ɸνѸ mood modality Ϥ褯Ʊ롥ؿ缭ŵ٤ˤ mood ϡ֡ưΡˡˡԤɽư֤ФüԤοŪ٤ưθѲաסmodality ϡˡˡơԴ˾̿Ꭵ½ʤɼοŪ٤칽¤ˤäɽ뤳ȡפȤ롥ξԤζ̤ˤĤơBybee (165--66) "Mood and modality" ꤹǫ˲⤷ƤΤǡѤ褦
The working definition of mood used in the survey is that mood is a marker on the verb that signals how the speaker chooses to put the proposition into the discourse context. The main function of this definition is to distinguish mood from tense and aspect, and to group together the well-known moods, indicative, imperative, subjunctive and so on. It was intentionally formulated to be general enough to cover both markers of illocutionary force, such as imperative, and markers of the degree of commitment of the speaker to the truth of the proposition, such as dubitative. What all these markers of the mood category have in common is that they signal what the speaker is doing with the proposition, and they have the whole proposition in their scope. Included under this definition are epistemic modalities, i.e. those that signal the degree of commitment the speaker has to the truth of the proposition. These are usually said to range from certainty to probability to possibility.
Excluded, however, are the other "modalities", such as the deontic modalities of permission and obligation, because they describe certain conditions on the agent with regard to the main predication. Some of the English modal auxiliaries have both an epistemic and a deontic reading. The following two examples illustrate the deontic functions of obligation and permission respectively:
Sally must be more polite to her mother.
The students may use the library at any time.
The epistemic functions of these same auxiliaries can be seen by putting them in a sentence without an agentive subject:
It must be raining.
It may be raining.
Now the auxiliaries signal the speaker's degree of commitment to the proposition "it is raining". Along with deontic modalities, markers of ability, desire and intention are excluded from the definition of mood since they express conditions pertaining to the agent that are in effect with respect to the main predication. I will refer to obligation, permission, ability, desire and intention as "agent-oriented" modalities.
The hypothesis implicit in the working definition of mood as an inflectional category is that markers of modalities that designate conditions on the agent of the sentence will not often occur as inflections on verbs, while markers that designate the role the speaker wants the proposition to play in the discourse will often occur as inflections. This hypothesis was overwhelmingly supported by the languages in the sample. Hundreds of inflectional markers that fit the definition of mood were found to occur in the languages of the sample. In fact, such markers are the most common type of inflection on verbs. However, inflectional markers of obligation, permission, ability or intention are extremely rare in the sample, and occur only under specific conditions.
mood ϼȤƷʤտ路ựŪƥָ̿modality ϼȤựŪƥָ̿ΤȤ⤢йټԻָΤȤ⤢롤ȤȤ館Ƥ褵̣δ餤СԤϸԤݤ뤳Ȥˤʤ롥Bybee (169) ˤϼ̤ꡥ
The cross-linguistic data suggest, then, the following uses of the terms modality and mood. Modality designates a conceptual domain which may take various types of linguistic expression, while mood designates the inflectional expression of a subdivision of this semantic domain. Since there is much cross-linguistic consistency concerning which modalities are expressed inflectionally, mood can refer both to the form of expression, and to a conceptual domain.
Bybee, Joan. Morphology: A Study of the Relation between Meaning and Form. John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1985.
#4564. ˡưκỤ̄ǧỤ̄ ([2021-10-25-1]) ˰³ˡư2ĤˡˤĤơmay ˼ȡ?Ƥ褤פȤĤɽ魯Ụ̄ȡ?⤷ʤפȤǽɽ魯ǧỤ̄롥2Ĥΰ̣ϤʤƱ路ƤΤ
ˤĤƤϱѸؤǤ͡ʬϤƤʤƤSweetser ǧΰ̣˴Ť⤬ܤ롥ˤȡmay κỤ̄ϡּҲʪˤŪʾ㳲ʤפȤȤǤ롥㤨 John may go. ֥ϤäƤ褤פϡŪˡ֥ԤȤˤŪʾ㳲ʤפ̣롥ۤʤо㳲Ƥ뤫⤷ʤǤϤΤ褦ʾ㳲ʤȤȤ
may ǧỤ̄ϡǧˤŪʾ㳲ʤפȤȤǤ롥㤨СJohn may be there. ֥Ϥˤ뤫⤷ʤפϡǧŪʴ֥ˤȤˤŪʾ㳲ʤפ̣롥ߤμμ˴ŤСΤ褦˿뤳ȤǤ롤ȤȤ
ĤޤꡤҲʪˤŪʾ㳲ʤפǧοˤŪʾ㳲ʤפ˥ޥåԥƤȤΤξԤϡʲΤ褦ƱΥޤ˴ŤƲ᤹뤳ȤǤ롥ΤȤŪʾ㳲ʤ鱦̤ȴȤ
ġġġġġġġġĢ
1. In both the sociophysical and the epistemic worlds, nothing prevents the occurrence of whatever is modally marked with may; the chain of events is not obstructed.
2. In both the sociophysical and the epistemic worlds, there is some background understanding that if things were different, something could obstruct the chain of events. For example, permission or other sociophysical conditions could change; and added premises might make the reasoner reach a different conclusion.
ʬϤ must can ʤɡỤ̄ǧỤ̄¾ˡưˤŬѤǤ롥must ˤĤƤ Sweetser (64) βˤꡤ䴰줿
. . . I propose that the root-modal meanings can be extended metaphorically from the "real" (sociophysical) world to the epistemic world. In the real world, the must in a sentence such as "John must go to all the department parties" is taken as indicating a real-world force imposed by the speaker (and/or by some other agent) which compels the subject of the sentence (or someone else) to do the action (or bring about its doing) expressed in the sentence. In the epistemic world the same sentence could be read as meaning "I must conclude that it is John's habit to go to the department parties (because I see his name on the sign-up sheet every time, and he's always out on those nights)." Here must is taken as indicating an epistemic force applied by some body of premises (the only thing that can apply epistemic force), which compels the speaker (or people in general) to reach the conclusion embodied in the sentence. This epistemic force is the counterpart, in the epistemic domain, of a forceful obligation in the sociophysical domain. The polysemy between root and epistemic senses is thus seen (as suggested above) as the conventionalization, for this group of lexical items, of a a metaphorical mapping between domains.
Sweetser, E. From Etymology to Pragmatics. Cambridge: CUP, 1990.
must, may, can ʤɤˡư (auxiliary_verb) ˤϡỤ̄ (root sense) ǧỤ̄ (epistemic sense) Ȥ롥̻ŪˤǧŪˤԤԤΤǤ뤳Ȥ顤ԤŪ (root) ȾΤ뤬ǽܤе̳Ụ̄ (deontic sense) ôäƤȤäƤ褤
must ˼Сʸ (1) Ρ?ʤФʤʤפŪʤ뤤ϵ̳Ū˰̣Ǥꡤʸ (2) Ρ?ˤʤפǧỤ̄ȤȤˤʤ (Sweetser 49)
(1) John must be home by ten; Mother won't let him stay out any later.
(2) John must be home already; I see his coat.
ŪˤСỤ̄ϸε̳ġǽϤɽ路ǧỤ̄Ͽˤɬǽɽ魯Sweetser (51) ̤ѸǤС줾 "sociophysical domain" "epistemic domain" ˴ط롥츫ƴطƤȤϻפʤ2Ĥΰ衦ؤθڤƱˡưˤäƤʤƤΤ϶̣
ºݡѸ˸¤餺¿θˤơỤ̄ǧỤ̄ξĸ줬ѻ롥²Ϥࡤեԥɥޥ䡤եνǤݤǧ롥⡤ŪԤԤȤ (unidirectionality) ζߤcf. #1980. Ѳ ([2014-09-28-1]))
Ȥȡ϶ǤϤʤ餫ưŤȤȤˤʤǧθؤǤϡ"sociophysical domain" "epistemic domain" δ֤ΥեȤ褦Ȥ롥ΰ̴طǧΰ̴ط˥ޥåԥ̡Ụ̄ǧỤ̄ΤȤǤ롥
Sweetser, E. From Etymology to Pragmatics. Cambridge: CUP, 1990.
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