Georgia’s party system is unusually difficult to map. More than 200 parties are formally registered, although many are inactive, while new parties, movements, and electoral alliances appear frequently. Parties split, rebrand, or cooperate for a single election and then separate again. For the outside observers, the formal party list therefore says little about which actors actually matter and how they relate to one another.

Author: Sandro Tabatadze, Assistant Professor, Tbilisi State University, Georgia

For much of the period after 2012, Georgian politics was organised around two poles: Georgian Dream–Democratic Georgia (GD), in power since 2012, and the United National Movement (UNM), which governed from 2004 to 2012 and then became the principal opposition force. That structure still matters, but it no longer captures the landscape as a whole. Many current parties emerged through splits from either GD or the UNM. While some continue to gravitate back toward one of these two poles, especially ahead of elections, others are becoming increasingly alienated from them. And then, there are forces that deliberately present themselves as alternatives to both.

Ideology alone is therefore a poor guide. Organisational origin, leadership networks and attitudes toward former and current ruling parties often explain behaviour better than conventional left–right labels. Foreign-policy orientation is another major dividing line, particularly the contrast between Euro-Atlantic integration and neutrality or openly Eurosceptic positions.

A third dimension has become more important since the disputed 2024 parliamentary election: institutional strategy. Most opposition parties rejected the results and refused to take up their mandates; some also boycotted the 2025 local elections, while others returned to electoral competition. Parliamentary representation alone is therefore no longer a reliable guide to political relevance.

How this guide classifies parties

This guide primarily focuses on political genealogy, but uses two more criteria, including foreign-policy orientation and current institutional strategy. Genealogy and foreign-policy position provide the main structure; participation in or boycott of elections and representative institutions helps distinguish parties within the same broader camp. While some forces and movements, including the Federalists, Girchi/Party of Free People, Girchi-More Freedom, Movement for Social Democracy, and Eurosceptic parties, maintain a strong ideological focus, such forces are yet to reach a share that would allow for an ideology-based classification of the entire political spectrum.

The categories are analytical rather than formal coalition labels: actors placed in the same group do not necessarily cooperate or share identical programmes. The guide covers 22 relatively visible political actors and divides them into five groups:

1. The ruling and ruling-aligned camp
2. The pro-European opposition originating from the ruling party
3. Pro-European parties originating from the former ruling party and its splits
4. Pro-European “third force” opposition
5. The Eurosceptic opposition

1. The Ruling and Ruling-Aligned Camp

The ruling camp is centred on Georgian Dream (GD). Founded in 2012 by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, now the party’s honorary chairman, GD came to power at the head of a broad opposition coalition. Over time, coalition government gave way to single-party rule. The party’s initial big-tent and broadly pro-Western profile has also changed substantially. GD still formally presents European integration as a national objective, but increasingly frames relations with EU institutions and Western partners through sovereignty, external interference and conspiracy narratives, including references to a “Global War Party” or “Deep State”. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze currently chairs the party.

Three formally separate actors are best understood as part of the wider ruling-aligned space.

People’s Power was founded in 2022 by MPs who formally left GD while continuing to support its parliamentary majority. Its members later ran again on the GD list in the 2024 parliamentary election. After the election, they once more separated from the majority and presented themselves as part of a “healthy opposition”. Sozar Subari chairs the group.

The European Socialists were founded in 2021 under Fridon Injia. They had run on the conservative Alliance of Patriots (AoP) party list in the 2020 elections but entered parliament after distancing themselves from the AoP’s boycott. The party did not contest the 2024 parliamentary election independently, but three MPs elected on the GD list later left the ruling faction and re-established a parliamentary group under the European Socialists name. The group, led by Ilia Injia, has likewise been presented as part of the “healthy opposition”.

United Neutral Georgia is a newer and somewhat different case. The movement emerged in 2024 and held its founding congress as a political party in December 2025. It advocates permanent neutrality and rejects Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Formally, it is not part of GD and at times criticises the government for remaining attached to what it calls “Euro-illusions”. In practice, however, its discourse has repeatedly echoed and amplified core GD narratives about the pro-EU opposition, Western interference and national sovereignty, while several founders have prior links to the ruling party or its political orbit. The party is led by Vato Shakarishvili.

These parties are not organisationally identical: GD governs; People’s Power and the European Socialists are parliamentary offshoots closely tied to it, while United Neutral Georgia operates outside parliament on a more radical anti-EU flank. Their inclusion in the same group reflects political alignment rather than organisational ties.

2. The Pro-European Opposition Originating from the Ruling Camp

Gakharia—For Georgia (FG) is the only major active opposition party to have emerged directly from GD. It was founded in 2021 after Giorgi Gakharia resigned as prime minister and broke with the ruling party. Before the split, Gakharia had been one of GD’s most prominent figures, serving as interior minister and then prime minister from 2019 to 2021.

FG presents itself as a pro-European force and accuses GD of abandoning Georgia’s Western trajectory. It rejected the official results of the 2024 parliamentary election and initially joined the parliamentary boycott without renouncing its mandates. The party later contested the 2025 local elections and ended the boycott, becoming the only opposition force elected in the 2024 disputed vote to enter parliament. Gakharia has remained in Germany since June 2025 amid mounting legal and political pressure and was charged in absentia in two criminal cases in November 2025.

3. Pro-European Parties Originating From Former Ruling Party and Its Splits

The third and largest group centres on the United National Movement (UNM) and pro-European parties that emerged directly or indirectly from its political and organisational networks. Within this wider political genealogy, however, the parties now occupy very different positions: some continue to cooperate closely with the UNM, while others have developed more autonomous political identities.

The UNM was founded in 2001 under Mikheil Saakashvili, who became president after the 2003 Rose Revolution and is currently imprisoned in Georgia. The party governed from 2004 to 2012 and remained the principal pro-Western opposition force for much of the following decade. Disputes over leadership, internal decision-making and electoral strategy subsequently produced several major splits. In the 2024 disputed parliamentary election, the UNM was the principal force in the Unity—National Movement coalition, but the second-best-performing opposition force per official results.

Two important parties emerged directly from earlier UNM divisions but eventually returned to electoral cooperation with it. Strategy Aghmashenebeli  (initially called New Georgia), a centrist and pro-European party led by Giorgi Vashadze, was founded in 2016 after Vashadze left the UNM. European Georgia – Movement for Liberty, a liberal and pro-European party currently led by Gigi Tsereteli, was formed by senior UNM figures in 2017 and initially sought to distance itself from Saakashvili’s leadership. Both joined the UNM-led coalition in 2024.

New Political Centre—Girchi also emerged from the UNM split but followed a different path. Founded in 2015 by Zurab Japaridze and several other former UNM MPs, it developed a right-libertarian and broadly pro-Western profile. After Japaridze left in 2020, Girchi, now led by Iago Khvichia and recently renamed the Party of Free People, increasingly distanced itself from both the UNM and the wider opposition mainstream. It supports Georgia’s Western integration but is more critical of EU institutions and regulations than most other parties in this group. Girchi contested both the 2024 parliamentary and 2025 local elections independently.

Ahead of the 2024 parliamentary election, three newer parties from different branches of this wider political genealogy came together in the Coalition for Change: Girchi—More Freedom, a pro-European right-wing libertarian party led by Zurab Japaridze, was established in 2020 after his split from the Girchi. Droa, a pro-European liberal party with an activist-oriented profile led by Elene Khoshtaria, was founded in 2021 after Khoshtaria left European Georgia. Ahali, a pro-European, centre-right liberal party co-led by Nika Melia, a former UNM chairman, and Nika Gvaramia, was founded in 2024.

The Federalists emerged from a further split within European Georgia later in 2024. The pro-European liberal party was founded by Giga Bokeria, Tamar Chergoleishvili, and their supporters after they left European Georgia following an internal dispute. Because the party was established after the electoral registration deadline, it did not participate in the 2024 parliamentary election.

These political parties therefore share a common political genealogy, but today range from close UNM partners to increasingly autonomous opposition actors.

4.     Pro-European ‘Third-Force’ Opposition

The fourth group comprises pro-European parties and movements that position themselves outside both GD and the UNM-linked political space. They are often described as part of a “third-force” opposition, although they do not form a single bloc and differ in ideology, leadership, and electoral strategy.

            The Georgian Labour Party was founded in 1995 and remains led by Shalva Natelashvili. A left-populist and broadly pro-European party, it predates both GD and the UNM and has remained organisationally independent of both. It contested the 2024 parliamentary election independently and boycotted the 2025 local elections, but has lately remained largely in the shadows.

            Lelo for Georgia (Lelo) was founded in 2019 by Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze and developed as a centrist, pro-European alternative to both GD and the UNM. Led by Khazaradze, it became the main force in the Strong Georgia coalition in the 2024 parliamentary election. The party refused to enter parliament after the election but participated in the 2025 local elections and formed a temporary electoral collaboration with Gakharia-For Georgia, but the alliance was later dissolved.

            Citizens was founded in 2020 by currently jailed Aleksandre Elisashvili as a small, pro-European party independent of both major political camps. It joined Strong Georgia in 2024 and remained with it for the 2025 local elections.

            For the People, a centre-left and pro-European party founded in 2021 and led by Anna Dolidze, also joined Strong Georgia in 2024. Although Dolidze had previously served as deputy defence minister under a GD government, the party did not emerge as a GD splinter. It left Strong Georgia in 2025 and boycotted the local elections, and has remained largely passive since.

            Freedom Square was established in 2024 by Levan Tsutskiridze and figures from civil society and academia. The pro-European movement joined Strong Georgia for the parliamentary election, became an independent political party in 2025, then left the coalition and boycotted the local elections.

Two newer actors have also entered this third-force space, but are yet to secure registration as a political party:

The Movement for Social Democracy, founded in February 2025, is a left-wing and pro-European political movement focused on social justice and economic inequality. It emerged from the protest movement, is led collectively, and is expected to launch as a political party in the coming months.

Georgia First (Jer Sakartvelo), founded by Viktor Kipiani, a former lawyer of GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, held its founding congress in June 2026. The party describes itself as a “pragmatic right” force, supports Georgia’s European and NATO integration, and has criticised GD’s increasingly confrontational approach towards the West. It has reported problems with securing official registration recently.

All these actors therefore occupy a shared “third-force” space rather than a unified political camp, combining a broadly pro-European orientation with distinct ideological profiles and political strategies.

5. The Eurosceptic Opposition

The fifth group comprises anti-liberal, sovereigntist, and Eurosceptic parties. Despite earlier allegations and perceptions that they closely cooperated with the ruling Georgian Dream party, they currently position themselves against both GD and the pro-European opposition, often presenting themselves as the only genuinely patriotic alternative.

The Alliance of Patriots of Georgia was founded in 2012 by Irma Inashvili and Davit Tarkhan-Mouravi. A national-conservative and neutralist party, it advocates military neutrality, rejects NATO membership, and supports direct dialogue with Russia. Although historically associated with strong anti-Western rhetoric, its position has become somewhat less categorical in recent years, particularly towards European integration. In 2024, the party ran on a joint electoral list with figures from the then-deregistered Conservative Movement – Alt-Info, but failed to cross the five-per-cent threshold. It contested the 2025 local elections independently.

Conservatives for Georgia was registered in April 2025 as the successor to the Conservative Movement-Alt-Info, founded in 2021. Chaired by Giorgi Kardava, with Zurab Makharadze among its principal public figures, the party remains explicitly anti-Western, anti-liberal and pro-Russian, advocating closer relations with Russia and portraying liberal Western values as a threat to Georgian national identity and traditional social norms. The group rose to notoriety for leading 2021 homophobic pogroms in Tbilisi. After running with the Alliance of Patriots in 2024, it contested the 2025 local elections independently.

The two parties therefore occupy a distinct Eurosceptic opposition space, but differ in both the degree of their anti-Western positioning and their current organisational strategies.

What the Map Shows in 2026

Taken together, the five groups show a party system that is neither a simple GD–UNM duopoly nor a conventional left–right competition. GD remains the only consolidated political pole, surrounded by several ruling-aligned actors, while the opposition is deeply fragmented among a pro-European force originating from GD, a broad UNM political genealogy, a diverse pro-European “third-force” space, as well as a smaller Eurosceptic opposition.

Within the pro-European opposition, the main dividing lines are increasingly political origin, leadership, mutual trust and institutional strategy rather than foreign-policy orientation. Parties differ over cooperation with UNM-linked forces and, since 2024, over whether to participate in elections and representative institutions or maintain a boycott. The five groups should therefore be read as a map of political origins and current positioning, rather than as fixed electoral blocs.