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2016-09-01 Thu

#2684. ֱפΥץȥװ̣ [prototype][semantics]

ץȥ (prototype) ˴Ṭ̌Ǥϡΰ̣ʣΰ̣ħ̵ͭ«ͤȤŪʰ̣ȯۤæựħ٤κǧᡤ̣Ȥϰ̣ŵͿ褦Ȼߤ롥ץȥϡ̸ϤᴶŪʪŪʰ̣ĸäŬѤ졤̤򤢤ƤǤϿŪҲŪǤĸäؤŬѤǤΤռ顤Coleman and Kay ϡѸ lie ʱˤ˥ץȥװ̣ʬϤä
Coleman and Kay (43) ĴμȵŸñ㤫Ǥ롥ʸηˤ褯ޤȤƤΤǡѤ롥

We have argued that many words, and the word lie in particular, have as their meanings not a list of necessary and sufficient conditions that a thing or event must satisfy to count as a member of the category denoted by the word, but rather a psychological object or process which we have called a PROTOTYPE. In some cases, a prototype can be represented by a list of conditions; but these are not necessary conditions, and the evaluative logic according to which these conditions are found to be satisfied, or not, is in general one of degree rather than of simple truth and falsity. . . .
   In particular, we formulated (on the basis of the sort of introspection usual in semantic and syntactic research) a prototype for the word lie, consisting of three elements: falsity, intent to speak falsely, and intent to deceive. Stories were then constructed which described speech acts embodying each of the eight possible combinations of these three elements; these were presented to subjects, to be judged on the extent to which the relevant character in the story could be said to have lied. The pattern of responses confirmed the theory. The stories containing and lacking all three elements received by far the highest and lowest scores respectively. Further, in comparing each pair of stories in which the first contained all the prototype elements of the second plus at least one more, the majority of informants always gave the higher lie-score to the first. Of the nineteen comparisons of this type, each of which turned out as predicted, eighteen produced proportions significant at the .01 level. We then compared each pair of stories which differed in the presence of exactly two elements, to see if these comparisons yielded a consistent pattern with respect to the relative importance of the prototype elements. A consistent pattern was found: falsity of belief is the most important element of the prototype of lie, intended deception is the next most important element, and factual falsity is the least important.


䤫˷Фlie lie Ǥ뤿κǤפʥѥ᡼ʥץȥǡˤϡüԤȯƤ򵶤ȿƤפȤǤꡤˡüԤ򵽤ȤƤפȤǤꡤǸˡȯƤºݤ˵ǤפȤ³νû졤⤤Τۤɱ餷Ǥꡤ㤤ۤɱäݤʤȤȤˤʤ롥ɤ餬Ǥꡤɤ餬ǤʤΤȽǤϸĿͤˤäƤˤäƤɤưץȥŪʱǤ뤫ǧȡΰæٹ礤˴ؤƤϡüԤδ֤Ǥ褽ФפȤȤͤߤ줿
ץȥװ̣Υå󥹤εͤޤäʬ䤹Ǥ롥

Coleman, L. and P. Kay. "Prototype Semantics: The English Word lie." Language 22 (1980): 26--44.

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