ظλŵ٤įƤȤѲ (language_change) Ȥδؿʬ˴ؤ͡ʵܤӹǤѲˤĤƤϻܥ֥¾͡˹ͤƤԤ10ͤ10̤θѲѤ롥ϡظλŵ٤ pp. 560--62 ˵ܤƤ롤ԻˤָѲװȤΥᥫ˥פꤹ1Ѥ롥
ѲװȤΥᥫ˥
ȤФϻήѲ³ΤǤꡤ˶٥ǤѲ˵ŤˤϤƤ֤ȤФפȤª졤оݤȤʤ롥Ȥʿ»ʸغʤ䡤ñʸȯΤʤɤСѲïܤˤ餫Ǥ롥äơޤȤФѲΤޤǤȤȯΩäƸ츽ݤƤȤפǤ롥Ĥƥ塼Ferdinand de Saussure, 185--1913ˤذ̸عֵ (Cours de linguistique générale)٤̻ (diachronic linguistics) ȶ (synchronic linguistics) ̡˸椹٤ǤȽҤ٤ΤϡޤǯʸˡɤŰ줷ˡ§õ˷پĤ餹ǤäȻפ뤬ɤʸǤ⤵ޤޤʥ٥ǾѲοʹʳˤΤǡŪԤʤǤ̻Ūʻ³뤳ȤڤǤ롥
ǤϤʤȤФѲΤǤŪװȤƤϻҶθ콬βҲŪѰۡŪװȤƤϸܿͤ롥Ҷͤζʤȯäʹʤû֤Τ˸ʸˡηϤ뤬ͤˤʤäƤϤۤɴñˤѲʤĤޤҶθ콬β˸ѲװǤȻפ롥ޤθ츽ݤवޤޤʼҲŪѰۤɤ줬ˤɤΤ褦ʷǺѤƤΤͽǤʤɤ⡤ȤΡ֥ɡפϡ֥ԲפȤιήؤȸָסֿ٤פʤɤΡ֤ȴաפ夷ƤΤ⤷ʤʬβˤϡָ콬פּҲءפθ̤ԲķȤ롥ܿˤѲϡŪܤ֤ʤɤȯѤ뤤¿Ѥˤ륳ɴ֤δĤˤäͶȯ롥ܺ٤ˤĤƤϸҤ롥
ƶ٥ǸѲβ˵ŤȤ⤢뤱ɤ⡤Ѳɴǯǯñ̤ǸˤꤤäϤäǧ롥λ庹ѻ뤿ˤϲʸԲķǤ롥ĤޤꤽΤ褦ʸäƽƸѲװȤΥᥫ˥βǽˤʤȤ롥λŪ椬ˤ礭ȯŸΤ⡤¾θ²ʤʸϿ¿¸ߤǤ롥ʸϲ٤ݼŪǤʤɡɬ줬ΤޤϿƤ櫓Ǥʤαդ뤳ȤɬפǤ롥
ûʸϤΤʤˡѲκǤפǻ̩˵ͤޤƤ롥ǽפΤ٤Ƥ夷Ƥ櫓ǤϤʤΤΡ̩٤϶ä٤䤬ǤͤȽǤ5ȴФ
(1) ֤ȤФѲΤޤǤȤȯΩäƸ츽ݤƤȤפǤ
(2) ֶŪԤʤǤ̻Ūʻ³뤳ȤڤǤ
(3) ֤ʤȤФѲΤǤŪװȤƤϻҶθ콬βҲŪѰۡŪװȤƤϸܿͤ
(4) ֤ʬβˤϡָ콬פּҲءפθ̤ԲķȤ
(5) ʸϲ٤ݼŪǤʤɡɬ줬ΤޤϿƤ櫓Ǥʤαդ뤳ȤɬפǤ
ԡָѲסظλŵ١ ʿԡˡīҽŹ2005ǯ560--82ǡ

ǯ4˽Ǥ줿ܸˤοǤVoicy heldio ۿ#1158. ܸȴ --- ˡʤդˡ١ȽŹҴȿӡ2024ǯǴñ˾Ҳ𤷤ޤ
Ϥפʵ͡ŸƤΤǤǤ pp. 9--10 1Ѥޤ
ޤǤϡɻܸˤĤơֲסָáסʸˡˡסʸɽΤ褦ˡʬʬƵҤʿ»塤һƱͤ˵ҤƤȤ꤫ȤƤɻ塤ʿ»ϤˤäƤΤǡ줾̤Ρֶ֡פȤߤ뤳ȤϤǤ롥ĤʤƤȤ館ƤɤϤ狼ʤȤ⤤롥ʤʤСɤȵԤǤϡ֤ۤʤ뤫ĤޤɻܸȻפäƤܸϤСפǤꡤʿ»ܸȻפäƤܸϤСֵפǤꡤۤʤʤΤ㤦ΤȤǽˤӽƤʤԹȤޤǤϤʤ⤷ʤȤˤܤۤɬפ롥ޤꤽθϤʤƤƤʤȻפ롥
λŦܸˤΤߤʤ餺Ѹˤˤ⤽ΤޤƤϤޤǡܤͤޤѸˤǤ⡤űѸΡɸפϥΥȥǤѸʹߤΤϡפȤĤ¾ħɥȤʤޤ
űѸȸѸθŪۤݤˡ̻ŪѲפ⤫٤Τ̤Ȼפޤ٤ƤΤűѸΥȥȸѸΥɥȤȤդɬפޤκۤϡ̻ŪѲǤϤʤȿǤƤǽΤǤ̻ŪѲξؤäƤ륱¿Ǥ礦ݥȤϡּǤϤʤּθʤФʤʤȤȤǤϡˤɤݤ˾դǤ
ܸȴ --- ˡʤȤФˡ١ȽŹҴȥ˥ӡ2024ǯ
ϢűѸˤ̾ܤƤ롥űѸȰˤäƤĹˤ錄ʤΤǡ̻ŪѲäȤƤ⤪ʤ̾̾դ˥ȥɤ뤳ȤϸαѸǤܸǤ褯ΤƤ̤ǤꡤűѸˤ⤽λήԤäȤƤäʤ
Clark (461) ϡBede ˤ731ǯ蘆줿 Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum (= Ecclesiastical History of the English People) William I 1086ǯ˺餻Ģ the Domesday Book ˤ̾Ӥ̾դη̻ŪѲ餷ΤˤĤƼΤ褦˽Ҥ٤Ƥ롥
Although neither sample can be taken fully to represent contemporary usages, it is no accident that in detail the recorded stocks differ, with deuterotheme usages similar but only half the protothemes in common. Even with allowance for the greater number of name-bearers represented in DB, overall variability seems little reduced. Some change of custom has none the less taken place: the fairly even seventh-century frequency-pattern has given way to a markedly uneven one, with many names occurring just once or twice but a particular few, such as Ælfrīc, Godrīc, Godwine, Lēofwine and Wulfrīc, having each a multitude of bearers distinguished from one another by by-names (a similar pattern appears in the names of Suffolk peasants of probably ca 1100 . . .). This development parallels those seen in continental West-Germanic communities. . . .
ɬΤ̻ŪѲǤȤƶĴƤ櫓ǤϤʤClark ϸűѸˤƿ̾¿ƤʬϤƤ뤳Ȥ狼롥ǡμפʾ̾ϻĤäƤꡤƱ̾ξˤ̤ (by-names) դä뤳Ȥˤ̤褦ˤʤäƤȤ
̾դήԤѲظ˲äΤˤʤȤ#813. Ѹο̾ˡ ([2011-07-19-1]) ȡ
Clark, Cecily. "Onomastics." The Cambridge History of the English Language. Vol. 1. Ed. Richard M. Hogg. Cambridge: CUP, 1992. 452--89.
(typology) ϡ̸ŪˤߤŪʬǤ롥оݤȤʬ¿ˤ錄뤬Ʊʬ路 Whaley (28) 3ĤŦƤ롥
The starting point for all typology is the presupposition that there are recurrent structural patterns across languages that are not random or accidental. These patterns can be described in statements called language universals.
Once one grants this simple assumption, myriad questions arise. . . . [T]ypologists explore both absolute properties of language and probabilistic properties. In addition, they are concerned with the connections between two or more properties.
A second key question about universals is "How are they determined?" . . . . For now, it is sufficient to say that this question has become central to typology in the past few decades, and its answer has profound implications, particularly for universals that are based on statistical probability.
The final basic question that concerns modern typology is "How are universals explained?" A protracted debate over issues of explanation has been occurring since the 1950s. The most acrimonious elements of the debate have concerned the relationship between diachrony and synchrony (i.e., to what degree does an explanation require reference to past stages of a language?) and the need to go outside the language system itself in forming satisfying explanations . . . .
˵Ƥ3Ĥδؿϡ줾ħ˴ؤ What, How, Why 䤤ȤȤ館Ƥ褤
˸ؤΩ줫ϡȤ櫓3Ĥ Why ꤬̻֤ؤäƤǽפǤ롥ȸѲδطˤĤơWhaley (25--26) ʹ
Another characteristic trait of modern typology that is represented well in Greenberg's work is a focus on the ways that language changes through time . . . . Greenberg's interest in diachrony was in many ways a throwback to the earlier days of typology in which historical-comparative linguistics predominated. The uniqueness of Greenberg's work, however, was in his use of language change as an explanation for language universals. The basic insight is the following: Because the form that a language takes at any given point in time results from alterations that have occurred to a previous stage of the language, one should expect to find some explanations for (or exceptions to) universals by examining the processes of language change. In other words, many currently existing properties of a language can be accounted for in terms of past properties of the language.
ȤŪˤ϶ŪʻȤäƤʬˡ̻ŪȤʤȡʤʤʵˤʤäƤ
Whaley, Lindsay J. Introduction to Typology: The Unity and Diversity of Language. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997.
塼衤 (synchrony) ̻ (diachrony) δط䤨ᤷʤܥ֥Ǥ⡤ˤĤ͡˵Ƥ
#866. üԤΰռ̻ŪʼϤ뤫 ([2011-09-10-1])
#1025. ֤̻֤δط ([2012-02-16-1])
#1076. 塼뤬֤̻֤ͥ褵3Ĥͳ ([2012-04-07-1])
#1260. ֤̻֤ ([2012-10-08-1])
#2134. Ѳ̷ǤϤʤ ([2015-03-01-1])
#2197. 塼ζ֤̻֤ǧ ([2015-05-03-1])
#2555. 塼ˤζ֤̻֡ ([2016-04-25-1])
#3264. Saussurian Paradox ([2018-04-04-1])
#3508. 塼Ωǰ3 ([2018-12-04-1])
˥ץ2Ĥ֤˴ؤƻιͤȤˤС̻֤϶֤ŪͿΤǤϤʤŪͿȤϡλDzѤŪϿȤۤɤΰ̣Ǥ롥ξ֤ϳΤľԤ뼴ǤޤǰۤʤäƤΤߤȤˤͣܿġܿξ֤Υͥ륮Ž̤ƤȤߤƤ롥ּΤ1ˤ̿ޤǤζ֤ϡ̻֤饨ͥ륮ơΤ褦̿ޤˤʤäƤΤ
Sweetser (9--10) νϤˤơ塼ΥȤưѤĤġ褦ʸƤΤǰѤ
. . . [W]e cannot rigidly separate synchronic from diachronic analysis: all of modern sociolinguistics has confirmed the importance of reuniting the two. As with the language and cognition question, the synchrony/diachrony interrelationship has to be seen in a more sophisticated framework. The structuralist tradition spent considerable effort on eliminating confusion between synchronic regularities and diachronic changes: speakers do not necessarily have rules or representations which reflect the language's past history. But neither Saussure nor any of his colleagues would have denied that synchronic structure inevitably reflects its history in important ways: the whole chess metaphor is a perfect example of Saussure's deep awareness of this fact. Saussure, of course, uses chess because for future play the past history of the board is totally irrelevant: you can analyze a chess problem without any information about past moves. But he could hardly have picked --- as he must have known --- an example of a domain where past events more inevitably, regularly, and evidently (if not uniquely) determine the present resulting state. No phonologist today would reconstruct a proto-language's sound system without attention both to recognized universals of synchronic sound-systems and to attested (and phonetically motivated) paths of phonological change; it is assumed that the same perceptual, muscular, acoustic, and cognitive constraints are responsible for both universals of structure and universals of structural change. And, for a historical phonologist or semanticist trying to avoid imposing past analyses on present usage, it is an empirical question which aspects of diachrony are preserved in a given synchronic phonological structure or meaning structure.
ͤᾭ֤ΤηȤƤϤ褤֤ΤΤǤϤʤ츦⡤֤ο餳ѻоݤȤΤǤäƤۤ
Sweetser, E. From Etymology to Pragmatics. Cambridge: CUP, 1990.
塼 (Ferdinand de Saussure; 1857--1913) ϡζ (synchrony) ̻ (diachrony) ̤ȤΤ (2Ĥ֤ˤĤƤεåȡˡ塼̻ŪֽͤưΤȤǤꡤͭñ̤ưȤȤˤۤʤʤסʴݻp. 310ˤƤ롥Ρưפϡե déplacement ʱѸ displacementˤषִפۤʬ䤹塼ϡ˥ե (signifié) ȥ˥ե (signifiant) η礫뵭 (signe) ѲϡξԤΡ֤פȤ⡤̤εˤִפȹͤƤ뤫
Ʊݻإ塼뾮ŵ٤ déplacement ι (284) äƤߤȤƤ֤졤ưפȵƤ뤬Ƥ褯ɤǤߤȼºݤˤϡִפˤۤʤʤʲѤ롥
déplacement Τ졤ư
ʤηǤμ (terme) ֤Ѥꡤη̤ȤƲ (valeur) ư뤳ȡּȽͤΥХʴط (frag. 1279) ư déplacer ʤ餹ˤѤ줿֤ʤʡġ (altération) νװ˹뤹٤Ϥʤη̡ȤȤ˥˥ե (signifie) Ф륷˥ե (signifiant) Υȡʴط (rapport) (frag. 1259) Τϡ˥ (signe) ǤԲʬΥबȤ̣ǤϤʤ˥سԤꤹʬΤΤƿ˥夬뤳Ȥ̣뤬Ť˥ȿ˥Ӥݡ (sujet parlant) ˤȤäƤϥ˥եȥ˥ե줿褦˺ФΤǤ롥
Ĥޤꡤ"déplacement" ȤѸΥ˥եȥ˥եδطΡ֤졤ưפؤΤǤ뤫Τ褦˻ȤäƤ뤬ºݤ˥塼뤬տޤƤΤϡ֤פǤϤʤִפʤΤǤʡֺפǤʤˡȤȡβѲ̣Ѳ⡤˥ե˥եϸꤷƤ¾줿ΤǤ롤ȤϤߤʤʤʤ롥Ť˥夬˥֤줿ΤȡߤʤȤˤʤ
ݻ Ϻإ塼뾮ŵ١罤ۡ1985ǯ
Fertig (7) "Change vs. diachronic correspondence" ꤹߤĤ2Ĥ˸ؤˤƶ̤٤פʳǰǤ롥ζ̤ռƤʤȡפ̸˴٤뤳Ȥ롥
Linguists often use 'change' to refer to correspondences among forms that may be separated by centuries or millennia, e.g. Old English stān and Modern English stone or Middle English holp and Modern English helped. For purposes of comparative reconstruction, diachronic correspondences that relate forms separated by hundreds of years may be just what one needs, but such correspondences often mask a complex sequence of smaller developments that may have taken a very circuitous route. Linguists who are serious about understanding how change actually happens often point to the fallacies that arise from treating diachronic correspondences as if they directly reflected individual changes. Where plentiful data allows us to examine the course of a change in fine-grained detail, the picture that emerges is often very different from what we would posit if we only had evidence of the 'before' and 'after' states . . . .
ۤʤ2ĤλˤơʼȤƷˤĤơбطǧ1ȤθबȤ2Ĥθϲ餫̻ŪǷӤĤ٤Ǥ롥̻Ūθब뤲Ѳμ֤Ǥ롥֤˱äƤۤɺ٤ʾڵʤ¤ꡤľʤΤʤΤǤФɤʷζʤΤʬʤȤ¿βŤ˿¬ǤĤʤ뤳ȤǤеǤꡤ̩˼ȤʾϵΤ褦˻פ롥ݡŪ䤤Ȥơǽбطǧ2ĤθबбطΤȤߤʤƤ褤ΤȤȤʤФʤʤ⤷ʤΤǤ롥
1ĵ褦ɸѸˤϡָŤפ̣ old Ȥ줬롥űѸˤƱ eald Ȥ줬ǧ롥ǯλ֤γ֤ϤΤΡ̣ˡϤۤܰפƤꡤŪˤ⽽ʬ˶Ƥ뤿ᡤ2Ĥθδ֤̻ŪбطǧȤϸ̻ŪбطǧȤƤ⡤Ѳ̤ľŪ eald old ؤȯŸȷŤΤפǤ롥ǫ˲Ѳͻʬ뤬eald ϸűѸ쥦ȥˤ֤ǤꡤɸѸ old Ȥ֤ľܤǤϤʤषűѸ쥢ꥢ ald ̤Ȥߤ٤Ǥ롥ȤСeald old δطϡľŪǤľŪǤʤȤˤʤ롥ald old ʤľŪľŪʴطФơeald ʬǼФǤƤ롤ȤΤȤʤ롥
ľˤ˴ؤơפʬ̻ŪбطؤפʬѲؤȹͤƤФ褤
Fertig, David. Analogy and Morphological Change. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2013.
ظλŵ٤ѥѥäƤơָѲפξϤκǸˡ̻ŪݥפȤäѸǤС"diachronic typology" ȤȤޤʹʤȤʹʤѸǤ롥ɤ߿ʤƤȡθѲˤȤäƤβ꤬̻Ūݥפ̾βˤĤƤݤФȡʲ4ˤʤ
(1) 19˸ءäӸءˤϡʬŪѲܤ뤢ޤꡤ«ŪѲڻ뤷Ƥ餤
(2) ưѤʤС֤ˤ륿ݥɵ椹뤳Ȥˤä̻֤ˤ륿ݥؤȿʤϤǤ
(3) Ѳ®٤Ȥ
(4) Ѳˤħܤƥݥ
ŪŪ˹ä˸ؤˡƤǤ롥줾ή˲᤹С(1) ˸ؤˤܿΰյäɾ衤ȤȤ
(2) ư (uniformitarian_principle) ˴Ťĥϡ̻ݥפŪפȤʤ붯ĥѲͼܻؤƱˡǤϤʤ˰ռŪܤСϡ̻оȸءפ᤹ܶǽƤ롥
(3) (4) ϴϢ뤬Ѳ䤹ʤ뤤ϡöѲϤʹԤΡˤݤȤ顤ʬषƤߤȤǤ롥ϳΤ˿Ǥ롥ܥ֥Ǥ⡤Ѳ®٤ˤĤƤ speed_of_change schedule_of_language_change ͡Ƥ˲ǽΤǤϤʤȹͤƤ롥
ݥˤоȸؤȤ2ʬϡ֤ΰ㤤Ǽ¼Ūʴؿ϶ᤤȸƤ뤬ȡ̻Ūݥפȡ̻Ūоȸءפߤ˶ᤤȤˤʤ롥ϡ˳Ť HiSoPra* θǤޤƤоȸˡפιͤˤᤤ
ԡָѲסظλŵ١ ʿԡˡīҽŹ2005ǯ560--82ǡ
¤ؤȤ٤塼 (Ferdinand de Saussure; 1857--1913) ϡʸˤ˴ؤ͡ΩǰǤȤ櫓פ3ΩˤĤơɽηǤޤȤƤʹⶶ pp. 3--4 ˡ
(1) (langue) ȥѥ (parole) Ω
| ѥ | |
|---|---|
| ηŪ (systematic) | ηŪ (not systematic) |
| ƱŪ (homogeneous) | ۼŪ (heterogeneous) |
| §Ū (rule-governed) | §Ū (not rule-governed) |
| ҲŪ (social) | ĿŪ (individual) |
| Ū (conventional) | Ū (not conventional) |
| Ū (invariable) | ѰŪ (variable) |
| ̵ռŪ (unconscious) | ռŪ (conscious) |
| η (system) | ̵η (no system) |
| Ϣ³Ū (discrete) | Ϣ³Ū (continuous) |
| ?????? (static) | ?????? (dynamic) |
| ̻ | |
|---|---|
| ̵Ū (ahistorical) | Ū (historical) |
| ?????? (internal) | ???? (external) |
| ѲŪ (unchanging) | ѲŪ (changing) |
| (invariable) | Ѥ䤹 (variable) |
| ¸Ū (coexistent) | ³Ū (successive) |
ϢεǡJoseph ʸ "Diachronic Explanation: Putting Speakers Back into the Picture" ȡѤƤ (cf. #3324. Ѳ̸Τʤ礦褦ˤƿʤǤ ([2018-06-03-1])#3326. ̻ŪȶŪ ([2018-06-05-1])#3327. ѲˤüԤ϶ŪǤ ([2018-06-06-1])) ѲˤˤĤƤκŪƹͤľƤ롤ͥ줿ͤǤ롥
ϡJoseph ŪỊ̇Ĺʲս˺Τ˲ȴƤ
[T]he contact is not really between the languages but is rather actually between speakers of the languages in question . . . . (129)
ϸƤߤФȯۤ˻פ뤬̡뤤ϸܿˤƤ顤Ф˺ƤǤ롥ʲε⻲ȡ#1549. Why does language change? or Why do speakers change their language? ([2013-07-24-1])#1168. ܿȤüܿǤ ([2012-07-08-1])#2005. üԺߤθѲؤηپ ([2014-10-23-1])#2298. Language changes, speaker innovates. ([2015-08-12-1])
ˡХ륫 (Balkan linguistic_area) ˤܿ夲ʤ顤ͿƤսꡥ
. . . an overemphasis on comparisons of standard languages rather than regional dialects, even though the contact between individuals, in certain parts of the Balkans at least, more typically involved nonstandard dialects . . . (130)
2ĤθѼܿͤݤˡξԤɸŪѼǰƬ֤뤳Ȥ¿ºݤθܿˤƤϤषɸѼɤܿʤΤˤɸѼüԤɤܿˤΤ̤ۤǤϤʤäȤʸǤ롥
Ѥäơָ̱츻 (folk_etymology) ؾ塤פǤ뤳ȤˤĤơ
Folk etymology often represents a reasonable attempt on a speaker's part to make sense of, i.e. to render transparent, a sequence that is opaque for one reason or another, e.g. because it is a borrowing and thus has no synchronic parsing in the receiving language. As such, it shows speakers actively working to give an analysis to data that confronts them, even if such a confrontation leads to a change in the input data. Moreover, folk etymology demonstrates that speakers take what the surface forms are --- an observation which becomes important later on as well --- and work with that, so that while they are creative, they are not really looking beyond the immediate phonic shape --- and, in some instances also, the meaning --- that is presented to them. (132)
Ǥ Joseph ϸѲˤüԤָ̱츻ŪȯۤΰյɾˤȤɤޤ餺ǤüԤζפָ̱츻ȤӤĤƤ롥#2174. ָ̱츻Ọ̇̄Ѳ ([2015-04-10-1])#2932. salacious ([2017-05-07-1]) ⻲ȡ
ˡüԤζȴϢơʬ (reanalysis) ñ㲽ʣˤɤؤ뤫˼1ʸ褦
[W]hen reanalyses occur, they are not always in the direction of simpler grammars overall but rather are often complicating, in a global sense, even if they are simplificatory in a local sense.
ѲΡñ㲽פ˴ؤŪȤơ#928. ޤ neutralization simplification ([2011-11-11-1])#1839. ñ㲽Ȥϲ ([2014-05-10-1])#1693. §ŪʲѲԵ§ŪʷѲ ([2013-12-15-1]) Ȥ줿
ǸˡѲζŪˤĤƤΰѤƤؼԤ϶Ū˷кȤƵ뤬ɬǤϤʤȤƤ
[T]he grammars linguists construct . . . ought to be allowed to reflect uneconomical "solutions", at least in diachrony, but also, given the relation between synchrony and diachrony argued for here, in synchronic accounts as well.
Joseph, B. D. "Diachronic Explanation: Putting Speakers Back into the Picture." Explanation in Historical Linguistics. Ed. G. W. Davis and G. K. Iverson. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1992. 123--44.
ɸ˴Ϣϡܥ֥Ǥ¿εǼ夲ƤܵΥȡˡ˴Ϣ Joseph ʸɤߡƹͤƤߤ٤3սѤ褦
[W]hile it might be said that there is always an historical explanation for some particular state of affairs in a language, it is equally true that relying solely on historical explanation means ultimately that an historical explanation is no explanation . . .; if everything is to be explained in that way, then there is no differentiation possible among various synchronic states even though some conceivable synchronic states never actually occur. Moreover, universal grammar, to the extent that it can be given meaningful content, is in a sense achronic, for it is valid at particular points in time for any given synchronic stage but also valid through time in the passage from one synchronic state to another. Thus in addition to the diachronic perspective, a synchronic perspective is needed as well, for that enables one to say that a given configuration of facts exists because it gives a reason for the existence of a pattern --- a generalization over a range of data --- in a given system at a given point in time. (124--25)
[A] synchronic account should aim for economy and typically, for example, avoids positing the same rule or constraint at two different points in a grammar or derivation (though the validity of the usual interpretations of "economical" in this context is far from a foregone conclusion . . ., while a diachronic account, being interested in determining what actually happened over some time interval, should aim for the truth, even if it is messy and even if it might entail positing the operation of, for instance, the same sound change at two different adjacent time periods, perhaps 50 or 100 years apart. (126)
[T]he constraints imposed by universal grammar at any synchronic stage will necessarily then be the same constraints that govern the passage from one state to another, i.e. diachrony. Diachronic principles or generalizations do not exist, then, outside of the synchronic processes of grammar formation at synchronic stage after synchronic stage. (127)
ΰѤˤƤ⼨Ƥ뤳Ȥϡ̻ŪȶŪȤȿиˤʤ礹餢ΤΡ䤦ȤˤäơǤǼΤǽȤʤȤʤϰۤʤ뤬ƱܻؤƤ2ͤȤǤ⤤̤ΥãΤ˼ȤΤ褷ʤΰۤʤڤΤ褷ɤ餫Ф뤳ȤʤΤȻפ
#866. üԤΰռ̻ŪʼϤ뤫 ([2011-09-10-1])
#1025. ֤̻֤δط ([2012-02-16-1])
#1040. ̻ŪѲȶŪѰۡ ([2012-03-02-1])
#1076. 塼뤬֤̻֤ͥ褵3Ĥͳ ([2012-04-07-1])
#1260. ֤̻֤ ([2012-10-08-1])
#1426. ̻ŪѲȶŪѰ (2) ([2013-03-23-1])
#2159. ֤̻֤ӤĤ diffusion ([2015-03-26-1])
#2197. 塼ζ֤̻֤ǧ ([2015-05-03-1])
#2295. Ѳϸξ֤ϳؤǤ ([2015-08-09-1])
#2555. 塼ˤζ֤̻֡ ([2016-04-25-1])
#2563. ̻ءؤȤѸäơ ([2016-05-03-1])
#2662. 塼ˤζ֤̻ (2) ([2016-08-10-1])
Joseph, B. D. "Diachronic Explanation: Putting Speakers Back into the Picture." Explanation in Historical Linguistics. Ed. G. W. Davis and G. K. Iverson. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1992. 123--44.
#3176. ȤưŪʿˤ륷ƥफ (1) ([2018-01-06-1])#3177. ȤưŪʿˤ륷ƥफ (2) ([2018-01-07-1]) εǡưŪʿ (dynamic_equilibrium) ιͤȤƥ˱ѤǤ뤫ȤˤĤ
ʡοǤϡưŪʿդʪʳؤα㤬¿Ƥ㤨СưŪʿȿפưŪʿշݽפʤɡˡưŪʿշݽפꤹ륨åˤơʡ (170--71) ϰȤƼΤ褦˽Ҥ٤Ƥ롥Ѳΰ̴ط (causation) ǼŪǤ롥
ΤǤϡߤϢؤ٤Ƥ¿δطǷҤꤢäƤ롥Ĥޤˤ⡤Τˤ衤ʬϤʤʬȸƤӡʬȤڤФΤʤΤҤϡߤ¾Χ뤤䤷Ƥ롥ΤȤˤϡִ֤ªƤߤȡȼ꤬褦˸롥ʬνִ֤ȡȷ̤ϵžƤ롥뤤ϡޤ̤ʿդưƤ롥Ĥޤꡤˤϡΰ̣ǰ̴طȸƤ֤٤Τޤ¸ߤʤʬʤȤˤϤ狼ʤʬƤ狼ʤΤǤ롥䤿ϳΤ˺ѥࡦեȤɬפʤΤμ꤬ϤɤˤΤ
ʡưŪʿˤƤϡ̿ɮƬȤưŪʿդˤ륷ƥˤȤäơ֤ܼŪʥѥǤ롥֤ΤʤDzƯ³Ƥ뤫餳ǽݤäƤȤͤäơǤϥѥȤץŻ뤵뤳Ȥˤʤ롥֤ǤϤʤư֤֡ǤϤʤ̻֤νŻȤ
塼θؤˤƤ⡤ѥ֤֡餫ˤ뤳Ȥ饨ͥ륮䤵Ƥǡץư̻֤֡θϤʤˤƤȤäƤ褤ԤԤȤˤȤäƤϡؤˤѥࡦեȤɬפΤ褦˻פ롥ȤϤʬʤȤˤϤ狼ʤʬƤ狼ʤפȤȤΰ̣Ǥ롥ѥࡦեȤȤäƤǤ롥
ʡ 졡ưŪʿ3Ͻ줿ˤΤ߹ߤΩġ١ڳڼҡ2017ǯ
#3162. Ű ([2017-12-23-1]) #3172. 饤ҥ㡼ηŪȯۤϥǤϤʤʸؤ ([2018-01-02-1]) ǻȤƤˤСʹ֤ιԤʤʪʬˡϡʬ͡ (group thinking) ȡַ͡ (tree thinking) ̤ȤȤʬहȽļηطȤʬहΤ (107) Ϥ줾˴ŤʳؤʬʳءפȡָŰʳءפȸƤӡξԤΤ褦оȤƤ롥
| ʬʳ | ʬ | ե | 硿 | ǧΥƥ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Űʳ | | ȥ˥ߡ | Ρʬ | ˡʥ֥ |
| ǰŪ | Ū | |
|---|---|---|
| ηϳ (Systematik) | (Phylogenetik) | |
| (Formverwandtschaft) | ط (Blutsverwandtschaft) | |
| (Metamorphose) | ȯ (Stammesentwicklung) | |
| ηϳŪʳ (systematischen Stufenreihen) | (Ahnenreihen) | |
| (Typus) | (Stammform) | |
| (typischen Zuständen) | Ū (ursprüngliche Zuständen) | |
| Ū (atypischen Zuständen) | Ū (abgeänderte Zuständen) |
| ʬʳ | Űʳ |
|---|---|
| ¤ (structural linguistics) | Ӹ (comparative linguistics) |
| (typology) | ˸ (historical linguistics) |
| (linguistic area) | ² (language family) |
| ܿ (contact, borrowing) | (inheritance) |
| (space) | (time) |
| (synchrony) | ̻ (diachrony) |
| ط (paradigm) | Ϣط (syntagm) |
| ѥ (pattern) | ץ (process) |
| ???? (variation) | ???? (change) |
| (type) | ȡ (token) |
| ե (metaphor) | ȥ˥ߡ (metonymy) |
| How | Why |
ʲͤƴĤȤƹ⤯Ǥ뤿ˤϡ䤿ʬͤйϤĤ⤦ĤλȤȤƥԡ뤹ɬפ롥ȤСܤˤΤ֤ɤΤ褦ˡƤΤʻװˤ˴ؤ뵿ϼºݤ̿ץʬʪؤؤȤߤʤ롥ФơΤ֤ʤפΤ褦ˤäΤʵװˤ˴ؤ뵿ϿʲʪؤȤ٤
ѲΡ֤ɤΤ褦ˡפȡ֤ʤפ (how_and_why) ˤĤƤϡ#2123. Ѳڤ ([2015-02-18-1])#2255. Ѳθɵ椹ͤˤĤơ ([2015-06-30-1])#2642. ѲμȻȤߤν̡ ([2016-07-21-1])#3133. Ѳ "how" "why" ([2017-11-24-1]) ǰäƤʪؤθˤ꿷ȯۤ줿롥
ؿʲͤҥȤϿݤɤηϲ뤫١NHKǡ2010ǯ
Francis Bacon (1561--1626) ήиλ۲Ȥ William Whewell (1794--1866) 롥οʪϡǤ˺ƤָŰء (aetiology) ϻϤʪǤ롥ΰѤŰؤȳΩܻؤ (101--02) ͳǤϤ롥
ʳؤϡꥷ ɦӦɦʸˤ츻Ȥơذ̳ء (aetiology)٤ȸƤФ뤳Ȥ롥ΤȤФϤ줬褦Ȥ¬γޤȤ館ƤϤʤʤʤ顤Ūʰ̴طǤϳؤΤ褦ʱʵṲ̄ʳؤޤǤ롥䤬礷褦ȤΰϡǽʲǤϤʤ¤βоݤȤ롥줬줫褦Ȥϼؤʬʤϡ¸ (Ц˦, ϦͦӦ) ʪоݤȤȤͳǡظʪء (palaeontology)٤̾ŤƤ롥ǡΤդĤγǰ (Ц˦, ɦӦɦ) ӤĤ뤳ȤˤꡤŰ (palaetiology) ȤդƳƤԹϤʤ褦˻פ롥ǤŰؤȤϲλݤ˴ؤưˡ§˴Ťߤ¬γǤסʡصǼʳؤˡ١軰p. 397
θŰؤо (object 뤤ϡֿʲҡפȤˤϲǤ褤櫓ǡСʪ졤ܡ̱¯ʤɲǤ⤢Ǥ롥γؤʸͻȤ褦ɽŪʤΤǤϤʤޤΤδܸΤ֤֤̻֤ѶŪߤȤߤ뤳ȤǤ롥֤̻֤Ȥ¤ϡˤȤɤޤ餺٤ƤŪİ٤ξؤǤ롥ñʤϤξػˡʤԺߡʤȤ鷺Ȥ⡤ˤʤΤǤ롥̻ȴԤäƤ褦˻פ롥
ŰؤϡפˤǤ롥ѸˤĥͤС
طͤ٤ƤϥĥȤȤˡ١̼ҡҹ̼Ҹ忷ӡ2006ǯ
#2854. 3000ǯʹߤδ䲽̱²ư ([2017-02-18-1]) ³ԡ²θϡĸ줬äƤˤϥ饤ʤΥƥåӤ䥢ʥȥꥢʤɽ⤢뤬⸽ߤΥ桼饷ΦˤʬۡȤ櫓ɸɤʤɤθȡŪ̴ϰꤵƤ뤳Ȥʬ롥դˤСĸôΤθŸϡˤäħŤȤ⤤롥̱²ưˤĤơڤ3500ǯ˵äưˤΤȹͤƤ롥θϡܸεɥδϢεˤŪ˴Ϳ桼饷ΦȤʥǤ̱²ưɥޤβǽΤǤ롥
ޡǯϡϵΤεˤꡤˤäƤϡάͰ쵤3˵ڤ10ε㲼Ǥ⥫ʥˤϻͶ塻ȥɹϤǤΤǤ뤫顤Ǥϵʬ̻äޡΤε㲼ϡ̤ν̱ˤȤäƤŪǤäϤǤꡤ줬ҤΤȹͤ롥ɡ衼åѽäΤΤϤޤ饢ե˥նƥΤۤȤäˤϥɥͤʸĤäƤάͤλŪʴ粽⤪äƤꡤꥢͤ˶व줿ά쥢Ǥ⡤㲼ˤä̱²äȹͤǡäƾȤ⤽ʹߡɥ줬ܸȴطäȤϹͤʤβȤʻδطˤĤƤϡꤹ뤳ȤϤǤʤڡp. 28--29
(34) ϡؤīȾ礫̱²ư⡤Ʊϵ٥δ䲽˵Ƥ롥
ʤ (24) ưŪ̱²ưŪ̱²ʬۤˤĤơΤ褦ʰ̣ĹȯƤ롥̱²ưϸߤǤ⤪ʤƤ뤬ŪˤϲθݤǤ롥СưƤʹ֤θݤΰ֤Ȥơߤ롥סϡ̻֤ȶ֤λڤؤߤ˸ɽΤǤ롥
ס̱²ΰưȸʬۡסطٸ졡ϴ15ǯǰ̺罤۽Ź1987ǯ24--40ǡ
θʬहݤ2ĤδǤַפȡֱƶפϡɤδطλŤǤ⤢롥ˤĤƤϡܥ֥ǤʲεϤȤơ餳Ƥ (see #369. ˤƶ ([2010-05-01-1])#807. ޤʪޤ ([2011-07-13-1])#371. ƶɬ̤Ǥʤ ([2010-05-03-1])#1136. ۤʤδ֤줬 ([2012-06-06-1])#1236. ڤȡ ([2012-09-14-1])#1930. ȱƶθ줿ɥ衼åѸ²δطޡ ([2014-08-09-1]))
ȱƶϡ줾̻֤ȶ֤δطˤ̤Ȥ롥Ȥϻּ˱äˤνļؤƶȤϼŪܴطˤ벣ؤˤַפȡֱƶפȤΩϡʪʬؤǤȤΡַפȡʳפΩ롥
ʬʬ (cladistics) Ǥϡּ˱äʬˤפȤַפλ顤ɤδطŤʤ롥ȤƤδطߤ˶ᤱСħ⤽ƤΤϼħƤ¨طᤤȤСɬ⤽ʤʤȤƤϰۤʤ뤬Ķʤɤ˱ƻ褦ʷ֤ȯã뤳ȡʼ̿ʲˤ롥Τ褦ʷȤ̵طŪƱ (homoplasy) ȤŪʶᤵǤϤʤŪƱ˴ŤƽĤʬλϡʳ (grade) ˤʬȸƤФ롥
å (70) ͤˤơĹʬहˡ夲褦ַפλˤСʲΤ褦ʬव롥
ҥ²ѥ²²²
ҥȲʡ
ҥ²ѥ²²²
26俷ʹīΥʡפˡgeneration ȤƤΡפˤĤơ⤬ä衤פȤϡǯסֻס塹ס塹פۤɤΰ̣ǻȤƤȾζʽʤɤʪѸȤưŪʰ̣ǤΡפޤäƤäȤˡ19--20˥ɥĿʸؤŪθͭƱǯؤνġפ̣ˡůءҲءݽѡʸؤʤɤˤƹäȤ櫓롦ޥϥ (1893--1947) ҲŪϤפͻȤǡĬήܤˤƤ⡤Ūʰ̣ǤΡפ夹褦ˤʤä
ʪŪʡפȼҲŪʡפȤǤϡȤƤƱñǤäƤ⡤礭ʰ̣κ롥ԤϽ˸ؤƤȤ̣Ǥʳɽ魯ΤФơԤƱǯؽĤȤƤη³ްդ롥㤨СIJפβʹѤϡȤȤ˹ǯϾ夬äƤΤΡ켫ΤѲʤȤǷ³Ȥ롥
Ԥκƣ˻ˤСξΰ̣ˤƶ̤ƤΤϡȤˤϡڤˤơռ뷹פȤȤƬ˽Ҥ٤ˤС塹פȤϡŤ̤ͤ³ƤפäĤޤꡤפʹƴ륤ϡءפϡָήפΤۤ˶ᤫäǽ롥
פФ2ĤΥκϡѲͻäƤ⼨ŪǤ롤ʸˡΩ줫ϡѲȤʸˡѲΤȤǤꡤǤϡפȯۤ§Ǥ롥ҲŪΩ줫鸫СѲΥϡָήפΤۤ˶ᤤǯüؤǯüؤǤϡΤ˸ոʿͤϰۤʤäƤġüԤСǯθոαƶǯοͤ⤤СεդΥ⤢롥ξüؤϡޤ줿ǯϰۤʤΤΡߤޤढδ֡ʸͭƤΤ顤ζͭ٤˱ơ¿ʤȤ¸ߤƤγʺѲϡؤˤꥫȿʤǤ¦̤⤢뤫⤷ʤָήˤꤢޤǴˤ䤫˿ʤǤȤʬ礭ΤǤϤʤ
Bloomfield θѲˤפǧ⡤#1352. ߥ˥̩٤̻֡ ([2013-01-08-1]) Ǹ褦ˡָήפȯۤ˶ᤫä褦˻פ롥
ߥ롦Хǥˡإ塼κθѼԡॹ쥦٤ɤǡȤ (glossematics) Ѥʡ#1074. Hjelmslev θء ([2012-04-05-1]) ⻲ȡˡ
ॹ쥦εŪǧ濴ˡ桤桤ζ̤롥Ϥ̾εؤϡɽ켫ΤǤ褦ʵؤơϡ켫ΤǤ褦ʵؤδŪΩˡŪ (paradigmatic) ϢŪ (syntagmatic) Ȥ塼褯Τ줿ΩȤ߹ޤ졤1Ĥǧ롥
Υॹ쥦ǧΩäơ¸θؽʬΰ֤ŤȡʲɽΤ褦ˤʤʥХǥ롤p. 205ˡ

αդ٤ϡ¸ʬ̾ΤȤǸ椵ƤƤΤޤޥॹ쥦ŪǧˤƱ̾ʬΤȤǰȤϸ¤ʤȤ㤨СɽϢַפϡ褽ŪʡַפǰƤʬʤȹͤƤ褤ǤŪѰۤʤɤޤȤǾ°פۤʤ롥
ɽθʬˤĤƸȡä˶̣Τϡ̻פ뤤ϡˡפѰۤ˴ؤ뼡1ĤȤƤȤ館ƤǤ롥Ʊ̤μƤΤϡסּҲסֿס־ħפʤɤǤ롥Ǥϡ̻פȤꤿƤơֶפΩΤȤΩƤƤ櫓ǤϤʤषסּҲסֿס־ħפʤɤȤĴƤ롥
Хǥ (207--08) Ǥϡζ̻κƲˤĤơΤ褦˽Ҥ٤Ƥ롥
Τ褦줿ʬϤϡŪʬϤȸʤɬפϤʤ̻ŪʬϤޤפǤ롥طϡ֤̻֤Ω꼰ľɬ̣롥Ĥޤꡤ̻֤Ȥϡ֤ΡءפŤʤäƺΤǤϤʤŪˤƴͿŪʤΤϡषεդǤ롥ΡֹųŪפʬϤ¹Ԥ뤳ȤǽʤΤǤ롥äơŪħϡ¾θ̲⤿餹ǡκĤμȤȤˤʤ롥
ŪؤŪͥʸߡؤΤʤ̻֤褵褦Ȥ뤳ȤϴñʻߤǤϤʤॹ쥦ǧ1ĤΥҥȤˤʤꤽ
ؤνȤˤĤƤϡ#378. ϸδܹ礫ݤ ([2010-05-10-1])#1110. Guiraud ˤؤι ([2012-05-11-1])#1726. ַ֡פʶ路 Ullmann ˤؤι ([2014-01-17-1]) ⻲ȡ
ߥ롦ХǥˡĮ ˡإ塼κθѼԡॹ쥦١罤ۡ2007ǯ
120դǡָѸѸˤλͤꤹϢܵϤޤǯҤǤ줿رѸΡ֤ʤפ롡ϤƤαѸˡδϢȤƤϢܴƤǤȤϢޤĤġƤˤĤƤŪƤ椯ͽǤ˰٤ΥڡȤʤޤܥ֥ȤȤˤꤤޤ
ơϡ֤ȤФ̻Ūˤߤ פȤϡ Ǥ2.1.3 ֶŪ̻ŪפǼ夲ܤʬ䤹겼ޤȤơ3.2ǰä֤ʤ *foots, *childs ǤϤʤ feet, children ʤΤפȤԵ§ʣפλƤޤŪǤϤʤ̻ŪʻįƤߤȡѤΤȤȤƼĥƤޤ
̻ (diachrony) ȶ (synchrony) ˤĤƤϡܥ֥Ǥ⤤ȹͤƤޤεˤȤ櫓ϢˤĤƤεɤ
Ϣơ#2764. رѸΡ֤ʤפ롡ϤƤαѸˡ٤Ǥޤ ([2016-11-20-1]) #2806. رѸΡ֤ʤפ롡ϤƤαѸˡ٤δϢ ([2017-01-01-1]) ε⤴Ȥ
#2743. ʾȸ ([2016-10-30-1])#2746. ʾȸ (2) ([2016-11-02-1]) ˰³Ƥꡥ[2016-11-02-1]εκǸǡֲʾʪŪʲͤȷӤĤƤ뤬ϤޤdzǰŪʲͤȷӤĤƤˤʤȤϡषξԤ礭פȽҤ٤θڤȴϢơ塼˵ȤƤβʾȸоȤƤս꤬롥塼ˤСξԤϵȤƺŪ˰ۤʤ°Ȥε̤ơ쵭 (arbitrariness) ͳ褹ʤ֤̻֤ܼŪΩ⤭Ħˤʤ롥
ε뤿ˡޤ塼θˤֲ͡ (valeur) ˤĤƸƤʤФʤʤݻ (68--69) ˤС
塼ηϤϡޤطȤƤβͤηϤǤ롥ǤϡŪŪˤäġǤ꽸ޤäΤΤǤϤʤΤȤδϢ¾ǤȤߴطǤϤƸĤβͤ롥⡤ʤηϤϡưʪȤƤΥҥȤǽȿǤʤߤ̤ǤϤʤʹ֤ˡҲŪˤäƤϤƷꤵͤηϤǤꡤλʪɤ֤ɤطդƤ뤫ȤΤǤϤʤȤñ̤ȤҴŪʼΤ¸ߤʤηϤʤΤǤ롥Ϥ줬ηϤǤ¤ꡤϢ³ñ̤¸ߤꤵ롥ñ̤ϡץꥪ˼¸ΤǤϤ塼ޤäĤ϶줷ޤϡñ̤ºǤä塼ηϤϡܼ˴ؤڤΥ뤳ȤϤǤʤȸ
֥ȥФϺŪˡΩ˴פ֤ηϤȤʤġϤ礦ɡޤޤʶͿ줿ϤΤޤޤȤ߹碌ΩĥΤ褦ʤΤסˤ⤫餺ΤȤƤñ̤ϤɤˤͿƤʤ֥ȥФ˼ͿƤʪ븸ۤκϿפȤϸߤΤϴطΩʹ֤λʡᶦƱѡˤǤ롥ֿͤΩʪ֤嫤ϡʪΩä¸ߤʪꤹƯʤ̡ġͿͤϤλˤäŪ˻ʪ¤롥̡ġͤʤʪ⡤ʤоݤ⡤ʤִ֤ˤƤ¨ŪˤͿƤʤפΤ
塼ˤȤäơŪʲͤˤϤΤ褦˼ŪŪʼΤλ٤ʤΤǤ뤫顤ϲʾβͤȤ٤٤ʤȤȤˤʤ롥塼3ֵǡˤĤƿƤ롥ݻ (116) ȡ
塼ˤС쵭ϡ¾ΤɤΤ褦ʵ桤ɤΤ褦٤ˤˤʤŪäƤ롥ȤС빭ϤˤĤʾŪʲͤʤɤϡɤäƤѲĴ٤뤳ȤǤϡʾȤε椬ϤȤѤμŪоݤγ˻äƤ뤫ạ̇̄ǤεܼŪˡñפʤΤǤ롥Ȥ쵭ˤϡλ٤ϤɤˤʤΤǤꡤΤϤİбפȡֳǰפĤιࡤΰ֤«δ֤δطˤäƤݾڤƤʤĤιࡤȤȤˤʤ롥ιϡ¬ꤹɤΤ褦ʼ٤ʤȤǡҤѲ롥ѲǤ٤Ͼ֤ΤˤϤʤ֤ͳѲΤˤϸФʤȤϤ٤ơ쵭椬ֻʪμŪطפˤȤŤʤŪַפǤ뤳Ȥ餯Τǡؤ̻ؤ̡ǤΩƤɬ⡤¤Ϥ˺Ƥ櫓Ǥ롥
Ǥϡ쵭ΤȲʾΤΩƤ롥ΰ㤤椨ˡʾˤĤƤϡ֤̻֤ζ̤ä˰ռˡñפ˰ȤǤΤФ쵭ˤĤƤξ֤˶̤ưʤФʤʤȤפΤȤΤȤĥƤս Saussure (115--16) Ѥ褦
Il est certain que toutes les sciences auraient intérêt à marquer plus scrupuleusement les axes sur lesquels sont situées les choses dont elles s'occupent ; il faudrait partout distinguer selon la figure suivante : 1o l'axe des simultanéités (AB), concernant les rapports entre choses coexistantes, d'où toute intervention du temps est exclue, et 2o l'axe des successivités (CD), sur lequel on ne peut jamais considérer qu'une chose à la fois, mais où sont situées toutes les choses du premier axe avec leur changements.
Pour les sciences travaillant sur des valeurs, cette distinction devient une nécessité pratique, et dans certains cas une nécessité absolue. Dans ce domaine on peut mettre les savants au défi d'organiser leurs recherches d'une façon rigoureuse sans tenir compte de deux axes, sans distinguer le système des valeurs considérées en soi, de ces mêmes valeurs considérées en fonction du temps.
C'est au linguiste que cette distinction s'impose le plus impérieusement ; car la langue est un système de pures valeurs que rien ne détermine en dehors de l'état momentané de ses termes. Tant que par un de ses côtés une valeur a sa racine dans les choses et leurs rapports naturels (comme c'est le cas dans la science économique --- par exemple un fonds de terre vaut en proportion de ce qu'il rapporte), on peut jusqu'à un certain point suivre cette valeur dans le temps, tout en se souvenant qu'à chaque moment elle dépend d'un système de valeurs contemporaines. Son lien avec les choses lui donne malgré tout une base naturelle, et par là les appréciations qu'on y rattache ne sont jamais complètement arbitraire ; leur variabilité est limitée. Mais nous venons de voir qu'en linguistique les données naturelles n'nont aucune place.
ȤƤβʾȸоȤ̤ơ줾⤭ĦˤʤäƤ
ݻ Ϻإ塼뾮ŵ١罤ۡ1985ǯ
Saussure, Ferdinand de. Cours de linguistique générale. Ed. Tullio de Mauro. Paris: Payot & Rivages, 2005.
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