These are excerpts and elaborations from my book "The Nature of Consciousness"
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Conceptual Dependency The culmination of this
school was, in the 1970s, Roger Schank's "conceptual dependency" theory (1969), whose tenet is that two
sentences whose meaning is equivalent must have the same representation. This
goal can be achieved by decomposing verbs into elementary concepts (or semantic
primitives). Sentences describe things that happen, i.e. actions. While every
language provides for many different actions (usually expressed as verbs), it
turns out that most of them can be defined in terms of simpler ones. For
example, “to deliver” is a combination of “to move” and other simpler actions.
In other words, a number of primitive actions can be used to form all complex
actions. In analyzing language, one can therefore focus on those primitive
actions. Or, equivalently, a verb can be decomposed in terms of more primitive
concepts. Each action entails roles
which are common to all languages. For example, “to move” requires an agent who
causes the move to happen, an object to be moved, an old location and a new
location, possibly a timeframe, etc. Sometimes the roles are not explicitly stated
in a sentence, but they can be derived from the context. Whether they are
stated in the sentence or implicit in the context, those roles always exist.
And they exist for every language that has that concept. “To move” may be
translated with different words in different languages, but it always requires
a mover, an object, etc. An important
corollary is that any two sentences that share the same meaning will have
exactly the same representation in conceptual dependency, regardless of how
much is left implicit by each one, regardless of how each is structured. If
they refer to the same mover and the same object and the same location and the
same timeframe, two different sentences on “moving” will have identical
representations. Conceptual dependency reveals
things that are not explicit in the surface form of the utterance: additional
roles and additional relations. They
are filled in through one’s knowledge of lexical semantics and domain
heuristics. These two components help infer what is true in the domain. Conceptual dependency
represented a major departure from “Chomskyan” analysis, which always remained
relatively faithful to the way a
sentence is structured. Schank’s analysis considers negligible the way words have been assembled and
shifts the emphasis on what is being described. If nothing else, this is
presumably closer to the way our memory remembers them. Back to the beginning of the chapter "Language: Minds Speak" | Back to the index of all chapters |
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