

COMPLETE TEXT OF THE "YELLOW BOOK" OF FRANCE ISSUED BY AUTHORITY OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

The Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Negotiations Which Preceded the Declaration of War by Germany. Authorized Translation, and the Rights of Which in the United States Are the Property of The New York Times.

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INTRODUCTION.

In this "Yellow Book" the French Government offers its contribution of diplomatic evidence upon the origin of the war and the negotiations which preceded it. The British, German, Russian, and Belgian Governments have taken a similar course in their respective "White Papers," "White Book," "Orange Book," and "Gray Book." Not all of these collections of documents are of equal value. The German "White Book," in particular, is singularly incomplete. The French "Yellow Book" will be found to contain not only the fullest record of the efforts made by the Allies to preserve peace and of the persistent determination of the German Government to thwart them, but a striking analysis of the psychology of Germany and of the delusive policy of aggression pursued by Germany for months and years before the actual outbreak of hostilities.

This psychological analysis of the situation ante bellum constitutes the peculiar interest of the French documents. Through it we are held that the French dispatches relating to the negotiations immediately antecedent to the war add but little to the information previously conveyed by the British, Russian, and Belgian publications—an opinion which it would be easy to refute—a perusal of the opening pages of the "Yellow Book" about suffice to convince any impartial reader that the German attack upon the liberties of Europe was carefully premeditated and timed to take place at the moment of maximum advantage to the aggressor and of the greatest disadvantage to the powers attacked.

Germany's Consistent Policy Against France

Since the defeat of France in 1870-71, it has been a main object of German policy to prevent the restoration of France to a position that would enable her, alone or with the help of allies, seriously to menace German hegemony on the Continent of Europe. For this purpose Germany formed the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy in the early nineties created, for the first time, a counterpoise to the crushing weight of Germany in European affairs, but it was not until England concluded with France, in 1904, the *Entente Cordiale*, and supplemented it in 1907 by the agreement with Russia, that Germany's policy of aggression, least her power to dictate her will to Europe should be curtailed. The German Emperor's visit to Tangiers on March 31, 1905, the organization of the panic in Paris which drove M. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, from office in the following summer, the Agadir Crisis of 1905-06, the Franco-German agreement of February, 1906, in regard to Morocco, the *Agadir coup* of July, 1911, and the subsequent Franco-German agreement of November, 1911, are the milestones that mark the path of Germany toward the final act of aggression. The defeat of Turkey by the Balkan alliance in the Autumn of 1912 hastened the catastrophe. The collapse of Turkey deprived Germany of an ally on the eastern frontier and counted. Under German guidance, the Young Turkish Committee of Union and Progress was preparing to place a million Turkish bayonets at the disposal of Berlin. Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary imagined that the Turkish Army would be so speedily discomfited by the prowess of the allied Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Hellenic forces. The success of Serbia was, in particular, a severe disappointment for Berlin and Vienna. A Serbia territorially enlarged and morally stimulated by a successful war threatened to diminish the effective support which Austria-Hungary could lend to Germany in a European conflict. Hence the decision of Germany in 1913 to increase her army by several fresh corps; hence, also, the successful attempt of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy to induce Bulgaria to attack Serbia and Greece in the hope of weakening Serbia, and of sowing lasting discord between the Balkan allies; hence the successful Austrian intrigue, to which the powers of the Triple Entente weakly lent themselves, to create an aggressive Albania in the rear of Serbia; hence, also, the pressure of Germany upon Austria to bring about an increase in the Austro-Hungarian Army corresponding to the increase already effected in the German Army.

It was supposed in Germany that France, with her stationary population, would not be in a position to reply to these Austro-German efforts. The reorganization of the Russian Army was known to be not complete, and it was presumed that Austria-Hungary and Germany would thus acquire a marked preponderance over those of France and Russia. The military preponderance of the two Central European empires would thus be re-established.

To the annoyance of Germany, France replied by reverting to the three years' service system despite the burden which it involved for the whole country. Russia likewise began an even greater increase of her army. Germany seems therefore to have resolved to strike her blow before the Russian increase could take effect. It is significant that the German war tax on fortunes, which was intended ostensibly to cover the cost of the increase of the German Army, was timed to be collected in July of the present year. This date indicates the approximate moment when Germany was determined to force matters to an issue.

The assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and of his consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg, on June 28, provided the requisite pretext. Into the circumstances of this crime, many of which are still mysteriously obscure, the French "Yellow Book" does not enter. It reveals, however, with striking clearness, the means

by which Germany and Austria-Hungary, in concert, utilized the crime for the purpose of compelling Russia to choose between utter humiliation and war. The psychological problem whether Germany believed that Russia in 1914, as in 1909, would call before an ultimatum, is not, and may perhaps never be solved. In view of the many misadventures of German diplomacy, it is possible that the German Emperor may have counted upon a Russian surrender. The effects of such a surrender would have been scarcely less striking and politically remunerative than those of victory in the field. The cohesion of the Triple Entente would have been undermined, its prestige destroyed, the confidence of its members in each other shattered, and France would have been immediately exposed to the exactions which Germany was determined to levy upon her.

The "Yellow Book" opens with a dispatch, dated March 17, 1913, from the French Ambassador in Berlin, M. Jules Cambon, covering reports drawn up by the Naval and Military Attachés upon the new German army law. The Ambassador points out that the German Imperial authorities were representing the revision to the three years' service system in France as the cause, not as the consequence, of the increase in the German Army, and were losing no opportunity of inflaming patriotic feeling. He observes that the Emperor daily takes pleasure in recalling the memories of 1870-71, when Germany rose against the military tyranny of Napoleon. M. Cambon adds:

"If the movement which a century ago aroused the German people against the man of genius who aspired to universal domination could find any equivalent today, it ought to be sought for in France, since the French people have no thought but to defend themselves against domination by force."

The report of the French Military Attaché at Berlin remarks that a member of the Reichstag—not an agitator—had gone so far as to represent the adoption of the three years' service in France as an intolerable provocation.

"More moderate people," he adds, "but have been in a similar position to support the thesis that France with her 40,000,000 souls has not the right to rival Germany in this way."

The report concludes:

"By whatever pretext Germany may justify her aggression, no doubt, no doubt can prevent the first decisive blow from being aimed at France."

The French Naval Attaché reports that it would be folly to believe that the German Socialists would throw down their arms whenever France and Germany come to grips, "but," he observes,

"It will be extremely important for the Imperial Government to persuade them, on the occasion of the next election, that the early nineties created, for the first time, a counterpoise to the crushing weight of Germany in European affairs, but it was not until England concluded with France, in 1904, the *Entente Cordiale*, and supplemented it in 1907 by the agreement with Russia, that Germany's policy of aggression, least her power to dictate her will to Europe should be curtailed. The German Emperor's visit to Tangiers on March 31, 1905, the organization of the panic in Paris which drove M. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, from office in the following summer, the Agadir Crisis of 1905-06, the Franco-German agreement of February, 1906, in regard to Morocco, the *Agadir coup* of July, 1911, and the subsequent Franco-German agreement of November, 1911, are the milestones that mark the path of Germany toward the final act of aggression. The defeat of Turkey by the Balkan alliance in the Autumn of 1912 hastened the catastrophe. The collapse of Turkey deprived Germany of an ally on the eastern frontier and counted. Under German guidance, the Young Turkish Committee of Union and Progress was preparing to place a million Turkish bayonets at the disposal of Berlin. Neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary imagined that the Turkish Army would be so speedily discomfited by the prowess of the allied Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Hellenic forces. The success of Serbia was, in particular, a severe disappointment for Berlin and Vienna. A Serbia territorially enlarged and morally stimulated by a successful war threatened to diminish the effective support which Austria-Hungary could lend to Germany in a European conflict. Hence the decision of Germany in 1913 to increase her army by several fresh corps; hence, also, the successful attempt of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy to induce Bulgaria to attack Serbia and Greece in the hope of weakening Serbia, and of sowing lasting discord between the Balkan allies; hence the successful Austrian intrigue, to which the powers of the Triple Entente weakly lent themselves, to create an aggressive Albania in the rear of Serbia; hence, also, the pressure of Germany upon Austria to bring about an increase in the Austro-Hungarian Army corresponding to the increase already effected in the German Army."

The Naval Attaché indicates also one reason for the adoption of a war tax on fortunes.

"Presented in this form," he explains, "the war tax cannot dispense with the aid of the army, who, following their usual tactics, will be enabled to reject the principle of universal conscription, and to reserve the credits which insure its execution."

And again:

"If we take note of the fact that the German Government is endeavoring to prevent this enormous tax from being paid in several instalments, and if, as is the case, the first instalment of the payment, must be made before July 1, 1914, we get a formidable hint, for nothing but the most extraordinary haste on the part of the military authorities to have a liquid war treasure of 240,000,000 in their chest."

The Government and people of France cannot excuse their diplomacy of having failed to understand the significance of German preparations.

"Small States Must Follow Us or Be Cowed"

A further document of supreme interest is an official and secret report, apparently drawn by Germany's office of high rank, upon the strengthening of the German Army. The report reached the French Minister of War, "from a sure source," on April 2, 1913. The part of it dealing with general principles is illuminating.

"Our new army law," runs one of its pages, "is but an extension of the military education of the German people. Our ancient and venerable history, the principles of the sacred duty to sharpen the sword which has been placed in our hand, and to be ready for defense against the strike down our enemy. The idea that our armaments are *regula* to the armaments and policy of the people must be secured among the people. The people must be accustomed to think that it is on our part is a necessity, if we are to combat the adversaries' provocations. The war must be prepared from a financial point of view. There is much to be done in this direction. The distrust of our armaments is not to be tolerated, but nevertheless it will be impossible to hide many things. There need be no alarm about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle that for them. On the other hand, disturbances must be provoked in Northern Africa and in Russia. This is a means of absorbing the attention of the forces of the adversary. It is, therefore, vitally necessary that through well-chosen agents we should get into contact with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers, and in Morocco, in order to prepare the necessary measures in case of European war. These secret allies would, of course, be recognized only at the time of the final decision of peace they would be guaranteed the preservation of the advantages they have won in the preparations for war. A first attempt made a few years ago gave us the necessary contact. Unfortunately the relations established then have not been sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not we shall have to bring the relations back to their old order rapidly to bring the campaign to an end. Risings in times of peace require careful preparation by material means. They must be carried out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication. They should have a guiding hand who might be a foreigner, a Jew, a Christian, or political chiefs. The Egyptian School is specially suited for this. More and more we must turn to the Moslems of the Mussulman world. By whatever means we must be strong, so as to be able to destroy our enemies in the East and in the West. But in the Central European States we must be forced to follow us or must be cowed. In certain conditions their armies are not to be destroyed, but they must be cowed or neutralized (this might probably be the case with Belgium and Holland) so as to prevent our Western front from obtaining a base of operations against our flank. To the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or from the Scandinavian States. We have the less to

fear, and in any case we should arrange for the concentration of a strong army in the north capable of replying to any bad intention on this side.

"At the worst Denmark might be forced by England to abandon her neutrality, but by then the decision would already have been reached by land and sea. Our northern army, the strength of which might be greatly increased by Dutch troops, would oppose an extremely active defense to any attack from this direction. In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can count upon her defending herself manfully against any attack with energy, and thus protecting this flank. If the defensive organization of Belgium were thrown against us, which would give obvious advantages to our Western adversary, we could not in any way defend Belgium any guarantee of the security of her neutrality. A vast field is thus opened up for our army to work in the interests in this country. The plans made in this direction allow of the hope that the offensive might be taken immediately the concentration of the army of the lower line is completed. An ultimatum with brief delay followed immediately by invasion, would enable us to stop our action sufficiently from the point of international law."

"Such are the duties of our army. They are large and arduous. But we must not be deterred by the fact that we are attacked on all sides. If we wish to tame him, we shall do as did our brothers one hunting dog must find the way to the other. We will take its flight, and seizing the enemy in his sharpened claws, render him harmless. We shall then remember the provinces of the old German Empire, the County of Burgundy, and a large part of the Netherlands, after the death of the Franks, that thousands of our German brothers and sisters were killed. It is a national matter to give back to Germany what she formerly possessed."

Plain Words From the Kaiser and Von Moltke

A dispatch from the French Ambassador in Berlin cites the opinion of Gen. von Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff.

"The commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor," said Gen. von Moltke, "must be disregarded. When war has broken out, it is not to be decided by ranging all the chances on one's own side. Success alone justifies it. Germany cannot and must not wait for the other to mobilize or she will be obliged to maintain in the eastern frontier a force which would leave her in a position of inequality, if not of inferiority, in regard to France. Therefore, we must forestall our principal enemy before he can do so. There are nine chances out of ten that we are going to have war, we must begin by waiting in order brutally to crush all resistance."

"This explains," the Ambassador says, "exactly the state of mind in military circles. It corresponds to the state of mind in political circles."

Among the most important documents in the "Yellow Book" is the dispatch (No. 6) from M. Jules Cambon, dated Berlin, Nov. 22, 1913. It reproduces a report of a conversation between the German Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of Gen. von Moltke, and warns the French Government that "the Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace." This dispatch should be read in its entirety, since it tells the German Emperor has been brought to think that war with France was inevitable, and that he and Count Moltke strove to persuade the King of the Belgians of the irresistible might of Germany so as to lead him not to resist in case of a Franco-German war.

A long note prepared for the French Foreign Minister in April, 1914, on German public opinion in the light of diplomatic and consular reports, contains an admirable description of the German state of mind. It analyzes penetratingly the forces making for war and for peace in Germany, and concludes:

"It must finally be noted that the particular danger of peace lies not in the fact of war, because they can see no solution to the present situation. In certain countries, especially in the public mind, there is a clause enabling the contract to be canceled in case of war has been introduced. The German Emperor has been brought to think that war with France was inevitable, and that he and Count Moltke strove to persuade the King of the Belgians of the irresistible might of Germany so as to lead him not to resist in case of a Franco-German war. A long note prepared for the French Foreign Minister in April, 1914, on German public opinion in the light of diplomatic and consular reports, contains an admirable description of the German state of mind. It analyzes penetratingly the forces making for war and for peace in Germany, and concludes:

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"This note accurately diagnoses one of the principal causes of the war—the determination of Junkerdom to strike a blow in defense of its class interests and its predominant position in the Prussian State for the purpose of proving that its sword is the mainstay of Prussia-Germany. In the Junker class the spirit of Prussian militarism is embodied. It has inoculated the whole German Nation with its ideas, and driven the youth of Germany to slaughter in defense of its privileges."

The portions of the "Yellow Book" dealing with the diplomatic negotiations which preceded the war call for little comment. They cover ground mainly known, though they survey it from a different angle of vision. In a dispatch dated July 2, the French Ambassador at Vienna, M. Adolphe Dumaine, indicated with remarkable foresight the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. A dispatch from M. Paléologue, French Ambassador to Russia, reports a significant warning given in July by M. Sazonov to the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Baron von Goltz, that Austria-Hungary might be forced to search on Serbian territory for the instigators of the Sarajevo crime. M. Sazonov said:

"No country has suffered more than Russia from outrages planned on foreign territory. It is not to be expected that against any country whatever the measures with which your newspapers threaten it will be taken. Do not tread that path. It is dangerous."

Very illuminating are the reports from the French Ambassador in Berlin on his conversations with Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister. Herr von Jagow assured the Ambassador that Berlin had been completely ignorant of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before the ultimatum was presented at Belgrade, and the Ambassador expressed surprise that the

German Foreign Minister should thus undertake to support pretensions of which the extent and nature were unknown to him. Herr von Jagow replied testily, "It is only because we are talking between ourselves that I allow you to say that." To the contrary, the frankness of M. Jules Cambon in dealing with the German Foreign Minister form, indeed, an outstanding feature of the diplomatic correspondence.

German Ultimatum Checked Efforts to Keep Peace

Scarcely less interesting was the attempt of Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Paris, to compromise France in the eyes of Russia by dictating to M. Bienvenu Martin, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, a note for the French President stating that the Ambassador and the Minister had examined the means to be employed for the maintenance of peace in a friendly spirit and "with a feeling of pacific solidarity."

M. Bienvenu Martin avoided the trap, and informed the press merely that he and the Ambassador had sought for a means of action by the powers for the maintenance of peace." A telegram from London on July 27, 1914, contains the information that on that day Sir Edward Grey warned the German Ambassador that an Austrian invasion of Serbia, after the Serbian reply to the ultimatum, would prove that she was not merely seeking for a settlement of the question mentioned in the ultimatum, but that she wished to crush a small State.

"Then," added Sir Edward Grey, "a European question would be raised, and a war would ensue in which all the great powers would take part."

Germany had thus clear warning of the consequences of encouraging Austria. On the same day in Berlin, the French Ambassador asked Herr von Jagow whether "he had pledged himself to follow Austria everywhere, blindfold, and to have regard to the rights of Austria which he had been presented to him that morning." "I have not yet had time," replied Herr von Jagow. Two days later, however, Herr von Jagow admitted that he saw in the Serbian reply a possible basis of negotiation—wholly, however, he did nothing whatever to utilize. On July 30 the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg reported Mr. Sazonov's conviction that Germany did not wish to speak to Vienna the decisive word that would safeguard peace, and added:

"The Emperor Nicholas has the same impression from the exchange of telegrams which have just taken place with the Emperor William. That evening, July 30, M. Sazonov spoke very plainly to the German Ambassador. The patriotic movement displayed in France has aroused positive anger in certain quarters. It is not, however, a movement of a virulent article in the Cologne Gazette expresses any general feeling. It is the angry explosion of an impulsive journalist immediately disowned by the Government."

But, in view of the Czar's desire to avoid war, M. Sazonov proposed the formula given in the Russian "Orange Book." The formula provided that, if Austria would declare herself ready to relinquish the ultimatum clauses which affected the sovereignty of Russia, Russia would undertake to stop all military preparations. At the request of Sir Edward Grey, M. Sazonov subsequently moderated even this mild proposal, but the German ultimatum to Russia cut off all possibility of successful negotiation.

On July 31 the French Ambassador in Berlin reported a conversation with Herr von Jagow that is likely to stand in diplomatic history alongside of the German Chancellor's "scrap of paper" declaration of war. The British Ambassador, Herr von Jagow had previously declared officially to the Ambassador that Germany would not consider herself obliged to mobilize unless Russia mobilized upon the German frontier. On July 31 Herr von Jagow expressed the fear that Austria might mobilize completely in consequence of the partial Russian mobilization which might bring about a total Russian mobilization, and in consequence that of Germany. The dispatch adds:

"I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he himself had said to me that Germany would not consider herself obliged to mobilize unless Russia mobilized upon the German frontier, and the utter was not of course, He replied that he was true, but that the heads of the army insisted that all delay was a loss of strength to Germany. He said that the words recalled did not constitute a firm engagement on his side. Though the French "Yellow Book," thus summarily analyzed, contains no dramatic incidents like the "scrap of paper" proposal of Germany to England, or the fine conversation between Sir Edward Goschen and the German Imperial Chancellor, it forms an invaluable contribution to public knowledge of the history of the great conflagration. Every page bears traces of the responsibility of Germany in the outbreak of the war, and reports with irrefutable evidence the conclusion that the responsibility for the world-wide catastrophe lies upon Germany and Austria, and upon them alone."

CHAPTER I. WARNINGS.

1913.

No. 1.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 17, 1913.

OUR naval and military attachés have reported to their respective Ministers reports upon the new German military law. I direct the attention of your Excellency to these important documents.

Only the study of the financial means with which Germany has in view, the publication of the final proposals of the Government. In spite of the affected patriotism with which the wealthy classes accept the sacrifice which will be demanded of them, they are, nevertheless, particularly in the business world, dissatisfied by the financial measures announced, and they feel that a forced contribution imposed in time of full peace creates a redoubtable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Government have offered the most lively re-

sistance to the innovation, which will attribute to the Empire resources drawn from direct taxation. Up to the present, taxation of this nature has been reserved to the Federal States, who see in the abandonment of this rule a further affirmation of the personality of the Empire, which constitutes, to a certain degree, a belittling of their own sovereignty.

However this may be, by increasing the strength of the German Army the Emperor intends to leave nothing to chance should a crisis arise.

Germany's new departure has produced a situation she did not expect; the proposal of the Government of the Republic re-establishing three years' service, and the virile resolution with which this proposal has been greeted in France. The impression of astonishment made by these proposals has been turned to account by the Imperial Government to urge the absolute necessity for an increase in the military forces of Germany. The Emperor takes pleasure in recalling the memory of 1870-71, when Germany rose against the military tyranny of the Slav, since the immense military effort accepted by France is but the consequence of German Initiative.

The Imperial authorities lose no opportunity of exalting patriotic feeling. Every day the Emperor takes pleasure in recalling the memory of 1870-71, when Germany rose against the military tyranny of the Slav, since the immense military effort accepted by France is but the consequence of German Initiative.

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It is none the less true that this state of opinion in the two countries makes the situation grave.

JULES CAMBON.

Annex 1.

Report of Lieut. Col. Serret, Military Attaché at the French Embassy in Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War.

Berlin, March 15, 1913.

The patriotic movement displayed in France has aroused positive anger in certain quarters. It is not, however, a movement of a virulent article in the Cologne Gazette expresses any general feeling. It is the angry explosion of an impulsive journalist immediately disowned by the Government."

But in spite of its unseemliness, the manifestation of the Cologne Gazette is no negligible fact. It has aroused in the public mind, in its letter, by several fairly important newspapers, and appears to me to correspond to a real feeling, to a latent anger.

It is interesting to take note of it, because it throws a more vivid light upon the meaning of present armaments.

For some time past people have been heard to declare that the military proposals of France were extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag, and not an agitator, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation, and we shall not permit it." More moderate people, who are soldiers and civilians, currently support the thesis that France with her forty million souls has not the right to rival Germany in this way.

In short, they are furious, and their anger is not the result of the outcry of certain French papers, which serious people scorn. It is a feeling of vexation. People are enraged to see that in spite of the enormous effort undertaken last year, which has been maintained, and again increased this year, they will probably still be unable to outdistance France. Since we neither wish to be nor will we be Germany, it is a real object to put us completely out of the race. This cannot be too often repeated, and the forth-coming law, which French opinion regards rather too much as being a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the present situation. This latter measure indeed, while creating two new army corps, purposely, and in accordance with German methods, left incomplete important units and regiments. It was evident that no great time would be lost in filling up these gaps." The Balkan crisis would be a wonderful opportunity, if it broke out just at the right time to enable the century of the Wars of Liberation to be exploited, with a view to obtaining more easily further sacrifices in memory of those already agreed to against us.

May I suggest in order the better to show the genesis of this military programme, what was written by my predecessor, Col. Pellé, a year ago when the law of 1912 made its appearance:

"We discover every day how deep and how lasting are the sentiments of wounded pride, and of rancor against us provoked by the events of last year. The treaty of Nov. 4, 1911, is a profound disappointment."

"The resentment felt in every part of the country is the same. All Germans, even the Socialists, resent our having taken their share in Morocco."

"It appeared, one or two years ago, as if the Germans were set out to conquer the world. They deemed themselves so strong that they thought no one would dare to enter the lists against them. Boundless possibilities were opened up for German industry, German trade, and German expansion."

"Naturally those ideas and those ambitions have not disappeared today. Germans still require outlets for their commerce, and they still desire economic and colonial expansion. This they consider as their right, as they are growing every day, and the future belongs to them. They look upon us, with our 40,000,000 inhabitants, as a secondary nation."

"In this crisis of 1911 this secondary nation held its own against them. The Emperor, and the Government yielded; public

"The problem which confronts us today would, therefore, have been raised, and in a more acute form, a few years later, since the shrinkage of our contingents continues to reduce our peace effectiveness."

opinion has neither forgiven them nor us. Public opinion does not intend that such a thing shall occur again."

At a time when the second and formidable portion of their programme is on the eve of realization, when German military power is on the point of acquiring that definite superiority, which, should occasion arise, would force us to face humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, "the eternal power of renaissance and resurrection."

German vexation is very comprehensible. The Government, of course, invokes the general European situation and talks of the Slav peril. To me, public opinion seems in reality indifferent to the Slav danger, but it has nevertheless accepted, with very good grace, to say no more of it, the huge burdens of these two consecutive laws.

On the 10th of March last, the centenary of the organization of the general German rising against us, an enormous crowd, in spite of the rain, went to the cemetery of the front of the castle in the middle of the Tiergarten, at the foot of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by mounds of flowers.

These anniversaries recording the struggle against France are to be continued throughout the year. In 1914 the centenary of the first campaign in France, of the first Prussian entry into Paris, will be celebrated.

To sum up, if German public opinion does not point its finger at France as does the Cologne Gazette, it is nevertheless against us that it will long continue to be aimed. German public opinion considers that in proportion to our 40,000,000 inhabitants we occupy a "place in the sun" which is really too large. It is constantly proclaimed that the Germans desire peace, and the Emperor more than any one else has done for peace based on mutual concessions and balance of armaments. They want to be feared, and they are now making the necessary sacrifices. If at any moment their national pride should be hurt, the confidence the country will be able to have in the enormous superiority of its army will favor an explosion of national anger before which the moderation of the Imperial Government may perhaps be powerless.

It must, moreover, be noticed that the Government is doing its utmost to inflame national feeling by pompous celebration of the anniversary of 1870-71. The trend of opinion can only result in giving to a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany may justify a European conflagration, nobody can prevent the first decisive blows from being struck at France."

Annex 2.

M. de Faramond, Naval Attaché at French Embassy in Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.

Berlin, March 15, 1913.

In reporting to you the debate on the naval estimates by the Reichstag Committee, I said that no naval law increasing the fleet would be presented this year, and that the whole military effort would be directed against us. The new bill to increase German effectives has not yet been presented. It is a fact, however, that we nevertheless know that it deals with "a military reinforcement on a grand scale," to use the expression of the North German Gazette.

The semi-official newspapers have, moreover, commented upon the Army bill in terms which would justify one regarding as exact the communiqué of the Lokai Anzeiger.

The German effectives at present amount to 720,000 men. We have reason to conclude that on Oct. 1, 1914, the strength of the Imperial army will be brought to a figure close upon 880,000. The importance of this figure would be less did not the new bill (according to the hints of official newspapers) tend, as did the law of 1912, to place the army corps near our frontier as closely as possible on a war footing, with a view to a sudden attack upon us, with greatly superior forces, on the very day of the mobilization. It is imperative necessarily for the Imperial Government to achieve success at the very outset of operations.

The conditions under which the German Emperor would today embark upon a struggle against France are no longer what they were years ago. On the outbreak of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had taken into consideration the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, foreseeing that we might possibly succeed in getting as far as Mainz, said to his sovereign, "The day they (the French) will have (*La is se heurtent*)." The German soldier is no longer what he was forty years ago—a simple, religious man, ready to die at the order from his King—and William II. cannot afford to allow a retreat to enter into his mind. He is a man of the world, and his four million Socialist votes polled at the last election, and remembering that the franchise is only given at the age of twenty-five, one may be justified in thinking that the active army, composed of young people between the ages of twenty and twenty-five, must have in its ranks a considerable number of Socialists.

It would, of course, be folly to believe that the German Socialists will throw down their arms the day that France and Germany come to grips. But it will be extremely important in the Imperial Government to persuade them, on the one hand, that we are the aggressors, and on the other that they may have complete confidence in the command and in the result.

I was much struck, during the last ceremony of swearing in the recruits of the guard at Potsdam, to see the Emperor, in the text of his discourse to the young soldiers, "The duty of being more courageous and disciplined in bad than in good fortune." It is just because an initial German defeat would have incalculable results for the Empire that the aim of the military plans elaborated by the headquarters staff is a smashing offensive against France.

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be able to meet every possible eventuality. The greatest danger appears to be from France. The Cologne Gazette has said so in an article full of hate and of violence, in which the manner rather than the matter has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse [The German Foreign Office].

But we must persuade ourselves that the view expressed by the Cologne Gazette is, at the present moment, that of a minority of the German people. It is interesting in this connection to quote a conversation which one of the members of our Embassy had the other evening with the Em-

Prince Henckel von Donnersmark, because it may well reflect the ideas which reign in Court circles here.

Alluding to the new German Army bill, the Prince von Donnersmark said: "The French are quite wrong in thinking that we cherish dark designs, and that we desire war. We cannot, however, forget that in 1870 popular feeling forced the French Government to attack us insanely, without being ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, so prompt to catch fire in France, will not some day force the Government of the Republic to make war upon us? It is against this danger that we wish to guard ourselves. The Prince added: "I have frequently been regarded in France as one of the artisans of the war of 1870. That is altogether wrong. Although I worked on the consequences of the war, I did my best to prevent its outbreak. Some time before the war, at a dinner where the most eminent personages of the Imperial régime were gathered, I raised my voice to deplore those sentiments of enmity which were already showing themselves between France and Prussia. I was told that if I spoke thus it was to excite a struggle, the issue of which would certainly be favorable to Prussia. I replied, 'No; it is not because I am afraid that I reject the idea of a war between France and Prussia, but really because I believe its avoidance to be the interest of both countries. And the Prince added: 'I have frequently said since you have alluded to the question of a struggle, I am going to give you my opinion. I am convinced that you would be beaten, for the following reasons: In spite of the brilliant qualities which I admit belong to the French and which I admire, you are not precise. By precision I do not mean the fact of arriving punctually at an appointment; I mean punctuality in every sense of the word. The Frenchman, who has great facility for work, is not as punctual as the German in the accomplishment of his duties. In the conduct of the victorious war, it will be that nation whose servants, from the top to the bottom of the ladder, are exact in the accomplishment of their duty, however important or however trivial it may be.'"

Prince von Donnersmark added: "The punctuality which played so great a part, when it was a question of the war, in moving an army of 500,000 men, will have still greater importance in the course of the next war, in which masses of a far greater number will have to be put into action."

In this way the old Prince expressed the confidence and the uneasiness in the superiority of their military organization.

In speaking above of the new German bill I only alluded to an increase in effectives. The bill, however, also provides for an increase in material for defensive works, the details of which are not known, but of which an idea can be formed by the amount of the contemplated expenditure, 200,000,000 francs. The expenditure of the Quinquennate law of 1911 did not call for any special financial measures. The army and navy law of 1912 was provisionally covered by budgetary surpluses of 1910

(Continued from preceding page.)

Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the cause of the Serajevo attempt.

In the present circumstances, the most favorable supposition one can make is that the Vienna Cabinet, feeling itself swamped by the press and by the public opinion, is endeavoring to obtain the maximum from Servia by direct and indirect preliminary intimidation, and is leaning upon Germany to this end. I have asked the French Ambassador in Vienna to use all his influence to reach Count Berchtold, in order to represent to him in friendly conversation how greatly moderation shown by the Austrian Government would be appreciated in Europe, and what reverberation might be caused by brutal pressure on Servia.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 18.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Nothing is known yet as to the decisions which the Emperor will take on this week. The demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, relating to the repression of crime, and to certain surveillance and police guarantees, appear to be acceptable to the dignity of the Servians. M. Jovanovitch declares that they will be agreed to. M. Paul Cambon, however, declares himself ready to declare himself ready for every resistance. He is confident in the strength of the Servian Army, and he counts, moreover, on the union of all the Slavs of the monarchy to paralyze the effort directed against his country's blindness. It should be seen here that a *coup de force* has the greatest chance of being disastrous, both to the Austro-Hungarian troops as well as to the already compromised cohesion of the nationalities ruled by the Emperor. The German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirnitz, shows himself to be a partisan of violent resolutions, while willingly allowing it to be understood that the Imperial Chancellery might not be in complete agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left for the court yesterday, has made the reassuring declarations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will have no objection to steps being taken for the punishment of the consequences of the Serajevo demarche of the notoriously revolutionary associations, but could not admit exactions which would have been humiliating for Servian national feelings.

DUMAINE.

No. 19.

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 22, 1914.

Your Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me impressions gathered by our Ambassador in Berlin with regard to the consequences of the demarche which the Austrian Government is proposing to make at Belgrade. Those impressions have been conveyed to me by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey told me that he had received a visit from the German Ambassador, who confided to him that in Berlin they expected the Austro-Hungarian Government to take steps to support the Servian Government, that the German Government busied itself in holding back and in moderating the Vienna Cabinet, but that up to the present it had not succeeded, and that it was not without anxiety as to what would be the consequences of such a demarche. Sir Edward Grey replied to Prince Lichnowsky that he liked to think that, before intervening in Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Government had informed itself thoroughly of the circumstances of the plot to which the hostility of Austria had been the Duchess of Hohenberg had fallen victims, and that it had assured itself that the Servian Government had cognizance of that plot, and had not done all that it ought to have done to prevent its effects. For if it could not be proved that the responsibility of the Serajevo Government was implicated in some degree the intervention of the Austro-Hungarian Government could not justify itself and would raise against it the opinion of Europe. Prince Lichnowsky's communication left Sir Edward Grey under the impression of anxiety which he did not hide. The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who also dreads the possibility of further tension in Austro-Servian relations.

This morning I received the visit of the Servian Minister, Sir Edward Grey, who expressed his apprehension. He fears that Austria will place the Servian Government in the presence of a demand which the dignity of the Government, and especially the susceptibility of public opinion, will render inacceptable without protest. He said that if the feeling which appears to prevail in Vienna, which is testified to by all the Ambassadors accredited in this capital, he replied that this official calm was only apparent and concealed most deeply rooted hostile feelings towards Austria, and he added that if these feelings were displayed in a demarche lacking in the desirable moderation, it would be necessary to take into account the public opinion of Servia, which had been inflamed by the had actions showered by Austria upon the country, and that he had been rendered patient by the still fresh memory of two victorious wars. In spite of the sacrifices which Servia had bought her recent victories she can still place 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which was aware of this, was not inclined to tolerate any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey today saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. He begged Count Mensdorff to urge his Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation which are necessary if fresh complications are to be avoided, only ask of Servia measures of moderation which she could reasonably agree, and not to allow itself to be dragged beyond that.

PAUL CAMBON.

No. 20.

M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome.

Paris, July 23, 1914.

The first intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government were, according to the information gathered by the French Ambassador in Vienna, to act with the greatest rigor against Servia and to hold eight army corps ready to take the field. Its present attitude would appear to be more conciliatory. In reply to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, when I instructed to call the attention of the Austrian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands formulated by it, permitted one to count upon a pacific denouement. I do not know what trust is to be placed in these assurances in view of the habits of the

Imperial Chancellery. In any case the Austrian note will be presented within a very brief space of time. The Servian Minister considers that in his desire for an arrangement M. Paschitch will accept the demands relating to the repression of crime, and the surveillance and police guarantees, but will resist anything which might impair the sovereignty or dignity of his country. In the Vienna Diplomatic Corps the German Ambassador recommends violent resolutions, while warning substantially that the Imperial Chancellery is not wholly in agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, relying on the assurances given him, confided to M. Dumaine before leaving Vienna that his Government would raise no objection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the revolutionary associations, but could not have tolerated exactions which would have been humiliating to the national feeling of Servia. BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 21.

M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

Munich, July 23, 1914.

The Bavarian press appears to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian crisis is not only possible but even probable. Official circles, on the contrary, for some time past have displayed with more or less sincerity positive pessimism.

The Prime Minister, notably, said to me today that the Austrian note of which he had received the text, was in his opinion, in no terms acceptable to Servia, but that the present situation appeared to him none the less to be very grave.

ALLIZE.

CHAPTER III.

The Austrian Note and the Servian Reply (July 24 and 25).

No. 22.

M. Rene Viviani, Prime Minister, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I SHALL be obliged if you will immediately transmit the following information and instructions to M. Dumaine:

Reval, July 24, 1914, I. A. M.

In the course of my interview with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs we have been led to consider the dangers which might result from any Austro-Hungarian demarche with regard to Servia in connection with the crime to which the Hereditary Archduke fell a victim yesterday in the city of Servia. It would be well to neglect nothing which might prevent a demand for explanations or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, and which the latter might justly consider as an infringement of her sovereignty and independence.

In consequence we have thought it well to give to Count Berchtold, in friendly conversation, counsels of moderation such as shall make him understand how badly inspired would be any demarche at Belgrade which one might discern a threat on the part of the Vienna Cabinet.

The British Ambassador, informed of this by M. Sazonof, expressed the view that his Government would doubtless associate itself in question, but he said that he would not be led to consider the dangers which might result from any Austro-Hungarian demarche with regard to Servia in connection with the crime to which the Hereditary Archduke fell a victim yesterday in the city of Servia. It would be well to neglect nothing which might prevent a demand for explanations or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, and which the latter might justly consider as an infringement of her sovereignty and independence.

M. Sazonof has sent instructions to this effect to Sir Schöbök. Although there is no question here of a collective or concerted demarche by the representatives of the Triple Entente at Vienna, I beg you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors, and to come to an understanding with them as to the best means by which each of you can without delay make Count Berchtold hear the counsels of moderation which appear to us to be demanded by the present situation.

I add that it would be well to ask M. Paul Cambon, Sir Edward Grey, the French Minister at London, to support the suggestion which the British Ambassador in Russia must have made to the Foreign Office to this effect. Count Benckendorff is charged to make a similar recommendation.

RENE VIVIANI.

No. 23.

M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene Viviani, Prime Minister, on Board the France.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

I immediately transmitted your instructions to Vienna, but information in the press of this morning shows that the Austrian note was presented in Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday.

This note, of which we have not yet received the official text from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very pronounced. It is said to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Servians directly involved in the attempt of Serajevo, but is also reported to demand the repression of all anti-Austrian propaganda in the Servian press and army. Servia, it appears, is given until 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to yield.

In transmitting your instructions to M. Dumaine, I begged him to come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 24.

Text of the Austrian Note.

Note Communicated by Count Szecsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Friday, July 24, 1914, at 10.30 A. M.

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on July 23, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade:

"On March 31, 1909, the Servian Minister at Vienna, on receipt of the instructions of the Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

"Servia recognizes that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the powers may take in conformity with the interests of the Triple Entente. In deference to the advice of the great powers Servia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She renounces, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter."

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of June 28 last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement, with the object of detaching from the territories of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy. The movement which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertak-

ings contained in the declaration of March 31, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has tolerated passively the instigation of these societies and groups count among their members Generals and diplomatists, Government officials and Judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian Journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighboring monarchy, or to the outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary, and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a considerable increase of the conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step to the suppression of this propaganda, which has its duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of March 31, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia, was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendly attitude toward it.

The Servian Government has not, however, shown a benevolent attitude toward the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow the analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development in the Servian Government which would lead it to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Government should publish the front page of its "Official Journal" of June 26 (July 13) the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the general tendency of which is to detach from the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it sincerely deprecates the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress.

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the "Official Bulletin" of the army.

The Imperial and Royal Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity.

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled *Narodna Odbrana*, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

3. To take judicial proceedings against acquiescence in the plot of June 28 on the Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto.

4. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Vojta Tankosic and of the individual named Milica Ciganovic, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo.

5. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier.

6. To take judicial proceedings against acquiescence in the plot of June 28 on the Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto.

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Vojta Tankosic and of the individual named Milica Ciganovic, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo.

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9. To take judicial proceedings against acquiescence in the plot of June 28 on the Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto.

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 5 o'clock on Saturday evening, July 25.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the investigation into the Serajevo crime, regarding to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

I have the honor to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, and to inform your Excellency with the following observations:

On March 31, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of installing revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and so preparing the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the basis of the Serb nationality. Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members Generals and diplomatists, Government officials and Judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian Journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighboring monarchy, or to the outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary, and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a considerable increase of the conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step to the suppression of this propaganda, which has its duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of March 31, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia, was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendly attitude toward it.

The Servian Government has not, however, shown a benevolent attitude toward the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow the analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development in the Servian Government which would lead it to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

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The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress.

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2. To dissolve immediately the society styled *Narodna Odbrana*, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

3. To take judicial proceedings against acquiescence in the plot of June 28 on the Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto.

4. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Vojta Tankosic and of the individual named Milica Ciganovic, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo.

5. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier.

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9. To take judicial proceedings against acquiescence in the plot of June 28 on the Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto.

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.

The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 5 o'clock on Saturday evening, July 25.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the investigation into the Serajevo crime, regarding to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note.

I have the honor to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of the Government to which you are accredited, and to inform your Excellency with the following observations:

On March 31, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of installing revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and so preparing the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the basis of the Serb nationality. Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members Generals and diplomatists, Government officials and Judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian Journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighboring monarchy, or to the outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary, and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a considerable increase of the conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step to the suppression of this propaganda, which has its duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of March 31, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia, was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendly attitude toward it.

The Servian Government has not, however, shown a benevolent attitude toward the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow the analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development in the Servian Government which would lead it to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Government should publish the front page of its "Official Journal" of June 26 (July 13) the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the general tendency of which is to detach from the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it sincerely deprecates the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of March 31, 1909.

The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress.

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the "Official Bulletin" of the army.

The Imperial and Royal Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity.

2. To dissolve immediately the society styled *Narodna Odbrana*, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

(Continued from preceding page.)

No. 35.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Belgian Minister is very much concerned. He considers that Austria and Germany have wished to profit from the circumstances by which Russia and Great Britain are threatened with domestic troubles, and the fact that in France our military system appears to be shaken. Also he does not believe in the ignorance which the Berlin Government affects as to the Austrian démarche.

He thinks that if the form of it was not submitted to the Cabinet in Berlin, its time was perfectly chosen with the Berlin Cabinet, with a view to surprising the Triple Entente in a moment of disorganization.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who had interrupted his leave to return. It would appear that Italy is much surprised, to say nothing stronger, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 36.

M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stockholm (Prime Minister), and to London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Rome, and Vienna.

Paris, July 25, 1914.

The German Ambassador came at noon to protest against an article which appeared in the Echo de Paris, under the heading "The Ultimatum of Vienna," and which had reference to the démarche of Baron von Schoen. Baron von Schoen has informed a number of journalists, and called at the Political Direction to say, that there was no "agreement" between Austria and Germany, and that the ultimatum was a German note, of which the German Government was ignorant, although the German Government had subsequently approved it, on receiving communication of it at the same time as the other powers. Baron von Schoen added that there was, moreover, no menace.

The German Government had confined itself to indicating that it considered the localization of the conflict desirable and that the intervention of other powers threatened to aggravate the dispute.

The Acting Political Director, in taking note of this step of Baron von Schoen, begged him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, and pointed out to him that those terms revealed the wish of Germany to thrust herself between the powers and to prevent the Triple Entente from taking any step which might lead to a no confidence had been made to any journalist, the news in the Echo de Paris only engaged that newspaper, and only showed that the German démarche appeared to have been known outside the Quai d'Orsay, and that, not by the Triple Entente, but by the German Ambassador did not take up.

The Austrian Ambassador in London has called upon Sir Edward Grey, and has informed him that the Austrian note does not constitute "an ultimatum," but a "demand for a reply with a time limit," which meant that if the Austrian demands were not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening the Austrian Minister would leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government would begin acts of military "preparation," but not military "operations." The London Cabinet, like those of Paris and St. Petersburg, has advised Belgrade to express its regret for any guilt which might be proved in the Serajevo attempt, and to promise the utmost satisfaction in this regard. As to the demand added, it is Serbia's concern to reply as may seem best in Serbian interests. The British Minister in Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if they have been also instructed in this sense, to advise the Serbian Government to give no satisfaction on every possible point. Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky, who up to the present has made no communication similar to that made by Baron von Schoen in Paris, that if the Austrian note was taken to trouble the Austrian and Russian, the British Government would not have to concern itself with it, but it was to be feared that the strict character of the Austrian note and the shortness of the time allowed would result in tension. In the circumstances the only chance of avoiding a struggle would be in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy, and England, Germany alone being able to act in this sense upon the Vienna Government. The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit his suggestion to Berlin, but he led the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would join in no proceedings in Vienna.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 37.

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d'Affaires in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 25, 1914.

The German Ambassador called at the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse to intervene between Austria and Serbia.

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the help of Germany in Vienna they could not act in St. Petersburg. If, however, Austria and Russia both mobilize it would be an opportunity for intervention by the four other powers. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude and refuse to associate itself with Great Britain, France, and Italy? Prince Lichnowsky did not think so, because it would then no longer be a question between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey added this remark, that if war did break out no power in Europe would be able to remain aloof.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 38.

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Government is going to endeavor to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum, so as to enable the powers to form an opinion on the judiciary documents, communication of which is offered to them.

M. Sazonof has begged the German Ambassador to point out the danger of the situation to his Government. He refrained, however, from alluding to the step which Russia will no doubt be led to take if Serbia is threatened in her national independence or territorial integrity. The advance report and recommendations of Count de Pourtales made an unfavorable impression upon M. Sazonof.

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 39.

M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna.

Paris, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Government has instructed its

representatives in Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time given to Serbia. This would enable the powers to form an opinion on the record of the case which Austria has offered to communicate to them so as to avoid consequences which would be undesirable for all.

An Austrian refusal of this demand would of all significance her step in communicating her note to the powers, and would place her in contradiction with international morality. The Russian Government has asked that you shall without delay make a similar request to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the demand of your colleague. The Russian Government has sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin, and Bukharest.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 40.

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d'Affaires in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 25, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey this morning received communication of the instructions given to the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit given to Serbia by the Austrian note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian step should be supported by the British Embassy.

Sir Edward Grey has telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen, instructing him to inform himself in the same sense as his Russian colleague, and to recall the Austrian communication made to him late yesterday evening by Count Mensdorff, according to which Serbian failure to adhere to the conditions of the ultimatum would lead only to result in diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations.

Sir Edward Grey concluded from this that the powers would be given time to intervene and seek for means of solving the crisis.

DE FLEURIAU.

No. 41.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

This morning the British Charge d'Affaires, in accordance with the orders of his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany would join Great Britain, France, and Italy, in order to intervene in Austria and Russia with a view to preventing the outbreak of the first of all in asking Vienna for an extension of the time limit granted to Serbia by the ultimatum. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that on receipt of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky informing him that Sir Edward Grey had received and telegraphed that very morning to his Ambassador in Vienna instructing him to ask for this extension of the time limit from Count Berchtold. Unfortunately, Count Berchtold is not believe that this demand will be accepted.

The British Charge d'Affaires also inquired of Herr von Jagow, as I did yesterday, whether Germany had not had some knowledge of the Austrian note before it was sent, and received a reply so definitely negative that he could not press the matter; but he could not but express his surprise at the blank check given by Germany to Austria.

Herr von Jagow having replied that the matter was a domestic question to Austria, he pointed out that it had become, in the highest degree, international.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 42.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d'Affaires has been told to ask the German Government to press their view to prevent the outbreak of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow only having given him an appointment at the end of the afternoon, that is to say, at the moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent, with all speed, a telegram to the Secretary of State, in which he pointed out that the delay of the communication made by Austria to the powers rendered the effect of the communication illusory, since it did not give the powers the opportunity to intervene with the facts alleged before the expiry of the ultimatum. He insisted very urgently on the necessity of extending it, if one had not in view the creation of a great crisis.

JULES CAMBON.

No. 43.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d'Affaires has called upon the Secretary of State, and has made the démarche he was instructed to make with a view to an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow replied to him that he had no objection to the indication of this sort to Vienna, but that he thought that all these steps were too late.

M. Broniewski insisted, saying that if the time limit could not be prolonged the work of mediation would be rendered impossible, so as to allow the powers to use their offices for the avoidance of a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to hurt Serbia and to force her to war.

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of war, but of "execution" in a local matter.

The Charge d'Affaires persisted, and expressed regret that the German Government did not measure its responsibilities in the event of hostilities occurring, which might spread to the rest of Europe. To this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such consequences.

The Russian Charge d'Affaires has heard, as has a rumor that Austria, while declaring that she desires no territorial annexation, will occupy portions of Serbia until she has received full satisfaction. "We know," he said to me, "what the word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impression was that the German Ambassador to point out the danger of the situation to his Government. He refrained, however, from alluding to the step which Russia will no doubt be led to take if Serbia is threatened in her national independence or territorial integrity. The advance report and recommendations of Count de Pourtales made an unfavorable impression upon M. Sazonof.

A council of Ministers will be held tomorrow under the Presidency of the Emperor. M. Sazonof retains all his moderation. "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which may precipitate the crisis. I think that even if the Austro-Hungarian Government proceeds to action against Serbia, we ought not to break off negotiations."

PALÉOLOGUE.

No. 44.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has made the démarche at the Consulta in accordance with the instructions issued by M. Sazonof to the Russian representatives in Paris, Rome, Berlin, and Bukharest, which were to induce the different cabinets to associate their action with that of Russia in Vienna with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit given to Serbia.

In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. de Martino replied to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could only reach them toward 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step in Vienna.

BARRERE.

No. 45.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d'Affaires received inrostructions from his Government to ask for a postponement of the ultimatum to Serbia just at the time that the Russian Government was for Ischl with the intention of remaining near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff has, nevertheless, informed him of the step he had to take by means of two telegrams in plain language, one addressed to Count Berchtold, or rather, and the other to his destination. He does not expect any effect from them.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to whom the Prince communicated his telegraphic instructions and the sense of his telegraphic démarche, displayed an icy coldness when his interlocutor represented to him that to submit a plaint with justificative documents without giving time for the study of the dossier was contrary to international morality. The Russian Government has sometimes exempted one from being courteous.

The Austrian Government is resolved to inflict humiliation upon Serbia; it will not accept intervention of any power until the blow has been struck and been received full in the face by Serbia.

DUMAINE.

No. 46.

M. Boppe, French Minister in Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with the reply which will be handed to the Austrian Minister this evening.

The Serbian Government agrees to publish in the Official Journal tomorrow the declaration which it has made. It will also communicate that declaration to the army in an order of the day. It will dissolve the societies of national defense and all other associations likely to carry on agitation against Austria-Hungary. It undertakes to make concessions in the press law, to disband the service of the army, of public instruction, and of other departments, all officials whose participation in the propaganda is proved.

It only asks that the names of these officials shall be communicated to it.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the inquiry, it asks for explanations as to the manner in which that participation shall take place. It could only accept cooperation so far as is compatible with international law and good neighborly relations.

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during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifices that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Russian Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as the general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave place of the measures proposed to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighboring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statement according to which members of the Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and to be ready to do so. It would protect the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the Journal Officiel, on the day of the 13th (25th) of July, the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy any part of its territory, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Serbian officials have been guilty of the crime of having participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good-neighborly relations to which the Royal Serbian Government were solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, (New Style), which declared the press law, to disband the service of the army, of public instruction, and of other departments, all officials whose participation in the propaganda is proved. It only asks that the names of these officials shall be communicated to it.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the inquiry, it asks for explanations as to the manner in which that participation shall take place. It could only accept cooperation so far as is compatible with international law and good neighborly relations.

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give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures proposed to order the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague or to that of the powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, (New Style).

CHAPTER IV.

The Rupture of the Diplomatic Relations (July 25, 1914) and the Declaration of War by Austria to Serbia (July 28, 1914).

No. 50.

M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Copenhagen (for the Prime Minister), and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, and Vienna.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

THE events of Saturday may be summarized as follows: Refusal of Austria to agree to the extension of the time limit demanded by Russia; departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade, after the handing in of the Serbian reply, which was considered insufficient, although it went to the limit of the concessions deemed possible; mobilization order given in Serbia, the handling of which has withdrawn from Kragujevatz, whither it has been followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

Italy, to whom the Austrian note was communicated on Friday without any request for support, or even opinion, has not been able, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who will not return until Tuesday, to give an opinion on the demand. But he should insist in Vienna upon an extension of the time limit. A confidence made by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paleologue shows that at Vienna they still comfort themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not stand firm," and must be forgotten that Russia is only bound by the engagements of the Triple Alliance in matters in which she has been previously consulted.

We learn from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof has advised Serbia to ask for British mediation. At the Council of Ministers held on the 25th in the presence of the Emperor, the mobilization of thirteen army corps was considered, destined, if needs be, to operate against Austria. This mobilization would, however, only become effective if Austria constrained Serbia by force of arms, and only after notification by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom is left the duty of determining its date. Freedom is also given him to continue the negotiations even in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, but the Russian position shows that it would be impossible, politically and morally, for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.

In London a German démarche was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen in Paris. Sir Edward Grey replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if war broke out no power in Europe could remain unconcerned. He did not go into further detail, and his language to the Serbian Minister was very reserved.

The communication made on the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador has made Sir Edward Grey more optimistic. Since the diplomatic rupture is not to bring about immediate military operations, the Secretary of State will like to hope that the powers will have time to intervene.

In Berlin the tone of the Secretary of State to the Russian Charge d'Affaires is very unsatisfactory and dilatory. To a request that he should join in asking Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had only acted in this sense, but that it was too late. To the request that he should obtain a delay in order to prolong the measures of execution, he replied that it was a domestic matter—not a war, but a local execution of the law.

Herr von Jagow persisted in his belief that Austrian action may lead to general consequences.

There is a positive explosion of Jingolam in Berlin. The German Emperor is returning to Kiel, and the Kaiser's departure has been announced. The German Government considers that Germany will reply immediately to the first military steps of Russia, and will probably not await a pretext to attack us. In Vienna the French Ambassador did not have time to associate himself in the step of his Russian colleague, who has not yet received an extension of the delay given to Serbia.

He does not regret this, the demand having been categorically refused, and England also not having had time to give instructions to her agent on the matter.

Herr von Jagow has been handed me by the British Embassy. It gives an account of the conference of the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg with M. Sazonof and M. Paleologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four powers will not intervene against Serbia, but that they will urge upon Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that time should be given to Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to mediate. If Germany agrees, the British Government has reason to believe that Italy also would be happy to associate herself in the joint action of Great Britain and France. The adhesion of Germany is essential, for neither Austria, no more than Russia, would tolerate any intervention but that of impartial friends or of allies.

BIENVENU MARTIN.

No. 51.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 26, 1914.

A Vienna telegram just received at the Consulta reports the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Serbia, and states that Austria is taking the initiative. The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fleggi, will only reach Rome the day after tomorrow.

I had an interesting conversation today with the Prime Minister on the situation, the full gravity of which he realizes.

From the sum of his remarks I gather the impression that the Italian Government desires, in case of conflict, to hold itself aloof and to remain in an observant attitude.

We shall make the greatest effort to prevent a breach of peace. Our position is somewhat similar to that of England, perhaps we might do something in a pacific direction with the English."

M. Salandra confirmed to me that the Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment.

BARRERE.

No. 52.

M. Barrere, French Ambassador in Rome, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 26, 1914.

M. Sazonof told the Italian Ambassador in St. Petersburg yesterday that Russia would not give up diplomatic means of solution, a struggle, and that she had not given up hope that mediation might bring Austria to adopt a less obstinate attitude; nevertheless he could not be asked to allow Serbia to be crushed.

I note that the bulk of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this grave matter.

BARRERE.

No. 53.

M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, Charge d

(Continued from preceding page.)

Dojic, who had returned to Agram from America, made an attempt upon the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlez, an attempt which was the fruit of the propaganda organized by the Serbs in Southern Slav circles in America, and the work of the foreign agitation of this kind, exemplified in the Serbian, T. Dimitrijevitich, printed at Chicago, containing unmeasured attacks upon his Imperial and Royal Majesty, and appeals to the Serbs in the monarchy, referring to their impending "deliverance" and urging them to return to the Serb fold, shows the parallel lines on which the propaganda, freely conducted by the Serbs in America, and the agitation which is conducted from Serbia in the dominions of the monarchy, are based.

And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a fresh attempt, which on this occasion failed.

On May 29, 1913, Jacob Schäfer made an attempt in the Agram theatre on the Baron von Skerlez, an attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a policeman. The inquiry, however, disclosed a plot in the evening of the previous day, in which was Rudolf Heregonja. The declarations of this person and of the five others accused together with him showed that this attempt also had its origin in Serbia.

Heregonja had taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to secure the release of Jukic, and had fled to Serbia (October, 1912), where he associated with his accomplice, Marojan Jakic, certain komitadjis, and members of the Narodna. As frequently is the case with young minds who have occupied themselves too early with political questions, this intercourse was attended by the worst results. Heregonja returned home, full of the doctrine preached in Belgrade, that the Southern Slav region of the monarchy ought to be separated from Austria and reunited with the Serbian Kingdom. He had, moreover, become persuaded, as the result of teaching received from his friends, that this end ought to be pursued by means of attempts upon personages in high places who took a solely in directing the policy of the monarchy.

It was in this state of mind that Heregonja exerted his influence on his friends at Agram and converted their views. Foremost among his projects was the perpetration of an attempt upon the life of the heir to the throne.

A few months earlier proceedings on a charge of high treason had been instituted against Saka Alginovic. In the course of these proceedings the witnesses declared that Alginovic had said in their presence that he had received 100 dinars from the Narodna in equal to the money which he had received of students, in order to set on foot a propaganda, but chiefly in order to carry out an attempt on the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

From these facts it may be seen to what extent the criminal agitation of the Narodna, and of those who follow its course, had lately concentrated itself upon the person of the Heir Presumptive.

From these established facts the conclusion is reached that the Narodna and the circles around it hostile to the monarchy had begun to consider that the innocent had arrived to translate their doctrine into practice.

It is not necessary that the Narodna content itself with giving the incitement to action, and that where this incitement had fallen upon fertile soil, with furnishing material assistance, but that it transfers the whole danger of this active propaganda of deeds solely to the shoulders of the youth of the monarchy, stirred up and corrupted by this society, which ought to bear alone the burden of this deplorable "heroism."

All the characteristics of this method of procedure are further exemplified in the history and origin of the deeply regrettable crime committed on June 28, 1914.

Princip and Gratzek are examples of this youth which has been poisoned from its schooldays by the ideas of the Narodna. In Belgrade, where he frequented associations of students imbued with these ideas, Princip occupied himself with projects for an attempt upon the life of the Heir Presumptive, against whom the lively hatred of the elements hostile to the monarchy was particularly directed, upon the occasion of the Archduke's journey in the annexed provinces.

Princip struck up a friendship with Kabinovich, who frequented the same circles, and whose thoroughly revolutionary ideas, which he himself confessed, had led him to entertain the same hostile sentiments toward the monarchy and favor a more energetic action. But however carefully this plot might have been prepared, and however decided the conspirators themselves might have been, the attempt would never have taken place. In the case of Jukic persons had not been found to supply the conspirators with the means of executing their design. Princip and Kabinovich explicitly admitted that they lacked both the necessary weapons and the money with which to buy them. It is interesting to observe that the conspirators procured their weapons. Milan Pribievic and Zvonko Dacic, two of the leading men in the Narodna, were the first to whom the conspirators applied for arms. They were the manifest expectation that in them they would find ready coadjutors, doubtless because it had already been a matter of common talk among those who were prepared to commit crimes of this kind that it was possible to obtain from the representatives of the Narodna the instruments of murder.

A mental circumstance, that at the critical moment these two men did not happen to be in Belgrade, doubtless played a part in this project, but Princip and Kabinovich were not at a loss to find assistance in another quarter, namely, from Milan Ciganovic, a former komitadj, who was at that time in the city. Princip and a member of the Narodna. This man and his friend, Major Voja Tankoski, who has already been mentioned, and who was also of the Narodna, and who, in 1908, had been head of the school for armed bands at Kupria, had recently disclosed the existence of the conspiracy. There was only one point with regard to which they felt at the outset a slight doubt, and that was whether the conspirators were really desirous to commit this act, but this doubt soon disappeared, thanks to their inspiration. From that moment they were ready to furnish every assistance. Tankoski procured four Browning pistols, ammunition and money for the journey. Six hand grenades which came from the stocks of the Serbian Army completed the armament, a circumstance which recalls the case of Jukic. Concerned for the success of the enterprise, Tankoski provided for the training of the conspirators in shooting; but he and Ciganovic further took special precautions to secure the secrecy of the plot. They agreed that the conspirators should not be permitted to discuss the project, and that the two conspirators committed suicide after perpetrating their crime, a measure of precaution which was designed primarily to prevent them, should the secret become known, would do away with even the slight risk which they had incurred in the enterprise. Certain death, then, the conspirators gave every influence and complete security for itself, that is, as the world knows, the motto of the Narodna.

In order to render possible the execution of this project it was necessary that the weapons and bombs should enter Bosnia under a false description and without being detected. The plan was to disguise them as every possible assistance; he prescribed a fixed route for the conspirators and assured them of the protection of the Serbian frontier authorities. The manner in which this journey, which was described by Princip as "mysterious," was organized and carried out leaves no doubt in the mind that it was secret and well prepared, and that it had already often been traversed by those, whose business it was to promote the secret designs of the Narodna, in principle, and in fact, assurance which could only have come from practice, the frontier Captains at Sabak and Lomnica lent their administrative or-

ganization for the furtherance of the enterprise; the secret journey was effected without a hitch under the auspices of a complicated system of guides, who constantly changed, and, finally, was allowed by a miracle, invariably presented themselves at the place where they were needed. Without inquiring into the means by which the journey by a handful of suspiciously young students, the Serbian authorities, upon receiving a hint from the former komitadj, accomplished this feat, it is sufficient to say that the machinery which worked so easily. As a matter of fact, there was no need for them to ask any questions, since, in view of the indications which they had received, it was clear to them that they had once more to discharge a mission on behalf of the Narodna. The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers provoked from the overseer Grbic merely a benevolent smile of approval which fully proved how anxious people along this route were to come across contraband of this kind.

The Royal Serbian Government assumed a heavy load of responsibility in allowing all this to pass.

Although the Serbian Government was bound to cultivate good neighborly relations with Austria-Hungary, which allowed by the press to show hatred against the monarchy, it has tolerated a public campaign against the monarchy by societies established on the basis of the Narodna, and by the aid of high rank, officials, schoolmasters, and Judges—a campaign which imbued its own circles with revolutionary ideas—and did not prevent men who placed themselves in the direction of Serbian military and civil administration from poisoning the public mind against Serbia, and from occupying the pitch that in this conflict vulgar assassinations by unscrupulous conspirators was made to appear the most legitimate weapon.

No. 75 A.
Semi-Official Communiqué from the Press Bureau.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.
The Austrian Minister in Belgrade presented the text of the Serbian reply on his return from Vienna.

This reply is filled with a spirit lacking in the Serbian Government. The Serbian Government does not seriously intend to put an end to the culpable tolerance thanks to which the anti-Austrian agitation has been possible. The Serbian reply contains no restrictions and limitations, not only as to the principle itself of the Austrian démarche, but also with regard to the claims of Austria, that the concessions made are without importance, especially the refusal, on a vain pretext, to accept the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of outrages domiciled in Serbia.

In the same way the Serbian reply to the Austrian demand, that she should put a stop to the hostile agitation of the press, is tantamount to a refusal. The demand with regard to the steps to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria being able after their dissolution to continue their activities under another name and form, has not even been considered. These claims constitute the minimum which the Serbian Government, in its present position in the southeast of the monarchy, and therefore the Serbian reply is regarded as being insufficient.

The Serbian Government, moreover, appears to be aware of this, since it discusses the settlement of the conflict by means of arbitration, and since on the day upon which the Serbian reply was received, she had before that presentation, she had given orders for mobilization.

No. 76.
M. Rene Viviani, Prime Minister, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On board the France, July 28, 1914.
I have received from Copenhagen your telegram summarizing the events of Saturday, the telegram recounting the last visit of the German Ambassador to the Imperial German Government, which opened the crisis, and in regard to the mediation Russia has advised Serbia to ask for and to the British démarche in Berlin. I have also received this morning your dispatch direct to the Eiffel Tower. I fully approve the reply you made to Baron von Schoen: the thesis you supported is as clear as daylight, and the position of the struggle we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and who has not yet allowed herself to be drawn into the least suspicion. But it is clear that, as a counterpart, Germany cannot refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, who have opened the crisis.

It would, therefore, be well to continue to use this language to the German Ambassador, who is now in his last act, and to the English proposal, mentioned in your telegram. I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir Edward Grey and I am anxious that the British Government should be made known in Berlin and in Vienna that our full co-operation with the British Government, with a view to finding a solution of the Austro-Serbian conflict. The action of the four less interested powers, which has been taken in the case of Jukic, persons had not been found to supply the conspirators with the means of executing their design. Princip and Kabinovich explicitly admitted that they lacked both the necessary weapons and the money with which to buy them. It is interesting to observe that the conspirators procured their weapons. Milan Pribievic and Zvonko Dacic, two of the leading men in the Narodna, were the first to whom the conspirators applied for arms. They were the manifest expectation that in them they would find ready coadjutors, doubtless because it had already been a matter of common talk among those who were prepared to commit crimes of this kind that it was possible to obtain from the representatives of the Narodna the instruments of murder.

A mental circumstance, that at the critical moment these two men did not happen to be in Belgrade, doubtless played a part in this project, but Princip and Kabinovich were not at a loss to find assistance in another quarter, namely, from Milan Ciganovic, a former komitadj, who was at that time in the city. Princip and a member of the Narodna. This man and his friend, Major Voja Tankoski, who has already been mentioned, and who was also of the Narodna, and who, in 1908, had been head of the school for armed bands at Kupria, had recently disclosed the existence of the conspiracy. There was only one point with regard to which they felt at the outset a slight doubt, and that was whether the conspirators were really desirous to commit this act, but this doubt soon disappeared, thanks to their inspiration. From that moment they were ready to furnish every assistance. Tankoski procured four Browning pistols, ammunition and money for the journey. Six hand grenades which came from the stocks of the Serbian Army completed the armament, a circumstance which recalls the case of Jukic. Concerned for the success of the enterprise, Tankoski provided for the training of the conspirators in shooting; but he and Ciganovic further took special precautions to secure the secrecy of the plot. They agreed that the conspirators should not be permitted to discuss the project, and that the two conspirators committed suicide after perpetrating their crime, a measure of precaution which was designed primarily to prevent them, should the secret become known, would do away with even the slight risk which they had incurred in the enterprise. Certain death, then, the conspirators gave every influence and complete security for itself, that is, as the world knows, the motto of the Narodna.

No. 77.
M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene Viviani, Prime Minister, on Board the France.

Paris, July 28, 1914.
In spite of the assurances given to the German agents, both in Berlin and Paris, as to the desire of their Government to assist in the maintenance of peace, no serious effort has been made to prevent the outbreak of the English proposal, which consists of action by the four less interested powers, with a view to obtaining a stoppage of military operations in the Balkans, and in a meeting in London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors, under the Presidency of Sir Edward Grey, with a view to finding a solution of Austro-Serbian difficulties, is meeting with objections in Berlin, which are likely to wreck the project. The Ambassador has informed us that his Government will tomorrow take energetic measures to force Serbia to give her the satisfaction of the guarantee of the independence of that State. Count Szecsen did not explain himself as to these matters. According to our Military Attaché in Vienna, mobilization from July 28 seems certain.

No. 78.
M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome.

Paris, July 28, 1914.
I received a visit from the German Ambassador yesterday. He told me that he had no communication, no official proposal to make to me, but that, as yesterday, he came to discuss the situation and the means of preventing the outbreak of hostilities. He was questioned as to the intentions of Austria, he declared that he was not acquainted with them and that he was not aware of the nature of the concrete measures which were being prepared. Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only wants to act with France out of the maintenance of peace. It was pointed out to him that a project of four-power mediation had been put forward by England, to which France had adhered, and which had been accepted by the German Government. The Ambassador said that the German Government doubtless desired nothing better than to associate itself with

the action of the powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or of a conference, which had been rejected by Austria-Hungary. He said that it was only the name which stood in the way of the Austrian Government, the end might be reached by other means, that the German Government would not consent to ask from Austria that she should give the powers time to intervene and find a means of reconciliation. Baron von Schoen thereupon remarked that he had no objection to this, and only knew that Germany refused to exert pressure upon Austria, who did not want a premature peace. He repeated the French newspapers with attributing to Germany an attitude which was not hers, by making out that she was pushing Austria. No doubt she pushed Austria, but she pushed it because she was not aware of Austria's note, she could not pull up Austria too brusquely, for Austria had need of guarantees against Serbian proceedings.

No. 83.
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.
Count Berthold has just told Sir M. de Bunsen that all intervention for the resumption of discussion between Austria and Serbia on the basis of the Serbian reply is useless and, moreover, too late, war having been officially declared at noon.

My Russian colleague's attitude has not varied up to the present in his view. It was not a question of localizing the conflict, but of preventing it. The declaration of war will render very difficult the engagement of *pourparlers* between the four powers, as well as the continuance of direct discussions with M. Sazonov and Count Szapary. It is the object of the latter, in a formula which appeared to be able to bring about the admission of Germany, "mediation between Austria and Russia," has the merit of stating the existence of a conflict between these two empires, which up to the present does not exist. The most disturbing of the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolve of Austria is that Germany may have agreed her aggression against Serbia, so as to be able herself to enter the lists against France and Russia, and that, in this case, she supposes, must be the most favorable for her and in conditions which have been deliberated.

No. 80.
M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 28, 1914.
Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austrian and German colleagues. The former continued to maintain that the Serbian reply was unacceptable. The latter held language which was entirely in keeping with the one in Paris. He insisted upon the usefulness of English moderating action in St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey replied that Russia had shown herself very moderate since the opening of the crisis, and notably in her advice to the Serbian Government, and that he offered the most embarrassed in making public recommendations to the Russian Government. He added that it was in Vienna that action ought to be taken, and that the help of Germany was indispensable in this other hand, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg has telegraphed that M. Sazonov has suggested to the Austrian Ambassador a conversation with regard to the Serbian affair. This news has been confirmed by the British Ambassador in Vienna, who reports that a first interview between the Russian Minister in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador has produced a good effect at the Ballplatz. Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson have both been informed of this. Questioned by Sir G. Buchanan as to the possible summoning in London of a conference of the representatives of England, Germany, France, and Italy, Sir Edward Grey, seeking an issue from the present situation, M. Sazonov replied that he had begun *pourparlers* with the Austrian Ambassador, in that he hoped the matter would be favorable conditions, but that he had nevertheless not received an answer to his proposals for the revision of the Serbian ultimatum. He said that direct explanations with the Vienna Embassy are impossible. M. Sazonov declared himself ready to accept the British proposal, or any other which might be proposed, about a favorable settlement of the matter.

In any case, it would be very desirable that this direct negotiation, at a time when the situation is still so fluid, should be continued. In the case of Jukic, persons had not been found to supply the conspirators with the means of executing their design. Princip and Kabinovich explicitly admitted that they lacked both the necessary weapons and the money with which to buy them. It is interesting to observe that the conspirators procured their weapons. Milan Pribievic and Zvonko Dacic, two of the leading men in the Narodna, were the first to whom the conspirators applied for arms. They were the manifest expectation that in them they would find ready coadjutors, doubtless because it had already been a matter of common talk among those who were prepared to commit crimes of this kind that it was possible to obtain from the representatives of the Narodna the instruments of murder.

A mental circumstance, that at the critical moment these two men did not happen to be in Belgrade, doubtless played a part in this project, but Princip and Kabinovich were not at a loss to find assistance in another quarter, namely, from Milan Ciganovic, a former komitadj, who was at that time in the city. Princip and a member of the Narodna. This man and his friend, Major Voja Tankoski, who has already been mentioned, and who was also of the Narodna, and who, in 1908, had been head of the school for armed bands at Kupria, had recently disclosed the existence of the conspiracy. There was only one point with regard to which they felt at the outset a slight doubt, and that was whether the conspirators were really desirous to commit this act, but this doubt soon disappeared, thanks to their inspiration. From that moment they were ready to furnish every assistance. Tankoski procured four Browning pistols, ammunition and money for the journey. Six hand grenades which came from the stocks of the Serbian Army completed the armament, a circumstance which recalls the case of Jukic. Concerned for the success of the enterprise, Tankoski provided for the training of the conspirators in shooting; but he and Ciganovic further took special precautions to secure the secrecy of the plot. They agreed that the conspirators should not be permitted to discuss the project, and that the two conspirators committed suicide after perpetrating their crime, a measure of precaution which was designed primarily to prevent them, should the secret become known, would do away with even the slight risk which they had incurred in the enterprise. Certain death, then, the conspirators gave every influence and complete security for itself, that is, as the world knows, the motto of the Narodna.

No. 81.
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.
Herr von Jagow has been informed by the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, that the Russian Government has had with Count Szapary. The Secretary of State told him, in conformity with the remarks of the German Ambassador, that the Russian Government would not refuse to converse with the Austrian ultimatum the Vienna Government did not refuse to converse with the St. Petersburg Government. I beg you to communicate this telegram to our representatives with the Great Powers and to our Minister in London.

No. 82.
M. Paleologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.
I am from this moment able to assure your Excellency that the Russian Government acquiesces in any step which may be proposed in Vienna for the purpose of securing the safeguard of peace. My British colleague is telegraphing to the same effect to London.

No. 83.
M. Klobukowski, French Minister in Brussels, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 29, 1914.
I have gained the following impression from conversation with Mr. de Visschers, various personages who are in a position to be accurately informed. The attitude of Germany is entirely in keeping with the apprehension. It appears improbable that the Austrian Government should have taken an initiative leading it, in accordance with a preconcerted plan, to a declaration of war, without previous agreement with the Emperor William. The German Government has prepared, reserving according to circumstances her action for war or for peace, but the anxiety is that in all quarters a brusque intervention against us would surround us on one side by the Russian and British colleagues share this opinion.

The Belgian Government is taking steps in conformity with the declaration made to me yesterday evening by Mr. d'Argenson that all would be got ready for the defense of the country's neutrality.

No. 84.
M. Paleologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburg, July 28, 1914.
The Austro-German attitude is becoming defined. Austria, disturbed by the Slav propaganda, has seized upon the opportunity of the German ultimatum to the official end of this consultation, and will assist all English attempts in favor of peace.

No. 85.
M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.
I yesterday asked the Secretary of State what was happening to the direct conversation between the German and Austrian Governments which yesterday appeared to him to be the best means of reaching a détente. He replied that the feeling on this point was good in St. Petersburg, and that he had no intention of entering upon this path. He awaited the reply. The British Government, after having had rejected its suggestion of a conference, had let it pass, and had not known how to favor the opening of these conversations between Austria and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria to this. This Imperial Government is failing to do so. I asked Herr von Jagow if at last he had the reply of Serbia to Austria, and what he thought of it. He replied that he believed it was exactly because of that that I considered Austria's rupture, after the refusal of such a document, to be a serious threat. The Secretary of State thereupon remarked that with Austro-Hungarian peoples one could never have enough, and that Austria wished to have, over the execution of the promises made to her, a control which Serbia refused to give. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, was a very serious point which remained to be settled between Austria and Serbia, and, finally, by a declaration of war as precipitate and radical as the original rupture. The Secretary of State of Berlin, as well as of Vienna, is still dilatory. The former capital, while maintaining the German desire to safeguard general peace by the complete and genuine agreement, rejects the idea of a conference, without making any suggestion as to other means of settling the dispute. The latter, however, in Vienna, in the Austrian capital, they wish to keep St. Petersburg amused by the illusion that an understanding might result from direct conversations, and, meanwhile, they are taking action against Serbia.

In these conditions it appears to be essential to reach a decision, which desires for a peaceful settlement of the crisis is manifestly impossible. It is in this frame of mind, which corresponds with Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburg, that the British Government is endeavoring to disengage Germany. It must be asked, however, if Austria is not seeking time in order to make her preparations. I have already been informed by the British colleague with the Secretary of State, the latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Grey, that he could not possibly accept the British proposal, which was in the nature of a declaration of war, in spite of all assurances of territorial disinterestedness, would in fact modify the state of affairs in Eastern Europe, and would seriously affect the position of the British Empire, if not at present, at any rate in the near future.

No. 86.
M. Roussin, French Consul General at Frankfurt, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Frankfurt, July 29, 1914.
I draw your attention to important movements of troops yesterday and tonight. This movement, which is being carried out by rail, chiefly along the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mainz, which are filled with troops, On the pretext of preparing for the autumn manoeuvres, bridges and railways are guarded.

No. 87.
M. Alize, French Minister in Munich, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Munich, July 29, 1914.
I am informed that the mills of Ulrich (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary customers and to reserve all their output for the army. From Straßburg, the transport of motor lorries, used in connection with firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles, is reported. On the other hand, it is rumored that the Austro-Hungarian Government intends to decide upon a general mobilization of its armies on July 30. Austria, with a view to meeting any threat, and perhaps with a view to meeting the Emperor's wishes, will return to Vienna from Teschl tomorrow.

No. 88.
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador in Vienna, to M. Bienvenu Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.
The French Consul at Vienna has reported the mobilization of the Eighth Army Corps and that of the Landwehr division of that army corps. The Galician cavalry division, the 1st and 2nd, and the 3rd, and the 4th, and the 5th, and the 6th, and the 7th, and the 8th, and the 9th, and the 10th, and the 11th, and the 12th, and the 13th, and the 14th, and the 15th, and the 16th, and the 17th, and the 18th, and the 19th, and the 20th, and the 21st, and the 22nd, and the 23rd, and the 24th, and the 25th, and the 26th, and the 27th, and the 28th, and the 29th, and the 30th, and the 31st, and the 32nd, and the 33rd, and the 34th, and the 35th, and the 36th, and the 37th, and the 38th, and the 39th, and the 40th, and the 41st, and the 42nd, and the 43rd, and the 44th, and the 45th, and the 46th, and the 47th, and the 48th, and the 49th, and the 50th, and the 51st, and the 52nd, and the 53rd, and the 54th, and the 55th, and the 56th, and the 57th, and the 58th, and the 59th, and the 60th, and the 61st, and the 62nd, and the 63rd, and the 64th, and the 65th, and the 66th, and the 67th, and the 68th, and the 69th, and the 70th, and the 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(Continued from preceding page.)

In these circumstances, I have proposed to His Majesty the King and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who concurred with my views, to give you at once precise indications with regard to the steps which you would have to take if the menace of war between France and Germany became more imminent. You will find inclosed herewith a letter, signed but not dated, which you will read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom you will also leave a copy of this document. If circumstances should require a communication of this kind to be made,

I shall let you know by telegram, the moment at which you are to act. The telegram will be addressed to you at the moment when the mobilization of the Belgian Army has been decided, and if, contrary to my sincere hope and to present prospects of a peaceful solution, our information should induce us to take this extreme measure, I enclose it.

Inclosure in No. 2.
Sir:—The international situation is serious; the eventuality of a conflict among several powers cannot be excluded from the anxieties which beset His Majesty's Government. Belgium has observed, with the most scrupulous exactitude, the obligations of a neutral State, and has conducted with my treaty of April 19, 1839. These obligations she will remain at unalterable pains to fulfill, whatever circumstances may arise.

The friendly disposition of the powers toward her has been asserted so often that Belgium is confident that she will be able to break out upon her frontiers.

All the measures which are necessary in order to preserve the observance of neutrality have none the less been taken by the Belgian Government. The Belgian Army has been mobilized and is proceeding to take up its strategic position. It has been placed in order to insure the defense of the country and respect for its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and of the Meuse have been placed in a state of defense.

It is scarcely necessary to insist upon the significance of these measures. Their sole object is to leave a free hand to Belgium to fulfill her international obligations; it goes without saying they have not been, and could not have been, inspired, either by an intention to take part in the armed conflict of the powers, or by any sentiment of mistrust toward any one of them.

In accordance with the instructions which I have received, I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by His Majesty's Government, and to beg your Excellency to be good enough to take cognizance of it.

An identical communication has been made to the other powers which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium.

No. 8.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxembourg.
Brussels, July 29, 1914.
Sir: His Majesty's Government has decided to place the army on the reinforced peace footing.

This measure is in no wise to be confounded with mobilization.

In consequence of the restricted area of her territory, the whole of Belgium constituted in a sense, a frontier region. Her army, on the ordinary peace footing, consists only of one class of militia and of divisions of her army and her cavalry divisions, thanks to the calling up of three classes, show an effective strength of 100,000 men. A member of the Social Democratic Party, Gen. von Heeringen, Minister for War, said:

Belgium bears no part of the responsibility for the proposals for German military operations; the organization of the proposals is to be found in the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties.

A member of the Radical Party having once more spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow again pointed out that his declaration concerning Belgium was sufficiently clear.

Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, and London.

Brussels, July 31, 1914.
Sir: The French Minister came to show me a telegram, from the Havas Agency, announcing that a state of war had been declared. Germany and Austria had declared a state of war against France. The occasion of declaring that no incursion into Belgium will be made by French troops, even if considerable forces were massed on the frontier, was to make it clear that France did not wish to incur the responsibility of committing the first act of hostility against Belgium. Instructions in this regard will be issued to the French authorities.

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I considered it my duty to draw his attention to the fact that we had always reposed the greatest confidence in the fidelity with which our two neighboring States would devote themselves to fulfilling their engagements toward us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be identical with the opinion of the Government of the French Republic.

No. 11.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Paris.
Brussels, July 31, 1914.

The British Minister asked to see me on a matter of urgent importance, and delivered the following communication, which already for some days past he had been hoping to be able to make to me in view of the possibility of European war, Sir Edward Grey asked the French and German Governments, separately, if each of them would be ready to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided that no other power violated it.

"In view of existing treaties, I am instructed to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do everything in her power to maintain her neutrality, and that he desires and expects that the other powers will observe and maintain it."

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government had received with interest. I added that Great Britain and the other nations which have guaranteed our independence might be assured that we were doing nothing undone in order to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and of confidence which we had always entertained with them, would observe and maintain this neutrality. I did not fail to declare that our military forces, which had been considerably developed, as a result of the recent reorganization of our defenses, were capable of allowing us to defend ourselves energetically in the event of a violation of our territory.

In the course of the conversation which followed Sir Francis appeared to me to be a little surprised at the cordiality with which we had decided upon the mobilization of our army. I pointed out that the Netherlands had decided to send a similar message, and had done anything, and that, moreover, the recent date at which our new military régime had come into effect, and the provisional measures which we had decided upon at that occasion, compelled us to take urgent and complete precautions. Our neighbors and guarantors ought to regard this decision as a desire on our part to manifest our profound determination to maintain our neutrality unimpaired.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and informed me that his Government was awaiting this reply in order to continue negotiations with France and with Germany; that the conclusion of these negotiations would be communicated to me.

No. 12.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Paris.
Brussels, July 31, 1914.

Sir: In the course of the conversation with the Secretary General of my department had

this morning with Herr von Below (German Minister at Brussels) he explained to the latter the bearing of the military measures which we had taken, and said to him that they represented a consequence of our determination to fulfill our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an act of mistrust toward our neighbors.

The Secretary General then asked the German Minister if he were acquainted with the conversation which he (the Secretary General) had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and with the reply which the German Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to return.

In the course of the discussion which was excited in 1911 by the introduction of the Dutch proposals for the fortification of Belgium, the German Minister had declared that in the event of a Franco-German war our neutrality would be violated by Germany.

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs had put forward the suggestion that a declaration made in the German Parliament on the occasion of a debate on foreign policy would be calculated to tranquillize public opinion and to allay its mistrust, which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg intimated, in reply, that he had been extremely sensible to the sentiments which had inspired our suggestion, and that Germany had no intention of violating our neutrality, but he expressed the opinion that if Germany were to make a public declaration she would incur military obligations with regard to France, who would be relieved of anxiety as to her northern frontier, and would concentrate all her forces toward the east.

Herr von Flotow, (the Belgian Secretary General) continuing, said that he fully understood the objections which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had raised against the suggestion, and that he was certain that the fact that subsequently, in 1913, Herr von Jagow (German Foreign Secretary) had Reichstag resolution stating that Belgium was to observe the neutrality of Belgium.

Inclosure in No. 12.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 29, 1914.
Sir: I have the honor to acquaint you on the authority of the official North German Gazette with the declaration made in the course of the sitting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag of April 29 by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister of War, with regard to the neutrality of Belgium.

A member of the Social Democratic Party said:

In Belgium the approach of a Franco-German war is viewed with apprehension, since it is feared that Germany will not respect the neutrality of Belgium.

Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied:

The neutrality of Belgium is defined by international conventions, and Germany is determined to respect these conventions. This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democratic Party. Herr von Jagow thereupon observed that he had not intended to make the plain statement which he had delivered with regard to the relations between Germany and Belgium.

A member of the Social Democratic Party, Gen. von Heeringen, Minister for War, said:

Belgium bears no part of the responsibility for the proposals for German military operations; the organization of the proposals is to be found in the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that Belgian neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties.

No. 13.
Telegram Addressed by Comte de Lalain, Belgian Minister in London, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, Aug. 1, 1914.
Great Britain has informed separately of France and of Germany whether they would respect the territory of Belgium if their adversary should not violate it. The German reply is awaited. France has accepted.

No. 14.
Telegram Addressed by Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, Aug. 1, 1914.
The British Ambassador has been instructed to ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium. The Minister is said to have replied that he cannot answer this question.

No. 15.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, Paris, and London.

Brussels, Aug. 1, 1914.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:

I am authorized to declare, that in the event of an armed conflict, the Government of the republic, as they have always proclaimed, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In view of the deep regret, will see itself compelled to carry out—if necessary by force of arms—the measures of security which have been taken in the face of the French menace.

I beg you, M. le Ministre, to accept the assurance of my high esteem. VON BELLOW.

No. 28.
Letter Addressed by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister in Brussels, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government, that if Germany enters a state of war with the object of compelling Belgium to abandon her part as a neutral country, the Government of his Britannic Majesty expects that Belgium will resist by every means in her power.

In this event the Government of his Britannic Majesty is prepared to join Russia and France in the event of Belgium's refusal to offer to the Belgian Government, without delay, its co-operation, with a view to restoring the neutrality of Belgium, and at the same time to offer a guarantee for the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in future years.

No. 30.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in London and Paris.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 31.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.
Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:

I am authorized to declare, that in the event of an armed conflict, the Government of the republic, as they have always proclaimed, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In view of the deep regret, will see itself compelled to carry out—if necessary by force of arms—the measures of security which have been taken in the face of the French menace.

I beg you, M. le Ministre, to accept the assurance of my high esteem. VON BELLOW.

No. 20.
Note Delivered at 7 P. M. on Aug. 2 by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, Aug. 2, 1914.
The German Government has received trustworthy information according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt with regard to the immediate privilege and the break of official relations with you. Your Excellency will find inclosed the passports which are necessary for your departure, and for that of the staff of the legation, am, &c.

No. 35.
Letter Addressed by the Belgian Minister in Berlin to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, Aug. 4, 1914.
Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation of part of a speech delivered today at the Tribune of the Reichstag by the Imperial Chancellor, with regard to the odious violation of our neutrality:

"We are in a state of legitimate self-defense, and are obliged to take the necessary steps to repel the invasion of our territory. Our troops have occupied Luxembourg, and have, perhaps, already penetrated into Belgium. This is contrary to the international law, and the breach of it is true, declared in Brussels, that she is determined to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long as it is respected by herself. But Germany has been obliged to enter Belgium, and she has maintained the honor of its arms, the German Government bears the King of the Belgians the further horrors of war. The Government is ready to conclude with Belgium an agreement, which will be in accordance with the arrangements with France, Germany offers, further, the solemn assurance that she has no intention of appropriating Belgium territory, and that her intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is always ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of the campaign permits it."

The American Minister had been his colleagues to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted this mission, and he has undertaken it as a favor to him.

No. 39.
Telegram Addressed by the Belgian Minister in London to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, Aug. 4, 1914.
Great Britain this morning called upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that in view of the note addressed to Berlin by Germany, and the latter with the use of armed force if she opposes the passage of German troops, in view of the violation of Belgian territory at Givet, Belgium is obliged to take the necessary steps to repel the invasion of her territory. The ultimatum expires at midnight.

In consequence of Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany, the British proposals, which I have transmitted by telegram, stand for the moment unaltered.

No. 40.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Russia, in Brussels.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The Belgian Government regrets to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of the engagements which Germany has undertaken toward us. His Majesty's Government is firmly resolved to resist by every means in its power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate in the defense of her territory.

There would be concerted and common action with a view to resisting the measures of force employed by Germany against Belgium, and with a view, at the same time, of guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume the defense of her fortified towns. I am, &c.,

No. 41.
Telegram Addressed by the Belgian Minister in London to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, Aug. 5, 1914.
Germany having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that she will delay not to make the slightest concession to the German ultimatum.

No. 44.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Heads of Missions in All States Maintaining Diplomatic Relations with Belgium.

Brussels, Aug. 5, 1914.
Sir: By the treaty of April 19, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves to be guarantors of the treaties, concluded the same day, between his Majesty the King of the Belgians and his Majesty the King of the Netherlands. This treaty provides:

"Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State."

Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations; she has preserved her independence and integrity, and has left nothing undone in order to maintain and to secure respect for her neutrality.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume the defense of her fortified towns. I am, &c.,

No. 27.
Letter Addressed by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister in Brussels, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914. (8 A. M.)
Sir: I have been instructed, and I have the honor to inform your Excellency, that in the event of an armed conflict, the Government of the republic, as they have always proclaimed, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In view of the deep regret, will see itself compelled to carry out—if necessary by force of arms—the measures of security which have been taken in the face of the French menace.

I beg you, M. le Ministre, to accept the assurance of my high esteem. VON BELLOW.

No. 28.
Letter Addressed by Sir Francis H. Villiers, British Minister in Brussels, to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government, that if Germany enters a state of war with the object of compelling Belgium to abandon her part as a neutral country, the Government of his Britannic Majesty expects that Belgium will resist by every means in her power.

In this event the Government of his Britannic Majesty is prepared to join Russia and France in the event of Belgium's refusal to offer to the Belgian Government, without delay, its co-operation, with a view to restoring the neutrality of Belgium, and at the same time to offer a guarantee for the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in future years.

No. 30.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in London and Paris.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 31.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:

I am authorized to declare, that in the event of an armed conflict, the Government of the republic, as they have always proclaimed, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In view of the deep regret, will see itself compelled to carry out—if necessary by force of arms—the measures of security which have been taken in the face of the French menace.

I beg you, M. le Ministre, to accept the assurance of my high esteem. VON BELLOW.

No. 32.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 33.
Letter Addressed by the Belgian Minister in Berlin to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, Aug. 4, 1914.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me:

I am authorized to declare, that in the event of an armed conflict, the Government of the republic, as they have always proclaimed, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In view of the deep regret, will see itself compelled to carry out—if necessary by force of arms—the measures of security which have been taken in the face of the French menace.

I beg you, M. le Ministre, to accept the assurance of my high esteem. VON BELLOW.

No. 34.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 35.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 36.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 37.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 38.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

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Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 40.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 41.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 42.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 43.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 44.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 45.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 46.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 47.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 48.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 49.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 50.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 4, 1914.
The General Staff announces that Belgian national territory has been violated by Germany.

No. 51.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

Brussels, Aug. 5, 1914.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that the Ministers of France and Russia have this morning approached me in order to acquaint me with the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in defense of our territory. I am, &c.,

No. 52.
Letter Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg.

Brussels, Aug. 5, 1914.
Sir: I have the honor to inform you that the Ministers of France and Russia have this morning approached me in order to acquaint me with the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in defense of our territory. I am, &c.,

No. 53.
Telegram Addressed by the Belgian Minister at The Hague to M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, Aug. 5, 1914.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs has requested me to transmit to you the following information, since the American Ambassador in Brussels declines to do so.

The fortress of Liège has been stormed after a gallant defense. The German Government very deeply regrets that in consequence of the attitude of the Belgian Government toward Germany, sanguinary encounters have taken place, and that any and every step of entering Belgium and occupying Liège as a point d'appui for her subsequent military operations. Now that the Belgian Government has taken this attitude against greatly superior forces, has maintained the honor of its arms, the German Government bears the King of the Belgians the further horrors of war. The Government is ready to conclude with Belgium an agreement, which will be in accordance with the arrangements with France, Germany offers, further, the solemn assurance that she has no intention of appropriating Belgium territory, and that her intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is always ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of the campaign permits it."

The American Minister had been his colleagues to undertake this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted this mission, and he has undertaken it as a favor to him.

No. 54.
Telegram Addressed by M. D'Avignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers in Berlin, London, and Vienna.

Brussels, Aug. 12, 1914.
Please hand the following telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"The proposal which the German Government makes to us reproduces the proposal which had been formulated in the ultimatum of August 2. It is a repetition of international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, all the more, in view of the fact that, since August 4, her neutrality has been violated, and a grievous war has been transferred to her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have failed to take any effective step to her relief."

Annex 5.
Telegrams Exchanged Between the Emperor William II. and the Emperor Nicholas II.

(Extracts from the German "White Book.")

No. 1.
The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas.

July 28, 1914. (10:45 P. M.)
It is with the liveliest anxiety that I have learned of the impression which has been produced in your empire by the advance of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The corollary agitation which has been pursued in Serbia for years has led to a monstrous attempt, to which the Archduke Francis Ferdinand was a victim. The guilt which has led the Servians to assassinate their own King and his Consort still reigns in their country. You will not doubt agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, have, like all other sovereigns, a common interest in insisting that those who are morally responsible for this terrible murder shall receive the punishment they deserve.