TLS Working Group P. Urien Internet Draft Telecom Paris Intended status: ExperimentalJanuary 28 2024
Expires: July 2024
Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 draft-urien-tls-im-10.txt
Abstract
TLS 1.3 will be deployed in the Internet of Things ecosystem. In many IoT frameworks, TLS or DTLS protocols, based on pre-shared key (PSK), are used for device authentication. So PSK tamper resistance, is a critical market request, in order to prevent hijacking issues. If DH exchange is used with certificate bound to DH ephemeral public key, there is also a benefit to protect its signature procedure. The TLS identity module (im) MAY be based on secure element; it realizes some HKDF operations bound to PSK, and cryptographic signature if certificates are used. Secure Element form factor could be standalone chip, or embedded in SoC like eSIM.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 2024.
. Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 1]
Copyright Notice
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.Urien Expires July 2024 [page 2]
Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024
Table of Contents
Abstract........................................................... 1 Requirements Language.............................................. 1 Status of this Memo................................................ 1
Copyright Notice................................................... 2
1 Overview......................................................... 5
2 Protecting the Key Schedule for PSK.............................. 5
2.1 Context..................................................... 5
2.2 Identity Module Procedures.................................. 6
2.3 KSGS: Keys Secure Generation and Storage.................... 6
2.4 Identity Module Key Procedures (IMKP)....................... 6
2.4.1 CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret .................... 6
2.4.2 EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret ................... 7
2.4.3 HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key .......... 7
2.4.4 HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret .................... 7
3. Asymmetric Signature............................................ 7
3.1 GENKEY...................................................... 8
3.2 GETPUB...................................................... 8
3.3 SIGN........................................................ 8
4 Optional Procedures.............................................. 8
4.1 GENDHE...................................................... 8
4.2 GETEPK...................................................... 8
4.3 RAND........................................................ 8
5 Identity Module Procedures Summary............................... 9
6. Secure Element as Identity Module.............................. 10
6.1 Administrator mode......................................... 10
6.2 User Mode.................................................. 10
6.3 KSGS: Keys Secure Generation and Storage................... 10
6.3.1 Example ............................................. 11
6.4 CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret.......................... 11
6.4.1 Example ............................................. 11
6.5 EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret......................... 11
6.5.1 Example ............................................. 12
6.6 HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key................ 12
6.6.1 Example ............................................. 12
6.7 HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret.......................... 12
6.7.1 Example ............................................. 12
6.8 Signature Procedures....................................... 12
6.8.1 Keys Generation ..................................... 12
6.8.2 Keys Setting ........................................ 13
6.8.3 Signature ........................................... 14
6.9 GENDHE..................................................... 14
6.9.1 Example ............................................. 14
6.10 GETEPK.................................................... 14
6.10.1 Example ............................................ 14
6.11 RAND...................................................... 14
6.11.1 Example ............................................ 15
7. A simple Identity Module code for Javacard 3.04................ 15
8 IANA Considerations............................................. 32
9 Security Considerations......................................... 32
10 References..................................................... 32Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 3]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024
10.1 Normative References...................................... 32
10.2 Informative References.................................... 32
11 Authors' Addresses............................................. 32Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 4]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024 1 OverviewTLS 1.3 [RFC8446] will be deployed in the Internet of Things ecosystem. In many IoT frameworks, TLS or DTLS protocols, based on pre-shared key (PSK), are used for device authentication. So PSK tamper resistance, is a critical market request, in order to prevent hijacking issues. If DH exchange is used with certificate bound to DH ephemeral public key, there is also a benefit to protect its signature procedure. The TLS identity module (im) MAY be based on secure element [ISO7816]; it realizes some HKDF [RFC5869] operations bound to PSK, and cryptographic signature if certificates are used. Secure Element form factor could be standalone chip or embedded in SOC like eSIM.
+-----------+ +----------+ | Processor | | Identity | | TLS 1.3 +------+ Module | | | | im | +-----------+ +----------+Figure 1. TLS 1.3 Identity Module (im)
The ISO7816 standards specify the binary encoding for ISO7816-4 commands and responses, refereed as Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU). APDUs can be exchanged with secure elements according to various transport protocols [GP-SPI-I2C] such as ISO7816-3 T=0, ISO7816-3 T=1, Inter Integrated Circuit (I2C) or Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
2 Protecting the Key Schedule for PSK 2.1 ContextAccording to [RFC8446] external PSKs MAY be provisioned outside of TLS.
The Early Secret (ESK) is computed according to relation: ESK =HKDF-Extract(salt=0s,PSK) = HMAC(salt=0s,PSK)
The Binder Key (BSK) for outside provisioning is computed according to the relation: BSK = Derive-Secret(ESK, "ext binder", "")
The Derived Secret (DSK) is computed according to the relation: DSK= Derive-Secret(ESK, "derived", "")
The Finished External Key (FEK) is computed according to the relation: FEK = KDF-Expand-Label(BSK, "finished", "", Hash.length) For Derive-Secret procedures, "" is equivalent to the value hash(empty), whose size is hash-length.
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 5]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024 2.2 Identity Module ProceduresThe identity module MUST provide a "Keys Secure Generation and Storage" (KSGS) procedure, which computes and securely stores ESK, BSK and FEK keys.
The KSGS procedure MUST require administrative rights.
A set "Identity Module Key Procedures" (IMKP) of four procedures is required, in order to protect from public exposure ESK, BSK, and FEK:
- CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret - EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret - HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key - HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret
These procedures MAY require user rights.
2.3 KSGS: Keys Secure Generation and StorageThe Identity module MUST provide a KSGS procedure, requiring administrative rights, which computes and securely stores ESK, BSK, DSK, and FEK. The KSGS procedure uses with a hash function (for example SHA256) identifies by an AlgoId attribute.
Input: AlgoId, salt, PSK Output: Success or Failure
ESK, DSK, and BSK secret values are stored in the identity module.
HL16 : hash Length, 16 bits HL8 : hash length, 8 bits H0 : hash(empty)
ESK= HMAC(salt=0s,PSK) DSK= HMAC(ESK,HL16||0d746c7331332064657269766564||HL8||H0||01) BSK= HMAC(ESK,HL16||10746c733133206578742062696e646572||HL8||H0||01) FEK= HMAC(BSK,HL16||0E746C7331332066696E69736865640001) 2.4 Identity Module Key Procedures (IMKP)2.4.1 CETS: Client Early Traffic Secret
Input: Length, Message Output: Client Early Traffic Secret or Failure
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 6]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024 CETS(ClientHello) = Derive-Secret(ESK, "c e traffic", Message) = HMAC(ESK, Length || 11746c733133206320652074726166666963 || Message || 01)Message is a hash value.
2.4.2 EEMS: Early Exporter Master Secret
Input: Length, Message Output: Early Exporter Master Secret or Failure
EEMS(ClientHello) = Derive-Secret(ESK, "e exp master", Message) = HMAC(ESK, Length || 12746c733133206520657870206d6173746572 || Message || 01)Message is a hash value
2.4.3 HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret Key
Input: DHE value Output: Handshake Secret or Failure
HEDSK(DHE)= HKDF-Extract(salt=DSK,DHE) = HMAC(salt=DSK, DHE)
2.4.4 HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key Secret
Input: data Output: HMAC(BSK, data) or Failure
HBSK(data) = HMAC(FEK, data)
Data is a hash value
3. Asymmetric SignatureThe identity module MUST provide a "Generate Key" (GENKEY) procedure, in order to store or generate private asymmetric key and associated public key. This procedure MUST require administrative rights.
The procedure "Get Public Key" (GETPUB:) is required in order to read the public key value. This procedure MAY require user rights.
The procedure "Signature" (SIGN) is required in order to perform a raw signature for a digest value, computed from certificate. This procedure MAY require user rights.
The symmetric algorithm is identified by the AlgoId attribute. The key is identified by the KeyId attribute.
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 7]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024 3.1 GENKEYInput: AlgoId, KeyId Output: Success or Failure
A private key is generated and stored in the identity module. A public key is computed from the private key.
3.2 GETPUBInput: KeyId Output: Public Key Value or Failure
3.3 SIGNInput: KeyId, DigestValue Output: Signature Value or Failure
4 Optional ProceduresIn IoT context, the computing resources needed for supporting cryptographic procedures such as elliptic curves or true random number generators can be an issue. Optional procedures facilitate TLS1.3 support in such devices.
4.1 GENDHEInput: AlgoId, PublicKey, KeyId Output: The DHE value
A DHE is computed according to an input public key, and an algorithm identifier. An ephemerous public key EPK is generated, which is identified by the KeyId attribute and can be retrieved by the GETEPK procedure.
4.2 GETEPKInput: KeyId Output: Error or ephemerous public key
This procedure returns the ephemerous public key (EPK), identified by the KeyId attribute, previously computed by GENDHE.
4.3 RANDInput: Number of random bytes, Nr Output: Nr bytes
This procedure generates Nr random bytes
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 8]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024 5 Identity Module Procedures SummaryFirst column: The procedure name Second column: The procedure status Mandatory (M) or Optional (O) for PSK or PKI (e.g. signature generation) Third column: Input parameters Fourth column: Output vale Fifth column: The mode, ADMinistrator or USER
+--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | Name |Status | Comment | Input | Output |Mode| +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | KSGS | M PSK | Compute Secrets | AlgoId | none | ADM| | | | from PSK | Salt | | | | | | | PSK | | | +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | GENKEY | M PKI | Generate Private| AlgoId | none | ADM| | | | and Public Key | KeyId | | | +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | CETS | M PSK | Compute Early | Length | Client Early |USER| | | | Traffic Secret | Message |Traffic Secret | | +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | EEMS | M PSK | Compute | Length | Early Exporter|USER| | | | Early Exporter | Message | Master Secret | | | | | Master Secret | | | | +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | HEDSK | M PSK | Compute | DHE | Handshake | | | | | Handshake Secret| | Secret |USER| +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | HBSK | M PSK | Compute HMAC For| Data | HMAC For | | | | | Identity Binder | |Identity Binder|USER| +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | GETPUB | M PKI | Read Public Key | KeyId | Public Key |USER| +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | SIGN | M PKI | Compute | KeyId | Public Key |USER| | | | Signature | Data | | | +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | GENDHE | O | Generate Pub.Key| AlgoID | DH Value |USER| | | | Compute DH | PUB.Key | | | | | | | KeyId | | | +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | GETEPK | O | Read Ephemeris | KeyId | Public Key |USER| | | | Public Key | | | | +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ | RAND | O | Generate | Number | Random Bytes |USER| | | | Random Bytes |of Bytes | | | +--------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------+----+ Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 9]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024 6. Secure Element as Identity ModuleSecure elements are defined according to [ISO7816] standards. They support hash functions (sha256, sha384, sha512) and associated HMAC procedures. They also provide DH procedures in Z/pZ* groups, and elliptic curves. Open software can be released thanks to the Javacard standards, such as JC3.04, JC3.05, JC3.1.
This section is an illustration of binary encoding rules for secure element according to the T=1 ISO7816 protocol.
An ISO7816 command (TAPDU) is a set of bytes comprising a five bytes header and an optional payload (up to 255 bytes)
The header comprises the following five bytes - CLA, Class - INS, Instruction code - P1, P1 byte - P2, P2 byte - P3, length of the payload, or number of expected bytes
The response comprises a payload (up to 255 bytes) and a two bytes status word SW=(SW1, SW2), 9000 meaning successful operation.
6.1 Administrator modeThe [ISO7816] command VERIFY (INS=0x20) SHOULD be used to enter the administrative mode.
Tx: CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=Adm P3=PIN-Length [PIN-Value] Rx: 9000
6.2 User ModeThe [ISO7816] command VERIFY SHOULD be used to enter the user mode
Tx: CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=User P3=PIN-Length [PIN-Value] Rx: 9000
6.3 KSGS: Keys Secure Generation and StorageLength= 2 + Salt-Length + PSK-Length
Tx: CLA=00 INS=TLS13 P1=AlgoId P2=KSGS P3=Length Salt-Length [Salt- Value] PSK-Length [PSK-Value] Rx: 9000
This procedure computes and stores ESK, BSK DSK and FEK.
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 10]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 20246.3.1 Example
PSK=0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20
Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=00 P2=0A P3=23 01 00 20 0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F20 Rx:9000
Sha256(empty) = E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855
ESK= HMAC-SHA256(0,PSK) ESK= 23499E7EDF0FBE6BAA137DF0F23BECAEF722AD19FC262855409DE8CD8B3C897
DSK= HMAC-SHA256(ESK,0020 0d746c7331332064657269766564 20 E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855 01) DSK=E8E7AC087158FC8440E41A12989F9194783764CD5FC36564028037F2C8206E96
BSK = HMAC-SHA256(ESK,0020 10746c733133206578742062696e646572 20 E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649B934CA495991B7852B855 01) BSK=4351F8A53AA85AC394AB04C516464CAB96E9340C269632D09899537887EE651F
FEK= HMAC-256(BSK, 0020 0E746C7331332066696E6973686564 00 01) FEK=FCA24690D17DDE3F727D29D2186A5F83E1AEBD4889A4841793139168A65BFCB0
6.4 CETS: Client Early Traffic SecretLength = 2 + Messages-Length Hash-Length: the hash length (2 bytes)
Tx: CLA INS=TLS13 P1=CETS P2=ESK P3=Length Hash-Length Messages- Length [Messages] Rx:[Client Early Traffic Secret] SW
6.4.1 Example
Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=00 P2=0B P3=03 0020 00 Rx: 0738A2B6F6FAA2AF5CDD9B6F0F2B232F19B3256A5926EAC600B911F91E98D2D4 9000
Message= NULL = 0s [Client Early Traffic Secret] = HMAC-SHA256(ESK, 0020 11746c733133206320652074726166666963 00 01)
6.5 EEMS: Early Exporter Master SecretLength = 2 + Messages-Length Hash-Length: the hash length (2 bytes) Tx: CLA INS=TLS13 P1=EEMS P2=ESK P3=Length Hash-Length Messages- Length [Messages] Rx: [Early Exporter Master Secret] SW
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 11]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 20246.5.1 Example
Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=01 P2=0B P3=03 0020 00 Rx: 9B7FC6A8F854C16A301DFC566859931DB5EE9A22793142A0C67159C445E7BEAB 9000
Message= NULL = 0s [Early Exporter Master Secret] = HMAC-SHA256(ESK, 0020 12746c733133206520657870206d6173746572 00 01)
6.6 HEDSK: HKDF-Extract from Derived Secret KeyTx: CLA INS=TLS13 P1=0 P2=HEDSK P3=Data-Length [Data] Rx: [HMAC(Data,DSK)] SW
6.6.1 Example
Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=00 P2=0E P3=01 00 Rx: 7092C2117D67E6AEB5C5FDF5E6D9C70FBDC69B374E914C26AB08A122483D0E73
DHE=NULL=0s HMAC-256(DSK,DHE)= HMAC-256(DSK,0s)
6.7 HBSK: HMAC from Binder Key SecretTx: CLA INS=TLS13 P1=0 P2=HBSK P3=Data-Length [Data] Rx: [HMAC(FEK,data)] SW
6.7.1 Example
Tx: CLA=00 INS=85 P1=00 P2=0C P3=01 00 Rx: 3E015D850B89C2470D4C49D4BD8E7C76F2B74175DDD85F393569315DA15480A4
Data=NULL=0s HMAC-256(FEK,Data)= HMAC-256(DSK,0s)
6.8 Signature Procedures6.8.1 Keys Generation
Select Identity Module Application (AID= 010203040500) Tx: CLA=00 INS=A4 P1=04 P2=00 P3=06 01 02 03 04 05 00 Rx: 9000
Verify Administrator PIN (PIN= "00000000") Tx: CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=01 P3=08 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 Rx: 9000
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 12]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024Clear Key (P2=KeyId=0) Tx: CLA=00 INS=81 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 Rx: 9000
Init Curve secp256r1 (P1 = idCurve, P2=KeyId) Tx: CLA=00 INS=89 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 Rx: 9000
GenKey (P2=KeyId) Tx: CLA=00 INS=82 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 Rx:9000
Read PublicKey (P2=KeyId) Tx: CLA=00 INS=84 P1=06 P2=00 P3=00 Rx: 0041049E92726E24A548BB69ADA51103F265AA9B9F304E25971427D79EFAF471 889CCC52FD8B05A729A400105C06AF99592535A4EDF338B5A37BB6089D3B11E7 1B847B 9000
Read PrivateKey (P2= KeyId) Tx: CLA=00 INS=84 P1=07 P2=00 p3=00 Rx: 00208E8793D5C399659D8A35B585534B5D9D0FAB37AD3FC7E8B43373C4BAD81E
9000
6.8.2 Keys Setting
Select Identity Module Application (AID= 010203040500) Tx: CLA=00 INS=A4 P1=04 P2=00 P3=06 01 02 03 04 05 00 Rx: 9000
Verify Administrator PIN (PIN= "00000000") Tx: CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=01 P3=08 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 Rx: 9000
Clear Key (P2=KeyId=0) Tx: CLA=00 INS=81 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 Rx: 9000
Init Curve secp256r1 (P1 = idCurve, P2=KeyId) Tx: CLA=00 INS=89 P1=00 P2=00 P3=00 Rx: 9000
Set PrivateKey (P2=KeyId) Tx: CLA=00 INS=88 P1=07 P2=00 P3=20 2e86bdd6d3b241ddbd00999f6a0ac1cb546d2bfb55744dca40f0268ac2bf7338 Rx: 9000
Set PublicKey (P2=KeyId) Tx: CLA=00 INS=88 P1=06 P2=00 P3=41 045c8c90d0859dd96c722a589c4b62047ff01323cc74383e0e8eb80bea4ea45e55b8 5499abd39d719885e874ed3f6327960d519ba25423c3fbdc14e6fd0cd5edee Rx: 9000
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 13]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 20246.8.3 Signature
Select Identity Module Application (AID= 010203040500) Tx: CLA=00 INS=A4 P1=04 P2=00 P3=06 01 02 03 04 05 00 Rx: 9000 Verify User PIN (PIN= "0000") CLA=00 INS=20 P1=00 P2=00 P3=04 30 30 30 30
ECDSA secp256r1 Signature (P2=KeyId) Tx: CLA=00 INS=80 P1=00 P2=00 P3=20 0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF Rx: 0047304502206BB1B02742C90B5FEAD3EF34F87B49D2A87F846F0368D0DBB3A 0E9D9F3ABC450022100A0178CDE84FB9ACA4662ECC68638437D46EC27B69657 8F8080E43ACCA4B35586
6.9 GENDHETx: CLA INS=GENDHE P1=AlgoId P2=KeyId P3=Key-Length [Public Key] Rx: [DHE] SW
6.9.1 Example
Tx: CLA=00 INS=8A P1=00=Secp256r1 P2=FF P3=41 4104C4B5F7682C374AAD1C9125C2F225D343A8986C8E0A475E4003F6C98DA13F99 9E80A55E66F0644E84F7F6503615B9EC4CB7C2844AF6BE7F9091BF319B0291A2D8 Rx: 1BEE561B95F9EC99EE0E49F28E415D4F74580ACB8D9E0019BD3A7974FF3148E5
6.10 GETEPKTx: CLA INS=GETEPK P1=06 P2=KeyId P3=2+Key-length Rx: [Key-Length] [Public Key] SW
6.10.1 Example
Tx: CLA=00 INS=84 P1=06 P2=FF P3=43 Rx: 004104CD8EF9695FAC953D89B9C91B994DC77F3140BDEDF54AABF63521548AB9 8031942C829FC5D958F143AA09E622E6CB190D7A91773E1794F792E1D4D7E1B84603 FF9000
6.11 RANDTx: CLA INS=RAND P1=00 P2=00 P3=[Number-Of-bytes] Rx: [Number-Of-Bytes] SW
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 14]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 20246.11.1 Example
Tx: CLA=00 INS=8B P1=00 P2=00 P3=20 Rx: 85DEE2DD24BF79D8CCB6D21C1F515CE040A2E13B8C98177822BD3B66876CD9A1 9000
7. A simple Identity Module code for Javacard 3.04An example of TLS-IM code is available at [IM-JC]. package im;Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 15]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024import javacard.framework.*; import javacard.security.* ; import javacardx.crypto.* ;
public class im extends Applet { final static byte INS_SIGN = (byte) 0x80 ; final static byte INS_CLEAR_KEYPAIR = (byte) 0x81 ; final static byte INS_GEN_KEYPAIR = (byte) 0x82 ; final static byte INS_GET_KEY_PARAM = (byte) 0x84 ; final static byte INS_HMAC = (byte) 0x85 ; final static byte INS_GET_STATUS = (byte) 0x87 ; final static byte INS_SET_KEY_PARAM = (byte) 0x88 ; final static byte INS_INIT_CURVE = (byte) 0x89 ; final static byte INS_SELECT = (byte) 0xA4 ; public final static byte INS_VERIFY = (byte) 0x20 ; public final static byte INS_CHANGE_PIN = (byte) 0x24 ;
public final static short N_KEYS = (short) 16; public final static byte[] VERSION= {(byte)1,(byte)0};
KeyPair[] ECCkp = null ; Signature ECCsig = null ; MessageDigest sha256 = null ;
short status=0 ; byte [] DB = null ; public final static short DBSIZE = (short)320 ;
private static OwnerPIN UserPin=null;
private static final byte[] MyPin = {(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,
(byte)0xFF,(byte)0xFF,(byte)0xFF,(byte)0xFF};
private static OwnerPIN AdminPin=null;
private static final byte[] OpPin = {(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,
(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30,(byte)0x30};
private final static short SW_VERIFICATION_FAILED = (short)0x6300; private final static short SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED = (short)0x6380; final static short SW_KPUB_DEFINED = (short)0x6401; final static short SW_KPRIV_DEFINED = (short)0x6402; final static short SW_KPRIV_UNDEFINED = (short)0x6403; final static short SW_GENKEY_ERROR = (short)0x6D10; final static short SW_SIGN_ERROR = (short)0x6D20; final static short SW_DUMP_KEYS_PAIR = (short)0x6D30; final static short SW_SET_KEY_PARAM = (short)0x6D40;
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 16]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024private final static byte [] ParamA1 = {(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x01,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, (byte)0xff,(byte)0xfc};
private final static byte [] ParamB1 = {(byte)0x5a,(byte)0xc6,(byte)0x35,(byte)0xd8,(byte)0xaa,(byte)0x3a, (byte)0x93,(byte)0xe7,(byte)0xb3,(byte)0xeb,(byte)0xbd,(byte)0x55, (byte)0x76,(byte)0x98,(byte)0x86,(byte)0xbc,(byte)0x65,(byte)0x1d, (byte)0x06,(byte)0xb0,(byte)0xcc,(byte)0x53,(byte)0xb0,(byte)0xf6, (byte)0x3b,(byte)0xce,(byte)0x3c,(byte)0x3e,(byte)0x27,(byte)0xd2, (byte)0x60,(byte)0x4b};
private final static byte [] ParamField1= {(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x01,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff};
private final static byte [] ParamG1= {(byte)0x04,(byte)0x6b,(byte)0x17,(byte)0xd1,(byte)0xf2,(byte)0xe1, (byte)0x2c,(byte)0x42,(byte)0x47,(byte)0xf8,(byte)0xbc,(byte)0xe6, (byte)0xe5,(byte)0x63,(byte)0xa4,(byte)0x40,(byte)0xf2,(byte)0x77, (byte)0x03,(byte)0x7d,(byte)0x81,(byte)0x2d,(byte)0xeb,(byte)0x33, (byte)0xa0,(byte)0xf4,(byte)0xa1,(byte)0x39,(byte)0x45,(byte)0xd8, (byte)0x98,(byte)0xc2,(byte)0x96,(byte)0x4f,(byte)0xe3,(byte)0x42, (byte)0xe2,(byte)0xfe,(byte)0x1a,(byte)0x7f,(byte)0x9b,(byte)0x8e, (byte)0xe7,(byte)0xeb,(byte)0x4a,(byte)0x7c,(byte)0x0f,(byte)0x9e, (byte)0x16,(byte)0x2b,(byte)0xce,(byte)0x33,(byte)0x57,(byte)0x6b, (byte)0x31,(byte)0x5e,(byte)0xce,(byte)0xcb,(byte)0xb6,(byte)0x40, (byte)0x68,(byte)0x37,(byte)0xbf,(byte)0x51,(byte)0xf5};
private final static short ParamK1 = (short) 0x0001;
private final static byte [] ParamR1= {(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0x00,(byte)0x00, (byte)0x00,(byte)0x00,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff, (byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xff,(byte)0xbc,(byte)0xe6, (byte)0xfa,(byte)0xad,(byte)0xa7,(byte)0x17,(byte)0x9e,(byte)0x84, (byte)0xf3,(byte)0xb9,(byte)0xca,(byte)0xc2,(byte)0xfc,(byte)0x63, (byte)0x25,(byte)0x51}; private byte [] ESK = new byte[32]; // Early Secret Key private byte [] HSK = new byte[32]; // Handshake Secret Key private byte [] eBSK = new byte[32]; // Binder Secret Key private byte [] rBSK = new byte[32]; // Binder Secret Key private byte [] feBSK = new byte[32]; // Finished Binder Secret Key private byte [] frBSK = new byte[32]; // Finished Binder Secret Key
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 17]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024private final static byte EXTRACT_EARLY = (byte)0x0A; private final static byte EXPAND_EARLY = (byte)0x0B; private final static byte HMAC_EBSK = (byte)0x0C; private final static byte HMAC_RBSK = (byte)0x0D; private final static byte EXTRACT_HANDSHAKE = (byte)0x0E;
private byte [] derived = {(byte)0x00,(byte)32,(byte)13,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s', (byte)'1',(byte)'3',(byte)' ',(byte)'d',(byte)'e',(byte)'r', (byte)'i',(byte)'v',(byte)'e',(byte)'d', (byte)0x20,(byte)0xE3,(byte)0xB0,(byte)0xC4,(byte)0x42,(byte)0x98, (byte)0xFC,(byte)0x1C,(byte)0x14,(byte)0x9A,(byte)0xFB,(byte)0xF4, (byte)0xC8,(byte)0x99,(byte)0x6F,(byte)0xB9,(byte)0x24,(byte)0x27, (byte)0xAE,(byte)0x41,(byte)0xE4,(byte)0x64,(byte)0x9B,(byte)0x93, (byte)0x4C,(byte)0xA4,(byte)0x95,(byte)0x99,(byte)0x1B,(byte)0x78, (byte)0x52,(byte)0xB8,(byte)0x55,(byte)1};
private byte [] ext_binder = {(byte)0x00,(byte)32,(byte)16,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s', (byte)'1',(byte)'3',(byte)' ',(byte)'e',(byte)'x',(byte)'t', (byte)' ',(byte)'b',(byte)'i',(byte)'n',(byte)'d',(byte)'e', (byte)'r',(byte)0x20,(byte)0xE3,(byte)0xB0,(byte)0xC4,(byte)0x42, (byte)0x98,(byte)0xFC,(byte)0x1C,(byte)0x14,(byte)0x9A,(byte)0xFB, (byte)0xF4,(byte)0xC8,(byte)0x99,(byte)0x6F,(byte)0xB9,(byte)0x24, (byte)0x27,(byte)0xAE,(byte)0x41,(byte)0xE4,(byte)0x64,(byte)0x9B, (byte)0x93,(byte)0x4C,(byte)0xA4,(byte)0x95,(byte)0x99,(byte)0x1B, (byte)0x78,(byte)0x52,(byte)0xB8,(byte)0x55,(byte)0x01};
private byte [] res_binder = {(byte)0x00,(byte)32,(byte)16,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s', (byte)'1',(byte)'3',(byte)' ',(byte)'r',(byte)'e',(byte)'s', (byte)' ',(byte)'b',(byte)'i',(byte)'n',(byte)'d',(byte)'e', (byte)'r',(byte)0x00,(byte)0x01};
private byte [] c_e_traffic = {(byte)17,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s',(byte)'1',(byte)'3', (byte)' ',(byte)'c',(byte)' ',(byte)'e',(byte)' ',(byte)'t', (byte)'r',(byte)'a',(byte)'f',(byte)'f',(byte)'i',(byte)'c'}; private byte [] c_exp_master = {(byte)18,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s',(byte)'1',(byte)'3', (byte)' ',(byte)'e',(byte)' ',(byte)'e',(byte)'x',(byte)'p', (byte)' ',(byte)'m',(byte)'a',(byte)'s',(byte)'t',(byte)'e', (byte)'r'};
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 18]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024private byte [] finished = {(byte)0x00,(byte)32,(byte)14,(byte)'t',(byte)'l',(byte)'s', (byte)'1',(byte)'3',(byte)' ',(byte)'f',(byte)'i',(byte)'n', (byte)'i',(byte)'s', (byte)'h',(byte)'e',(byte)'d',(byte)0, (byte)1};
public void process(APDU apdu) throws ISOException { short adr=0,len=0,index=0,readCount=0;
byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer() ;
byte cla = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_CLA]; byte ins = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_INS]; byte P1 = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P1] ; byte P2 = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_P2] ; byte P3 = buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC] ;
adr = Util.makeShort(P1,P2) ; len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,P3) ;
switch (ins) {
case INS_SELECT: readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); return;
case INS_GET_STATUS: Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(VERSION,(short)0,buffer,(short)0,(short)VERS ION.length); Util.setShort(buffer,(short)VERSION.length,status); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(2+VERSION.length)); break;
case INS_VERIFY: readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); if (P2 == (byte)1) { if (readCount != (short)8) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); verify(AdminPin,buffer) ; if(AdminPin.isValidated()) UserPin.resetAndUnblock(); else if (P2 == (byte)0xFF) { if (readCount != (short)8) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); verify(AdminPin,buffer) ; if(AdminPin.isValidated()) { UserPin.resetAndUnblock();
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 19]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024UserPin.update(MyPin,(short)0,(byte)8) ;
}
} } else if (P2 == (byte)0) { if (readCount > (short)8) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); verify(UserPin,buffer); } else ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_P1P2); break;
case INS_CHANGE_PIN: readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive() ; if (readCount != (short)16) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); buffer[4]=(byte)8; if (P2 == (byte)1) { verify(AdminPin,buffer) ;
AdminPin.update(buffer,(short)13,(byte)8);
} else if (P2 == (byte)0) { verify(UserPin,buffer) ;
UserPin.update(buffer,(short)13,(byte)8);
} else ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_P1P2); break;
case INS_HMAC:
readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)4]);
if (len != readCount) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CORRECT_LENGTH_00);
else if ( (!AdminPin.isValidated()) && (!UserPin.isValidated()) ) ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED); if (P2 == (byte)2) // Compute HMAC { len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)5]) ;
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 20]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024hmac(buffer, (short)6, len, buffer, (short)(7+len),
Util.makeShort((byte)0, buffer[(short)(6+len)]), sha256, buffer,(short)0,true);
apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)sha256.getLength());
}
else if (P2 == EXTRACT_EARLY) { len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)5]); //HMAC: key-length
hmac(buffer,(short)6,len,buffer,(short)(7+len),
Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)(6+len)]), sha256, buffer,(short)0,true);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,ESK,(short)0,
(short)ESK.length);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)32,
(short)32);
hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length,
derived,(short)0,(short)derived.length, sha256, buffer,(short)0,true);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,HSK,(short)0,
(short)HSK.length);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)64,
(short)32);
hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length,
ext_binder,(short)0,(short)ext_binder.length, sha256, buffer,(short)0,true);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,eBSK,(short)0,
(short)eBSK.length);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)96,
(short)32);
hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length,
res_binder,(short)0,(short)res_binder.length, sha256, buffer,(short)0,true);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,rBSK,(short)0,
(short)rBSK.length);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)128,
(short)32);
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 21]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024hmac(eBSK,(short)0,(short)eBSK.length,
finished,(short)0,(short)finished.length, sha256, buffer,(short)0,true);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,feBSK,(short)0,
(short)feBSK.length);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)160,
(short)32);
hmac(rBSK,(short)0,(short)rBSK.length,
finished,(short)0,(short)finished.length, sha256, buffer,(short)0,true);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,frBSK,(short)0,
(short)frBSK.length);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)0,buffer,(short)192,
(short)32);
If (P1==(byte)0xFF) apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)32,(short)192); return ; }
else if (P2 == EXPAND_EARLY) { len = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[(short)7]); // data length if (P1 == (byte)0) {
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)5,buffer,(short)0,
(short)2);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)7,
buffer,(short)(2+ c_e_traffic.length), (short)(readCount-2));
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(c_e_traffic,(short)0,buffer,(short)2,
(short)c_e_traffic.length);
buffer[(short)(readCount + c_e_traffic.length)] = (byte)0x01; hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length, buffer,(short)0,(short)(readCount+c_e_traffic.length+1), sha256, buffer,(short)0,true); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)32); return; } else if (P1 == (byte)1) {
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)5,buffer,(short)0,
(short)2);
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer,(short)7,buffer,
short)(2+ c_exp_master.length), (short)(readCount-2));
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 22]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(c_exp_master,(short)0,buffer,(short)2,
(short)c_exp_master.length);
buffer[(short)(readCount + c_exp_master.length)] = (byte)0x01; hmac(ESK,(short)0,(short)ESK.length, buffer,(short)0,(short)(readCount+c_exp_master.length+1), sha256, buffer,(short)0,true); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)32); return; } else ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2);
else if ( P2 == HMAC_RBSK) { hmac(frBSK,(short)0,(short)rBSK.length, buffer,(short)5,readCount, sha256, buffer,(short)0,true); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)sha256.getLength()); }
else if (P2 == HMAC_EBSK) { hmac(feBSK,(short)0,(short)eBSK.length, buffer,(short)5,readCount, sha256, buffer,(short)0,true); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)sha256.getLength()); }
else if (P2 == EXTRACT_HANDSHAKE ) { hmac(HSK,(short)0,(short)HSK.length, buffer,(short)5,readCount, sha256, buffer,(short)0,true); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)32); }
else ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); break;
case INS_SIGN: readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive(); if ( (!AdminPin.isValidated()) && (!UserPin.isValidated()) ) ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);
index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);if (!ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); if (!ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED);
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 23]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024switch (P1) { case (byte)0: // RAW 256 bits case (byte)33:// ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256 len= EccSign(ECCkp[index],buffer,P1) ; apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,len); break;
default:
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); break; } break;
case INS_CLEAR_KEYPAIR:
if ( !AdminPin.isValidated()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);if (ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) ECCkp[index].getPublic().clearKey(); if (ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) ECCkp[index].getPrivate().clearKey(); break;
case INS_GEN_KEYPAIR: // Generate KeyPair
if ( !AdminPin.isValidated()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);if (ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); if (ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED); len=this.GenECCkp(ECCkp[index]); break;
case INS_GET_KEY_PARAM:
if ( (!AdminPin.isValidated()) && (!UserPin.isValidated()) ) ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 24]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED); if ( (P1 == (byte)7) && !AdminPin.isValidated()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED); if ( (P1 == (byte)6) && !ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); if ( (P1 == (byte)7) && !ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED) try { switch (P1)
{ case 0:
len= ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.getA(buffer,(short)(2));
Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); break;
case 1: len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.getB(buffer,(short)(2));
Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); break;
case 2: len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.getField(buffer,(short)(2));
Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); break;
case 3: len= ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.getG(buffer,(short)(2));
Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); break;
case 4: len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic()).getK(); Util.setShort(buffer,(short)2,len); Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,(short)2); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)4); break;
case 5: len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.getR(buffer,(short)(2));
Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); break; case (byte)6: len= ((ECPublicKey) ECCkp[index].getPublic())
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 25]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024.getW(buffer,(short)(2));
Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); break;
case (byte)7: len= ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.getS(buffer,(short)(2));
Util.setShort(buffer,(short)0,len); apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0,(short)(len+2)); break;
default: ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); break;
}
} catch (CryptoException e) {ISOException.throwIt(SW_DUMP_KEYS_PAIR);
break;
}
break;
case INS_SET_KEY_PARAM:
readCount = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive();
if ( !AdminPin.isValidated()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);if ( (P1 == (byte)6) && ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); if ( (P1 == (byte)7) && ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED);
try { switch (P1)
{ case (byte)0:
((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setA(buffer,(short)5,len);
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setA(buffer,(short)5,len);
break; case (byte)1: ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 26]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024.setB(buffer,(short)5,len);
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setB(buffer,(short)5,len);
break;
case (byte)2: ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) .setFieldFP(buffer,(short)5,len) ; ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate()) .setFieldFP(buffer,(short)5,len); break;
case (byte)3: ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setG(buffer,(short)5,len) ;
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setG(buffer,(short)5,len);
break;
case (byte)4: ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setK(Util.makeShort(buffer[5],buffer[6])) ;
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setK(Util.makeShort(buffer[5],buffer[6]));
break;
case (byte)5: ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setR(buffer,(short)5,len);
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setR(buffer,(short)5,len);
break;
case (byte)6: ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setW(buffer,(short)5,len) ;
break;
case (byte)7: ((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setS(buffer,(short)5,len);
break;
default: ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); break;
}
} catch (CryptoException e) {ISOException.throwIt(SW_SET_KEY_PARAM);
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 27]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024break;
}
break;
case INS_INIT_CURVE:
if ( !AdminPin.isValidated()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_PIN_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED);index= Util.makeShort((byte)0,P2); if ( (index <0) || (index >= N_KEYS)) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);if ( (P1 == (byte)6) && ECCkp[index].getPublic().isInitialized() ) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPUB_DEFINED); if ((P1 == (byte)7) && ECCkp[index].getPrivate().isInitialized()) ISOException.throwIt(SW_KPRIV_DEFINED);
switch((byte)P1) { case (byte)0: case (byte)1: (ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setA(ParamA1,(short)0,(short)ParamA1.length) ;
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setA(ParamA1,(short)0,(short)ParamA1.length);
((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setB(ParamB1,(short)0,(short)ParamB1.length) ;
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setB(ParamB1,(short)0,(short)ParamB1.length); ((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic()) .setFieldFP(ParamField1,(short)0,(short)ParamField1.length);
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setFieldFP(ParamField1,(short)0,(short)ParamField1.length);
((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setG(ParamG1,(short)0,(short)ParamG1.length) ;
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setG(ParamG1,(short)0,(short)ParamG1.length);
((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setK(ParamK1) ;
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setK(ParamK1);
((ECPublicKey)ECCkp[index].getPublic())
.setR(ParamR1,(short)0,(short)ParamR1.length) ;
((ECPrivateKey)ECCkp[index].getPrivate())
.setR(ParamR1,(short)0,(short)ParamR1.length); break; default: ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INCORRECT_P1P2); break;
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 28]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024}
break;
default: ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED); }
}
public short EccSign(KeyPair ECCkeyPair, byte [] buf, byte mode) { short len,sLen=(short)0; len= Util.makeShort((byte)0,buf[4]); Util.arrayCopy(buf,(short)5,buf,(short)2,len) // Sign try { if (mode == (byte)0)// default
{ ECCsig.init(ECCkeyPair.getPrivate(),Signature.MODE_SIGN);
sLen = ECCsig.signPreComputedHash(buf,(short)2,len buf,
(short)(2+len));
}
else
{ ECCsig.init(ECCkeyPair.getPrivate(),Signature.MODE_SIGN);
sLen = ECCsig.sign(buf, (short)2, len, buf, (short)(2+len));
}
}
catch (CryptoException e) {ISOException.throwIt(SW_SIGN_ERROR);
return (short)0;
}
Util.arrayCopy(buf,(short)(2+len),buf,(short)2,sLen); Util.setShort(buf,(short)0,sLen); return(short)(sLen+2); }
public short GenECCkp(KeyPair ECCkeyPair) { short len; try { ECCkeyPair.genKeyPair(); } catch (CryptoException e) { ISOException.throwIt(SW_GENKEY_ERROR);
return (short)0;
}
return 0; } public void verify(OwnerPIN pin,byte [] buffer) throws ISOException
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 29]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024{short i,x;
x = Util.makeShort((byte)0,buffer[4]); for(i=x;i<(short)8;i=(short)(i+1)) buffer[(short)(5+i)]=(byte)0xFF; if ( pin.check(buffer, (short)5,(byte)8) == false ) ISOException.throwIt((short)((short)SW_VERIFICATION_FAILED |
(short)pin.getTriesRemaining()));
}
public static final short DB_off = (short)0 ;
public void hmac ( byte [] k,short k_off, short lk, // Secret key byte [] d,short d_off,short ld, // data MessageDigest md, byte out[], short out_off, boolean init) { short i,DIGESTSIZE, DIGESTSIZE2=(short)64,BLOCKSIZE=(short)128; DIGESTSIZE=(short)md.getLength(); if (md.getAlgorithm() == md.ALG_SHA_512) { DIGESTSIZE2= (short)64; BLOCKSIZE = (short)128; } else if (md.getAlgorithm() == md.ALG_SHA_256) { DIGESTSIZE2= (short)32; BLOCKSIZE = (short)64;}
if (init) { if (lk > (short)BLOCKSIZE )
{ md.reset();
md.doFinal(k,k_off,lk,k,k_off); lk = DIGESTSIZE ; } for (i = 0 ; i < lk ; i=(short)(i+1)) DB[(short)(i+DB_off+BLOCKSIZE+DIGESTSIZE2)] = (byte)(k[(short)(i+k_off)] ^ (byte)0x36) ; Util.arrayFillNonAtomic ( DB,(short)(BLOCKSIZE+DIGESTSIZE2+lk+DB_off), (short)(BLOCKSIZE-lk),(byte)0x36); for (i = 0 ; i < lk ; i=(short)(i+1)) DB[(short)(i+DB_off)] = (byte)(k[(short)(i+k_off)] ^ (byte)0x5C); Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(DB,(short)(lk+DB_off),
(short)(BLOCKSIZE-lk),(byte)0x5C);
}
md.reset(); md.update(DB,(short)(DB_off+BLOCKSIZE+DIGESTSIZE2),BLOCKSIZE); md.doFinal(d, d_off,ld,DB,(short)(DB_off+BLOCKSIZE)); md.reset(); md.doFinal(DB,DB_off,(short)(DIGESTSIZE+BLOCKSIZE),out,out_off); } protected im(byte[] bArray,short bOffset,byte bLength) { init();
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 30]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024register();
}
public void init() { short i=0; status = (short)0; ECCkp = new KeyPair[N_KEYS]; UserPin = new OwnerPIN((byte)3,(byte)8); // 3 tries, 4=Max Size AdminPin = new OwnerPIN((byte)10,(byte)8); // 10 tries 8=Max Size UserPin.update(MyPin,(short)0,(byte)8) ; AdminPin.update(OpPin,(short)0,(byte)8); for(i=0;i<N_KEYS;i++) {
try{
ECCkp[i] = new KeyPair(KeyPair.ALG_EC_FP,KeyBuilder.LENGTH_EC_FP_256); status =(short)(status + (short)1);
}
catch (CryptoException e){}
} try { ECCsig = Signature.getInstance(Signature.ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256, false); status =(short)(status | (short)0x0100);
}
catch (CryptoException e){} try { sha256 = MessageDigest.getInstance(MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_256, false); status =(short)(status | (short)0x2000);
}
catch (CryptoException e){} DB = JCSystem.makeTransientByteArray(DBSIZE,
JCSystem.CLEAR_ON_DESELECT);
}
public static void install(byte[] bArray, short bOffset,
byte bLength )
{ new im(bArray,bOffset,bLength);}
public boolean select() { if (UserPin.isValidated()) UserPin.reset(); if (AdminPin.isValidated()) AdminPin.reset(); return true;
}
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 31]Identity Module for TLS Version 1.3 January 2024 8 IANA ConsiderationsThis draft does not require any action from IANA.
9 Security ConsiderationsThis entire document is about security.
10 References 10.1 Normative References[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and- Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[ISO7816] ISO 7816, "Cards Identification - Integrated Circuit Cards with Contacts", The International Organization for Standardization (ISO).
[GP-SPI-I2C] GlobalPlatform Technology, APDU Transport over SPI/I2C Version 0.0.0.39, July 2019
10.2 Informative References[IM-JC] https://github.com/purien/TLS-SE/blob/master/im/im.java
11 Authors' AddressesPascal Urien Telecom Paris 19 place Marguerite Perey 91120 Palaiseau Phone: NA France Email: Pascal.Urien@telecom-paris.fr
Urien Expires July 2024 [Page 32]
