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I attended the AGM today — and it was quite a spectacle.
A large number of shareholders took to the microphone to push for share buybacks. Even before the meeting, the outsourced IR team had received over 50 pre-AGM questions, more than 20 of which were repeated calls for buybacks. During the AGM itself, roughly half of the shareholders who spoke raised the same issue. Due to recurring themes, it was condensed to 16 questions, with even a later question making reference to Q5 which was YZJFH rebuttal against the merits of a share buyback
The core argument from shareholders was straightforward: a buyback would signal confidence in management, demonstrate belief in the underlying assets, and help address the persistent undervaluation.
Management, however, pushed back and outlined three key reasons why buybacks were not currently being considered:
1. Earnings impact – Buybacks do not increase absolute earnings and could affect their 40% payout ratio framework.
2. Portfolio concentration – Buybacks would reduce diversification by concentrating exposure within the existing portfolio.
3. Capital allocation strategy – Management believes China offers the best risk-adjusted returns. As such, they are holding significant cash in RMB to deploy into opportunities where they can acquire controlling stakes and take over management of Chinese companies.
Shareholders were quick to challenge these points. On the first argument, several highlighted that buybacks are earnings accretive on a per-share basis, which should support dividend growth. Comparisons were drawn to Hongkong Land, where the new CEO initiated buybacks to reflect confidence in the company’s assets. Others also pointed out that YZJFH itself conducted buybacks in 2023 — when CEO Liu Hua was already part of the management team — under similar undervaluation conditions.
After sustained pressure, management softened its stance slightly, stating they would consider buybacks if deemed an efficient use of excess cash. That said, their body language suggested continued hesitation. This even when shareholder mathematiclally showed there was a 80-90% uplift in NAV while buying into the company with core earnings of 10 times price earnings
Beyond buybacks, management reiterated their long-term strategy: deploying capital into private debt and acquiring equity stakes in distressed companies, with the goal of becoming controlling shareholders and influencing management.
On the topic of investing in Singapore equities, management clarified that their 4.5% return target refers to total shareholder return, not just dividend yield. While they acknowledge that SGX-listed REITs can deliver yields above 6%, these are viewed as short-term trading positions rather than core holdings. The intention is to recycle capital from such investments into higher-conviction opportunities aligned with their long-term strategy. They had achieved 4.5% returns in the past 4 months on an annualised basis
Operationally, management shared that in the first four months of 2026, they had liquidated approximately 15–20% of their China debt investments classified as non-performing loans, utilising a significant portion of the credit allowances previously set aside.
Shareholders also raised concerns about communication and governance. There were calls for more forward-looking guidance, in line with Singapore Exchange expectations. The AGM itself was poorly managed — the IR team spent nearly 30 minutes reading out pre-submitted Q&A that should have been disclosed beforehand via SGX announcements. Shareholders eventually interrupted this portion saying this should have been published earlier as pre-reading instead of them being read out during the AGM. Most SGX companies are doing this. Management acknowledged these shortcomings.
After nearly two hours of non-stop Q&A — largely centred on undervaluation and the case for buybacks — I left the meeting (along with several others) with the clear impression that management remains firmly committed to its current capital allocation stance.
Notably, management disclosed that up to RMB 1 billion of cash could be redeployed annually offshore with limited tax leakage under the SAFE framework — more than their SGD 616 million equivalent cash held in China. Despite this flexibility, they prefer to keep funds in RMB, citing expectations of RMB appreciation and a stronger opportunity set in China. The previously mentioned 50/50 China vs ex-China allocation is now a long-term aspiration with no fixed timeline.
In the interim, around 20% of this RMB 1 billion has been deployed into high-yielding Singapore assets, generating an annualised total shareholder return of approximately 4.5%.
Ultimately, as minority shareholders, we do not have control over YZJFH’s capital allocation decisions. For now, investors will have to accept management’s strategic direction. Based on current assumptions, the company could deliver around 3 cents in EPS, implying dividends in the range of 1.2–1.5 Singapore cents.
A large number of shareholders took to the microphone to push for share buybacks. Even before the meeting, the outsourced IR team had received over 50 pre-AGM questions, more than 20 of which were repeated calls for buybacks. During the AGM itself, roughly half of the shareholders who spoke raised the same issue. Due to recurring themes, it was condensed to 16 questions, with even a later question making reference to Q5 which was YZJFH rebuttal against the merits of a share buyback
The core argument from shareholders was straightforward: a buyback would signal confidence in management, demonstrate belief in the underlying assets, and help address the persistent undervaluation.
Management, however, pushed back and outlined three key reasons why buybacks were not currently being considered:
1. Earnings impact – Buybacks do not increase absolute earnings and could affect their 40% payout ratio framework.
2. Portfolio concentration – Buybacks would reduce diversification by concentrating exposure within the existing portfolio.
3. Capital allocation strategy – Management believes China offers the best risk-adjusted returns. As such, they are holding significant cash in RMB to deploy into opportunities where they can acquire controlling stakes and take over management of Chinese companies.
Shareholders were quick to challenge these points. On the first argument, several highlighted that buybacks are earnings accretive on a per-share basis, which should support dividend growth. Comparisons were drawn to Hongkong Land, where the new CEO initiated buybacks to reflect confidence in the company’s assets. Others also pointed out that YZJFH itself conducted buybacks in 2023 — when CEO Liu Hua was already part of the management team — under similar undervaluation conditions.
After sustained pressure, management softened its stance slightly, stating they would consider buybacks if deemed an efficient use of excess cash. That said, their body language suggested continued hesitation. This even when shareholder mathematiclally showed there was a 80-90% uplift in NAV while buying into the company with core earnings of 10 times price earnings
Beyond buybacks, management reiterated their long-term strategy: deploying capital into private debt and acquiring equity stakes in distressed companies, with the goal of becoming controlling shareholders and influencing management.
On the topic of investing in Singapore equities, management clarified that their 4.5% return target refers to total shareholder return, not just dividend yield. While they acknowledge that SGX-listed REITs can deliver yields above 6%, these are viewed as short-term trading positions rather than core holdings. The intention is to recycle capital from such investments into higher-conviction opportunities aligned with their long-term strategy. They had achieved 4.5% returns in the past 4 months on an annualised basis
Operationally, management shared that in the first four months of 2026, they had liquidated approximately 15–20% of their China debt investments classified as non-performing loans, utilising a significant portion of the credit allowances previously set aside.
Shareholders also raised concerns about communication and governance. There were calls for more forward-looking guidance, in line with Singapore Exchange expectations. The AGM itself was poorly managed — the IR team spent nearly 30 minutes reading out pre-submitted Q&A that should have been disclosed beforehand via SGX announcements. Shareholders eventually interrupted this portion saying this should have been published earlier as pre-reading instead of them being read out during the AGM. Most SGX companies are doing this. Management acknowledged these shortcomings.
After nearly two hours of non-stop Q&A — largely centred on undervaluation and the case for buybacks — I left the meeting (along with several others) with the clear impression that management remains firmly committed to its current capital allocation stance.
Notably, management disclosed that up to RMB 1 billion of cash could be redeployed annually offshore with limited tax leakage under the SAFE framework — more than their SGD 616 million equivalent cash held in China. Despite this flexibility, they prefer to keep funds in RMB, citing expectations of RMB appreciation and a stronger opportunity set in China. The previously mentioned 50/50 China vs ex-China allocation is now a long-term aspiration with no fixed timeline.
In the interim, around 20% of this RMB 1 billion has been deployed into high-yielding Singapore assets, generating an annualised total shareholder return of approximately 4.5%.
Ultimately, as minority shareholders, we do not have control over YZJFH’s capital allocation decisions. For now, investors will have to accept management’s strategic direction. Based on current assumptions, the company could deliver around 3 cents in EPS, implying dividends in the range of 1.2–1.5 Singapore cents.
