ɸ2ĤѸϸؤǤϤ褯Ȥ뤬ϤƱΤʤΤȤۤʤΤΰ̣ˤޤĤǤꡤƳǤ롥Ѿϡ̩ͿʤޤޤˡξѸŬˡQŪˡѤʬˤƤΤȻפ롥ºݡѸ synonym ϡƱפˤפˤΤ
Ūˤϡ˰פִƱ (absolute synonym) ΥڥϡʤۤȤɡˤʤȸ (cf. #1498. taboo ŪȤʤͳ (3) ([2013-06-03-1])) ȤȤϡsynonym ȤѸ줬̣ͭȤʤ뤿ˤϡִƱפǤϤʤԴƱפʤפۤɤؤƤ뤳Ȥ˾ޤѸˤ near-synonym 뤤ϤŪ plesionym (< Gr. plēsios ʶܤ + onoma ̾) ȤѸ⤢롥顤synonym, near-synonym, plesionym ȤѸϡ줳ߤ synonymous ʴطˤȲǤǤ롥λƤٹ礤ȤΤϿͲǤ櫓Ǥʤʤ̯ˤʤ뤳ȤϤʤ
Cruse (176--77) ΰ̣Ѹ켭ŵƤߤ褦
synonymy, synonyms A word is said to be a synonym of another word in the same language if one or more of its senses bears a sufficiently close similarity to one or more of the senses of the other word. It should be noted that complete identity of meaning (absolute synonymy) is very rarely, if ever, encountered. Words would be absolute synonyms if there were no contexts in which substituting one for the other had any semantic effect. However, given that a basic function of words is to be semantically distinctive, it is not surprising that such identical pairs are rare. That being so, the problem of characterising synonymy is one of specifying what kind and degree of semantic difference is permitted. One possibility is to define synonymy as 'propositional synonymy': two words A and B are synonyms if substituting either one for the other in an utterance has no effect on the propositional meaning (i.e. truth conditions) of the utterance. This is the case with, for instance, begin: commence and false: untrue (on the relevant readings):
The concert began/commenced with Beethoven's Egmont Overture.
What he told me was false/untrue.
By this definition, synonyms will typically differ in respect of non-propositional aspects of meaning, such as expressive meaning and evoked meaning. Thus, begin and commence differ in register; the difference between false and untrue (indicating lack of veracity) is rather subtle, but the former is more condemnatory, perhaps because of a stronger presumption of deliberateness. However, while this is a convenient and easily applied way of defining synonymy, it does not capture the way the notion is used by, for instance, lexicographers, in the compilation of dictionaries of synonyms or in the assembly of groups of words for information on 'synonym discrimination'. Certainly, some of the words in such lists are propositional synonyms, but others are not, and for these we need some such notion as 'near-synonymy' ('plesionymy'). This is not easy to define, but roughly speaking, near-synonyms must share the same core meaning and must not have the primary function of contrasting with one another in their most typical contexts. (For instance, collie and spaniel share much of their meaning, but they contrast in their most typical contexts.) Examples of near-synonyms are: murder: execute: assassinate; withhold: detain; joyful: cheerful; heighten: enhance; injure: damage; idle: inert: passive.
synonyms ʬϤˤäơ̿Ụ̄ (propositional meaning) ̿Ụ̄ (non-propositional meaning) ̤ȤˡϳΤˤ狼䤹ϳǰỤ̄ (conceptual meaning) ǰỤ̄ (non-conceptual meaning) ζ̤ˤᤤʡ#1931. ǰỤ̄ ([2014-08-10-1]) ȡˡ̿Ụ̄䳵ǰỤ̄ϥ̿Ụ̄ǰỤ̄ۤʤäƤˡ2 synonyms ȸƤܤȤ櫓
켭ŵʤɤ˵ƤꥹȤñϡƤ˴ˤ̣ǡֻƤñ췲ˤʤǤ濴Ūʰ̣ΤߤͭƤꡤĸߤ˰ۤʤŪʰ̣Ϥޤ2ŪʤΤȤơ̤ϤääƤۤɤδطǤ (near-)synonyms ȸƤ٤ȤȤˤʤ䤳ǤϤ롥
Cruse, Alan. A Glossary of Semantics and Pragmatics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006.
ΩǤϡʿ29ǯ4ܽʬˡ (NDC) ο10ǤŬѤƤΰȡˡ10Ǥʬ2017ǯ1ǡˤ (PDF) *
9Ǥ10ǤؤŪѹϤۤȤɤʤѸǤ롥10Ǥιɽ2ʬɽ˴ŤʲΥޥɥޥåפäƤߤPDFSVGɤˡ

δؿäˡ80 פˤ뤬9Ǥ龯ѤäΤϡ84 ɥĸפäΤ84 ɥĸ졥¾ΥޥפȤʤäȤǤ롥Ʊͤˡ85 եס86 ڥס87 ꥢפ⤽줾85 ե졥ץХס86 ڥ졥ݥȥס87 ꥢ졥¾Υޥפܾ̾Ƚ줿90 ʸءפбʬˤƱͤγȽܤƤ롥Τ褦ʳȽʬϻϤХ꤬ʤɤޤɽ뤫ϡʬθŪȤ⤪ǷŪнˡϤʤ
ܽʬˡϿ˴ؤʬˡ (taxonomy) 1ĤɴʻŵŪʬˡȤ⤤롥ʬˡȤС̣켭ŵ (thesaurus) ԻˤƤ̣ʬϺǤνʬϿݤȤ̤βƤȤ狼롥
ѸˤȤδطǤСܳŪŪ켭ŵ HTOED ʬɽ#3159. HTOED ([2017-12-20-1]) ͳǻȤ줿
Algeo and Pyles ϡΰ̣ѲϤκǸạ̇̄ѲԲƳǧƤ롥ǰŪʤΤϡEsperanto ʤɤοФʤ顤Τ褦ʸŪ۶Ọ̇̄ѲԲƤʤȤǮäƤĹ"SEMANTIC CHANGE IS INEVITABLE" ꤹѤ褦 (243--44)
It is a great pity that language cannot be the exact, finely attuned instrument that deep thinkers wish it to be. But the facts are, as we have seen, that the meaning of practically any word is susceptible to change of one sort or another, and some words have so many individual meanings that we cannot really hope to be absolutely certain of the sum of these meanings. But it is probably quite safe to predict that the members of the human race, homines sapientes more or less, will go on making absurd noises with their mouths at one another in what idealists among them will go on considering a deplorably sloppy and inadequate manner, and yet manage to understand one another well enough for their own purposes.
The idealists may, if they wish, settle upon Esperanto, Ido, Ro, Volapük, or any other of the excellent scientific languages that have been laboriously constructed. The game of construction such languages is still going on. Some naively suppose that, should one of these ever become generally used, there would be an end to misunderstanding, followed by an age of universal brotherhood---the assumption being that we always agree with and love those whom we understand, though the fact is that we frequently disagree violently with those whom we understand very well. (Cain doubtless understood Abel well enough.)
But be that as it may, it should be obvious, if such an artificial language were by some miracle ever to be accepted and generally used, it would be susceptible to precisely the kind of changes in meaning that have been our concern in this chapter as well as to such change in structure as have been our concern throughout---the kind of changes undergone by those natural languages that have evolved over the eons. And most of the manifold phenomena of life---hatred, disease, famine, birth, death, sex, war, atoms, isms, and people, to name only a few---would remain as messy and hence as unsatisfactory to those unwilling to accept them as they have always been, no matter what words we use in referring to them.
ιʥפʸϤǤ롥ʤѤκǸ "no matter what words we use in referring to them" ȽҤ٤ƤΤϡonomasiological change/variation ˴ؤ뤳ȤAlgeo and Pyles ϡsemasiological change onomasiological change 碌ợְѲפȤȤ館Ƥ뤳Ȥ狼롥
̣ˤĤƤϡ#961. ([2011-12-14-1]) (4) ȡϢơ#963. Ѹˤȿ ([2011-12-16-1]) ɤޤ#1955. ̣ѲΰŪ ([2014-09-03-1]) ⤴
Algeo, John, and Thomas Pyles. The Origins and Development of the English Language. 5th ed. Thomson Wadsworth, 2005.
Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary (HTOED) ϡѸ켭ŵ (thesaurus) ȤƺΤΤǤǤʤŪʡ켭ŵȤơ̤ƤͣܳŪʥեǤ롥1965ǯ Michael Samuels ˤäԻץȤΤΤ夲졤ǤޤǤ45ǯκзפʥᥤξܺ٤ The Story of the Thesaurus ȡ
HTOED ϡ3ĤΥСǻȤ뤳ȤǤ롥
(1) 2009ǯ˽Ǥ줿Τ2ܡ1饹Ρ2Ǥ롥Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary (HTOED). Ed. Christian Kay, Jane Roberts, Michael Samuels and Irené Wotherspoon. 2 vols. Oxford: OUP, 2009.
(2) 饹ؤ (1) Υ饤ǡThe Historical Thesaurus of English ȤƤ롥
(3) OED Online Ȥ߹ޤ줿饤ǡ
ƥС֤ˤդ٤ۤ롥Ȥ HTOED OED 2Ǥ˴ŤԻ줿ΤǤ뤿ᡤ3Ǥ˸ƲѤ줿ƤʬŪ˴ޤ OED Online ϢȤƤ륪饤ǤȤδ֤ǡǯ̣ƤʤɤˤĤư㤤ߤ뤳Ȥ롥ޤOED Online ǤϡOED ˤ˽ä1150ǯʹߤäƤʤűѸñ줬٤ƾʤƤΤǡűѸñˤĤ濴ŪĴ٤ˤ A Thesaurus of Old English (TOE). Ed. Jane Roberts and Christian Kay with Lynne Grundy. Amsterdam: Rodopi, [1995] 2000. Available online at http://oldenglishthesaurus.arts.gla.ac.uk/ . ̤Ͽ (1) (2) ǤѤ٤Ǥ롥
HTOED ǺѤƤ̣Ƥϡ235,249ܤˤޤǺʬƤꡤ793,733줬ޤޤƤ롥ʬξܺ٤ Classification Υڡȡ3ؤޤǤʬɽ (PDF) ⻲ȤǤ롥 *
ؤˤ (syntax) ȤϲʬʤΤȤ䤤ФϡɤΤ褦ʸǰƬˤƤ뤫ˤäưۤʤäƤ롥ŪѤ§ä绨Ĥ˸äƤޤСȤʸˤȸδطʬǤꡤŵŪˤϸε§Ҥꡤ繽¤餫ˤꤹ뤳ȤɸȤ롥
⤦ŪβΤǤСLos "Three dimensions of syntax" ꤯Ƥ롥1ĤѤˤʤȤФʤΤɤǤʤۤɤȻפäΤǵƤ (Los 8)
1. How the information about the relationships between the verb and its semantic roles (AGENT, PATIENT, etc.) is expressed. This is essentially a choice between expressing relational information by endings (inflection), i.e. in the morphology, or by free words, like pronouns and auxiliaries, in the syntax.
2. The expression of the semantic roles themselves (NPs, clauses?), and the syntactic operations languages have at their disposal for giving some roles higher profiles than others (e.g. passivisation).
3. Word order.
Dimension 1 ϡư濴ȤƳ꿶̣䤬ޤʤɤηŪʤɽ蘆Τ֤ˤŪʤɽ蘆ΤȤ˴ط롥ԤμʤѤƤСʤȤʤ롥
Dimension 2 ϡ꿶줿̣䤬ʤɽˤäƼ¸Τ˴ͿʤѷˤȤä˾Ƥ롥
Dimension 3 ϡ̤ȤƼ¸ȸ֤˴ؤǤ롥
3ĤμϡǤŪǿŪ Dimension 1 顤ǤŪɽŪ Dimension 3 Ȥ¤٤Ƥ롥ʸˡѤ˴ŤΤǤ뤬褯줿ѤǤ롥
Los, Bettelou. A Historical Syntax of English. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2015.
ð̣Υץ1ĤˡPustejovsky (Generative Lexicon) 롥Ǥϡΰ̣ʬϤΤ "quolia role" ȤͤƳ롥Cruse (149--50) Ѹ˴Ťȡʲ̤Ǥ롥
γǰˤ "quolia roles" ȸƤФ뤤ĤΥפ̤졤ʸ̮ˤäƳ륿פۤʤ롤ȤΩġPustejovsky ˤС̾ǹͤ4Ĥ quolia roles ̤Ȥ"formal", "constitutive", "telic", "agentive" Ǥʤϡꥹȥƥ쥹4פˡ
formal: This includes information about an item's position in a taxonomy, what it is a type of, and what sub-types it includes.
constitutive: This includes information about an item's part-whole structure, its physical attributes like size, weight, and what it is made of, and sensory attributes like colour and smell.
telic: This includes information about how an item characteristically interacts with other entities, whether as agent or instrument, in purposeful activities.
agentive: This includes information about an item's 'life-history', how it came into being, and how it will end its existence.
"formal" ϸáǰΥס"constitutive" ʪŪǧŪʥס"telic" Ū¸ͳ˴ؤ륿ס"agentive" Ͻм˴ؤ륿פȳάŪ˼
Pustejovsky ˤȡ̾ΰ̣ϡơ quolia role Фƾܺ٤Ϳ뤳ȤˤäŤ롥Τ褦˸ΰ̣Ω quolia roles 鹽ȹͤ뤳Ȥˤꡤξ꤬줤ȤΤΥ륹ݥȤ
㤨СPete finished the book yesterday. Ȥʸϡܤɤ߽פΤֽפΤȤ2ĤβǽǤ롥ξϡ̾ book ɤ quolia role 뤫˴ŤΤȤ롥ɤ߽פȤˤƤϡ̾ book telic roleʤֿͤɤޤΤȤƤܡפȤŪ¸ͳ˴ؤ䤬뤬ֽפȤˤƤϡagentive roleʤֿͤ˽줿Ȥˤä¸ߤƤܡפȤм˴ؤȹͤ뤳ȤǤ롥
Cruse, Alan. A Glossary of Semantics and Pragmatics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006.
³ԡȥΤ carnage ȤʸդȤäȤˤĤơϤǥͯƤ褦Ǥ롥
20νǤˤĤơ22īʹīǡʸȲ⤬դƤ "This American carnage stops right here and stops right now." Τβˡä
carnageפϡֻ٤θλפȤạ̈ǡֻߡפ˶ᤤʤɤɽ˻ȤˤƶաȥľԻϺ䡤Ⱥᡦ̢˿졤ỴʾˤƹפαħդȤơƥǥܤƤ롥
ΡֻߡפȤȲϡͥƤȻפ¼ŵˤ°̤Ρֻ٤פȤǤϤʤֻߡפ˶ᤤȲᤷ餷
εǰ OED Ǥθ 3a Ȥ̤θ 2a ˡΤ褦롥"Carcases collectively: a heap of dead bodies, esp. of men slain in battle. ? Obs."ֻ٤פȤϡη̤ȤƤΡֻߡפǤ롥Ʊ褦ˡJohnson μǤ⤳θ "Heaps of flesh" ȤƤ롥carnage εǻŦ褦˥ƥǡפ̣ carn-, carō Ǥ뤳ȤͤСľŪʰ̣ȯãȤƤϡ٤ȤƤΡֻ٤פǤϤʤֻΡʤνˡפؤȤΤǤ롥ѸǤνǯ夳ֻ٤פθǤ1600ǯֻΡʤνˡפθǤ1667ǯ ("Milton Paradise Lost x. 268 Such a sent I [sc. Death] draw Of carnage, prey innumerable.") ȡԤΤۤᤤ̣ȯãμνͤȡ̴طֲ̡עְפȤɤäȥ˥ߡ (metonymy) ȤơֻΡʤνˡעֻ٤פΤ褦ѲΤǤϤʤ롥ȤƤʤСȥΤ carnage ϡֻפȤư줬ߴλȤѤ줿Τ褦ʡִλ̡פΰ̣ʤֻ٤ξ֡סֻߡפ̣ΤªΤŬڤȤʤ롥ʤȤ⡤ȥΡʤ뤤ϡΰդȤ31Фμ㤭ԡ饤 Stephen MillerˤϡΡֻ٤פǤʤη̤ȤƤΡֻߡפθؼĴäϤǤ롥
ʤ٤פȤˤĤƤСϡ֤ФФڤäƤŨĹʤǤޤͤĹʤǻˤ롥פ̣롥δϡƱ֥ꥯפȤɤߤΡҭפƤơϤ碌פΰ̣äƤꡤְķפƱΡ٤϶פʤͻϸ⤢롥Ρ٤פǤФ褤ΤøԤ
ɸˤĤơ#286. homonymy, homophony, homography, polysemy ([2010-02-07-1])#815. polysemic clash? ([2011-07-21-1])#1801. homonymy polysemy ζ ([2014-04-02-1])#2174. ָ̱츻Ọ̇̄Ѳ ([2015-04-10-1]) ʤɤǰäƤϤ⤦2ĤƱ۵ (homonymy) ¿ (polysemy) ζۣˤĤƲƹͤƤߤ
̣γ路 Saeed (65) Ѹ줫 sole gay θƤ롥sole ˤϡ̾Ȥ "bottom of the foot" ˤ "flatfish" ʥ쥤֡ˤ2Ĥθ롥ξ¿üԤˤȤäƸߤ˴طΤʤΤȤƤꡤäƱ۵ǧƤ롥Ūˤϥƥ solea "sandal" եͳDZѸäΤǤꡤƱǤ롥ΤˡƤߤСȤʿ٤ä֥פǤ롥ǤΰޤޤǤꡤ2ĤθФΩƤƤΤ⤢С1ĤθФΤȤ2ĤθʬƤΤ⤢롥ȤȡΩΤǤСڤϰξԤδط homonymy Ǥ⤢ polysemy Ǥ⤢ȷʤ
⤦1Ĥϡƻ gay Ǥ롥θˤ "homosexual" ƱΡˤ "lively, light-hearted, bright" ۵ʡˤȤ2Ĥμ礿̣롥ä˼㤤ˤȤäơξδϢϡäȤƤΤ˴褦ǡǤ homonymy δطˤİƤΤǤϤʤʤˤξߤ˴طȤȤ館Ƥͤ⤤뤫⤷ʤºݡ̻Ūˤϡ۵ʡפƱΡפؤΰ̣ѲΤȤƤ롥Ǥ⡤ͤˤȤäƤ homonymy̤οͤˤȤäƤ polysemy Ȥ롥븫 homonymy̤θ polysemy ȸƤ褤
ҴŪʰ̣δ顤δط뤳Ȥ϶ˤhomonymy polysemy ζˤĤơŪΤͳʬ
gay ˡˤĤƤϡAmerican Heritage Dictionary Usage Note gay ⻲ȡ
Saeed, John I. Semantics. 3rd ed. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
#1962. ǰء ([2014-09-10-1]) #1961. ܥ٥ơ ([2014-09-09-1]) Ǥߤǰ (conceptual hierarchy) 뤤ݴط (hyponymy) ˤƤϡ㤨СֲȶפȤ̸ (hypernym) ۲ˡִפȤ̸ (hyponym) ꡤˤΡִפ̸ȤʤäơβˡٶפֺȴפȤ̸줬֤Ť롥ǤϡݤȤط˴ŤơΤع¤ʤƤΤħŪǤ롥
Τ褦 hyponymy Ƥ뤬̤٤ŪطȤơmeronymy ʬΤδطˤȸƤФΤ롥㤨Сּءפȡּž֡פʬΤδطˤꡤּءפϡּž֡פ meronym ʬˡּž֡פϡּءפ holonym θˤȾΤ롥meronymy ˤƤ hyponymy ξƱͤˡδطŪʤΤǤꡤ㤨Сּءפϡּž֡פˤȤäƤ meronym ؤաʥݡˡפˤȤäƤ holonym Ǥ롥Cruse (105--06) meronymy
meronymy This is the 'part-whole' relation, exemplified by finger: hand, nose: face, spoke: wheel, blade: knife, harddisk: computer, page: book, and so on. The word referring to the part is called the 'meronym' and the word referring to the whole is called the 'holonym'. The names of sister parts of the same whole is called 'co-meronyms'. Notice that this is a relational notion: a word may be a meronym in relation to a second word, but a holonym in relation to a third. Thus finger is a meronym of hand, but a holonym of knuckle and fingernail. (Meronymy must not be confused with by hyponymy, although some of their properties are similar: for instance, both involve a type of 'inclusion', co-meronyms and co-taxonyms have a mutually exclusive relation, and both are important in lexical hierarchies. However, they are distinct: a dog is a kind of animal, but not a part of an animal; a finger is a part of a hand, but not a kind of hand.
meronymy hyponymy ϡݡפȡֳع¤פǶ̤Ƥ뤬κǸˤ褦ˡԤ partԤ kind бΤǤȤۤǧ롥ޤmeronymy ǤϡʬΤߤˤɤΤ餤ɬܤǤ뤫ˤĤơhyponymy ξबΤǤʤȤ¿ִפȡܡפδطϤۤɬܤȹͤ뤬֥ġפȡֶߡסֲȡפȡϲפϤɤ
ˡhyponymy meronymy ϰܹ (transitivity) Ǥۤʤ뿶hyponymy ǤϰܹݤƤ뤬meronymy Ǥɬ⤽ǤϤʤ㤨Сּפȡֻءפȡޡפϸߤ meronymy δطˤꡤּˤϻؤפȸǤʤּˤޤפȤΤǡδط transitive Ȥߤʤ롥פȡפȡ륬饹פϸߤ meronymy δطˤ뤬뤬פȤϸƤ륬饹פȤϸʤΤǡtransitive ǤϤʤ
Cruse, Alan. A Glossary of Semantics and Pragmatics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006.
Ray Jackendoff Ƥ복ǰ̣ (conceptual semantics) ˤƤϡ̣ȤϿʹ֤ƬΤʤǥɲ¤Ǥ롥ʲθ "the Mentalist Postulate" ȸƤФƤ롥
Meaning in natural language is an information structure that is mentally encoded by human beings. (qtd. in Saeed 278)
Jackendoff ϡʸΰ̣ϹǤƸΰ̣ʤȹͤƤ뤿ᡤǰ̣Ǥϸΰ̣̤դʧ뤳Ȥˤʤ롥̾ΰ̣ʬϤ̤ơǰ̣ΰüƤߤ褦ʲSaeed (283--84) Ȥ롥
Jackendoff ϡ̾ΰ̣ħȤ [BOUNDED] [INTERNAL STRUCTURE] ƤƤ롥[BOUNDED] ϡŵŪˤϲĻ̾ (count noun) ȼ̾ (mass noun) ̤ΤѤ롥Ļ̾Τʶñ̤ؼ롥㤨Сa car a banana λؼоݤʪŪǤȤǤ줿ơΥΤϤϤ a car a banana ȤϸƤ٤ʤФơwater oxygen Τ褦ʼ̾ϡʣʬʬ䤷ȤƤ⡤ơʬ water oxygen ȸƤ³뤳ȤǤ롥äơĻ̾ [+b] Ȥơ̾ [-b] ȤƵҤ뤳ȤǤ롥
[INTERNAL STRUCTURE] ˤĤƸƤߤ褦Ļ̾ʣ㤨 cars bananas ϡ˹¤Ȥߤʤ[+i] ɽ魯Фơwater oxygen Τ褦ʼ̾¤ʤȤߤʤ[-i] Ȥʤ롥
2Ĥΰ̣ħ [BOUNDED], [INTERNAL STRUCTURE] ݤ碌ȡ4̤Ȥ߹碌Ǥơ4̤γơ̾줬¸ߤ뤳ȤԤ롥ºݡѸˤϤ줬롥Ƥߤ褦
[ Material Entity ]
individuals groups substances aggregates
(count nouns) (collective nouns) (mass nouns) (plural nouns)
[+b, -i] [+b, +i] [-b, -i] [-b, +i]
a banana, a government, water, bananas,
a car a committee oxygen cars
ɽΰ̣ϡ줬ؤ餫оݡʤؼоݤǤȤϡΰ̣Ǥϥʥ֤ˤȤƼʤ֥쥹Ȼפȡ֥ޡפ˼ξԤϰۤʤɽǤ롥2ĤƱλؤƤˤϰ㤤ʤȤäƱ̣äƤȸڤ뤳ȤǤ
㤨СϺϥޤ쥹ȻǤ뤳ȤΤʤפȤʸȡϺϥ쥹Ȼ쥹ȻǤ뤳ȤΤʤפȤʸȤϡۤʤ̣äƤ褦˴롥Ԥϡޤ쥹Ȼ̾Ǥ뤳ȤϺΤʤʤɤѤΤФԤϡܤ˸Ƥ뻳쥹ȻǤ뤳ȤϺŤƤʤʤɤѤ롥֥쥹Ȼפȡ֥ޡפƱλؤȤƱΰ̣ǤȹͤƤޤȡ˽Ҥ٤2Ĥʸΰ̣ۤʤͳǤʤʤ롥
Ρְ̣ؼоݡפȤΤˤϡְ̣ϻؼоݤˤäƿԤפȤ˵ꤲΤ Gottlob Frege (1848--1925) Ǥ롥 (16) ϢսѤ褦
ե졼ΥǥϤǤ롥졤ȤС֥쥹ȻפȤͭ̾ϤʪĤޤꥨ쥹ȻΤΤؤϤθΰ̣ԤƤϤʤθΰ̣ˤϡθ줬ؤΡϤˡ̣ (Bedeutung) Ȥ̾ͿȤ̤ˡյ (Sinn) ȤΤꡤϤΡְյפ̤ợְפؤȥե졼ϹͤΤǤ롥ξ硤ĤɽƱְ̣סʤĤޤؼоݡˤۤʤְյפ̤ƻؤȤȤⵯꤦ롥άͤǤϡΡְյפȤϲʤΤե졼ˤСϡְ̣פͿͼˤۤʤʤΡְ̣֡פͿͼפȤΤޤʼԤǡϤ߽꤬ʤ餫ˤʤФʤʤΤǤ뤬ϤƤ
ǤΡְյ (Sinn) ȤϡֻؼλפƤƤ褤ʸ˳ĥСʸΡְյפȤϡʸοͤͿͼפȤʤǰʤȤ˥ե졼ϡֻؼλפʸοͤͿͼפʤΤʤΤγ˿ˤĤ餫ˤƤʤ
ˤ衤ְ̣ؼоݡ⤬ñ˼ΤǤϤʤȤʬˤĤƤϡ#1769. Ogden and Richards semiotic triangle ([2014-03-01-1])#1770. semiotic triangle դľܤˤĤʤäƤȤθ ([2014-03-02-1]) ⻲ȡ
͵ظů١Ҧ˼2003ǯ
ΰ̣ˤĤƤϡͿФǺѤࡤȤΩ줬롥̣ʬʤСǧФ褤ȤΤʸΰ̣ˤĤƤϡʸƸΰ̣äƤСΰ̣Ĥʤ碌Τʸΰ̣ȤʤΤǤꡤϤʤΩ "definitions theory" ȸ졤ؤΰ褫ФС˹ƤͤȤäƤ褤ϴñˤʤȤΤ̣ΩǤ롥Saeed (6--7) ˤäơ"definition theory" 3ĤŦ褦
1ˡƤߤФ狼褦ˡΰ̣ϡ̤̾θȤ߹碌ʸͿƤꡤγƸΰ̣ʬäƤʤСȽʤȤˤʤ롥ơγƸΰ̣ޤ̤θʸˤäΤĤޤꡤǤʤʾ塤ʱ˼Ǥ餤ˤ졤ɤޤǤԤäƤ⽪꤬ʤˤϡν۴Ĥ (circularity) ʤͿ뤿Ѥ (metalanguage) ФСϲ褹뤫⤷ʤϤƵҴŪ˼ʤΤϤꤦΤ
2ˡͿ줿ΤʤΤǤȤݾڤˤ뤳ȤǤΤȤ꤬롥̣üԤƬΤʤ˳ǼƤΤǤ뤳ȤȤʤСüԤμ1ĤǤȤȤˤʤ롥ǤϡθŪμ (linguistic knowledge) ϡ¾μμɴʼŵŪμ (encyclopaedic knowledge) ȤƱΤʤΤ㤦ΤʤΤ㤨СͤߤϵȿƤꡤ̤οͤϷߤϤȿƤ硤2ͤѤַߡפȤΰ̣ƱΤʤΤ㤦Τ⤷㤦ȤƤ⡤ξԤϡֻϷߤݤ߹ޤ̴פȤʸΰ̣ܴۤ˶ͭǤȻפ뤬ϤʤʤΤְפ̱פˤĤƤϤɤͤˤäƤΰ̣ۤʤȤȤϡʬˤꤽǤ롥
3ˡȯäΰ̣ƥ (context) ˰¸Ȥʶʤ¤ʥƥȤˤĤƤϡε#2793. ƥȤμ (2) ([2016-12-19-1]) ڤӡ#2122. ƥȤμ ([2015-02-17-1]) ȡˡMarvellous weather you have here in Ireland. Ȥʸΰ̣ϡƤȯä줿Τȡȯä줿ΤǤϡ˰̣ۤʤ̣ޤǤȤСϤȤ륳ƥȤβǽ̣ǤʤФʤʤȤˤʤ뤬Τ褦ʤȤϲǽ
(1) "circularity", (2) "the question of whether linguistic knowledge is different from general knowledge", (3) "the problem of the contribution of context to meaning" 3Ĥ顤ְ̣פȤñʰ̣˴ؤϼʤ
̣ȤϲȤܼŪˤĤƤϡ#1782. ̣ΰ̣ ([2014-03-14-1])#1931. ǰỤ̄ ([2014-08-10-1])#1990. ͡ʼΰ̣ ([2014-10-08-1])#2199. Bloomfield ˤȤäƤΰ̣ΰ̣ ([2015-05-05-1]) ʤɤȡ
Saeed, John I. Semantics. 3rd ed. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
ˤͭ̾ʻߤˡReichenbach ΤΤ롥3ĤλȻѤ뤳Ȥǡ礿Ū褦ȤΤ3ĤλȻȤϡʲ̤Saeed (128) ѡˡ
S = the speech point, the time of utterance;
R = the reference point, the viewpoint or psychological vantage point adopted by the speaker;
E = event point, the described action's location in time.
S, R, E λּŪʰִطԤˤ "<"Ʊξˤ "="³ˤ ">" εɽ뤳Ȥˤ롥㤨Сʸ "I saw Helen", λʸ "I had seen Helen"̤ʸ "I will see Helen" Τ줾λϡʲΤ褦ɽ魯ȤǤ
"I saw Helen" >
(R = E < S) R, E S
"I had seen Helen" >
(E < R < S) E R S
"I will see Helen" >
(S < R = E) S R, E
| Simple past | (R = E < S) | "I saw Helen" |
| Present perfect | (E < S = R) | "I have seen Helen" |
| Past perfect | (E < R < S) | "I had seen Helen" |
| Simple present | (S = R = E) | "I see Helen" |
| Simple future | (S < R = E) | "I will see Helen" |
| Proximate future | (S = R < E) | "I'm going to see Helen" |
| Future perfect | (S < E < R) | "I will have seen Helen" |
106դīʹˡJICA ߥޡȻٱΤˡֽ ٤ȤֲüפƤޤ˻Ŧ줿ȤäѸɽǡü humidifier dehumidifier ʤΤǡde- ̵ͭŤʬȤμܸǤ⡤1뤤1⡼㤤ξǤ롥Ʊ;ϤʤǤϤʤˤ260ߤȤۤؤäƤ롥
Ƭ de- ϡŵŪưδΤղäơΰ̣ȿžꡤδްդäꤹ롥ȤȤϥƥ "off" ۤɤ졦ֻ de- ͳ褷եФƱѸäƤ⤢Сľܥƥ줫äƤ졤˱Ѹ¤줵줿Τ⾯ʤʤϳ˱ѸƬȤĹƤΤǤ롥de- θϡʬаʲ̤ˤʤ (Web3 ˡ
1. ٤ȿž (ex. decentralize, decode; decalescence)
2. (ex. dehorn, delouse; dethrone)
3. (ex. derate)
4. εäʸˡѸʤɤˡ (ex. decompound, deadjectival, deverbal)
5. (ex. debus, detrain)
6. Ҥηǡ (ex. dehydro-, deoxy-)
7. (ex. de-emanate)
ˤϵƤʤ#2638. Ƭ dis- ([2016-07-17-1]) ǿ줿褦ˡde- dis- ȺƱ졤̣ŪʱƶȤƤ롥ޤεǤ줿ΤȤŪʰ̣ޤǤˤϡde- Τ褦ŪƬĤȡĴ̤िᡤֶĴפˡ٥뤬դ路ʤ뤳Ȥ⤢롥㤨Сdecline Ǥϡcline Ȥȡֶʤ롤ޤפȲΤͥƥʴްդäƤΤǡde- ˡϡָפǤȤϡֶĴפȤʤʤdenude derelict de- ΤδްդͥƥʤΤǡde- ̤ȤơֶĴˡȲƤ
dehumidifier de- ֶĴˡȤƤФȤϤǤˤʤƬ¿ˤդƤ
ǧθ (cognitive_linguistics) ϡȤ1980ǯȯãƤ칽¤ȸưθˡǤ롥Cruse Ѹ콸 cognitive linguistics ιˤȡθˡطʤˤϡĤδŪ롥
(1) ϰ̣ãŪȯŸƤΤǤꡤ̣졤̤ˤ餺٤Ƥθ칽¤ϤεǽȴϢƤϤǤ롥
(2) ǽϤϡŪǧǽϤޤƤꡤʬĤȤϤǤʤäơòǾμΧṲ̄ʤΤ¸ߤʤΤȤ̣ˤȤäƤİյϡỤ̄ȰŪμΤˡ§Ūʶ̤ǧ뤳ȤǤʤȤȤǤ롥
(3) ̣賵ǰŪʤΤǤꡤˡǧŪγŪʸ˷֤դȤ˴Ϳ롥
ǧθؼԤϡ˴Ṭ̌ˡϰ̣Ŭڤ뤳ȤǤʤȼĥ롥ǧθؤϡǧοؤ̩ܤʴطäƤꡤȤ櫓ǰι¤˴ؤ븦˰͵Ƥ롥ǧθؤȯŸä˱ƶϤΤؼԤ2͵ȤСLakoff Langacker
ǧθؤˤĤƤϡ#1957. Ụ̄ǧΰ̣ˤǰ ([2014-09-05-1]) ⻲ȡ
Cruse, Alan. A Glossary of Semantics and Pragmatics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006.
ܸˤϡֱפμ٤ʬƻؤä˭٤ˤꡤѸˤϡַפɽ魯줬ηƤΤμ˱ƻȤʬʡ#1894. Ѹ͡ʡַסܸ͡ʡֱס ([2014-07-04-1])#1868. Ѹ͡ʡַס ([2014-06-08-1]) ȡˡΤ褦äϡԥᥦդβ (sapir-whorf_hypothesis) ˴ؤȤợ⤿롥ºݤˤϡΤ褦ʻ㤬ɤƱμĥʸȸ̩ܤʴطٻΤʤΤΤȽǤ뤳ȤΤȤϡ#364. The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax ([2010-04-26-1])#1337. ְñʸաס ([2012-12-24-1]) ʤɤεմƤ
Ǥ⡤μʹʹۤɤ⤷ȤΤ¤ǤꡤĤɤƤȻפäƤWardhaugh (234--35) ˡźθ줫λ㤬ƤΤǡʲ˰ѤƤ
If language A has a word for a particular concept, then that word makes it easier for speakers of language A to refer to that concept than speakers of language B who lack such a word and are forced to use a circumlocution. Moreover, it is actually easier for speakers of language A to perceive instances of the concept. If a language requires certain distinctions to be made because of its grammatical system, then the speakers of that language become conscious of the kinds of distinctions that must be referred to: for example, gender, time, number, and animacy. These kinds of distinctions may also have an effect on how speakers learn to deal with the world, i.e., they can have consequences for both cognitive and cultural development.
Data such as the following are sometimes cited in support of such claims. The Garo of Assam, India, have dozens of words for different types of baskets, rice, and ants. These are important items in their culture. However, they have no single-word equivalent to the English word ant. Ants are just too important to them to be referred to so casually. German has words like Gemütlichkeit, Weltanschauung, and Weihnachtsbaum; English has no exact equivalent of any one of them, Christmas tree being fairly close in the last case but still lacking the 'magical' German connotations. Both people and bulls have legs in English, but Spanish requires people to have piernas and bulls to have patas. Both people and horse eat in English but in German people essen and horses fressen. Bedouin Arabic has many words for different kinds of camels, just as the Trobriand Islanders of the Pacific have many words for different kinds of yams. Mithun . . . explains how in Yup'ik there is a rich vocabulary for kinds of seals. There are not only distinct words for different species of seals, such as maklak 'bearded seal,' but also terms for particular species at different times of life, such as amirkaq 'young bearded seal,' maklaaq 'bearded seal in its first year,' maklassuk 'bearded seal in its second year,' and qalriq 'large male bearded seal giving its mating call.' There are also terms for seals in different circumstances, such as ugtaq 'seal on an ice-floe' and puga 'surfaced seal.' The Navaho of the Southwest United States, the Shona of Zimbabwe, and the Hanunóo of the Philippines divide the color spectrum differently from each other in the distinctions they make, and English speakers divide it differently again. English has a general cover term animal for various kinds of creatures, but it lacks a term to cover both fruit and nuts; however, Chinese does have such a cover term. French conscience is both English conscience and consciousness. Both German and French have two pronouns corresponding to you, a singular and a plural. Japanese, on the other hand, has an extensive system of honorifics. The equivalent of English stone has a gender in French and German, and the various words must always be either singular or plural in French, German, and English. In Chinese, however, number is expressed only if it is somehow relevant. The Kwakiutl of British Columbia must also indicate whether the stone is visible or not to the speaker at the time of speaking, as well as its position relative to one or another of the speaker, the listener, or possible third party.
֤Ǹΰ̣ʬƤˡۤʤäƤ㤫Ϥޤꡤ;Τʤɤʸˡ (category) κۤ㡤ƷɸηϤΤ褦ʼҲŪʹܤ˴ؤޤǵƤ롥ԥᥦդβƹͤǤΡäμˤʤ
Wardhaugh, Ronald. An Introduction to Sociolinguistics. 6th ed. Malden: Blackwell, 2010.
98դǷǼĤɸ˴ؤ䤬줿̤ˤϡ괧Τʤ few ϲĻ̾ˤĤơ֤ۤȤɤʤפŪʴްդäѤ졤괧դ a few ϡ־פȹŪʰ̣ͭȤ롥Ȥ櫓ǤϤʤܸˤʤ⡤ѱѼŵˤͤˤޤ褦˻פ롥㤨 OALD8 ˤСfew "used with plural nouns and a plural verb to mean 'not many'" Ȥꡤ a few "used with plural nouns and a plural verb to mean 'a small number', 'some'" Ȥ롥Ĥޤꡤfew many ꡦеȤƤΰ֤Ťa few some ƱȤƤΰ֤ŤǤ롥 few Ū˷a few ϹŪ˷ȤȯΤȹͤ롥
ˤ̤äƤߤ褦few ȤϡűѸ fēawa, fēawe, fēa ʤɤηǡ§ȤʣηƻȤơʤޤ̾Ūˤ̤ѤƤΰ̣Ϥޤ many ¿; OE maniġˤеȤƤΡ־ʤפǤꡤѸ괧ʤ few ƱǤ롥
a few ɽˤĤƤϡűѸǤ괧̤ȯãäˡ⤽ΩƤʤäĤޤꡤΤ褦 few a few ΩϤޤ¸ߤƤʤäΤǤ롥Ѹꡤ괧줬ȯãƤȡ褦䤯 "a small number of" ۤɤΰ̣ a few Ƥ롥OED Ǥν1297ǯ "1297 R. Gloucester's Chron. (1724) 18 Þe kyng with a fewe men hym~self flew at þe laste." Ƥ롥
ϡʤΤ褦ʰ̣ζ̤ȤȤǤ롥 few ˤĤƤϡűѸ many еȤơĤޤ "not many" ȤƤΰ֤ŤʹߡߤޤϢʤȼѤ줿ȹͤФ褤a few ˤĤƤϡ괧Ūʡ֡ʹŪ¸ߡפδްդ few դä줿ȹͤΤǤϤʤ#86. one ȯ ([2009-07-22-1]) Ǥߤ褦ˡ괧 a(n) εϿ ān (one) Ǥ롥ơθ꼭 ne ղääΤnān (< ne + ān) Ǥꡤ줬 none ˤ no ؤȯã롥Ĥޤꡤ괧 a(n) ϡȤƤ1ѶŪ˼Ȥϡ no ֤Ȥǡ¸ߤδްդ
ʾޤȤȡfew ΤΤ many Ȥư֤Ť졤ȤŪʴްդäƤ뤬a ղä줿 a few 괧ΤĹꡦ¸ߤδްդӤӤ뤳ȤˤʤäȤȤǤϤʤƱȤϡԲĻ̤̾ɽ魯 little a little ˤĤƤ롥Ԥ much ȤơԤϤ a դȤǹŪʴްդĤȤˤʤäȹͤ롥
ͤޤǤ OED few, adj. 1Ƥ
1. Not many; amounting to a small number. Often preceded by but, full, so, too, very, well.
Without prefixed word, few usually implies antithesis with 'many', while in a few, some few the antithesis is with 'none at all'. Cf. 'few, or perhaps none', 'a few, or perhaps many'.
Ρ#2683. Huang θܼ ([2016-08-31-1]) ˰³ϡSaeed ΰ̣ΥƥȤܼ롥ɾΤ̣γǡỤ̄ιʬ夷ƤꡤŪʴäؤ֤ΤŬƤ롥̻Ūʰ̣ϤۤȤɰäƤʤ
Part I Preliminaries
1 Semantics in Linguistics
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Semantics and Semiotics
1.3 Three Challenges in Doing Semantics
1.4 Meeting the Challenges
1.5 Semantics in a Model of Grammar
1.6 Some Important Assumptions
1.7 Summary
2 Meaning, Thought and Reality
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Reference
2.3 Reference as a Theory of Meaning
2.4 Mental Representations
2.5 Words, Concepts and Thinking
2.6 Summary
Part II Semantic Description
3 Word Meaning
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Words and Grammatical Categories
3.3 Words and Lexical Items
3.4 Problems with Pinning Down Word Meaning
3.5 Lexical Relations
3.6 Derivational Relations
3.7 Lexical Universals
3.8 Summary
4 Sentence Relations and Truth
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Logic and Truth
4.3 Necessary Truth, A Priori Truth and Analyticity
4.4 Entailment
4.5 Presupposition
4.6 Summary
5 Sentence Semantics 1: Situations
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Classifying Situations
5.3 Modality and Evidentiality
5.4 Summary
6 Sentence Semantics 2: Participants
6.1 Introduction: Classifying Participants
6.2 Thematic Roles
6.3 Grammatical Relations and Thematic Roles
6.4 Verbs and Thematic Role Grids
6.5 Problems with Thematic Roles
6.6 The Motivation for Identifying Thematic Roles
6.7 Voice
6.8 Classifiers and Noun Classes
6.9 Summary
7 Context and Inference
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Deixis
7.3 Reference and Context
7.4 Knowledge as Context
7.5 Information Structure
7.6 Inference
7.7 Conversational Implicature
7.8 Summary
8 Functions of Language: Speech as Action
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Austin's Speech Act Theory
8.3 Categorizing Speech Acts
8.4 Indirect Speech Acts
8.5 Sentence Types
8.6 Summary
Part III Theoretical Approaches
9 Meaning Components
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Lexical Relations in CA
9.3 Katz's Semantic Theory
9.4 Grammatical Rules and Semantic Components
9.5 Components and Conflation Patterns
9.6 Jackendoff's Conceptual Structure
9.7 Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon
9.8 Problems with Components of Meaning
9.9 Summary
10 Formal Semantics
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Model-Theoretical Semantics
10.3 Translating English into a Logical Metalanguage
10.4 The Semantics of the Logical Metalanguage
10.5 Checking the Truth-Value of Sentences
10.6 Word Meaning: Meaning Postulates
10.7 Natural Language Quantifiers and Higher Order Logic
10.8 Intensionality
10.9 Dynamic Approaches to Discourse
10.10 Summary
11 Cognitive Semantics
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Metaphor
11.3 Metonymy
11.4 Image Schemas
11.5 Polysemy
11.6 Mental Spaces
11.7 Langacker's Cognitive Grammar
11.8 Summary
Saeed, John I. Semantics. 3rd ed. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
ץȥ (prototype) ˴Ṭ̌Ǥϡΰ̣ʣΰ̣ħ̵ͭ«ͤȤŪʰ̣ȯۤæựħ٤κǧᡤ̣Ȥϰ̣ŵͿ褦Ȼߤ롥ץȥϡ̸ϤᴶŪʪŪʰ̣ĸäŬѤ졤̤ƤǤϿŪҲŪǤĸäؤŬѤǤΤռ顤Coleman and Kay ϡѸ lie ʱˤ˥ץȥװ̣ʬϤä
Coleman and Kay (43) ĴμȵŸñ㤫Ǥ롥ʸηˤ褯ޤȤƤΤǡѤ롥
We have argued that many words, and the word lie in particular, have as their meanings not a list of necessary and sufficient conditions that a thing or event must satisfy to count as a member of the category denoted by the word, but rather a psychological object or process which we have called a PROTOTYPE. In some cases, a prototype can be represented by a list of conditions; but these are not necessary conditions, and the evaluative logic according to which these conditions are found to be satisfied, or not, is in general one of degree rather than of simple truth and falsity. . . .
In particular, we formulated (on the basis of the sort of introspection usual in semantic and syntactic research) a prototype for the word lie, consisting of three elements: falsity, intent to speak falsely, and intent to deceive. Stories were then constructed which described speech acts embodying each of the eight possible combinations of these three elements; these were presented to subjects, to be judged on the extent to which the relevant character in the story could be said to have lied. The pattern of responses confirmed the theory. The stories containing and lacking all three elements received by far the highest and lowest scores respectively. Further, in comparing each pair of stories in which the first contained all the prototype elements of the second plus at least one more, the majority of informants always gave the higher lie-score to the first. Of the nineteen comparisons of this type, each of which turned out as predicted, eighteen produced proportions significant at the .01 level. We then compared each pair of stories which differed in the presence of exactly two elements, to see if these comparisons yielded a consistent pattern with respect to the relative importance of the prototype elements. A consistent pattern was found: falsity of belief is the most important element of the prototype of lie, intended deception is the next most important element, and factual falsity is the least important.
䤫˷Фlie lie Ǥ뤿κǤפʥѥʥץȥǡˤϡüԤȯƤȿƤפȤǤꡤˡüԤȤƤפȤǤꡤǸˡȯƤºݤ˵ǤפȤ³νû졤⤤Τۤɱ餷Ǥꡤ㤤ۤɱäݤʤȤȤˤʤ롥ɤ餬Ǥꡤɤ餬ǤʤΤȽǤϸĿͤˤäƤˤäƤɤưץȥŪʱǤ뤫ǧȡΰæٹ礤˴ؤƤϡüԤδ֤Ǥ褽ФפȤȤͤߤ줿
ץȥװ̣Υåεͤޤäʬ䤹Ǥ롥
Coleman, L. and P. Kay. "Prototype Semantics: The English Word lie." Language 22 (1980): 26--44.
ѷʸˡʤɤǤϡƻ줬ˡ (attributive use) ȤѤƤ the big table Ȥϡˡ (predicative use) ȤѤƤ the table that is big Ȥ礫ŪΤȹͤƤԤδطϢ be Ĥäƻ̾˰ưȤ§Τ¿μ㤬Τ褦褦ˤפ뤬Ūˤɬ⤦ޤʤBolinger ͳĤƤ롥
1ܤˡˡȤƤѤʤƻ줬¿롥㤨Сthe main reason ȤϸƤ *The reason is main. Ȥϸʤfond, runaway, total ۤƱηƻϤ (see #643. ΩȤȯ -ed IJʬƻ ([2011-01-30-1])#712. ΩȤȯ -ed IJʬƻ (2) ([2011-04-09-1])#1916. ˡȽˡǰۤʤ֤ķƻ ([2014-07-26-1])) ȿФˡThe man is asleep. Ф *the asleep man Ȥϸʤ褦ˡˡȤƤѤʤƻ⤢롥طꤹʤСʤ *The reason is main. ʸǤʤ顤the main reason ŬʤǤΤʤ⤦1ĤˤĤƤϡʤ The man is asleep. *the asleep man ؤޤʤΤʤФʤʤ
2ܤˡѷʸˡĹξäǤˤϤطꤹ뤳ȤǡषξФƤޤäƤȤȤThe jewels are stolen. the stolen jewels 褦The jewels are stolen. ϡ֤ФޤפȤ٤ɤߤȡ֤ФʤǤפȤɤߤꡤξŪǤ롥ꤵ the stolen jewels ɤߤʤξŪǤϤʤȤǡʳˤȹͤ the jewels stolen ɤߤϤꤨ٤ɤߤȤʤꡤξŪǤϤʤȡνȯãɤߤϡ줾֡ס?ס֡פȤʤꡤν֤ȤʤȡŪǤ롥
Bolinger Ͼ嵭2İʳˤ⡤ȤʤͳۤˤƤ뤬ε̤ƼĥƤΤϡˡ "reference modification" Ǥꡤˡ "referent modification" ǤȤȤThe lawyer is criminal. ֤۸ΤȺԤפˤơƻ criminal ϼλؼоݤǤ֤۸ΡפƤ롥the criminal lawyer ַ۸Ρפˤơcriminal Ϥ۸ΤɤΤ褦۸ΤʤΤȤ̤Ƥ롥СWhat kind of lawyer? ȤƤ criminal (lawyer) ȤȤ
ɸ2ĤζСthe big table the table that is big ϡߤȤطˤȤϡ̣Ū˰ۤʤɽȤȤ館٤Ǥ롥ԤϤΥơ֥μɽȤƤΤФơԤϤΥơ֥̤Ƥ롥
ºݤˤϤۤñʵǤϤʤΤˡȽˡκͤǽפʥݥȤǤ롥
Bolinger, Dwight. "Adjectives in English: Attribution and Predication." Lingua 19 (1967): 1--34.
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