#1800. ͡ȿи ([2014-04-01-1]) εǡäȤŵŪȿиȤ "gradable antonym" ȾΤˤĤƿ줿"contrary" ȤƤФ뤬ŵŪ٤ηƻΥڥפ⤫٤Ф褤good / bad, big / small, hot / cold, old / young, long / short, happy / sad, clean / dirty Ǥ롥줾츫ñʥڥ̣ŪܳŪ˰ȤȡʤʤʣޤǤ롥
ȿոڥˤĤƤ褯ΤƤ븽ݤϡεǤ줿褦ˡڥΤ̵ɸ (unmarked) ǡ¾ͭɸ (marked) Ǥ뤳Ȥ㤨СǯҤͤ뵿ʸǤϡHow old are you? old ѤΤ̤Ǥ롥How young are you? young Ѥˤϡ֤ʤ㤤ȤȤϤǤΤäƤ뤬ҤͤΤϤɤ㤤פȤüޤȤʤ롥old ξˤϤΤ褦Ϥʤ̾ΩŪ˻Ȥ롥츫 old young Ϥ줾ƱλʤǥڥʤƤȿոΤ褦˸뤬ºݤˤ old ΩŪƯôäƤ̵ɸǤΤФơyoung ϾˤäƤü᤹ͭɸǤ롥old young ˸뤳Τ褦ʺϡŪ˸뺹ǤϤʤ̣Ū˵ꤵƤ뺹Ǥȹͤ졤̣ΰȤ롥
ȿոͭɸ̵ɸΩɽФΤϡ٤Ҥͤ뵿ʸȤʸ̮˸¤ʤ㤨С̾⡤ȿոƻ̵ɸС˴ŤΤ¿long / short бΩŪ̾ length shortness ȤƤޤȡ̣νſûطΩŪǤϤʤƱͤˡdeep / shallow Ф depth strong / weak Ф strength 줾ΩŪ̾
ͭɸ̵ɸΩɽФĶȤƵʸ̾2ǵLehrer (400) Ϥ6ĤιܤơΩȿոΰ̣˿Ƥ뤳Ȥ8ܤʲ˼
I Neutralization of an opposition in questions by unmarked member.
II Neutralization of an opposition in nominalizations by unmarked member.
III Only the unmarked member appears in measure phrases of the form Amount Measure Adjective (e.g. three feet tall).
IV If one member of the pair consists of an affix added to the antonym, the affix form is marked.
V Ratios can be used only with the unmarked member (e.g. Twice as old).
VI The unmarked member is evaluatively positive; the marked is negative.
VII The unmarked member denotes more of a quality; the marked denotes less.
VIII If there are asymmetrical entailments, the unmarked member is less likely to be 'biased' or 'committed'. Cf.
A is better than B. A and B could be bad.
B is worse than A. B must be bad, and A may be as well.
I II ˤĤƤϤǤ˿줿III ϡfive feet tall, two years old, three metres wide ʤɤñ̤ˤɽ̾ѤΤ̵ɸСȤ롥
IV ϡŵŪƬΤĤСͭɸǤȤȤǡlucky / unlucky, important / unimportant ʤɤ㤬롥impartial / partial unbiased / biased ΥڥǤϡ¾°˾Ȥ餹ȡषƬΤĤԤ̵ɸȤʤꡤȿ롥
V ϡtwice as long as . . ., ten times as heavy as . . . ʤɤܿɽѤС̵ɸȤȤǤ롥
VI ϡݥƥɾôС̵ɸǤȤΤgood, strong, happy, clean ʤɤߤ¤ꡤΤˤη褦˻פ뤬ʸˤɤѤˤѰۤϤȤСclean / dirty ΩˤơݥλԽԤˤȤäƥݥƥɾôΤ dirty Τۤ
VII ϡҴŪ̲ˡ礭ʤ̵ۤɸǤȤΤbig, long, heavy, wide ʤɤˤĤƤϤδϤ褯ƤϤޤ뤬clean / dirty ξ硤ԤԤ٤Ʋ̤礭ΤϤ褯ʬʤ餫äƤ르ߤ̤ǤСdirty Τۤ礭ȤȤˤʤ롥safe / dangerous, sober / drunk, pure / impure, accurate / inaccurate ˤƱ꤬ͤ롥
VIII ϡް (entailment) ˴ؤ붽̣㤨 good / bad ΩˤơThe steak is better than the chicken, but both are bad. ϵƤ뤬* The chicken is worse than the steak, but both are good. ϵƤʤȤϡgood bad ȰۤʤꡤΩŪʰ̣ôȤǤ뤳Ȥɽ魯դˡbad ΩŪǤꡤƤȤȤˤʤ롥bad ΤΤ褦ϡ"committed" ɽ롥ǡhot / cold, happy / sad ʤɤǤξСȤ "committed" Ǥ뤫顤ΥСΤߤ "committed" Ǥ good / bad, long / short Τ褦ʥڥȤۤʤ뤳Ȥˤʤ롥
嵭8ܤϡΤȤ gradable antonyms ̵ɸͭɸΩͭ뷹뤳ȤΤˤȤɤޤꡤ٤ƤΥڥɬ8ܤΤ٤ƤȤȤˤϤʤʤI ǤϤ°ȤߤʤȤޤǤϤǤ뤬ʳ°ϸġȿոڥ˱줿ʤäȤޤޤ
嵭Ѹʳθˤѻ븽ݤʤΤޤ⤽ʤȿոڥ̵ɸͭɸΩΤʤΤȤŪ⤫Ǥ롥ȿոΰ̣ϡʾ˿Ǥ롥
Lehrer, A. "Markedness and Antonymy." Journal of Linguistics 21 (1985): 397--429.
homonymy Ʊˤ polysemy ¿ˤζ̤ȤˤĤƤϡ#286. homonymy, homophony, homography, polysemy ([2010-02-07-1]) #815. polysemic clash? ([2011-07-21-1]) εˤƱ֤2ĤθǤ2ĤƱǤΤ뤤1Ĥ¿ǤΤϡ̻Ūʰ̣ͤˤơ¾ǤüԤζŪľͤˤȽǤȤΤ̾٤2Ĥλ㤦Ȥ⤢롥
㤨СʥȥפΡȻʰΡ˥ġʾ٤3Ĥθ suit Ȥͤ褦3Ԥϸ츻ŪˤϴϢꡤˤȤʤ̣Ȥ "a following or natural sequence of things or events" ۤɤġȻפȡ֥ġפϰȡ³Ȥ̹Ǥ줽ʾ١פϸ餬æƤ褦˻פ롥ʾ١פϡŪǼήȤˡʤפͳ褷ŪˤϸȤĤʤݤäƤΤŪʴФȤƤϰæȤƤȤäƤ褤Voyles (121--22) ϡ̣Ω줫顤3Ĥθ1ĤθȤƶ¸ʳΰ̣§ (1) Ȥơ2Ĥθʬ줿Ȥ˶ᤤʳΰ̣§ (2) Ȥ꼰

(1) polysemous(2) homonymous ȤȤˤʤ뤬(2) ΤҤȤˤƤȤǤϡɬ2Ĥ̤θȤߤʤƤ櫓ǤϤʤΤ⤷ʤݥȤϡhomonymy polysemy ζ̤٤ȤȤǤ롥Voyles (122) ۩
We are suggesting that for most contemporary speakers the meaning of suit as a set of cards or a set of clothes is an instance of polysemy: these two meanings share certain semantic markers in common. The other meaning of 'legal action' has become completely divorced from the meaning of 'collection' in that it has virtually no features in common with this meaning. This is then an instance of homonymy. The question of whether two or more different sense of a word should be considered the same or separate lexical items is, we believe, a function of the number of semantic features shared by the two (or more) senses. Often such a question does not admit of a simple yes or no; rather, the answer is one of degree.
̣Ǥΰ̣ѲιͤˤĤơҤ٤ƤVoyles ˤС̣«ΰ̣ɽФợäꡤæꤹ뵬§ŬѤ뤳Ȥˤäơθΰ̣Ѳȹͤʸˡ̣ݤ˾˥쥹秤ȤʤΤϡɤΰ̣Ūʰ̣Ȥꤹ뤫ȤǤ롥Voyles (122) ⡤ɡƱˤ֤ĤäƤ褦Williams (462) ˤ Voyles ʸФɾϡŪ
A formal system for representing semantic structure is no less a prerequisite to describing most patterns in change of meaning. Voyles 1973 has attempted to represent change of meaning, building on the formal semantic theory of features and markers first proposed by Katz & Fodor 1963. He tries to demonstrate that semantic change can be systematically explained by changes in rules that generate semantic representations, much as phonological change can be represented as rule change. But a great deal of investigation is still necessary before we understand what should go into a semantic representation, much less what one should look like and how it might change.
̣ŪˤϲΤΤȤäƤ褤homonymy polysemy Τ褦ʸ̤ˤĤƤϡɤⲿ餫ΥҥȤͿƤΤǤ롥
Voyles, Joseph. "Accounting for Semantic Change." Lingua 31 (1973): 95--124.
Williams, Joseph M. "Synaesthetic Adjectives: A Possible Law of Semantic Change." Language 52 (1976): 461--78.
ȿи (opposite) ˤȿո졤ȿʤɤθƤ̾뤬Ѹꤵ⤵뤳Ȥʤ顤äȿФȤ뤫ˤĤƤ͡Ǥ롥
ȿФȿФϹȡ֡ˤȤͤΤǤϤʤ֤ȹ٤ȤȤ߹碌⤢뤷浡פ⤫٤֤ġʼºݤοСˤȤΩͤ롥ޤֹ⤤פȿФˤϡ㤤פȡְ¤פ2Ĥ뤬㤤פȿФˤϡֹ⤤1ĤʤȿФ狼뤤ϻФϤޤ夫ФǭФ륤ȿиȤΤhappy ȿФ unhappy Ȥ sad ĹûȻࡤȳ̤פȺʤϡ줾ƱˤäȿиȸƤ٤Τ
̣Ǥϡȿиˤ͡ʼब뤳ȤǧƤ롥ʲ Hofmann (40--46, 57--60) ˵äơɽŪʤΤޤȤ褦
(1) (gradable) antonym
ǤŵŪȿиϡhigh / lowlong / short, old / new, hot / cold Τ褦٤ɽ魯ƻФǤ롥ȿиƻϡѸǤӵǾˤǤ롤very ٤ʤɤħġ٤Ҥͤ뵿̾˻ѤΤϡФΤ줫Ǥꡤ餬ŪΩŪʰ̣ôȤˤʤ롥㤨Сlong / short Ф˴ؤƤ long ̵ɸȤʤꡤHow long is the train? the length of the train ʤɤ¤̣Ѥ롥ܸǤ֤ɤΤ餤ĹΤפȿҤͤ뤷̾ϡĹפȤǤϡĹûס羮סִȡפʤɤФˤΩŪ٤ɽ魯ȤǤΤ⤷
(2) complementary
on / offtrue / false, finite / infinite, mortal / immortal, single / married ʤɤΧȿФ롥(1) ФȰۤʤꡤvery ʤɤǶ뤳ȤϤǤ٤ȤɽǤʤǥʴطǤ롥ŪˡƬղäƤơɤ餬̵ɸǤ뤫뤳ȤǤʤФΰ (1) ¾ (2ˤĥ⤢롥㤨Сopen / shut, cooked / raw, invisible / visible ϡ줾ΥڥΤԤ gradable Ǥ롥
¾ʻǤϡmale / female, stop / move ʤɤ롥
(3) antonymous group
black / white / red / blue / green Τ褦ˡȿСפȤʤꤦΤޤäưϢθ췲ʤξˤϿ̸áˤΡȿиȤϡषƱ췲°Ȥ̣ǤȤ٤Ǥ롥ߤƱǤʤ⡤°Ǥϸͭϰ̤Ƥߤ˺ŪǤȤǡˤäƤϡȿиפȤ⤵ˤʤdog cat Ϥ줾ƱǤʤ顤Ʊ°ߤ˰ۤʤäƤΤǡantonymous group ΰʤƤȤ롥ǭܸǤѸǤⴷŪ˥ڥʤΤиȸʤ뤬Ʊ롼פιȤƤϡ͡ڡѡޤ¿ưʪ뤳ȤǤ롥ƻȤƤϡbig / small Ǥ (1) Ʊͤˤߤ뤬huge / big / small / tiny Ȥ4ʳΤʤǹͤ (3) ˤƤ뤳Ȥ狼롥Ĥޤꡤ(3) ϡ(1) (2) 2ΩȤϰۤʤꡤʣΩȸƤ褤north / south / east / west 4ܤʤɡ˴ؤ¤äƤ褦ʥ롼פ⤢롥
ܸǻȿФϳʤ뤤ˤ̤ꥫǤ mountain ФƤ valley ̤Ǥ롥Τ褦ˡ롼ԥʸŪƶΤ¿
(4) reversative
ưưˤĤơžطɽ魯tie ʷ֡ˤ untie ʤۤɤˡclothe 夻ˤ unclothe æˤʤɡʬƻˤ tied / untied, clothed / unclothed Ωžȡ(1) (2) Ȥʤ롥appear / disappear, enable / disable Ʊ͡
(5) converse
husband / wife, parent / child Τ褦ߤ˵Ǥʤ䤤礦ط"X is the (husband) of Y." ΤȤ"Y is the (wife) of X." Ωġson / father ϾθɬǤʤΤǡ converse Ǥ (ex. "X is the father of Liz")
ϰۤʤ뤬buy / sell, lend / borrow Τ褦ñνȿФδǸΤ䡤above / below, in front of / behind, north of / south of, right / left Τ褦˶Ūִطɽ魯Τ⡤converse Ȥ롥
嵭Τ褦ˤ줤ʬǤʤ褦ʡȿиפ⤢ϤζʬȤƻͤˤʤ
Hofmann, Th. R. Realms of Meaning. Harlow: Longman, 1993.
ƤαѸǽ줿̣ζʽϡ̣ΰ̣ͤȤơѸ mean ȤưѤ͡ʸ뤳ȤǻϤޤ롥㤨СHofmann (1--2) ǤϡΤ褦ʸ롥
What did she mean by winking like that?
That nasal accent means he comes from Chicago.
How she feels means a lot to me.
Who do you mean to refer to by that?
Who do you mean by 'that guy with an earring'?
What does the word teacher mean?
What do you mean by freedom?
Crystal (187) Ǥ⡤Τ褦 mean ¿ƳƤ롥
'intend' --- I mean to visit Jane next week.
'indicate' --- A red signal means stop.
'refer to' --- What does 'telemetry' mean?
'have significance' --- What does global warming mean?
'convey' --- What does the name McGough mean to you?
Ǥϡ줾տޡؼʤɤȸɽȤǤ褦ʸǡmean ѤƤ롥ޤѸ켭 mean Ĵ٤ȡˤäƸʬ˺ۤΤΡʣθƤΤ̤Ǥ롥ܸΡְ̣פ⤪褽Ʊͤ˹ȤǤΤǡmean ȤۤƱäƤȤȤ館Ƥ褤
Ogden and Richards (186--87) ϡThe Meaning of Meaning ạ̇̄ΰ̣ʤȤƸźѤƤΡˤ16ʬषƤ롥ʲ褦
A I An Intrinsic property. II A unique unanalysable Relation to other things. B III The other words annexed to a word in the Dictionary. IV The Connotation of a word. V An Essence. VI An activity Projected into an object. VII (a) An event Intended. (b) A Volition. VIII The Place of anything in a system. IX The Practical Consequences of a thing in our future experience. X The Theoretical consequences involved in or implied by a statement. XI Emotion aroused by anything. C XII That which is Actually related to a sign by a chosen relation. XIII (a) The Mnemic effects of a stimulus. Associations acquired. (b) Some other occurrence to which the mnemic effects of any occurrence are Appropriate. (c) That which a sign is Interpreted as being of. (d) What anything Suggests. (In the case of Symbols.) That to which the User of a Symbol actually refers. XIV That to which the user of a symbol Ought to be referring. XV That to which the user of a symbol Believes himself to be referring. XVI That to which the Interpreter of a symbol (a) Refers. (b) Believes himself to be referring. (c) Believes the User to be referring.
ߤγ´ʸߤƤǡFischer ˤѸ츦ΥݥˤĤƤʸɤѸˤޤˤѸäθϡ3ĤδʤƤȤ(1) morpho-etymological (or morphological), (2) lexico-semantic (or semantic), (3) socio-historical (or sociolinguistic) Ǥ롥
(1) ϡ#901. ʬ ([2011-10-15-1]) 褦ˡmodel loan ȤŪˤʤطˤ뤫ȤǤ롥Ūʴطܤ˸Τ importationʤΡʤʤ̣Τߤμѡˤ importation Ǥ롥(2) ϡѤξˤꡤ¦ΰ̣ηϤȸηϤԤ줿ݤǤ롥(3) ϡμѤɤΤ褦ʼҲŪʾΤȤ˹Ԥ줿ξԤشط餫ˤ褦ȤǤ롥3ʬϸߤ˸Ȥ⤢뤷¤θȤ߹碌ɵ椵ʤФʤʤΤʬȻפ
Fischer ϡΤʤ (3) μҲŪʴϺǤⶽ̣뤬ܤ˸븦̤ϴԤǤʤŪǤ롥δŻ뤷 Thomason and Kaufman Ȥ⤯ɾʤ⡤Ѹ츦ˤϹʤȽҤ٤Ƥ롥
Of the three types of typologies discussed here, the third, although the most attractive because of its sociolinguistic orientation, is possibly the least useful for a study of lexical borrowing: lexis is an unreliable indicator of the precise nature of a contact situation, and the socio-historical evidence necessary to reconstruct the latter is often not available. Morphological and semantic typologies on the other hand, though seemingly more traditional, can yield a great deal of new information if an attempt is made to study a whole semantic domain and if such studies are truly comparative, comparing different text types, different source languages or different periods. (110)
Fischer (1) (2) δѸ츦ˤƴ˾ΤƤǤȻ롥츫ȡѸˤ˸ꤷ硤2ĤδȤ櫓 (1) δϡ˸椬ʤƤΤǤϤʤȻפ뤬ƳȤǤʤ㤨С̣ (semantic loan) ɽ substitution μѸˤĤƤϡѤۤɤʤˤϡimportation Ф substitution ϰ̣ΤǸˤȡ٤ȤŪʤȤͳȤƵ롥
ˤƤ⡤ѤȤˡˤ importation ǡ̤ξˤ substitution ǼΤϤʤظˤɤΤ褦ƯƤΤ¦üԡʽġˤο䡤ŪŪʸȤäҲŪװˤĤƤϸڤ뤳Ȥ뤬嵭 (1) (2) θŪʴΥץϤۤȤɤʤȤäƤ褤Fischer (100) ռ"why certain types of borrowing seem to be more frequent than others, depending on period, source language, text type, speech community or language policy, to name only the most obvious factors." ŪͤƤ롥伫Ȥ⡤Ʊͤռ#902. Ѥ䤹ܡ ([2011-10-16-1])#903. Ѥ¿Ⱦʤ ([2011-10-17-1])#934. Ѥ¿Ⱦʤ (2) ([2011-11-17-1])#1619. ʤ deus Ѥ줺 God ݤ줿Τ ([2013-10-02-1]) ʤɤǼƤ
ѸˤˤƥѸͤƤߤСűѸǤ importation ¤ substitution ¿äʤषԤΤۤ¿äȤˤѸʹߤ importation ήǤ롥Fischer (101) ǿƤ褦ˡStandard High German Swiss High German ˤޥϼѸǤϡԤ substitution ꡤԤ importation ηꥫѸǤ substitution fall ФƥꥹѸǤ importation autumn Ȥ̣⤢롥ܸؤθμѤ⡤ˤϴˤ substitution ήäˤ importation ŪȤʤäˤäơˤäơimportation substitution Ψư뤬ˤϼҲŪװȤ̤˲餫θŪװƯƤǽΤ
Fischer (105) ϡΤ褦ʿ¿פĤȤǤȤѸˤˤȤ3ĤƤ롥
How many of all Scandinavian borrowings have replaced native terms, how many have led to semantic differentiation?
How does French compare with Scandinavian in this respect?
How many borrowings from language x are importations, how many are substitutions, and what semantic domains do they belong to?
HTOED (Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary) Ǥ줿ߡ̣μѤǤ substitution ˴ؤ븦䤹ʤäƤѸѸ츦̤Ϥ줫뤽
Fischer, Andreas. "Lexical Borrowing and the History of English: A Typology of Typologies." Language Contact in the History of English. 2nd rev. ed. Ed. Dieter Kastovsky and Arthur Mettingers. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003. 97--115.
Thomason, Sarah Grey and Terrence Kaufman. Language Contact, Creolization, and Genetic Linguistics. Berkeley: U of California P, 1988.
ε#1776. Ogden and Richards ˤ5Ĥεǽ ([2014-03-08-1]) ˰³Ogden and Richards ꡤϸ쵭ױѤ뤿εϤˤĤơԤϡỌ̇̄ŪʹͻʤäƤΤΡܼŪˤϵҲȤȤ "therapeutic" ʵϲȤǤ롥#1769. Ogden and Richards semiotic triangle ([2014-03-01-1]) ɽ蘆 SYMBOL, REFERENCE, REFERENT 뵭ηϤˤưʲεϽ˼طʤݤƤСεηϡʤˤϲʳؤˤФǤϤȤ
I. The Canon of Singularity: One Symbol stands for one and only one Referent. (88)
II. The Canon of Definition: Symbols which can be substituted one for another symbolize the same reference. (92)
III. The Canon of Expansion: The referent of a contracted symbol is the referent of that symbol expanded. (93)
IV. The Canon of Actuality: A symbol refers to what it is actually used to refer to; not necessarily to what it ought in good usage, or is intended by an interpreter, or is intended by the user to refer to. (103)
V. The Canon of Compatibility: No complex symbol may contain constituent symbols which claim the same 'place.' (105)
VI. The Canon of Individuality: All possible referents together form an order, such that every referent has one place only in that order. (106)
I, II, III SYMBOL, REFERENCE, REFERENT δ֤˳ݤ٤طIV εѤV, VI Ͻδ֤˳ؤݤƤɬפ줾Ҥ٤ΤǤ롥
Ogden and Richards (107) The Canons of Symbolism 餹뤳ȤθѤˤĤơοŪǤ롥
In these six Canons, Singularity, Expansion, Definition, Actuality, Compatibility, and Individuality, we have the fundamental axioms, which determine the right use of Words in Reasoning. We have now a compass by the aid of which we may explore new fields with some prospect of avoiding circular motion. We may begin to order the symbolic levels and investigate the process of interpretation, the 'goings-on' in the minds of interpreters.
դˤС̾θѤ The Canons of Symbolism æηϤ˰¸ƤʤƤ뤫ȤȤͤ롥Ȥηϡ뤤ϤλѤϡ츫Ƥ褦ǤƸʤˤƤʤΤѼԤǤʹ֤ϡΥ˼餬ϮƤƱˡΥѤƤȤ⤢ȤϵˤȤƤɬפ롥äȤ⡤Ogden and Richards ϡξ¤ޤפäƤ褦ʤΤ
Ogden, C. K. and I. A. Richards. The Meaning of Meaning. 1923. San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989.
ε#1769. Ogden and Richards semiotic triangle ([2014-03-01-1]) ǡOgden and Richards ͭ̾ʿޤˤСSYMBOL REFERENT ĤʤդŪʤĤʤˤʤˤ⤫餺Ǥ¿ξ硤ľŪʤĤʤʼˤ뤫Τ褦˸ƤǤȤȤä ("The fundamental and most prolific fallacy is . . . that the base of the triangle given above is filled in" (15)) ȤԤλפ "missionary fervor" (Eco vii) ȤǤ٤ۤɤΤΤǡ1ϤľˤϡλפͭͤΰѤ¿ǤƤ롥
"All life comes back to the question of our speech---the medium through which we communicate." ---HENRY JAMES.
"Error is never so difficult to be destroyed as when it has its root in Language." ---BENTHAM.
"We have to make use of language, which is made up necessarily of preconceived ideas. Such ideas unconsciously held are the most dangerous of all." ---POINCARÉ.
"By the grammatical structure of a group of languages everything runs smoothly for one kind of philosophical system, whereas the way is as it were barred for certain other possibilities." ---NIETZCHE.
"An Englishman, a Frenchman, a German, and an Italian cannot by any means bring themselves to think quite alike, at least on subjects that involve any depth of sentiment: they have not the verbal means." ---Prof. J. S. MACKENZIE.
"In Primitive Thought the name and object named are associated in such wise that the one is regarded as a part of the other. The imperfect separation of words from things characterizes Greek speculation in general." ---HERBERT SPENCER.
"The tendency has always been strong to believe that whatever receives a name must be an entity or being, having an independent existence of its own: and if no real entity answering to the name could be found, men did not for that reason suppose that none existed, but imagined that it was something peculiarly abstruse and mysterious, too high to be an object of sense." ---J. S. MILL.
"Nothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach on the province of grammarians, and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern." ---HUME.
"Men content themselves with the same words as other people use, as if the very sound necessarily carried the same meaning." ---LOCKE.
"A verbal discussion may be important or unimportant, but it is at least desirable to know that it is verbal.." ---Sir G. CORNEWALL LEWIS.
"Scientific controversies constantly resolve themselves into differences about the meaning of words." ---Prof. A. Schuster.
ĤΰѤǼ̤ꡤOgden and Richards 忴Ƥ뤳θϡԥᥦդβ (sapir-whorf_hypothesis) (linguistic_relativism) ˤؤäƤ롥ºݤɤǤߤȡThe Meaning of Meaning ¿μˤޤ餷ƤΤ狼ꡤΰ̣ "a seminal work" ȸƤǤ٤Ȥ
Ogden, C. K. and I. A. Richards. The Meaning of Meaning. 1923. San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989.
Eco, Umberto. "The Meaning of The Meaning of Meaning." Trans. William Weaver. Introduction. The Meaning of Meaning. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989. v--xi.
ɸϡOgden and Richards ˤ뵭̣θŵŪ̾ The Meaning of Meaning ǹΤ褦ˤʤäʲοޤΤȤؤ

οޤΤĺΰյϡSYMBOL REFERENT δ֤ˤϡʤȻʪδ֤ˤϡܼŪʴطϤʤŪʴطʤȤƤ뤳ȤǤ롥ľܤδط뤫Τ褦˸Ƥ뤳ȤŬڤʻͤȸλѤˤȤäƽκǤȡԤ⤹롥μĥϡΤʤDz٤Ȥʤ֤롥
SYMBOL, REFERENCE, REFERENT 3ԤδطˤĤơĹѤȤʤ뤬ԤľƤ餪 (10--12)
This may be simply illustrated by a diagram, in which the three factors involved whenever any statement is made, or understood, are placed at the corners of the triangle, the relations which hold between them being represented by the sides. The point just made can be restated by saying that in this respect the base of the triangle is quite different in composition from either of the other sides.
Between a thought and a symbol causal relations hold. When we speak, the symbolism we employ is caused partly by the reference we are making and partly by social and psychological factors---the purpose for which we are making the reference, the proposed effect of our symbols on other persons, and our own attitude. When we hear what is said, the symbols both cause us to perform an act of reference and to assume an attitude which will, according to circumstances, be more or less similar to the act and the attitude of the speaker.
Between the Thought and the Referent there is also a relation; more or less direct (as when we think about or attend to a coloured surface we see), or indirect (as when we 'think of' or 'refer to' Napoleon), in which case there may be a very long chain of sign-situations intervening between the act and its referent: word---historian---contemporary record---eye-witness---referent (Napoleon).
Between the symbol and the referent there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one, which consists in its being used by someone to stand for a referent. Symbol and Referent, that is to say, are not connected directly (and when, for grammatical reasons, we imply such a relation, it will merely be an imputed, as opposed to a real, relation) but only indirectly round the two sides of the triangle.
It may appear unnecessary to insist that there is no direct connection between say 'dog,' the word, and certain common objects in our streets, and that the only connection which holds is that which consists in our using the word when we refer to the animal. We shall find, however, that the kind of simplification typified by this once universal theory of direct meaning relations between words and things is the source of almost all the difficulties which thought encounters.
Ogden and Richards ܤŪƤ semiotic triangle ˻äͳϡθˤϤӤäƤ뵭Ọ̇̄˴ؤȤˤäSYMBOL, REFERENCE, REFERENT 3Ԥδ֤ˤطƤʤȤפˤäƿθդΥߥߥ˥ƤȤȤؤξ紶ԤͤưƤΰ̣ǤϡThe Meaning of Meaning ϡŪŤŪȤ֤ Umberto Eco ɾƤ̤ꡤ"therapeutic" ʽǤȸ ("The Meaning of Meaning is pervaded by an abundant missionary fervor. I will call this attitude, with a certain severity, the 'therapeutic fallacy'." (vii)) Ԥ餬 Basic English ϺפĤΤ⡤Τ褦 "therapeutic" ʰտޤäƤˤۤʤʤBasic English ˤĤƤϡ#960. Basic English ([2011-12-13-1]) ڤӡ#1705. Basic English ǽ줿ä ([2013-12-27-1]) ȡˡ
ȤʤäƤϡsemiotic triangle ϵỌ̇̄ȤƴŪ°뤬⤵˻äаޤˤϡOgden and Richards θѤ˴ؤºŪռäΤǤ롥
Ogden, C. K. and I. A. Richards. The Meaning of Meaning. 1923. San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989.
Eco, Umberto. "The Meaning of The Meaning of Meaning." Trans. William Weaver. Introduction. The Meaning of Meaning. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989. v--xi.
2֤ε ([2014-02-17-1], [2014-02-18-1]) ǡ18Ⱦ19ˤƤΥޥɤ synaesthesia ɽδطˤĤƸƤŪ뤤ϰ̣ŪˤСsynaesthesia ɽΤĺ̥Ϥϡ̴ֲФ̴Фؤΰ̣žѡפȤ뤤ϡؿӤɽǤСˡ§ˤ롥
ˤĤƤβѸζɽˤä̤˼¾ڤͤΤWilliams Ǥ롥Williams ϡ100Ķ봶Фɽ魯ѸηƻˤĤơϢνǯ OED MED dzΤʤ顤̣žѤ̻Ū餫ˤˡѸ˸¤äƤСñ˲̤̤ؤžѤȤҤ٤ǤϤʤδд֤ǤžѤΩĤȤ餫ˤWilliams (463) ηǤ롥
THE MAJOR GENERALIZATION is this: if a lexeme metaphorically transfers from its earliest sensory meaning to another sensory modality, it will transfer according to the schedule shown in Figure 1.
ŪʴɽС"Sensory words in English have systematically transferred from the physiologically least differentiating, most evolutionary primitive sensory modalities to the most differentiating, most advanced, but not vice versa." (Williams 464--65) Ȥʤ롥Williams (464) ꡤŪʷƻ롥
TOUCH TO TASTE: aspre, bitter, bland, cloying, coarse, cold, cool, dry, hard, harsh, keen, mild, piquant, poignant, sharp, smooth.
TOUCH TO COLOR: dull, light, warm.
TOUCH TO SOUND: grave, heavy, rough, smart, soft.
TASTE TO SMELL: acrid, sour, sweet.
TASTE TO SOUND: brisk, dulcet.
DIMENSION TO COLOR: full.
DIMENSION TO SOUND: acute, big, deep, empty, even, fat, flat, high, hollow, level, little, low, shallow, thick.
COLOR TO SOUND: bright, brilliant, clear, dark, dim, faint, light, vivid.
SOUND TO COLOR: quiet, strident.
Ullmann ΥޥɻͤĴˤ⸫줿褦ˡ㳰ʤ櫓ǤϤʤWilliams (464) ϡʲ㳰ꥹȤƤ롥
TOUCH TO DIMENSION: crisp.
TOUCH TO SMELL: hot, pungent.
TASTE TO TOUCH: eager, tart.
TASTE TO COLOR: austere, mellow.
DIMENSION TO TASTE: thin.
DIMENSION TO TOUCH: small.
SOUND TO TASTE: loud.
SOUND TO TOUCH: shrill.
Williams ϡβ˱褦ɽϡˤ뤬Τ83--99%ǤȽҤ٤Ƥ롥ޤǹ⤤ΨǤСʤȤⷹȤϸƤ٤뤷ˤϰˡ§˶ᤤΤȤߤʤƤ⺹٤ʤ
Williams (470--72) ϡβڤ¾ˤƤϤޤϤȸǤꡤºݤܸζɽˤĤơع٤ܸüԥեޥȤѤơƱ91%ȤΨʤǧƤ롥
ΰ̣žѤβ⤬̣1Ĥϡ̳ (smell) ɤͤޤǤȤȤ̳ФžѤϤʤȤȤˤʤ뤬ϰˤܸˤ뤳ȤǤ롥ޤtouch -> taste -> smell ˤĤƤСꥹȥƥ쥹̣ (taste) üʿ (touch) ǤȹͤȤȶ礤̣ (taste) ̳ (smell) ȶᤤԤԤѸߤФƤȲ᤹뤳ȤǤ뤫⤷ʤ (Williams 472) ŪʶɽȡʲؤȤʿܤʤ顤Williams (473) ϤҤ٤Ƥ롥
Though I do not suggest that Fig. 1 represents more than chronological sequence, the 'dead-end' appearance of the olfactory sense is a striking visual metaphor for the evolutionary history of man's sensory development.
ʸκǸǡWilliams (473--74) ϡְ̣ˡ§ס[2014-02-16-1]ε#1756. ̣Ѳˡ§餷ΡפȡˤؤμƤ롥
. . . what is offered here constitutes not only a description of a rule-governed semantic change through the last 1200 years of English---a regularity that qualifies for lawhood, as the term LAW has ordinarily been used in historical linguistics---but also as a testable hypothesis in regard to past or future changes in any language.
Williams, Joseph M. "Synaethetic Adjectives: A Possible Law of Semantic Change." Language 52 (1976): 461--78.
ε#1757. synaesthesia ȥޥɻ (1) ([2014-02-17-1]) ˰³ɽȥޥɻͤˤĤơ
Ullmann (281) ˡ2ͤΥޥɻ Keats Gautier κʤѥȤ synaesthesia Ĵ̤ǺܤƤ롥ɽˤơ6ĤδФΤ줫餤ؤΰ̣žѤ줾첿㤢뤫פΤǤ롥ɽθϡǽ Keats ɽǤСTouch -> Sound žѤ39㤢Ȥɤߤˤʤ롥
| Keats | Touch | Heat | Taste | Scent | Sound | Sight | Total |
| Touch | - | 1 | - | 2 | 39 | 14 | 56 |
| Heat | 2 | - | - | 1 | 5 | 11 | 19 |
| Taste | 1 | 1 | - | 1 | 17 | 16 | 36 |
| Scent | 2 | - | 1 | - | 2 | 5 | 10 |
| Sound | - | - | - | - | - | 12 | 12 |
| Sight | 6 | 2 | 1 | - | 31 | - | 40 |
| Total | 11 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 94 | 58 | 173 |
| Gautier | Touch | Heat | Taste | Scent | Sound | Sight | Total |
| Touch | - | 5 | - | 5 | 70 | 55 | 135 |
| Heat | - | - | - | - | 4 | 11 | 15 |
| Taste | - | - | - | 4 | 11 | 7 | 22 |
| Scent | - | - | - | - | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| Sound | 2 | 1 | - | 1 | - | 13 | 17 |
| Sight | 3 | - | - | 1 | 34 | - | 38 |
| Total | 5 | 6 | - | 11 | 124 | 87 | 233 |
Visual terminology is incomparably richer than its auditional counterpart, and has also far more similes and images at its command. Of the two sensory domains at the top end of the scale, sound stands more in need of external support than light, form, or colour; hence the greater frequency of the intrusion of outside elements into the description of acoustic phenomena.
ˡUllmann (282) ϡ¾κȤޤʲĴ̤Ƥ롥̴Ф̴ФؤžѤ Upwardεդ Downward ȤҤη䶯Ƥ롥
| Author | Upward | Downward | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Byron | 175 | 33 | 208 |
| Keats | 126 | 47 | 173 |
| Morris | 279 | 23 | 302 |
| Wilde | 337 | 77 | 414 |
| 'Decadents' | 335 | 75 | 410 |
| Longfellow | 78 | 26 | 104 |
| Leconte de Lisle | 143 | 22 | 165 |
| Gautier | 192 | 41 | 233 |
| Total | 1,665 | 344 | 2,009 |
Ѳˤˡ§̾ͤΤ롥⤢뤬ʤȤ⡤ȵ뤳ȤϤǤ롥̣Ѳˤˡ§褦ʤΤϤʤΤˡ#473. ̣ѲŵŪʥѥ ([2010-08-13-1]) #1109. ̣Ѳθʬ ([2012-05-10-1]) ʤɤǸ褦ˡ̣Ѳη丶ˤĤƤͤϤ뤬ˡ§Ȥۤɤΰ̲ϤޤʤƤʤʤ뤳ȤϤʤ⤷ʤʾ塤ˡ§̤Ȥ٤㤬롥
Stern ϡ"The Regularity of Sense-change. Semantic Laws." ꤹ (185--91) ˤơ®ע֤ˡפȤ̣Ѳ˴ؤˡ§פŦƤ롥®פư®٤®ͻҡ֤ˡפϻֳִ֤ƤʤͻҤǤꡤξԤΰ̣ϡquickly Ѥ3ʸ٤뤳Ȥˤä뤳ȤǤ (Stern 185)
I. He wrote quickly.
II. When the king saw him, he quickly rode up to him.
III. Quickly afterwards he carried it off.
I quickly Ͻ®٤®Ȥɽ魯III quickly ϡ?θ夹ˡפΤ褦˻ֳִ֤ûȤްդ롥I III θĤʤΤII ʸˤ quickly Ǥ롥ϤǶĤ®٤®Ȥɤ뤷ʸƬ when ȤδطǡֲȤˡפȤɤ롥ܸΡ֤Ϥ䤤פ⡤®٤Ρ®פȻ֤Ρפξɽ魯Τạ̇̄Ϣ³ԤԤؤθѲβǽˤĤƤϡݤ߹
ѸˤλȤƶ̣Τϡΰ̣Ѳ®פɽ魯Ϣˤơꤵ줿㳰ʤ餷ȤȤǤ롥Ϳ뤢ˤλƯȤǤϡˡ§ȸƤФ벻ѲƱäƤ뤳Ȥˤʤꡤ "semantic law" ȸƤ֤ˤդ路Τ褦˻פ롥
ŪˤϡStern (188) ϡ23ˤ3ĤθνǯĴ١ʲΤ褦ˤޤȤ
| Sense I | Sense II | Sense III | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 'Rapidly' | 'Rapidly/immediately' | 'Immediately' | |
| Hrædlice | OE | OE | OE |
| Hraþe (Raþe) | OE | OE | OE |
| Ardlice | OE | OE | OE |
| Lungre | OE | OE | OE |
| Ofstlice | OE | OE | OE |
| Sneome | OE | OE | OE |
| Swiþe | OE | OE | 1175 |
| Swiftly | OE | OE | 1200 |
| Caflice | OE | OE | 1370 |
| Swift | OE | 1360 | 1300? 1400? |
| Georne | OE | 1290 | 1300 |
| Hiȝendliche | 1200 | 1200 | 1200 |
| Quickly | 1200 | 1200 | 1200 |
| Smartly | 1290 | 1300 | 1300 |
| Snelle | 1300 | 1275 | 1300 |
| Quick | 1300 | 1290 | 1300 |
| Belife | 1200 | 1200 | 1200 |
| Nimbly | 1430 | 1470 | 1400 |
| Rapely | 1225 | 1300 | 1325 |
| Skete | 1300 | 1300 | 1200 |
| Tite | 1300 | 1350 | 1300 |
| Wight | 1300 | 1360 | 14th cent. |
| Wightly | 1350 | 1350 | 1300 |
We have found that English adverbs with the sense 'rapidly' are divided into two chronological groups, one in which the sense is earlier than 1300 (or 1400) and in which the sense 'immediately' nearly always arises out of it; another in which the sense 'rapidly' is later than the date mentioned, where no such development occurs. It is further demonstrable that the development always takes place in definite contexts: when the adverb is employed to qualify verbs which may be apprehended as imperfective or as perfective (punctual). We may therefore formulate the following semantic law:
English adverbs which have acquired the sense 'rapidly' before 1300, always develop the sense 'immediately'. This happens when the adverb is used to qualify a verb, the action of which may be apprehended as either imperfective or perfective, and when the meaning of the adverb consequently is equivocal: 'rapidly/immediately'. Exceptions are due to the influence of special factors.
But when the sense 'rapidly' is acquired later than 1300, no such development takes place. There is no exception to this rule.
This "law" has the form of a sound-law: it gives the circumstances of the change and a chronological limit.
We ask, next, what may be the reasons for the cessation of the development. It cannot have been that the conditions favouring it ceased to exist, for we may still say, he went rapidly out of the room; but this has not caused a change of meaning for rapidly.
It seems that the tendency itself disappeared. The reason is obscure. The changes began at a period when OE, without any considerable influence from other languages, was following its own line of development; they continued during the periods of Scandinavian and French influence, and ceased as the importation of French and Latin linguistic material was at its height. We cannot demonstrate any connection between the general linguistic and cultural development, and the sense-change in question. (190)
ΰϢθ췲Ʊ̣ѲΤϡ̣ˡ§ˤΤǤϤʤñѤˤΤȿ뤫⤷ʤStern (191) ϡѤȤϹͤʤȼĥƤ롥
Analogical influence ought to work with equal strength in both directions, so that words meaning 'immediately' receive the sense 'rapidly', but there is no trace of such a development And why has not the analogical influence continued during the Modern English period, with regard to the adverbs in my second list?
ϤơϱѸˤ˸ؤ̣ˡ§εŤ1ʤΤ
ʤְ̣ˡ§פˤĤƤϡWilliams (461--63) ͤͻͿƤ롥
Stern, Gustaf. Meaning and Change of Meaning. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1931.
Williams, Joseph M. "Synaethetic Adjectives: A Possible Law of Semantic Change." Language 52 (1976): 461--78.
ˤĤƤϡarbitrariness ε濴ˡȤ櫓#1108. 쵭̵ͭ ([2012-05-09-1]) ǵǤϡ̵̤ͭɬפ뤳Ȥ˿줿signifié signifiant Ȥδطʿа̣ȷ֤ȤδطˤĤƤ˹ͻΤ塼Ρä˥ե˸ؤȤ뤬̣ؼԤǤФʤΤȡ¡ʤ̴ؿ
Ф2ϤϡۤȤɰ̣ȷ֤δطιͻ䤵Ƥ롥ФϡʬˤĤơ#767. ʬ ([2011-06-03-1]) ǾҲ𤷤 Martinet Ѹ礤˽Фʤ顤ˤ signifié signifiant δطäƤФμŪɾĤѤ褦
̣ϰǤϡ֤ʬΥǤʤΰ̣ȷ֤ʬΥη11бʤƤ餺֤ϰ̣ꤹΤ˽ʬǤϤʤΥѥɥåˤäơΰ̣ȷ֤δط餫ˤɬפ롥(54)
Ƥϡˤȡ1ʬñ̤Ǥ뤫顤Ǥˤʤäƺ줿̣Υʤɤ̣θǤ2ʬͭ¤ǤˤϴԸǤʤ(56)
Ū̻ŪȤ2ŤδϡɽΥ٥ƤΥ٥ǤȤȤ餫ˤʤ롥Τˡθ֤Ǹΰ̣뤳ȤȡŪʲ椹뤳ȤȤ餫˰ۤʤ2ĤΥץǤ롥άͤޤޤʻ˸줿Ĥΰ̣⡤¿Ȥ˹ͤСƱΤΤȤȤˤʤʤơΤϡФд¸ΥѥѤΤǡ塼ϡָ϶ǤĤϤǤפȤΤ٤Ƥ롥סʡعֵ١235ǡˡΰ̣ط1Ĥζ֤¾ζ֤ؤ³1̵ռŪФ뤳Ȥ⤢롥̵ռŪϡĶŪˤʤä1Ĥθΰ̣֤ΤǤ롥(61)
̣ΩϡĤ줿ηϤΤǤϤʤ줿ηϤΤǤ롥ΤˡŪˤʤäựİ뤳ȤϤǤʤ(62)
ŪŪʴؿϡȤ櫓3ܤΰѤǿƤ롤Ū¿̻Ūʰ̣ѲȤδطˤĤƤιͻܤ̣Ѳϻ֤ȤȤ˽˿ʹԤ̣ɬṬ֤̌षξΰ̣ѤƤȤ¿Ѥ̤ϡŪˤ¿Ȥʤ롥ζŪ¿ϡ1ͤüԤФΤǤϤʤŪ˿ФƺФ줿ΤǤȤǡ̵ռŪȸƤӤ뤷֤̻֤ȤĶۤĶŪȤƤӤ
嵭Τ褦˰̣Ѥ뤬֤ˤѤȤǰϤۤɤޤƤϤޤʤ褦˻פ롥ȡ֤ˤ̵ռŪĶŪʼȤΤϡͤˤȤȤˤʤդˡ̣ȷ֤ħ礭ʺΤǤϤʤ
졼̡ ءοǡϰ̣١ҡʸ˥ӡ2013ǯ
졼̡Фˤءοǡϰ̣٤ɤԤȤˤҤ٤Ƥ褦ˡƳŪʸ˥ˤƤϤǤϤʤȻפĤɤΤ2ɤǤߤ顤˱ԤƶФƤ뤳Ȥ狼äȤ櫓1ϡ̣ˤγάͭפäʲˤγάγά
(1) Ūð̣ŪǤäӸؤοʲ#1666. semantics ΰ̣ˡ ([2013-11-18-1]) Ǥ줿褦ˡMichel Bréal (1832--1915) 1883ǯ sémantique ϻϤ1897ǯäựȤ븫⤢ˡBréal ΰ̣ϿʲȯۤƤꡤ̣οʲʲΰˡ§ˡ§ηиŪѻƳФȤƤ롥ˤꡤ̣ϼʳؤ˲ʳؤؤȯŸȤ뤳ȤˤʤäԤϸͭȤ Arsène Darmesteter (1846--88) August Schleicher (1821--68) ʤɤˤꡤԤ Antoine Meillet (1866-1936) ʤɤˤȤʤäΤ褦ˡỤ̄Ͽʲαƶʤ顤ůءءؤ̤ΤȤƼΩ˼Ҳؤߴ뤳ȤˤäơǤʤΰФ˻ä
(2) Ūð̣ħι¤Ū塥塼оˤؤϹ¤λạ̈⡤1931ǯJost Trier (1894--1970) ˤ̣ˤꡤ¤ạ̈Ȥϡ1θäΤϹ¤ʤʬʡˤʤäƤꡤͭ¸Ĥθˤä줿ǰ줬ꤵȤǤ롥αĹȤơפˤΥʬϤʤɤФ
̣¤֤⤦1Ĥμϰ̣ʬϤǤ롥ΰ̣ϡħͭ¸Ĥδ̣ܰʸʬǤȤǤ롥̣ηϤγΩȤײϺޤ褦Ǥ롥
(3) ʸäΰ̣иʸˡλ塥1963ǯ Jerrold J. Katz (1932--2002) and Jerry A. Fodor (1935--) 1965ǯ Noam Chomsky (1928--) ʸ칽¤Ọ̇̄¤Ȥδطܤ̣ϤChomsky ʸˡ˰̣Ƴ줬Ȥ1968--72ǯδ֤̣Ȥδ֤ˡָפȯʸˡˤ̣ϹԤͤޤä뤬1970--73ǯδ֤ Richard Merett Montague (1930--71) ˤŪʤƳʸˡŸ
äΰ̣ŸǤϡؼƯŪꥹůؤɤˤ٤ꡤäθȯäΰ̣ʤɤͻ롥
(4) ΰ̣֤ǤϤʤưǧŪ¦̤Ȥδطǰ̣Ȥ館복ǰ̣ǧβʳؤλ塥(3) Ǽ줿ήϡءʪءؤܶᤵ1978ǯʹߤǧε˴פ̣Ȥ櫓ϡ1987ǯ G. Lakoff (1941--) Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things ڤ R. Langacker (1942--) Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol. 1 Ǥ뤳ȤˤŤ줿ǧΰ̣ϡ̣ǾΰŪƯȷӤĤ뤳Ȥǰ̣˿ŪפͿ褦Ȥ롥ǤϡȤƶɽƥ경ȥץȥסեʤɤ꤬롥ޤǽ (artificial intelligence) (connectionism) Ȥο⤤
ʾΤ褦ˡ1883ǯ1931ǯ1963ǯ1978ǯˡۤʤΰ̣ƤԤΤ³Τľܤִ줿櫓ǤϤʤष³Τؤդạ̈ߤƤȤ٤ߤʬŪ˱ƶͿʤ⡤줾ŪΩ⤤Τ¤Ǥꡤλ¤Ż뤷ơԤΥФϽ̾Ԥñ la sémantique ǤϤʤʣ les sémantiques ɽäȤΤܲΤ褦ºݤˡ1980ǯʹߤ̣οŸ³ƤꡤɸطáʸˡʤɤμΥץޤƤ롥Ụ̄غŪˤʤäƤƤꡤȼΰˤȤɤޤäƤ뤳ȤϤǤʤʤäƤΤ
졼̡ ءοǡϰ̣١ҡʸ˥ӡ2013ǯ
ؤ1ạ̇̄ʬ semantics ʰ̣ˤȸƤǤ롥ߤǤϤ̾Τ夷Ƥ뤬夹ޤǤˤ;ޤäޤ夷ϡƻ semantic ȤȤ˰̣γ硤Ȥ櫓̣ΰ̲Фơߤ˻äƤ롥semantic(s) Ȥΰ̣ι̻Ū˵ҤʸĤɤǤߤ
Read ˤȡѸˤ semantic νФϡJohn Spencer ˤ A Discourse concerning Prodigies 2 (1665ǯ) ˤƤǤ롥Ǥϡ"Semantick Philosophy" ȤƸڤƤꡤϵ椫̤ꤦͽΤȤ̣Ƥ17λѤۤˤʤȤȽǤȡ Spencer 奮ꥷǥꥹȥƥ쥹ʤɤˤäѤ줿ƻ σημαντικóς (significant) (< σημαίνω (to signify)) ñȯ˼ѤΤȹͤʥƥǤ semanticus ѤƤˡ
17˾嵭ñȯλ㤬줿ϡθܳŪˤ19ȾޤǸʤθ줬ϤΤϡ̣γġեθؼ Michel Bréal (1832--1915) 1883ǯʸǻѤƤǤ롥ʲϡBréal ˤ sémantique Ǥ롥
L'étude où nous invitons le lecteur à nous suivre est d'espèce si nouvelle qu'elle n'a même pas encore reçu de nom. En effet, c'est sur le corps et sur la forme des mots que la plupart des linguistes ont exercé leur sagacité: les lois qui président à la transformation des sens, au choix d'expressions nouvelles, à la naissance et à la mort des locutions, ont été laissées dans l'ombre ou n'ont été indiquées qu'en passant. Comme cette étude, aussi bien que la phonétique et la morphologie, mérite d'avoir son nom, nous l'appellerons la SÉMANTIQUE (du verb σημαίνω), c'est-à-dire la science des significations. (quoted by Read , p. 79)
Ǥ狼褦ˡsémantique ϼȤựѲγؤؤƤ2ǯ1885ǯ˥եθؼ Arsène Darmesteter (1846--88) ⤽ѤޤǤˤϱѸǤѤϤޤä1897ǯ Bréal Essai de Sémantique Ǥȡ̾ΤϹΤϤ뤳ȤȤʤäѸˤƤϡ1900ǯƱα̤ʤ semantics Ѥ줿
̣ˤĤƤθؤ̾ΤȤƤϡ19͡ʸ줬ȤƤꡤsemantics Ūϰ̤ޤǤˤϻ֤ä㤨С饤ХɽȤơsemasiology (a1829--), rhematic (1830), sematology (1831--), glossology (a1871--), comparative ideology (1886), sensifics (1896), significs (1896--), rhematology (1896--), semiotic (ca 1897--), semiology (a1913), orthology (1928--), science of idiom (1944) ʤɤä줾ɽؼ븦ϰϤϰۤʤäƤΤΡΩ1ĤʬȤƤޤȤޤ礤Ƥ狼ʤߤǤ̣ = semantics ˤޤȤޤ꤬뤫ɤϵ路ˡɥĤγسǤ19 Semasiologie ޤƤ˱ƶꥫγسǤ20ȾǤϤޤ semasiology Τۤ semantics ޤƤۤɤǤ롥̣̾ Ogden and Richards The Meaning of Meaning (1923) Ǥ⡤semantics ϻѤƤʤ̾ȤƤ semantics ϡѸˤƤ⤽ۤɸŤäǤϤʤΤǤ롥
̤ήȤơsemantics ϡ1930ǯ˥ǵä¾ڼ (logical positivism) γɤ Alfred Korzybski (1879--1950) ˤůؤˤƤˤѤ褦ˤʤꡤθǧ٤ǧ٤ޤˤĤ semantic(s) θ̲1940ǯʹߡŪˡΩĤ褦ˤʤäsemantic ϤФ verbal ƱηƻǤꡤ̣դɽ魯ʸ̮ǻȤ褦ˤʤäƤ (ex. He did not want to enter into a semantic debate.) Read (91) semantic(s) ΰ̣ΰ̲rhetoric ΰ̣ΰ̲ӤƤ롥
One is reminded here of the fate that has overtaken the word rhetoric: fallen from its high status in the pattern of the medieval schoolmen, it now usually occurs in the phrase 'mere rhetoric,' with reference to discourse that is insincere, pretentious, or mendacious. In similar popular use, semantics often appears in contexts that tend to bolster word-magic rather than to combat it.
semantic(s) Ȥϡˤˤơ켫Ȥ Bréal ϻϤ̣ѲγؤȤƤ sémantique ǺƤȤȤˤʤ롥
Read, Allen Walker. "An Account of the Word 'SEMANTICS'." Word 4 (1948): 78--97.
lexeme ʸǡˤϤΥ֥Ǥ⤿ޤ˽ФƤѸΤ褦Ȥ#22. ǥȱѸˡ ([2009-05-20-1]) ǤƤϡФȤޤǤϤʤĤαѸؼŵȤơɤΤ褦ʸñ̤Ǥ뤫lexeme ˤϤĤΥץ롥
(1) morpheme ʷǡˤ word ʸˤӤñ̤Ȥơmorpheme ϡ#886. ǤˤޤĤ̻Ū ([2011-09-30-1]) ǿ줿褦ˡǤϤʤBloomfield θŵŪˤ "a linguistic form which bears no partial phonetic-semantic resemblance to any other form" (Section 10.2) Ǥ롥word ϡ##910,911,912,921,922 Ǽ夲褦ˡ̣ͭŪñ̤Ǥ뤳Ȥˤϰ㤤ʤlexeme Ʊͤ˷ñ̤Ǥ롥ηˤϰ̣տ路Ƥ뤬lexeme ϤޤǤηỌ̇̄ͻΤǤ뵭ΤηʬؤǤϡmorpheme, word, lexeme Τΰ㤤ϤɤˤΤ㤨Сunderstand 12Ĥη under- -stand Ȥ롥θΰ̣2ĤηǤΰ̣¤ˤϤʤäƤ餺̣ΤȤ1ĤβȸʤʤǤϡñ̤Ọ̇̄ñ̤Ȥ줤бƤʤȤȤˤʤ롥Ʊͤˡput up with Ȥǥϡ3Ǥ3줫äƤ뤬̣ñ̤ȤƤϤϤ1ĤβǤ롥Ǥ⡤ñ̤Ọ̇̄ñ̤ȤäƤ롥ǡunderstand put up with ʬǤʤ1Ĥΰ̣ĤΤ顤Ūˤб1Ĥñ̤ꤹΤǤϤʤȤͤ롥줬 lexeme Ǥ롥 UNDERSTAND PUT UP WITH ϡ줾1Ĥ lexeme ȤƻȤ뤳ȤǤ褦ˤʤälexeme ʸɽΤˡ
(2) 1ĤθΤߤ°Ȥơwater ˤ̾ư줬롥ĤޤꡤƱǤϤ뤬ۤʤ2Ĥθ°Ƥ뤳Ȥˤʤ롥̾ȤƤ water ưȤƤ water ̰뤳ȤǤ褦ˡword Ȥϰۤʤ lexeme Ȥñ̤ΩƤǤ롥ñ water ʣ waters ̾ lexeme ȤƤ WATER μ¸Ǥꡤ waterñ waters watered-ing watering ʤɤư lexeme ȤƤ WATER μ¸Ǥ롥
(3) ¸ۤʤޤȤᤢ뤿ɽȤơgo, goes, went, going, going Ϥ줾֤ۤʤ뤬ˤ lexeme GO Ǥ롥δ lexeme ϡheadword, citation form, lemma ʤɤȸƤؤ뤳ȤǽǤ롥
ľŪˤСˤơФ뤤ɤ߸ФȤϿƤꡤ̣ͿƤȻפ褦ʷñ̤ȤäƤФ褵̩ؼԡʳɡˤˤä͡ƤȤǤϡmorpheme, word, lexeme Τ褦ʸñ̤ɽ魯ѸΰǤ롥ʤlexeme Ȥñ̤ռԻ줿ŪʳؽѱѱѼȤơCambridge International Dictionary of English (1995) Ƥ
Bloomfield, Leonard. Language. 1933. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1984.
Pearce, Michael. The Routledge Dictionary of English Language Studies. Abingdon: Routledge, 2007.
#1108. 쵭̵ͭ ([2012-05-09-1]) #1110. Guiraud ˤؤι ([2012-05-11-1]) ǻȤ̣ؼԤ Guiraud ϡ (information_theory) θؤؤαѤˤؿηϤ쵭Τ;١ѤʤɤͻƤ롥
1954ǯʸɤߡ¿μŪƶ줿㤨С˥ե˥ե١ĹδطˤĤƼΤ褦˽Ҥ٤Ƥ (128) ǽϥ˥ե˥ե֡סкǤû˥եǤ٤ι⤤˥ե˳Ƥ롥줫顤˥եˡֶưסˡѹäס
Υ˥եȥ˥եߴطްդΤϡ餫ͳ٤̣֤ѲƤ椯ȡޤݤƤξԤδ֤ζѹդ뤿ˡηϤĴǽȯưѹդȤȤȤǤ롥̤θСѲϡãθΨ¤ݤ¤ˤƵȤȤˤʤ롥ηϤηϤ1ĤǤʾ塤˴ؤ̸ǤָΨפ˽虜ʤȤˤʤ
ǤϡָΨפ졤ְ̣פϼξݤΤ̤̣ȤȤƤ Guiraud ϡΤ褦ˡǾθ̣Ѥ˳褫ȹͤƤ롥ҴŪ˿ɽ蘆٤ĹȤɸѤơܤ˸ʤ˥եȥ˥եδطõΤǤϤʤ
La relation coût/information (ou forme/fréquence) traduit objectivement ces rapports entre le signe et le concept et permet de poser en termes objectifs le problème de la signification. (128)
ѡʤ뤤Ϸ֡١ˤδطϥ˥եȥ˥եδ֤ΤδطҴŪɽ魯ΤǤꡤ̣ѤҴŪ뤳ȤǽˤƤ롥
Guiraud, P. "Langage et communication. Le substrat informationnel de la sémantisation." Bulletin de la société de linguistique de Paris 50 (1954): 119--33.
ε#1184. ͭ̾첽 ([2012-07-24-1]) ǾҲ𤷤 Coates onymisation ˤĤơפȤ2⤹롥
(1) Coates ˤä onymisation ϰ̣Ǥȡϡ[2012-05-09-1]ε#1108. 쵭̵ͭפǸڤ̵ﲽפˤۤʤʤǿ줿褦ˡ쵭̵ﲽͭﲽ̻Ū̵¤ΥȤȤθȡͭ̾Ȱ̾δ֤αޤ̵¤˷֤ΤʤΤ⤷ʤεϡ#1056. ѲϿʹ֤ˤѶŪʺѤǤ ([2012-03-18-1]) #1069. ե顼ɡɡ --- üԸĿͤοŤѡ ([2012-03-31-1]) εǤߤĹˤθѲѤˤؤȤ롥
(2) ͭ̾ϲŪפ䡤̸ˤϸʤ㳰ŪʲѲ뤳Ȥ¿Ūˤϡεǿ줿褦ˡͭ̾ä phonological space Ū˹ȤƤ뤳ȤǤ뤫⤷ʤ˸ؤˡδϡѲ˴ؤͭ̾㳰ŪʿϡֲѲݤˤϡͭ̾Ȥ뤳ȤդפȤȤʤ롥Coates (33) ϡHogg Ʊݤθڤٻʤ顤"using name material in argumentation about phonology (and morphology) needs caution, because name material can contain chronological and systemic anomalies with respect to its matrix language" ȽҤ٤Ƥ롥㤨СűѸ geat "gate" ϡYeats, Yates ʤɤȯֻκפĤƤ뤬ɸѸǤϸťΥɸ gat ͳ褹Ȥܤ gate äƤHogg 69; [2009-11-19-1]ε#206. Yea, Reagan and Yeats break a great steak.פ⻲ȡˡ
Coates, Richard. "to þære fulan flóde . óf þære fulan flode: On Becoming a Name in Easton and Winchester, Hampshire." Analysing Older English. Ed. David Denison, Ricardo Bermúdez-Otero, Chris McCully, and Emma Moore. Cambridge: CUP, 2012. 28--34.
ԥ롦 ƣ ذ̣١ҡʸ˥ӡ1990ǯ
Hogg, Richard M. "Phonology and Morphology." The Cambridge History of the English Language: Vol. 1 The Beginnings to 1066. Ed. Richard M Hogg. Cambridge: CUP, 1992. 67--167.
metonymy ޤ (trope) θϡ̣˹ԤʤƤǤϡФСͭ̾줬̾첽㤬夲롥atlas, bloody mary, cardigan, dobermann (pinscher), hoover, jacuzzi, jersey, juggernaut, madeira, mercury, oscar, post-it, sandwich, tom (cat), turkey, wellington (boot) ʤˤȤޤʤξάͭ̾ǰƤ̿̾ҥåȾʤʤɤˤꡤ̾첽Ƥ椯㤬롥
դβ̾줬ͭ̾첽ˤĤƤϡޤ긦оݤȤƤʤäβϡͭ̾ (onomastics) Ǥ "onymisation" ȸƤ֤٤ΤǤ롥Coates ϡűѸΰŪɽ sēo fūle flōde "the foul channel" Fulflood Ȥͭβ̾ȯŸƹԤ˼ʤ顤onymisation Ū˹ͻƤ롥ʲCoates (30--33) 褦
ޤonymisation ϡɬŪѲްդʤΤ Fulflood ξˤϡ첻ѲȼäƤ뤬the White House ʤɤϡȤʤ "the white house" ٤ä˷ŪѲƤʤʤǤ϶κۤϹθʤȤȤˡonymisation ܼϡη֤ˤΤǤϤʤ˸ͭ̾ȤƻȤ褦ˤʤäƤ뤫Ȥˤ롥˸褦ˡºݤˤ onymisation ϷѲȼȤ¿ϲܼǤϤʤȤȤǤ롥
ˡͭ̾ˤʤȤȤϡȤʤɽΤäƤ̣ȤȤǤ롥sēo fūle flōde ϡ֤Ρס֤ʤסֿϩפȤŪʰ̣¤Ȥ뤬Fulflood ̾ʬϤ줺ˡľܤβؼ뵭Ȥ롥Ԥΰ̣Ѥ "semantic" ȸƤ֤ΤǤСԤΰ̣Ѥ "onymic" ȸƤ֤ȤǤ
ߡŪˤ flood ˤĤƤΡֿϩפΰ̣Ϥʤ̾ȤƤ flood ϡűѸ衤̣ѲƤṬ̌ϸͭ̾ Fulflood ΤʤˡʴʬϤС˲Ū˻¸ƤȤ롥λ¸ϡͭ̾ Fulflood ʬϤ̣ʬϤʤʤä餳ǽˤʤäΤǤꡤonymisation η̤ŵŪʸȤ롤̣Ȥˤäƻ¸ȤΤŪǶ̣
ˡCoates ϡ̣ѡʲθ顤"Onymic Reference Default Principle" (ORDP) Ƥ롥ϡ"the default interpretation of any linguistic string is a proper name" ȤǤ롥ˤϡθѤˤƤϡŪľܤʻؼ (onymic reference) ͭä˰㤤ʤȤʲŪȯۤ롥
Ǹˡonymisation ϤФзŪѲȼϲŪפ䡤̸ˤϸʤ㳰ŪʲѲȤ뤳Ȥ¿ͭ̾äϰ̸äΤ褦˲ΰ̩٤⤤櫓ǤϤʤΤǡȯ¿ΤԵ§äƤ⡤֤ͭ̾μ̤»ʤʤȤ
Using an expression to refer onymically licenses the kind of attrition, or early and/or irregular sound change . . . because the phonological space of proper names is less densely populated than that of lexical words, and successful reference may be achieved despite less phonological precision. (33)
ͭ̾줢뤤ϸͭ̾첽ȤˤĤơŪΩ줫顤ޤǾܤͤȤϤʤäΤǡCoates ʸ⤷ɤ
Coates, Richard. "to þære fulan flóde . óf þære fulan flode: On Becoming a Name in Easton and Winchester, Hampshire." Analysing Older English. Ed. David Denison, Ricardo Bermúdez-Otero, Chris McCully, and Emma Moore. Cambridge: CUP, 2012. 28--34.
[2010-08-13-1]εǤϡ#473. ̣ѲŵŪʥѥפߤ̣ѲθˤϤɤΤ褦ʼबΤ (82--84) ϡᥤ˥åפιͻ˴Ťơ4ʬƤ롥
a) Ūʤʳءѡ١¯ʤɤѲ̾Ѳȼ鷺˻ʪѲ⤿餹äƤϸηϤľŪˤϱƶʤμϡۤȤɤ٤Ƥΰ̣ؼԤǧƤ롥
b) ŪʤŪŪ뤤Ūʽͳ褹Ѳ¯츻Ʊξ͡ά
c) ҲŪּҲŪѸפ䡤μҲŪͭϰϤΰưΰ̣ͭϰϤΰưʶ۽̤뤤ϳĥˤ椭褦粽Ȱ̲
d) Ūɽõ桤֡նˡưϡʤ4̤ϥᥤΤȤʬˤϤʤäˡ
ʬθܤñºݤΰ̣ѲϼθŤʤäΤǤ롥̴طϢؤ1ĤǤǤС̣ѲɤȤϤǤʤäơġθΰ̣Ѳβˤϡ˴ȼäƤ롥
嵭θȤʤ̣ѲθȤơε#1108. 쵭̵ͭ ([2012-05-09-1]) Ǽ쵭ͭﲽ̵ﲽΥ뤬롥Ǥϡ̣Ѳθʬ丶줿ˡ§Ω뤳ȤϤǤΤ
ΰ̣ѲǽʸˤΤǤ뤫顤ˤˡ§ȤäǰޤޤƤ롥εǤߤ褦ˡ signifiant signifié δطϸŪǤŪǤʤ˼ͳǤ롥äơͭ¤μʤˤطѲƤ椯ȤȤϤ狼äƤƤ⡤ͽ뤳ȤԲǽǤ롥ʤͭ¤λȤƻϼͳǤȤȤϡ¾塤̵¤̵ˡ§ǤȹͤƤ褤̣ѲˤƤϡʤƸѲ̤ˤƤˡˤΨˤȤɤޤ
ԥ롦 ƣ ذ̣١ҡʸ˥ӡ1990ǯ
塼 (Ferdinand de Saussure; 1857--1913) (arbitrariness) Ȥƾư衤̵褬֤Ƥ㤨СθȿΤȤơΥޥȥ (onomatopoeia) ħ (sound_symbolism) ФеƤϡӤǤꡤͭȤ2Ĥΰۤʤ̤в褹ȼĥ
(24--27) ˤСܼȤƵ뤳Ȥϵʤ signifiant signifié ϡ˼ҲŪʵˤäƷӤĤƤ롥ˤȤȡ֤Ǥפ֥פΤ褦פ⤫٤뤫⤷ʤɬͭӽ櫓ǤϤʤष֤ɤʸߤʸ츻ŪˤͭŪǤ (25) ͭŪȤȤˤϡŪͭȸṲ̄ͭƤɬפ롥Ԥϼˤ벻첻˼̤ onomatopoeia ǤꡤԤʣʤɤηŪʤˤäߴط㤨Сpossible impossible δطˤǤ롥ޤ캬 (root_creation) ơ٤ƤθϤ줫μͭˤä߽ФȤ¤ܤͤ롥
פʤΤϡͭϸŪǤʤŪǤʤ˼ͳǤȤŪǤʤȤΤϡäޤä signifiant signifié бѤǤϤʤͳ˴طƤ褤ȤȤǤ롥ŪǤʤȤΤϡȡʣ硤ǥಽʤɡɤˡѤƤ⡤̣̿̾ŤǤȤȤǤ롥
äơۤܤ٤Ƥθ͡ʼʤˤͭŪ߽Ф졤 signifiant signifié бꤹ뤬ꤷˤϺƤбѲ뼫ͳ롥СͭŪʴطϻ֤ȤȤޤꡤ˺졤Ĥˤ̵ŪȤʤ뤬̵ﲽ椬ȯȤʤäƺƤͭﲽƻ߽ФͭﲽȤϰռŪϢ³θĿͤϺǤꡤ̵ﲽȤ̵ռŪϢ³ŪʽĤŤǤ (45) ͭﲽ̵ﲽΤαʱΥϡ̣ܼˤǤ롥ΰ̣ѲͭȤСʲΤ褦ˤʤ

ˤȤäơ塼ΤȤϡĤǤ⼫ͳͭﲽ̵ﲽ뤳ȤǤʤľ˵ŪǤȤؤΤʤΤǤ롥
#1056. ѲϿʹ֤ˤѶŪʺѤǤ ([2012-03-18-1]) #1069. ե顼ɡɡ --- üԸĿͤοŤѡ ([2012-03-31-1]) εǤߤĹˤθѲϡΥͭﲽʬˤȤ櫓ܤȤȤˤʤ
ԥ롦 ƣ ذ̣١ҡʸ˥ӡ1990ǯ
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