompanied by a book/catalogue, published by Paul Holberton

at £20. A handsome large format paperback, its principal authors are Edward Chaney and Christine Clearkin, both from the Southampton Institute, and it contains more than 100 illustrations, many of them unfamiliar. If Professor Chaney rather sticks his neck out by calling Eurich 'one of the greatest artists of the 20th century', the exhibition and publication nevertheless perform an essential duty in bringing once more before us an artist of rare independence and considerable invention, of haunting strangeness, a modern painter of light and air, and though scarcely radical, a quiet but distinctive talent too easily overlooked.

This summer, at least two other shows make a day trip from the metropolis worthwhile. The first begins life at the National Museum and Gallery in Cardiff (21 May – 10 August) before proceeding to the Whitworth Gallery in Manchester (22 August – 26 October), whence the Italian section only will travel to the National Gallery in London (12

November – 15 February 2004). The exhibition is devoted to the rediscovery of Welsh artist Thomas Jones (1742 – 1803), a pupil of the landscapist Richard Wilson, best-known for his odd, small-scale oils of buildings in Naples. This large exhibition will feature early and late work of Welsh subjects, with the Italian subjects sandwiched between. Meanwhile a major survey of the 20th century English artist Paul Nash (1889 – 1946) is being mounted at the Tate Liverpool (23 July – 19 October). Titled 'Modern Painter, Ancient Landscape', this exhibition will focus on Nash as a radical exponent of landscape painting who drew equally upon abstraction and surrealism as upon pre-historic culture and ancient monuments to investigate the meanings of the land he loved and celebrated. As Liverpool is the only venue for the show – and it should not be missed – a trip to Albert Dock, where the Tate building is situated, becomes a necessity.


The Royal West of England Academy in Bristol rarely gets a mention in the national press, yet its fine building and exhibition programme ought to be better known. Unlike its fellow academy in London, it doesn't hold an

annual Summer Show, but traditionally takes the autumn season for its open exhibition. (I will therefore reserve writing about it for a later month.) Meanwhile the London Royal Academy is about to open its doors to the hordes who throng the Summer Show, and who perhaps visit no other art exhibition during the year. In its beautifully-lit galleries can be seen an extra-ordinary cross-section of contemporary painting and sculpture, much of it worth more than a passing glance. One of the most distinguished artists on show there, who is also an Academician, is Jeffery Camp. Eighty this year,

Camp is a figure painter in the great British individualist tradition of Hogarth and Sickert, a draughtsman of exactitude and invention, a tender land- and seascape artist, a celebrator of the city in all its moods. His range is inspiring, his touch at once gentle and lyrical and cunning.

Here is a painter who has spent a lifetime looking with all his attention, and then trying to translate imaginatively his observations into images of beauty, grace and human vulnerability. Camp achieves this, and something even more unlikely – understanding.

If you manage to get to the Academy before 12 June, there's a substantial exhibition of Camp's recent paintings and drawings hanging in the Friends Room, and open to the public daily 4-6pm. The prices are remarkably modest (£600 – £5,000) for an artist of such gifts and proven ability, but it's typical of our topsy-turvy art establishment that an untried young painter is encouraged to market his or her work in the higher thousands, when Camps can be had for a song. Still, this is one artist who will never repine. As he points out: 'Happiness is rarely painted now. I become happy when my charcoal point shows the up-turning of a mouth or toes curling in happiness. The gargoyle views of Francis Bacon allow no trace of paradise. The people I have drawn have been inspiring, beautiful, vital, elegant, innocent, desirable, patient, sensuous and strong. I will always remember their generosity.'



Magpies, Beachy Head

Jeffrey Camp

Conservative Classic: - 10

Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*.

Alfred Sherman

When first published, a few years before Hitler's rise to power and the Spanish Civil War, *The Revolt of the Masses* made a considerable impact here in Britain. This impact did not endure, though the book has been continuously in print. By contrast, in Spain and Latin America Ortega is still widely read and used as a basis for further excursions into political philosophy. This is paradoxical, since his major theses regarding the emergence of 'mass man', the vulgarisation of current idiom and disempowerment of discriminating elites, are even more relevant to Western Europe and the USA than to Spain or Latin America. The prophet of higher pessimism should presumably have been most honoured in the countries where the process appeared to have gone furthest.

The familiar English title is a mistranslation and gives a misleading introduction to Ortega's message. The Spanish term 'rebellion' is ambiguous, one meaning is rebellion or revolts, the other is a condition of rebelliousness. It was the latter which Ortega intended. For him there was no question of 'mass man' taking power and introducing alternative society along Marxist lines, but rather of his rejecting authority and demanding the fruits of progress without contributing to it, disrupting the operation of intellectual religious or economic leadership and causing social and intellectual decline. To make this clear, he changed the title in a later edition. The real sense is Common Man's insubordination.

Let Ortega speak for himself:

It is illusory to imagine that the mass man of today, however superior his vital level may be compared with that of other times, will be able to control, by himself, the process of civilisation. I say process and not progress. The simple process of preserving our present civilisation is supremely complex, and demands incalculably subtle powers. Ill-fitted to direct it is this average man who had learned to use much of the machinery of civilisation, but who is characterised by root-ignorance of the very principles of that civilisation...

The actual mass man is, in fact, a primitive who has slipped through the wings on to the age-old stage of civilisation.

Ortega enunciated the principle that though we owe the benefits of scientific and economic progress to the minority of scientists, inventors, innovators and businessmen, mass man regards all the benefits they bring as his unrequited due. But if, deprived of their rights, the élites slacken their endeavour, progress grinds to a halt and regression supervenes. Instead of moving forward and upward through wider enfranchisement, we face confusion and decline.

At a time of increasing polarisation between Left and Right, Ortega remained outside the thicket of catchphrases, and did not fit into the Left-Right antithesis. Though he could be accused, in contemporary jargon, of 'élitism', his

élites were not those of birth and wealth, but of merit. He supported and served the Spanish Republic, choosing exile after its fall, while boldly denouncing the Communist takeover under the premiership of Negrin which had helped undermine it. In 1950, after the dust had settled, he returned

from the Argentine to live out the last few years of his life in Spain, resuming his literary career.

Then, the world of the 'fifties seemed aeons away from the age of Ortega, at least outside Latin America, where experiments in democracy were reaping decreasing returns, including in the erstwhile Eldorado, the Argentine, where Peron had successfully mobilised mass man, and in Spain, where people were patiently awaiting Franco's departure from the scene to open the way for revival. Thanks to the Second World War, the Soviet Union had become a major everyday threat, looming over other considerations. The move, towards Europeanism, which Ortega had perceptively forecast in the 'thirties and entrusted with the task of rescuing Europe from its lassitude, was coming about, true, but less as a revival of the spirit than as a new continent-wide projection of mass man as Rome gave way to Brussels. Keynes and Marx seemed to be contesting the evolution of Europe into a brave new world where mass man was promised everything.

But by the closing decades of the century, symptoms of the syndrome familiarised by Ortega were rife around us. Here, Beatlemania heralded the new demoticism; with classicism under attack, and entertainers pronouncing on

Schoolteachers live in fear of their pupils and their pupils' parents, and sometimes of their lives; the elderly poor are persecuted by organised hooligans whose form of self-expression is destruction.

matters of moment. In Britain, fifty per cent of school-leavers – i.e., seventy percent of all those who can more or less read and write – are to be given the status of university graduates at the expense of those taxpayers who cannot leap even this minimal hurdle. Entry qualifications to seats of higher learning are to be waived in favour of alleged ‘potential’ – which cannot be measured, only posited – in the case of the new avatars of mass-manhood. Pupils from the older public schools, once Britain’s pride, are to be denied entry to universities of their choice, however good their exam results, perhaps denied university entry at all, in a manner reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s early years, or subsequently Red China’s. Or will they simply decamp to the USA?

‘Elitism’, once the overriding purpose of university education, is now denounced from the despatch-box in the Mother of Parliaments as a cardinal sin against human rights. Are élites to be replaced by party machines? I am still haunted by Ortega’s observation that though in recent generations historical science has evolved markedly, educated men and decision-makers know less history nowadays than was common in the past. And with knowledge of history goes sense of history. One Kissinger does not offset this.

Gossip columns are filled with the doings, often disreputable, always paltry, of ‘celebs’, mainly models, actresses, footballers or a combination of them, with whom mass man can identify. Vulgarity and dumbing down are rampant; to be white, middle class or middle-aged is *eo ipso* sinful. Trade unions, which not only the Thatcher dispensation but also resurgent Labour sought to tame, have recovered their mood of resentful defiance, measuring their success not by benefits accruing to their members but by their ability to vex management and disrupt public activities.

Schoolteachers live in fear of their pupils and their pupils’ parents, and sometimes of their lives; the elderly poor are persecuted by organised hooligans whose form of self-expression is destruction. The masses’ rebelliousness and restiveness, identified in 1930, seems to be sweeping present-day Britain. When Ortega died, the Moslem resurgence was only just beginning. Pakistan had been created and was undergoing regression from levels achieved as part of British India. The writing was on the wall in French and Spanish North Africa, but few cared to read it. By now, Islam’s resurgence provides a parallel to mass man’s rebelliousness. Millions of third-world Moslems crowd into Europe in response to fictitious labour shortages. They are archetypal mass men, demanding endless rights but eschewing minimal duties and loyalties, egged on both by fanatical Imams and by our masochistic indigenous political classes who a few

years ago were applauding Moscow and Peking.

It is both the strength and weakness of Ortega’s socio-political writing that it is descriptive and analytical, never prescriptive. He unfolds the present and identifies both the broad sweep of history and man’s limited ability to change it. In a lecture in Buenos Aires in 1928, when he was flexing his muscles for the work under discussion, he objected that ‘history does not spring from the poor ideas of man but from deeper zones, earthy hidden springs, ultra-conscious and ultra-rational impulses comparable to those which create the tides and make the wheat grow.’ (*Meditacion de Nuestro Tiempo*, Madrid.)

Associated with this, in an essay entitled ‘Ideas and Beliefs’, (‘Ideas y Creencias’) he warned that our political philosophers and historians overplay the role of ideas and underplay that of beliefs, those implicit mental structures which envelope our activities. What men think is so often less decisive than what they take for granted; change in the climate of opinion is less a conscious process than a product of habit and sub-conscious drives. This is particularly relevant to British Conservatism’s present tribulations. For generations, Conservatism prevailed on the basis of common unspoken beliefs. After the Second World War, when it was considered that in order to compete with Labour, Conservatives needed a comparable set of ideas, they elaborated a set of clichés and formulae which vulgarised Conservative thinking and imprisoned it in verbal straitjackets. In transition from belief to ideas, Conservatism has lost its appeal to the Englishman.

Ortega warned even then, in an age of relative optimism before economic crisis, Hitler and the great upheavals, that ‘if everything is possible, the worst is also possible’. Hence he ends *The Rebellion* with the reflection that ‘we still have to identify the source of the radical defects from which modern European culture (circa 1932) suffers.’ Seventy years on, the *Salisbury Review* still grapples with this.

‘Elitism’, once the overriding purpose of university education, is now denounced from the despatch-box in the Mother of Parliaments as a cardinal sin against human rights

Reputations - 1

Kipling

Helen Szamuely

Two days before the war began in Iraq the popular newspapers abandoned the words 'British troops' and started referring to 'Our Boys' or as *The Sun* preferred it: 'Our Brave Boys'. This was the signal that the debate was over and the country fell into line. It was an oddly Kiplingesque moment and the words he had written a century earlier seemed entirely appropriate: *For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' 'Chuck him out, the Brute!' / But it's 'Saviour of 'is country' when the guns begin to shoot;*

Some things have changed. It is rare for the sort of contempt that Kipling described to be expressed towards the British soldier. Two terrible wars and constant danger near home rather than in far-flung lands have raised appreciation 'o' uniforms that guard you while you sleep'. Yet it is Kipling that our soldiers have to thank for that change in attitude. He was the first writer and poet to have written sympathetically about the ordinary soldier, though his real heroes were the young officers in the army and, especially, in India.

Between Shakespeare and Kipling sailors were celebrated by writers and poets. The soldiers were not. Historically, armies were seen to be the tools of oppressive Continental monarchs and the constitutional battles of the seventeenth century were fought around the problem of soldiers raised by the King and the money that was needed for them. It was Kipling who first looked at soldiers' lives in battle and out of it, on service and back home, because he was interested in what they thought, said, and felt. He met soldiers in India and listened to their tales, reproducing them in his first successful stories about the *Soldiers Three*. Like Shakespeare, Kipling acknowledged that soldiers were not 'plaster saints' or, for that matter the selfless heroes of the sort of wonderful Boy's Own stories that ignorant critics attribute to him. *We aren't no thin red 'eroes nor we aren't no blackguards too, / But single men in barracks, most remarkable like you.'*

Kipling had a curious affinity with the underdog, particularly with one that made the best of things. He is one of the few writers on India who wrote sympathetically


about the Anglo-Indians, who were not accepted by either community. He understood the longing people far away from home felt, whether it was the British in India or those same soldiers, who had spent much of their lives in various corners of the Empire, who found themselves back in a gloomy England, as ordinary clerks, constrained by rules made by others and with little money. The sighing of the British soldier for the Burma girl in Mandalay is pathetic in the true sense of the word. Here is a very ordinary man, who has, nevertheless,

been to many places, done many things and seen many sights, condemned to a dreary existence in London without a hope of anything better. No wonder he longs to be shipped ... *somewheres East of Suez, / Where the best is like the worst, / Where there ain't no Ten Commandments / And a man can raise a thirst.*

The reason for Kipling's sympathy for the outsider, the underdog is clear: he saw himself as one. From the first catastrophic exile from India to the cold, unsympathetic home of the woman described as Aunt Rosa

in *Baa Baa Black Sheep* he frequently found himself in situations where he was not part of the crowd. At school in the United Services College, evoked somewhat nostalgically in *Stalky and Co.*, he was reasonably popular but suffered from the usual problems that face a precocious adolescent. He did not fit in. Though useful in the production of the school magazine, a budding poet and a bookworm who, moreover, could not play games because of his extreme short-sightedness, he remained an odd sort of bird.

During his years as a journalist in India he was not altogether accepted by the rest of the British in India. Perhaps it was his exuberance or his undoubted talent for verse and prose or his 'satiableness', which led him to all sorts of places and into conversation with all sorts of people. On his return to London he felt himself lonely and a fish out of water. He was the British soldier who was being called back to Mandalay. Though he was to some extent lionized by literary society, he remained an outsider, unable to fit in with the many writers and critics, who, in turn, found him



odd and unsympathetic. His stay in Vermont was poisoned by the feud with his brother-in-law and darkened by the tragedy of his daughter Josephine's death. By the turn of the century he was out of favour with the literary establishment, though not with the readers. Or not much, since his readers then and now often feel that they should not really like Kipling. And therein lies the whole problem of Kipling and his reputation.

In many ways, there is no real need to bring Kipling back into favour, though critics keep saying so. He had never gone away. In a recent poll for the nation's favourite poem *If* ... came top by a long lead. The poem is resolutely memorable, has an easy rhythm and a clear structure. But there is something more: it voices sentiments that many people accept. The idea of service, duty, self-improvement, self-reliance remain dear to most people. How disappointing for those who have affected to see a sea-change in the national mood towards the emotional and confessional.

Kipling had a great empathy with children who had to obey rules they rarely understood but unlike many of his Victorian contemporaries, he did not idealize them. His children's books and stories have remained consistently popular. Even *Stalky and Co.* has received a new boost as a boarding school tale in the post-Harry Potter age. Children are conservative in their tastes: they do not like experimental literature but old-fashioned tales of right and wrong. They also like language that is sonorous. It is a rare child (or, for that matter, adult) who does not thrill to the 'grey-green greasy Limpopo river, all set about with fever trees'. But it is also a rare child who does not cheer the elephant child on when he returns to his bullying relatives, complete with his new trunk and gives them all a sound thrashing. The underdog turns on his tormentors; the powerless child becomes an avenger. Just as Kipling's description of battles presaged the grim poems of the First World War, so his anarchic view of childhood is a precursor of much inferior modern writing. And so, the elephant-child with his 'satiating curiosity' and the 'cat who walked by himself' survive while many other, more up-to-date, more 'relevant' children's tales disappear.

It is impossible to separate Kipling's prose and poetry. He recognized that to some extent and mingled the two in many of his collections both for children and adults. Perhaps it is this impossibility to pigeonhole him that makes him such a curse for the literary intelligentsia. For the unseemliness of Kipling is not new; it was first defined during his lifetime though he paid no attention to it. Other critics, men of such disparate views as T. S. Eliot and George Orwell, felt the need to defend him. Eliot tried to by-pass the political problems of Kipling's attitude, Orwell tackled them and accepted that many of the views expressed, particularly in the Indian stories and poems, were objectionable. But he also realized that much of the hostility to Kipling was simply a misunderstanding and a rather mimseyish inability to cope with real life. In many ways Orwell's own problems with the literary establish-

ment echoed those of Kipling's with the difference that the latter paid less attention to it. Like the cat, he continued to walk by himself.

Still, they cannot leave him alone, those critics. Not a year goes by but another book about Kipling is published, another analysis is presented. His apparently outdated imperialistic outlook remains a matter for discussion. Indian writers have long acknowledged that Kipling wrote with greater understanding about the country than others like E. M. Forster. Indeed, Nirad C. Chaudhuri called *Kim* the greatest novel about India in the English and, possibly, any other language. The stories and the poems continue to live and many a phrase first uttered by Kipling has entered the English language to be used by many who would be horrified to discover the source.

There were many contradictions in Kipling himself. He was an imperialist in that he saw the Empire as a sacred duty that the most advanced nation in his opinion, the British, had to perform for the rest of the world. When he instructed the young men he admired to 'take up the white man's burden' he meant it as such. It was a burden for them, not just, as Orwell saw it, for the colonial people. And he called for more than just an obedience to the law, an acceptance of duty – he called for humility, most famously in that much misunderstood poem, whose rhythms echo the Psalms, *Recessional: If, drunk with sight of power, we loose / Wild tongues that have not thee in awe – / Such boasting as the Gentiles use / Or lesser breeds without the Law – / Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet, / Lest we forget, lest we forget!*

The 'lesser breeds without the Law' is not some racist statement about the natives but a fearful reference to the rising power and arrogance, as Kipling saw, of the German Empire under Wilhelm II.

He loved England and its history to distraction. Few people could write more lyrically about the many strands that make up English character and English society than he did in the stories of poems of *Puck of Pook's Hill* and *Rewards and Fairies*. But he it was, who also said: 'What do they know of England, who only England know?' He was a man who sided with authority; yet he refused to accept any honours from the government or the King: he refused a knighthood twice and the chance of becoming Poet Laureate; he even refused the OM three times, even when it was offered by King George V himself.

There were other contradictions in Kipling's personality and his work, which make it difficult for those who are so minded to place him precisely in the accepted structure of Eng. Lit. What of his attitude to war? Did he glorify it or did he see it for the horror that it usually was? He was seen by many as the unquestioning supporter of the British cause in South Africa and a brutal militarist at the start of the First World War. Yet, his later poems and his *Several Epitaphs of the War* make sombre reading. The two lines of Common Form are particularly moving: *If any question why we died / Tell them, because our fathers lied.*

Kipling's own grief and guilt over the death of his son John at Loos echoed that of many parents who had proudly sent their sons into the inferno.

A love of machinery and of those who do things has never been considered to be the proper subject for poetry and literature in England. Only Kipling could write poems under the title of *Song of the Dynamo* or *The Secret of Machines*, which has the following lines that could have come out of a poem written in celebration of the Five Year Plan: *We can pull and haul and push and lift and dive, / We can print and plough and weave and heat and light, / We can run and race and swim and fly and dive, / We can see and hear and count and read and write.*

No nostalgic romantic, he. In the poem *The Glory of the Garden* there is a clear mockery of those who sigh over pretty flowers: 'but the Glory of the Garden is more than meets the eye;'. The real heart of it are the 'tool- and potting-sheds'. Not very romantic but lines that would appeal

to anyone who really loves gardens and gardening.

Kipling will continue to be rediscovered, loved and excoriated for ever. His writing remains too popular to be liked by those who claim to speak for the populace but who dislike ordinary people as soon as they discover that the latter are, indeed, 'most remarkable like you'. It is, indeed, one of the ironies of literary and political thinking that one of the most popular poets is despised by those who are for ever calling for a less elitist approach to culture. Above all, Kipling is the poet (both in verse and prose) of the individual, of the achiever, of the self-reliant; he writes of those who do, who make, who create, whether a physical reality like Wayland's sword or a great civilization. And he writes, whether in verse and prose, in a language that sings with an urgency and immediacy that few writers, either of his time or ours, can muster. No wonder he remains popular and disturbing in about equal measure.

LETTERS

Sir,

Vaclav Klaus' article (Winter 2002) has created quite a stir amongst Prague readers of *The Salisbury Review*. In Autumn 1993, Klaus, the then premier and chairman of the ruling party ODS, stated that the privatisation process was complete and reported metaphorically that the patient was recovering after a difficult operation.

The Czech lands of the 19th century Austro-Hungarian Empire saw the merger of liberalism and nationalism. As the Czechs have more experience with the economic dimension of liberalism, neo-liberals saw the transformation in society mainly in economic terms and predominantly in terms of the privatisation of state property. However this process would be described by ordinary people as mafia capitalism and has contributed to the loss of hope in the revival of a credible right-wing political force. The electorate (i.e. non-communists) expressed their hopelessness in the last parliamentary elections; the turn-out was on 40 per cent. Similarly, the neo-liberal policy of drawing a thick line after the communist past in the post-catholic countries led inexorably to an absolute loss of trust of those citizens, who called for 'checks and balances' in the hope that corruption and abuse of power would not be repeated. Ordinary people do not harbour any exaggerated hopes; they only want to know the costs of the demise of parliamentary government and of the collapse of civilised society when the institutions of private ownership and freedom of opinion are destroyed. They will then be able to comprehend the 'costs of transformation', including accession to the European Union.

Unfortunately communists never draw a thick line after the past; they are very adept at working in any environment where there is a moral vacuum and frustration and disorientation especially among young people.

A more analytical explanation from Prague of what actually occurred in this period would explain that the revolution was as much a velcro as a velvet one.

Alena Hromadkova, Prague

Sir

Vaclav Klaus (Winter 2002) offers a rather subjective account of his activity in Czech politics during the last decade. It was the Central Bank, the media, in fact everyone apart from himself who was at fault. They and all his critics including Havel, the philosopher king, were just fools who understood nothing and their expectations were unjustified. A legal framework for the transfer of state property would take too long and it could not have been dictated anyway. Today the Czechs benefit from a regular standard democracy.

One could observe the mass transfer of property to the old elites and to fraudsters, the tolerance of the bribe culture, the high taxation of small entrepreneurs and the support of large failing industries, accompanied by an unprecedented expansion of bureaucracy. There was a determined effort to centralise power and a successful attempt to bend the rules of parliamentary democracy. The taxpayers apparently had to cover for all the bank frauds during his premiership, a sum equivalent to 45 per cent of the gross domestic product. The excessive self -

confidence of Mr. Klaus made him unsuitable to work in a team while his actions often conflicted with his claim to be the only true right-wing politician.

Klaus' critique of the European Union might explain the publication of this dubious article, but it does not explain why he recommends that his country should join. Perhaps as a Trojan horse to destroy the hated institution. What an entry card for the Czech Republic! Klaus likes nothing more than to lecture. But memory, or rather language, truth and logic are often failing him.

V. Svoboda, Petersfield

Sir,

I wonder what Lowe would make of our modern media and the hold it has over a mass electorate today (Tour de Farce, Spring 2003). Now almost every household in this country and elsewhere in the world has a small screen in at least one corner of their house to which they are slavishly attached, the ability of those who are in control of the media to manipulate events according to their way of thinking is huge. While freedom of speech and a free press are necessary to counter absolute political power, the 'fourth estate' unlike governments and other institutions, is not accountable. We witness the rapidly declining standards in the media fuelled by the greed of the film and porn industries accompanied by a liberal-left agenda.

The recent use of school children for anti-war protests is a sinister manifestation of the insidious effect of anti-authority thinking which comes to the small screen in soaps and dramas and which is so apparent on our streets.
Pippa Smith, Via E-Mail

Sir,

A recurring theme of the Spring issue is the character of 'Real Conservatism' and 'True Toryism'. I suggest that the most succinct definition of Toryism is that of HJW Edwards – 'Toryism is the politics of Memory.' No one attempting a definition of Conservatism should have failed to read H.W.J's first book, *Young England* (Hutchinson, 1938), though I must confess that I have been unable to find a copy of his last book, with a foreword by Enoch Powell. *The Salisbury Review* should reprint Peel's Tamworth Manifesto 'Our new party accepts the spirit of the Reform Bill in so far as it concerns the righting of proven wrongs.'

Anthony Cooney, Liverpool

Sir,

What a pity Helen Szamuely had to spoil an interesting article (SR Spring 2003) on Agatha Christie as a conservative writer by making unfair comments on Dorothy L Sayers, a greater literary figure than any of the other writers mentioned.

Sayers was a poet years before she became a novelist and to write of her being 'ostentatiously intellectual' shows lack of knowledge about her background. She

was educated at home by her parents and governesses – she had been learning Latin from the age of five until at sixteen she went to school. She excelled in her translations of French poetry, writing school plays, designing costumes and was an accomplished musician.

She was a high Anglican lay theologian and wrote a series of twelve plays entitled *The Man born to be King* which was first broadcast by the BBC during the war. She also wrote several religious plays for performance in our Cathedrals. I had read all her novels before the war but not until later did I stumble upon her marvellous translation of Dante's *Commedia* trilogy. She gave the Dante Lectures in the Cambridge Italian Summer School in the forties which were published by Methuen in two volumes. There is much more to Sayers than the sum of her detective fiction, excellent though that is.

On the subject of her snobbery, I can refer readers to Roger Scruton's general comments on this subject in his delightful book *On Hunting*: 'Everyone condemns snobbery, but everyone below the Queen is prone to it, even if only in some inverted form...'

Gloria Hobday, Folkestone

Sir,

As the official biographer of the philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990), I should be most grateful for any information or reminiscences your readers may care to supply, especially concerning his early life.

*(Dr) Robert Grant English Literature Department,
Glasgow University, G12 8QQ,
R.Grant@englit.arts.gla.ac.uk*

Sir,

As a lifelong member of the 'loony left', I often glance at the *Salisbury Review* to see how the other half think. I was particularly amused by Hugh Nicklin's article 'Tour de Farce' (Spring 2003).

There is a copy of Robert Lowe's *Speeches and Letters on Reform* in the London Library, a private sector institution.

However the main point that interested me was the parallel between Mr. Nicklin's search and my own interests. For those of us on the far left – especially those who belong to a tradition which was vigorously anti-Stalinist even when old Joe was sitting down to dine with Winston Churchill – there are many books we believe valuable which have virtually vanished into oblivion.

We track them down, photocopy them, scan them into web sites or publish them through small non-profit making publishing houses. I know several people who do such work, in their own time and at their own expense. They certainly don't expect the nanny-state in the form of the British Library to do it for them.

Ian Birchall, London N.9

BOOK REVIEWS

War and History Alun Chalfont

The Shield of Achilles – War, Peace and the Course of History,

Philip Bobbitt, Penguin Allen Lane, 2002,
£25.00 h.b., £8.99 p.b.

This is a remarkable book. The apocalyptic scope of its ambition is evident from its subtitle. After all, once war, peace and the course of history have been comprehensively dealt with, there is not a great deal left. Philip Bobbitt is well-equipped to take on a project of this kind. He has already made distinguished contributions to the literature of nuclear strategy, deterrence, and constitutional matters based upon his impressive academic qualifications in law and strategic studies: and he has held senior appointments in the American National Security Council in both Democrat and Republican administrations.

The shield of Achilles is a paradigm (to use one of his favourite words) of Bobbitt's thesis. In the *Iliad* it was literally a massive metal shield forged by Hephaestus, the Greek God of fire. On it were depicted two cities, one of peace and one of war. In W. H. Auden's bleak poem under the same title, the shield is represented by a juxtaposition of verses, contrasting aspirations of peace, hope and harmony with realities of desolation, cruelty and despair. Bobbitt's book (originally intended to be published in two volumes) pursues this antithesis – it consists of Book I, 'State of War' and Book II, 'States of Peace'.

Book I focuses on the individual nation state. Its principal argument is that 'Epochal Wars' beginning with the Peloponnesian Wars determined the very nature of the nation state. Thus, as Sir Michael Howard notes in his magisterial foreword, the First World War brought about the end of the dynastic regimes of early modern Europe and prepared the way for the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War and of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Book I is essentially an historical analysis

beginning with a brief reference to *The Peloponnesian War* in which Thucydides treated the series of conflicts between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century B.C. as a single continuing war. This is the overture to Bobbitt's account of the conflict between fascism, communism and parliamentarianism from 1914 to 1919; the continuation of the struggle from 1919 to 1945, and its final phase from 1945 to 1990. Bobbitt concludes that this was an epochal war – what he calls the Long War, consisting of the First World War, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam and the Cold War – in other words a continuous war which began in 1914 and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, and which brought about the emergence of the market-state as a successor to the nation state. This is a constitutional development in which the nation state has adapted to the revolutions in such fields as information technology, communications and weapons of mass destruction and that a new kind of state is emerging within which the citizen's relationship is not one of patriotism or loyalty, but one of adherence to some kind of contract, freely entered into. Bobbitt suggests that the United States is the first of these market-states, but he goes on to endorse Zbigniew Brzezinski's proposition that the U.S. will not be able to act either as the world's banker or its policeman and will have to act through collective security arrangements. The corollary to this theory is that the future world order will have several power centres, including America, Europe and the Muslim crescent.

Bobbitt brings Book I to an end with three chapters on strategy and war which should send most contemporary strategic analysts limping back to the drawing board. He concludes that the world is entering upon another epochal war, which will either be a series of low-intensity information-guided wars linked by a commitment to re-enforcing (sic) world order or a gradually increasing anarchy that leads to intervention at a much costlier level, or even a cataclysm of global proportions.

Book II (States of Peace) deals with the subject of the society of states, which, unlike the nation state system which currently prevails, consists, in fact, not exclusively of states in the formal sense, but also of non-state entities like the Red Cross and CNN. Bobbitt sees the future as a society of these so-called market-states in which different societies will develop different forms of constitutional arrangements. These will require rules of

co-operation to deal with situations in which these differences invite conflict. In a reference to the allegories of Hephaestus's shield, Bobbitt asks his readers to accept that war, like the cultivation of fields and the making of wine, is 'a creative act of civilized man, with important consequences for the rest of human culture...'

This proposition is a thread which runs through the dense fabric of the second book, which describes the nature of the new market-states and the various kinds of world to which they may give rise. It is a depressing, not to say terrifying picture, since the possible worlds are all, in various ways, dysfunctional and violent. Yet it is by no means evident that Bobbitt's thesis is valid. Reports of the demise of the nation-state may turn out to be premature, as they have in the context of previous prophecies of doom.

The Shield of Achilles had been written before the events of September 2001 in New York and Washington, but, as Michael Howard points out, these events have done much to reinforce Bobbitt's doom-laden scenario. The global network of terror, of which Osama bin Laden's Al'Queda is only a part, is to be regarded as a version of the market-state. It is, in effect, to borrow an expression from the cyberworld, a virtual state; and the strategies and doctrines of the cold war based on nuclear deterrence and powerful conventional military forces may be powerless to deal with it.

As Philip Bobbitt writes in a chilling postscript intended to bring his work up to date 'The onslaughts in the autumn of 2001... on the East Coast of the United States are both the herald of further savagery and the call for defences that, if they are sustained, offer the world's best hope of avoiding a world-rending cataclysm'. These defences must be based upon a coalition of states which are 'subject to attacks by a virtual state, because a virtual state is the neighbour of all'. States thus threatened, which might otherwise be in violent conflict amongst themselves, might see the wisdom of seizing this opportunity to create a new global security structure.

This book is a major work of research and analysis. If there is to be a criticism, it is that the sense of doom impending becomes too oppressive. The chapters are interspersed with poems intended by the author to reflect some of the motifs of his presentation. They are works of a generally hopeless and almost nihilistic kind, including examples of Philip Larkin at his most disenchanting and one (May 24, 1980) by Joseph Brodsky which exhales the foul air of the gulag – not to mention a dispiriting passage from *Paradise Lost* There is, too, a tendency to flirt dangerously with psychobabble, notably in a chapter on the Kitty Genovese Incident and the War in Bosnia, which seeks to draw a parallel between the public reaction (or lack of it) to a brutal murder in New York in 1964 and the international attitude to the ethnic cleansing atrocities in Bosnia thirty years later.

However, these are minor complaints about what is in

every sense a *magnum opus*. It has been said that this is a book which will change the way in which people look at international affairs. This may be a good example of the ultimate triumph of hope over experience. It would indeed be a matter for great rejoicing if the talking heads of television and the scribblers of the op-ed pages found time to read and absorb Philip Bobbitt's provocative reconstruction of the process which has brought the world to where it is today, and his often pessimistic analysis of the paths which it might take in the future.

Towards the end of *The Shield of Achilles*, Philip Bobbitt advances a proposition which may, since September 11th 2001, seem self-evident, namely that the threat which we are now facing is no longer from state aggression, since a state structure is no longer necessary to organise violence on a devastating scale. If we fail to deal with this threat a new horrifying kind of conflict may emerge, in which an authoritarian market state challenges the contentment of the rest enabling non-state terrorists and aggressors to bring chaos everywhere. As Michael Howard has written in his foreword, Bobbitt believes that mankind could be facing a tragedy without precedent in its history.

It may require some visionary statesmanship to prove him wrong.

Hungarian Prophet George Ross

The Life and Thought of Aurel Kolnai

Francis Dunlop, Burlington, VT, USA, Ashgate Publishing, 2002, £49.99

The loveable Doris Lewis was a kind and concerned landlady, not minding when her tenants fell in arrears. She introduced me to the oddballs living in her house, for she regarded them as distinctly eccentric, albeit unfailingly courteous, charming and solicitous, in an old-fashioned, continental way. And unusual they certainly were. One of them, Aurel Kolnai, had the high intelligence, argumentative nature and intensity of the typical intellectual hailing from Mittel-Europa: full of cerebral power and passion, believing in his destiny, role and responsibility in shaping the *Zeitgeist*, pursuing unfashionable topics and refusing to adapt and to compromise, or being viscerally incapable of doing so. As Popper put it: 'He is not good at compromise – and England, at least, lives by compromise'. Kolnai was concerned with problems

that, at the time, seemed irrelevant; his outlook also went against the grain, against the post-war current of opinion prevalent in British universities. This explains, at least in part, why Kolnai was never fully accepted and adopted by the academic establishment, more concerned with 'getting the prescribed stuff across to the students, rather than offering a platform for an original thinker' (as Popper wrote scathingly in Kolnai's support), and in particular by departments of philosophy, in this country. He was extraordinarily kind and interested. I was very young, a newly arrived political refugee, hailing from not far away from Kolnai's own roots. He helped me in practical ways and offered me advice as well as always fascinating conversation.

He was one of those visionaries born before their time, or, perhaps, so many of the faculty members were, sadly, living in a time warp, but there was no mental synchrony between them. Kolnai saw, better than most of his coevals, the dangers facing humanity and in particular facing Western values and culture and its liberal-democratic political order.

Aurel Kolnai was born in Budapest, on 5th December 1900 and died in London on 28th June 1973. He also lived in Vienna, Paris, New York, Boston, Quebec – a true wanderer. He wrote in five languages. It was this permanent rootlessness, instability and insecurity of his life that resulted in Kolnai's relatively low output of works; but those produced and published are of fundamental importance. The only full-time academic position he ever held was at the Catholic Laval University in Quebec, between 1945 and 1955. In England, which he made his home in June 1955, he never managed to obtain more than temporary visiting fellowships at Birmingham and, from 1959 until his death, a part-time lectureship at (the now defunct) Bedford College, University of London.

Kolnai's work is varied; he produced numerous articles and several books. He was – like Popper – passionately militating for the 'radical rejection of totalitarianism' – of which he had first-hand knowledge – and upheld the idea of piecemeal social reform, being totally opposed to historicism, in fact preceding Popper in formulating his anti-historicist stance. Kolnai singles out as his *bête noire* the 'tribal mind' and the outlook it engenders, especially in his seminal book *The War Against the West*, published in 1938; he emphasised its pernicious and noxious character, some seven years before Popper listed tribalism amongst the enemies of the 'Open Society'. This doctrine originates in the political writings of late Romanticism, particularly in Fichte's post-1790 works. 'The tribal group is', as Kolnai indicates, quoting from Lévy-Bruhl, 'immanent in the individual who has no *raison d'être*, no sphere of relationship apart from it. Not only does he live for the community's sake alone, he actually lives through the community. Therefore anyone acquiring from personal experience a mode of thinking other than the one

proper to the community lays himself open to merciless destruction. Discipline and education are designed to produce an absolute uniformity of thought.'

This 'mystical community', this system or organism, was identified by some with a nation (the effect being one version or another of Romantic chauvinism), by some with a Church (leading to one form or another of religious fundamentalism), by some with a race and some with a class. The common characteristic of all those systems has always been intolerance: the denial of otherness, the rejection of pluralism, of dissent. Each such system has justified itself by reference to some over-arching, self-validating, legitimising mythology or ideology. This vision has shattered the idea of a single human species whose members were each equally entitled to the same forms of moral conscience. The division of mankind into two groups, into 'us' and 'them', into 'insiders' who are members of the organic community and 'outsiders', those excluded and deemed to be beyond the pale, into 'proper' men and those regarded as belonging to inferior races, or inferior cultures, or to nations or classes condemned by history, is a denial of common humanity – a premise previously embraced by all humanist doctrines, religious or secular.

The result has been invariably distasteful, often pernicious, sometimes calamitous, occasionally apocalyptic. This denial of individualism represents the foundation of collectivism: the belief that it is the collective self that generates and determines the forms of lives lived by all its individual members, to whom it gives meaning and purpose, for whom it creates values and the institutions which embody those values and for whom it represents the supreme authority, from which there can be no appeal. Such a mentality frequently promotes a soterial belief, a messianic vision informed by utopian messages, and the cult – bordering on hagiolatry – of a leader-cum-redeemer, invested with oracular gifts, super-human attributes and heroic qualities. This outlook is responsible for all the forms of monism, fanaticism, titanism, authoritarianism and totalitarianism that have haunted our continent, especially during the last hundred years. It is still not extinct, and it is still looming ominously in various parts of the world, and even in Europe.

When Kolnai gave his warning, he had in mind not only the National-Socialist calamity or the Bolshevik disaster, but also the corporatist outlook that started to dominate the political thought in various parts of Europe, such as Austria. Kolnai found profoundly distasteful, and was particularly worried by, the doctrine formulated by the self-styled 'political theologian' and ideologue of the Nazi movement, Carl Schmitt. Alas, the intervening sixty-five years have not rendered Kolnai's serious concerns and warnings obsolete and have not dimmed their relevance and urgency. They have not fallen in desuetude, as the horror of 11th September 2001 demonstrated. In one of the best and most illuminating articles attempting to grasp the

ideological apparatus and the mentality of the perpetrators of this crime, with the title 'Occidentalism' and published in the *New York Review of Books* of 17th January 2002, its authors, Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, refer, with approval, to Kolnai's *The War Against the West*, as the prophetic caveat and guide for the future. He anticipated, by many decades, Samuel Huntington's insight into these matters.

When Kolnai died, he left another important work unfinished: *The Utopian Mind*. He was acutely aware of the dangers of Utopianism, which underpins all totalitarian, fundamentalist ideologies: 'Utopianism rejects the common-sense submission to the human condition and pursuit of the good on its terms', replacing it with non-human submission to an abstraction: the utopian mind, 'places its perfection-schema above experienced reality, including 'ordinary' pluralistic value-experience,' and replaces the 'inadequacy of life lived on common-sense presuppositions' with 'a fundamental rupture of continuity with the commonsensical universe'. Whilst shunned and sidelined by the academic establishment as a whole, a few of Kolnai's colleagues and students have always appreciated his originality, as well as the significance of his output, and strove to promote and publicise his work. A small minority also displayed great personal kindness and concern for his always precarious financial situation, trying to help him and, after his death, his widow, Elisabeth, (who survived him by eight years); Bedford College was persuaded, in those halcyon days of academia, to pay her a small pension.

Of those who have worked tirelessly to make his work known as widely as possible, one must single out Francis Dunlop. Having edited and prepared for publication Kolnai's unfinished *The Utopian Mind* in 1995, he has now produced this remarkable, spellbinding book, *The Life and Thought of Aurel Kolnai*. It is a labour of love: beautifully written, in an elegant and fluent style, it is easy – indeed a joy – to read and it is a mine of information. It is not only a biography or even an intellectual biography: but also an important contribution to the intellectual history of the twentieth century. Francis Dunlop well deserves our congratulations and gratitude. The time is, surely, ripe to reprint those of Kolnai's works that are now no longer available, indeed to publish Kolnai's complete collected works. The proper assessment of Kolnai's place in European history of thought is long overdue.

Appeasement Feeds Islamic Terror

Alfred Sherman

Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, responding to the Challenge

Alan M. Dershowitz, Yale University Press, 2002, £ 17.95

The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat

Roger Scruton, Continuum, 2002, £ 12.99

9/11 is turning out to be the most pyrrhic of victories for the Islamic terrorists, by engaging the United States, which had hitherto been apathetic towards Moslem terrorism, or even tolerant and in some cases supportive of it, e.g., in Bosnia and Kosovo, in a life and death struggle against it. Correspondingly, Islam and its relationship with 'The West' – a collective noun easier to brandish than to define – have become a must for authors and publishers. The two books under review indicate both the sense of urgency and its attendant costs. Both are by reputable authors, both are valuable contributions to a discussion which has a long way to go; yet both are dominated by the here and now.

Dershowitz is both a Professor of Law at Harvard and a leading courtroom lawyer, the 'top lawyer of last resort' in the USA. 'Why Terrorism Works' is two books for the price of one. The first half is a politico-legal study of Palestinian terrorism from 1968 to the present; its conclusion is that terrorism pays. The second half, or the second book as you might call it, deals with the implications of 9/11 for American law-enforcement.

The first half is a campaigning essay on Arafat's elevation to Palestinian leadership and world status by means of terrorism. Dershowitz lists forty two acts of terrorism, most of them carried out against civilian targets, principally but not exclusively Israeli or Jewish, including children, air-line passengers and staff, and diplomats. The rewards listed by Dershowitz include unprecedented status at the UN, meetings with EU and US leaders and the Pope. Germany, France, Italy, Holland and the USA are among powers rewarding Arafat for acts of terror which cost hundreds of innocent lives.

Dershowitz makes out a strong case; but it has lacunae. His story begins in 1968, whereas Arafat's terror campaign began in 1962, while the 'West Bank' was still under Jordanian rule and the Gaza Strip under Egyptian. His fedayeen (terrorists) began their attacks on Israeli

civilian targets; Nasser became involved in support; this escalated into war in 1967; Nasser convinced King Hussein that he was winning and persuaded him to attack Israel; the Israelis counter-attacked and occupied the West Bank. Arafat's avowed aim remains to liberate 'the whole of Palestine', including all the territories which became Israeli after 1947. He thrives on terrorism, but his people pay a high price. However strong Dershowitz's case, it should not preclude examination of Israel's policies in and towards the West Bank and Gaza strip and their influence on Arab behaviour. There may be ample room for disagreement within this, but that Israeli and Arab actions interact cannot be gainsaid.

Dershowitz's section on policies needed after 9/11 could almost have been written by another person. He reflects a characteristic of American – and to some extent British – law which makes it something of an obstacle race for the prosecution rather than a search for truth and justice. There is some confusion between presumption of innocence and the authorities' right of access to factual information. For instance, he minimises the FBI/CIA failure to get wind of 9/11, which was subsequently excoriated as a major failure by a congressional committee, and euphemises it as an exercise in balancing the needs of national security against the right to privacy.

The case of Zacarias Moussai epitomises an approach which led Charles Dickens to complain that 'the law is a ass'. When Moussai, later to be identified as the potential twentieth hijacker, was detained on suspicion, 'the FBI did not even seek a warrant to search his laptop computer because agents believed that no judge would issue one based on the kind of vague information they had at the time... Reasonable people can disagree about whether searching Moussai's computer on the basis of the suspicious information then available would have been justified, but no democracy could simply allow law enforcement agents free rein to search anyone and anything on nothing more than suspicion.' But how reasonable is it to disagree when what we are talking about here is an agent's well-based suspicions which if followed up could have saved three thousand innocent lives?

American legal traditions which Dershowitz expresses derived from the British, true, but they derived at a fairly late stage in joint British-American history when major threats to British liberty and independence stemming from the assault by the Catholic Church and Catholic empires were already a thing of the past, while the threat from the French revolution and Napoleonic imperialism, later matched by the Communist threat, still lay in the mists of the future.

The Islamic assault on the Western world represents a new stage in the confrontation between Islam and the West. al-Qa'eda represents only the tip of an iceberg; terrorism is only one of its weapons. Islam provides only one threat to Western survival; the 'enemy within' as Margaret Thatcher described it, never sleeps. It may no longer love communism but it still hates the free

Christianised society. The question is not simply how current constitutional practice in the USA and like-minded states at the turn of the century can be modified at the margins to meet new threats, but how the Western world can respond to a new war of religion combined with third world importunity. Dershowitz's legalistic strictures in an impeccably liberal spirit are valid in themselves, but however worthy, they are out of scale to the magnitude of the new threat. They deal with tactics whereas the strategy of confrontation is at issue. To elaborate it will take a longer wind and some of the intellectual robustness displayed in the strictures on Arafat in the first half.

Roger Scruton is a prolific author whose current book is an essay in defining 'The West', timely in itself, which he counter-poses to 'the rest', and in laying out guidelines for the struggle against Islamic terrorism. The book is bold and courageous, attempting a great deal in a short compass. Its main thesis is that the West's specificity in comparison with Islam arises from the separation of Church and State and the tempering of their conflict by territorial loyalties.

Following on this, he presents globalisation as a negation of nationdom, because it creates multinational corporations and organisations, without territorial loyalties. By the same token, he identifies the European Union as a threat to the territorial basis of free societies and their survival. He may be right, but this antedates the Islamic threat by decades, and Europeanism has deep roots in the Western tradition of the Holy Roman Empire, against which nationalism rebelled. His sub-Toynbeeish thesis is strong on philosophy but weak on history. Our understanding of the human condition falls far short of telling us why some religions wax and others wane. Why did Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Zoroastrianism lose so much to Islam, which for centuries survived Western conquest? Wherein lies the secret of Islam's success in spreading and winning absolute loyalty, and its failure to produce just and viable societies? Greater understanding awaits future intellectual advance.

One can compare Islam and Christianity, but not equate them. Muhammed established his theocratic empire from scratch to conquer the world for Allah, and his followers still take their inheritance and obligation seriously. Constantine, by contrast, inherited the Roman Empire by secular law and imposed on it one of the religions then competing for Roman allegiance. The Christianised Roman, later East-Roman, Empire survived for another millennium in caesaro-papist mode. For centuries, the concepts of Christendom and Christian empire dominated Western thinking and practice. The idea that the State could operate in its own right was long resisted as heresy.

The emergence of what is now considered the Western modality took centuries. In the sixteenth century, Henry the Eighth ruled as a despot no different from his Asiatic

equivalents, executing wives and counsellors at will. He 'nationalised' the Church because it opposed his divorce and to enable him to seize its properties, while resisting reformation. It took more than a century after Henry the Eighth, a civil war and glorious revolution for the ideal of the rule of law to be established in Britain, and for civil and religious power to be distinguished. The Catholic domain was slower, much slower, to evolve into a Western mode. Could the West have become 'Western' as we now know it without the Reformation? By the nineteen thirties, Western values, as Scruton describes them, still had limited purchase in Europe. Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia, among others, were despotisms. Though Latin America is wholly Christian, many of its states' institutions and behaviour patterns bear closer similarities to Moslem societies than to archetypally Western ones.

Scruton widens his focus to describe and excoriate attempts to destroy Western society and culture from within. By his own evidence this constitutes a far more real and present threat than the Islamic assault. 'In place of the old beliefs of a civilisation based on Godliness, judgment, and historical loyalty, young people are given the new beliefs of a society based on equality and inclusion, and are told that the judgment of other lifestyles is a crime. ... The 'non-judgemental attitude' towards other cultures goes hand in hand with a fierce denunciation of the culture which might have been one's own. Unfortunately, however, there is no such thing as a community based on repudiation. The assault on the old cultural inheritance leads to no new form of membership but only to a kind of alienation.' Scruton concludes that 'to defend our civilisation against this combined assault requires us not merely to believe in something, but to study how to put our beliefs into practice'. In its own modest way, the *Salisbury Review* has been attempting this end.

An Ambivalent Legacy

David J Levy

Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse
Richard Wolin, Princeton University Press,
2001, £ 19.95

Martin Heidegger was the most influential as well as the most politically notorious philosopher of the 20th Century. His political notoriety derives from his enthusiastic engagement with National Socialism, which as

now we know went far beyond his brief period as Rector of Freiburg University in the immediate wake of Hitler's accession to power. His intellectual influence also stems however, from his vast body of writings – discouragingly obscure and disconcertingly acute by turns – as well as from the extraordinary number of gifted students whom he inspired to become independent thinkers in their own right. In this book Richard Wolin, one of America's most lucid analysts of Heidegger's thought, examines the ideas of four of these figures, all of Jewish origin, while simultaneously continuing the critical examination of the intimate interplay of philosophy, politics and cultural criticism in their master's teaching first undertaken in his volume of 1990, *The Politics of Being*.

After over a decade of studies devoted to the apparent enigmas of Heidegger's life and thought – enigmas that are truly insoluble only to a dyed-in-the-wool liberal democrat – Wolin's first study of the political sub-text that flavours even the most seemingly apolitical of the philosopher's early writings, remains the best introduction to the subject. If this volume is less authoritative than *The Politics of Being*, this is because Wolin deals not with Heidegger alone but with four thinkers, each influenced by their teacher in a distinct way, and all hardly less intellectually ambitious than their common mentor. Inevitably this leads the author to sometimes overhasty characterisations of what were in every case highly developed and contrasting modes of thought. If Arendt, Löwith, Jonas and Marcuse were all Heidegger's children, then each acquired a different genetic legacy from their intellectual progenitor.

One theme of this book is the debt of four gifted pupils to an outstanding teacher from whom each was more or less distanced by the trauma of a shared and painful history. Such a theme tends to diminish, except in the case of Marcuse, the author's sense of the way in which these students managed to free themselves from the pathos of Heideggerian existentialism. They did this through a retrieval of elements of what another of his one-time Jewish admirers, Leo Strauss, termed the radically anti-Heideggerian tradition of 'classical political rationalism'.

Though enshrining at its core the cultivation of precautionary practical reason, as Heidegger emphatically does not, this is nevertheless a tradition that does not take the universal validity of political democracy for granted. Wolin points to instances, more or less prominent in all four thinkers' writing, that cast doubt upon the claims to our allegiance of a democratic order, in ways that he clearly finds distasteful. This is not, as Wolin supposes, necessarily a feature that we should attribute to the lingering influence of an Heideggerian educational ethos. There are quite different, more intellectually reputable sources for a suspicion of democracy among philosophers than Heidegger's brand of political decisionism, and these play a greater part in the mature thinking of theorists such as Jonas, Arendt, and even

Herbert Marcuse than Wolin allows.

In Marcuse this element is bound up with a commitment to the ideal of a socialist vanguard that preceded his encounter with Heidegger. But for Arendt, and still more Hans Jonas, such reservations about democracy stem from a traditional sense of respect for the autonomy of practical political reason as directed toward long term human well-being. There are dangers in this style of thinking too, but one need not find such an openness to authoritarian options either agreeable or even acceptable – not least because of their own inherent dangers – in order to perceive that the reasons leading to their consideration may have little affinity with the sort of political atavism, decked out in volkisch authenticity, that induced Heidegger to throw in his lot with the Third Reich in the fateful spring of 1933.

Wolin's discussion of those he labels 'Heidegger's children' is broadly sensitive to the peculiarities of the situation into which, in Heideggerian terms, they were 'thrown' by the events of the time. Each reacted in a differing way: Löwith by the cultivation of an austere, de-historicised and apparently apolitical stoicism; Jonas by the development of a biologically based yet objectivist theory of ethics; Arendt by a classically oriented theory of politics; and Marcuse by a helter-skelter series of reformulations of revolutionary faith that reached its oddball climax with his strange sanctification as a guru of America's politically innocent New Left. Which leaves us at last with Heidegger himself, who is, of course, the real focus of Wolin's book.

In his preface the author describes *Heidegger's Children as*: 'a final instalment in my effort to come to grips with Heidegger's ambiguous and powerful legacy,' and also 'a study in what Harold Bloom called 'the anxiety of influence'. The latter phrase clearly refers primarily to the work of Heidegger's students, none of whom entirely escaped their mentor's influence nor, despite every provocation, seems ever to have felt any great need to do so. But there is a secondary sense, captured by George Steiner's reference to the pervasive presence of Heidegger on the Western cultural scene, in which a related phenomenon has been generalised in academic circles well aware of the problematic cultural and political aspects of Heidegger's. The fact is that these circles are simultaneously hypnotized by what is taken to be his achievement in overcoming or, in his own terms, 'destroying' much of the rational, or 'logo-centric,' tradition that has, until recently, been the unchallenged paradigm in philosophy and the disciplines of humane enquiry.

Wolin responds to the philosopher rationally, with a proper balance between receptive appreciation and critical distance. Avoiding both the rapt enchantment of the philosopher's uncritical admirers and the indiscriminating disdain of his most radical detractors, Wolin uses his knowledge of Heidegger to show his readers that, quite beyond issues of political commitment and ideological

allegiance, as well as the philosopher's hostility to most of the established culture of modernity, the Heideggerian legacy is problematic in an intellectual sense as well. Following the lead of Karl Löwith, whose essays on Heidegger he edited for Columbia University Press in 1995, Wolin charges, rightly in my view, that the overall effect of acceptance of what might be termed the Heideggerian revolution in philosophy is to undermine the norms of rational discourse, while privileging a language of emotive evocation and assertion that feels itself with no obligation to answer objections derived from the demands of either logical consistency or common sense.

No one familiar with much recent writing with such post-Heideggerian movements as Deconstructionism and some varieties of Post-Modernism can fail to see the ruinous results when the success of such a revolution is taken for granted by 'theorists' who neither understand the original motivations of Heidegger's own work nor seem to question the innate limits of his approach. These anarchic intellectual impostures can be undermined only through the sort of vindication of modes of thinking dismissed by Heidegger but retrieved by some of his most talented students.

Much of what Wolin writes about Heidegger will be familiar enough. The particular merit of the author's considerations, in this book, is in their unaccustomed clarity rather than in their intrinsic originality. A partial exception to this is in Wolin's discussion of the recently published text of a course of Heidegger's lectures in 1934 that is still unavailable in English and which throws further light on the depth of the philosopher's engagement with the prevailing ideology of the time. These lectures post-date Heidegger's resignation from the Rectorate at Freiburg. Most striking is the extent to which the course is pervaded by themes familiar from the world-view of National Socialism, of which the most original is an emphasis on the importance of labour as a means of redeeming the fortunes of the German Volk.

Such a motif is not surprising in a course of this period, nor is the portentous, utterly Heideggerian way in which labour is here endowed with an ontological import of 'revelation' or 'unconcealment' that might, in other circumstances, seem more than a little comic to those who experience work on a day-to-day basis and in a rather more prosaic light. However these lectures do contain Heidegger's most extensive treatment of the subject of labour and are therefore of special interest to luminaries interested in parallels between his ideas and those of the Marxist tradition, which also privileges labour as a means of worldly redemption, but with a different objective. Other Heidegger scholars will find in these writings further confirmation of what they already knew – namely the depth of the philosopher's sympathy for the world-view of Nazi Germany and the disconcerting way in which he could so often draw striking though seldom intellectually conclusive insights from even the

most unpromising material. Both these are lessons that Wolin is rightly concerned that we should not forget in an age still marked in its self-understanding and cultural assumptions by ideas whose dubious origins and resonance it seldom fully comprehends.

Perhaps the prime purpose of a work like *Heidegger's Children* is to help us understand the paradox best expressed by Leo Strauss, who not only described Heidegger as 'the only great thinker in our time', but also regarded this preeminence as a major misfortune of the age. This, I think, is also Wolin's verdict on a thinker whom we cannot ignore yet dare not trust as either a diagnostician or guide in the future.

Jane Austen's 'Outlandish' Cousin David Edelsten

The Life and Letters of Eliza de Feuillide

Le Faye - The British Library, 2002, £18.95

This charming book is recommended both for the light that it throws on Jane Austen, and in its own biographical right. Few who know anything of Jane Austen will be entirely unacquainted with the subject, the novelist's only full first cousin on her father's side, and, as Claire Tomalin put it, 'a central figure' in her life. It is based on letters Eliza wrote to another cousin, Philadelphia (Philly) Walter, an exact contemporary, and the daughter of her mother's half-brother.

Fourteen years Jane's senior, evidently a loved, magnetic mentor, Eliza was born to George Austen's older sister, also called Philadelphia, wife of an ill-starred East India Company surgeon, Tysoe Saul Hancock, in Calcutta, in 1761. It has been widely supposed, on the basis of a passage in a letter home to his wife from Lord Clive, 'In no circumstances whatever keep company with Mrs Hancock, for it is beyond doubt that she abandoned herself to Mr Hastings', that Eliza was the natural daughter of her godfather. This slur was given colour by his lifelong generosity to her and to her mother.

Biographers have been too ready to parade gossip and circumstantial evidence. 'There is not the slightest hint in Hastings's diaries and other private papers that would corroborate such a claim.' Le Faye urges. He had moreover a reputation for 'blameable generosity'. Possibly the author lays herself open to the same charge. Eliza, whose father died as good as penniless, lived extravagantly on income from her godfather's trust, travelling it seems at will, 'my horses and my servants' often cited. The question of Eliza's parentage seems to remain as open as it is interesting.

The family returned to this country in 1765, Hancock supposing that he had accumulated enough capital to retire on. Rather typically it seems, he was mistaken. He returned to India, unaccompanied, four years later, never to see his family again, and died at the age of 64 in 1775. Eliza's, or Betsy's as she was then known, infancy in India, and her childhood at home, are followed, in the first of the five chapters of this short book, largely through her parents' correspondence.

Her income being unequal to London life, the widow took her daughter to Europe in 1777, eventually settling in Paris, and family history repeated itself. Much as her mother had been shipped out to India a portionless orphan expressly to be married, Eliza, who with the Hastings money behind her was far from portionless, was clearly on offer as a bride. Her marriage in about 1782, to Jean-Francois Capot de Feuillide, a captain in the Queen's Regiment of Dragoons, and some ten years her senior, was no love match. Like her mother's, it was a marriage of convenience; events ensured that they spent most of it apart, and it ended under the guillotine in 1794.

There is some mystery about de Feuillide's entitlement to the style of Comte, which seems to have been assumed, rather than inherited: 'he was only the son of a provincial lawyer who had risen to become mayor of Nérac in south-west France, where the family owned a small estate'. Was such an imposition really possible in pre-revolutionary France, and did Eliza's status as a Countess go unquestioned in this country? It seems so. I find this more puzzling even than the question of her paternity.

Of Eliza's letters to her 'country mouse' of a cousin Philly, we only have one half. The correspondence, jejune and pro-forma as between inseparable 'best friends' at its start, hits a stride in 1787, and is from then on a delight. One can enjoy it at various levels, as social history, as throwing an occasional well-focussed beam on her soon to be teen-age cousin Jane, and as an enigmatic portrait of the letter-writer herself, Jane's 'outlandish cousin'.

It was a great pleasure to try to read through the habitual irony and mannerism of the writing to the person herself, all female, light-hearted, joyfully given to 'dear flirtation' – as a young widow she was to have at one time two of Jane's brothers on a string, declining offers from both. Her child, Hastings, who had fits and barely survived childhood, sometimes goes unmentioned in her long letters, bulletins from the nursery giving place to news of various pug-dogs. Was there something of Becky Sharp in his mother – surely of Mary Crawford?

Her mother's death from breast cancer in 1792, pre-figuring her own twenty-one years later, certainly leaves no room for doubt as to her devotion as a daughter. Her courage and lack of self-pity when the disease cast its long all too recognizable shadow on her is entirely admirable – one thinks of Fanny Burney. Here she is writing on November 7th, 1796:

I have been prevented writing to You My dear Cousin by being so thoroughly disheartened about my Complaint. A few days after I wrote last to You I thought myself materially worse, and accordingly dispatched a note to Farquar (Sir Walter Farquar). With beating heart I repaired to my Rendezvous. The Servant would have shewn me into a Parlour with a good fire in it, but on seeing two Smart young Men there, who opened their eyes as wide as Barn Doors to view the Doctor's female Patient, I desired to go into another Apartment and was accordingly shut into a Study where an empty grate announced the cold reception which I had to depend on. Here I waited nearly two Hours which gave me an opportunity of reading various physical Books filled with shocking cases, and also of inspecting two large presses where I expected to find Skeletons, but however met with nothing but crooked Scissors and other formidable Surgical Instruments, and a few Embryos in Spirits.

The letter goes on for several pages, making fun of her plight and ends 'I live in hope of Pug's arrival, Pray get him for me if possible.'

On the last day of 1797 Eliza did eventually marry the fourth, most colourful, of George Austen's sons, Henry. The final chapter follows the course of their brief, but happy marriage. She died in 1813, only four years before Jane Austen.

Save Whitey

Frank Ellis

The New White Nationalism in America: Its Challenge to Integration

Carol M. Swain, Cambridge University Press, 2002, \$30.00

Supported by an ugly Soviet-style censorship, more generally known as political correctness (PC), the American liberal establishment, as in the UK, has managed to create a climate of fear, and even self-loathing, such that any criticism of multiculturalism will be denounced as racism, fascism and so on. Despite this intimidation, many scholars from across the political spectrum are defying the commissars and bullies.

By no means a complete break with multicultural orthodoxy – Professor Swain is passionately committed to diversity and integration – *The New White Nationalism* nevertheless raises some very awkward questions for the racial-industrial complex on both sides of the Atlantic. Professor Swain, a black professor at Vanderbilt University, concedes that PC is a real menace and that the problems afflicting America need to be

discussed openly and honestly if they are to be solved. Uncontrolled immigration, affirmative action, high levels of black crime, racial double standards and claims for reparations for slavery are some of the issues that Professor Swain believes could tear the US apart. She worries that these are now being ably exploited by various white organisations in the US.

Swain has gone to great lengths to present the case of white supremacists, white nationalists and separatists in a fair manner. She covers the spectrum of white groups from Neo-Nazi and Christian fringe to organisations geared to speak up for whites, such as the National Association for the Advancement of White People (NAAWP) and the small but influential New Century Foundation (NCF), which publishes the monthly journal, *American Renaissance*, edited by Jared Taylor. Unfortunately, Professor Swain does not always manage to distinguish between white supremacists, nationalists and separatists. The book cover depicts an American flag and in place of the stars we find mini swastikas, the obvious implication being that any assertion of white nationalism or identity makes one a Nazi. Who was responsible for this cover? Swain herself? Or some multicultural propagandist at CUP? Certainly, some of the white groups discussed can be represented in this manner but not all, certainly not the NCF or the NAAWP. Nor does she manage to maintain her sense of balance when discussing some of the various protagonists in the debate. Thus, Professor Michael Levin's views on race, those of an outstanding and original thinker (see, for example, *Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What they Mean* (1997)) are implied to be no better or worse than those of Leonard Jeffries, a black professor who, like Levin, teaches at City University of New York. One of Jeffries's more profound contributions to the sum of man's knowledge is the assertion that blacks are 'sun people' and whites are 'ice people'. And in an echo of the Beethoven-is-black school of history Jeffries claims that the Holocaust is a fabrication. Jeffries can get away with this sort of malevolent denial because he is black.

Further inconsistencies can be detected in Swain's discussion of affirmative action. On the one hand, she concedes that: 'the public remains overwhelmingly opposed to racial preferences', yet she claims on a number of occasions that arguments about racial preferences are being 'twisted to fuel the growth of white nationalism among disaffected whites'. She does not realise that the twisted situation of which she complains is the policy whereby better qualified whites are sacrificed to propitiate poorly qualified blacks. Swain seems mightily bothered by whites who demand that the same standards should apply to all regardless of race (or sex) and accuses them of appropriating the language of civil rights. Well, are whites not allowed to have civil rights or are they just for blacks? What bothers Swain is not that whites are victimised in the name of affirmative action – on occasions she questions whether they are victims at

all – but that whites, as individuals, and increasingly as members of organisations formed to defend whites, are not accepting the tyranny of affirmative action any more and doing something about it. Even though Swain concedes that: ‘Resentment against racial preferences by the white majority shows no inclination of abating’, she is, one suspects, more concerned about the damage done to race relations rather than the intrinsic evils of affirmative action and ruined lives. When whites and white organisations quite rightly complain about this persecution she responds that this is being done for ‘racist ends’. Whites should just accept their persecution with good grace. This is hardly a recipe for the integration that Professor Swain desires.

Professor Swain is deeply concerned that well-educated whites disapprove of racial preferences in college admissions, whereas they tend to favour preferences in other areas. This, she concludes, is ‘counter intuitive’. I suggest it confirms the underlying hypocrisy of white middle class attitudes on diversity and multiculturalism that Jared Taylor, cited by Swain, has exposed with characteristic eloquence and force in *The Real American Dilemma: Race, Immigration and the Future of America* (1998). Liberal, middle class whites are quite happy to tolerate diversity in areas when it only impinges on blue-collar jobs and employment and housing – as in the UK – but as soon as it starts to affect them, as, for example, in the growing competition for university places, an area of special interest to the white middle classes, then they discover that diversity is suddenly not for them. Middle class whites who supported, or have pretended that affirmative action was not a problem, have helped to create a monster which is now turning on them, as indicated by the growing number of white students filing suit against universities.

The author is not at her best when discussing *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (1994), the magisterial and meticulously researched book by Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein that reignited the IQ controversy in spectacular fashion. Much of her argument relies on the straw man fallacy. Murray, Herrnstein – and various anonymous white nationalists – do not claim that IQ is destiny or that absolute predictions about an individual’s future, based on an individual’s IQ, can be made. IQ alone is not a guarantee of success and Murray and Herrnstein repeatedly make this point throughout their book, caveats which Professor Swain decides to ignore. Nevertheless IQ is an extremely useful asset and you are statistically better off with this asset than without it. More importantly, the vast data banks analysed by Murray and Herrnstein for *The Bell Curve* overwhelmingly confirm the relationship between high IQ and high socioeconomic status (SES). That there are individuals with high IQs who do not achieve high SES in no way invalidates the conclusions reached by Murray and Herrnstein, as Swain would have us believe.

Professor Swain’s own views on the nature of black crime are the greatest tribute she pays to the intellectual


honesty and fearlessness of Jared Taylor, Michael Levin, Sam Francis and J. Phillippe Rushton. On this issue she acknowledges that Taylor *et al* have been right all along. Black leaders, she insists, must make the reduction of black crime a priority number one issue:

White nationalists accurately report that African Americans are responsible for an alarming proportion of the nation’s violent crime, and many of the crimes they commit against whites and Asians would be labeled as racial hate crimes if similar standards were applied across races. White fear of violent crime from blacks is a rational fear supported by data showing that African Americans are far more likely than members of other racial groups to kill complete strangers....

These are the views that the *Guardian*-reading classes in Britain, the Tories, the BBC and our Macphersonised police do not have the stomach to face up to. Again, agreeing with what many white academics have been saying for some time, Swain makes the following recommendation:

It is crucial for the future of American race relations for the black crime rate to be reduced to the point that African-Americans are not seriously over-represented among the nation’s criminals. A group that constitutes less than 13 percent of the population should not be responsible for committing almost 50 percent of violent crimes.

The New White Nationalism in America represents another blow to multiculturalism, and one from an unexpected source. For all the book’s shortcomings, Professor Swain has made a serious effort to address the hopes and fears of whites, nationalist or otherwise, in the USA. She is honest and intelligent enough to admit that opposition to multiculturalism is legitimate, intellectually coherent and, alarmingly, from her point of view, winning the essential arguments.



**Christian Language in the Secular City,
Christian Language and its Mutations**
David Martin, Ashgate Publishing,
2003, £15.99 each p.b.

When I was a country parson, I once visited a local farmer and asked him, ‘What does your farm mean to you?’ I might have known it was a damn fool question. He answered, ‘Come back tomorrow morning at six o’clock – and in your walking-boots.’ We spent the day

walking the perimeter of his fields and in the pub at the end of the afternoon he said, 'That's it, you see: you don't really know your farm until you've walked it.'

I thought of that farmer when I read David Martin's books. These are rare volumes. We are usually offered, whether in books or from the pulpit, huge dollops of discursiveness of the sort, 'Now let me tell you what Jesus really meant.' As if Jesus in his parables could not speak for himself. I have even heard, 'This is one of Our Lord's very best parables' – which prompts the reply, 'Oh, were the others not so good then?'

Martin is not discursive. Instead, he does something like what my farmer did: he leads you through the New Testament stories and lets them speak for themselves. *Christian Language in the Secular City* is a collection of sermons on the Church's Year. As the author says, 'To use the language of transcendence is not to give information about God or to deal in testable hypotheses, else faith would be science. Rather, we evoke the transforming vision.' And this is what he does throughout: 'We become Christian in the first place by absorbing its sign language into our hearts like miniature sacraments. 'There is nothing in the mind, said Thomas Aquinas, that has not come first through the senses.' And if I were to lapse into discursive prose, I should say that this tangibility of the sensual imagination is exactly what we expect to find in a religion which is based on incarnation. Martin offers scores of illuminating examples of what he means: 'To the unseeing eye, this nativity scene is just a woman in blue with a baby mysteriously raising his fingers towards a bunch of grapes and wheat stalks. But

once interpret the signs and the picture shows the Blessed Virgin bearing the fruit of her womb, Jesus, as he blesses the fruit of the earth to make it his body and blood.'

It is paragraphs like that which make the hair stand out on the back of the neck. You read and you hear the background hum of transcendence, the intellectual pressure of indubitability as the author's words, like a fragrance, convey the very unconditional grace which is the theme of this lovely book. In the direct presentation of image, sign, landscape, facial expression and tone of voice, we are reminded of the highest sermons ever composed. Here are echoes of George Herbert and Lancelot Andrewes. *Christian Language and its Mutations*, at least according to the blurb, 'explores how Christian language alters in various social, cultural, historical and religious contexts.' But that way of describing the book only makes it sound boring, run of the mill discourse. Whereas, what we have here is not so much discourse as meat and drink – the word made flesh:

'As the shadows of the coming Passion darken, Judas goes out into the night, the disciples slip into the tenebrous darkness of the Mount of Olives, and the sun itself goes out as Jesus yields up his spirit. And it is very early in the morning, before it is yet light, that the women converge on the tomb to find that the Sun of Righteousness has already risen.'

One could say that here David Martin gives us a brilliant introduction to the phenomenology of the Christian religion. It would be far better to say, 'He speaks with authority – not as the scribes.'

NOTES ON REVIEWERS

LORD CHALFONT IS PRESIDENT OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS' DEFENCE GROUP.

DAVID EDELSTEN IS A FREELANCE JOURNALIST AND HUNTING CORRESPONDENT.

FRANK ELLIS IS LECTURER IN RUSSIAN AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS.

DAVID LEVY'S MOST RECENT BOOK IS *HANS JONAS: THE INTEGRITY OF THINKING*, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI PRESS, 2002.

PETER MULLEN IS RECTOR OF ST MICHAEL'S CORNHILL.

GEORGE ROSS IS A FORMER ACADEMIC AND WRITER.

SIR ALFRED SHERMAN LIVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND STUDIED ARABIC AND ARAB NATIONALISM.

IN SHORT

Called to Account: The Case for an Audit of the State of the Failing Church of England

(ed Digby Anderson and Peter Mullen)

The Social Affairs Unit, 2003, £5

Remember when the Church of England was called the Tory Party at Prayer? But it was then in the business of salvation for souls rather than social work, facing up to the enemy rather than embracing the attractions of secular society or other religions. Various authors press the charges: the decline in numbers, the catastrophic finances, the failure of the liberal agenda among others. Jogging for Jesus type services may appeal to some of the chattering classes but most ordinary people actually prefer traditional services. Those who give up going to church are not less but more spiritually minded. Perhaps the most disturbing section is the story of the empty coffers. At least one thought if the C of E ever recovered its soul and nerve there would be money to help its recovery. In the early 1990s the Commissioners' capital fund lost £800m on its property investments. There has been a huge loss in income as well and selling off rectories to pay salaries is not a permanent solution. Now parishes are being asked to make up the deficit but neither congregations nor clergymen are natural entrepreneurs.

An interesting contribution comes from Fay Weldon who describes herself as a newcomer to Christianity. She challenges the nostrum that all faiths are equally valid: 'If I had been persuaded by the Islamic faith I would have joined Islam. I was not, and did not. I take offence when it is suggested to me that I might as well have.'

Digby Anderson suggests that those responsible for leading the C of E into failure and decline should apologise and resign and that the Archbishop of Canterbury should commission a full independent audit. I cannot see this happening. However there are islands of hope like St Michael's Cornhill and other churches dotted round the country who represent the old values. It is up to believers to support them.

Merrie Cave

The Blight of Blairism

Francis Bennion, Lester Publishing,
2002, £15.95

'I come to expose the horrible blight of Blairism which is indeed a horrible, treacherous, wicked doctrine. For the true English it stinks to high heaven... Mockery is the only weapon left when puffed up grandees show them

selves deaf to reason'. As well as a rallying call to the faithful this is a very useful companion volume to *Blair's Britain* (Claridge Press) published in 1999, which explained the background of and reasons for the phenomenon. Much has happened since then and major issues like the reform of the House of Lords, Section 28, the Human Rights Act, Ramblers rights, Ulster, Foot and Mouth and many more are explained in engaging and racy prose. Bennion first came to the Commons in 1953 as a Parliamentary counsel so he is well able to judge and compare Blair with his predecessors. An immense amount of detail is included, even correspondence with Ministers, making it a good source and reference book for campaigners and others.

The final chapter is a glossary of Blairism – 'England: the country that gave them birth holds a special position for Blairites – a little below that of every other country in the world.'

Merrie Cave

Paralysis or Power?

Rupert Darwall, *The Centre Right in the 21st Century*, Centre for Policy Studies, 57 Tufton Street, London SW1P 3QL, 2002, £7.50

How did the Conservative Party go in ten years from the organization that led the political debate in this and other countries to one that resembles a frightened rabbit caught in the glare of the triumphant Blairite truck. Rupert Darwall, a director of Reform, the new Conservative think-tank, says the party has abandoned intellectual argument. The Conservatives must stop underestimating the ideological basis of Tony Blair's thinking, abandon empty gestures and focus groups and return to their own ideology, which will attract voters: allowing people to make their own decisions about their lives, which includes decisions about the public services, at present expensive and catastrophically inept. The Conservatives must explain to the electorate that state monopoly can never work. They must, once again, become the party of individual liberty. Rupert Darwall does a bit of denying himself. The structure of public services is within the British Government's power for the moment; the regulatory structure is not. He dismisses the European issue as best left in the limbo of an uneasy agreement but, alas, it remains the central issue of British politics. Sooner or later the Conservatives must face up to the bogeyman and decide how the European project fits in with what ought to be their world view.

Helen Szamuely

A Moral Duty to Act There

Peter Osborne, Centre for Policy Studies,
2003, £7.50

There seems to be no end to the horrors in Africa, so we, in the Western world, have lost all interest in the continent, springing to attention briefly when something concerns us directly: refugees from North Africa who may or may not be terrorists, or displaced and tormented white farmers in Zimbabwe. As Peter Osborne says in this cogent pamphlet, Mugabe's attack on the white farmers was of relatively little importance either politically or demographically, though he possibly underestimates the far-reaching economic effect. However his murderous war is threatening to turn into a full holocaust, against the people of his own country who dare to voice any opposition to his tyrannical and corrupt regime. The West and especially Britain should have been galvanized into action. Far from it. Osborne traces the sequence of non-events, cowardly reactions and appeasing statements that have disgraced the British and other European governments throughout the whole Mugabe saga. He blames impartially South Africa, Prime Minister Blair, who had announced in 2001 that Africa was going to be his special interest only to explain that Zimbabwe did not count as Africa, a couple of Foreign Secretaries, Clare Short with her little girlish 'worries' and other EU countries, whose various interests prevented any kind of coherent policy.

Osborne curiously, does not mention the long devastating war in DR Congo, which has turned East and Central Africa into a never-ending bloodbath. Several times he draws parallels between the Nazis and Mugabe. A more exact parallel would be with Communist regimes from Stalin to Mengistu who incidentally lives in Zimbabwe, Somewhere behind Mugabe's apparent insanity there is an ideology trying to get out and it is like the one that visited mayhem on many parts of the world throughout the twentieth century. Three quarters of a loaf is better than none; Osborne's account, his interviews with courageous people in the country and his indictment of both Africans and Europeans should open a few people's eyes. Is the rest of the world going to do anything about it? *Helen Szamuely*

The Blue Book on Transport

ed. Edward Vaisey and Michael McManus,
Politicos Publishing, 2002, £10

This Blue Book is one of a Politico's series, on various areas of government activity, designed to point the Conservative Party towards careful thought and policy making. It could be said that if you want to get there you wouldn't start from here, but the present Tory Party is probably the best Conservative Party we have.

The seventeen essays cover all aspects of transport from walking to flying (except shipping). Each has a different author, some conservative, some not. They include politicians, academics, members of think-tanks, and spokesmen for pressure groups. Unlike an official blue book, this one is not packed with facts and statistics, though there are some.

A few of the writers are public figures. Brenda Dean, well-known for her services to the printing industry, has been rewarded by chairmanship of 'Freedom to Fly'. She believes in the right of all to fly where they like on holiday, and the necessity to make it easy and cheap for foreign tourists to fly here. Thus we would need bigger and more airports.

Opposing views are given on cars: Most people have cars, and should be allowed to make the best use of them that they can; but they lead to congestion and pollution and should be controlled, and substituted by subsidised public transport. While all would object to the pollution of diesel fumes and nitrogen oxides, these campaigners also assume the Kyoto theory that fossil fuels produce carbon dioxide, which leads to global warming, which is a Bad Thing. This is by no means clear. In Great Britain, in the early Middle Ages, the climate was warmer and agriculture more productive.

This collection provides a range of opinions and possible resulting policies. It will be very helpful to whoever is looking after the can of worms that is transport policy.

Robin Cave

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